As reported by The Telegraph, it was Giriraj Singh, the BJP’s MP from Begusarai, who told a poll rally in Arwal district on Saturday that “citizens who accept government welfare have a moral obligation to vote for the ruling party.” Twisting perversely the very fundamentals of republican democratic governance, he clearly appeared to use the term for Muslims who are beneficiaries of the schemes declared by the current regime at the Centre but do not support the BJP.

In a video of the speech, Singh recounted a reported conversation with a cleric. “So I told him that one who doesn’t acknowledge help is called a namak haram,” the minister is heard saying.

“I told him, ‘Maulvi Saheb, I don’t want the votes of the namak haram’,” he said.

Despite facing criticism on Sunday (October 19), Singh stood by his remarks, telling reporters he meant only to highlight that government welfare schemes were non-discriminatory.

The comments drew strong and immediate criticism.

Shiv Sena (UBT) leader Sanjay Raut demanded the minister’s removal, asking, “If someone doesn’t vote for you, does that make them namak haram?” The Bihar Congress called Singh “mentally unstable.”

The BJP’s main ally in Bihar, the Janata Dal (United), was more cautious in its response. Spokesperson Rajeev Ranjan said voters “make decisions beyond such comments,” while another party leader defended Singh.

The minister’s provocative statement was the most high-profile of several communally charged incidents involving BJP leaders over the weekend. In Pune, on Sunday, Rajya Sabha MP Medha Kulkarni led a protest organised by the Patit Pavan Sanghatna and other Hindu outfits at the historic Shaniwarwada fort, reported The Indian Express.

After a video showed Muslim women offering prayers at the site, Kulkarni and activists “purified” the spot with cow urine and performed a Hindu ritual. “We will not allow ‘namaz’ in Shaniwarwada, Hindu community has now become awakened,” she tweeted before the protest. She later defended the action, stating, “It is a symbol of Hindavi Swaraj… We cannot allow anyone to offer namaz here. It is not a mosque.”

The move was slammed by political opponents as an attempt to polarise voters ahead of local civic polls. Sachin Sawant of the Maharashtra Congress noted the fort’s diverse history, adding, “The BJP MP is also protesting against the ‘dargah’ outside Shaniwarwada. When the Peshwas had no problem, what is her problem?”

Separately, a video showed BJP leader Pragya Thakur urging parents to use violence to control their daughters, reported The Financial Express. She warned that girls welcomed as “Lakshmi or Saraswati” grow up to become “mianin” (a derogatory term for a Muslim man’s wife).

“Strengthen your mind, and make it so strong that if our daughter does not obey us, if she goes to a non-believer’s house, leave no stone unturned in considering breaking her legs,” Thakur said.

She added that parents should not “step back” from beating their children for their own good! These incidents come as Bihar prepares for elections, with the first phase of polling on November 6, the second on November 11, and counting on November 14.

Related:

Unifying cultural celebration weaponised: Ganesh processions turned into stages for hate speech & moral policing

India’s Hate Speech Crisis: 1,165 cases recorded in 2024, up 74.4% from 2023

CJP files three complaints against pro-right-wing leader and BJP Minister Nitesh Rane over alleged hate speech in Maharashtra

The post Bihar Elections Build-up: ‘Won’t allow namaz’, ‘namak haram’, BJP MPs’ communal hate-filled remarks draw fire appeared first on SabrangIndia.

While the speech originated as a local executive response to the Bareilly protest, its propagation and amplification were largely mediated through national and regional media, especially Hindi television channels like Times Now Navbharat, Zee News Hindi, and News18 Hindi, which paired the CM’s words with dramatic visuals of protests, police action, and property demolitions. Short-form clips circulated widely on social media, creating a feedback loop that magnified both the rhetoric and the state response.

This media-driven amplification transformed a local law-and-order issue into a nationally visible spectacle of punitive governance, normalising coercive enforcement and targeting of a religious community. The timing and scale of dissemination may also have significant political resonance, particularly with the upcoming Bihar elections, as the Hindi-language media networks ensured that the CM’s rhetoric reached a broad, politically significant audience.

Within days the state response in Bareilly intensified: large-scale arrests, property-sealing and demolition actions, 48-hour internet suspensions, criminal FIRs (running into hundreds or thousands in some counts), and administrative notices against aides of the cleric who called the Bareilly protest. That sequence of ‘protest → CM rhetoric → heavy-handed enforcement’ raises three connected questions the rest of this piece examines in depth:

• Did the CM’s speech cross legal lines such as incitement or unlawful discrimination?
• Did the state response follow due process and the Supreme Court’s own safeguards (including the duty to investigate hate speech suo moto)?
• What are the measurable social, legal and media consequences of that political rhetoric?

What happened — a timeline

The trigger (September 4–9, 2025): The flashpoint began on September 4 when an illuminated board/banners reading “I Love Muhammad” appeared during an Eid-e-Milad-un-Nabi procession in parts of Kanpur (Syed Nagar/Rawatpur). Local objections, framed by some Hindu groups as a “deviation from tradition”, led the police to register an FIR on September 9 against 24 persons (9 named, 15 unknown) for allegedly disturbing communal harmony. The complaint, according to the report of India Today, centred on shifting tents/banners into a location on a public road near a gate used by Ram Navami processions. That apparently small ritual alteration escalated as news and social media spread the story to other districts.

Escalation and the Bareilly protest (September 26–27, 2025): On September 26, a public gathering in Bareilly — called in sympathy with the “I Love Muhammad” campaign and associated with cleric Tauqeer Raza Khan — clashed with police after Friday prayers; police used lathi-charge and reported stone-pelting and injuries to officers. According to a report of Times of India, authorities say the protest had been called without permission; police also said the gathering showed signs of pre-planning through social media groups. Multiple FIRs and detentions followed. Local reporting states dozens detained with FIRs filed against hundreds — and some outlets report FIR counts running into the thousands across multiple stations. Shortly after the clashes, the cleric and several aides were arrested.

The Chief Minister’s response (September 28, 2025): Speaking at a public ‘Viksit UP’ event, CM Yogi Adityanath warned that those who “vandalise in the name of faith… attack the police… we won’t let you go… chedhoge to chodenge nahi aur chodenge nahi toh fir chootoge bhi nahi.” He used phrases such as “denting and painting must be done” and framed the response as necessary to protect festivals and public safety. These comments were widely reported and repeated across national news outlets the same day and the day after.

The contentious speeches delivered by CM Adityanath are:

अगर बेटी की सुरक्षा पर हाथ डालने का प्रयास किया,
व्यापारी के प्रतिष्ठान में आग लगाने का प्रयास किया,
उत्सव में अराजकता पैदा करने प्रयास किया तो,

यह रास्ता सीधे नर्क में जाने का होगा… pic.twitter.com/gUV9vkYnRX

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

‘गजवा-ए-हिंद’ हिन्दुस्तान की धरती पर नहीं होगा,

अगर किसी को जहन्नुम में जाना हो तो ‘गजवा-ए-हिंद’ के नाम पर अराजकता पैदा करने का कुत्सित प्रयास करे…

देर-सबेर ‘छांगुर’ जैसे हाल तो उनके भी होने ही हैं… pic.twitter.com/8V6MXvZbgm

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

छोटे-छोटे बच्चों को जिनके हाथों में कलम होनी चाहिए, जिनके हाथों में नोटबुक होनी चाहिए, विज्ञान और गणित की पुस्तकें होनी चाहिए, उनके हाथों में I Love Muhammad का पोस्टर…

…इनको यह भी नहीं मालूम कि उनकी जिंदगी तो बर्बाद है ही लेकिन इन बच्चों की भी जिंदगी ये लोग बर्बाद करने पर… pic.twitter.com/rhCBIxoh71

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

याद रखना!

जब भी दुस्साहस करोगे, ऐसे ही पिटोगे जैसे बरेली के अंदर पीटे गए हो… pic.twitter.com/AZWOU4m495

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

लव-जिहाद, धर्मांतरण और गो-तस्करी जैसी राष्ट्र विरोधी गतिविधियों के प्रति हमें सतर्क रहना होगा,

अगर कहीं कोई भूल से भी इस प्रकार की गतिविधियों में लिप्त है, उसकी सूचना ससमय पुलिस और प्रशासन को उपलब्ध करवाइए,

उपचार की व्यवस्था हम स्वयं कर लेंगे… pic.twitter.com/wLTyTcChgD

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

2025): After the violence and speeches, the district administration moved decisively: large-scale arrests and FIRs were filed, properties linked to accused persons were sealed or demolished by the local authority demolished including a banquet hall and other structures allegedly used by those arrested, administrative notices, for example, power-theft notices, were issued against associates of the cleric, and internet and SMS services in Bareilly district were suspended for 48 hours citing maintenance of public order, as per The Economic Times. Several human-rights and legal activists have already filed petitions and complaints alleging lack of prior notice for demolition and possible collective punishment. Political parties and civil-society delegations have begun to visit the city; opposition leaders are demanding investigations.

The problem with the speech itself

1. Targeting + personal reference. The CM specifically attacked a cleric’s actions, namely Tauqeer Raza Khan, and conduct in public, saying that the “Maulana forgot who is in power” and promising retribution that would be remembered by “future generations.” Targeting an identifiable leader and associating him and his followers with violence elevates the rhetoric beyond abstract law-and-order language.
2. Punitive metaphors taken literally. The repeated use of “denting and painting” and explicit references to the “bulldozer” rhetorical universe, and actual demolitions in other recent UP campaigns, is not merely figurative; in the current UP context it has an institutional history as a public performance of punishment — a state spectacle with material consequences. The phrase therefore reads as both a policy cue and a public warning.
3. Promise of force / deterrence directed at a community act. Even if the immediate trigger was violence, the CM’s formula — “If you trouble us, we will not spare you” — was framed to deter a specific form of expressive action, such as displaying I Love Muhammad posters, that political actors and some civil-society figures had defended as speech. The combination of delegitimisation, portraying the slogan as manipulation of children or anarchy, plus promise of collective discipline is consequential.

Those three features — naming, punitive metaphor, and generalised deterrence — are the elements that make legal and normative analysis urgent.

Media: Who amplified, and how amplification changed the story

The media ecosystem played a decisive role in transforming Yogi Adityanath’s remarks from a local political reaction into a nationally mediated performance of power. Within hours of his speech, both television and print outlets had front-paged his most aggressive lines — “chedhoge to chodenge nahi” and “denting and painting must be done” — turning threats of retribution into viral catchphrases.

National and regional broadcasters, including Times Now Navbharat, Zee News Hindi, and News18 Hindi, ran segments that paired these quotes with dramatic visuals of protests, lathicharges, and property demolitions. The YouTube thumbnails and on-screen tickers themselves became an extension of the state’s messaging — text overlays like “Maulana bhool gaya kaun sarkar mein hai” or “Bareilly mein danga, sarkar ki kathor karwai” visually encoded the CM’s warning as spectacle and slogan.

This media choreography had a dual effect. First, it nationalised the CM’s rhetoric, ensuring that what began as a local communal disturbance was recast as a state-wide law-and-order triumph. Second, the widespread replaying of his lines — often stripped of context and accompanied by enforcement footage — normalised the language of punishment and deterrence. Even platforms that did not editorially endorse the speech contributed to its amplification through repetition and aestheticisation.

Some outlets, such as The Wire and The Indian Express, offered a countervailing frame: detailed timelines, verification of police claims about “online toolkits,” and critical analysis of the administration’s disproportionate use of force. But these were exceptions within an overwhelming current of performative law-and-order coverage. The split in framing — between law-and-order narratives and civil-liberties scrutiny — reveals how editorial positioning directly shapes the moral valence of communal incidents.

Short-form videos from these channels, extracted as YouTube shorts and Twitter/X reels, circulated widely on social media. These clips — the CM’s warning juxtaposed with scenes of violence and police deployment — fed a feedback loop: the more viral the visual, the stronger the administrative justification for subsequent measures like internet suspension and mass arrests. In effect, the media ecology and the state’s coercive apparatus became mutually reinforcing.

This convergence also raises a constitutional question about mediated governance. When executive speech, journalistic amplification, and administrative coercion operate in sync, the boundary between state messaging and independent reportage collapses. The outcome is not merely the spread of information, but the construction of a “performance of control”, where the appearance of decisive governance substitutes for adherence to due process.

Attached is a collection of YouTube thumbnails from Times Now Navbharat, Zee News Hindi, and News18 Hindi demonstrates this vividly — a montage of headlines that blur the line between news coverage and narrative reinforcement, framing punitive action as political virtue.

Legal frame: what the law says and where courts have drawn the line

Three interlocking legal rules matter here:

• The statutory toolbox for “hate” / public-order speech: India’s criminal law criminalises speech that promotes enmity or hatred between groups (e.g., IPC Section 153A/Section 198 BNS), imputations prejudicial to national integration (IPC Section 153B/Section 197 BNS), deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings (IPC Section 295A/Section 298 BNS), and statements likely to create terror or public alarm (IPC Section 505/Section 356 BNS). These are the provisions courts and police typically invoke in communal-speech cases. The Supreme Court has emphasised that lawful restrictions must be precisely applied and proportionate
• The Supreme Court’s duty-to-act on hate speech: Shaheen Abdulla and follow-up orders: In Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India (2022), the Supreme Court highlighted the “growing climate of hate” and directed police chiefs to take suo motu action in hate-speech incidents — specifically instructing registration and investigation under IPC sections such as 153A, 295A and 505 without waiting for a private complaint. These directions were later extended to all States/UTs; the court took the view that proactive policing is essential to preserve the secular fabric envisaged by the Preamble. That jurisprudence puts an onus on state police: if a public utterance plausibly constitutes hate speech, police must investigate it on their own motion.
• The constitutional limit: incitement and proximity to violence: Indian courts have insisted on a context-sensitive test. The classic guide is Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962), where the Supreme Court upheld sedition law only for words that have the “tendency or intention of creating public disorder” or inciting violence; mere abusive or critical expression cannot be criminalised. Modern caselaw returns to the same principle: to punish speech the state must show an intention or proximate tendency to produce imminent lawless action — not merely dislikeable or provocative words. This high threshold matters because it keeps robust political speech protected while allowing punishment where speech is truly dangerous.

Apply the law to the facts: Did the UP CM cross the line?

This is the crucial, uncomfortable question. Courts usually apply a two-part analysis to political speech by powerful actors:

• Does the speech itself contain elements of the statutory offences?

The Chief Minister’s speech went beyond mere governance rhetoric. It singled out a specific cleric and his supporters, implicitly ascribing collective culpability to a religious community. The language of punishment and humiliation—phrases such as “denting and painting” or “beaten as in Bareilly”—was not random metaphor; it invoked a visual and historical grammar of state-sanctioned coercion. These expressions are deeply loaded in Uttar Pradesh’s recent political lexicon, symbolising demolition drives, police beatings, and targeted action that disproportionately affect Muslim localities.

Further, the assertion that “future generations” would be taught a lesson carries the unmistakable tone of collective retribution, extending the threat from present offenders to an entire community across time. Such language constructs Muslims not as citizens subject to law, but as an enduring adversarial category — a perpetual “other” against whom exemplary force is justified.

Under Sections 153A (now Section 196 of BNS) and 295A (now Section 298 of BNS)  of the Indian Penal Code, the test for criminality hinges not merely on overt incitement but also on whether the speech promotes enmity, targets a community, or is likely to disturb public tranquillity. Read against the backdrop of recent police actions in UP—demolition of Muslim-owned properties, custodial violence, and selective FIRs—the Chief Minister’s words may reasonably be understood as an endorsement and encouragement of discriminatory state practices.

Moreover, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in cases such as Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2020) clarifies that when influential figures make statements capable of mobilising real-world hostility, the likelihood of incitement must be assessed contextually, not in isolation. From that perspective, Yogi Adityanath’s remarks arguably cross the boundary from administrative assertion into speech that legitimises and incites discrimination.

In sum, while the speech may not contain an explicit call to violence, it performs a dog-whistle function: normalising state-backed hostility and signalling permissibility for coercive action against a targeted religious group. In legal terms, that makes it a fit case for prima facie examination under Sections 153A, 295A, and 505(2) IPC, especially given the speaker’s constitutional position and the demonstrable pattern of violence that followed.

• What changed after the speech? (state action and proportionality)

The true constitutional stakes emerge not merely from what was said, but from what followed. When a Chief Minister’s public rhetoric is swiftly mirrored by administrative action—bulldozers rolling in, FIRs multiplying overnight, and digital blackouts silencing affected districts—the question is no longer one of abstract speech, but of state power animated by speech.

In the immediate aftermath of Yogi Adityanath’s address, municipal and police authorities in multiple UP districts launched coordinated operations: mass detentions of Muslim youth, property demolitions framed as “encroachments,” and sweeping suspension of internet services. These were not isolated law-and-order responses but a choreographed display of retribution, executed without adequate notice, hearing, or judicial oversight.

Courts have repeatedly emphasised that executive spectacle cannot substitute due process. In its observations concerning “bulldozer justice,” the Supreme Court has held that demolitions carried out as instantaneous punishment for alleged offences are unconstitutional unless preceded by notice, opportunity to respond, and adherence to municipal laws (Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2022). The law draws a bright line: urban planning cannot be weaponised as penal theatre. Yet, in Uttar Pradesh, the chain of events—fiery speech followed by visible coercive measures—suggests a punitive motive masquerading as law enforcement.

Equally significant is the Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India (2022) principle, which imposes a positive duty on the police: they must initiate suo-moto FIRs against hate speech, irrespective of the speaker’s political stature. The judgment underscored that inaction is complicity, and selective enforcement deepens discrimination. In this case, law enforcement pursued alleged protestors with urgency but failed to act on the Chief Minister’s inflammatory remarks, despite clear statutory grounds under Sections 153A, 295A, and 505(2) IPC.

The constitutional doctrine of proportionality also comes into play. Administrative actions must bear a rational nexus to legitimate aims, employ the least restrictive means, and avoid discriminatory impact. Yet the scale and selectivity of post-speech measures—demolitions confined largely to Muslim-majority neighbourhoods, police raids on specific youth groups, and the near-complete absence of accountability for vigilante actors—suggest a pattern of collective punishment rather than targeted, proportionate law enforcement.

As many have noted, when executive speech operates as a signal and the bureaucratic apparatus responds with coercive overreach, the boundary between political rhetoric and state sanction collapses. The state ceases to act as a neutral arbiter and instead becomes a performer in its own moral spectacle, projecting deterrence through fear.

In sum, while Yogi Adityanath’s speech might be defensible as political expression if viewed in isolation, the temporal and causal sequence of events—immediate arrests, sweeping FIRs, and punitive demolitions—creates a compelling case that state power was deployed not for justice but for signalling. Such a pattern raises grave constitutional concerns under Articles 14, 19, and 21, even if establishing direct criminal culpability for the speech remains legally complex.

The ground reality: Evidence of disproportionate enforcement and social fallout

The aftermath of the Bareilly clashes reveals a pattern that extends far beyond a conventional law-and-order response. It reflects a multi-tiered exercise of coercive state power, activated in the wake of the Chief Minister’s speech and sustained through both formal and informal mechanisms of punishment.

• Mass arrests and sweeping FIRs: In the immediate aftermath, police operations intensified across Bareilly and adjoining districts. Reports cited dozens of detentions within hours, and FIRs naming hundreds—sometimes even thousands—of individuals. According to The Times of India, nearly 2,000 people were named across multiple police stations, though the exact number varied by outlet. The breadth of these FIRs—often containing generalised allegations—raises serious questions about collective culpability and the use of preventive detention as a form of intimidation rather than targeted investigation.
• Property sealing and demolitions: Municipal and development authorities undertook swift demolition and sealing drives against properties allegedly linked to the accused—among them a banquet hall and other commercial structures. Families reported that no prior notice or opportunity to be heard was provided, prompting complaints to the Uttar Pradesh Human Rights Commission. As The Times of India noted, these measures echo the state’s recent pattern of bulldozer-led punitive actions, widely criticised by rights groups as performative retribution designed to convey dominance rather than ensure compliance with planning laws. The recurrence of such demolitions immediately after communal incidents suggests a deliberate conflation of criminal liability with property ownership and community identity.
• Administrative and regulatory reprisals: Alongside police action, the administration issued a series of “ancillary punishments”—including power-theft notices, income recovery claims, and regulatory sanctions against persons associated with the cleric at the centre of the protests. These quasi-civil penalties compounded the economic and psychological burden on affected families. The simultaneity of these measures—each lawful in isolation but collectively disproportionate—points to a pattern of cumulative punishment through bureaucratic instruments.
• Communications blackouts: Authorities imposed a 48-hour suspension of mobile internet, broadband, and SMS services across Bareilly district, citing the need to curb rumours and prevent mobilisation. The Economic Times reported that this was one of several recent instances where internet shutdowns have become the default administrative reflex during communal tensions. Such measures, while framed as precautionary, raise acute proportionality and necessity concerns under the Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of Indiav (2020) standard, which requires narrowly tailored, time-bound restrictions and periodic review.
• Societal reverberations and exclusionary practices: The social aftershocks were equally significant. Civil-society observers and media, such as LiveMint documented a perceptible tightening of social boundaries in the weeks following the incident. Muslims reportedly faced pressure to abstain from participating in garba celebrations and other public festivities, and instances were noted where Hindutva groups sought to monitor or exclude Muslim presence at cultural events. Though less quantifiable, these developments illustrate how executive rhetoric and coercive enforcement combine to legitimise exclusion at the community level, embedding state-endorsed bias within everyday social interactions.

Taken together, these events depict not an isolated breakdown of order but a coordinated sequence: rhetoric, repression, and social sanction. The cycle of speech, enforcement, spectacle, and exclusion forms a distinctive template of governance—where administrative action doubles as political performance, and punishment itself becomes a form of public messaging.

The Political Economy of Hard-line Rhetoric: How speech translates into power

Whether by deliberate strategy or downstream effect, hard-line public rhetoric by state leaders like Yogi Adityanath yields three tangible advantages for majoritarian or vigilante actors operating at the political margins. It converts language into action, rhetoric into legitimacy, and coercion into spectacle.

1. Implicit legitimisation of vigilante policing: When a head of government publicly vows “uncompromising action” and uses metaphors of retribution—such as “denting and painting” or “we will not spare you”—the message travels well beyond the bureaucracy. It functions as a symbolic green light for local affiliates, vigilante groups, and ideological sympathisers. These actors interpret the rhetoric as moral endorsement for “citizen policing” or social intimidation campaigns under the guise of defending faith or nationalism. Civil-society reports document a consistent pattern: Hindutva outfits intensify surveillance of Muslim participation in cultural events—such as garba celebrations or processions—soon after high-profile communal statements. In practice, this rhetoric lowers the cost of vigilantism, creating a permissive environment where harassment appears state-sanctioned.
2. Narrative control and inversion: Strongman rhetoric also reshapes the moral sequence of events. By branding expressive or devotional acts—such as the “I Love Muhammad” posters—as “provocations,” the state repositions itself as the neutral guarantor of order, while protestors are recast as disruptors. This narrative inversion turns a community’s assertion of faith into a law-and-order problem, allowing the administration to deploy coercion with minimal public pushback.
   As The Wire and other critical outlets observed, media framing plays a decisive role: channels that foreground “riots” and “discipline” amplify the executive’s preferred storyline, while those that question due process or disproportionality are marginalised as “soft on disorder.” The result is a feedback loop where political rhetoric and editorial selection co-produce legitimacy.
3. Electoral signalling and mobilisation gains: Beyond its immediate administrative use, hard-line speech operates as a performative display of strength aimed at a political constituency. The imagery of bulldozers, swift arrests, and collective punishment serves as a spectacle of decisive governance, projecting control and dominance. Scholars of South Asian populism have noted that such performances of punishment—what The Loop terms “punitive populism”—transform the machinery of justice into an instrument of emotional reassurance for the majority. Each demolition or crackdown becomes not just an act of enforcement but a ritual reaffirmation of political identity, blurring the lines between public order and electoral theatre.

Taken together, these three dynamics show how rhetoric, media, and enforcement converge into a single ecosystem of majoritarian power. In this model, punishment is not merely administered—it is performed, televised, and voted upon.

Accountability gaps and legal remedies

The aftermath of the Bareilly episode demands more than commentary — it demands accountability. When executive speech, administrative action, and media amplification intersect to produce coercive outcomes, the constitutional order must provide correctives. The following lines of legal and institutional response arise directly from existing Supreme Court jurisprudence and human-rights practice:

1. Suo moto inquiry into the Chief Minister’s speech under the Shaheen Abdulla directions: The Supreme Court has made it unequivocally clear that police are under a continuing duty to register suo moto FIRs in cases of hate speech, regardless of the speaker’s political position. Inaction in the face of potentially inflammatory statements by high public officials amounts to contempt of the Court’s directions. A representation to the High Court or Supreme Court seeking compliance would therefore be legally tenable if no inquiry has yet been initiated.
2. Judicial review of demolitions and sealing drives for arbitrariness and disproportionality: The Supreme Court’s November 2024 observations on “bulldozer justice” caution that demolitions used as instant punishment violate due process. Every affected person is entitled to prior notice, an opportunity to be heard, and independent adjudication before property action. Where municipal or development authorities acted immediately after communal incidents, those demolitions merit judicial scrutiny as punitive theatre rather than lawful urban regulation.
3. Human-rights complaints and public-interest petitions documenting the full sequence: The timeline itself — from the Kanpur FIRs to the Bareilly clashes, the CM’s speeches, and the administrative crackdown — forms crucial evidence of state overreach and selective enforcement. Complaints to the NHRC, the State Human Rights Commission, or the jurisdictional High Court can seek independent inquiry, victim compensation, and publication of findings. Precedents show that such petitions have successfully compelled state responses and stayed coercive action.
4. Media accountability and transparency demands: Given the central role of television and digital platforms in magnifying punitive rhetoric, transparency measures are essential. Broadcasters and social media intermediaries should be required to preserve all footage, thumbnails, and metadata for future scrutiny. Outlets that used sensational promos can be asked to issue contextual clarifications or corrections through the NBDSA process. Simultaneously, police and civic authorities must disclose the legal basis for mass FIRs, demolition orders, and internet suspensions. Public disclosure often becomes the first step toward halting unchecked executive excess.

Conclusions — legal risk, democratic cost

The Bareilly “I Love Muhammad” row and its aftermath sit at a critical intersection of power and speech in contemporary India. What began as an expressive act — a slogan, a banner, a theological or identity affirmation — was transformed rapidly under political and administrative force into a narrative of provocation, then into a sequence of punitive state interventions.

Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath’s rhetoric did more than warn: it arguably furnished the legal and moral scaffolding for escalated state action — actions that, according to credible reportage, stretched procedural norms, threatened minority rights, chilled speech, and disrupted daily life for many. Legal redress is challenging but not impossible: the constitutional framework, statutory provisions, and Supreme Court precedents exist to push back against such overreach.

Bareilly is therefore not just a local incident. It’s a test case. If the judicial system, civil society, and media fail to rigorously examine speech + enforcement, the precedent is troubling: political speech that combines identity, faith, punitive promise and spectacle becomes a license to marginalise. For democracy to survive in such moments, the invisible boundary between “law-and-order” and state overreach must be policed with the same seriousness with which we monitor overt dissent.

References:

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/take-suo-motu-action-against-hate-speech-crimes-without-waiting-for-complaint-supreme-court-212282

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/what-is-i-love-muhammad-row-and-why-it-sparked-protests-across-india-barawafat-procession-kanpur-nagpur-hyderabad-owaisi-full-story-2791497-2025-09-22

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/meerut/bareilly-cleric-among-8-held-2000-booked-31-detained/articleshow/124185812.cms

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/i-love-muhammad-row-up-cm-yogi-adityanath-warns-habitual-law-breakers-after-bareilly-protest-says-denting-painting-must-be-done/articleshow/124189795.cms

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/internet-suspended-in-bareilly-for-48-hours-after-i-love-muhammad-row/articleshow/124273149.cms

https://www.livemint.com/news/india/yogi-adityanath-warns-i-love-mohammad-protesters-chedhoge-to-fir-chodhenge-nahi-11758975758381.html

https://thepolisproject.com/research/sc-verdict-demolitions-statecraft/

https://thewire.in/politics/i-love-muhammad-banner-controversy-how-routine-decoration-in-kanpur-sparked-nationwide-protests-and-crackdowns

https://www.scobserver.in/journal/bulldozer-demolitions-remind-of-a-lawless-ruthless-state-of-affairs-declares-supreme-court-as-it-issues-pan-india-guidelines

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/meerut/i-love-muhammad-row-plea-filed-in-human-rights-body-on-demolition-ofproperties-in-bareilly-affected-families-say-no-prior-notice-sent/articleshow/124345491.cms

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bareilly/i-love-muhammad-row-rs-1-crore-power-theft-notice-to-tauqeer-razas-aides/articleshow/124324197.cms

https://theloop.ecpr.eu/bulldozer-justice-punitive-populism-in-india/

https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/lucknow/i-love-muhammad-row-cleric-tauqeer-raza-detained-protest-10274731

https://theprint.in/politics/cleric-who-once-said-modi-should-learn-from-yogi-whos-tauqeer-khan-in-eye-of-i-love-muhammad-storm

https://kmsnews.org/kms/2025/09/20/muslims-protest-across-india-against-registration-of-case-for-writing-i-love-muhammad-saw.html

https://sabrangindia.in/register-prosecute-hate-speech-offences-promptly-uphold-rule-law-sci-all-states

https://sabrangindia.in/hate-crime-hate-speech-scs-scrutiny-continue

https://sabrangindia.in/free-speech-even-in-bad-taste-is-protected-if-no-incitement-to-violence-hp-hc

https://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/138-lokur-damojipurapu

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/tension-in-bareilly-drones-are-up-ahead-of-friday-prayer-internet-shut-down/articleshow/124280351.cms

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/one-can-say-i-love-modi-but-not-i-love-mohammad-owaisi-amid-bareilly-unrest-condemns-violence/articleshow/124284809.cms

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/i-love-mohammad-march-violence-after-stone-pelting-in-bareilly-cops-resort-to-lathicharge/articleshow/124157113.cms

https://cjp.org.in/bns-2023-does-nothing-to-bring-in-a-nuanced-effective-understanding-of-hate-speech-making-its-prosecution-even-more-difficult

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-files-complaints-against-the-hate-speeches-delivered-in-uttar-pradesh

https://cjp.org.in/the-sentinel-and-the-shift-free-speech-in-the-supreme-court

https://thelogicalindian.com/chedhoge-to-chodhenge-nahi-yogi-adityanaths-warning-after-i-love-mohammad-protest-turns-violent-in-up

https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/internet-cut-for-48-hours-in-ups-bareilly-amid-i-love-muhammad-posters-row-9384013

https://article-14.com/post/govt-whataboutery-inaction-why-hate-speech-persists-despite-the-supreme-court-wanting-to-stop-it-64c3372224505

The post From Words to Bulldozers: How a Chief Minister’s rhetoric triggered and normalised punitive policing in Bareilly appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In its submissions, CJP contended that as an organisation promoting communal harmony, it felt compelled to inquire whether appropriate action was being taken in accordance with directives issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Bombay High Court.

CJP urged authorities to adhere to these directions, which specifically ordered detailed investigations and prosecutions concerning hate speech, to ensure such divisive rhetoric did not go unchecked. CJP also highlighted the Supreme Court’s Amish Devgan judgment, which emphasised that those in positions of influence bore a greater responsibility for their words and actions and must be aware of the potential meanings and impacts of their words.

February 20, 2025 – Nanijdham, Ratnagiri Speech

The series of complaints included one filed on March 28, 2025 with the Superintendent of Police and the Collector & District Magistrate of Ratnagiri against Nitesh Rane for his divisive and communal rhetoric at a public felicitation event organised by Jagadguru Ramanandacharya Shri Swami Narendracharayaji Maharaj in Nanijdham, Ratnagiri on February 20, 2025. During this speech, Rane had delivered a deeply problematic anti-Muslim hate speech. He had propagated baseless conspiracies such as ‘love jihad’ and ‘land jihad,’ terms that CJP noted had been repeatedly used to spread harm and mistrust towards the Muslim community. Further escalating his rhetoric, Rane had used Islamophobic slurs like “jihadis” and targeted religious sites, specifically Mazars and Dargahs, claiming that they “just pop up anywhere.”

CJP asserted in its complaint that, “This inflammatory language, delivered in a public setting in Nanijdham, posed a serious threat to communal harmony and deserved immediate attention. Rane’s remarks spread dangerous narratives.” The complaint stated that a disturbing video of Nitesh Rane’s speech had surfaced, which could be perceived as encouraging hatred and attempting to justify it under the guise of religion. At the event, Rane had made claims regarding the alleged crime of “love jihad.”

However, CJP pointed out that there were no verified statistics or credible evidence supporting the existence of such a phenomenon. He had further escalated his rhetoric with conspiracies of “love jihad” and “land jihad,” calling Muslims “jihadis,” and attacking religious sites such as Mazars and Dargahs. CJP also noted that Rane had referred to the efforts of certain individuals to “Islamise” India, reinforcing harmful and unfounded myths about Muslims, and stressed that it was crucial that the police and authorities took stringent action to prevent further harm to the peace and harmony of the nation.

CJP detailed how elements in the speech delivered constituted hate speech, aligning with the elements outlined in the Supreme Court’s Amish Devgan judgment. Rane’s speech, CJP argued, employed demonising language and promoted unfounded conspiracy theories, particularly with terms like “Love Jihad,” “Land Jihad,” and references akin to “Ghar Wapsi.” By framing these terms as part of a widespread and deliberate effort by Muslims to “Islamise” India, Rane, according to CJP, perpetuated the myth of a planned Islamic takeover, further stirring fear and mistrust among communities.

CJP further contended that Rane’s speech also crossed the line into direct threats and incitement to hatred. His call for a “Jihad-free coastline” and an anti-conversion law were seen by CJP as not only divisive but also potentially having the effect of restricting individuals’ freedom to make personal choices. The statement that the Maharashtra government would “take a firm stand without any Hindutva-based bias” in fighting against “illegal activities,” which included the building of mazars and tombs, was highlighted by CJP as clearly targeting Muslims and fostering an atmosphere where violence and discrimination against the Muslim community could be justified under the guise of national protection.

The copy of complaint dated March 28, 2025 can be accessed here:

February 5, 2025 – Wagholi, Pune Speech

Prior to the Nanijdham incident, on February 5, 2025, Rane had delivered another contentious speech at Rameshwar Mahadev Mandir in Wagholi, Pune. Consequently, on March 18, CJP further approached the ADG (Law &Order), Maharashtra, and Pune Police against this divisive hate speech. At this event, Rane had spread anti-Muslim hate speech, perpetuating the conspiracies of “land jihad” and “love jihad,” and falsely claiming that Muslims aimed to turn India into an Islamic state. In his inflammatory speech, Rane had urged Hindus to rent houses exclusively to fellow Hindus, warning that “it starts with one Aslam, and then you have a hundred Aslams.”

CJP argued this rhetoric served to demonise Muslims, portraying them as a threat to Hindu society. He had specifically targeted the practice of azaan, the Muslim call to prayer, claiming that if Hindus rented homes to Muslims, “in no time, they will be there in hordes, and next thing you know, the azaan is blaring five times a day.” CJP highlighted this statement as not only spreading fear but also perpetuating the false narrative that Muslims were attempting to impose their religious practices on non-Muslims.

CJP asserted that Rane had openly encouraged housing discrimination, an anti-Constitutional move that violated Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution, by telling the audience: “Just declare that you don’t rent to non-Hindus.”

This, CJP contended, incited segregation and exclusion based on religion. Later, he had continued pushing the unfounded conspiracy of “love jihad,” reinforcing baseless claims that Muslims were deliberately targeting Hindu women for conversion and marriage. CJP noted these dangerous, divisive narratives fueled communal hatred and further polarised society.

In his speech, Rane had said, “When the police conducted their inquiry and asked what exactly they were plotting here, they responded by saying that their goal is to make India an Islamic nation by 2047, and all their efforts are directed towards achieving that.”

CJP argued that this statement fabricated an entire conspiracy theory that portrayed Muslims as systematically working to take over the nation. CJP described the allegation of a coordinated Islamic effort to turn India into an Islamic state by 2047 as completely unfounded, with no evidence to support such a claim, and designed to exploit fear and misrepresentation, creating an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion toward an entire religious group.

Further, against Rane’s statement with an exaggerated and dehumanising portrayal of Muslims, stating, “Because in the beginning, only one comes. Just one—someone named Aslam. And then he will bring 100 more Aslams along with him. I can give you at least 100 examples where one arrived, and soon there were 100 more. He will start cooking food that we don’t prefer, and because of that smell, the Hindu community will begin to leave,” CJP informed the Pune Police that this statement painted Muslims as a threat to the cultural and social fabric of Hindu communities.

CJP explained that the speaker used fear-based language, associating the arrival of Muslims with the destruction of Hindu lifestyle by focusing on trivial issues like food and religious practices, thereby dehumanising Muslims and intensifying community polarisation.

The copy of complaint dated March 18, 2025 can be accessed here:

February 8, 2025 – Kundal, Sindhudurg and February 19, 2025 – Sawantwadi, Sindhudurg Speeches

Earlier in February, Rane had delivered similar speeches in the Sindhudurg district. On March 7, CJP filed a joint complaint with the Superintendent of Police and the Collector & District Magistrate, Sindhudurg, against Nitesh Rane’s divisive hate speeches in Kundal on February 8, 2025, and Sawantwadi on February 19, 2025.

In its complaint, CJP mentioned that these speeches had been delivered at events organised by right-wing outfits. On February 8, 2025, Rane had spoken at the “Hindu Rashtra Adhiveshan” organised by Hindu Janajagruti Samiti (HJS) in Kundal, and on February 19, 2025, at the “Shivjanmostav” event organised by VHP-Bajrang Dal in Sawantwadi. CJP stated these speeches, delivered in different locations across Sindhudurg district, contained several alarming and dangerous elements of hate speech that merited urgent attention.

In his speech delivered at and reported from Kundal, Rane had spoken about what he termed “Love Jihad” and “Land Jihad,” terms which CJP noted had been coined and repeatedly used to generate a sentiment of harm towards the Muslim community. Rane had said, “how far have these Islamisation and Jihadisation people reached? How much has their courage grown? You all should imagine this. You people should be able to guess where the danger is from.” His speech, CJP argued, was also symptomatic of a dangerous rhetoric that provoked local communities into hostilities against some of their neighbours (Muslims).

In a similar vein, during his speech at Sawantwadi, Rane had continued with stigmatising slurs and stereotypes, stating: “If anyone in this Sawantwadi, this Sindhudurga, keep evil eye at my Hindu religion, just give me a call, I will make sure that he doesn’t go to that place again on Friday.” He had also asserted, “By 2047, there are plans to make our country, India, an Islamic nation. We must not fall victim to this.”

CJP described these misconceived and provocative statements, unsubstantiated by fact and delivered by a sitting MLA and Cabinet Minister, as deeply concerning. CJP contended that Rane’s warning in the Sawantwadi speech was not only a call to arms but also a clear incitement to communal hatred, with the phrase “I will make sure that he doesn’t go to that place again on Friday” being an explicit threat targeting Muslims, who traditionally observe prayers on Fridays.

This, CJP argued, aligned with hate speech, as it singled out a religious group and implicitly threatened them with harm.

The copy of complaint dated March 7, 2025 can be accessed here:

Rane’s speech served no aim other than to sow division and fuel communal hatred: CJP

CJP strongly contended that Rane’s speeches in Kundal and Sawantwadi exhibited numerous traits that were clearly indicative of hate speech. These speeches, CJP stated, targeted one section of the Indian population, the Muslims pointedly, propagating certain communal narratives that stirred resentment and incited fear. As per the Supreme Court’s judgment in Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1, such speech fell under the category of hate speech, as it sought to promote hatred against a particular group without any legitimate purpose. Rane’s inflammatory statements, CJP argued, met these criteria, as they served no aim other than to sow division and fuel communal hatred.

CJP referenced the Amish Devgan (2021) judgment, where a bench comprising Justices A M Khanwilkar and Sanjay Khanna emphasised that hate speech was not merely an expression but an act intended to foster hatred or violence against a specific community, requiring subjective intent to target a group or class of people. The Court had further reinforced the responsibility of persons of influence, such as Rane, given the reach and authority they possessed over the public.

Supreme Court’s Decision in Amish Devgan v Union of India (2021)

Across its complaints, CJP urged authorities that as per the Supreme Court’s judgment in Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2021) 1 SCC 1, Rane’s speech fell under the category of hate speech, as it sought to promote hatred against a particular group without any legitimate purpose.

CJP argued Rane’s inflammatory statements met these criteria. The complaints highlighted that in the Amish Devgan judgment, the Court had emphasised that hate speech was not merely an expression but an act intended to foster hatred or violence against a specific community and clarified that for speech to be categorised as hate speech, there must be subjective intent to target a group or class of people. The Court had further reinforced the responsibility of persons of influence, such as Rane, given the reach and authority they possessed over the public.

CJP stressed the Court’s ruling that individuals in positions of power must be especially cautious of the messages they conveyed, understanding their potential to incite hatred and social discord. The complaints noted the Court observed that the object of criminalising hate speech was to protect the dignity of an individual and to ensure political and social equality between different identities and groups. In this context, the Court had explained that ‘dignity’ “refers to a person’s basic entitlement as a member of a society in good standing, his status as a social equal and as bearer of human rights and constitutional entitlements.”

Rane holds considerable sway over public opinion

In light of the Supreme Court decision, CJP argued that Nitesh Rane, as a sitting MLA and Cabinet Minister, held considerable sway over public opinion, and his position of influence amplified the impact of his words. By making remarks that explicitly targeted Muslims and encouraged anti-Muslim sentiment, Rane, according to CJP, not only flouted the constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination but also directly contravened the guidelines set by the Supreme Court. His speeches were described as emblematic of the kind of rhetoric the Court had cautioned against, as they incited communal hatred without any valid or legitimate message.

Failure to uphold duty of responsibility

In its complaints, CJP mentioned that Nitesh Rane’s speeches, such as the one in Wagholi, represented a direct violation of his duty as a public figure, as outlined in the Amish Devgan judgment (2021). The Supreme Court had emphasised that individuals with substantial influence must exercise heightened responsibility, as their words could stir public sentiments and foster division. Rane’s rhetoric, CJP argued, filled with such provocative and divisive language, showed a blatant disregard for this responsibility. As a leader, Rane should have been aware of the harmful impact his words would have on the public, especially given his influence as an elected representative.

Apex Court mandated video recording of such events

In its complaints addressing the proliferation of hate speech in Maharashtra, CJP consistently highlighted the Supreme Court’s recent and explicit directives aimed at its prevention and prosecution. CJP underscored key judicial interventions, such as the order dated February 3, 2023, concerning an event by Sakal Hindu Samaj in Mumbai. On that occasion, the apex court had mandated video recording of the event, had secured an undertaking from the Maharashtra government that permission would be conditional upon no hate speech being delivered, and had directed law enforcement to utilise Section 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) for preventive action if warranted.

Furthermore, CJP pointed to the Supreme Court’s proceedings on January 17, 2024, where the bench had expressed its dismay at the necessity for repeated petitions and had directed the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police in Yavatmal, Maharashtra (along with Raipur, Chhattisgarh) to take ‘appropriate steps,’ including the installation of CCTV cameras, to ensure no incitement to hate speech occurred during planned rallies. These specific Supreme Court mandates, CJP emphasised, formed a central pillar of its arguments, emphasising the judiciary’s expectation of proactive and diligent law enforcement against individuals and groups disseminating hate.

Circulars issued by DGP Maharashtra in February 2023 and May 2023 urging strict action on hate speech

CJP’s complaints further elaborated that these Supreme Court pronouncements had spurred administrative responses within Maharashtra, notably citing circulars issued by the Director General of Police (DGP) in February and April 2023. The February 2, 2023 circular, referencing a Supreme Court order from January 13, 2023, had directed all Unit Commanders to ensure suo moto action (under IPC Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, and 505) when hate speech occurred, even without a formal complaint.

The subsequent circular on April 3, 2023, had detailed comprehensive measures for maintaining law and order during agitations and speeches, including mandatory meetings with organisers, audio-video recording of events, and pre-emptive intelligence gathering.

In all its submissions, CJP systematically referred to the foundational Supreme Court order in Shaheen Abdulla vs. Union of India & Ors. (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 940/2022), which had mandated suo moto action against hate speech, and its crucial expansion in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India (April 28, 2023), directing all States and Union Territories to register FIRs against hate speech offenders irrespective of their religion.

By invoking these judicial directives, administrative instructions, and pertinent legal precedents such as Firoz Iqbal Khan vs Union of India and Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India, CJP contended that the persistent failure of authorities to curb inflammatory rhetoric, which often instilled fear within minority communities and was amplified by social media, represented a significant contravention of established legal and constitutional safeguards.

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The post CJP files three complaints against pro-right-wing leader and BJP Minister Nitesh Rane over alleged hate speech in Maharashtra appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The speech and the full incident

On Tuesday, March 11, Suvendu Adhikari, speaking to reporters outside the West Bengal Assembly, accused the ruling Trinamool Congress (TMC) government of being a “communal administration” and likened it to “Muslim League 2.” He went further, stating that if the BJP comes to power in 2026, they would remove all Muslim MLAs of the TMC from the assembly. His remarks, laced with communal undertones, sparked immediate outrage, with many terming it a direct attack on constitutional democracy.

The controversy erupted just a day after BJP’s Haldia MLA Tapasi Mondal defected to the TMC. The TMC swiftly condemned Adhikari’s remarks, with spokesperson Kunal Ghosh calling them “dangerous, provocative, and depraved.” Ghosh further stated, “In Parliament or state assemblies, there can be debate and arguments. But to rake up religion and target MLAs belonging to a specific community is contrary to the principles of the Constitution. It’s also a criminal offence.” The state BJP, however, remained silent, neither endorsing nor disowning the comments.

The incident occurred against the backdrop of Adhikari’s suspension from the assembly until March 18, 2025 for allegedly insulting the Speaker’s chair. Earlier in the day, BJP MLAs had staged a protest inside the assembly, tearing official documents after the Speaker denied their adjournment motion over alleged attacks on Hindu temples. The Speaker, Biman Bandyopadhyay, in response, directed the assembly secretary not to provide BJP legislators with any further documents related to House proceedings.

In a further escalation, Adhikari and his party members staged a demonstration outside the assembly, alleging that the ruling party was suppressing the opposition’s voice. He claimed that Hindus were being attacked in various districts of Bengal, that Hindu shop owners and houses had been set on fire, and that the state police were acting in a communal manner by restricting Holi celebrations on March 14, as it coincided with a Friday prayer day. He alleged that in Birbhum district’s Santiniketan, police had instructed people to finish Holi celebrations by 11 AM due to Friday prayers. He also claimed that in Uluberia, those celebrating India’s victory in the Champions Trophy were attacked, with even a local police officer being injured. Adhikari framed these incidents as proof that the TMC government was catering to Muslim interests at the cost of Hindus, further inflaming communal sentiments.

Inciting hate, undermining the Constitution

Adhikari’s statement is not merely hate speech—it is a direct assault on the constitutional framework of India. The Constitution guarantees equal rights and representation to all citizens, irrespective of religion. His words suggest an intention to exclude a specific religious community from legislative representation, violating the core tenets of democracy and secularism. Article 14 (equality before the law) and Article 15 (prohibition of discrimination based on religion) are fundamental principles enshrined in the Indian Constitution, and Adhikari’s remarks trample upon them with shocking impunity.

This is not an isolated instance of Adhikari’s communal rhetoric. His earlier dismissal of BJP’s ‘Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas’ slogan, replaced with a divisive “Jo hamare saath, hum unke saath” (We are with those who are with us), was a clear indication of his supremacist ideology. Such statements, if left unchecked, normalise religious discrimination and stoke communal polarisation.

A case for immediate action

The Trinamool Congress (TMC) has rightly condemned Adhikari’s comments as “dangerous, provocative, and depraved.” Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee responded strongly, condemning Adhikari’s remarks as a blatant attempt to sow communal discord. “This is not just hate speech, this is an open threat to democracy. Bengal will never accept such divisive politics. I challenge him to try and throw out a single MLA—he will see the power of the people’s mandate,” she said.

Given the gravity of his statements, mere condemnation is insufficient. Adhikari was earlier suspended from the assembly for the remainder of the budget session due to his misconduct, but this latest episode warrants far more serious consequences.

1. Legal action: His remarks could potentially be prosecuted under Sections 196 (promoting enmity between different groups) and 299 (deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
2. Expulsion from the Assembly: The West Bengal Legislative Assembly must consider a more severe disciplinary measure—either extending his suspension indefinitely or expelling him altogether. The Speaker has the authority to take such action in cases of grave misconduct.
3. BJP’s accountability: The silence of the state BJP leadership on this matter is deeply telling. If the party does not dissociate itself from Adhikari’s remarks and take internal disciplinary action, it is complicit in endorsing such unconstitutional rhetoric.

A dangerous precedent

If Adhikari is allowed to get away with such statements, it sets a dangerous precedent for Indian politics. Normalising calls for religious exclusion from legislative bodies not only weakens democracy but also emboldens other leaders to follow suit. West Bengal has a long history of communal harmony, and allowing such hate speech to fester threatens the social fabric of the state.

India cannot afford to treat such explicit communal threats as mere political rhetoric. There must be an unequivocal rejection of these unconstitutional utterances, backed by swift legal and parliamentary action. Anything less would be a failure to defend the democratic ideals upon which the nation stands.

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The post WB LoP Suvendu Adhikari’s open call for Muslim-free assembly from the Assembly must be met with action, not silence appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Similarly, T Raja Singh, notorious for his divisive views, has with his statements about “Ghazwa-e-Hind,” a theory that frames Muslims as a threat to India’s identity. Alongside these leaders, right-wing influencer Kajal Hindustani has propagated harmful stereotypes and hate against Muslims.

Nitesh Rane: spreading misinformation and suspicion through alleged theories of ‘Love Jihad’ and ‘Land Jihad’

Nitesh Rane, the BJP MLA from Kankavli in the Sindhudurg district of Maharashtra and now the Maharashtra Ports and Fisheries Minister, has emerged as one of the most vocal proponents of aggressive hate speech in the state. Many of his speeches from February 2025 have caused a significant uproar, raising concerns for the social climate in the state. 

February 20, 2025 

February 20, during a public felicitation event at Jagadguru Ramanandacharya Shri Swami Narendracharayaji Maharaj Nanijdhama in Ratnagiri, BJP MLA Nitesh Rane delivered a hate-filled speech targeting Muslims. 

Rane in his speech said that, “Because issues like Love Jihad and Land Jihad are actively happening around us. Through Love Jihad and religious conversion, a large-scale effort is underway to bring countless Hindu mothers and sisters into Islam by those engaging in Jihad.”

He propagated unfounded conspiracies about ‘love jihad’ and ‘land jihad,’ intensifying his rhetoric by labelling Muslims as “jihadis.” Rane also criticised Mazhars and Dargahs, claiming that the said structures “pop up anywhere,”.

He further added that, “I have initiated a program through my ministry to make our 720-kilometer coastline Jihad- free. Therefore, in all these matters, it is extremely important for me to receive Swamiji’s guidance and blessings from time to time. All the illegal activities happening around us—wherever you look, spreading the green cloth, building mazars and tombs everywhere—against all this, our Maharashtra government will take a firm stand without any Hindutva-based bias. On this occasion, I assure Swamiji of this today.”

His words not only spread fear but are also baseless accusations against an entire religious community. His speech serves as another example of the dangerous rhetoric emerging from political figures in the region.

The video of speech can be seen here:

February 19, 2025 

On February 19, at a Shiv Jayanti event organised by the VHP and Bajrang Dal in Sawantwadi, Sindhudurg, Maharashtra, BJP MLA Nitesh Rane delivered a series of inflammatory remarks targeting Muslims. He boldly declared, “This is a Hinduwadi government,” and went on to threaten that in Sindhudurg, anyone who even “looks at Hindus in an incorrect manner” would face consequences, urging people to contact him directly to “settle it before next Friday.”

Rane said that, “the Chief Minister is a staunch Hindutva. If anyone in this Sawantwadi, this Sindhudurga, keep evil eye at my Hindu religion, just give me a call, I will make sure that he doesn’t go to that place again on Friday. Don’t worry about anything.”

He also labelled Muslims as “green snakes,” who are involved in a deep-rooted conspiracy against Hindus. Rane’s speeches continued in this vein throughout the month of February, spreading more hateful conspiracy theories, and even suggesting that if Muslims “looked at Hindus in an incorrect manner,” they would face consequences. He stated that, “Our government is very bad. What is going on around I am aware of everything. You don’t have to struggle. Wherever something wrong is happening, wherever someone tries to slaughter a cow, wherever someone tries to smuggle, wherever green snakes try to wriggle, just make one call, and leave the rest of the arrangements to me.”

The video of speech can be seen here:

February 8, 2025 

On February 8, at the Hindu Rashtra Adhiveshan organised by the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti in Kudal, Sindhudurg, BJP MLA Nitesh Rane delivered a divisive speech, alleging that ‘jihadis’ were targeting Hindu temples and again referring to Muslims as ‘green snakes.’ He said that India is a Hindu nation and alleged that Muslims were conspiring to turn the country into an Islamic state by 2047. Rane then propagated the baseless conspiracies of ‘love jihad’ and ‘land jihad,’ fearmongering about the supposed Islamization of India. He accused Muslims of attempting to seize Hindu lands and religious sites, symbolically covering them with a ‘green shroud.’ 

Nitesh Rane’s speech is deeply problematic due to its divisive and inflammatory nature. He quite deliberately, and repeatedly perpetuates harmful stereotypes and spreads fear by framing certain religious communities as a threat to Hindu society. His speech begins with claims of “Love Jihad,” “Land Jihad,” and references to the “Waqf Board,” which without evidence, target Muslims and imply a coordinated effort against Hindus:

“While taking out these rallies, there were some cases of Love Jihad, some cases of Land Jihad, and some cases related to the Waqf Board. We, as the Sakal Hindu Samaj, took out those rallies and went to meet the affected families and we tried to provide them justice. How far have these Islamization and Jihadisation people reached? How much has their courage grown? You all should all imagine this. You people should be able to guess where the danger is from.”

This statement fuels unfounded fear and animosity, casting Muslims as a monolithic and hostile group. He further stokes this narrative by discussing the supposed encroachment of Muslims on religious sites, such as temples:

“I always wonder—if you want to spread Islam, why do you always target our temple lands? If you want to build a mosque or a dargah, then buy an open piece of land yourselves and say, ‘We want to build a mosque here, a dargah here.’ But they always want to do these things on the land of our temples.”

Such rhetoric incites division, mistrust, and hostility. He concludes by framing this as a grand conspiracy:

“By 2047, they want to turn our Hindu nation into an Islamic nation. Their evil eyes are on the temples, and we should be moving towards ensuring how to keep them safe,” Rane Said.

Rane referred Savarkar in his speech and said, “Swatantryaveer Savarkar has written very well that the Hindu society suffers more from Hindus themselves than from Muslims. Some of these people ask me how I can call it a Hindu nation, as it does not fit within the Constitution.”

The video of speech can be seen here:

February 5, 2025 

On February 5, at a public event organised by a coalition of far-right groups in Wagholi, Pune, BJP MLA Rane delivered an inflammatory anti-Muslim hate speech, propagating the baseless conspiracies of ‘land jihad’ and ‘love jihad,’ while falsely claiming that Muslims aim to turn India into an Islamic state. 

During his speech, he urged Hindus to rent homes only to fellow Hindus, warning that “it starts with one Aslam, and then you have a hundred Aslams.” Targeting the azaan, he claimed that if Hindus rented to Muslims, soon they would be overrun and the azaan would echo five times a day. He openly advocated for housing discrimination, urging the audience to “just declare that you don’t rent to non-Hindus.” Rane further fuelled the conspiracy of ‘love jihad,’ continuing to spread baseless fears of a demographic threat.

The video of speech can be seen here:

February 3, 2025 

On February 3, in Chandrapur, Rane made a chilling threat towards Muslims, declaring that acts like “Love Jihad,” “Land Jihad,” and “cow slaughter” would no longer be tolerated. At a religious assembly, Rane openly warned the minority religious community, stating that the state had a Hindutva-based government, and if these issues persisted, they would take direct action.

He was quoted as saying:

“If these people sporting beards do not stop this Love Jihad, Land Jihad, and the drama against Hindu society in time, then even those sitting in Pakistan will not be able to recognize you. I guarantee.”

His rhetoric targets Muslims as a collective threat to Hindu society, presenting them as part of a grand conspiracy to turn India into an Islamic nation by 2047. The speech perpetuates harmful myths such as “Love Jihad” and “Land Jihad,” which have no basis in reality but are used to fuel hatred and division. Rane asserts:

“When the police conducted their inquiry and asked what exactly they were plotting here, they responded by saying that their goal is to make India an Islamic nation by 2047, and all their efforts are directed towards achieving that.”

This unfounded claim creates an atmosphere of fear and suspicion, portraying Muslims as scheming to overthrow the country’s demographic makeup.

He continues with further inflammatory statements:

“Because in the beginning, only one comes. Just one—someone named Aslam. And then he will bring 100 more Aslams along with him. He will start cooking food that we don’t prefer, and because of that smell, the Hindu community will begin to leave. Then, five times a day, their loudspeakers will start blaring.”

This passage not only reinforces the idea of Muslims as an invasive force but also promotes communal fear by linking Muslims to undesirable behaviour.

Additionally, Rane makes claims about “Love Jihad,” where he manipulates personal stories to push the narrative of Hindu girls being brainwashed:

“I have met sisters who have been victims of Love Jihad. You would be shocked to see their miserable condition. These girls are brainwashed to the extent that they refuse to recognize their own parents.”

This kind of rhetoric is not new for Rane, who has long harboured views that fuel communal animosity. At this event, he claimed that a strict law against religious conversions would be introduced in Maharashtra. He further warned Muslims involved in such acts of “trapping” Hindu women that the government would deal with them harshly, reinforcing the idea of an aggressive, intolerant Hindutva ideology.

The video of speech can be seen here:

Maharashtra Ports and Fisheries Minister #NiteshRane on Monday sounded a stern warning to a particular community, stating that “Love jihad, Land Jihad, and cow slaughter” will not be tolerated. He emphasised that the state has a #Hindutva-oriented government and discussed the… pic.twitter.com/OZfJAUR67L

— Hate Detector (@HateDetectors) February 4, 2025

Recently, two FIRs were filed against Nitesh Rane for alleged hate speech targeting Muslims in Ahmednagar. Both FIRs were filed by the Ahmednagar Police against Nitesh Rane for his controversial remark. Rakesh Ola, the Superintendent of Police in Ahmednagar, confirmed the registration of two FIRs—one on September 1, 2024, and the other on September 2, 2024. These FIRs were filed at the Shrirampur and Topkhana police stations, respectively. Rane made his speeches during public meetings in the Shrirampur and Topkhana, in support of Hindu seer Mahant Ramgiri Maharaj, who had made derogatory remarks about Islam and Prophet Muhammad. Rane warned of repercussions if the Maharaj was harmed. In his address, Rane had said, “If anything happens to Maharaj, there will be repercussions. I’m going to give this threat in the language which you understand. If you have done anything against our Ramgiri Maharaj, we will kill you after barging into your mosques. You must remember this threat,” Rane had said, reported Times of India.

On September 5, an FIR was also filed against Nitesh Rane for his hate speech. The case was registered by the Gittikhadan police in Nagpur under sections 196, 299, 302, 352, and 353(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. The FIR follows a complaint lodged by Mohammed Yunus Patel (47), a resident of Awasthi Nagar in South Nagpur, who alleged that Rane hurt the religious sentiments of a specific community during a speech he delivered in Ahmednagar on September 1, 2024, as HT reported.

Rane’s rhetoric, including claims of Love Jihad and Land Jihad, is not an isolated incident but part of a wider strategy by certain BJP leaders to stoke communal fears for political leverage.

T Raja Singh: Escalating divisive narratives

T Raja Singh, BJP’s MLA from Goshamahal in Hyderabad, is notorious for his controversial and often extremist views. His speech at the Deccan Summit in Pune on February 8, 2025, only further reinforced his reputation. Singh stirred the pot by promoting the divisive conspiracy theory of “Ghazwa-e-Hind,” falsely claiming that Muslims were plotting to turn India into an Islamic nation.

“They have another Pakistan inside India, these land jihadis.”

Singh went on to misrepresent historical events and figures, wrongly alleging that former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had declared that Muslims had the first right to India’s resources. 

His rhetoric also targeted religious educational institutions, especially Madrasas, and he called for the construction of temples in historically disputed locations like Kashi, Mathura, Bhojshala, and Sambhal, where Mosques stand at the moment. In his mind, these temples, built after destroying the current Islamic religious structures, would “remove the stains” from these sacred sites, promoting the idea of religious purity while targeting Islamic places of worship.

Singh’s speeches only contribute to a growing sense of fear and mistrust between India’s communities, feeding into a larger narrative of religious confrontation and division.

The video of speech can be seen here:

Kajal Hindustani: A right-wing influencer encouraging harmful communal divisions

February 19, 2025 

Kajal Hindustani is another key figure spreading dangerous communal poison. At a Shiv Jayanti event in Nagpur on February 19, Hindustani not only pushed the harmful “love jihad” narrative but also revived harmful stereotypes about Muslims. She referred to Muslims as “jihadis,” equating them with violence and radicalism. Additionally, she launched an attack on the Muslim practice of Azaan, fuelling the existing prejudice against Islamic religious practices.

This kind of speech is highly problematic, as it promotes an environment where one community’s practices and identity are vilified and targeted. Hindustani’s reach as an influencer amplifies her harmful messages, reaching a much wider audience.

The video of speech can be seen here:

Following the complaint filed by Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) on October 25, 2024, against Kajal Shingala, also known as Kajal Hindustani, for delivering an anti-Muslim hate speech at an event in Thane, an FIR was registered on October 30, 2024, at the Wagle Estate Police Station in Thane. The FIR charges Hindustani under sections 299, 302, and 353 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which address offenses related to promoting religious animosity and public mischief. In addition, the event’s organizer, Veer Bahadur Yadav, was also booked for his involvement in permitting the speech. 

Ashwini Upadhyaya: Legitimising hate and conspiracy theories

February 20, 2025 

Ashwini Upadhyaya, a Supreme Court lawyer and prominent BJP leader, has also been vocal in spreading far-right narratives. On February 20, at a lecture on the Indian Constitution in Parbhani, he advocated for the restoration of “historic sacred places” like Kashi, Mathura, and Bhojshala, referring to which he claimed that the Mosque had been built after destroying temples. This rhetoric is rooted in the ideological push for the Ram Mandir, built at the destruction site of Babri Majid, and other religious sites to be reclaimed as symbols of Hindu supremacy.

The video of speech can be seen here:

Upadhyaya’s speeches are filled with conspiracy theories, including baseless claims about “love jihad” and “land jihad.” He further exacerbated these fears by drawing on international examples, citing China and Israel as models for population control measures. Linking population control to “love jihad” reflects a troubling trend where he frames demographic changes, especially Muslim migration, as a grave threat to India’s Hindu identity.

February 11, 2025 

On February 11, in Raigarh, Upadhyaya made statements about “infiltration jihad” and the alleged presence of six crore “infiltrators” in India, many of whom, according to him, were Muslims. Such claims serve no purpose other than to stoke fear and division in society.

The video of speech can be seen here:

February 2, 2025 

On February 2, in Pune, at the V.D. Savarkar Memorial Lectures organized by Swanand Janakalyan Pratishthan, Supreme Court lawyer Ashwini Upadhyay demonized Muslims by selectively citing cases where Hindu women were murdered by Muslim men. He stirred fear about ‘infiltration’ and led the audience in an oath against alleged ‘land jihad’ and ‘love jihad,’ promoting unfounded and divisive claims about demographic threats.

The video of speech can be seen here:

The role of Hindu Janajagruti Samiti: furthering hate and division

Hindu Janajagruti Samiti, a far-right organisation, also plays a significant role in spreading of conspiracies and peddling hatred with potential to harm our social fabric and harmony. On February 3, during a press conference on Bangladeshi ‘infiltrators’ at Marathi Patrakar Sangh, Mumbai, organized by Hindu Janajagruti Samiti, Sanatan Sanstha leader Abhay Vartak claimed that on alleged Bangladeshi “infiltrators,”. Abhay Vartak, claimed that up to ten lakh Bangladeshi immigrants live in Mumbai, which he linked to an increase in crimes and unemployment. His remarks were clearly aimed at inciting fear and suspicion towards the Muslims living in Mumbai, holding them responsible for collectively attacking the Indian economy. Vartak further promoted the conspiracy of “land jihad” and “love jihad,” underscoring how these controversial and harmful ideas are being propagated at multiple levels.

The impact of hate speech on Maharashtra and beyond

The hate-filled speeches delivered by these lawmakers and influencers are not only harming Maharashtra’s social fabric but also endangering the unity of the nation. Such rhetoric creates an environment where one minority community feels persecuted, that can lead to a cycle of hate and retaliation. Moreover, these statements are dangerous as they normalize a call for violence and discrimination against a particular religious community, portraying them as collectively acceptable responses to perceived grievances.

By invoking divisive terms like “love jihad,” “land jihad,” and “infiltration jihad,” these above-mentioned leaders are playing on people’s fears, creating imaginary threats to the nation’s demographic and religious balance. 

Furthermore, these speeches shrinking the very foundation of India’s secular democracy, where all religions are meant to be treated equally. Instead, they promote a vision of India where one religion is dominant and all others are viewed with suspicion and hostility.

The role of authorities in curbing hate speech

The time has come for a serious conversation about the accountability of public figures, particularly legislators, who use their platforms to promote hate and division. In Maharashtra, BJP leaders like Nitesh Rane, T Raja Singh, Ashwini Upadhyaya, and others have proven that they are willing to sow communal discord for political gain. Their speeches not only undermine the values of unity and secularism but also pose a grave threat to the fabric of society.

It is critical for the authorities to take swift action against hate speech and hold leaders accountable. The continued silence and inaction will only embolden others to follow in their footsteps, further poisoning the political discourse and deepening the divisions within our society. The future of Maharashtra, and indeed India, depends on the strength of its commitment to secularism, equality, and justice. It is time for the nation to stand united against hate, no matter where it originates.

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The post Leaders and the spread of divisive narratives appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Two key factors shaped the trajectory of hate speech in 2024: the general elections held between April and June and the state elections in Maharashtra and Jharkhand later in the year. The election season provided an opportunity for the BJP and its ideological allies to deploy hate speech as a tactical instrument of voter mobilisation, using communal rhetoric to polarise electorates along religious lines. Additionally, the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government in Bangladesh in August 2024 and subsequent violence against Hindus in that country were exaggerated and weaponised by Hindu nationalist groups to justify anti-Muslim sentiment in India. These events led to the second major surge in hate speech, as BJP leaders and right-wing organisations capitalised on anxieties surrounding Bangladeshi Hindus to vilify Indian Muslims as an existential threat.

This report does not merely document numbers; it exposes the deliberate strategies, key actors, and ideological motivations behind the intensification of hate speech. By analysing both the content and context of hate speech events, it highlights how communal hatred has become a structured and institutionalised feature of Indian political life.

The role of the BJP and Hindu nationalist groups in organising hate speech

The most striking aspect of the hate speech patterns in 2024 was the direct involvement of the BJP and its ideological affiliates. Unlike previous years, where hate speech was primarily driven by state-level BJP politicians and religious extremists, 2024 saw an aggressive push from the highest levels of political leadership, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Home Minister Amit Shah, and Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath. These leaders did not merely tolerate or ignore hate speech; they actively participated in it, using their national and regional platforms to spread divisive narratives, dehumanise Muslims and Christians, and stoke communal tensions.

The BJP emerged as the largest organiser of hate speech events, directly facilitating 340 gatherings—29.2% of all documented cases. This was a massive 580% increase compared to 2023, where the party was responsible for only 50 such events. The party’s leadership strategically weaponised hate speech as an electoral tool, particularly during the general elections, where 76.7% of BJP-organised hate speech events occurred.

Alongside the BJP, its ideological allies, including the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and its militant youth wing, the Bajrang Dal, played a central role in propagating hate. These groups organised 279 hate speech events, a 29.1% increase from the previous year. The Sakal Hindu Samaj (SHS), a Maharashtra-based coalition of Hindu nationalist organisations, was responsible for 56 hate speech events, featuring extremist speakers like Suresh Chavhanke, Kajal Hindustani, and BJP legislators T. Raja Singh and Nitish Rane.

The Hindu Rashtra Sena (HRS), led by Dhananjay Desai—an individual accused in the 2014 murder of a Muslim tech professional—also expanded its operations, coordinating 19 hate speech events. Smaller groups such as the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti (HJS), Rashtriya Hindu Sher Sena, Shiv Shakti Akhada, and Shri Ram Sena also played roles in spreading anti-Muslim and anti-Christian propaganda.

These findings illustrate that hate speech in India is not merely an act of individual bigotry; it is an organised, well-funded, and politically sanctioned project, strategically deployed to create a climate of fear and exclusion for religious minorities.

The election season: Hate speech as a tool for political mobilisation

The 2024 general elections and subsequent state elections in Maharashtra and Jharkhand were inflection points in the escalation of hate speech. During the election period, 373 hate speech incidents were recorded, with Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Bihar, Delhi, West Bengal, and Jharkhand being the most affected.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi emerged as one of the most active disseminators of hate speech, particularly after his April 21 election rally in Banswara, Rajasthan, where he accused Muslims of being “infiltrators” who would take away Hindu wealth and resources. This speech triggered a nationwide surge in hate speech events, with many BJP leaders mimicking and amplifying his rhetoric.

Home Minister Amit Shah also played a pivotal role, delivering 58 hate speeches, often invoking Muslim “vote jihad” and the threat of “land jihad”. Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath led the charge with 86 hate speeches, averaging one hate speech every four days. Other BJP leaders, including Himanta Biswa Sarma, T. Raja Singh, Nitish Rane, and Pushkar Singh Dhami, followed suit, systematically targeting Muslims and Christians.

The BJP’s election strategy relied heavily on manufacturing fear and communal resentment. A common narrative was that opposition parties, particularly the Congress and the INDIA alliance, were working to strip Hindus of their rights and redistribute resources to Muslims. Modi, Adityanath, and Shah repeatedly claimed that the opposition would take away Hindu property and give it to “Bangladeshi infiltrators and Rohingya refugees.”

The normalisation of such rhetoric had real-world consequences. Hate speech is not just words; it is a form of political violence—a precursor to mob attacks, communal riots, and systemic discrimination. By integrating hate speech into mainstream electoral discourse, the BJP and its allies effectively legitimised violence against minorities, making it an acceptable part of governance and state policy.

The role of social media in amplifying hate

Hate speech in 2024 was not confined to public gatherings. Social media played a critical role in amplifying and mainstreaming hate speech, ensuring that it reached millions within seconds. The IHL report tracked 995 videos of in-person hate speech events back to their original sources on Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, and Telegram.

Facebook alone hosted 495 hate speech videos, while 211 were traced to YouTube. Additionally, 266 anti-minority hate speeches delivered by BJP leaders were simultaneously live-streamed across multiple platforms. This demonstrates how social media platforms, despite their stated policies against hate speech, served as key enablers of communal propaganda.

The virality of hate speech on digital platforms exacerbated the cycle of radicalisation, with algorithm-driven amplification prioritising the most extreme voices. Instead of curbing communal incitement, Facebook and YouTube allowed inflammatory content to spread unchecked, effectively becoming complicit in the proliferation of Hindu nationalist extremism.

Anti-Muslim hate speech: From dehumanisation to calls for violence

The IHL report reveals that 1,147 out of 1,165 hate speech events targeted Muslims, demonstrating that anti-Muslim rhetoric remains the cornerstone of Hindu nationalist politics.

Dehumanisation and conspiracy theories- The report documents an alarming rise in the use of conspiracy theories to portray Muslims as an existential threat to Hindus. These include:

• “Love Jihad” – The false claim that Muslim men are seducing Hindu women to convert them to Islam and destroy Hindu culture.
• “Land Jihad” – The baseless allegation that Muslims are systematically occupying Hindu lands.
• “Vote Jihad” – The claim, propagated by Modi himself, that Muslims vote as a bloc to weaken Hindu political power.
• “Population Jihad” – The debunked theory that Muslims are deliberately increasing their population to outnumber Hindus.
• “Thook Jihad” (Spit Jihad) – The unfounded conspiracy that Muslims spit on food to contaminate it.
• “Economic Jihad” – The assertion that Muslim businesses are attempting to monopolise the economy to subjugate Hindus.

PM Modi, CM Adityanath, and other BJP leaders actively promoted these narratives in election speeches, fuelling hate crimes and vigilante violence against Muslims.

Direct calls for violence and social boycotts- The report documents 259 hate speeches that explicitly called for violence against Muslims. This included:

• Calls to “eliminate infiltrators”, a dog whistle for Muslim extermination.
• 111 speeches advocating economic boycotts of Muslim businesses.
• 274 speeches calling for the destruction of mosques and Muslim homes.
• 123 speeches that urged Hindus to arm themselves against Muslims.

In one of the most egregious incidents, at a VHP weapons worship event in Uttarakhand, a speaker openly declared that “killing non-Hindus would lead to salvation”.

By endorsing and institutionalising hate speech at the highest levels of political leadership, the BJP has created an atmosphere where state-backed discrimination and violence against Muslims have become routine.

Anti-Christian hate speech: A surge in persecution

While anti-Muslim hate speech remains dominant, 2024 also witnessed a sharp increase in anti-Christian rhetoric. The report documents 115 hate speech events targeting Christians, a number that correlates directly with the rise in attacks on churches and Christian institutions.

Religious persecution and forced conversions- Hindu nationalist groups, particularly the VHP, Bajrang Dal, and Rashtriya Bajrang Dal (RBD), have aggressively pushed the narrative that Christian missionaries are engaging in mass conversions.

At a VHP event in Siliguri, West Bengal, on November 24, a speaker urged activists to “resort to violence if necessary” to stop Christian pastors from entering villages.

Targeting Christian institutions- Christian schools and churches have faced relentless attacks. In March 2024, Hindu nationalist groups in Assam posted threats across Christian-run schools, demanding the removal of crosses and religious symbols.

In December 2024, a Hindu monk in Rajasthan boasted of shutting down “10-15 churches” and jailing 80 Christian priests.

At a Rashtriya Bajrang Dal event in Uttar Pradesh, leaders called for attacks on Catholic schools, branding them as “centres of religious conversion”.

The surge in anti-Christian hate speech has led to a documented increase in mob attacks, forced “reconversion” events, and desecration of churches across India.

Conclusion: Hate speech as a normalised political strategy

The findings of the India Hate Lab 2024 report point to a chilling reality: hate speech has been fully absorbed into India’s political mainstream. The BJP, through both its top leadership and its allied organisations, has made communal rhetoric a central feature of its governance and election strategy. Social media platforms have failed to contain the spread of hateful content, creating an ecosystem where violent rhetoric thrives with impunity.

This normalisation of hate speech is not just a symptom of rising intolerance—it is a deliberate and structured political project, designed to marginalise Muslims and Christians, consolidate Hindu nationalist power, and undermine India’s democratic framework. The consequences of this state-sanctioned hate will reverberate for years to come.

The complete report may be viewed here.

Related:

Are Indian anti-conversion laws targeting minorities or protecting the vulnerable?

The Steady Marginalisation of Indian Muslims

Honour for killers of Gauri Lankesh and MM Kalburgi in Karnataka, public felicitation and terms like “Hindu tigers” for accused Amit Baddi and Ganesh Miskin

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The post India’s Hate Speech Crisis: 1,165 cases recorded in 2024, up 74.4% from 2023 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

– A VHP leader addressing a gathering in Delhi.

“..Consume less food, purchase a cheaper mobile phone, anything, only promise to have five tridents in a home”.

– Another VHP leader addressing a meeting in Delhi.

Provocative speeches and distribution of what is being peddled as ‘legally permissible weapons’ , very much in the heart of the national capital ; detailed plans to hold similar events all over the city, on the eve of elections – all this has not stirred the deep slumber in which the law and order machinery found itself in.

Thanks to the inaction, now the campaign to arm a section of radical Hindus has reportedly spread to the womenfolk as well. Plans are afoot to distribute 20,000 daggers to women from the majority community under what is being billed as ‘Shastra Deeksha Samaroh’. In fact, media was agog with footage of daggers being distributed to Hindu women in the second week of January itself.

No doubt, it would be height of innocence to presume that the silence of the officers/ personnel entrusted with maintaining law and order in the city – which is directly under the purview of the Ministry of Home – is inadvertent.

These events are rather difficult to believe in a city still recovering from the ‘riots’ five year ago which saw deaths of innocents from both the communities and damage to their properties, with role of a section of the police itself coming under the scanner.

It is not difficult to imagine the serious impact such radical mobilisation of the majority community can have – with at least 50,000 Hindu men, the actual numbers could be far more, holding fresh tridents/trishuls and 20,000 women possessing daggers – on the social fabric of the city. With Republic Day celebrations approaching followed by elections to the Assembly, with three major players in the wings, it is anybody’s guess that mischievous elements can engage in their dirty tricks, or even a single event/ non-event can bring the peace and harmony in the national capital under cloud.

What needs to borne in mind is that distribution of what are being portrayed as ‘legally permissible weapons’ (the term itself is an oxymoron) – focusing on the majority community – under religious garb have tremendous political overtones and such programmes held in the national capital are no exception.

It remains to be seen how such ‘weapons distribution’ does not come under censure of the Arms Act, 1959. Section 2(1) (c) of the Act defines “arms” as:

Articles of any description designed or adapted as weapons for offences, or defence, and includes firearms, sharp edged and other deadly weapons, and parts of and machinery for manufacturing arms, but does not include articles designed solely for domestic or agricultural uses such as a lathi, or an ordinary walking stick and weapons incapable of being used otherwise than as toys or of being converted into serviceable weapons.

The programme in Paharganj in Delhi in December 2024, where the regular right-wing rhetoric was very much on display, was not an isolated programme. It was an integral part of a ‘series of far-right gatherings in December 2024’ which had exposed a ‘disturbing pattern of communal mobilisation which was spread across Punjab, Delhi and Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan according to the Citizens for Justice & Peace (CJP).

What one observes that even dates of programmes in Delhi, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh coincided with each other (15 December). According to close observers, all these events, “[w]hich involve distributing tridents and administering oaths to “protect Hindu identity,” have become platforms for promoting exclusionary ideologies and inciting communal hatred”, CJP said. All these gathering where vilifying minorities, glorifying ‘baseless conspiracies like ‘love jihad’ and ‘land jihad,’ ‘ calls for calling for economic boycotts’, and glorifying vigilantism is freely on display thus ‘deepen social divisions but also normalize the idea of violence under the guise of cultural or religious defence’, the CJP added.

For example look at this report of a Trishul Deeksha event held in Nurmaha (Punjab), organised by VHP and Bajrang Dal, where ‘[a] far-right leader made several inflammatory remarks, invoking controversial issues tied to communal tensions.’ He declared: “Now that Ram Mandir is built, Kashi and Mathura remain!”—a direct reference to the ongoing demands by right-wing groups to reclaim the Gyanvapi mosque in Varanasi and the Shahi Idgah mosque in Mathura. Such rhetoric stokes communal sentiments by framing these mosques as illegitimate structures atop Hindu temples.

Any close observer of the communal situation in the country can vouch that the idea of holding ‘Trishul Deeksha Samaroh’ by Hindutva Supremacists formations is not a recent one and has a more than two decade old history, where conscious attempts were made to vitiate communal atmosphere. In fact, while armed communal mobilisation of the wider populace has always remained on the agenda of these supremacists organisations, such attempts gathered further strength through this campaign. The programme of Trishul Deekshas was taken up as a broader campaign since 1998 which gained in pace and stridency since the Gujarat massacre in 2002. Formally such programmes were termed as symbolic religious exercise supposedly to awaken the people but its intent was clear.

Reports of resistance to such mischievous attempts were also not uncommon. According to a report:

Perhaps in this grim situation it would be soothing to remember that a decade ago public protests led by organisations like PUCL, MKSS and others had pressurised the then Gehlot government to not only bring the VHP led Trishul Deeksha programme under the purview of the Arms Act but also prosecute leaders like Togadia who had been making communal hate speeches in the Trishul distribution ceremonies.

With the ascent of these Supremacists forces in the national polity, of late such programmes are again gaining momentum.

Look at this complaint filed by CJP with Nagpur police against two trishul distribution events, organised by Bajrang Dal & VHP. It provided details of these ‘two Trishul Diksha events held on May 2 and May 9’ respectively by ‘extremist outfits owing allegiance to Hindutva’ where, in addition to distribution of tridents amongst men, hate speeches are delivered exhorting Hindus to take up arms.’ Under these programmes demands for ‘India as a Hindu nation were also raised’, and the speakers ‘indulged in peddling various conspiracy theories to generate hate towards Muslims.’ The petition also talked about how “Bajrang Dal (BD) and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) have been organising such trishul distribution events regularly in the state of Rajasthan, and have been creating disharmony, furthering their communal agenda’.

Within less than three months CJP filed another petition with National Commission of Minorities against ‘arms training camps, weapon distribution events in Assam and Rajasthan’ held on July 30, 2023 and August 1, 2023, flagging “IPC violations, Arms Act breaches, and concerns for public safety and inter-community relations’ in these programmes

According to the complaint, the ‘arms training camp was organised by the Rashtriya Bajrang Dal in Darrang District of the state of Assam’, where ‘around 350 Hindu youths received training in handling firearms, martial arts, survival skills, and quick thinking. The intention of this camp was allegedly to fight against “love jihad” and create a divide among people from different communities, religions, and linguistic affiliations.’ The Rajasthan story was bit different. Here ‘fringe extremist organization of Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Bajrang Dal’ allegedly distributed sharp-edged tridents among hundreds of Hindu men in Jaitaran, Pali, Rajasthan. Participants took an oath to uphold a “Hindu Rashtra,” pledging allegiance to militant Hindu ideologies.

Within less than a month Sabrang published a detailed article unmasking ‘the Ideological Shift in Rajasthan’s Communal Landscape’ with a special focus on trident distribution and collective pledges taken at these programmes and explained how it “[r]eflects a troubling trend of religious polarisation, challenging India’s secular fabric and communal harmony. The aggressive mobilisation and hate that inevitably accompanies such gatherings sets the stage of stigmatisation and targeting of minorities in the area.’

According to it, such events which hold deep symbolism within the context of Hindutva, signify not only ‘Commitment to Hindutva Ideology’, but also it is openly proclaimed ‘their allegiance to an ideology that seeks to establish India as a Hindu-only nation’, which ‘goes against the principles of secularism enshrined in the Indian Constitution, that guarantees equal rights and freedoms to all religious communities.’ It further explained how the pledge to protect Hindu Dharam – repeated umpteen times in such gatherings underlines their belief that such elements are under threat from other religious communities and how it ‘fosters an “us versus them” mentality which further leads to ‘social tensions and conflicts.’

Coming back to Delhi, one does not know whether the custodians of law and order in Delhi – who directly work under the central Ministry of Home Affairs, led by none other than Mr Amit Shah, would review their approach and try to rein in these fanatic elements.

An added complexity is the manner in which AAP has never been forthcoming about the politics of polarisation practised by the BJP which is being termed as its own Hindutva Lite politics by analysts.

AAP’s decade old history bears witness to its own game of pandering to the false anxieties of the majority community to try to win them over its own side. A glimpse of its myopic approach vis a vis this issue can be gleaned from its direction to schools to stop admission of ”illegal Bangladeshis’ which contradicts its own policy.

Any neutral observer can see that the task of preserving the secular character of the polity and society becomes extremely difficult and challenging in such times.

Courtesy: Newsclick

The post Tridents for Men and Daggers for Women appeared first on SabrangIndia.

He referred to Muslims as “descendants of the Mughals,” called for “Jai Shree Ram” to dominate India, and spread fear by suggesting a Muslim population threat to Hindus, with specific reference to West Bengal, as CJP pleads before the CEO Delhi.

CJP mentioned in its complaint that, “BJP leader Ravinder Singh Negi’s speech appears to be a clear attempt to communalize the election process by drawing sharp religious lines between Hindus and Muslims. By invoking his identity as a “Sanatani Hindu” and asserting a duty to protect Hindus, Negi positions the Hindu community as a victim in need of protection from an alleged Muslim threat. He frames this as a moral imperative, aimed at gaining votes on religious grounds rather than on merit or policy.”

CJP stated that BJP Councillor’s speech highlights divisive rhetoric, particularly in his mention of the “descendants of the Mughals” and their “faces downcast,” which seems to stigmatize Muslims by associating them with past Muslim rulers in India. This historical reference is meant to provoke fear and resentment towards Muslims, painting them as hostile or antagonistic to Hindu interests. The statement that “only ‘Jai Shri Ram’ will be spoken” further emphasizes Hindu supremacy, implying that Muslims and other non-Hindu groups should be marginalized.

Additionally, Negi brings up the issue of the Kashmiri Pandit exodus and the alleged persecution of Hindus in Bangladesh. While these are legitimate concerns, his framing of these issues in a way that directly associates them with Muslims (both in Kashmir and Bangladesh) exploits communal sentiments to garner support. By focusing on perceived threats to Hindu communities, he uses emotional appeals that stoke fear and division rather than offering solutions to social or economic issues.

The harmful impact of divisive rhetoric on Delhi’s social fabric and democratic values

CJP in its complaint before CEO, Delhi concerned that the divisive rhetoric presented in Ravinder Singh Negi’s speech poses a significant threat to Delhi’s social fabric and democratic values. By categorizing entire communities based on religious identity, Negi fosters division and resentment between Hindus and Muslims. His statements that Muslims are the “descendants of the Mughals” with “faces downcast” perpetuate harmful stereotypes and vilify a large segment of the population. This fuels communal animosity, creating an environment where religious identity becomes the basis for trust and belonging, rather than shared values of equality and mutual respect.

“Furthermore, the use of historical grievances, such as the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits and alleged violence in Bangladesh, stirs up fear and distrust without addressing the broader complexities of these issues. Instead of focusing on unity or national progress, Negi’s rhetoric plays on emotions, encouraging polarization and undermining the inclusive spirit that democratic societies thrive on” as per CJP complaint.

Impact on electoral environment

Additionally, CJP has highlighted serious concerns regarding the impact of divisive language on the electoral environment, particularly in reference to BJP Councillor Ravinder Negi’s statements. CJP stated that Negi’s rhetoric significantly impacts voting behavior, as it shifts the focus of electoral choices from substantive issues like governance, economic growth, healthcare, and infrastructure to communal anxieties. This shift, according to CJP, undermines reasoned debates and encourages a political discourse cantered on identity politics and exclusionary agendas. The divisive language employed fosters communal polarization, transforming elections into contests for dominance rather than forums for collective progress. Voters, CJP mentioned, are swayed by alarmist narratives rather than informed decision-making based on candidates’ policies and merits. CJP also pleaded that this kind of rhetoric diminishes the democratic integrity of the electoral process, as it exploits religious and cultural insecurities.

Furthermore, CJP emphasized that such communal narratives erode public trust in democratic institutions, as high-ranking leaders like Negi set a troubling precedent prioritizing polarization over unity. CJP noted that this rhetoric risks inciting social unrest, which could have lasting consequences for peace and stability in Delhi.

Violations of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC)

CJP also brought attention to Negi’s violations of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), specifically stating that his statements breach guidelines aimed at ensuring free, fair, and peaceful elections. CJP pointed out that Part I of the MCC prohibits activities that aggravate existing communal tensions, which Negi’s comments clearly violate by using religious identity to promote political loyalty. His call for Hindus to vote for BJP based on religious grounds and his derogatory references to Muslims further exemplify this breach. Additionally, CJP emphasized violations under Part V of the MCC, where appeals to religious sentiments in election campaigns are prohibited, stating that Negi’s speech violates this by promoting Hindu identity and vilifying Muslims.

Legal violations under the Representation of People Act, 1951

CJP also referenced legal violations under the Representation of People Act, 1951, specifically Section 123(2), which prohibits undue influence on voters. CJP pleaded that Negi’s religious appeals aim to influence voters by framing voting for BJP as a moral duty, based on religious loyalty rather than policy considerations. CJP further noted that Negi’s appeal violates Section 123(3), which prohibits appeals on religious grounds, as well as Section 123(3A), which prohibits promoting feelings of enmity or hatred between communities for electoral gain. CJP argued that Negi’s divisive rhetoric, which creates hostility between Hindus and Muslims, seeks to exploit these divisions for political advantage, violating multiple sections of the Representation of People Act.

CJP’s complaint to CEO Delhi dated January 10, 2025 may be read here:

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The post Communal Campaign: CJP approached CEO, Delhi against the MCC violation and hate speech by BJP Councillor appeared first on SabrangIndia.

For Cow vigilantes Modi had given a statement that murder in the name of cow is not acceptable, and just a few hours later a Muslim man was done to death on this issue. Apart from the phenomenon which is continuing. “Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Monday said that the significance of love, harmony, and brotherhood is central to the teachings of Lord Christ. He also urged people to strengthen these values.” Just a couple of days later the vigilante groups and even Bajrang Dal groups attacked a person in Ahmedabad who had dressed as Santa Clause and was distributing gifts. A video is going viral where two men dressed as Santa Claus being beaten up by hooligans at the Kankaria Carnival in Ahmedabad. This probably is the first year where people dressed as Santa Clause are being hauled up.

Already we had seen that Carol Singers were beaten up and since BJP came to power Carol singing has been stopped in Rashtrapati Bhavan. Bajrang Dal has also issued warnings to Hindus for their attending Christmas parties. How come these acts at the time of Christmas are seeing a new low currently?

Recently we also saw the claims on mosques that there was such a temple so it must be dug up a la Babri Masjid style. Seeing the spate of such made up claims, RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat himself said that we should not keep looking for Shivling under every mosque. It is amazing that the claim is made, and dispute created in Kashi where a fountain looking structure is claimed to be a Shivling and demand for converting the mosque into a temple boosted. After the Sambhal claims, the violence followed.

Probably shaken by this and the feeling that the Supreme Leader of the supra political outfit felt it will bring loss of face for ‘RSS Combine’ and so he gave a sane looking call, “The Ram Temple was about faith, and Hindus wanted it built. But raising disputes about new sites out of hate is unacceptable,” he said. “Some people think they can become leaders of Hindus by creating new controversies. How is this allowed?”

And lo and behold most of the fringe organizations of Hindutva politics are coming forward to oppose it. One knows that RSS is a strict disciplinarian organization, and its members do not violate the commands of its leader. So who are these Senas, Dharma Sansads springing up by a dozen and going against the appeal of Bhagwat?

To cap it all, RSS’s unofficial mouth piece Organizer itself came forward to articulate the fringe elements’ demands and wrote that “Temple restorations are a quest for our identity! (TOI Dec 27, 2024). It also claims that temple restorations are for our national identity and to seek civilizational justice.

How come the hate is so pervasive that it is crossing the limits set by its own leaders? Is it that the leaders like Prime Minister Modi want the actions leading to hate to continue, as it strengthens their politics? If not then why are the perpetrators of violence are enjoying impunity? Why does the whole system from spreaders of hate speech, to those responsible for maintaining law and order and even to some extent even the judiciary have a soft corner for these criminal elements.

Having enjoyed the impunity for destroying Babri Mosques and lynching in the name of cow/beef or on killings and torture on the charge of ‘love-jihad’, now they know they can get away with their illegal acts. They feel that law may be bent to ensure that they are exonerated.

The phenomenon of Organiser opposing Bhagwat arouses curiosity. Is there a split within RSS on the issue? Bhagawat trying to talk peace and harmony and the managers of Organiser feeling that the path of Hate and violence should be pursued to its fullest depth.

There is another aspect which needs to be understood. When such phenomenon’s are unleashed for political benefits, initially the leaders congratulate themselves for their success in the electoral arena. From top to bottom diverse elements spring up and as Mr. Bhagawat said some of them ape for higher political position and influence. They are the one’s continuing their earlier political roots of which were sown by their leaders. One recalls that previous top RSS leader K. Sudarshan, who later became RSS Chief, was on the stage when Babri mosque was being demolished. This has been a classical case of crime and no punishment.

All the guilty of this dastardly crime of Babri demolition were finally given ‘not guilty’ chit and the judge who did this for the communal politics, got a plum job after his retirement.

As they say, ‘as you sow, so you reap’, the demolition of Babri process as a whole tells us that it was not just a spreading of fake narratives of temple destructions, and many myths against Muslims. The result is there for us to see, where even the Supreme authority of RSS is not being listened to. The anti-Christian campaign is just a continuation of the decade’s old propaganda against Christians that they are converting by force, fraud and allurement.

The likes of Bhagwat and Modi are witnessing right in front of their eyes that the Genie can be unleashed from the bottle, but to put it back is a task, which is close to impossible.

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On November 22, a division bench of Acting Chief Justice Manoj Kumar Tiwari and Justice Rakesh Thapliyal heard a petition (WPCRL/1275/2024) filed by the Alpsankhayak Seva Samiti (ASS), a minority organization. The court directed the District Magistrate (DM) and Superintendent of Police (SP) in Uttarkashi to provide stringent security for the mosque, which has been targeted by right-wing groups alleging its illegal construction. These groups have called for a Mahapanchayat (community gathering) on December 1 to demand the mosque’s demolition.

In its oral observations, the High Court emphasized that India is a country governed by the rule of law, not a theocracy. “No one should indulge in hate speech or threats of destruction,” the bench remarked, as Times of India reported.

Background

The row over the mosque dates back to September 2024 when members of the Sanyukt Sanatan Dharam Raksha Sangh, along with other right-wing groups, organized a rally in Uttarkashi demanding the mosque’s removal. They alleged that the mosque was illegally constructed on government land. The protests led to violent clashes between demonstrators and police, with at least four officers injured during a November 3 rally. Police had to resort to lathi charges and flag marches to restore order.

In their petition, the ASS, through its president Mushraf Ali and Istiak Ahmed, highlighted the mosque’s historical and legal status. The petitioners claim that the mosque was built in 1969 on land purchased by Istiak Ahmed’s father, Yasim Beg, and was later registered as a Waqf property in 1987 following a notification by the Uttar Pradesh Waqf Commissioner. The mosque, located near Varunavat Mountain, has been a place of worship for the Sunni Muslim community for over five decades, as Times of India reported.

However, the protests have centered on the assertion by right-wing leaders that the mosque’s construction was illegal and it should be demolished. Leaders of the Sanyukt Sanatan Dharam Raksha Sangh have spread claims that the mosque was unlawfully built on government land. These allegations have fueled the demand for its demolition, despite the mosque’s legal recognition as a Waqf property.

The ASS petition, filed in response to these demands, has raised concerns over the safety of the mosque and its worshippers. The petitioners argue that the local authorities have failed to protect the mosque from threats and acts of violence, forcing them to seek judicial intervention.

The High Court’s intervention came after a series of violent incidents linked to the protests. On October 24, a rally organized by the right-wing groups turned violent, leading to stone-pelting and police baton charges. At least 27 people, including nine police officers, were injured during the confrontation. The police subsequently filed an FIR against 200 unidentified individuals and arrested key organizers, who were later granted bail.

Direction to maintain law and order in, and around the mosque

In addition to calling for heightened security, the High Court urged the state to take explicit direction from the Director General of Police (DGP) to maintain law and order. The court has scheduled a fresh hearing for November 27, at which further actions to address the growing tensions will be discussed.

The bench directed that “In the meantime, respondent nos. 2 & 3 are directed to maintain law and order in, and around, the place of worship mentioned in the Writ Petition, and to ensure that no untoward incident happens by any person till the next date of listing.”

The petitioners have also emphasized the violation of the Supreme Court’s guidelines on hate speech. As reported by The Indian Express, advocate Imran Ali Khan, representing the petitioners, argued that the hate speech against Muslims and the mosque by the protestors was a direct violation of the Supreme Court’s directive in the case of Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India. The Supreme Court had ruled that authorities must take suo motu action against hate speech, even in the absence of formal complaints, and register cases under Sections 196 and 197 of the Indian Penal Code.

The rising tensions have also attracted national attention, as the issue strikes at the heart of ongoing debates over religious tolerance, freedom of worship, and the rule of law in India. The Uttarakhand High Court’s ruling is seen as a critical stand in upholding these values and ensuring that religious communities are protected from violence and intimidation.

As the court proceedings continue, all eyes will be on the government’s response and its ability to maintain peace in the region. With the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) also planning to participate in the Mahapanchayat on December 1, the coming weeks will be crucial in determining whether the state can quell the rising unrest and ensure the safety of the mosque and its community members. However, the challenge now lies in the hands of the state authorities to act decisively and prevent further escalation.

The Uttarakhand High Court order dated November 22, 2024 can be accessed here

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