Still, no case was registered.

An FIR was finally registered on Tuesday, January 27, but by the time the police acted, the damage had already been done—not just in words spoken, but in what the delay itself revealed.

Incidentally, “Direct and public incitement to commit genocide” is expressly prohibited by Article III(c) of the 1948 UN Genocide Convention and is punishable even if the genocide does not actually occur. Besides, incidentally, it is concerning that Indian authorities are so lax on such utterances when Genocide Watch has already adjudged India as an ‘enabler’ and in a report published in 2024 outlined how, in India all the early warning signs of a potential genocide of/against Muslims is present and that this threat must be addressed quickly and proactively. This report of Genocide Watch may be read here.

Five days earlier, according to the report of Siasat, at a public religious-political gathering in Shivgarh, Raebareli, speakers stood on a stage, before a cheering crowd, and openly called for mass violence against Muslims, invoking the logic, language, and memory of one of India’s most brutal communal massacres. They did not whisper. They did not speak in riddles. They asked for bloodshed, mocked past killings, and framed genocide as retaliation and “peace.”

Yet for days, the state remained silent.

It was only after a sustained social media campaign and repeated formal complaints by former student leader and journalist Prashant Kanojia—who meticulously documented the speeches, flagged their legal implications, and publicly questioned police inaction—that the Uttar Pradesh Police moved to register an FIR. The registration came three days after his initial complaint, and five days after the event itself.

A week after hate speeches targeting the Muslim community, UP police have finally registered an FIR against Daksh Chaudhary, Riddhima Sharma, Prakash Singh, Akku Pandit, Abhishek Thakur, Khushboo Pandey and others for inflammatory hate speech at Virat Hindu Sammelan in… pic.twitter.com/CrYCWPeU3j

— Mohammed Zubair (@zoo_bear) January 27, 2026

The FIR, therefore, marks not swift law enforcement, but reluctant compliance—an action taken only after public scrutiny made continued inaction untenable.

This episode is not merely about one conference or a handful of speakers. It is about how calls for genocide are increasingly delivered from public stages, how historical massacres are resurrected as rallying cries, and how the constitutional promise of equal protection under law fractures when hate speech enjoys informal impunity.

What follows is a detailed account of what was said at the Raebareli conference, who said it, how the state responded, and why the delay itself demands as much scrutiny as the speeches that triggered it.

The Trigger: A call for a “15-minute bloodbath”

Videos from the event that later went viral show a woman speaker urging the crowd to allow “15 minutes” of unchecked violence, explicitly referencing the 1989 Bhagalpur riots, one of the deadliest communal massacres in post-Independence India. The implication was chillingly clear: that brief withdrawal of state restraint could once again result in mass killings without consequences.

These clips circulated widely online, drawing sharp condemnation—but initially, no police action followed.

What was said at the Virat Hindu Conference

Open calls for mass killing: As per the report of Siasat, at the centre of the controversy are speeches by Riddhima Sharma, a Hindutva social media influencer known as SanataniRiddhi, and Khushbu Pandey, also known as Hindu Sherni.

Riddhima Sharma referred to the December 2025 lynching of Bangladeshi Hindu Dipu Chandra Das and told the audience: “If they kill two of yours, you kill 100 people in retaliation for peace.”

She went further, invoking the conspiracy theory of “love jihad”, and urged: If they make one Hindu girl run away, then you should make 100 of their girls run away.”

She added that the Muslim population was already large, implying that reducing their numbers would not matter—a remark cited in complaints as an explicit endorsement of mass violence.

Glorification of Bhagalpur 1989: Khushbu Pandey revived the phrase “gobi farming,” a widely recognised dog whistle for the Bhagalpur riots of 1989, particularly the Logain massacre, where at least 116 Muslim men were killed and buried in fields where cauliflower saplings were planted to conceal the bodies.

Addressing the crowd, Pandey reportedly said that during Bhagalpur:

“The police stepped away for 15 minutes—and not a single body floating in the Ganga was of a Hindu.”

She laughed as the crowd cheered, later joking about planting “organic gobi” on Muslim graves—remarks widely seen as celebrating mass murder.

Location: Shivgarh, Raebareli, Uttar Pradesh

(We kill them, bury them, and then grow cauliflower on top)

During a Virat Hindu Conference meeting, Khushboo Pandey, referencing the 1989 Bhagalpur massacre, requested 15 minutes to speak and called for the massacre of Muslims. pic.twitter.com/yOWXl9Vm1j

— The Muslim (@TheMuslim786) January 22, 2026

Targeting Christians and vigilante warnings: The hate speech was not limited to Muslims. Another speaker, Thakur Ram Singh, accused Christians of engaging in illegal forced conversions, portraying them as a community systematically taking over Hindu groups across India.

An unidentified speaker urged residents to remain vigilant in their neighbourhoods, warning them not to allow Hindu women or girls to be taken away by people labelled as “jihadis.”

Multiple speakers repeatedly emphasised the need to “protect” Hindu women, issuing thinly veiled threats of violence against Muslim men.

No immediate action—until the pressure built

Despite the gravity of the speeches and the circulation of video evidence, no immediate FIR was filed.

On January 23, former journalist Prashant Kanojia submitted a formal written complaint to the Raebareli Superintendent of Police, explicitly stating that Riddhima Sharma had openly called for the massacre of Muslims.

The complaint argued that:

• The speeches amounted to incitement to violence
• They disturbed communal harmony
• They posed a direct threat to public order
• Such rhetoric violated constitutional principles

Kanojia followed up multiple times over the next three days, while simultaneously running a public-facing social media campaign, documenting the delay, tagging authorities, and sharing video excerpts from the event.

FIR registered against Terrorist for calling open genocide of the Muslims. pic.twitter.com/A7gSLANzPp

— Prashant Kanojia (@KanojiaPJ) January 27, 2026

FIR registered—five days after the event

Only after three days of sustained follow-ups and five days after the conference itself, did the UP Police finally register an FIR at Shivgarh police station, on January 27.

As of now:

• No arrests have been made
• The FIR comes only after extensive public scrutiny
• The delay itself has raised serious questions about institutional reluctance to act against communal incitement

A pattern, not an isolated incident

Both Sharma and Pandey have a documented history of inflammatory conduct.

• Sharma recently uploaded a video harassing a Muslim temple employee, questioning why a Muslim had been hired.

Riddhima Sharma tries to threaten people accusing them of allowing Muslim near temple

A Hindu guy intervened & taught her a lesson saying “you people want Riot and Communal tension only,get out from here”

These sanghis are the real threat to Hinduismpic.twitter.com/WccjtbXlCC

— Nehr_who? (@Nher_who) January 27, 2026

• Pandey has previously led rallies calling for violence against Muslims, publicly asserting the “right to bear arms,” often under police escort, without any case being registered.

Hello @DelhiPolice why this lady Khusboo Pandey is roaming around free after such a hateful statements, which is directly incitement of violence.

Even Police is around her but she is perfectly fine spewing venom against Muslims?

pic.twitter.com/S0jyQQlFbn

— Prashant Kanojia (@KanojiaPJ) January 23, 2026

Hate monger Khushbu Pandey has been arrested by Bihar police for reciting Hanuman Chalisa in front of a mosque, disturbing communal harmony.

The search for other accused is ongoing; several people have been arrested so far.#ArrestKhusbuPandey pic.twitter.com/5zOV5EkRGO

— هارون خان (@iamharunkhan) February 18, 2025

• Both figures frequently appear alongside prominent political personalities and boast large online followings, amplifying the reach of their rhetoric.

Why this FIR matters

The FIR is not merely procedural—it is the result of pressure, not proactive policing.

The Raebareli incident underscores:

• How genocidal language is increasingly normalised in public forums
• How dog whistles referencing historical massacres are openly used
• How state response often follows outrage, not law
• How social media scrutiny has become a last resort for accountability

Whether this FIR leads to meaningful legal consequences remains to be seen. For now, it stands as a stark reminder that without public pressure, even the most explicit calls for mass violence can go unanswered.

Related:

From Purola to Nainital: APCR report details pattern of communal violence in Uttarakhand

Publicly Tortured, Forced to Eat Cow Dung: No arrests in Odisha Pastor assault case

Days After Muslim Properties Torched in Tripura, Opposition Parties Say Atmosphere of Fear Persists

Bihar under BJP: Hate attacks against Muslims spiral, one dies

The post When Genocide is provoked from the Stage: Raebareli hate speeches, Bhagalpur dog whistles, and a delayed FIR appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A broad comparative reading of speeches, videos, rallies, slogans, media patterns, complaints, and reports reveals something deeper than mere rhetorical excess. It reveals a political order that increasingly depends on the manufacture of an existential threat. The political message has fused with social fear. Social fear has fused with administrative paralysis. Administrative paralysis has fused with electoral advantage. In this fusion, the very meaning of democracy is being reconfigured: elections no longer offer competing futures but competing hatreds; political legitimacy no longer flows from representation but from the ability to summon and sustain anger.

In this transformed landscape, hate speech functions as infrastructure. It builds worlds. It shapes consciousness. It reorganises neighbourhood markets, influences police behaviour, triggers vigilante assertion, and fractures interdependence at the most micro levels. It is not ephemeral. It is lived, circulated, absorbed, and enacted. In addition, its long-term damage is not only to India’s minorities, but also to India’s democratic capacity itself. Hate becomes not only an electoral weapon but also a method of governance; not only a tactic of polarisation but also a technique of population management.

This article takes stock of this new political order. It examines the imagery and stereotypes deployed across electoral contexts; the fears they stoke; the patterns of mobilisation they generate; the administrative silences that empower them; the media networks that amplify them; and, most importantly, the differential ways in which states like Maharashtra, Delhi, and Bihar adapt this infrastructure to their own socio-political terrains. In Bihar especially, hate speech became a tool to reorder caste configurations—an extraordinary strategic shift with profound implications for the state’s political future.

The fundamental objective of this “Architecture of Polarisation” is two-fold: first, to successfully consolidate a majority (read Hindu) vote bank through the construction of an existential threat narrative; and second, to systematically blur socio-economic realities and caste equations—particularly in states like Bihar—by substituting governance failures with religious conflict. This piece argues that electoral hate speech has evolved from fringe outbursts into an essential, multi-stage campaign strategy, aiming to consolidate a majority vote bank by constructing a fear-driven narrative of existential threat to the majority community.

Notably, along with the article, documents containing communal and provocative speeches delivered during Delhi, Maharashtra and Lok Sabha elections has been attached separately.

CJP’s Election Hate Watch operates as a specialised monitoring system designed to track, document, and challenge hate speech that corrodes the fairness of India’s electoral process. During election cycles, CJP’s conduct daily scans of speeches, election rallies, roadshows, religious gatherings, local WhatsApp circulation, hyperlocal events, and media broadcasts. Every instance of communal incitement is timestamped, transcribed, archived, and assessed against the Model Code of Conduct, RPA, and hate-speech jurisprudence. The process is meticulous: the team captures not only explicit slurs or violent calls but also dog-whistles, coded conspiracies (“love jihad,” “land jihad,” “vote jihad”), ritualised slogans, vigilante mobilisation, and election-season communal rumours. The emphasis is on understanding how hate operates as a political technology—where it originates, who amplifies it, how quickly it spreads, and how it shapes the emotional climate of the constituency.

A core function of the Election Hate Watch is formal accountability. Each verified violation is filed with the Election Commission as a structured MCC complaint—supported with evidence, legal references, URLs, transcripts, and explicit analysis of how the speech violates electoral norms. As complaints accumulate, CJP identifies deeper patterns: repeat offenders who face no consequences; fringe groups that act as advance agents of polarisation months before polling; the transition of hate speech from local agitators to star campaigners; the silence or selective inaction of District Magistrates; and the seasonal spike in anti-minority mobilisation whenever elections approach. The Hate Watch therefore does more than document abuse—it exposes the systemic, cyclical nature of hate-mongering during elections and highlights how institutional indifference enables its escalation.

The National Template of Hatred: How stereotypes become strategy

Across every state examined—Maharashtra, Delhi, Bihar, and during the Lok Sabha campaign—one encounters a startlingly consistent repertoire of imagery. It is a set-piece performance, travelling effortlessly from district to district, from rallies to WhatsApp forwards, from street-corner speeches to prime-time studio screens. The central character of this repertoire is the Muslim figure cast entirely outside the domain of citizenship: the eternal infiltrator, the calculating seducer, the demographic schemer, the territorial conspirator, the economic parasite, the cultural invader.

Protagonists employed to spew this hatred by the ideological majoritarian formation that most benefits from it, the RSS led-Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are the constitutional CEOs of the party’s most polarised states (Uttar Pradesh, Assam and Uttarakhand). The carry forward or trickle down circulation of this hate is then by local level, recognised functionaries of far right formations, closely allied with the regime.

The term “infiltrator” is the axis around which this ecosystem revolves. It appears not merely as an insult but as a political doctrine. Hatred does not operate by merely expressing dislike; it operates by constructing the “Other” as an enemy so dangerous that even constitutional protections must bow before national survival. The infiltrator trope achieves this by collapsing legal categories—foreigner, migrant, refugee, citizen—into a single undifferentiated target. A Muslim man walking with his daughter to school becomes indistinguishable from a Bangladeshi terrorist. A Muslim vendor selling tomatoes becomes indistinguishable from a Rohingya infiltrator. This collapse is not a misunderstanding; it is a deliberate political intervention that renders all constitutional protections fragile.

Alongside the infiltrator, we see the proliferation of “jihad” conspiracies. These conspiratorial logics—love jihad, land jihad, population jihad, vote jihad—are a masterstroke of rhetorical engineering. They allow entirely ordinary, mundane aspects of life—love, marriage, land purchase, childbirth, voting—to be reinterpreted as part of a sinister plan. The beauty of a conspiracy theory is not that it is credible but that it is expansive. It can absorb anything, interpret everything, and justify whatever violence follows. For electoral actors, this is strategic gold.

This vocabulary is supplemented by dehumanising metaphors: termites, snakes, demons. Dehumanisation functions as the precursor to violence, lowering the psychological barrier between rhetoric and action. The use of such animalistic vocabulary across Maharashtra and Lok Sabha speeches shows a clear attempt to create a moral universe in which harming the target feels like cleansing, not cruelty.

Then there is the linguistic architecture of purity and contamination. In Delhi, vendors are forced to display saffron flags or publicly assert their Hindu identity. The underlying claim is that Muslim bodies carry impurity—social, cultural, or even culinary. If a Muslim vendor hides his identity, he is framed as deceitful; if he reveals it, he is ostracised. It is a no-win situation designed to make minority livelihoods precarious.

The repetition of identical metaphors across states shows a powerful truth: hate is being standardised.

The thematic trinity of existential threat

The communal campaign strategy relies on a narrow but potent set of themes, which are tailored locally but consistent nationally. These themes function to dehumanise the minority community, primarily Muslims, and position them as a singular, monolithic threat that transcends local governance issues.

1. The ‘Infiltrator’ and Citizenship Trope: Stoking demographic fear

Across Bihar, Maharashtra, and the Lok Sabha campaign, the core message is that the opposition parties are enabling “Bangladeshi infiltrators” and “Rohingya refugees” to undermine the nation’s security and steal local resources.

• Commonality- The threat to resources and identity: The core claim across all these elections is that “Bangladeshi infiltrators” and “Rohingya refugees” are being enabled by opposition parties to usurp local resources, jobs, and land, thereby changing the demography of border districts. This rhetoric is deployed to stoke the fears of demographic replacement and economic dispossession.

• Top-down amplification: This is not limited to local functionaries; it has been mainstreamed by the highest-ranking “Star Campaigners.” The Prime Minister, for instance, used the term ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) in Bihar, alleging demographic changes in border districts and announcing a mission to deport them to prevent the theft of livelihoods and resources from the youth of Bihar. In the Lok Sabha campaign, the same narrative was used to claim the opposition planned to redistribute the country’s wealth to these “infiltrators”.
• Targeting indigenous communities (Jharkhand): In Jharkhand, this narrative was explicitly used to divide and mobilise the Adivasi and indigenous communities. BJP leaders accused the ruling JMM-Congress coalition of enabling these “infiltrators” to settle illegally, thereby “stealing” resources, jobs, and land from the Adivasis. The rhetoric successfully frames the election not as a choice on development, but as a defense of indigenous culture and territory against an external Muslim threat.
• Delhi and Maharashtra: Local leaders in Delhi utilised the same language, warning residents that if the opposition won, the city would “turn into Dhaka” and that the opposition was busy making Aadhaar cards for these “Bangladeshis”. In Maharashtra, the demand for NRC/Janta NRC was raised with the promise to throw out all Bangladeshis/Rohingya.

The fear stoked: This theme directly stokes the fear of demographic replacement, economic dispossession, and national security compromise, making the electoral choice one of survival rather than policy.

2. The ‘Jihad’ Conspiracy Matrix: Fuelling moral panic and segregation

The term ‘Jihad’ is weaponised as a prefix to various social and economic activities to generate a state of perpetual moral panic within the majority community.

Certain instances of hate speech targeted Muslims in Bihar are as follows:

1. Raghunathpur, Bihar

Assam CM & BJP leader Himanta Biswa Sarma says, “Before I came to Raghunathpur, I thought I would see Lord Ram, Lord Lakshman and Goddess Sita, but I was told that there are many Ram, Laxman and Sita here and there is also Osama. So I asked, who is Osama? This Osama is like the earlier Osama Bin Laden. We have to ensure the elimination of all Osama Bin Ladens in the state. What was Osama’s father’s name? He was called Shahbuddin…”

2. Keoti, Darbhanga, Bihar

Top themes from Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath’s campaign speech: “Bihar’s security is being compromised by letting ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) into Bihar’s land — these are the same people who divide you on caste lines, invite ghuspaithiya (infiltrators), play with your faith, and then work to undermine national security. We must not allow these ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) to enter. Just as Article 370 was ended in Kashmir and Pakistani elements were pushed out, we will remove ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) from our border areas, seize the property of anyone involved in criminal activities, and distribute that property among the poor — the NDA government will do this. Elect NDA candidate Shri Murari Mohan Jha again; do not allow any element that shelters ghuspaithiya (infiltrators), breeds anarchy, or insults Mithila’s culture during festivals and celebrations.”

3. Hajipur, Vaishali, Bihar

Top themes from Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s campaign speech delivered virtually at a public rally: “Should ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) have the right to be on Bihar’s electoral rolls? I know your answer — it should not be. Congress leader Rahul Gandhi took out a ‘Ghuspaithiya Bachao’ yatra in Bihar, because all these parties fighting elections against us see these ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) as their vote bank. And I believe these ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) are snatching jobs from our youth, taking a share of the poor’s grain, and making the country insecure. Rahul ji, hold as many ‘Ghuspaithiya Bachao’ yatras as you want — we will pick out every infiltrator from Bihar and the country and send them out, and we will also work to remove their names from the electoral rolls. This is the decision of the Bharatiya Janata Party, this is the decision of the NDA.”

4. Harsidhi, Purvi Champaran, Bihar

Top themes from CM Pushkar Singh Dhami’s campaign speech: “We have taken strict action against counterfeiters, religious conversion, riots, and against ‘love jihad,’ ‘land jihad,’ and ‘thook jihad.’ Additionally, to curb the operation of illegally functioning madrasas and religious extremism, we have decided to dissolve the Madrasa Board in Uttarakhand. In the coming days, only those madrasas in Uttarakhand that teach the syllabus prescribed by our education board will operate. After winning Bihar, these same measures will be implemented here to ensure its safety. Who do you stand with? Will you stand with the BJP-NDA that puts the national interest above all, or will you stand with those who support ghuspaithiya (infiltrators)? Will you stand with the Uniform Civil Code, or with those who bring Shariat laws and openly give license to the oppression of women?”

5. Chapra, Saran, Bihar

Key themes from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s campaign speech: “Remember this — the RJD and Congress, drowned in appeasement and vote-bank politics, can do nothing except protect ghuspaithiya (infiltrators). These ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) have become their maai-baap (masters). They have invested all their political strength in saving them.”

This matrix directly translates into violence against vulnerable sections and the enforcement of social and economic apartheid. A BJP Councillor in Delhi, for instance, not only demanded a Muslim vendor display his name but also installed saffron flags on Hindu vendors’ stalls to facilitate identity-based commerce, explicitly propagating the slur that the “other community” spits on food.

3. Dehumanisation and Direct Incitement: The slur-to-violence pipeline

The final, most dangerous thematic stage involves the deployment of dehumanizing language that makes violence against the target community palatable and justified.

• Dehumanising slurs: Instances include a BJP member inside the Lok Sabha using Islamophobic and threatening slurs like “terrorist” and “pimp” against a Muslim MP. A BJP leader in Maharashtra, Nitesh Rane, threatened to burn someone and other leaders openly called for gruesome violence, threatening to “kill you like Insects” and chanting, “Danda uthao, Lande baghao“.
• Incitement to violence: Rallies in Maharashtra, led by figures like BJP MLA T Raja Singh, have featured anti-Muslim slurs and direct incitement. In one instance, a leader threatened to “burn someone,” while others openly chanted, “we will also cut people here and throw them in drains”. Another leader explicitly threatened, “we will kill you like Insects”. The CM of Assam, Himanta Biswa Sarma, while delivering a speech in Bihar, likened a person to “Osama Bin Laden” and explicitly called for their “elimination”. This constant use of extreme rhetoric (e.g., “cut people here and throw them in drains”) serves to normalise a climate of hostility, making actual violence against vulnerable sections an anticipated outcome. This rhetoric aims to condition the public to accept violent elimination as a righteous act.

The Emotional Infrastructure of Fear: How hate speech manufactures threat

Hate speech may appear to be about anger, but its true currency is fear. Anger mobilises crowds; fear sustains movements. Across states, four carefully constructed fears appear repeatedly.

The first is economic fear. In poor, agrarian states such as Bihar—or in working-class belts of Maharashtra—the rhetoric focuses on infiltrators stealing government benefits, occupying land illegally, taking jobs, receiving welfare they do not deserve. This rhetoric is powerful because it taps into real economic frustrations but diverts them away from structural inequality and towards minorities. It converts legitimate anger over unemployment or deprivation into communal resentment.

The second is cultural fear. This fear takes the form of a narrative of civilisational decline. Hindu culture is portrayed as under siege; traditions are framed as endangered; festivals are depicted as battlefields. Rituals like Chhath Puja—once shared by communities—become arenas of policing and communal signalling. What was once a festival of rivers and devotion becoming a theatre of antagonism.

The third is demographic fear. It appears most explicitly in national-level speeches during the Lok Sabha campaign. By exaggerating Muslim fertility and framing demographic change as a Muslim conspiracy, politicians create a sense of population panic. Demographic fear is one of the most potent tools of ethnic majoritarianism globally—it transforms the majority into a frightened minority in their own imagination.

The fourth is sexual fear. Women’s bodies become sites of communal anxiety. “Bahu-beti ki izzat” rhetoric casts Muslim men as sexual predators and Hindu men as protectors. It converts women’s autonomy into a communal battlefield and legitimises violent moral policing. This fear is especially weaponised in Maharashtra, where love jihad rhetoric saturates both street-level speeches and high-profile rallies.

Together, these fears produce a moral panic in which majoritarian self-defence becomes not only political strategy but civic virtue.

The operational playbook of mobilisation and division

The communal escalation follows a meticulous, three-stage operational pattern designed to build momentum while providing plausible deniability to the main political party.

The three-stage escalation model: A remarkable consistency emerges across state after state: hate speech follows a three-stage escalation pipeline. This pipeline is not theoretical. It is empirically visible across the Maharashtra file, the Delhi dossier, and Bihar’s hate-speech archive.

In the first stage, fringe actors begin the work of seeding hatred. These actors are often small, semi-obscure organisations—vigilante groups, local religious fronts, hardline cultural outfits. They operate without restraint, testing the boundaries of permissible speech. Their role is to sow the initial seeds of anxiety.

In the second stage, local political leaders elevate these narratives. Their speeches are strategically targeted, naming places, identifying supposed threats, and calling for exclusion or boycott. They do the work of translating fringe slogans into electoral messaging.

In the third stage, national leaders adopt the same rhetoric. This is the most crucial moment, where language becomes law-like, carrying the weight of authority. When senior ministers repeat terms like “infiltrator”, they confer legitimacy on the entire ecosystem. What begins as street-level rumour becomes a central campaign theme.

This pipeline ensures that hate speech does not remain marginal. It becomes mainstream political messaging, producing a nationwide vocabulary of resentment. (Read: Elections 2024: The lead up to the first two phases of voting have seen far right leaders deliver anti-Muslim hate speech across India and April: CJP’s hate watch campaign analyses several hate incidents reported across the country in the last week)

Stage 1: Fringe elements get active (the groundwork)

The process begins 3-4 months before the elections with dedicated far-right organisations laying the groundwork.

• In Maharashtra, groups like the Sakal Hindu Samaj and Hindu Janjagruti Manch organise Hindu Jan Akrosh rallies, peddling the most extreme versions of the ‘Jihad’ conspiracies, including calls to take up arms. In Bihar, it was the “I Love Mahummad” campaign that led to chaos and violence.
• In Bihar, groups like the Bajrang Dal and VHP host events where convenors openly reject slogans of communal harmony and urge Hindus to take up weapons (shastra) to defend their identity. This fringe content serves as an ‘out-of-syllabus’ test balloon for later, more moderated main-party rhetoric.

Instances from Bihar:

1. Gaya, Bihar

Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), Matrushakti, and Durga Vahini conducted Durga Ashtami and Shastra Poojan (weapon worship) programs at multiple locations. During the event, women brandished weapons and raised religious slogans.

2. Kaimur, Bihar

Bhagwati Shukla, national president of Rashtriya Sanatan Sena, speaking at a religious conference organised by the group, promoted the anti-Muslim conspiracy theory of “love jihad” and falsely claimed that over 3 lakh Hindu girls are killed every day in its name. He also declared that they will cut those who slaughter cows.

3. Bettiah, West Champaran, Bihar

During a Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) Foundation Day event, leader Ambarish Singh made anti-Muslim remarks, claiming Muslims seek separate laws and identity. He said those who refuse to say “Bharat Mata ki Jai” “may be citizens but are not our brothers,” mocked slogans of communal harmony, and linked the VHP’s mission to ending “love jihad,” cow slaughter, and religious conversions.

4. Bhagwanpur, Vaishali, Bihar

At a Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) Sthapna Diwas event, Bajrang Dal state convenor Prakash Pandey rejected slogans of communal harmony and spread anti-Muslim conspiracy theories around “love jihad,” “land jihad,” religious conversions and cow slaughter. He also urged Hindus to take up weapons (“shastra”) to defend their identity.

Stage 2: Local leaders build-up (the designated agitators)

The next stage involves “designated agitators”—one or two individuals per state who consistently make hateful statements. These leaders test the boundaries of acceptable rhetoric and generate the initial media traction.

Instances:

1. Maharashtra- Nitesh Rane peddles conspiracy theories and threaten violence in Dongri. Caught on camera threatening to burn someone and peddled conspiracy theory of ‘land jihad’

https://cjp.org.in/nitesh-rane-peddles-conspiracy-theories-and-threaten-violence-in-dongri-thane

2. Maharashtra- CJP files complaint before Maharashtra Police against serial hate offender Kajal Hindustani. In complaint, CJP urged to take strict action and seek prosecution under sections 196, 197(1), 352 and 353 of the BNS, 2023 for communal, hate speech

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-files-complaint-before-maharashtra-police-against-serial-hate-offender-kajal-hindustani

3. Maharashtra- CJP lodges additional police complaints against Nitesh Rane and Ashwini Upadhyay for hate speeches. Incendiary remarks by Nitesh Rane and Ashwini Upadhyay span multiple locations in Maharashtra

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-lodges-additional-police-complaints-against-nitesh-rane-and-ashwini-upadhyay-for-hate-speeches

4. Maharashtra- Hindu Jan Akrosh rally in Mumbai sees conspiracy theories being peddled against Muslims. Leaders like Nitesh Rane, made speeches calling out ‘Jihadis’ and accusing people of bringing in ‘Bangladeshis’, and ‘Rohingya’ to conduct riots

https://cjp.org.in/hindu-jan-akrosh-rally-in-mumbai-sees-conspiracy-theories-being-peddled-against-muslims

Stage 3: Star campaigners take over

Once the ground is polarised and the themes are established, the main national leaders (PM Modi, Amit Shah, Rajnath Singh, Yogi Adityanath) step in, adopting the subtext of the hate speech—shifting from local incitement to national security and resource threat—to legitimize the narrative and reach a mass audience. This also involves the tactic of “catching” one or two Maulanas to make statements that fit the narrative, ensuring the rhetoric is framed as a response to minority aggression (e.g., the use of Imran Masood’s statement in Bihar).

Blurring caste equations and weaponising Dalits

A key analytical dimension in Bihar and the Lok Sabha elections is the calculated effort to fracture social justice coalitions by pitting Dalits, Adivasis, and OBCs against Muslims. A critical function of communal hate speech is the calculated effort to blur Caste Equations/Realities and divert attention from governance failures.

• The reservation theft narrative: This is achieved by framing any potential minority benefit (like reservation for backward Muslims, as done in Karnataka) as a direct theft of resources earmarked for Dalits, Scheduled Castes (SCs), and Scheduled Tribes (STs). Senior leaders, including Home Minister Amit Shah, systematically framed any potential reservation for Muslims as a direct theft from Dalits, Adivasis, SCs, and OBCs. The explicit claim that Congress would take reservations “out from the Dalits… and give it to Muslims” is designed to create a zero-sum communal conflict, fracturing the socio-political alliance built on caste-based identity and social justice.
• Diverting from joblessness and poverty: By focusing campaign energy entirely on ‘Infiltrators,’ ‘Love Jihad,’ and ‘Reservation Theft,’ the political discourse successfully diverts attention from the real issues plaguing Bihar, such as poverty, unemployment, and lack of development.

Communalising shared public and festival spaces

The strategy of division extends to hijacking shared cultural symbols and spaces.

• Festival polarisation: Festivals traditionally celebrated by both communities are being communalised, such as Chhath Puja in Bihar, where the use of VHP stickers is a new tactic to stake exclusive claim over shared cultural rituals.
• Economic segregation: The use of festivals or local gatherings to enforce economic boycotts and social separation (e.g., the paneer vendor incident in Delhi).
• Infiltrating secular institutions: Even educational institutions are being targeted, with reports of Hindutva activities like Gaushalas and Shobha Yatras being brought into college campuses like IIT-B in Mumbai, symbolically mirroring the ‘Land Jihad’ narrative in cultural and academic domains.

Targeting religious and political spaces

• Religious sites: Speeches included promises to remove mosques from Kashi and Mathura if the BJP wins a supermajority in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. The destruction of the Babri Mosque was openly glorified in Maharashtra.
• Parliamentary attacks: A Muslim MP, Kunwar Danish Ali, was called a “terrorist, pimp” by a BJP member, Ramesh Bidhuri, inside India’s parliament.
• Political rivalry: Assam CM Himanta Biswa Sarma made a deeply communal remark in Bihar, linking a local leader to Osama Bin Laden and his father to Shahabuddin

Instances from Bihar:

1. Gaya, Bihar

At a government event inaugurating development project, Prime Minister Narendra Modi targeted those he referred to as “ghuspaithiya” (infiltrators), alleging demographic changes in Bihar’s border districts. He asserted that infiltrators would not be allowed to steal livelihoods and resources from the youth of Bihar and Indian citizens, and announced the formation of a demography mission to deport each “ghuspaithiya” from the country.

2. Barauni, Begusarai, Bihar

Home Minister Amit Shah delivered a speech targeting those he referred to as “ghuspethiya” (infiltrators). He questioned whether they should receive voting rights, be included in voter lists, or be entitled to free food rations, employment, housing, or medical aid, claiming that Rahul Gandhi prioritises them over the people of Bihar. He further alleged that “ghuspethiyas” serve as vote banks for opposition leaders and vowed to remove each one of them.

3. Dehri, Rohtas, Bihar

Home Minister Amit Shah delivered a speech targeting those he referred to as “ghuspethiya” (infiltrators). He mocked Congress leader Rahul Gandhi’s campaign as a “Ghuspethiya Bachao Yatra” and asked attendees whether infiltrators should have voting rights, access to free rations, jobs, housing, or medical aid. He alleged that infiltrators are receiving these benefits instead of Indian youth, warning that if the opposition wins, “every house in Bihar will have only ghuspethiyas.”

4. Danapur, Patna, Bihar

Top themes from Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath’s campaign speech: “The INDI Alliance has started a new campaign– development vs ‘burqa’. When Bihar and its youth are talking about development, Congress and RJD are trying to expand their reach through ‘burqa’. Should they be allowed to conduct fake polling? Should ‘foreign ghuspaith’ (infiltrators) be given a free hand to rob the poor, Dalits, and citizens of Bihar? Anywhere in the world, one must show their identity and face, but they want to let anyone vote without revealing their faces.”

From Rhetoric to Rupture: How hate speech reorders everyday life

Across Maharashtra, Delhi, and Bihar, hate speech produces concrete, lived consequences. It reorganises public space. It transforms markets into segregated zones. It forces everyday interactions to become declarations of identity.

In Delhi, the pressure on Muslim vendors to display saffron flags is not simply symbolic. It is a form of coercion that destroys anonymity, exposes vulnerability, and renders economic life contingent on communal compliance. In Maharashtra, boycott campaigns led to assaults on shops, disruption of livelihoods, and humiliation of workers. In Bihar, rumours about “Bangladeshi vendors” have triggered spontaneous harassment of ordinary labourers. Panchayat resolutions in various states have attempted to exclude Muslim traders from local markets—a practice that mimics apartheid structures where economic participation becomes conditional on identity.

Violence follows predictably. Mob assaults, harassment of couples, vandalism of shops, threats to imams, surveillance of Muslim-majority localities—these are not “law and order incidents”. They are direct outcomes of a discursive environment engineered for hostility.

When hate speech saturates public space, violence becomes not a deviation but an expected response. A society trained to see neighbours as infiltrators is a society primed for confrontation.

The Systemic Enablers: Media and institutional inaction

The final, critical piece of the pattern is the widespread belief that the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is a functionally dead instrument, a perception reinforced by consistent inaction on complaints against powerful figures. The piece must highlight that despite the existence of electoral laws and the MCC, enforcement remains critically weak, thus encouraging repeat offenses.).

1. The media multiplier and the digital battlefield

The media ecosystem acts as a critical force multiplier, ensuring maximum saturation of the divisive narratives.

• The role of media in propagation: The media acts as a critical force multiplier. The search results confirm that social media platforms (Facebook, YouTube, X) are key instruments for amplifying and mainstreaming hate speech, with top BJP leaders’ speeches often live-streamed across official accounts.
• AI-generated content and deepfakes: As anticipated, the Bihar election has become a test case for the use of AI Deepfakes, hate posters, and malicious Bhojpuri songs, “blurring the line between propaganda and parody”. The attempt to create an AI Deepfake targeting Colonel Sofia Qureshi and falsely linking Trishul drills to the Bihar polls is a clear example of using sophisticated technology to manufacture a crisis narrative.
• “Paid” hardliners: A crucial pattern is noted: the existence of “paid” Muslim hardliners whose provocative clips are used by the political machinery to validate the “existential threat” narrative. This creates a false equivalence, framing the majority community’s rhetoric as a justified defensive reaction. 

2. The MCC Paradox: A functional impunity

One of the most troubling revelations across states is the consistent institutional inaction. MCC complaints filed by civil society groups in Maharashtra resulted in little to no prosecution. Delhi administrators took no meaningful action against blatant hate speech. Even where the Election Commission issued notices, follow-up was weak.

The paralysis is not bureaucratic inefficiency—it is political choice. District Magistrates, legally empowered to act suo-moto, routinely fail to intervene. Police forces often behave not as neutral protectors but as silent spectators or selective enforcers. Voting-day advertisements—clearly illegal—continue year after year with complete impunity.

The absence of enforcement does not merely fail to stop hate speech. It incentivises it. (Read: From Welfare to Expulsion: Bihar’s MCC period rhetoric turns citizenship into a campaign weapon)

• Lack of consequence for star campaigners: The most damning evidence comes from the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, where the Congress party explicitly petitioned the Supreme Court, stating that the Election Commission’s (ECI) “continued silence” on complaints of hate speech and MCC violation against the Prime Minister and Home Minister amounted to a “tacit endorsement” of their statements and was a form of “invidious discrimination”. The Supreme Court was eventually forced to direct the EC to decide on these complaints.
• The DM’s suo-moto power failure: District Magistrates (DMs) possess the suo moto power to initiate action against violations of law and order, including hate speech, without waiting for the ECI’s directive. The consistent failure of DMs to utilise this power effectively creates a security vacuum and raises a fundamental question: What is the purpose of the MCC if its own local enforcement arms refuse to exercise their legal authority?
• The silence period violation: A consistent tactical violation is the use of full-page newspaper advertisements on the day of voting—a direct breach of the legally mandated “silence period”. Complaints are filed every year, yet nothing ever happens, turning a legal restraint into a predictable, unpunished final campaign flourish. Complaints were explicitly filed against the BJP, MNS, and the Shiv Sena (Shinde faction) in Maharashtra for silence period violations, specifically citing political ads in major newspapers. (Read: How BJP is accused of violating 48 Hours-Silence Period even on Poll Day?)

How MCC violations become a license for electoral hate: One of the most disturbing features of India’s contemporary electoral landscape is not merely the explosion of hate speech, but the near-total collapse of institutional response to it. The Model Code of Conduct—once regarded as a moral compass and a boundary-marker—is now little more than a symbolic pamphlet. Across Maharashtra, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and during the 2024 Lok Sabha cycle, repeated, documented, and widely circulated instances of explicit hate speech, communal incitement, and even direct calls for violence were flagged to the Election Commission of India with urgency and precision. Yet the ECI’s response oscillated between silence, non-committal notices, or bureaucratic platitudes. This selective inertia has effectively rewritten the MCC: instead of a code meant to regulate elections, it has become a code that politicians can violate with impunity once they understand that consequences are unlikely, uneven, or easily deflected. The absence of deterrence becomes a form of permission.

The judicial system’s response—especially from constitutional courts—has only deepened this institutional void. High Courts routinely dismiss or defer petitions concerning hate speech at election time, often on procedural grounds, or by sending complainants back to the very authorities that have already refused to act. Even more worrying is the Supreme Court’s posture, which has increasingly adopted a stance of non-intervention, repeatedly expressing “helplessness,” “constraint,” or “reluctance” to issue proactive directions. This judicial passivity is not neutral. By refusing to treat communal hate as an urgent constitutional injury, the courts inadvertently normalise its presence in electoral politics. When the highest court of a democracy signals that it cannot act unless someone else acts first, hate becomes embedded as an acceptable mode of political communication.

This institutional abdication has profound consequences for the democratic process. It creates a political marketplace in which the loudest, most inflammatory actors gain the greatest advantage. It rewards radicalisation, emboldens repeat offenders, and silences vulnerable communities who lose faith in the very institutions meant to protect them. The MCC becomes a decorative façade, the ECI a passive spectator, and the judiciary an absentee guardian. What remains is a hollowed-out electoral field where hate speech does not merely occur—it thrives under the protective cover of institutional silence. When the state signals that hate is politically useful and legally inconsequential, it corrodes not only public discourse but the constitutional foundation of elections themselves. In such a climate, communal propaganda is not an aberration; it becomes the new grammar of democratic participation.

Some of the MCC complaints sent by CJP during these four election cycles may be read here, here, here and here.

Bihar: The strategic communalisation of caste politics

Bihar stands out for a deeper, more consequential transformation. Unlike Maharashtra or Delhi, where communal polarisation has been cultivated for years, Bihar has historically been governed by caste equations. Political coalitions were built on OBC solidarity, Dalit assertion, and the arithmetic of caste-based identities. Muslims, though electorally significant, were integrated into caste-based alliances rather than positioned as central antagonists.

In the recent Bihar cycle, hate speech has been weaponised to redraw this landscape. The infiltrator narrative is used to redirect OBC and EBC economic frustrations toward Muslims. Hate speech in Bihar functions not merely as communal rhetoric but as caste engineering. By portraying Muslims as beneficiaries of welfare schemes, as land-grabbers, as demographic threats, hate speech fractures long-standing solidarities between marginalised castes and Muslim communities. The constructed rhetoric also blurs or diminishes issues of caste deprivation and discrimination of the most marginalised where the systemic exploiters are from the dominant ‘Hindu’ fold.

This transformation is visible in the communalisation of Chhath Puja, one of Bihar’s most syncretic cultural spaces. It is visible in the circulation of AI-generated videos designed to provoke OBC anger. It is visible in the increasing recruitment of Dalit and OBC youth by Hindutva groups seeking to expand their caste footprint.

In Bihar, like elsewhere, hate speech is not simply dividing communities. It is restructuring them.

Democracy in Decline: The erosion of rights, citizenship, and public reason

The cumulative effect of election hate speech is the erosion of India’s constitutional framework. Hate speech violates Articles 14, 15, and 21 by producing inequality, discrimination, and insecurity. It corrodes the idea of citizenship by creating a two-tier system: those who belong fully and those who must constantly prove their belonging.

The damage is not simply legal. It is epistemic. Hate speech erodes the ability of citizens to think democratically. The utter failure of constitutional institutions, conceived as safeguards –be it the constitutional courts or the infamous Election Commission of India (ECI) to act decisively and punitively ensures further impunity and normalisation. Result: hate speech and its impact, crowds out substantive debate, reduces governance to identity warfare, and delegitimises political disagreement. In such an environment, elections cease to be democratic practices and become theatres of domination.

Conclusion: Reclaiming democratic integrity

The analysis demonstrates that the current surge in electoral hate speech is neither random nor reactive; it is the product of a highly organised, multi-layered, and financially supported political architecture designed to achieve communal mobilization.

India’s contemporary elections reveal a political landscape where hate speech is not an aberration but an organising principle. It structures campaigns, mobilises voters, reorganises identities, and shapes governance. It transforms neighbours into enemies and turns public space into a battlefield. It reorders caste politics in places like Bihar. It destroys livelihoods in places like Delhi. In addition, it legitimises violence in places like Maharashtra.

Most dangerously, it normalises a new political order in which fear is the principal currency of power.

India now stands at a critical juncture. If hate remains the central grammar of elections, then elections themselves cease to be instruments of democratic renewal. They become mechanisms of social control. The future of India’s democracy depends not merely on recognising this transformation but on confronting it with legal, political, and moral urgency.

Hate is not a speech act.

It is a system.

Moreover, systems do not collapse on their own—they must be dismantled.

The pre-election hate machinery that turned Maharashtra into a communal battleground:

Capital city became a laboratory for pre-election communal polarisation:

2024’s election rhetoric and weaponisation of hate across India:

References:

https://www.outlookindia.com/elections/hate-speech-surges-in-bihar-polls-the-return-of-communal-and-caste-divides-in-campaign-rhetoric

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/cpim-slams-pm-modi-for-remarks-against-tamil-nadu-during-bihar-poll-campaign/article70224918.ece

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/ahead-of-bihar-polls-union-minister-and-begusarai-mp-giriraj-singh-sparks-controversy-2805440-2025-10-19?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://news.abplive.com/elections/pm-modi-speech-purnea-congress-rjd-yatra-infiltrators-bihar-election-2025-bihar-sir-1800488?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Oct/22/political-islam-undermined-hindu-faith-largely-overlooked-in-history-cm-yogi

https://www.newslaundry.com/2025/09/24/indian-muslims-not-equal-abp-show-allows-hate-speech-slurs-as-ragi-vs-pathan

https://www.freepressjournal.in/mumbai/mumbai-hindu-groups-call-for-restricting-non-hindus-from-garba-venues-citing-love-jihad-concerns-during-navratri

https://cjp.org.in/mtra-elections-on-cjps-complaint-on-an-mcc-violation-fir-has-been-registered-against-kajal-hindustani-for-hate-speech

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-stands-against-hate-seeks-preventive-action-against-hate-driven-events-in-maharashtra

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-complaints-to-the-maharashtra-election-commission-over-communal-posters-featuring-up-cm-yogi-adityanath

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-highlights-mcc-violation-urges-maharashtra-election-commission-to-act-on-hate-speech

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-files-complaint-against-bjp-mns-and-ss-shinde-faction-silence-period-violations-in-maharashtra-elections

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-files-5-hate-speech-complaints-before-ceo-maharashtra-as-violated-mcc

https://sabrangindia.in/hindutva-enters-mumbai-college-campuses-gaushala-shobha-yatra-in-iit-b-restriction-to-freedom-of-speech-at-tiss

https://sabrangindia.in/chhattisgarh-maharashtra-sc-directs-police-to-ensure-no-hate-speech-by-bjp-mla-raja-singh-hindu-jan-jagruti-samiti-rallies

https://cjp.org.in/bjp-mla-t-raja-singh-at-mira-road-hurls-anti-muslim-slurs-incites-violence-at-rally-permitted-by-bombay-high-court

https://cjp.org.in/hindu-jan-akrosh-rally-in-mumbai-sees-conspiracy-theories-being-peddled-against-muslims

https://sabrangindia.in/is-mumbai-becoming-a-hotbed-of-hate

https://sabrangindia.in/bjp-mla-nitesh-rane-leads-hindutva-rally-in-govandi-demands-demolition-of-illegal-masjids-and-madrasa

https://sabrangindia.in/environmental-interest-converted-into-communal-tension-madras-high-court-refuses-to-quash-criminal-case-against-bjp-state-head-annamalai

https://cjp.org.in/hindu-jan-akrosh-rally-in-mumbai-sees-conspiracy-theories-being-peddled-against-muslims

https://sabrangindia.in/ground-report-protests-erupt-in-assam-after-portrayal-of-muslims-as-criminals-in-rally-by-bodoland-university

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-files-complaint-against-bjp-leader-nazia-elahi-khan-over-hate-speech-in-delhi/

https://sabrangindia.in/cjp-calls-for-electoral-action-against-bjp-leaders-hate-speech-at-rohini-chetna-event/

https://www.newslaundry.com/2025/01/21/denial-and-deflection-how-the-bjps-bidhuri-walked-off-when-asked-about-crude-remarks

https://www.indiatvnews.com/delhi/delhi-assembly-elections-2025-police-registers-over-1100-cases-of-mcc-violations-model-code-of-conduct-detained-35516-people-latest-updates-2025-02-07-975130

The post The Orchestrated Extremism: An analysis of communal hate speech in India’s election cycle (2024–2025) appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to the Hindu, the bench remarked “We are not legislating in the garb of this petition. Rest assured, we are not inclined to either legislate or monitor every small incident which takes place in X, Y, Z pocket of this country”. Stressing the constitutional architecture already in place, the judges noted, “There are high courts, there are police stations, there are legislative measures. They are already in place.”

The Supreme Court’s latest remarks—disclaiming responsibility for monitoring hate-speech incidents and directing petitioners to High Courts and police stations—represent an increasingly pronounced judicial retreat at a time when hate speech has become pervasive, organised, and often politically sanctioned. Coming from a Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, the Court’s insistence that it “cannot legislate or monitor every small incident” may appear administratively pragmatic, but constitutionally, it raises serious concerns.

‘Approach the High Court; We cannot monitor the entire country’

The Bench initially directed the applicant to raise the grievance before the concerned High Court. “How can this court continue to monitor all such instances all over the country?” it asked, according to The Print. “You approach the authorities. Let them take action, otherwise go to the high court.”

Counsel for the applicant, Advocate Nizam Pasha, submitted that he had filed an application in an already pending writ petition on hate speech, bringing forth “additional instances” of boycott calls. When the Bench observed that the calls appeared to be made by private individuals, counsel responded that “some public representatives are also issuing similar calls.”

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta interjected sharply: “Public interest cannot be selective to one particular religion… There are severe hate speeches going on amongst all religions. I will supply those details to my friend (applicant). Let him add that and espouse that public cause on a pan-religion basis.”

The applicant’s counsel insisted that he approached the Court only because the authorities “are not taking any action,” and invoked earlier directions of the Court where State inaction on hate speech was to trigger suo motu registration of FIRs and potential contempt for non-compliance.

Mehta maintained that while “no one can be indulging in hate speech,” a public-spirited litigant “cannot be selective.” The Bench reiterated that statutory mechanisms existed: “Whichever state you have a problem with, you approach the jurisdictional high court for appropriate relief.”

Advocate Nizam Pasha, appearing for journalist Qurban Ali and others, reminded the Court of its October 2022 order. In October 2022, disturbed by the “unabated ferocity” of hate crimes and warning that a “climate of hate prevails in the country,” the Court had directed police authorities to suo motu register cases against hate-speech offenders. However, these remarks suggest a recalibration: the Supreme Court asserting that enforcement must be handled at the proper institutional levels, not continuously escalated to the apex court.

In addition to this, Pasha also referred to an affidavit flagging a post shared by an Assam minister following the BJP’s victory in Bihar, claiming it referenced the 1989 Bhagalpur massacre by alluding to “Bihar approving gobi farming”—an alleged nod to victims whose bodies were buried in cauliflower fields.

The Bench listed the matter for further hearing on December 9, 2025.

To read about the surge of hate speech during elections, read here, here and here.

A Court that once called arresting hate crimes a “sacrosanct duty” now says: go elsewhere

These oral observations represent a notable moment nearly seven years after the Court’s landmark Tehseen Poonawala (2018) judgment, where it held that preventing hate crimes is the State’s “sacrosanct duty.” The Court had then laid down extensive guidelines to prevent mob violence and lynching.

In Tehseen Poonawala (2018), the Supreme Court emphatically held that preventing hate crimes is the State’s “sacrosanct duty” and placed considerable constitutional responsibility on the judiciary to ensure compliance.

When the Bench says: “We are not inclined to either legislate or monitor every small incident”, the question naturally arises: What counts as “small” in hate speech? Hate speech is not an isolated “X, Y, Z pocket” problem; it is a structural, national, and increasingly legitimised phenomenon that fuels violence, radicalises communities, and undermines constitutional fraternity. Treating each incident as merely local—best handled at the nearest police station—ignores the systemic, not episodic, nature of the problem.

Additionally, the petitioner’s counsel explicitly reminded the Court of its own earlier directions: If States fail to act on hate speech, police must register FIRs suo motu; if police fail, contempt proceedings follow. By refusing to even monitor compliance with its own framework, the Court creates a paradox:

• Duty to act remains,
• but enforcement evaporates.

This turns constitutionally mandated preventive oversight into judicial suggestion, not judicial command.

In regards to Solicitor General’s assertion that public interest cannot be selective and that all religions face hate speech is a familiar rhetorical manoeuvre that:

1. Equates majority-to-minority hate speech with minority-to-majority rhetoric, flattening unequal power structures;
2. Deflects from documented, systemic hate speech targeting Muslims, including political campaigns;
3. Reframes structural discrimination as generic social disharmony.

The Court’s willingness to echo the “pan-religion basis” line dilutes the urgency of addressing majoritarian hate speech, a constitutional and empirical reality widely acknowledged by previous benches.

For detailed report of significant orders of Supreme Court on hate speech issue, read here.

Chhattisgarh High Court: Reinforcing judicial distance from enforcement

The Chhattisgarh High Court’s decision on November 21 in a separate hate-speech matter further illustrates the judiciary’s growing reluctance to scrutinise investigative lapses in such cases. A Division Bench of Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru dismissed a plea seeking coercive action against Johar Chhattisgarh Party leader Amit Baghel, accused of repeated inflammatory statements against Agrawal, Sindhi, and Jain communities

The Division Bench held firmly that the petitioner had failed to substantiate allegations of State inaction, emphasising that mere accusations of “State apathy” could not justify extraordinary judicial intervention.

The Court observed:

• “The Petitioner has not brought forth any cogent material to demonstrate that the investigating agency has either shut the investigation or refused to act on the FIRs.”
• “Mere dissatisfaction with the pace or nature of investigation cannot, in law, furnish a ground for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 or Article 226 of the Constitution.”

The Bench cautioned that the reliefs sought—direction for arrest, supervision by a specific-rank officer, periodic status reports, consolidated chargesheet—would amount to “judicial micromanagement” of investigation and intrude into the statutory domain of the police.

The Court reiterated established law: a writ of mandamus cannot compel arrest, dictate the course of investigation, or require a consolidated chargesheet when the statute does not mandate one. “The Petitioner has not shown any exceptional circumstance to indicate non-compliance with these guidelines, nor is there any imminent threat to public order warranting extraordinary measures,” the Court added in its order.

Finding no exceptional urgency or imminent threat to public order, the petition was dismissed.

The Chhattisgarh High Court’s dismissal of the plea against Amit Baghel fits seamlessly into this larger pattern of institutional distancing. By insisting that:

• dissatisfaction with investigation pace is not enough,
• courts cannot “micromanage,”
• no “exceptional circumstances” exist,

the High Court reinforces a trend where judicial review of State inaction on hate speech is increasingly restricted, even as hate speech intensifies.

Order of the Court may be read here.

The constitutional misdiagnosis at the heart of India’s hate-speech crisis

The core difficulty lies in the Court’s very conceptualisation of hate speech: by repeatedly characterising it as a routine “law-and-order” matter to be handled by local police or challenged before jurisdictional High Courts, the Supreme Court collapses a profound constitutional crisis into an administrative problem. This framing disregards the Court’s own jurisprudence recognising hate speech as a threat to equality, an assault on dignity, a catalyst for mob violence, a barrier to democratic participation, and a weapon disproportionately used against minorities and dissenters—phenomena that cannot be meaningfully addressed through ordinary policing. Far from being “pocket-level incidents,” contemporary hate speech is intimately connected to electoral mobilisation, vigilante networks, and entrenched patterns of institutional discrimination, placing it well beyond the capacity or neutrality of local law-and-order mechanisms. The Court’s withdrawal from scrutiny therefore carries structural consequences: it signals to State authorities that inaction will not attract judicial oversight; it chills public-spirited litigation by suggesting that constitutionally significant harms are too “small” or “local” for the Supreme Court’s attention; and it sits uneasily with the Court’s own earlier precedents mandating suo motu FIRs and warning States of contempt, thereby diminishing both doctrinal coherence and the credibility of constitutional adjudication. In effect, reducing hate speech to a routine policing matter does not merely minimise its gravity—it risks normalising it.

Conclusion: A constitutional moment demanding vigilance, not withdrawal

India is living through a documented and politically charged escalation in hate speech, and at such a moment the Supreme Court’s assertion that it cannot monitor “every small incident” risks being interpreted not as judicial restraint but as a signal that State authorities may do less, not more. No constitutional court is expected to police every episode—but it is expected to ensure that State machinery functions, that fundamental rights are meaningfully protected, and that its own earlier mandates are not rendered hollow through non-enforcement. By appearing to withdraw just when constitutional vigilance is most necessary, the Court creates a troubling gap between constitutional promises and institutional practice. At a time when hate speech carries structural, electoral, and communal consequences, this is not a moment for judicial distance but for principled constitutional engagement; stepping back now risks weakening precisely the safeguards the Constitution relies on courts to uphold.

Related:

Unveiling the diverse impact of Hate Speech: From elections to escalating violence

Hate speeches, stone pelting, brandishing of weapons – what VHP’s Shaurya Yatras have achieved till date

India’s Struggle for Social Harmony: Challenges Amidst Surge in Hate Speech

Three separate benches of the Indian Supreme Court interrogate hate speech

CJP writes to Minorities Commission over repeated attacks on Muslims

The post A New Silence: The Supreme Court’s turn toward non-interference in hate-speech cases appeared first on SabrangIndia.

While the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is in force for the ongoing Bihar Assembly elections, Choubey, a senior BJP leader and sitting MP, delivered a speech that directly targeted the state’s Muslim population. In his address, he appealed to “Muslim brothers” to “reduce their population” and claimed that “ghuspaithiye (infiltrators) are coming from across the border.” The remarks, CJP noted, deliberately conflated Indian Muslims with illegal immigrants and invoked communal stereotypes to create fear and prejudice among voters.

CJP has urged immediate intervention by both the Election Commission and state authorities to safeguard the neutrality and integrity of the electoral process.

A dangerous conflation of faith and foreignness

According to the complaint, Choubey’s remarks go beyond electoral rhetoric. They represent a calculated act of hate speech, portraying Indian Muslims as demographic threats and foreign infiltrators — a narrative that has become disturbingly frequent in election campaigns.

By stating, “Our population is also declining. I appeal to my Muslim brothers as well: reduce your population. Ghuspaithiye are coming from across the border… our government is working to remove them,” the MP collapsed the boundary between citizen and non-citizen, implying that the Muslim presence itself was suspect.

CJP’s complaint underscores that such rhetoric de-nationalises Indian Muslims, recasting them as outsiders within their own country — a move that weaponises religious identity to secure electoral advantage.

Clear violations of electoral and criminal law

CJP’s complaint meticulously details how the speech violates several provisions of law:

• Under the Representation of the People Act, 1951:
  • Section 123(3) and (3A) — forbidding appeals on religious grounds and promotion of enmity between communities.
  • Section 125 — making it a punishable offence to promote hatred in connection with elections.
  • Section 123(2) — covering undue influence on the electorate through intimidation or communal fear.
• Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023:
  • Section 196 — promoting enmity between groups.
  • Section 297 — statements conducing to public mischief.
  • Section 356 — outraging group dignity.

The organisation also cited violations of the Model Code of Conduct, which explicitly prohibits appeals to religion or acts that aggravate communal tension, and constitutional breaches of Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25 — which guarantee equality, dignity, and freedom of conscience to all citizens.

A pattern of Islamophobic rhetoric

Pirpainti, a constituency in Bhagalpur district, has a mixed population and a history of communal sensitivity. In this context, CJP warned that such inflammatory remarks carry “dangerous polarising potential” — alienating Muslim citizens, normalising prejudice, and reducing the election to a contest over identity rather than policy.

The complaint places Choubey’s remarks within a wider and troubling pattern of electoral Islamophobia, where demographic myths and border anxieties are repeatedly used to stigmatise India’s Muslim citizens. It warns that this form of hate-driven politics seeks to redefine citizenship itself — who belongs and who does not — through the language of religion and fear.

Calling Choubey’s statements “hate propaganda delivered under the cover of governance and nationalism,” the complaint asserts that such conduct corrodes the very spirit of democracy. It notes that communal appeals not only distort voter choice but also legitimise bigotry as a form of governance, thereby eroding India’s secular foundation.

CJP invoked key Supreme Court precedents, including Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017), which forbids religious appeals in elections, and Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India (2014), which recognised hate speech as an assault on equality and fraternity.

CJP’s prayer and demands

Through the complaint, CJP has urged the Election Commission of India and Bihar’s election authorities to:

1. Take immediate cognisance of the complaint.
2. Register an FIR against Ashwini Kumar Choubey under relevant provisions of the Representation of the People Act and Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
3. Debar him from further campaigning pending inquiry.
4. Issue a public censure and advisory to all political parties to desist from communal appeals.

The complaint concludes by calling upon the Election Commission to ensure compliance with the constitutional mandate of free, fair, and secular elections under Article 324.

The complaint may be read here.

Related:

From Despair to Dignity: How CJP helped Elachan Bibi win back her identity, prove her citizenship

Two Hate-Filled Speeches, One Election: CJP complaints against Himanta Biswa Sarma and Tausif Alam for spreading hate and fear in Bihar elections

From ‘Tauba Tauba’ to ‘Expel the Ghuspaithiya’: The language of exclusion in Bihar’s election season

CJP urges YouTube to remove content targeting CJI Gavai from Ajeet Bharti’s channel

The post Hate Has No Place in Elections: CJP moves State EC against BJP MP Ashwini Choubey’s communal speech appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Delivered within 24 hours of each other on November 4, 2025, these campaign speeches have been described by CJP as “a double assault on India’s constitutional morality and the sanctity of the electoral process.” One, by a sitting Chief Minister, communalises the campaign through religious vilification and genocidal language; the other, by a local candidate, turns political rivalry into a threat of physical mutilation.

The Siwan Rally: Himanta Biswa Sarma’s speech of hate and fear

At an election rally in Raghunathpur, Siwan, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma compared RJD candidate Osama Shahab to global terrorist Osama bin Laden, telling the audience that they must “eliminate all Osama Bin Ladens” from Bihar. Sarma further warned that a victory for Shahab would be “a defeat for Hindus,” promising to watch the results from the Kamakhya temple in Assam and invoking figures like Babur and Aurangzeb to frame the election as a Hindu versus Muslim battle.

His remarks — equating a Muslim candidate with terrorism, describing Muslims as “infiltrators” who threaten women, and boasting of stopping salaries of “mullahs” — were deemed by the complaint to be “state-sponsored demonisation” and “an incitement to exterminatory politics.” Delivered by a Chief Minister under the Model Code of Conduct, they constitute, according to the complaint, “a direct assault on the secular fabric of the Constitution.”

CJP’s complaint lays out an exhaustive legal analysis: violations of Sections 123(2), 123(3), 123(3A), and 125 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and Sections 196, 297, and 356 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Through the complaint, it has been claimed that Sarma’s speech breaches the Ministerial Code of Conduct, since he holds constitutional office and bears heightened responsibility to maintain neutrality and restraint.

Describing the speech as “hate institutionalised as political strategy,” the complaint also notes that Sarma’s words collapse the constitutional boundary between religion and citizenship — constructing Muslims as infiltrators and enemies of the nation. CJP has demanded the registration of an FIR, Sarma’s debarment from further campaigning, and a public censure from the Election Commission.

The complaint may be read here.

The Kishanganj Rally: Tausif Alam’s threats of violence

On the same day, in Laucha Naya Haat, Kishanganj, AIMIM’s Tausif Alam took the campaign stage to retaliate against RJD leader Tejashwi Yadav, who had earlier called AIMIM chief Asaduddin Owaisi an “extremist.” In a shocking display of aggression, Alam told the crowd: “Tejashwi Yadav called our leader Owaisi an extremist. Tell him — I will cut his eyes, fingers, and tongue if he dares insult Owaisi Sahab again.”

He went further, mocking Tejashwi as the “son of a fodder thief,” an evident reference to his father, Lalu Prasad Yadav.

The complaint describes these remarks as “acts of open intimidation and violent abuse that degrade democratic discourse.” It cites violations of Sections 115, 326, 349, and 356 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, along with Sections 123(2), 123(4), and 125 of the RPA, 1951, and multiple provisions of the Model Code of Conduct.

The complaint further emphasises that this is not political hyperbole but a “direct threat of grievous bodily harm” designed to intimidate a rival candidate and vitiate the atmosphere of free choice. CJP has called for an FIR against Alam, his temporary debarment from campaigning, and a public censure to reaffirm that threats of violence have no place in electoral politics.

The complaint may be read here.

A Pattern of Electoral Decay: Hate as common ground

Though ideologically opposite, the two speeches share a disturbing symmetry. Both substitute argument with aggression, civic discourse with communal or personal hostility. In Siwan, hate was religiously coded — against Muslims, invoking “infiltrators” and “Osamas.” In Kishanganj, hate was personally targeted — against a rival, invoking mutilation and humiliation.

CJP’s complaints thus expose a broader crisis: the normalisation of hate and violence in electioneering. Both incidents, as highlighted in the complaint, have the potential to trigger communal tension and retaliatory violence in Bihar’s politically sensitive districts. The Election Commission’s inaction, it argues, would erode not just the Model Code of Conduct but the very credibility of free and fair elections.

The complaints legal framing situates these speeches within the broader constitutional architecture of Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25, and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017) and Ziyauddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Mehra (1975), which define religious appeals and hate speech as “corrupt practices” that vitiate elections.

A call for restoring democratic dignity

Together, these complaints articulate an urgent appeal — that India’s electoral arena must not be reduced to a theatre of hate, threat, or intimidation. When political speech turns into a weapon — whether through communal vilification or violent menace — it corrodes the very spirit of democratic civility and constitutional equality. Electoral politics draws its legitimacy from civility, equality, and reasoned dissent — not from the language of fear or vengeance. The complaint reminds the Election Commission and the public alike that elections are not merely contests for power but tests of the Republic’s moral fibre.

Related:

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The complaint, addressed to the Chief Electoral Officer (Telangana), the Director General of Police (Telangana), and the Chief Election Commissioner, details how Kumar used the BJP’s roadshow at Borabanda Crossroads, Jubilee Hills, to launch a series of public remarks that demeaned Islamic religious practices while glorifying Hindu identity as a test of authenticity and courage.

Among his most inflammatory statements were:

“If a day comes when I must wear a skull cap for votes, I’d rather cut off my head.”

“I’m an unapologetic Hindu — I won’t insult other faiths by faking a namaz.”

He further mocked Chief Minister Revanth Reddy and a Congress candidate for wearing skull caps, questioning their sincerity and daring them to “prove their Hindu courage” by visiting temples with Muslim leaders.

CJP’s complaint deemed these remarks to be “a textbook example of hate speech” and a direct violation of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA), and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).

Religious mockery as political appeal

According to the complaint, Kumar’s statements do not merely express religious pride — they constitute a deliberate and divisive appeal to religion for electoral gain. By contrasting “unapologetic Hindu authenticity” with “fake Muslim gestures,” the speech urges voters to make electoral choices based on religious identity rather than policy or performance.

CJP has alleged violations under:

• Section 123(3) (appeal on religious grounds) and Section 123(3A) (promotion of enmity) of the RPA,
• Section 125 (offence of promoting enmity between classes in elections),
• and Sections 196, 297, and 356 of the BNS, which criminalise promoting enmity, public mischief, and deliberate insult to religion.

The complaint notes that these remarks, made at a public, recorded, and widely disseminated campaign event, fall squarely within the ambit of hate speech and constitute both a criminal offence and an electoral malpractice.

Erosion of Constitutional values

CJP’s complaint situates the incident within the constitutional mandate of secularism and equality, citing Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25 of the Constitution. It argues that by mocking the skull cap and namaz, Kumar has not only insulted the religious sentiments of a community but has also degraded the dignity of Muslim citizens, violating their rights to equality, dignity, and free profession of religion.

Quoting the Supreme Court’s judgment in Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017), CJP reminds the ECI that “religion cannot be used to influence the choice of voters — even indirectly.” Kumar’s remarks, it states, are not “expressions of faith” but “acts of public provocation designed to divide voters and delegitimise inclusivity.”

Impact on the electoral climate

The Jubilee Hills constituency, home to a diverse and interfaith electorate, has already witnessed heightened polarisation. CJP provides that Kumar’s remarks risk inflaming communal sentiments, intimidating minority voters, and damaging the fairness and integrity of the election.

The complaint further asserts that the remarks have the potential to chill interfaith coexistence by equating expressions of respect (like wearing a skull cap) with betrayal, while valorising exclusivist religious assertion as political bravery.

CJP’s demands

CJP has urged the Election Commission and state authorities to act swiftly and decisively:

1. Take cognisance of the video evidence of the Jubilee Hills roadshow and register an FIR under relevant provisions of the RPA and BNS.
2. Debar Bandi Sanjay Kumar from further campaigning pending inquiry.
3. Issue a public censure to the BJP and all political parties to refrain from religiously provocative campaigning.
4. Forward the complaint to the ECI for further constitutional action under Article 324.

Reclaiming the secular spirit of elections

CJP emphasised the dangerous descent into hate-driven politics as dangerous by providing that when a political leader declares that wearing a skull cap merits decapitation and ridicules namaz as performance, it ceases to be political speech — it becomes humiliation, hate, and a constitutional offence. Through this complaint, CJP calls upon the Election Commission to reaffirm its constitutional duty to keep elections secular, equal, and dignified — ensuring that faith remains a matter of conscience, not a tool for votes.

The Complaint can be read here:

Related:

From Despair to Dignity: How CJP helped Elachan Bibi win back her identity, prove her citizenship

Two Hate-Filled Speeches, One Election: CJP complaints against Himanta Biswa Sarma and Tausif Alam for spreading hate and fear in Bihar elections

From ‘Tauba Tauba’ to ‘Expel the Ghuspaithiya’: The language of exclusion in Bihar’s election season

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The post From Campaign Trail to Communal Provocation: CJP files complaint against Bandi Sanjay Kumar for divisive campaigning in Hyderabad by-election appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) filed three separate complaints with the Election Commission of India (ECI) during the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) period, citing violations of electoral law and criminal statutes. The fourth speech—by Union Home Minister Amit Shah in Siwan—was delivered two days later and completes the arc that the complaints had already begun to document.

The four speeches, read together, construct a continuum of rhetoric that moves from ridicule to coercion to threat: the ridiculing of religious language, the coercion of loyalty tests tied to welfare benefits, and the threat of identification and expulsion directed at an entire community.

The complaint against Giriraj Singh

Dates and locations: October 18 (Arwal) and October 19 (Begusarai), 2025

Union Minister Giriraj Singh’s two speeches are at the base of this chain. In Arwal, he told a story about a “Maulvi” and the Ayushman card, asking whether the man would swear “on Khuda” to acknowledge benefits received under Modi’s government. “I don’t need votes from namakharam people,” Singh declared, transforming gratitude for welfare into a religious oath of political loyalty.

A day later in Begusarai, he manipulated the word “haram” into a slur, questioning the faith and morality of Muslims who benefited from government schemes but did not vote for the BJP. The complaint describes these statements as “coercive and communal,” arguing they violate the MCC’s ban on religious appeals and constitute “undue influence” under Section 123(2) of the Representation of the People Act (RPA), 1951.

CJP’s complaint sought immediate ECI action, including a show-cause notice, FIR registration under sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) relating to promoting enmity, and removal of the videos from circulation. It framed Singh’s language as “a public loyalty test administered through humiliation.”

The complete complaint may be read below.

The complaint against Ashok Kumar Yadav

Date: October 16, 2025

Location: Darbhanga (Keoti constituency)

Three days earlier, Madhubani MP Ashok Kumar Yadav addressed “Muslim brothers” at a public rally, instructing them: “Say ‘tauba tauba,’ I will not eat free grain; I will not take a gas cylinder; I will not walk on the road built by Modi ji; I will not cross the bridge built by Modi ji.”

The crowd laughed. The complaint did not. CJP’s complaint describes the speech as “mocking religious practice and publicly demanding a ritual renunciation of entitlements,” amounting to psychological coercion of a targeted group. It invokes Sections 123(2), (3), and (3A) of the RPA and Sections 196 and 297 of the BNS, which criminalise promotion of enmity and acts prejudicial to public peace.

By equating welfare use with political loyalty and faith with betrayal, Yadav’s speech redefined citizenship as conditional. It fused spiritual vocabulary (“tauba tauba”) with partisan mobilisation, turning a phrase of repentance into a performative punishment.

The complete complaint may be read below.

The complaint against Nityanand Rai

Date: October 22, 2025

Location: Hayaghat, Darbhanga

When Union Minister of State for Home Affairs Nityanand Rai took the stage in Hayaghat, the stakes rose. His speech moved beyond ridicule to overt nationalism, religion, and xenophobia. “I want to be born only as a Hindu, only in this Bharat. We live by Krishna’s teachings,” he began, before pivoting sharply: “Those wearing reshmi salwar and topi are against the message of the Gita. Some want to bring in Bangladeshi and Rohingya infiltrators and take away the livelihood of Bihar’s youth. You cannot include these infiltrators in the voter list.”

The complaint noted the gravity of a Home Ministry official using xenophobic tropes while the MCC was in force. It argued that such speech carries “the force of state policy” when uttered by a minister responsible for internal security. The complaint sought a show-cause notice, FIR registration, and referral to the Prime Minister’s Office for ministerial code violation.

In legal language, Rai’s speech blends three distinct offences: an appeal to religion for votes, the vilification of a religious group, and the use of a ministerial office to threaten administrative exclusion. In political terms, it sanctifies prejudice and embeds it within the authority of the state.

The complete complaint may be read below.

Amit Shah in Siwan: The arc completed

Date: October 24, 2025

Location: Siwan, Bihar

Speaker: Union Home Minister Amit Shah

Two days later in Siwan, Amit Shah’s campaign speech brought the narrative to its most explicit point. He invoked the Ram Mandir in Ayodhya as a triumph of faith and political will, asked voters whether they supported it, and immediately shifted to the question of “ghuspaithiya” — infiltrators.

“Rahul Baba says we should allow ‘ghuspaithiya’ in Bihar. People of Siwan, tell me — should these ghuspaithiya be removed or not? Should their names be on the voter list or not? I promise you, once the NDA wins again, the BJP will identify and expel each and every individual ghuspaithiya from the country.”

He concluded: “They are snatching our youth’s jobs and the ration of our poor. These infiltrators are involved in anti-national activities. The BJP is determined to pick them out one by one and expel them.”

In the arc that began with Giriraj Singh’s coercive mockery and moved through Rai’s sanctified nationalism, Shah’s words were the culmination: an explicit promise of identification and expulsion, tying the future of governance to the physical removal of a constructed internal enemy.

Delivered during the MCC period, it was not merely an opinion—it was a campaign pledge of state action.

A shared political logic

Across all four speeches, three interlocking strategies emerge:

1. Welfare as a political debt: Welfare schemes—rations, gas cylinders, Ayushman cards—are presented not as rights but as favours to be repaid through political allegiance. Those who refuse are branded “ungrateful” or “namakharam.”
2. Religion as a mobilising instrument: Sacred references are casually inserted into electoral appeals. “Swear on Khuda,” “tauba tauba,” “I want to be born only as a Hindu,” “Ram Mandir”—each invocation draws moral legitimacy from religion and aligns it with party identity.
3. ‘Infiltrator’ as the enemy within: The trope of the “ghuspaithiya” shifts the narrative from faith to belonging. It identifies a community—implicitly Muslim, explicitly Bengali-speaking or Rohingya—as outsiders usurping entitlements, jobs, and rations. It allows the campaign to move from gratitude and shaming to exclusion and threat.

Each strategy reinforces the next. Gratitude establishes hierarchy, religion sanctifies loyalty, and the “infiltrator” label converts political opponents into existential threats. Together, they blur the boundary between welfare policy, religious identity, and citizenship status.

Legal violations and democratic harm

The three complaints collectively invoke the Model Code of Conduct, the Representation of the People Act, and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. Under the Model Code of Conduct, parties are prohibited from appealing to religion, caste, or communal feelings and from using temples, mosques, or religious symbols for electoral gain. The MCC came into force in Bihar in early October 2025 after the ECI announced the poll schedule.

Under the Representation of the People Act, these speeches fall within multiple definitions of “corrupt practice”:

• Section 123(2) – Undue influence through coercion or threat.
• Section 123(3) – Appeal to religion for votes.
• Section 123(3A) – Promotion of enmity or hatred for electoral advantage.
• Section 125 – Offence of promoting enmity between classes in connection with elections.

The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which replaced the IPC in 2023, reinforces this framework through Sections 196, 297, and 356, criminalising the promotion of enmity, insult to religion, and public mischief.

Each complaint demands that these provisions be activated: show-cause notices by the ECI, FIRs by the police, and debarment of the speakers from further campaigning.

The legal core is clear: these are not mere lapses in civility but prima facie offences that undermine the constitutional promise of free and fair elections.

The arc of escalation

When read in sequence, the four speeches trace a visible escalation in both tone and institutional proximity to power:

• Ashok Yadav’s speech begins with ridicule.
• Giriraj Singh’s adds humiliation through oaths and public shaming.
• Nityanand Rai’s brings religion and national security together, as a sitting Home Ministry official.
• Amit Shah’s completes the circle by translating rhetoric into an explicit promise of expulsion.

This progression is not accidental. It reveals a tested campaign grammar where each rung normalises the next: what begins as jest ends as policy.

The broader stakes

These episodes are not confined to Bihar. They speak to a larger transformation of Indian electoral speech where the distance between communal rhetoric and administrative policy has collapsed. When senior ministers use the language of exclusion, the threat is no longer hypothetical—it carries bureaucratic plausibility.

For voters marked by faith, language, or origin, such speeches blur the line between citizenship and suspicion. When welfare becomes conditional, religion becomes campaign currency, and “infiltrator” becomes a category of governance, the right to participate as an equal citizen is quietly replaced by a test of loyalty.

Conclusion

The complaints filed by CJP during the MCC period document more than isolated offences; they expose a deliberate strategy of electoral communication. The sequence from Ashok Yadav’s “tauba tauba” to Amit Shah’s “expel each and every ghuspaithiya” reveals how easily populist politics collapses welfare into servitude, faith into allegiance, and citizenship into a privilege contingent on identity.

If the Election Commission and the police fail to act decisively, the precedent will be set: that speeches promising the exclusion of communities can be made under the protection of the very laws meant to prevent them.

In the end, the question that echoes across these rallies in Bihar is the one Amit Shah himself asked in Siwan: “Should their names be on the voter list or not?” The answer, if democracy is to retain meaning, cannot be decided by a campaign crowd—it must remain the inalienable right of every citizen, beyond the reach of faith, fear, or political favour.

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The post From Welfare to Expulsion: Bihar’s MCC period rhetoric turns citizenship into a campaign weapon appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As reported by The Telegraph, it was Giriraj Singh, the BJP’s MP from Begusarai, who told a poll rally in Arwal district on Saturday that “citizens who accept government welfare have a moral obligation to vote for the ruling party.” Twisting perversely the very fundamentals of republican democratic governance, he clearly appeared to use the term for Muslims who are beneficiaries of the schemes declared by the current regime at the Centre but do not support the BJP.

In a video of the speech, Singh recounted a reported conversation with a cleric. “So I told him that one who doesn’t acknowledge help is called a namak haram,” the minister is heard saying.

“I told him, ‘Maulvi Saheb, I don’t want the votes of the namak haram’,” he said.

Despite facing criticism on Sunday (October 19), Singh stood by his remarks, telling reporters he meant only to highlight that government welfare schemes were non-discriminatory.

The comments drew strong and immediate criticism.

Shiv Sena (UBT) leader Sanjay Raut demanded the minister’s removal, asking, “If someone doesn’t vote for you, does that make them namak haram?” The Bihar Congress called Singh “mentally unstable.”

The BJP’s main ally in Bihar, the Janata Dal (United), was more cautious in its response. Spokesperson Rajeev Ranjan said voters “make decisions beyond such comments,” while another party leader defended Singh.

The minister’s provocative statement was the most high-profile of several communally charged incidents involving BJP leaders over the weekend. In Pune, on Sunday, Rajya Sabha MP Medha Kulkarni led a protest organised by the Patit Pavan Sanghatna and other Hindu outfits at the historic Shaniwarwada fort, reported The Indian Express.

After a video showed Muslim women offering prayers at the site, Kulkarni and activists “purified” the spot with cow urine and performed a Hindu ritual. “We will not allow ‘namaz’ in Shaniwarwada, Hindu community has now become awakened,” she tweeted before the protest. She later defended the action, stating, “It is a symbol of Hindavi Swaraj… We cannot allow anyone to offer namaz here. It is not a mosque.”

The move was slammed by political opponents as an attempt to polarise voters ahead of local civic polls. Sachin Sawant of the Maharashtra Congress noted the fort’s diverse history, adding, “The BJP MP is also protesting against the ‘dargah’ outside Shaniwarwada. When the Peshwas had no problem, what is her problem?”

Separately, a video showed BJP leader Pragya Thakur urging parents to use violence to control their daughters, reported The Financial Express. She warned that girls welcomed as “Lakshmi or Saraswati” grow up to become “mianin” (a derogatory term for a Muslim man’s wife).

“Strengthen your mind, and make it so strong that if our daughter does not obey us, if she goes to a non-believer’s house, leave no stone unturned in considering breaking her legs,” Thakur said.

She added that parents should not “step back” from beating their children for their own good! These incidents come as Bihar prepares for elections, with the first phase of polling on November 6, the second on November 11, and counting on November 14.

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The post Bihar Elections Build-up: ‘Won’t allow namaz’, ‘namak haram’, BJP MPs’ communal hate-filled remarks draw fire appeared first on SabrangIndia.

While the speech originated as a local executive response to the Bareilly protest, its propagation and amplification were largely mediated through national and regional media, especially Hindi television channels like Times Now Navbharat, Zee News Hindi, and News18 Hindi, which paired the CM’s words with dramatic visuals of protests, police action, and property demolitions. Short-form clips circulated widely on social media, creating a feedback loop that magnified both the rhetoric and the state response.

This media-driven amplification transformed a local law-and-order issue into a nationally visible spectacle of punitive governance, normalising coercive enforcement and targeting of a religious community. The timing and scale of dissemination may also have significant political resonance, particularly with the upcoming Bihar elections, as the Hindi-language media networks ensured that the CM’s rhetoric reached a broad, politically significant audience.

Within days the state response in Bareilly intensified: large-scale arrests, property-sealing and demolition actions, 48-hour internet suspensions, criminal FIRs (running into hundreds or thousands in some counts), and administrative notices against aides of the cleric who called the Bareilly protest. That sequence of ‘protest → CM rhetoric → heavy-handed enforcement’ raises three connected questions the rest of this piece examines in depth:

• Did the CM’s speech cross legal lines such as incitement or unlawful discrimination?
• Did the state response follow due process and the Supreme Court’s own safeguards (including the duty to investigate hate speech suo moto)?
• What are the measurable social, legal and media consequences of that political rhetoric?

What happened — a timeline

The trigger (September 4–9, 2025): The flashpoint began on September 4 when an illuminated board/banners reading “I Love Muhammad” appeared during an Eid-e-Milad-un-Nabi procession in parts of Kanpur (Syed Nagar/Rawatpur). Local objections, framed by some Hindu groups as a “deviation from tradition”, led the police to register an FIR on September 9 against 24 persons (9 named, 15 unknown) for allegedly disturbing communal harmony. The complaint, according to the report of India Today, centred on shifting tents/banners into a location on a public road near a gate used by Ram Navami processions. That apparently small ritual alteration escalated as news and social media spread the story to other districts.

Escalation and the Bareilly protest (September 26–27, 2025): On September 26, a public gathering in Bareilly — called in sympathy with the “I Love Muhammad” campaign and associated with cleric Tauqeer Raza Khan — clashed with police after Friday prayers; police used lathi-charge and reported stone-pelting and injuries to officers. According to a report of Times of India, authorities say the protest had been called without permission; police also said the gathering showed signs of pre-planning through social media groups. Multiple FIRs and detentions followed. Local reporting states dozens detained with FIRs filed against hundreds — and some outlets report FIR counts running into the thousands across multiple stations. Shortly after the clashes, the cleric and several aides were arrested.

The Chief Minister’s response (September 28, 2025): Speaking at a public ‘Viksit UP’ event, CM Yogi Adityanath warned that those who “vandalise in the name of faith… attack the police… we won’t let you go… chedhoge to chodenge nahi aur chodenge nahi toh fir chootoge bhi nahi.” He used phrases such as “denting and painting must be done” and framed the response as necessary to protect festivals and public safety. These comments were widely reported and repeated across national news outlets the same day and the day after.

The contentious speeches delivered by CM Adityanath are:

अगर बेटी की सुरक्षा पर हाथ डालने का प्रयास किया,
व्यापारी के प्रतिष्ठान में आग लगाने का प्रयास किया,
उत्सव में अराजकता पैदा करने प्रयास किया तो,

यह रास्ता सीधे नर्क में जाने का होगा… pic.twitter.com/gUV9vkYnRX

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

‘गजवा-ए-हिंद’ हिन्दुस्तान की धरती पर नहीं होगा,

अगर किसी को जहन्नुम में जाना हो तो ‘गजवा-ए-हिंद’ के नाम पर अराजकता पैदा करने का कुत्सित प्रयास करे…

देर-सबेर ‘छांगुर’ जैसे हाल तो उनके भी होने ही हैं… pic.twitter.com/8V6MXvZbgm

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

छोटे-छोटे बच्चों को जिनके हाथों में कलम होनी चाहिए, जिनके हाथों में नोटबुक होनी चाहिए, विज्ञान और गणित की पुस्तकें होनी चाहिए, उनके हाथों में I Love Muhammad का पोस्टर…

…इनको यह भी नहीं मालूम कि उनकी जिंदगी तो बर्बाद है ही लेकिन इन बच्चों की भी जिंदगी ये लोग बर्बाद करने पर… pic.twitter.com/rhCBIxoh71

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

याद रखना!

जब भी दुस्साहस करोगे, ऐसे ही पिटोगे जैसे बरेली के अंदर पीटे गए हो… pic.twitter.com/AZWOU4m495

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

लव-जिहाद, धर्मांतरण और गो-तस्करी जैसी राष्ट्र विरोधी गतिविधियों के प्रति हमें सतर्क रहना होगा,

अगर कहीं कोई भूल से भी इस प्रकार की गतिविधियों में लिप्त है, उसकी सूचना ससमय पुलिस और प्रशासन को उपलब्ध करवाइए,

उपचार की व्यवस्था हम स्वयं कर लेंगे… pic.twitter.com/wLTyTcChgD

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

2025): After the violence and speeches, the district administration moved decisively: large-scale arrests and FIRs were filed, properties linked to accused persons were sealed or demolished by the local authority demolished including a banquet hall and other structures allegedly used by those arrested, administrative notices, for example, power-theft notices, were issued against associates of the cleric, and internet and SMS services in Bareilly district were suspended for 48 hours citing maintenance of public order, as per The Economic Times. Several human-rights and legal activists have already filed petitions and complaints alleging lack of prior notice for demolition and possible collective punishment. Political parties and civil-society delegations have begun to visit the city; opposition leaders are demanding investigations.

The problem with the speech itself

1. Targeting + personal reference. The CM specifically attacked a cleric’s actions, namely Tauqeer Raza Khan, and conduct in public, saying that the “Maulana forgot who is in power” and promising retribution that would be remembered by “future generations.” Targeting an identifiable leader and associating him and his followers with violence elevates the rhetoric beyond abstract law-and-order language.
2. Punitive metaphors taken literally. The repeated use of “denting and painting” and explicit references to the “bulldozer” rhetorical universe, and actual demolitions in other recent UP campaigns, is not merely figurative; in the current UP context it has an institutional history as a public performance of punishment — a state spectacle with material consequences. The phrase therefore reads as both a policy cue and a public warning.
3. Promise of force / deterrence directed at a community act. Even if the immediate trigger was violence, the CM’s formula — “If you trouble us, we will not spare you” — was framed to deter a specific form of expressive action, such as displaying I Love Muhammad posters, that political actors and some civil-society figures had defended as speech. The combination of delegitimisation, portraying the slogan as manipulation of children or anarchy, plus promise of collective discipline is consequential.

Those three features — naming, punitive metaphor, and generalised deterrence — are the elements that make legal and normative analysis urgent.

Media: Who amplified, and how amplification changed the story

The media ecosystem played a decisive role in transforming Yogi Adityanath’s remarks from a local political reaction into a nationally mediated performance of power. Within hours of his speech, both television and print outlets had front-paged his most aggressive lines — “chedhoge to chodenge nahi” and “denting and painting must be done” — turning threats of retribution into viral catchphrases.

National and regional broadcasters, including Times Now Navbharat, Zee News Hindi, and News18 Hindi, ran segments that paired these quotes with dramatic visuals of protests, lathicharges, and property demolitions. The YouTube thumbnails and on-screen tickers themselves became an extension of the state’s messaging — text overlays like “Maulana bhool gaya kaun sarkar mein hai” or “Bareilly mein danga, sarkar ki kathor karwai” visually encoded the CM’s warning as spectacle and slogan.

This media choreography had a dual effect. First, it nationalised the CM’s rhetoric, ensuring that what began as a local communal disturbance was recast as a state-wide law-and-order triumph. Second, the widespread replaying of his lines — often stripped of context and accompanied by enforcement footage — normalised the language of punishment and deterrence. Even platforms that did not editorially endorse the speech contributed to its amplification through repetition and aestheticisation.

Some outlets, such as The Wire and The Indian Express, offered a countervailing frame: detailed timelines, verification of police claims about “online toolkits,” and critical analysis of the administration’s disproportionate use of force. But these were exceptions within an overwhelming current of performative law-and-order coverage. The split in framing — between law-and-order narratives and civil-liberties scrutiny — reveals how editorial positioning directly shapes the moral valence of communal incidents.

Short-form videos from these channels, extracted as YouTube shorts and Twitter/X reels, circulated widely on social media. These clips — the CM’s warning juxtaposed with scenes of violence and police deployment — fed a feedback loop: the more viral the visual, the stronger the administrative justification for subsequent measures like internet suspension and mass arrests. In effect, the media ecology and the state’s coercive apparatus became mutually reinforcing.

This convergence also raises a constitutional question about mediated governance. When executive speech, journalistic amplification, and administrative coercion operate in sync, the boundary between state messaging and independent reportage collapses. The outcome is not merely the spread of information, but the construction of a “performance of control”, where the appearance of decisive governance substitutes for adherence to due process.

Attached is a collection of YouTube thumbnails from Times Now Navbharat, Zee News Hindi, and News18 Hindi demonstrates this vividly — a montage of headlines that blur the line between news coverage and narrative reinforcement, framing punitive action as political virtue.

Legal frame: what the law says and where courts have drawn the line

Three interlocking legal rules matter here:

• The statutory toolbox for “hate” / public-order speech: India’s criminal law criminalises speech that promotes enmity or hatred between groups (e.g., IPC Section 153A/Section 198 BNS), imputations prejudicial to national integration (IPC Section 153B/Section 197 BNS), deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings (IPC Section 295A/Section 298 BNS), and statements likely to create terror or public alarm (IPC Section 505/Section 356 BNS). These are the provisions courts and police typically invoke in communal-speech cases. The Supreme Court has emphasised that lawful restrictions must be precisely applied and proportionate
• The Supreme Court’s duty-to-act on hate speech: Shaheen Abdulla and follow-up orders: In Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India (2022), the Supreme Court highlighted the “growing climate of hate” and directed police chiefs to take suo motu action in hate-speech incidents — specifically instructing registration and investigation under IPC sections such as 153A, 295A and 505 without waiting for a private complaint. These directions were later extended to all States/UTs; the court took the view that proactive policing is essential to preserve the secular fabric envisaged by the Preamble. That jurisprudence puts an onus on state police: if a public utterance plausibly constitutes hate speech, police must investigate it on their own motion.
• The constitutional limit: incitement and proximity to violence: Indian courts have insisted on a context-sensitive test. The classic guide is Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962), where the Supreme Court upheld sedition law only for words that have the “tendency or intention of creating public disorder” or inciting violence; mere abusive or critical expression cannot be criminalised. Modern caselaw returns to the same principle: to punish speech the state must show an intention or proximate tendency to produce imminent lawless action — not merely dislikeable or provocative words. This high threshold matters because it keeps robust political speech protected while allowing punishment where speech is truly dangerous.

Apply the law to the facts: Did the UP CM cross the line?

This is the crucial, uncomfortable question. Courts usually apply a two-part analysis to political speech by powerful actors:

• Does the speech itself contain elements of the statutory offences?

The Chief Minister’s speech went beyond mere governance rhetoric. It singled out a specific cleric and his supporters, implicitly ascribing collective culpability to a religious community. The language of punishment and humiliation—phrases such as “denting and painting” or “beaten as in Bareilly”—was not random metaphor; it invoked a visual and historical grammar of state-sanctioned coercion. These expressions are deeply loaded in Uttar Pradesh’s recent political lexicon, symbolising demolition drives, police beatings, and targeted action that disproportionately affect Muslim localities.

Further, the assertion that “future generations” would be taught a lesson carries the unmistakable tone of collective retribution, extending the threat from present offenders to an entire community across time. Such language constructs Muslims not as citizens subject to law, but as an enduring adversarial category — a perpetual “other” against whom exemplary force is justified.

Under Sections 153A (now Section 196 of BNS) and 295A (now Section 298 of BNS)  of the Indian Penal Code, the test for criminality hinges not merely on overt incitement but also on whether the speech promotes enmity, targets a community, or is likely to disturb public tranquillity. Read against the backdrop of recent police actions in UP—demolition of Muslim-owned properties, custodial violence, and selective FIRs—the Chief Minister’s words may reasonably be understood as an endorsement and encouragement of discriminatory state practices.

Moreover, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in cases such as Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2020) clarifies that when influential figures make statements capable of mobilising real-world hostility, the likelihood of incitement must be assessed contextually, not in isolation. From that perspective, Yogi Adityanath’s remarks arguably cross the boundary from administrative assertion into speech that legitimises and incites discrimination.

In sum, while the speech may not contain an explicit call to violence, it performs a dog-whistle function: normalising state-backed hostility and signalling permissibility for coercive action against a targeted religious group. In legal terms, that makes it a fit case for prima facie examination under Sections 153A, 295A, and 505(2) IPC, especially given the speaker’s constitutional position and the demonstrable pattern of violence that followed.

• What changed after the speech? (state action and proportionality)

The true constitutional stakes emerge not merely from what was said, but from what followed. When a Chief Minister’s public rhetoric is swiftly mirrored by administrative action—bulldozers rolling in, FIRs multiplying overnight, and digital blackouts silencing affected districts—the question is no longer one of abstract speech, but of state power animated by speech.

In the immediate aftermath of Yogi Adityanath’s address, municipal and police authorities in multiple UP districts launched coordinated operations: mass detentions of Muslim youth, property demolitions framed as “encroachments,” and sweeping suspension of internet services. These were not isolated law-and-order responses but a choreographed display of retribution, executed without adequate notice, hearing, or judicial oversight.

Courts have repeatedly emphasised that executive spectacle cannot substitute due process. In its observations concerning “bulldozer justice,” the Supreme Court has held that demolitions carried out as instantaneous punishment for alleged offences are unconstitutional unless preceded by notice, opportunity to respond, and adherence to municipal laws (Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2022). The law draws a bright line: urban planning cannot be weaponised as penal theatre. Yet, in Uttar Pradesh, the chain of events—fiery speech followed by visible coercive measures—suggests a punitive motive masquerading as law enforcement.

Equally significant is the Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India (2022) principle, which imposes a positive duty on the police: they must initiate suo-moto FIRs against hate speech, irrespective of the speaker’s political stature. The judgment underscored that inaction is complicity, and selective enforcement deepens discrimination. In this case, law enforcement pursued alleged protestors with urgency but failed to act on the Chief Minister’s inflammatory remarks, despite clear statutory grounds under Sections 153A, 295A, and 505(2) IPC.

The constitutional doctrine of proportionality also comes into play. Administrative actions must bear a rational nexus to legitimate aims, employ the least restrictive means, and avoid discriminatory impact. Yet the scale and selectivity of post-speech measures—demolitions confined largely to Muslim-majority neighbourhoods, police raids on specific youth groups, and the near-complete absence of accountability for vigilante actors—suggest a pattern of collective punishment rather than targeted, proportionate law enforcement.

As many have noted, when executive speech operates as a signal and the bureaucratic apparatus responds with coercive overreach, the boundary between political rhetoric and state sanction collapses. The state ceases to act as a neutral arbiter and instead becomes a performer in its own moral spectacle, projecting deterrence through fear.

In sum, while Yogi Adityanath’s speech might be defensible as political expression if viewed in isolation, the temporal and causal sequence of events—immediate arrests, sweeping FIRs, and punitive demolitions—creates a compelling case that state power was deployed not for justice but for signalling. Such a pattern raises grave constitutional concerns under Articles 14, 19, and 21, even if establishing direct criminal culpability for the speech remains legally complex.

The ground reality: Evidence of disproportionate enforcement and social fallout

The aftermath of the Bareilly clashes reveals a pattern that extends far beyond a conventional law-and-order response. It reflects a multi-tiered exercise of coercive state power, activated in the wake of the Chief Minister’s speech and sustained through both formal and informal mechanisms of punishment.

• Mass arrests and sweeping FIRs: In the immediate aftermath, police operations intensified across Bareilly and adjoining districts. Reports cited dozens of detentions within hours, and FIRs naming hundreds—sometimes even thousands—of individuals. According to The Times of India, nearly 2,000 people were named across multiple police stations, though the exact number varied by outlet. The breadth of these FIRs—often containing generalised allegations—raises serious questions about collective culpability and the use of preventive detention as a form of intimidation rather than targeted investigation.
• Property sealing and demolitions: Municipal and development authorities undertook swift demolition and sealing drives against properties allegedly linked to the accused—among them a banquet hall and other commercial structures. Families reported that no prior notice or opportunity to be heard was provided, prompting complaints to the Uttar Pradesh Human Rights Commission. As The Times of India noted, these measures echo the state’s recent pattern of bulldozer-led punitive actions, widely criticised by rights groups as performative retribution designed to convey dominance rather than ensure compliance with planning laws. The recurrence of such demolitions immediately after communal incidents suggests a deliberate conflation of criminal liability with property ownership and community identity.
• Administrative and regulatory reprisals: Alongside police action, the administration issued a series of “ancillary punishments”—including power-theft notices, income recovery claims, and regulatory sanctions against persons associated with the cleric at the centre of the protests. These quasi-civil penalties compounded the economic and psychological burden on affected families. The simultaneity of these measures—each lawful in isolation but collectively disproportionate—points to a pattern of cumulative punishment through bureaucratic instruments.
• Communications blackouts: Authorities imposed a 48-hour suspension of mobile internet, broadband, and SMS services across Bareilly district, citing the need to curb rumours and prevent mobilisation. The Economic Times reported that this was one of several recent instances where internet shutdowns have become the default administrative reflex during communal tensions. Such measures, while framed as precautionary, raise acute proportionality and necessity concerns under the Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of Indiav (2020) standard, which requires narrowly tailored, time-bound restrictions and periodic review.
• Societal reverberations and exclusionary practices: The social aftershocks were equally significant. Civil-society observers and media, such as LiveMint documented a perceptible tightening of social boundaries in the weeks following the incident. Muslims reportedly faced pressure to abstain from participating in garba celebrations and other public festivities, and instances were noted where Hindutva groups sought to monitor or exclude Muslim presence at cultural events. Though less quantifiable, these developments illustrate how executive rhetoric and coercive enforcement combine to legitimise exclusion at the community level, embedding state-endorsed bias within everyday social interactions.

Taken together, these events depict not an isolated breakdown of order but a coordinated sequence: rhetoric, repression, and social sanction. The cycle of speech, enforcement, spectacle, and exclusion forms a distinctive template of governance—where administrative action doubles as political performance, and punishment itself becomes a form of public messaging.

The Political Economy of Hard-line Rhetoric: How speech translates into power

Whether by deliberate strategy or downstream effect, hard-line public rhetoric by state leaders like Yogi Adityanath yields three tangible advantages for majoritarian or vigilante actors operating at the political margins. It converts language into action, rhetoric into legitimacy, and coercion into spectacle.

1. Implicit legitimisation of vigilante policing: When a head of government publicly vows “uncompromising action” and uses metaphors of retribution—such as “denting and painting” or “we will not spare you”—the message travels well beyond the bureaucracy. It functions as a symbolic green light for local affiliates, vigilante groups, and ideological sympathisers. These actors interpret the rhetoric as moral endorsement for “citizen policing” or social intimidation campaigns under the guise of defending faith or nationalism. Civil-society reports document a consistent pattern: Hindutva outfits intensify surveillance of Muslim participation in cultural events—such as garba celebrations or processions—soon after high-profile communal statements. In practice, this rhetoric lowers the cost of vigilantism, creating a permissive environment where harassment appears state-sanctioned.
2. Narrative control and inversion: Strongman rhetoric also reshapes the moral sequence of events. By branding expressive or devotional acts—such as the “I Love Muhammad” posters—as “provocations,” the state repositions itself as the neutral guarantor of order, while protestors are recast as disruptors. This narrative inversion turns a community’s assertion of faith into a law-and-order problem, allowing the administration to deploy coercion with minimal public pushback.
   As The Wire and other critical outlets observed, media framing plays a decisive role: channels that foreground “riots” and “discipline” amplify the executive’s preferred storyline, while those that question due process or disproportionality are marginalised as “soft on disorder.” The result is a feedback loop where political rhetoric and editorial selection co-produce legitimacy.
3. Electoral signalling and mobilisation gains: Beyond its immediate administrative use, hard-line speech operates as a performative display of strength aimed at a political constituency. The imagery of bulldozers, swift arrests, and collective punishment serves as a spectacle of decisive governance, projecting control and dominance. Scholars of South Asian populism have noted that such performances of punishment—what The Loop terms “punitive populism”—transform the machinery of justice into an instrument of emotional reassurance for the majority. Each demolition or crackdown becomes not just an act of enforcement but a ritual reaffirmation of political identity, blurring the lines between public order and electoral theatre.

Taken together, these three dynamics show how rhetoric, media, and enforcement converge into a single ecosystem of majoritarian power. In this model, punishment is not merely administered—it is performed, televised, and voted upon.

Accountability gaps and legal remedies

The aftermath of the Bareilly episode demands more than commentary — it demands accountability. When executive speech, administrative action, and media amplification intersect to produce coercive outcomes, the constitutional order must provide correctives. The following lines of legal and institutional response arise directly from existing Supreme Court jurisprudence and human-rights practice:

1. Suo moto inquiry into the Chief Minister’s speech under the Shaheen Abdulla directions: The Supreme Court has made it unequivocally clear that police are under a continuing duty to register suo moto FIRs in cases of hate speech, regardless of the speaker’s political position. Inaction in the face of potentially inflammatory statements by high public officials amounts to contempt of the Court’s directions. A representation to the High Court or Supreme Court seeking compliance would therefore be legally tenable if no inquiry has yet been initiated.
2. Judicial review of demolitions and sealing drives for arbitrariness and disproportionality: The Supreme Court’s November 2024 observations on “bulldozer justice” caution that demolitions used as instant punishment violate due process. Every affected person is entitled to prior notice, an opportunity to be heard, and independent adjudication before property action. Where municipal or development authorities acted immediately after communal incidents, those demolitions merit judicial scrutiny as punitive theatre rather than lawful urban regulation.
3. Human-rights complaints and public-interest petitions documenting the full sequence: The timeline itself — from the Kanpur FIRs to the Bareilly clashes, the CM’s speeches, and the administrative crackdown — forms crucial evidence of state overreach and selective enforcement. Complaints to the NHRC, the State Human Rights Commission, or the jurisdictional High Court can seek independent inquiry, victim compensation, and publication of findings. Precedents show that such petitions have successfully compelled state responses and stayed coercive action.
4. Media accountability and transparency demands: Given the central role of television and digital platforms in magnifying punitive rhetoric, transparency measures are essential. Broadcasters and social media intermediaries should be required to preserve all footage, thumbnails, and metadata for future scrutiny. Outlets that used sensational promos can be asked to issue contextual clarifications or corrections through the NBDSA process. Simultaneously, police and civic authorities must disclose the legal basis for mass FIRs, demolition orders, and internet suspensions. Public disclosure often becomes the first step toward halting unchecked executive excess.

Conclusions — legal risk, democratic cost

The Bareilly “I Love Muhammad” row and its aftermath sit at a critical intersection of power and speech in contemporary India. What began as an expressive act — a slogan, a banner, a theological or identity affirmation — was transformed rapidly under political and administrative force into a narrative of provocation, then into a sequence of punitive state interventions.

Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath’s rhetoric did more than warn: it arguably furnished the legal and moral scaffolding for escalated state action — actions that, according to credible reportage, stretched procedural norms, threatened minority rights, chilled speech, and disrupted daily life for many. Legal redress is challenging but not impossible: the constitutional framework, statutory provisions, and Supreme Court precedents exist to push back against such overreach.

Bareilly is therefore not just a local incident. It’s a test case. If the judicial system, civil society, and media fail to rigorously examine speech + enforcement, the precedent is troubling: political speech that combines identity, faith, punitive promise and spectacle becomes a license to marginalise. For democracy to survive in such moments, the invisible boundary between “law-and-order” and state overreach must be policed with the same seriousness with which we monitor overt dissent.

References:

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/take-suo-motu-action-against-hate-speech-crimes-without-waiting-for-complaint-supreme-court-212282

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/what-is-i-love-muhammad-row-and-why-it-sparked-protests-across-india-barawafat-procession-kanpur-nagpur-hyderabad-owaisi-full-story-2791497-2025-09-22

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/meerut/bareilly-cleric-among-8-held-2000-booked-31-detained/articleshow/124185812.cms

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/i-love-muhammad-row-up-cm-yogi-adityanath-warns-habitual-law-breakers-after-bareilly-protest-says-denting-painting-must-be-done/articleshow/124189795.cms

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/internet-suspended-in-bareilly-for-48-hours-after-i-love-muhammad-row/articleshow/124273149.cms

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https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/meerut/i-love-muhammad-row-plea-filed-in-human-rights-body-on-demolition-ofproperties-in-bareilly-affected-families-say-no-prior-notice-sent/articleshow/124345491.cms

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bareilly/i-love-muhammad-row-rs-1-crore-power-theft-notice-to-tauqeer-razas-aides/articleshow/124324197.cms

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https://sabrangindia.in/hate-crime-hate-speech-scs-scrutiny-continue

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https://cjp.org.in/bns-2023-does-nothing-to-bring-in-a-nuanced-effective-understanding-of-hate-speech-making-its-prosecution-even-more-difficult

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The post From Words to Bulldozers: How a Chief Minister’s rhetoric triggered and normalised punitive policing in Bareilly appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In its submissions, CJP contended that as an organisation promoting communal harmony, it felt compelled to inquire whether appropriate action was being taken in accordance with directives issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Bombay High Court.

CJP urged authorities to adhere to these directions, which specifically ordered detailed investigations and prosecutions concerning hate speech, to ensure such divisive rhetoric did not go unchecked. CJP also highlighted the Supreme Court’s Amish Devgan judgment, which emphasised that those in positions of influence bore a greater responsibility for their words and actions and must be aware of the potential meanings and impacts of their words.

February 20, 2025 – Nanijdham, Ratnagiri Speech

The series of complaints included one filed on March 28, 2025 with the Superintendent of Police and the Collector & District Magistrate of Ratnagiri against Nitesh Rane for his divisive and communal rhetoric at a public felicitation event organised by Jagadguru Ramanandacharya Shri Swami Narendracharayaji Maharaj in Nanijdham, Ratnagiri on February 20, 2025. During this speech, Rane had delivered a deeply problematic anti-Muslim hate speech. He had propagated baseless conspiracies such as ‘love jihad’ and ‘land jihad,’ terms that CJP noted had been repeatedly used to spread harm and mistrust towards the Muslim community. Further escalating his rhetoric, Rane had used Islamophobic slurs like “jihadis” and targeted religious sites, specifically Mazars and Dargahs, claiming that they “just pop up anywhere.”

CJP asserted in its complaint that, “This inflammatory language, delivered in a public setting in Nanijdham, posed a serious threat to communal harmony and deserved immediate attention. Rane’s remarks spread dangerous narratives.” The complaint stated that a disturbing video of Nitesh Rane’s speech had surfaced, which could be perceived as encouraging hatred and attempting to justify it under the guise of religion. At the event, Rane had made claims regarding the alleged crime of “love jihad.”

However, CJP pointed out that there were no verified statistics or credible evidence supporting the existence of such a phenomenon. He had further escalated his rhetoric with conspiracies of “love jihad” and “land jihad,” calling Muslims “jihadis,” and attacking religious sites such as Mazars and Dargahs. CJP also noted that Rane had referred to the efforts of certain individuals to “Islamise” India, reinforcing harmful and unfounded myths about Muslims, and stressed that it was crucial that the police and authorities took stringent action to prevent further harm to the peace and harmony of the nation.

CJP detailed how elements in the speech delivered constituted hate speech, aligning with the elements outlined in the Supreme Court’s Amish Devgan judgment. Rane’s speech, CJP argued, employed demonising language and promoted unfounded conspiracy theories, particularly with terms like “Love Jihad,” “Land Jihad,” and references akin to “Ghar Wapsi.” By framing these terms as part of a widespread and deliberate effort by Muslims to “Islamise” India, Rane, according to CJP, perpetuated the myth of a planned Islamic takeover, further stirring fear and mistrust among communities.

CJP further contended that Rane’s speech also crossed the line into direct threats and incitement to hatred. His call for a “Jihad-free coastline” and an anti-conversion law were seen by CJP as not only divisive but also potentially having the effect of restricting individuals’ freedom to make personal choices. The statement that the Maharashtra government would “take a firm stand without any Hindutva-based bias” in fighting against “illegal activities,” which included the building of mazars and tombs, was highlighted by CJP as clearly targeting Muslims and fostering an atmosphere where violence and discrimination against the Muslim community could be justified under the guise of national protection.

The copy of complaint dated March 28, 2025 can be accessed here:

February 5, 2025 – Wagholi, Pune Speech

Prior to the Nanijdham incident, on February 5, 2025, Rane had delivered another contentious speech at Rameshwar Mahadev Mandir in Wagholi, Pune. Consequently, on March 18, CJP further approached the ADG (Law &Order), Maharashtra, and Pune Police against this divisive hate speech. At this event, Rane had spread anti-Muslim hate speech, perpetuating the conspiracies of “land jihad” and “love jihad,” and falsely claiming that Muslims aimed to turn India into an Islamic state. In his inflammatory speech, Rane had urged Hindus to rent houses exclusively to fellow Hindus, warning that “it starts with one Aslam, and then you have a hundred Aslams.”

CJP argued this rhetoric served to demonise Muslims, portraying them as a threat to Hindu society. He had specifically targeted the practice of azaan, the Muslim call to prayer, claiming that if Hindus rented homes to Muslims, “in no time, they will be there in hordes, and next thing you know, the azaan is blaring five times a day.” CJP highlighted this statement as not only spreading fear but also perpetuating the false narrative that Muslims were attempting to impose their religious practices on non-Muslims.

CJP asserted that Rane had openly encouraged housing discrimination, an anti-Constitutional move that violated Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution, by telling the audience: “Just declare that you don’t rent to non-Hindus.”

This, CJP contended, incited segregation and exclusion based on religion. Later, he had continued pushing the unfounded conspiracy of “love jihad,” reinforcing baseless claims that Muslims were deliberately targeting Hindu women for conversion and marriage. CJP noted these dangerous, divisive narratives fueled communal hatred and further polarised society.

In his speech, Rane had said, “When the police conducted their inquiry and asked what exactly they were plotting here, they responded by saying that their goal is to make India an Islamic nation by 2047, and all their efforts are directed towards achieving that.”

CJP argued that this statement fabricated an entire conspiracy theory that portrayed Muslims as systematically working to take over the nation. CJP described the allegation of a coordinated Islamic effort to turn India into an Islamic state by 2047 as completely unfounded, with no evidence to support such a claim, and designed to exploit fear and misrepresentation, creating an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion toward an entire religious group.

Further, against Rane’s statement with an exaggerated and dehumanising portrayal of Muslims, stating, “Because in the beginning, only one comes. Just one—someone named Aslam. And then he will bring 100 more Aslams along with him. I can give you at least 100 examples where one arrived, and soon there were 100 more. He will start cooking food that we don’t prefer, and because of that smell, the Hindu community will begin to leave,” CJP informed the Pune Police that this statement painted Muslims as a threat to the cultural and social fabric of Hindu communities.

CJP explained that the speaker used fear-based language, associating the arrival of Muslims with the destruction of Hindu lifestyle by focusing on trivial issues like food and religious practices, thereby dehumanising Muslims and intensifying community polarisation.

The copy of complaint dated March 18, 2025 can be accessed here:

February 8, 2025 – Kundal, Sindhudurg and February 19, 2025 – Sawantwadi, Sindhudurg Speeches

Earlier in February, Rane had delivered similar speeches in the Sindhudurg district. On March 7, CJP filed a joint complaint with the Superintendent of Police and the Collector & District Magistrate, Sindhudurg, against Nitesh Rane’s divisive hate speeches in Kundal on February 8, 2025, and Sawantwadi on February 19, 2025.

In its complaint, CJP mentioned that these speeches had been delivered at events organised by right-wing outfits. On February 8, 2025, Rane had spoken at the “Hindu Rashtra Adhiveshan” organised by Hindu Janajagruti Samiti (HJS) in Kundal, and on February 19, 2025, at the “Shivjanmostav” event organised by VHP-Bajrang Dal in Sawantwadi. CJP stated these speeches, delivered in different locations across Sindhudurg district, contained several alarming and dangerous elements of hate speech that merited urgent attention.

In his speech delivered at and reported from Kundal, Rane had spoken about what he termed “Love Jihad” and “Land Jihad,” terms which CJP noted had been coined and repeatedly used to generate a sentiment of harm towards the Muslim community. Rane had said, “how far have these Islamisation and Jihadisation people reached? How much has their courage grown? You all should imagine this. You people should be able to guess where the danger is from.” His speech, CJP argued, was also symptomatic of a dangerous rhetoric that provoked local communities into hostilities against some of their neighbours (Muslims).

In a similar vein, during his speech at Sawantwadi, Rane had continued with stigmatising slurs and stereotypes, stating: “If anyone in this Sawantwadi, this Sindhudurga, keep evil eye at my Hindu religion, just give me a call, I will make sure that he doesn’t go to that place again on Friday.” He had also asserted, “By 2047, there are plans to make our country, India, an Islamic nation. We must not fall victim to this.”

CJP described these misconceived and provocative statements, unsubstantiated by fact and delivered by a sitting MLA and Cabinet Minister, as deeply concerning. CJP contended that Rane’s warning in the Sawantwadi speech was not only a call to arms but also a clear incitement to communal hatred, with the phrase “I will make sure that he doesn’t go to that place again on Friday” being an explicit threat targeting Muslims, who traditionally observe prayers on Fridays.

This, CJP argued, aligned with hate speech, as it singled out a religious group and implicitly threatened them with harm.

The copy of complaint dated March 7, 2025 can be accessed here:

Rane’s speech served no aim other than to sow division and fuel communal hatred: CJP

CJP strongly contended that Rane’s speeches in Kundal and Sawantwadi exhibited numerous traits that were clearly indicative of hate speech. These speeches, CJP stated, targeted one section of the Indian population, the Muslims pointedly, propagating certain communal narratives that stirred resentment and incited fear. As per the Supreme Court’s judgment in Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1, such speech fell under the category of hate speech, as it sought to promote hatred against a particular group without any legitimate purpose. Rane’s inflammatory statements, CJP argued, met these criteria, as they served no aim other than to sow division and fuel communal hatred.

CJP referenced the Amish Devgan (2021) judgment, where a bench comprising Justices A M Khanwilkar and Sanjay Khanna emphasised that hate speech was not merely an expression but an act intended to foster hatred or violence against a specific community, requiring subjective intent to target a group or class of people. The Court had further reinforced the responsibility of persons of influence, such as Rane, given the reach and authority they possessed over the public.

Supreme Court’s Decision in Amish Devgan v Union of India (2021)

Across its complaints, CJP urged authorities that as per the Supreme Court’s judgment in Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2021) 1 SCC 1, Rane’s speech fell under the category of hate speech, as it sought to promote hatred against a particular group without any legitimate purpose.

CJP argued Rane’s inflammatory statements met these criteria. The complaints highlighted that in the Amish Devgan judgment, the Court had emphasised that hate speech was not merely an expression but an act intended to foster hatred or violence against a specific community and clarified that for speech to be categorised as hate speech, there must be subjective intent to target a group or class of people. The Court had further reinforced the responsibility of persons of influence, such as Rane, given the reach and authority they possessed over the public.

CJP stressed the Court’s ruling that individuals in positions of power must be especially cautious of the messages they conveyed, understanding their potential to incite hatred and social discord. The complaints noted the Court observed that the object of criminalising hate speech was to protect the dignity of an individual and to ensure political and social equality between different identities and groups. In this context, the Court had explained that ‘dignity’ “refers to a person’s basic entitlement as a member of a society in good standing, his status as a social equal and as bearer of human rights and constitutional entitlements.”

Rane holds considerable sway over public opinion

In light of the Supreme Court decision, CJP argued that Nitesh Rane, as a sitting MLA and Cabinet Minister, held considerable sway over public opinion, and his position of influence amplified the impact of his words. By making remarks that explicitly targeted Muslims and encouraged anti-Muslim sentiment, Rane, according to CJP, not only flouted the constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination but also directly contravened the guidelines set by the Supreme Court. His speeches were described as emblematic of the kind of rhetoric the Court had cautioned against, as they incited communal hatred without any valid or legitimate message.

Failure to uphold duty of responsibility

In its complaints, CJP mentioned that Nitesh Rane’s speeches, such as the one in Wagholi, represented a direct violation of his duty as a public figure, as outlined in the Amish Devgan judgment (2021). The Supreme Court had emphasised that individuals with substantial influence must exercise heightened responsibility, as their words could stir public sentiments and foster division. Rane’s rhetoric, CJP argued, filled with such provocative and divisive language, showed a blatant disregard for this responsibility. As a leader, Rane should have been aware of the harmful impact his words would have on the public, especially given his influence as an elected representative.

Apex Court mandated video recording of such events

In its complaints addressing the proliferation of hate speech in Maharashtra, CJP consistently highlighted the Supreme Court’s recent and explicit directives aimed at its prevention and prosecution. CJP underscored key judicial interventions, such as the order dated February 3, 2023, concerning an event by Sakal Hindu Samaj in Mumbai. On that occasion, the apex court had mandated video recording of the event, had secured an undertaking from the Maharashtra government that permission would be conditional upon no hate speech being delivered, and had directed law enforcement to utilise Section 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) for preventive action if warranted.

Furthermore, CJP pointed to the Supreme Court’s proceedings on January 17, 2024, where the bench had expressed its dismay at the necessity for repeated petitions and had directed the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police in Yavatmal, Maharashtra (along with Raipur, Chhattisgarh) to take ‘appropriate steps,’ including the installation of CCTV cameras, to ensure no incitement to hate speech occurred during planned rallies. These specific Supreme Court mandates, CJP emphasised, formed a central pillar of its arguments, emphasising the judiciary’s expectation of proactive and diligent law enforcement against individuals and groups disseminating hate.

Circulars issued by DGP Maharashtra in February 2023 and May 2023 urging strict action on hate speech

CJP’s complaints further elaborated that these Supreme Court pronouncements had spurred administrative responses within Maharashtra, notably citing circulars issued by the Director General of Police (DGP) in February and April 2023. The February 2, 2023 circular, referencing a Supreme Court order from January 13, 2023, had directed all Unit Commanders to ensure suo moto action (under IPC Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, and 505) when hate speech occurred, even without a formal complaint.

The subsequent circular on April 3, 2023, had detailed comprehensive measures for maintaining law and order during agitations and speeches, including mandatory meetings with organisers, audio-video recording of events, and pre-emptive intelligence gathering.

In all its submissions, CJP systematically referred to the foundational Supreme Court order in Shaheen Abdulla vs. Union of India & Ors. (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 940/2022), which had mandated suo moto action against hate speech, and its crucial expansion in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India (April 28, 2023), directing all States and Union Territories to register FIRs against hate speech offenders irrespective of their religion.

By invoking these judicial directives, administrative instructions, and pertinent legal precedents such as Firoz Iqbal Khan vs Union of India and Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India, CJP contended that the persistent failure of authorities to curb inflammatory rhetoric, which often instilled fear within minority communities and was amplified by social media, represented a significant contravention of established legal and constitutional safeguards.

Related:

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