The stay was issued following the argument advanced by Solicitor General of India Tushar Mehta, appearing on the behalf of Maharashtra, that some parts in the high court order would have an impact on other pending MCOCA matters. MCOCA 1999 is a law that has, over the years since its enactment come up for several judicial indictments on its abuse.

Eleven of the defendants who are living (one of them passed away during the Cobid-19 pandemic, in 2021 while in jail) were released on July 21, as soon as the high court pronounced the judgement. Maharashtra chief minister Devendra Fadnavis, responding to the judgment, had said that it was “shocking” and within a day, the appeal before the apex court was filed. Two are still pending release in other minor cases.

In his arguments, Mehta told the Supreme Court bench comprising Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice N.K. Singh that he was not asking that the defendants be sent back to jail but that the judgment be stayed. The court first said that the judgement can’t be used as a “precedent” in other matters. But when Mehta further pressed for staying the order, Justice Sundresh said, “Order stayed to that extent”.

The court observed in the order: “We have been informed that all the respondents have been released and there is no question of bringing them back to the prison. However, taking note of the submission made by the SG (Mehta) on the question of law, we are inclined to hold that the impugned judgment shall not be treated as a precedent. To that extent, there is a stay of the impugned judgment.”

The acquittal came after 19 long years of incarceration. In 2015, the special MCOCA court had convicted 12 persons for their alleged role in the serial train blast case that had killed 189 persons and severely injured over 400 persons. Among those acquitted by the high court, five persons – Kamal Ansari, Mohammad Faisal Ataur Rahman Shaikh, Ehtesham Qutubuddin Siddiqui, Naveed Hussain Khan and Asif Khan – were awarded the death penalty by the MCOCA court.

Seven others who were sentenced to life (unto death) by the MCOCA court are Tanveer Ahmed Mohammed Ibrahim Ansari, Mohammed Majid Mohammed Shafi, Shaikh Mohammed Ali Alam Shaikh, Mohammed Sajid Margub Ansari, Muzammil Ataur Rahman Shaikh, Suhail Mehmood Shaikh and Zameer Ahmed Latiur Rehman Shaikh. Kamal Ansari died in 2021.

One person, Abdul Wahid Shaikh, who was also arrested along with the 12 men, and after nine years of incarceration, was finally acquitted by the MCOCA court in 2015. The state government had not filed an appeal against his acquittal at the time. 

Today, during the hearing, the Supreme Court asked if any of those acquitted were Pakistani nationals. “You mention in your appeal that there are Pakistani accused in this case,” the court inquired. To this, special public prosecutor Raja Thakare, who handled the trial in the lower court, said the Pakistani nationals are shown as absconding accused in the case and the 12 acquitted men were all Indians. 

 The implications of the stay of the High Court order are significant. As stated above, the SC has not stayed the release of those wrongfully convicted (except two they were released day before yesterday). What has happened and this does set another precedent is that Bombay HC’s scathing observations on the (mis)use of MCOCA, procedural lapses etc., has been stayed and the 671 page judgement passed by one constitutional court, after 75 days of rigorous hearings, has been stayed. The scathing findings by the high court in the judgement on the misuse of the MCOCA law cannot be used as a precedent in other cases. The question of law in the matter may come up at any future date, even after years, given the pendency of the cases in the apex court.

Related:

Still Waiting in Grief: How the 2006 Mumbai train blast victims were denied closure and justice

A Spectacle of Injustice Undone: After 19 years, Bombay HC’s acquittal in the 7/11 Mumbai train blasts case recognises the (mis) use of ‘torture for confession’

The post 7/11 Bomb Blasts: Supreme Court Judgement says Bombay HC Order cannot be treated as Precedent appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The 7/11 blasts as the incident came to be known, preceded by over two years the deadly 26/11 (2008) blasts in south Mumbai, a deadly terror attack that targeted civilians at numerous sites in the southern part of Mumbai, including the Chhatrapati Shivaji railway station, the popular Leopold Café, two hospitals, and a theatre. While the initial spate of attacks ended within a few hours after they were launched around 9.30 p.m. on November 26, the terror kept unfolding at three locations where hostages were taken—the Nariman House (location of a Jewish outreach centre) the Oberoi Trident and Taj Mahal Palace & Towers five star hotels. Totally, at least 174 people, including 20 security force personnel and 26 foreign nationals, were killed. More than 300 people were injured. Nine of the 10 terrorists were killed, and one was arrested. 

The coordinated 7/11 train blasts in fact preceded the 26/11 multiple terror attacks on Mumbai. 

On July 18, 2024, 19 years down, the Bombay High Court acquitted all 12 men who had been wrongfully convicted in connection with the blasts, after having spent years in prison. The Court cited fabricated confessions, coerced evidence, unreliable witnesses, and procedural lapses so grave they amounted to a collapse of justice itself. Worse, these men were brutally tortured by squads of the police, treatment that is entrenched in a criminal justice system that shows communal and caste bias. Even as the innocent incarcerated walk free, acquitted by the High Court, after nearly two decade long incarcerations which in itself came with a cost, the families of the victims remain ensnared in the pain of loss—now coupled with the gnawing knowledge that the real perpetrators were never pursued with integrity or seriousness. An absence of closure that does not allow the real healing.

A verdict that reopened old wounds

“We waited for justice for 19 years,” said Yashwant Bhalerao, father of 23-year-old Harshal Bhalerao, who died in the blast on his first day of work at Ibex Software in Andheri, as reported by Free Press Journal. “When the police arrested the accused, they fought among themselves for credit. I realised then they had no real evidence,” the report provided.

Bhalerao’s frustration was echoed by other survivors and bereaved families. Saguna Bhalerao, Harshal’s mother, was in tears as she recalled the day: “I prayed he wouldn’t be on that train. His phone wasn’t ringing. But what happened was not what I prayed for. My son will never return, but the terrorists should have been punished.”

A State more eager for rushed processes than either closure or the truth

The Bombay High Court’s 671-page judgment offered an unflinching indictment of the Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS), which had investigated the case. It found that the prosecution relied on scripted confessions extracted under duress, unsupported forensic claims, and call records that were misrepresented or inconclusive.

As Justices Anil Kilor and S.C. Chandak noted, the investigation was marred by “serious infirmities,” making the convictions legally unsustainable. No eyewitnesses could place any of the accused at the blast sites. Alleged bomb-making materials were recovered without proper documentation or witnesses. As per the judgment, one witness had even testified in an unrelated blast case, calling into question the neutrality of key testimonies.

Grief meets disbelief

Anita Srivastava, whose husband Abhinav died in the blasts, now works at Malad station as a railway announcer. She was offered the job on compassionate grounds. Speaking to Hindustan Times, she said: “If those who were given the death sentence didn’t do it, why were they in jail for so long?”

Rajesh Parekh, whose father Mahendra survived with lifelong hearing damage, expressed rage at the state’s abdication of responsibility. “It has been proven again today that there is no justice in the country,” he said. “I’m moving my family abroad.”

Ameet Shrawagi, a chartered accountant who lost his father Mohan in the Bandra explosion, said the verdict was a “mockery of the justice system.” He added, as per the HT report, that “The trial court sentenced five to death and seven to life. A decade later, the High Court lets them all go free. It’s just unbelievable.”

Justice delayed, justice denied

The police and prosecution’s eagerness to close the case with a string of hasty arrests, led to a focus on vulnerable Muslim men from impoverished backgrounds, from all over India, based largely on custodial confessions. Defence lawyers and human rights groups had flagged these concerns for years.

According to LiveLaw, senior advocate Dr. S. Muralidhar, who represented two of the acquitted, said during arguments: “In such cases where there is a public outcry, the approach by police is always to first assume guilt and then go from there. Investigating agencies have failed us miserably.”

Despite these early warnings, the Special MCOCA Court in 2015 sentenced five to death and seven to life imprisonment. Only now has the High Court reversed that, but it is a cold comfort to victims who watched nearly two decades pass by with no real accountability.

A House Named After a Martyr, a Justice System That Forgot Him

Harshal Bhalerao’s parents named their new home “7/11 Harshal Smriti,” believed to be the only such memorial to a blast victim. The name stands as a personal tribute—but also a haunting reminder that their son died without the State ever seriously pursuing his killers. His father, an Income Tax officer, shared with Free Press Journal how July 11 was Harshal’s first day at his job. “I told his boss not to go easy on him just because he was my son. That was the last thing I ever said about him.”

Conclusion: A justice system adrift

The acquittal of all 12 accused has raised profound questions about India’s approach to terror investigations. When the State closes a case not with evidence but expediency, it compounds the crime: first, by failing to prevent violence; next, by misidentifying perpetrators; and finally, by denying the victims and their families the dignity of truth.

What remains is a chilling silence. No fresh investigation has been announced. Rather, the acquittal by the Bombay High Court was challenged in the Supreme Court, within one day of the judgment being delivered, surely not a reasoned or studied decision. The ATS, discredited yet unaccountable, continues as if nothing has happened. Meanwhile, the real masterminds behind one of India’s deadliest terror attacks still walk free.

Related:

A Spectacle of Injustice Undone: After 19 years, Bombay HC’s acquittal in the 7/11 Mumbai train blasts case recognises the (mis) use of ‘torture for confession’

No innocent should ever be jailed, my life is dedicated to get other innocents released: Abdul Wahid Shaikh

2008 Jaipur blasts: Rajasthan HC acquits all four who were given death penalty

Malegaon blast case: Court rejects Pragya’s plea seeking exemption from appearing for trail

After 23 years in Prison on false charges, five Men walk out free in Samleti Blast case

The post Still Waiting in Grief: How the 2006 Mumbai train blast victims were denied closure and justice appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The acquittal came nearly eight years after a special MCOCA court had sentenced five of the accused to death and the others to life imprisonment in 2015. The special, Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Court had sentenced five of the accused to death sentence and the remainder seven to life imprisonment under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA), and Explosives Acts.In all, the accused were in jail for 19 years in jail without a break, with one of the 12 accused — Kamal Ahmed Mohammed Vakil Ansari –dying in 2021 to COVID-19 infection while he was lodged in Nagpur prison.

This judgment is not merely a reversal of a trial court verdict—it is a stinging indictment of investigative lapses, prosecutorial failure, and judicial oversight. The High Court held that the prosecution’s case suffered from “serious infirmities,” rendering the conviction unsafe and unjust.

Through the 19 years of incarceration, these men have been denied bail. Even in acute situations like the Covid-19 pandemic or when they lost near relatives, the men were denied any relief from prison. Today, July 21, 2025, the high court has released them on a simple “Personal Recognizance (PR) Bond” which essentially means that they can walk out of jal without having to make any financial payment for their release.

Background of the case 

On July 11, 2006, a series of seven coordinated bomb explosions struck first-class compartments of Mumbai’s suburban trains during peak hours. The scale, precision, and horror of the attacks led to an immediate manhunt. Within months, the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) –appointed by the Congress government that was in power at the time– claimed to have cracked the case and arrested 13 men, all of whom were Muslim and belonged to marginalised socio-economic backgrounds. Several cases handled by the ATS around that period under the Congress leadership, including the Malegaon 2006 blast case, have raised serious questions of the communal biases in the police and wrong implication of Muslim youth in terror cases. For instance, in the Malegaon 2006 blast case, the Muslim men were eventually exonerated after the National Investigating Agency (NIA) took over and the new line of investigations showed that the terror blast was the handiwork of accused persons belonging to Hindu community.

The prosecution in the 7/11 train blasts case alleged a cross-border conspiracy involving Pakistan’s ISI, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and operatives of the banned SIMI (Students’ Islamic Movement of India), with support from Indian collaborators. The case proceeded –as mentioned above –under the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA), along with charges under the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Explosives Act, and Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA.

Trial, conviction, and sentencing

The trial began in 2007 before a special MCOCA court. Relying heavily on confessions, circumstantial evidence, call data records, and alleged recoveries, the prosecution secured convictions in 2015 for 12 of the accused.

• Five were sentenced to death
• Seven were awarded life imprisonment

One accused, Wahid Shaikh, was acquitted in 2015 after nine years of incarceration.

However, right from the outset, defense lawyers and human rights groups flagged serious concerns:

• Most of the accused had retracted their confessions, alleging torture
• Witness testimonies were inconsistent and contradictory
• Key forensic links to explosives were weak or inconclusive
• Call data location mapping had been misrepresented or was scientifically insufficient
• Parallel investigations pointed to an entirely different group of perpetrators

The High Court’s Findings: A collapse of prosecution integrity

The High Court’s 671-paged judgment systematically dismantled the prosecution’s theory. The following were key findings:

1. Unreliable confessions: The Court held that confessions made under MCOCA, even if admissible, must be scrutinized with heightened caution. It noted that:

• The retractions by the accused were immediate and consistent
• There was credible evidence of custodial torture
• Medical records and affidavits indicated coercion
• Multiple confessions were similar in wording, suggesting scripting

2. Weak circumstantial evidence: The prosecution failed to convincingly link any of the accused to the procurement, assembly, or placement of the bombs. Among the failures:

• No eyewitnesses placed any of the accused at train stations
• Forensic tests on alleged bomb-making sites were inconclusive
• Travel routes and maps allegedly recovered from the accused were publicly available

3. Call data records and location mapping flawed: The ATS relied heavily on mobile phone data to show the accused were in contact and present near blast sites. But the Court found:

• Cell tower locations had been selectively interpreted
• Mapping did not conclusively place the accused at blast locations
• Some mobile numbers were never conclusively linked to the accused

4. Fabricated recoveries and witness inconsistencies

• Several “recovered” items were found to be planted or inadmissibly recovered without independent witnesses.
• Key prosecution witnesses, including police officers and panch witnesses, gave contradictory testimonies.
• One key witness had previously testified in an unrelated Ghatkopar blast case, casting doubt on impartiality

5. Discarded lead of pressure cookers

• Investigators originally flagged statements from shopkeepers about “Kashmiri-looking youths” buying pressure cookers, but dropped these leads during trial, without credible reason. Yet the prosecution later reintroduced the theory—revealing an arbitrary and inconsistent investigative approach

6. Illegal MCOCA sanction

• Per Section 23(1) of MCOCA, a senior official’s (Addl. CP S.K. Jaiswal) sanction was mandatory but not substantively proven—the sanction letter was never produced from the witness box. The High Court struck it down

The Acquitted: A decade lost in the shadow of guilt

The following table details the 12 acquitted men and their sentences:

Role of defence lawyers and long fight for justice

The acquittal owes much to a determined legal team and families that never gave up. At the start of the investigation itself, on September 29, 2006, over two months after the blast, the then police commissioner of Mumbai police, A.N. Roy had claimed that two Kashmiri men had gone to a local market and purchased pressure cookers from two shops. These pressure cookers, Roy had claimed, were used in assembling the highly explosive bombs. The blast came to be known as ‘pressure cooker blast case’. 

As what has increasingly become the norm for reportage of “terror cases”, media reporting since the blasts was almost entirely based on what the police would share in the press conferences. So for months after the ghastly blasts, all the men were accused of a whole range of things, from visiting Pakistan for arms training to storing Research Department Explosives (RDX), ammonium nitrate, nitrite and petroleum hydrocarbon oil in their houses. The pressure cooker theory soon vanished and it found no mention in the chargesheet. Eight years later, at the time of the final submission before the MCOCA court, the special public prosecutor in the case, Raja Thakare, reintroduced the theory. Advocate Ramakrishnan and her associate Rai, who appeared for the accused in the High Court, –in their final submissions– systematically punctured these gaps in the investigation. The police had claimed that two months after the serial bomb blasts, two men had come forward to claim that in May 2006, two ‘Kashmiri-looking youths’ had bought pressure cookers in large quantities. The statements of these two men were recorded. These two men should have been treated as crucial witnesses but the investigating agency decided to simply drop their statements at the time of the trial, terming them as “not credible”. What this meant was that a foundational brick in the prosecution’s ostensible theory was shaky.

“It is impossible to believe the version of witnesses that accused had mentioned pressure cookers in their interrogation in September, because the story of pressure cookers only occurred to ATS after 28.09.2006 after recording statements of shopkeepers that Kashmiri youths had bought pressure cookers en masse. Throughout this period, ATS said that the accused were giving them no lead. In fact, not a single remand application was taken on the ground that they had to identify pressure cookers or the accused had talked about pressure cookers,” the counsel for the accused had argued. The lawyers also raised questions about the application of the draconian MCOCA law in the case. Section 23(1) MCOCA, the lawyers pointed out, requires prior approval of a police officer not below the rank of the Additional Commissioner of Police (ACP) before any information about a commission of an offence under MCOCA is recorded. The officer, S.K. Jaiswal, the then deputy Inspector General of Police/Addl. Commissioner of Police, Anti Terrorism Squad, Mumbai, who allegedly had given the required approval, was never examined.

The HC, accepting the argument, noted in its judgement: “Shri. Jaiswal, who granted the prior approval, did not enter into the witness box to prove the contents of the letter of prior approval. Mere identification of signature of Shri. Jaiswal by PW-174 does not prove the contents of prior approval.”

Former Orissa High Court Chief Justice and senior advocate Dr. S. Muralidhar represented two of the accused — Muzammil Ataur Rahman Shaikh and Zameer Ahmed Latifur Rehman Shaikh. A string of lawyers, including arguing counsels Nitya Ramakrishnan, Yug Mohit Chaudhry, S. Nagamuthu and S. Muralidhar, along with Wahab Shaikh, Sharif Shaikh, Payoshi Roy and Stuti Rai, among many others, were also part of the legal team in the High Court on behalf of the accused. They had contended that the prosecution case was flawed and that the trial court erred in convicting the accused. Raja Thackeray was the special public prosecutor appointed in the case. 

In his submissions at the penultimate stage, as reported by LiveLaw, Muralidhar described the investigation as biased and media-driven, stating:

“Innocent people are sent to jail and then years later when they are released from jail there is no possibility for reconstruction of their lives. From last 17 years these accused are in jail. They haven’t stepped out even for a day. The majority of their prime life is gone. In such cases where there is a public outcry, the approach by police is always to first assume guilt and then go from there. Police officers take press conferences in such cases, and the way the media covers the case, it kind of decides the guilt of a person. In many such terror cases, investigating agencies have failed us miserably”.

He urged the court to consider the irreversible damage done — years lost, families stigmatised, and no closure for the victims or accused. Wahid Shaikh, who was acquitted in 2015, led the public campaign ‘Innocence Network’ and became a vocal critic of India’s terror trial processes. He published books, pursued a PhD, and coordinated legal aid for the remaining 12 accuse. 

A legal reckoning and its implications

This case serves as a searing indictment of:

• Investigative tunnel vision: The ATS prematurely closed the investigation around a preferred narrative and failed to pursue alternative leads.
• Judicial deference to state narratives: The trial court accepted questionable confessions and unreliable evidence without applying proper legal standards.
• Delays in appellate review: The eight-year delay in hearing the appeals effectively meant the accused had served most of their sentence even before acquittal.

The Bombay High Court’s verdict does more than acquit—it restores a sliver of institutional faith, while also raising deep concerns about how India investigates and prosecutes terror. For the acquitted, however, it may be too late. Years lost in prison, families destroyed, and reputations ruined—without compensation, without apology.

Systemic Implications: No closure for victims, no accountability for investigators

While the acquitted walk free, the victims of the 7/11 blasts are left without justice or answers. The ATS, which led the investigation, has now seen two major terror cases of that era — this and the Malegaon 2006 blasts — unravel due to procedural misconduct and communal bias.

In Malegaon, too, Muslim men were first arrested, only to be later absolved when the National Investigation Agency uncovered the role of Hindutva extremist groups. The parallels reinforce growing concerns that India’s terror probes are often driven more by political pressure and profiling than by forensic rigour.

Abdul Wahid Shaikh & the Innocence Network

Wahid, who was a school teacher at the time of his arrest, transformed into a fierce activist on his release in 2015. He started ‘Innocence Network’, a campaign for the release of the 12 others. He wrote books on his life in jail, researched on the Indian criminal justice system and obtained a PhD degree recently on the same. He, along with the  Jamiat Ulema-i-Hindu, also worked meticulously on the case. 

Conclusion: A broken system exposed

The 2006 Mumbai train blasts case will now be remembered not just for its brutality, but for the colossal miscarriage of justice it occasioned. The High Court’s judgment reaffirms the fundamental tenet of criminal law: that the burden of proof lies on the State, and every accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The case calls for immediate reforms in anti-terror investigations, greater prosecutorial accountability, and the establishment of a robust compensation framework for the wrongfully accused.

What also remains a question is the crucial issue of reparation and or compensation for the accused and their families given the loss of lives, livelihood and utter ostracisation by society. The penalty that ought to be paid by police officers (in this case from the ATS Mumbai) responsible for the investigative lapses is also a loophole in the system that provides no succour to those wrongfully accused.

Related:

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2008 Jaipur blasts: Rajasthan HC acquits all four who were given death penalty

Malegaon blast case: Court rejects Pragya’s plea seeking exemption from appearing for trail

After 23 years in Prison on false charges, five Men walk out free in Samleti Blast case

The post A Spectacle of Injustice Undone: After 19 years, Bombay HC’s acquittal in the 7/11 Mumbai train blasts case recognises the (mis) use of ‘torture for confession’ appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Mr. Bhamre was the candidate who had secured the second highest votes. The elected candidate secured 5,83,866 votes while the petitioner secured 5,80,035 votes. He lost by a narrow margin of 3,831 votes. Of the six assembly segments that fall in Dhule Parliamentary Constituency, Bhamre focused his election petition on the polling in Malegaon Central segment from where he could muster only 4,542 votes as against over 1.98 lakh votes polled by Bachchav.

In the election petition, Mr. Bhamre claimed that after conducting inquiries, he came to know from the residents of Malegaon and party workers associated with him that votes were polled in the name of persons who were already dead and that these votes are polled in favour of Ms. Bacchav. He claimed that multiple votes under identical names were cast across different booths, also, burkha-clad women were allowed to vote despite their names not being on the electoral rolls, and all these votes were in favour of Ms. Bacchav.  

Ms. Bacchav sought dismissal of the plea, arguing that the petitioner’s allegations were vague and unsupported. “The original election petition does not disclose the source of information from where the election agent of petitioner received information that votes from about six electric voting machines have not been counted.” Bacchav contended that the petition is “not based on verifiable facts but mere assumptions” and “there is no legally admissible evidence or definite pleading to back the charges.” 

A Single Bench judge, Justice Arun R. Pednekar dismissed the petition and noted, “There is no prima facie material to indicate that votes are cast in the name of dead persons. The data was asked from the petitioner and the Election Commission i.e. register maintained under Form 17-A and 17-C of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 with CCTV footage so as to verify, whether votes are cast in the name of dead persons and multiple votes are cast in the name of same persons at different booths.” 

There is no affidavit by polling agents that they have noticed votes being cast in the name of dead persons or that the polling agent had raised objection to the casting of the votes in the name of dead persons, the order said. Further, the order said that, in the absence of material that can prove that voting took place in the name of dead persons, the judge said, “Thus there is an element of speculation and inquiry by this court at the instance of the election petitioner. The petitioner has placed on record the names of dead persons, whose names continues to be on the electoral roll, so also, has placed names of voters at multiple places. However, there is no evidence that voting has taken place in the name of dead persons or that voting has taken place at multiple places by the same voter.”  

Further, by merely having names of dead persons on the electoral roll, this court will not presume that votes are cast in their names, the court said. “The polling agents in the booth are aware of the votes cast by persons and an affidavit of polling agents present in the polling station stating that votes are cast against the dead persons would at least indicate that voting has taken place against the name of dead persons.” 

In the election petition, the pleadings have to be precise, specific and unambiguous. If the allegations contained in election petition do not set out grounds as contemplated in Section 100 and do not conform to the requirement of Section 81 and 83 of the Act, the election petition is liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, the court observed.  

Dismissing the petition, the court said, “Omission of a single material fact leading to an incomplete cause of action or omission to contain a concise statement of material facts on which the election petitioner relies for establishing a cause of action, would entail rejection of election petition under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 83 and 87 of the Representation of the People Act.”  

In 2019, the position was slightly different: Subhash Ramrao Bhamre of the BJP emerged victorious with 613,533 votes, while Congress’s Kunal Rohidas Patil secured 384,290 votes, followed by VBA’s Nabi Ahmad Ahmadulla with 39,449 votes. The voter turnout for this election stood at 55.42%. In the 2014 elections, Subhash Ramrao Bhamre also secured victory with 529,450 votes. Congress candidate Amarishbhai Rasiklal Patel was the runner-up with 398,727 votes, and BSP’s Yogesh Yashwant Ishi came in third with 9,897 votes. The voter turnout was slightly higher at 58.65%.

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The post Bombay HC: No indication votes cast in name of dead in Dhule, 2024 Lok Sabha polls appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Division Bench of Justices M.S. Karnik and N.R. Borkar passed the stay order in a batch of petitions filed by several minority educational institutions, including prominent South Mumbai colleges like St. Xavier’s, Jai Hind, KC, and HR College, as well as institutions from Solapur. The Maharashtra Association of Minority Educational Institutions (MAMEI) also joined the petitioners in challenging the State’s move. The petitions contested a clause introduced through a Government Resolution (GR) dated May 6, 2025, issued by the School Education Department.

Clause 11 of the May 6 GR lies at the heart of the controversy. It permits unfilled seats under the minority quota to be surrendered for allotment through the centralised admission process, making them subject to applicable social and parallel reservations. The State government contended that this mechanism was devised to ensure optimal utilisation of seats and claimed it was introduced in response to requests made by the institutions themselves.

Historically, minority colleges in Maharashtra have followed a well-established formula: 50% of seats reserved for the respective minority community, 5% for the management quota, and the remaining 45% kept open and unreserved. However, for the academic year 2025–26, the centralized FYJC admission portal began reflecting the application of SC/ST/OBC reservations on this 45% open category, prompting the current legal challenge.

Arguments for the petitioner: Senior Advocate Milind Sathe, appearing for the petitioners, argued that the GR violates constitutional protections granted to minority institutions under Articles 15(5) and 30 of the Constitution. Article 15(5) specifically carves out an exception for minority educational institutions from the scope of affirmative action policies, including caste-based reservations, while Article 30 protects their right to establish and administer institutions without State interference. Sathe emphasised that even unfilled minority quota seats must revert to open category admissions, and not be diverted to socially reserved categories.

Arguments for the defence: The Government Pleader Neha Bhide submitted that the clause did not infringe on the autonomy or rights of minority institutions. She argued that once minority seats were voluntarily surrendered to the centralized pool, applying social reservations to those seats was a legitimate policy tool aimed at promoting social equity. “Social reservation is the obligation of the State,” she contended.

Order of the court: the Court found substance in the petitioners’ arguments and held that an earlier judgment of the Bombay High Court—which had quashed a similar attempt by Mumbai University to enforce social reservations in minority institutions—was directly applicable in this case. The Bench observed, as per the report in BarandBench “Prima facie, we find that there is substance in the submissions advanced by the petitioners for the grant of interim relief.”

Consequently, the Court directed that, for the purpose of FYJC admissions, the mandate of SC/ST/OBC reservation shall not be enforced in any seats of minority educational institutions. The State government has been directed to file its reply within four weeks. The matter is slated for the next hearing on August 6, 2025.

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The post Bombay High Court stays SC/ST/OBC reservations in minority-run junior colleges for FYJC admissions appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A vacation bench of Justices Dr. Neela Gokhale and Firdosh P. Pooniwalla passed the order in a writ petition filed by Ruksar and her two younger siblings, aged 16 and 8, seeking a writ of habeas corpus and protection against deportation or coercive state action in violation of due process. While the two younger children were handed over to their mother shortly after the petition was filed, the eldest daughter remained in custody at the Nirbhaya Cell of the Mankhurd Police Station, triggering judicial intervention. The High Court’s order not only underscores the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 but also reinforces that inquiries under the Foreigners Act, 1946 must be conducted with procedural fairness and sensitivity—particularly when the individuals in question are children or young adults born on Indian soil.

The petition had also sought to restrain the respondents—the Union of India, the State of Maharashtra, the Commissioner of Police, Mumbai, the Senior Inspector of Police, Mankhurd Police Station, and the Foreigners Regional Registration Office—from detaining or deporting them without adhering to lawful procedure.

Family Background and Detention

The petitioners are the biological children of one Dadamiya Bardhyar Khan and Mariyam Khan. The mother, Mariyam, is an Indian citizen by birth, while the father, Dadamiya, had lived in India, worked as a cab driver, and was married to Mariyam. The petitioners contended that they were all born in India, held valid Indian birth certificates, and that both their parents had official Indian documents including ration cards and voter IDs.

Despite this, following a special police drive in May 2025 targeting suspected illegal foreign nationals, the Mankhurd police detained all three children and their father. While the two younger children were later released to their mother’s custody following the filing of the habeas corpus petition, Ruksar continued to be held at the Nirbhaya Cell of the Mankhurd Police Station pending an inquiry.

State’s Position: Inquiry under Foreigners Act

The respondents, represented by Advocate Manisha Jagtap (for the Union) and Additional Public Prosecutor Mahalakshmi Ganapathy (for the State), argued that the detention was lawful and necessitated by an ongoing investigation under the Foreigners Act, 1946, and the Central Government Resolution dated May 2, 2025. The state placed on record a statement made by Dadamiya Khan during the inquiry, in which he allegedly admitted to being a Bangladeshi national who had entered India illegally via the Banafol border due to lack of employment in Bangladesh.

The Union and State further submitted that although the two minors had been released, Ruksar’s continued detention was required to establish her identity and citizenship as part of the broader inquiry.

Petitioners’ Stand: Indian by birth, documents ignored

Petitioners’ counsel, Advocate Siddha Pamecha, assisted by Advocate Raj Pani, vigorously opposed the detention, placing on record:

• Birth certificates of all three children, issued in India;
• Identity documents of Mariyam Khan, including her voter ID issued by the Election Commission of India;
• PAN card, ration card, and an alleged Indian passport held by Dadamiya Khan;
• Proof of residence in Mumbai.

They contended that Ruksar, having turned 18 only recently, was being unfairly targeted for her father’s alleged illegal status and that her detention violated constitutional guarantees under Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty) and applicable statutory protections under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 and related jurisprudence.

Court’s findings and ruling

After hearing both sides, the High Court noted that:

“Considering the ages of the Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 and also the age of Petitioner No.1 which is only 18 years, we do not find it necessary for the Petitioners to be detained in custody for the purpose of the inquiry, which is to be conducted.” (Para 9)

Accordingly, the court issued the following key directions:

1. Immediate release: Petitioner No. 1, Ruksar Dadamiya Khan, shall be released forthwith from the custody of the Mankhurd police.
2. No further custody without leave of court: Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3, who were already released to their mother’s custody, “shall not be taken into custody again without prior permission of this Court.” (Para 10)
3. Jurisdictional restraint: All three petitioners are barred from leaving the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court without express permission, and are to make themselves available to the police for the purpose of inquiry when summoned.
4. Communication obligations: Ruksar and her mother, Mariyam Khan, are directed to furnish their residential address, mobile numbers, and any other contact details to the investigating officer.
5. Inquiry into passport issuance: A one-page copy of Dadamiya Khan’s alleged Indian passport was also on record. The APP submitted that the passport might have been issued on the basis of forged documents. The court noted this submission and permitted the state to initiate an appropriate inquiry against the Regional Passport Office and any officials found negligent or complicit.

Broader legal and human rights concerns

Key legal issues highlighted in the above case are:

• Unlawful detention under Article 21 and the doctrine of proportionality.
• Procedural safeguards under the Foreigners Act and the requirement for quasi-judicial determination before deportation.
• Protection of minor children born in India under domestic and international legal standards.
• Importance of distinguishing individual citizenship from parental immigration history

This case has brought renewed attention to the use of the Foreigners Act, 1946, especially in cases involving minors and individuals born in India. There have been long standing warnings against the Act, which allows for executive inquiries into citizenship without judicial safeguards, must be read alongside Article 21, the right against arbitrary detention, and international child rights standards, especially where minors or mixed-nationality families are involved.

While the Bombay High Court order has brought relief to the Khan children, particularly Ruksar, the legal uncertainty surrounding their father’s nationality and the inquiry into their own citizenship status continues. The court has struck a balance between the state’s right to investigate and the individual’s right to liberty, due process, and dignity. The said ruling affirms a fundamental principle: the power of the state to question citizenship must be exercised lawfully, carefully, and without sacrificing the liberties of those—especially minors—who may well be Indian citizens by birth.

The complete order may be read here.

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The post Bombay High Court orders immediate release of 18-year-old detained for father’s citizenship status appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Brief facts

The case involved a series of incidents occurring on November 5 and 6, 2014. These included an initial altercation, followed by a criminal trespass, where a woman (the prosecutrix/primary victim) and her male companion (second victim) were assaulted, and a friend (third victim) who came to help was also attacked. During the trespass, the primary victim and the third victim were forced to strip and were videographed in compromising positions. Subsequently, the primary victim and the second victim were abducted. The second victim was taken to railway tracks, assaulted, and left for dead but managed to escape. The primary victim was then taken to multiple locations where she was subjected to gang rape by three individuals (two appellants and a juvenile tried separately).

Charges and initial convictions

Multiple accused faced charges including criminal trespass (Sections 450, 452 IPC), grievous hurt (Sections 324, 326 IPC), sexual harassment (Sections 354A, 354B IPC), voyeurism (Section 354C IPC), violation of privacy under the IT Act (Section 66E), abduction (Section 366 IPC), attempt to murder (Section 307 IPC), robbery (Section 394 IPC), gang rape (Section 376D IPC), and harbouring offenders (Section 212 IPC). The trial court convicted several accused on various counts, handing down severe sentences including life imprisonment. The accused appealed to the High Court.

High Court’s decision on appeals

The High Court upheld convictions for several appellants for offences including criminal trespass, assault (altered from grievous hurt to simple hurt by dangerous weapon in some instances), sexual harassment, voyeurism, IT Act violations, abduction, attempt to murder, robbery, and significantly, gang rape against two appellants.

One appellant was acquitted of all charges due to insufficient evidence placing him at the scene of the crime inside the room.

Sentences were modified for several convicts: life imprisonment for attempt to murder was reduced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment for two appellants; life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life for gang rape was reduced to 20 years rigorous imprisonment for the same two appellants. The sentence for harbouring an offender was reduced to the period already undergone for one appellant.

The Court on consent and sexual history

The High Court addressed the issue of consent, particularly in response to defence arguments that attempted to question the primary victim’s character and suggest that her alleged past relationships or sexual history, including a prior acquaintance with one of the accused, might imply consent or make her testimony unreliable. The Court emphatically rejected these notions, reinforcing the principle of “No means No.”

The judgment stated

• “NO means NO”: A woman who says ‘NO’ means ‘NO’. There exists no further ambiguity and there could be no presumption of consent based on a woman’s so called ‘immoral activities’. (Para 85)
• Irrelevance of past relationships or character: The Court made it clear that even though there may have been a relationship between the prosecutrix and [one of the accused] in the past but if the prosecutrix was not willing to have sexual intercourse with [the accused], his colleague… and the juvenile in conflict with law, any act without her consent would be an offence within the meaning of Section 375 of the IPC. (Para 85)
• Consent is instance-specific: The court stated that a woman who consents to sexual activities with a man at a particular instance does not ipso facto give consent to sexual activity with the same man at all other instances. (Para 85)
• Character and number of sexual partners are not determinative of consent: The court stated that a woman’s character or morals are not related to the number of sexual partners she has had in wake of Section 53A of the Indian Evidence Act. This section of the Evidence Act restricts evidence of the victim’s character or previous sexual experience in prosecutions for sexual offences. (Para 85)
• Primacy of consent over perceived morality: The Court addressed attempts to question the primary victim’s morals due to her being estranged from her husband and living with another man, or suggestions of a prior intimate relationship with one of the accused. It emphasized that even if such circumstances were true, “a person cannot force a woman to have intercourse with him without her consent.” (Para 84)
• Rape as aggression, domination: The Court described rape not merely as a sexual crime but as “a crime involving aggression which leads to the domination of the prosecutrix. It is a violation of her right of privacy. Rape is the most morally and physically reprehensible crime in society, as it is an assault on the body, mind and privacy of the victim, the court added. (Para 85)

In essence, the High Court’s judgment strongly affirmed that consent must be explicit and contemporaneous for each sexual act. A victim’s past sexual history, choices in relationships, or perceived character are not relevant to determining whether consent was given for a specific instance of sexual intercourse. The Court underscored that the absence of consent makes any sexual intercourse an offence, irrespective of the victim’s background or previous associations with the accused.

The judgement reinforced the evolving jurisprudence that centres the victim’s agency, making it unequivocally clear that consent must be specific, informed, and ongoing—regardless of any prior associations or societal judgments about the victim’s morality. In doing so, the Court not only delivered justice in a deeply disturbing case but also contributed meaningfully to the broader fight against rape culture and victim-blaming narratives in India’s criminal justice system.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

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The post Rape is aggression, domination, consent must be instant specific, not dictated by morality tests: Bombay High Court appeared first on SabrangIndia.

While the Court did not stay the investigation, it directed the police that if they intend to question Kamra, they must do so in Chennai, where Kamra currently resides. Notably, as per the report of LiveLaw, the Court also clarified that if a chargesheet is filed during the pendency of Kamra’s quashing plea, the trial court shall not proceed against him until the High Court has decided the matter. The order made permanent the interim protection that had been granted to Kamra earlier on April 16.

During the hearing, Senior Advocate Navroz Seervai, representing Kamra, argued that the FIR was a direct attack on the comedian’s constitutional right to free speech, guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. As per the report of Bar and Bench, he maintained that the impugned remarks were part of a larger political satire, a form of commentary that has long been protected in democratic societies. According to Seervai, the term gaddar was used in reference to the 2022 split in the Shiv Sena, when Eknath Shinde and a group of MLAs broke away from the Uddhav Thackeray-led faction and aligned.

Court’s key rulings and procedural safeguards

• Kamra shall not be arrested in connection with the FIR during the pendency of his petition.
• The Mumbai Police is permitted to continue the investigation but must question Kamra only in Chennai, his current place of residence.
• If the police file a chargesheet, the trial court must not initiate proceedings against Kamra until the High Court rules on the quashing petition.
• The police’s notice was issued under Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNSS), which does not require arrest. The court recorded this intention of non-arrest in its order.
• Should new material arise, the police may approach the court for further directions.

Arguments presented by Kamra’s counsel

1. Freedom of Speech under Article 19

Senior Advocate Navroz Seervai, representing Kamra, firmly asserted that the content of Kamra’s comedy act falls squarely within the ambit of the right to free speech and expression protected under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. He maintained that the performance was satirical in nature, dealt with public political events, and did not fall within the permissible restrictions under Article 19(2).

As per LiveLaw, referring to several judgments of the Supreme Court, including Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat, Seervai argued that censorious actions against artists amount to chilling effects and suppress free speech through fear of prosecution. He emphasised that this case was emblematic of the State’s misuse of legal processes, allegedly at the behest of a political party, to intimidate a comedian and send a broader message to dissenting artists.

2. Misuse of police machinery and procedural flaws

Seervai questioned the haste with which the FIR was filed. He pointed out that the complainant, Shiv Sena MLA Murji Patel, reportedly viewed the clip at 9:30 pm on March 23, filed a complaint at 10:45 pm, and an FIR was registered by 11:52 pm on the same night. Summons were issued the following day. As per Bar and Bench, Seervai contended that the FIR process was mechanically executed without due application of mind.

Additionally, he argued that Section 356(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which relates to defamation, was incorrectly invoked since the person allegedly defamed—Eknath Shinde—had not filed the complaint himself.

3. Lack of grounds for Section 353 (1) (b) BNS

The charge under Section 353(1)(b) BNS, which concerns attempts to create fear or alarm leading to offences against the State or public tranquillity, was also challenged. Seervai maintained that Kamra’s act was a factual and satirical account of political developments in Maharashtra, notably the 2022 split in the Shiv Sena and the subsequent change in government. He argued that satire should not be judged at face value and must be assessed from the standpoint of a rational, strong-minded observer.

4. Death threats and intimidation

Highlighting the threats Kamra has received from political workers, Seervai accused the police of harassment by insisting on Kamra’s physical presence despite his willingness to cooperate via video conferencing. He described the police’s approach as a “witch hunt”, citing that audience members and the show’s production team were called for questioning over 60 times.

State Government’s submissions

1. Distinction between humour and malicious targeting

The State’s counsel contended that Kamra’s remarks were not protected by Article 19(1)(a) because they constituted a cognisable offence. According to the State, the content of Kamra’s act crossed the line from satirical critique to “malicious targeting” of an individual. The counsel argued that public figures also possess a right to dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution, and that Kamra’s performance lowered Deputy CM Shinde’s dignity by targeting his appearance and political conduct.

The State rejected the comparison to politicians using similar language, stating that the absence of prior prosecution did not bar lawful action in Kamra’s case.

2. Section 353(2) and political community

The State also argued that Kamra’s clip promoted public mischief under Section 353(2) BNS. The counsel alleged that it contained false information and fostered ill-will. Notably, the State interpreted “community” to include political parties with large followings and common ideology, implying that Kamra’s remarks could foment hostility between political groups.

3. On threats and police conduct

While the State claimed responsibility for Kamra’s safety, it pointed out that Kamra had not filed any formal complaint about the threats. The High Court, however, acknowledged Kamra’s communications indicating fear for his safety and asked the police if his statement could be recorded in Chennai with the assistance of the local police.

When the State argued for liberty to arrest in future if new material emerged, the court responded that the notice under Section 35(3) BNSS already recorded the police’s current intent not to arrest and that the State could not now deny this position.

Background of the case

Kunal Kamra, who is currently residing in Tamil Nadu, had previously secured interim anticipatory bail from the Madras High Court, extended until April 17. The case stems from a Zero FIR initially filed under Sections 353 (1) (b), 353(2), and 356 (2) of the BNS at the behest of Shiv Sena MLA Murji Patel, who claimed that Kamra’s reference to a “traitor” was directed at Eknath Shinde. Although Shinde’s name was not explicitly mentioned in the performance, the MLA alleged that the remarks were clearly intended against him in the context of the Shiv Sena split.

The show, titled Naya Bharat, reportedly covered a range of political and social issues, including commentary on political opportunism, the power of India’s billionaire class, and gender inequality. Following the controversy, Shiv Sena workers vandalised Mumbai’s Habitat Studio, where Kamra had performed. Twelve individuals were arrested in connection with the violence and later released on bail. Kamra maintains that he has been facing death threats ever since.

Kamra subsequently received multiple threats and moved the Madras High Court—since he currently resides in Tamil Nadu—seeking interim anticipatory bail. On April 7, 2025, the Madras High Court extended his interim protection from arrest until April 17. Thereafter, Kamra approached the Bombay High Court seeking quashing of the FIR.

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Senior Advocate Navroz Seervai, appearing for Kamra, argued that none of the offences mentioned in the FIR were made out and asserted that the criminal justice process was being weaponised to harass and intimidate the comedian for his political satire. The FIR, he submitted, was registered merely 70 minutes after the complaint was lodged—without a preliminary inquiry as mandated under Section 173 (3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), and thus amounted to a procedural violation.

The bench took note of the submissions and concluded arguments on the matter. The Court reserved its order but made it clear that Kamra shall not be arrested in the meantime. This interim relief came in the backdrop of the prosecution’s concession that the summons issued to Kamra was under Section 35(3) of the BNSS, which explicitly provides that arrest is not required in such cases. “In that background, the question of arresting the petitioner does not arise,” the Court noted, as per LiveLaw.

Kamra’s plea also drew attention to the police’s insistence on his physical presence for questioning in Mumbai, despite credible death threats against him. The comedian, who resides in Villupuram, Tamil Nadu, had initially approached the Madras High Court for anticipatory bail, which was granted till April 17. He later moved the Bombay High Court seeking to quash the FIR entirely. His petition further alleged that over 500 threats had been received via email and messages following his performance of a parody song during his recent stand-up act titled “Naya Bharat”, which reportedly included the term “gaddar” in reference to Eknath Shinde’s political defection from Uddhav Thackeray’s Shiv Sena to the BJP-led alliance.

The FIR was registered under Sections 353 (1) (b), 353 (2), and 356 (2) of the BNSS, which pertain to speech that allegedly incites or disrupts public order. Kamra, however, maintained that his comments were well within the bounds of artistic and political expression protected by Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. He contended that the case against him was a misuse of state machinery to suppress dissent and artistic freedom.

The Court’s interim relief underscores a critical adjudication on free speech, misuse of criminal law, and procedural safeguards intersect. The outcome of the case is likely to set an important precedent on the extent to which political satire can be legally challenged in contemporary India.

Related:

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A Judgement of Conscience: Bombay High Court orders SIT Probe into alleged fake encounter in Badlapur

The post ‘No arrest of Kunal Kamra’ Bombay High Court grants interim protection in ‘Gaddar’ remark case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Background: A custodial death disguised as an encounter

The now deceased Akshay Shinde, a janitor employed at a school in Badlapur, was arrested in August 2024 on charges of sexually assaulting two minor girls. On September 23, 2024, while being escorted from Taloja jail to Kalyan, he was shot dead by police officers who claimed he had attempted to snatch a service revolver and fired at them. The police’s version — that they acted in self-defence — was accepted unquestioningly by the State. No FIR was registered against the policemen involved. Instead, the narrative of a justified encounter was quickly cemented in public discourse.

However, a magisterial inquiry under Section 176 of the CrPC, conducted by the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC), painted a very different picture. The report concluded that the custodial death was not only suspicious but allegedly amounted to a deliberate killing. Key findings included the absence of the deceased’s fingerprints on the weapon he was alleged to have used, inconsistencies in the police version of events, and a complete lack of procedural compliance. The bench, after examining the judicial inquiry report, concluded that a detailed investigation into the alleged encounter was necessary, given the undeniable fact that the accused died from bullet wounds inflicted by a police officer while in custody. The Court observed that any refusal to investigate such a death not only weakens the rule of law but also diminishes public trust in the justice system and enables those responsible to escape accountability. (Detailed reports may be read here, here and here).

State’s inaction and judicial intervention

The deceased’s parents, devastated and destitute, lodged a complaint at the Manpada police station the day after the incident. They received no response. In November, they filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court seeking a fair investigation. On February 24, 2025, the petitioner and his wife expressed a desire to withdraw their case. However, the Court declined to let the matter rest, citing serious questions surrounding the legality of the police action that led to Akshay’s custodial death. Emphasising the findings in the Magistrate’s report, the bench observed that ignoring such concerns would amount to shirking its constitutional duty. The Court underlined that in a democracy, citizens have the right to transparency and accountability from law enforcement, especially when a death occurs in custody. To ensure a fair inquiry into these troubling issues, the Court appointed senior advocate Ms. Manjula Rao as amicus curiae on February 27, 2025.

The State, through the Advocate General, insisted that no FIR was required, as a preliminary CID inquiry had not found enough material to proceed. The Court rebuked this position, noting that a preliminary inquiry cannot override a judicial officer’s findings under a statutory process like Section 176 CrPC.

Judicial Findings: Constitution over complicity

The judgment goes far beyond procedural correctness and squarely addresses the constitutional implications of the State’s inaction. The Court held that where a custodial death is prima facie established, and an inquiry report discloses cognisable offences, the police are under a mandatory obligation to register an FIR. Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2013), the bench reiterated that registration of an FIR in such cases is not discretionary. The Court also held that the authorities were duty bound to adhere to the principles laid down in Lalita Kumari case and ensure that the case which prima facie disclosed the commission of a cognizable offence, is taken to its logical end.

Justice Mohite-Dere and Justice Gokhale were unsparing in their critique of the State and the duty-bound law enforcement. The Court further relied on PUCL v. State of Maharashtra (2014), and Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand (2012), and opined that in the present case there was an even greater need for transparency, as the victim was already in police custody, accompanied by four police personnel, yet the police claim it to be an encounter. The judgment acknowledges the unequal power dynamic between the victims and the State, and calls upon constitutional courts to play an active role in redressing such injustice, especially when the complainants are from the poorest rings of the society.

Key takeaways from the judgment

1. The silence of the state and the failure to act

“Upon perusal of the inquiry report, we are satisfied that the case in question i.e. the encounter requires thorough investigation, as it is undisputed that the deceased succumbed to bullet injuries inflicted by a police officer, when he was in police custody.” (Para 28)

Through the judgement, the bench has affirmed that the deceased was in police custody—making the death a custodial killing, which imposes a heightened duty on the State to ensure accountability. Second, the Court is unequivocal in stating that the death was not a matter of speculation—the bullet injuries by a police officer are undisputed. By declaring that this requires “thorough investigation,” the Court implicitly rebukes the State for failing to act even in the face of clear and damning evidence. It also sets the stage for invoking Lalita Kumari v. State of UP, where the Supreme Court had held that registration of FIR is mandatory when a cognisable offence is disclosed.

2. Justice cannot depend on the strength of the victim

When the victim’s parents pleaded to withdraw the case, citing extreme hardship and threats, the Court refused to let the matter drop.

“We may also note, why, despite the petitioner and his wife expressing their desire to withdraw the petition, we thought it appropriate to proceed with the same, by appointing an amicus. Closing the matter in their absence would have been easy, but a Constitutional Court cannot ignore the State’s failure to fulfil its obligations.” (Para 29)

The Court acknowledges the vulnerability of the petitioners—driven by fear and systemic intimidation—but refuses to treat their withdrawal as the end of the road.
By stating that “closing the matter would have been easy,” the bench reflects a deep self-awareness about how courts often abdicate responsibility under the guise of procedural closure. But here, the judges take the harder, morally necessary path—appointing an amicus to carry the case forward. Moreover, this judgment lays down a precedent that when there is a failure by the State to discharge constitutional obligations, the Court must step in suo-moto if necessary. Justice, in this case, is framed not as something that is contingent upon the victim’s persistence, but as a constitutional imperative that the Court must uphold regardless.

3. The human cost of impunity

“A refusal to investigate a crime undermines the Rule of Law, erodes public faith in justice, and allows perpetrators to go unpunished. The State’s reluctance to even register an FIR has left the petitioner and his wife feeling helpless, forcing them to forgo closure over their son’s untimely death. Such negligence weakens public trust in institutions and compromises the State’s legitimacy. As a Constitutional Court, we cannot permit this and be mute spectators.” (Para 30)

This judgement is both a legal summation and a moral indictment. It links procedural failure (not registering an FIR) with broader democratic decay: erosion of rule of law, denial of closure, and collapse of institutional trust. By pointing out the emotional toll on the family—“feeling helpless, forcing them to forgo closure”—the Court humanises the victims and frames the denial of justice as a form of psychological and social violence. The part about the Court not being a “mute spectator” reinforces the judiciary’s constitutional role as an active guardian, not a passive observer. What makes this judgement particularly powerful is that it recognises how systemic impunity—not just one incident—can delegitimise the entire State in the eyes of the public.

4. Justice as Performance: Rebuilding public trust

“This course of action is warranted in the interest of justice, to advance the cause of justice and to uphold public confidence in the justice delivery system. The same is necessitated, keeping in mind the adage ‘Justice must not only be done, but seen to be done’.” (Para 33)

Here, the Court re-iterates one of the most well-known principles of natural justice—justice must not only be done, but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done—to justify its decision to direct further investigation despite the withdrawal of the petition by the victim’s family. This reflects the Court’s awareness of its public role. It is not enough for the judiciary to silently correct wrongs behind closed doors—the process must be transparent and principled, so as to inspire public faith in the legal system. The Court positions itself not merely as a neutral arbiter but as a guardian of legitimacy—conscious that public confidence is integral to the administration of justice. In the context of custodial violence and the inaction of the police, this judgment becomes even more significant as it signals that the Court is not merely acting to correct one injustice—it is also seeking to restore faith in the justice delivery system that had been severely compromised.

Court’s directions

The Court ordered the formation of a Special Investigation Team (SIT), which will be supervised by Joint Commissioner of Police (Crime), Mumbai, Lakhmi Gautam. The SIT is to be headed by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Commissioner of Police and will be relieved of all other duties to ensure full attention to the case. The CID was directed to hand over all files and documents to the SIT within 48 hours, and the investigation is to proceed independently of the earlier CID probe. Importantly, the Court held that even if the petitioner withdraws, “the criminal law can be set into motion by anyone.”

“Hence, we are left with no other option but to constitute a SIT under the supervision of Shri Lakhmi Gautam, the current Joint Commissioner of Police, Crime, Mumbai. The Joint Commissioner shall form the SIT, comprising officers of his choice from any department and the team shall be headed by a Deputy Commissioner of Police. If the selected officers are from different locations or department, they shall be relieved of their current duties to enable their full participation in the investigation. The State CID to hand over all papers relating to the ADR collected by them during the ADR investigation, to the Joint Commissioner of Police, Crime, Mumbai, within two days. Accordingly, the SIT to take appropriate steps in accordance with law, promptly, having regard to what is observed herein-above by us, in particular, the judgment of the Apex Court in Lalita Kumari (Supra), on receipt of papers. If the petitioner does not come forward for the reasons cited by him, the criminal law can be set into motion by anyone, including the police.” (Para 32)

Impact and significance

“Only because the complainant/informant/victim hails from the poor strata of the society, his grievance cannot be ignored or brushed aside by the State. The offence, if any, is against the State and it is the responsibility of the State to take appropriate steps, if not on the basis of the petitioner’s complaint, even on the basis of the inquiry report or otherwise, on the basis of the information received and take the same to its logical end. Any criminal offence is an offence against the society and the State acts as the guardian of human rights and as the protector of law.” (Para 25)

This ruling is significant for several reasons. First, it is a clear reminder that law enforcement officials are not above the law. In a political climate where “encounter” killings have been valorised, especially against marginalised accused, this judgment asserts that even those who stand accused have constitutional rights — and the State must be held accountable when those rights are violated.

Second, the Court’s refusal to allow procedural withdrawal due to fear or hardship sends a powerful signal: when the State fails to act, constitutional courts must. This affirms the judiciary’s proactive role in safeguarding rights, even when victims are unable to fight for themselves.

Lastly, the judgment reframes justice as a right, not a privilege — particularly for the marginalised. By declaring that every offence is an offence against society, the Court shifts responsibility for justice from the victim to the State. In doing so, it not only upholds the rule of law but strengthens the democratic promise of equality before law.

This is a judgment that pierces through the veneer of legal formality to deliver substantive justice. It affirms that silence and inaction in the face of State violence are constitutionally impermissible — and that courts must speak loudest when the victims have been rendered voiceless.

The complete judgment may be read below:

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