This article, written and published in 2013 is being re-published because it outlines the significance of the legal effort afoot to bring ultimate accountability for the genocidal killings of 2002
 
It is not often that the battle against aggressive communalism, the sustained mobilization that precedes brute and targeted violence and includes hate speech and hate writing, the deliberate debilitation and paralysis of preventive and pro active measures of law and order that minimize the spread of reprisal violence and protect lives and properties, gets sustained and validated through courts of law. In the south Asian context, majoritarian communalism fed in an insidious manner by its minority prototype has the unique characteristic to deteriorate into authoritarianism, even fascism. Be it Sri Lanka, Pakistan or India events past and present are testimony to this. In the cases of all countries of the region, communalists of the majority find ready partners with fundamentalists of the minority.

For over four decades now, aggressive communalism has made deep inroads into the pillars of the Indian republic, executive, legislature and even the judiciary. The calculated, and bloody mobilization of an ostensibly religious kind by India’s main opposition party from the late 1980s was purely political; it consolidated a rigid vote-bank of middle and upper class Hindus while demonizing the minority vote bank as the raison d’être for its existence. This section of Indians, fortuitously a numerical minority still substantial number at 27-30 per cent of the overall vote, have aggressively celebrated the bloody attacks on minorities and its critics even as the this rath yatra led by LK Advani had a bloody trail en route (Hubli, Karnataka, Jaipur, Rajasthan, Surat, Gujarat among others). Writers and commentators have analysed this phenomenon as the republic’s descent into proto-fascism, with forces of the Hindu right, the Bharatiya Janata Party –the parliamentary wing of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and its more modern avatars, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Bajrang Dal (BD) manipulating institutions of democratic governance. Our administration, our police, even our Courts barely withstood the systematic onslaught.

It is in this unique context that the battle for acknowledgement, justice and accountability for the well-orchestrated state directed and executed crimes of 2002 in Gujarat needs to be understood. For over 11 years now, a steely band of survivors, backed by groups of civil and legal rights groups and activists have extracted, for the first time a degree of acknowledgement, transparency and accountability from an indifferent system. One hundred and twenty-six sentences (imprisonments for life), pronounced to, among others, policemen, powerful politicians (one former minister) and strongmen of outfits of the VHP and BD, is a success story in its own right.

What the  Zakia Jafri protest petition filed on April 15, 2013 attempts is to take this battle for accountability several steps further, and deeper. In carving out a substantial case of criminal conspiracy planned and executed by the state’s chief minister who is also its home minister, this unique and historic legal intervention, apart from the individual cases of the 59 accused involved raises serious questions about
a) the systemic build up of communal mobilization and inaction by state agencies and actors;
b)  the lacunae in monitoring and check on hate speech, hate writing, pamphleteering;
c) the state and government’s specific response to a tragedy like Godhra on February 27, 2002;
d) contemporaneous records that reveal government’s intent to contain  the impact and spread of violence;
e) transparency in summoning assistance from the military /paramilitary forces;
f) comparative analysis of districts & commissionerates worst affected by violence (15) and those that held their own (SPs/DMs refused to bow down to political masters);
g) role of whistleblowers in pinning down accountability from political masters;
h) the role of survivors/activists/ legal and civil rights groups;
i) the role of the media in covering the build up and fall out of mass crimes.

Gujarat in early 2002 was sitting on a communal cauldron, carefully stoked since October-November of 2001.  Records of the State Intelligence Bureau (SIB) that are well-documented parts of the protest petition (annexures to the affidavit of former SIB Gujarat chief, RB Sreekumar) as well as responses received from the office of the chief minister during the course of the investigation clearly establish that sustained efforts to keep districts and cities of Gujarat on the boil were afoot (reference pgs 178, Paras 426-442 of the protest petition). Significantly the newly sworn in chief minister, Narendra Modi who had been brought in by the party’s national leadership after a series of bye-election losses in September 2001, is at the helm of the law and order machinery as the state’s home minister but does little to act against this communal mobilization. SIB warnings include detailed notings of the aggressive anti-minority speeches being made by BJP party leaders as also persons belonging to the VHP and BD. One such comment recorded would prove to be prescient, “Yeh andar ki baat hai, police hamaari saath hai.” (stated by one Prahlad Patel on his way upstate to Faizabad-Ayodhya). Despite this climate and warnings, Godhra with a poor record, is left unguarded and unprepared. Despite platoons of the military and paramilitary being not far away (at Vadodara), they are not galvanized. When the Sabarmati Express arrives five hours late at the Godhra station on the fateful day, February 27, 2002, Godhra and many parts of Gujarat were already sitting on a communal tinderbox.

It is how the Godhra tragedy is deliberately manipulated that requires a careful and dispassionate study for all those concerned with non-partisan governance. The first information on Godhra received by the chief minister, home and revenue department from the district magistrate, Jayanti Ravi details the sequence of events – aggressive and provocative sloganeering by kar sevaks that caused a mob of Muslims to gather and pelt stones. This reasoning that explains, partially at least how and why a crowd gathered when the train stopped after it had left and the chain was pulled, is thereafter deliberately and consciously obliterated by the government in official statements and releases. The chief minister in the assembly around 1 p.m that afternoon hints at a sinister and Machiavellian conspiracy. (paras 50-54 at pages 37-39 of the protest petition and paras 127-174, pages 71-92 of the protest petition ).

But it is other jigsaws in the puzzle that have fallen into place during the analysis of investigation papers and preparation of the protest petition that point to the chilling manoevres by men and women in positions of governance to abdicate their oath to the Indian Constitution and consciously allow a chain of criminal actions to spiral out of control, that bear careful understanding and discussion. Between 9 a.m. when news of the tragedy at Godhra has been received and 10.30 a.m. when an official meeting of home department officials is called by the chief minister, phone call records (that were deliberately ignored by the Special Investigation Team, SIT) show that the chief minister was in close touch with Jaideep Patel (accused number 21 in the criminal complaint). Jaideep Patel, far from being a man from officialdom, is actually a strongman of the VHP, the state’s general secretary. Despatched to Godhra soon after these telephone conversations it is the same Jaideep Patel who thereafter attends an official meeting at the Collectorate at Godhra (para 69, page 45 of the protest petition) and to whom the chief minister orders the 54 dead bodies of Godhra victims to be handed over. It is a VHP man who is given the responsibility of transporting these bodies to Ahmedabad in a motor cavalcade that causes violence in its wake (paras 73-81 at pages 47-50 of the protest petition) and Jaideep Patel who hands them over to the authorities at Sola Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad. Jaideep Patel thereafter is also charged with being an instigator of mobs to violence at Naroda Gaam, the next day, February 28, 2002.

This close contact between the chief minister and Jaideep Patel, both accused in the Zakia Jafri criminal complaint dated June 8, 2006 continues right through till February 28, 2002 when the massacres at Naroda and Gulberg are being executed. At 15:26:06 hours, Jaideep Patel calls the chief minister at his official number and has a conversation lasting 141 seconds. Jaideep Patel’s is one of just three calls on this number. Incidentally all the official office and residential numbers of the chief minister for both days show a shockingly low number of calls, raising more questions than they answer. The mobile number of the chief minister has been left deliberately uninvestigated by the SIT (para 106, page 61 of the protest petition)

After this surreptitious indications of the criminal conspiracy that was to unfold, the chief minister, then health minister, Ashok Bhatt, minister of state for home, Gordhan Zadaphiya and Jaideep Patel are in touch and a controversial decision to conduct postmortems on the bodies of the unfortunate Godhra victims, in the open at the railway yard, in full public view of an aggressive crowd of VHP persons, baying for blood, is taken. Chief minister who is accused number 1 in this protest petition is present at Godhra at the railway yard while these illegal post mortems are allowed.  (paras 473-477, pages 211-212 of the protest petition)

Law and procedure are exacting about whom bodies of such calamities are to be given; they require to be in the safe keeping of the police authorities (in this case the Godhra police where the case was registered) until claimed by relatives to whom they need to be handed over with due procedure. Photographs of gruesome/gory are strictly prohibited from being displayed or published. (para 480, page 214 of the protest petition). Not only were the gory charred remains displayed but they were allowed to be widely publicized in violation of Section 233, 4 (vi), Volume III of the Gujarat Police Manual.

The narrative behind this legal journey is in itself an exploration into systemic efficacy and response. Zakia Jafri, widow of quarterised, burned and slain former parliamentarian Ahsan Jafri first filed this criminal complaint before the Director General of Police, Gujarat. The man to hold this position by June 8, 2006, the date of the complaint, was none less than many times promoted despite being indicted Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad PC Pande. When the Gujarat police failed to register an FIR, she along with the Citizens for Justice and Peace, approached the High Court and later, when relief was denied further, the Supreme of India. On April 27, 2009 the Supreme Court, seeing merit in the issues raised by the complaint handed it over to the already appointed Special Investigation Team (SIT) under former CBI director, RK Raghavan. 

The investigations by the SIT resulted in four reports, three before the Supreme Court. While the SIT, despite contradictory findings concluded there was no evidence against any of the accused, the Amicus Curiae (friend of the court) senior counsel Raju Ramachandran said to the contrary. His report dated July 25, 2011 told the Supreme Court that there was a clear case for the prosecution of Modi and three others, at least. Based on this contrary advice, the Supreme Court on September 12, 2011 told the SIT to file its final report after considering the amicus’ contrary view and, in the event of this being no different from its conclusions before the Supreme Court, specifically entitled Zakia Jafri to a complete set of the investigation papers to file a competent protest petition. After a battle of five years, the complaint that began with a plea for registration of an FIR had now proceeded to the stage of a charge sheet being filed against the accused.

SIT did not change its conclusions and filed yet another report stating that no criminal charges were made out. As questionable, was its adamant refusal to comply with the Supreme Court’s order dated September 12, 2011 and give all the investigation papers to Zakia Jafri. The 514 page protest petition is an elaborate testimony to the reasons behind the SIT’s refusal to comply. Its own investigation papers have provided a wealth of further evidence of the callous complicity at the very highest levels in the state administration to paralyse the administration into inaction, deliberately refuse preventive arrests or the declaration of curfew, allow funeral processions to be the launching pads of attacks and rioting, neutralize any action on hate speech etc. By 2013 it is clear that the SIT has not simply performed an onerous job in a desultory and unprofessional fashion. It is today through its partisan conclusions completely obfuscating the dividing line between being an independent investigating agency that it was bound to be, given its appointment by the Supreme Court, to becoming a spokesperson for the Modi administration.

Raghavan, Malhotra and Shukla the three main spokespersons for the SIT have cynically misled the Supreme court when they stated that the funeral processions of the Godhra victims in Godhra and at least five-eight other locations (Khedbrahma, Vadodara, Modasa, Dahod, Anand) were peaceful.  The evidence from Police Control Room (PCR) records submitted by PC Pande to the SIT after 15.3.2011 reveal a cold-blooded mobilization of RSS workers and VHP men at the Sola Civil hospital from 4 a.m. onwards on 28.2.2002 in aggressive anticipation for the arrival of the dead bodies. Repeated PCR messages, that the home department under Modi (A-1, who held the home portfolio) and PC Pande (A-21) were trying to conceal, show that both in Ahmedabad and in several locations all over Gujarat, crowds were mobilized to aggressively parade bodies with bloodthirsty sloganeering, inciting mobs to attack innocent Muslims.

The then joint police commissioner, Ahmedabad, Shivanand Jha, also an accused in the complaint (A-38), was jurisdictionally in charge of Sola Civil Hospital in Zone 1. As the messages extracted show, repeated PCR messages desperately ask for more bandobast; they speak of the staff and doctors of the hospital being under threat; of a 5,000-6,000 strong mob accompanying the bodies and finally one message also says that “riots have broken out.”  (paras 559-560 at pages 244-247 of the protest petition) These records also reveal what the SIT was trying hard to conceal — that while the Ahmedabad police under PC Pande and the home department  under Modi and then MOS, home Gordhan Zadaphiya (A-5 ) had enough forces to escort a VHP leader known for his incendiary slogans, Giriraj Kishore, from the airport to the Sola Civil hospital to accompany the processionists, — they did not have enough forces to send to Naroda Patiya where 96 persons were massacred in broad daylight (charge-sheet figures in the Naroda Patiya case, though more deaths have been recorded) and 69 persons at Gulberg society the same day and around the same time aggressive processions were being allowed.

Sustained warnings from the SIB, even after the Godhra tragedy on February 27, 2002 show that large sections of the police were aware and knew of what should be expected all over the state now that the Godhra tragedy had happened. As early as 12:30 pm on the 27th February: An SIB officer through fax no 525 communicated to the headquarters that there were reports that some dead bodies would be brought to Kalupur Hospital station in Ahmedabad city. The same message said that kar sevaks had given explosive interviews to a TV station at Godhra and had threatened to unleash violence against the Muslims.  

But it is the panic messages from 1.51 a.m. onwards on February 28, 2002 from police wireless vans positioned at Sola Hospital demanding immediate protection from Special Reserve Police platoons and the presence of DCP Zone 1 that are grave testimony to the planned gory scenario that was to unfold. The message at 2:44 hours on February 28, 2002: the motor cavalcade has reached Sola Civil Hospital. Page No. 5790 of Annexure IV, File XIV reveals that at 04:00 am a mob comprising of 3,000 swayamsevaks, that is the members of the RSS, had already gathered at the Civil Sola Hospital. Again, another message three minutes later at 7:17 a.m. (Page 5797 of Annexure IV, File XIV of the documents) says that a mob of 500 people was holding up the traffic. By 11:55 am a PCR message is sent out saying that the Hindu mob had become violent and had set a vehicle on fire and was indulging in arson on the highway. Message at 11.55 a.m. on 28.2.2002 (Page No. 6162 Annexure IV File XV) saying that “Sayyed Saheb, the Protocol Officer had informed Sola-1 that riots have started at Sola civil hospital at the High Court where the dead bodies were brought. Again, there is another message with no indication of time (Page No.6172 of 28.2.2002) that states that the officers and employees of the hospital had been surrounded by a 500 strong mob and they could not come out”. The message also made a demand for more security for the civil hospital at Sola. In a cynical disregard of this hard documentary evidence, the SIT in its first investigation report dated May 12, 2010, the chairman’s comments, May 14, 2010 and its final report dated February 8, 2012 say the funeral processions were peaceful.

On the morning of February 28, 2002, another SIB message says that a funeral procession was allowed to take place at Khedbrahma, a town in Sabarkantha district and adds that soon after the funeral procession 2 Muslims on their way to Khedbrahma were stabbed and the situation had become very tense.  All this and more has been ignored by the SIT completely.

Other documentary evidence of deliberate acts of provocation by persons like Jaideep Patel Kaushik Mehta (also both accused) and Dileep Trivedi are recorded by the SIB that states that deliberately inflammatory and false statements of “women being molested at Godhra” are being propagated by these persons; other meetings at Vapi, Khedbrahma, Bhavnagar etc are being held by RSS, VHP, BD to whip up sentiments (paras 631-637, pages 274-276 of the protest petition). One message at Annexure III, File XVIII (D-160) at Page No. 19 Message No. 531 from SIB Police to KR Singh at 1810 hours on 27.2.2002, actually records that “on 27.2.2002 at 4.30 p.m. when the train arrived at the Ahmedabad Railway station, the kar sevaks were armed with ‘dandas’ and shouting murderous slogans ‘khoon ka badla khoon’ and ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’.”  

While the chief minister has travelled 300 kilometres to Godhra and returned the same night, he does not visit any of the refugee camps where in brute reprisal killings, women, children and men of the minority have been lodged until well after the visit of the chairperson of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), former chief justice JS Verma on May 21-22, 2002. He also announces a discriminatory compensation package for those killed at Godhra and those thereafter. The crucial and sensational meeting at his residence on the night of February 27, 2002, is where direct evidence of the conspiracy in operation has been alleged.

Officers and others who were present have over the past eleven years indicated the directly illegal orders conveyed by the accused chief minister. Unlike crucial law and order meetings at times of crises this meeting has not been minuted. What transpired at this meeting was first publicly revealed through the report of the Concerned Citizens Tribunal—Crimes Against Humanity headed by Justices VR Krishna Iyer, PB Sawant and Hosbet Suresh.  Thereafter in the course of the SIT investigations, a serving officer of the Gujarat police, Sanjiv Bhatt testified directly and corroborated this. The protest petition makes a strong case for testing this evidence in court. Amicus curiae Raju Ramachandran in his report to the Supreme Court has also clearly opined that it is not for the investigating agency to pre-judge the evidence but place it to be tested during trial.

Despite the evidence of intense communal mobilisation, bloodthirsty speeches and actual attacks on innocent citizens of the minority, on the day of the Godhra tragedy, there is no appeal for peace and calm by the state’s chief minister and home minister; no preventive arrests are made despite 19 attacks on minorities in Ahmedabad on February 27, 2002 itself; no prohibitory orders are issued and there is no clarity from the investigation papers as to when the army was actually called and deployed. SIT has not bothered to record the statement of Major Zameeruddin Shah in charge of the army operations in Gujarat neither that of KPS Gill sent  in by the erstwhile NDA government in May 2002 simply because the violence continued and refused to stop. Hence the protest petition apart from praying for the charge sheeting of all the accused also makes a strong case for a transfer of the further investigation to an independent agency

The failure of the SIT was to examine the evidence objectively, evaluate the motive behind the government supporting a bandh called by the VHP and RSS and its impact, tested officers of the ground who were sending warnings against the claims of their accused superiors who have collaborated in partisan mis-governance. An honest and robust investigation would have made a strong comparative analysis between those districts of Gujarat that burned and those that withstood the illegal instructions from above while succumbing to rampaging militias of the RSS-VHP-BD combine from below. Bhavnagar and Panchmahals are interesting studies.

SP Rahul Sharma despite all attempts to unleash bloodshed, held his own, even though re-enforcements and troops were deliberately delayed by his seniors in Gandhinagar.Annoyed at his non partisan conduct he was transferred out by March 26, 2002. Brought to the crime branch where he again, made significant points about non partisan charge sheets in both the Gulberg and Naroda Patiya investigations, he was transferred yet again. The narrative of the conspiracy of partisan governance and subversion of the justice process runs in parallel to a cynical policy of punishments of those officers and administrators who refused to bow down to a cynical leadership and rewards for those who succumbed and became collaborators.

Unfashionable as it is to quote from Jawaharlal Nehru when he said that "The [real] danger to India, is from Hindu right-wing communalism", it seems more than appropriate given the continued attempts by the government in power in Gujarat and the party in power to belittle what has been an onerous and exacting battle, fought at great risk, within the courts.
 
(This article first appeared in the Economic and Political Weekly, April-May 2013)

References:
1. Relentless Attack to Break the Resistance https://sabrangindia.in/column/relentless-attack-break-resistance

The post The Importance of the Zakia Jafri Petition Hearings to Resume on April 6-7, 2016 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

“Now, after nearly two years of the SIT saying that these records, as per the government of Gujarat’s version, are destroyed, you mentioned when I (Teesta Setalvad) brought this to your attention to be recorded in my 161 statement, that then commissioner of police PC Pande has, after the hon’ble court directed the SIT to go into the report filed by the amicus curiae, thereafter produced the entire documentary record that he had scanned and kept aside before they were ‘destroyed’! You also mentioned that there was 3,500 pages of such evidence which the SIT is now, after nearly two years of the inquiry, examining.

We wish to express, as co-petitioners and co-complainants, our distress and consternation at what we believe is a belated attempt by Shri Pande to save his skin or those of his political bosses, as all this while – including in the report submitted by yourself and Shri Raghavan to the hon’ble Supreme Court – you have maintained that these records have been destroyed. Shri Pande has, we have been given to understand, twice before been examined by the SIT in the Zakiya matter, between May 2009 and May 2010. Surely in the 12-month period he ought to have produced this record that he had so carefully scanned and preserved?

It may be assumed that if the inquiry had not reached this stage i.e. if the hon’ble Supreme Court had not impelled or compelled the SIT to go further, Shri Pande’s sudden and generous manoeuvre would have never happened, that is, the “destroyed” records would have remained buried!

Sir, We were particularly disturbed by your interpretation of the actions of Shri Pande, which seemed to be interpreted as his astute generosity (Shri Pande’s) in actually scanning and producing these records at this belated stage. The following questions arise that we wish to place specifically before you:

1. The timing of the “destroyed” records “reappearing” in the action of Shri PC Pande suddenly handing over the scanned CD of all destroyed documents to you post-March 15, 2011 i.e. the last directions of the hon’ble Supreme Court.
2. Since Shri Pande’s role of collusion in the conspiracy has been specifically alleged, we at least cannot see this either as a stray or innocent act and would therefore urge that a hard, objective inquiry into the previous evasion and suppression of evidence, and thereafter the sudden disclosure, takes place and offences against Shri PC Pande are also registered for the earlier suppression and subsequent disclosure.
3. When a senior officer like Shri Pande states that records are destroyed, in the preliminary inquiry, and thereafter turns up with the vanished documents, what are we to make of this? Similarly, we believe that videos will turn up.
4. Shri Pande’s role in the overall conspiracy and his subsequently being rewarded for his silence and suppression make him liable to be inquired into. His personal assets and accounts and those of his family members as also the assets and accounts of other IPS and IAS officials who have been favoured by the government of Gujarat need to be part of the inquiry.
5. We thought it imperative that this matter be placed on record…

I would like to end by stating that the fresh revelations by Shri Pande amount to an effort by a highly placed officer of not merely attempting a cover-up of his suppression of crucial records for nine-plus years but subverting the inquiries into various cases by not making available these records in the individual trials and thereby committing grave contempt of the judicial process. We would like to state that though partial records in the Gulberg cases (police control room and fire brigade, etc) were made available, this happened only after applications under 173(8) were filed by witnesses and did not logically form part of the charge sheet as they should have done from the very beginning. Why were Shri Pande and other senior officials suppressing these records? Allegations of high-level involvement and complicity have been made by victim survivors since immediately after the incidents. Was this suppression related to protection of the mighty and powerful?”

The SIT in 2010

“The Gujarat government has reportedly destroyed the police wireless communication of the period pertaining to the riots… No records, documentations or minutes of the crucial law and order meetings held by the government during the riots had been kept” (p. 13 of the Preliminary Inquiry Report).

The SIT makes this observation but recommends no action for this criminal act.
 

 
Archived from Communalism Combat, April-May 2012. Year 18, No.165 – Introduction, Gujarat 2002

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Excerpts from the report of the National People’s Tribunal on Kandhamal

Christians are a tiny minority in India. Contrary to the perception that British brought Christianity to India, it is one of the oldest religions of India. Its spread has been slow. Not much was heard against this minority till the decade of the 1990s when suddenly it started being asserted that Christian missionaries are converting. Anti-Christian violence has been occurring more in the remote interior and is accompanied by another phenomenon, that of Ghar Vapasi (return home), which is the conversion of Adivasis into the fold of Hinduism by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)-Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram.
It is from 1996 that this phenomenon of conversion/anti-Christian violence has captured the attention of all of us. Suddenly, as if from nowhere has descended the ‘threat of conversion to Christianity’ by force or fraud. Simultaneously, attacks on priests and nuns increased in distant interior places. It has been a peculiar phenomenon that while these attacks in remote places were being undertaken, the Christian institutions in cities – schools, colleges and hospitals – were hard pressed to cope with the demands on their services related to education and health.

The message has been spread that Christian missionaries working in remote places are soft targets and one can get away without much reprisal. Also, the anti-Christian mobilisation of Adivasi youth through cultural manipulation was the groundwork on which the anti-Christian violence could sustain. In the atmosphere created by the activities of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) progeny, local communal groups have felt emboldened to pick up any small issue and to make a violent incident out of it. Its frightening effect on the victims is tremendous. It also begins to polarise the local communities into Christian and non-Christian camps amongst whom the seeds of tension are sown.

The physical violence has been accompanied by cultural manipulation in these areas. The silent work to Hinduise Adivasis through religio-cultural mechanisms has been stepped up from the last three decades. People like Swami Aseemanand (Dangs, Gujarat), Swami Lakshmanananda (Kandhamal, Orissa), followers of Asaram Bapu (Jhabua, Madhya Pradesh), began their work in popularising Hindu gods and goddesses in the region.

The choice of gods/goddesses from the vast pantheon of the Hindu religion was a clever one. Here Shabri (symbol of poverty and deprivation) was the main goddess, the idol for Adivasis. Temples in her name were started and regular Kumbhs (mass religious congregations of Hindus) were organised in her name. Kumbhs have been a tradition in Hinduism at fixed intervals of time on the banks of holy rivers, the Ganges in particular. Modifying that tradition, these Kumbhs were organised in Adivasi areas. Here the work of conversion to Hinduism, the spread of hate against “foreigners”, particularly Christians, was spread. In addition, an atmosphere of terror was created against those who do not toe the line of the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram.

Similarly, the god Hanuman, the foremost devotee of Lord Rama, was also made popular, by spreading his lockets and through different stories around him, in the Ekal (Vidyalaya) schools and Saraswati Shishu Mandirs. It created an atmosphere of divide in the Adivasi areas; Adivasis turned Hindus, the Hindu Dalits and upper castes versus the Christians. It is this atmosphere of divisiveness which has been at the root of the violence in these areas.

The role of state agencies has been no different in these incidents than what it has been in the anti-Muslim violence. In most cases, the administration has looked the other way when communal goons were on the rampage. The administration most often provided enough leeway for them to wreak havoc, indulge in intimidation, violence, and to get away with that.  

It is in this backdrop that when the Kandhamal carnage took place, the offences of RSS affiliates, the lapses and partisan behaviour of the state machinery, the lack of rehabilitation and deliverance of justice, came as a big jolt to the victims and became a matter of concern for human rights groups. The lack of proper investigation and other actions on the part of the state were the key for getting justice for the victims.

Prologue
Thousands of Dalits and Adivasis belonging to the Christian minority community in Kandhamal district of Orissa were victims of organised violence that began in August 2008. According to government figures, during the violence from August to December 2008, in Kandhamal district alone, more than 600 villages were ransacked, 5,600 houses were looted and burnt, 54,000 people were left homeless and 38 people were murdered. Human rights groups estimate that over 100 people were killed, including disabled and elderly persons, children and women. An un-estimated number suffered severe physical injuries and mental trauma. While there are reports of a few women being sexually assaulted, many more such victims are believed to have been intimidated into silence.

Two hundred and ninety-five churches and other places of worship, big and small, were destroyed; 13 schools, colleges, and offices of several non-profit organisations damaged. About 30,000 people were uprooted and lived in relief camps and continue to be displaced. During this period about 2,000 people were forced to renounce their Christian faith. More than 10,000 children had their education severely disrupted due to displacement and fear. Despite the passage of time since August 2008, the situation has not improved. The state administration though continues to claim that Kandhamal is peaceful and has returned to normalcy.

The National People’s Tribunal on Kandhamal
The National People’s Tribunal (NPT) on Kandhamal, held in New Delhi on August 22-24, 2010, was organised by the National Solidarity Forum – a countrywide solidarity platform of concerned social activists, media persons, researchers, legal experts, film-makers, artists, writers, scientists and civil society organisations – to assist the victims and survivors of the Kandhamal violence, 2008, to seek justice, accountability and peace and to restore the victim survivors’ right to a dignified life.

 The tribunal heard 45 victims, survivors and their representatives. The victim survivors of the violence narrated their experiences to the tribunal through duly notarised affidavits which were taken officially on record by the panel of jury members. Though the organisers intended that each of the victim survivors would orally present the contents of the affidavit before the tribunal, not all gave oral testimonies, for lack of time.

Except for one woman victim of sexual assault, who gave her testimony to the jury members in camera, all other persons deposed before the tribunal in open proceedings despite being threatened and intimidated against testifying. This report quotes from both the affidavits as well as the oral testimonies of the affected persons, who spoke in Oriya and English, assisted by translators.

In addition to the oral testimonies, the jury members considered all documentation related to each case, consisting of affidavits, court documents, medical and other supporting documents, as well as copies of reports and studies on the violence. A unique feature of this NPT was that the testimonies and depositions by victim survivors of the violence were supplemented by 15 expert testimonies of reports of field surveys, research and fact-finding, as well as statements to the tribunal… This report incorporates and draws upon the contents of all reports and statements presented before the tribunal.
Formal invitations were extended to the ministry of minority affairs, ministry of tribal affairs, ministry of women and child development, ministry of social justice and empowerment, National Human Rights Commission, National Commission for Minorities (NCM), National Commission for Scheduled Castes, National Commission for Scheduled Tribes and National Commission for Women to participate in the proceedings of the tribunal. However, there was no participation from the concerned ministries and commissions.

From August-December 2008, in Kandhamal district alone, over 600 villages were ransacked, 5,600 houses looted and burnt and 54,000 people left homeless. Human rights groups estimate that over 100 people were killed. Several suffered severe physical injuries and women were sexually assaulted. About 30,000 people continue to be displaced.

On the final day of the tribunal – August 24, 2010 – the panel members of the jury released an interim report which contained its preliminary findings.
The jury of the NPT was headed by Justice AP Shah, former chief justice of the Delhi high court. Joining him as jury members were Harsh Mander (member, National Advisory Council), Mahesh Bhatt (film-maker and activist), Miloon Kothari (former UN special rapporteur on adequate housing), PS Krishnan (retired secretary, government of India), Rabi Das (senior journalist based in Bhubaneswar), Ruth Manorama (women’s and Dalit rights activist), Sukumar Muralidharan (Delhi-based freelance journalist), Syeda Hameed (member, Planning Commission, government of India), Vahida Nainar (expert on international law, mass crimes and gender), Vinod Raina (scientist and social activist with a specific focus on right to education), Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat (former chief of naval staff) and Vrinda Grover (advocate, Delhi high court).

Context of communal politics in Orissa
The historic context of the Kandhamal violence is located in the spread of Hindutva ideology. In 2002, following the carnage of Muslims in Gujarat, Hindu nationalists gave a call to transform Orissa into Hindutva’s next laboratory. It is only since then that concerned individuals and groups began seriously studying the reach of Hindu nationalism in Orissa. Following the Gujarat pogrom of 2002 that killed over 2,000 Muslims and destroyed the community, a targeted attack on the Christian minority in Orissa was a disaster-in-waiting. The potential of manipulating the tense dynamics of the relationship between the Dalit and the Adivasi communities to serve the goals of religious fanatics made Kandhamal an ideal site for such an attack.

The sangh parivar has a visible presence in 25 of the 30 districts in Orissa. They consolidated their reach and influence with the support of the institutions of the government of Orissa, and Hindu nationalists in the state. In October 2002 a Shiv Sena unit in Balasore district in Orissa declared that it had formed the first Hindu “suicide squad” to train youth for high-risk assignments. The RSS operates 6,000 shakhas (cells) in Orissa with more than 1,75,000 cadres and a growing general membership. The VHP has more than 1,50,000 primary workers in Orissa. The Bajrang Dal has more than 60,000 activists working as leaders through 200 akharas (training centres) in the state.

The sangh parivar has amassed between 35 and 40 major organisations with numerous branches (including paramilitary hate camps and charitable, religious, educational, political and development organisations), with a massive base of a few million persons operating at every level of society, ranging from, and connecting, villages to cities, in their campaign to “Hinduise” Orissa.

Socio-economic profile of Kandhamal
Kandhamal is among the poorest districts of Orissa. It stands 29th out of Orissa’s 30 districts on the UNDP’s human development index. The Hindutva forces allege that because of low per capita income, the tribals of Kandhamal district have become easy targets for missionaries.
Kandhamal is located in the heart of Orissa. Present-day Kandhamal was formed as a district in 1994 from the earlier Phulbani district. It consists of about 2,415 villages. Because of its hilly forested areas, it has poor connectivity with other districts. Only 12 per cent of its total area is cultivable. About 71 per cent comprises forests and the rest is barren land.

Statistics presented to the tribunal on the livelihood of the people in Kandhamal prior to the violence indicate that 78 per cent of the population depended on daily wage labour and other ancillary jobs (including small businesses, private and government jobs) and 22 per cent of the population earned their livelihood from agriculture.

The Christian community is economically disenfranchised in Kandhamal. A majority of the Christian population, including local Christian leaders, are landless or marginal landholders with an average holding of half an acre per family. Christian leaders assert that the church does not convert under duress or offer money in lieu of conversions. In the 1960s and 1970s many Adivasis benefited from the services of education, health care and employment provided by the Christian missionaries. The exposure to Christianity in the course of such access to services may have led some to convert their religion.
Adivasis and Dalits are not religious but ethnic groups. Adivasis are primarily animists and do not fall in the category of religion as a social phenomenon in the same way as Christians, Muslims and Hindus. However, the sangh parivar considers Adivasis to be Hindus and where they have adopted religions other than Hinduism, they have become targets for reconversion. More than 90 per cent of the Dalits in Kandhamal, otherwise known as Panas, are Christians. The Dalits are poorer than the Adivasis and have no access to resources. However, Kondhs – the Adivasis in Kandhamal – are also a disenfranchised community; 78 per cent of the Adivasis in Kandhamal live below the poverty line.

The Panas are designated as scheduled castes (SCs), comprise about 17 per cent of the district population and hold nine per cent of the cultivable land. By contrast, the tribal Kondhs, who are designated as scheduled tribes (STs), own about 77 per cent of the cultivable land. To increase their access to land and to avail of benefits, the Phulbani Kui Janakalyan Samiti, acting on behalf of the Panas, moved the Orissa high court seeking an order to be categorised as scheduled tribes. Tribal categorisation would allow Panas to buy tribal land and provide them with benefits such as reservation of jobs, education, regularise disputed land, etc. Irrespective of the outcome of this plea, it is a cause for serious concern for the Kondhs, since any addition to the list of STs without increasing the benefits given to STs as a whole would eat into their rights.

The predicament of the Panas however is no less a matter of concern. An anomaly in the definition of scheduled castes in the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950 issued by the president of India is that the scheduled castes who convert to religions other than Hinduism are no longer regarded among scheduled castes. Subsequent amendments to the presidential order have permitted conversion to Buddhism and Sikhism without a loss of SC status but not conversion to Christianity or Islam. As a result, a scheduled caste person loses his/her SC status upon conversion to Christianity. Conversely, scheduled tribes have rights to land and reservations that they do not lose upon conversion to any religion.

The 1950 order has caused many Christian Panas to lose their rights to reservations and other benefits that they were entitled to as SCs. It is in this context that allegations are made against the Panas, of using fake certificates to avail of SC benefits despite conversion to Christianity. There is however no information on how widespread the practice is. The practice is nevertheless alleged to be prevalent in all states and is rooted in the unreasonable character of the 1950 order. While the sangh parivar claims the demand for reservation benefits by converted Panas to be the root of the problem, the fact that both Dalit and Adivasi Christians have been at the receiving end of the violence exposes the hollow nature of this claim.

Socioculturally, there is a tradition of friendly interaction in Kandhamal among people across boundaries – Hindus and Christians, Adivasis and Dalits. Both Adivasis and Dalits speak the same Kui language and despite the politicisation and subsequent construction of oppositional identities, there are intermarriages among tribal Kondhs and Dalit Kondhs. Hindus and Christians have also lived side by side and for many of them, it is the outside Oriyas (mainly caste Hindus, some of whom are members of the sangh parivar) who have instigated conflicts between Adivasis and Dalits or Hindus and Christians so that their continued exploitation of local resources and domination of local politics and economy remains unchallenged. In Hinduising the Kondh Adivasis and polarising relations between them and the Pana Dalit Christians, the sangh parivar engineered rivalries between these two communities.

A desecrated statue of Mary at Mount Carmel Convent, Orissa 2007

Violence in Kandhamal, December 2007
The violence in Kandhamal in December 2007 and that which commenced in August 2008 were interconnected as events in the Hindu nationalist targeting of the Christian minority community in Orissa. Between December 24 and 26, 2007 a total of five parish churches, 48 village churches, five convents, four presbyteries, seven hostels, one vocational training centre and one leprosy centre were burnt and destroyed. Over 500 houses were burnt, looted or destroyed; 126 shops/other properties were destroyed. Several were killed and injured.

Swami Lakshmanananda’s murder, August 2008
The purported trigger for the violence in Kandhamal commencing on August 24, 2008 was the murder of Swami Lakshmanananda the previous day. On the evening of Saturday, August 23, 2008 Swami Lakshmanananda Saraswati was killed at his ashram in Jalespata in Kandhamal district along with four others, including three fellow leaders of the VHP. The swami had lodged a first information report (FIR) 48 hours prior to the attack, seeking adequate security arrangements, based on letters of threat to his life. The attackers, estimated at 30 gunmen, were suspected Maoist insurgents, based on the manner of the attack and a letter found at the ashram. The government announced a special investigation into the attack.

Despite the media’s announcement the next day, quoting police sources, that Maoist involvement in the killings was suspected, the sangh parivar, including the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Orissa, alleged that “extremist Christian groups” were responsible for the violence. They cited Lakshmanananda’s claims that Christians were trying to eliminate him for his opposition to conversion and had attacked him eight times in the past. On August 28, 2008 some media outlets, the VHP office in Gajapati district of Orissa and the Bajrang Dal received a letter from a Maoist group. Soon after the appearance of the said letter, Azad – a leader of the Maoist People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army – claimed responsibility for the murder of Lakshmanananda. A leader of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), Sabyasachi Panda, also claimed that they had killed the swami and four of his disciples. However, on October 7, 2008 the Orissa police announced that they had arrested three Christians in connection with the murders. As the media reported, there was no post-mortem done on any of the four bodies of the deceased persons.

While a Maoist group claimed responsibility for his killing, Maoist groups had largely not been operational in the riot-impacted areas. The swami had been involved in creating a confrontational situation between Hindutva workers, Adivasis and Maoists in the area. In mid-September 2008 national RSS leader, KS Sudarshan, alleged the involvement of “foreign hands” in the mobilisation of the church and Maoists against Hindus. Maoists began to be uniformly named as “terrorists” and certain members of the Christian community who were associated with Maoists were labelled “Christian Maoists”.
History of attacks against Christians in Orissa

A history of attacks against members of the Christian community in Orissa between 1986 and 2004 was presented by Fr Ajay Singh to the tribunal, illustrating that the 2008 violence in Kandhamal was not the first or the only instance of attacks on Christians in the state.
Many victim survivors who testified before the tribunal had suffered attacks both during the December 2007 violence as well as the August 2008 violence.

Between July and December 2007, Hindutva forces organised rallies that travelled across Kandhamal, raising sentiments against Christians in the district. In December 2007, massive attacks took place, causing several deaths, looting of, damage to and destruction of several hundred houses, churches, shops, educational and health institutions. The violence that commenced in August 2008 is thus a part of the continued attacks on Christians perpetrated by Hindutva forces.

Forms of violence
Physical violence
Some narratives of victim survivors before the tribunal contained references to multiple killings and brutal assaults, indicating the widespread nature of such violence. Indira Digal’s testimony below contained such references:
“On August 26, 2008 an armed mob of more than 4,000 people came again to the village, encircling the area from all directions… Christian people desperately escaped, running into forests, trying to save their lives. The culprits did not leave them any chance for running away. This time the rioters had plenty of guns in addition to axes, daggers, swords. They used their weapons, shot and killed two Christians, Prafulla Nayak, 55, and Ajaba Digal, 20. The murderers did not stop their atrocities and a woman named Sulochana received a deep cut on the head with a dagger.

“I, with other Christians, reached the Orissa State Armed Police camp at the school of the village. During this escape seven more persons [Prasad Digal, Gilap Nayak, Choi Nayak, Prafulla Nayak, Ratikant Digal, Ajab Nayak and one more] were shot and sustained grievous injuries. Later, they were taken to the hospital for treatment and were saved.

“In addition, some members of the mob caught hold of a young girl named Manini Digal, aged about 20. They removed her clothes and made her naked in public view. They even tried to rape her publicly but she protested and resisted. Thereafter, in lust and anger, they poured kerosene/diesel on her and set fire to her body. The lonely girl suffered alone with all these humiliations and pain while the antisocial people were enjoying her suffering. Though her life is saved, she is more than 60 per cent burnt and is under treatment…” (Indira Digal)

Many people were killed or grievously injured due to the assaults by violent mobs. A woman from Petapanga village in Raikia block narrated to a team from Nirmala Niketan College that her eldest brother was stopped by some people who asked him if he was a Christian. When he said yes, they killed him. When the family received his body, they found 27 stab wounds on it, all made by different weapons. There were also burns on his body. The family learnt that they stabbed him and then dragged his body around before trying to burn it.

There are several narratives which speak of sexual and gender-based violence. The attack on Sulokshana, a permanent resident of Barakhama village, Balliguda block, is one such case. Sulokshana said that when she was in her relative’s house, around 50 attackers entered the house and attacked all the people in the house. A 20-year old girl was being raped by five-six of the attackers. Sulokshana was hiding in the house but seeing the girl’s condition, she intervened to rescue her but was in turn also attacked. Sulokshana was sexually abused by the attackers who severely assaulted her on her abdomen. She was assaulted at five places on her head with an axe, became unconscious and was admitted to the government hospital at Phulbani for five days. Due to the severity of the injuries, she was subsequently transferred to a hospital in Berhampur. She has undergone three surgeries, including of her head and stomach.

The Jan Vikas, Orissa, report stated that although 86 people across the district were killed over a period of 120 days, proving how fearlessly and freely people were attacked, the government has confirmed a total death toll of 54 people who have been considered for death compensation. The Multiple Action Research Group (MARG), New Delhi, report, based on various figures stated by different sources, states that between 75 and 123 people were killed and many more injured.

Psychological violence
Among the facets of the psychological violence faced by the victim survivors is the continued threat, intimidation and insecurity, causing obstacles to their return to their places of habitual residence, forcing victim survivors to reside in hiding or preventing a life of dignity and peace upon their return.
The National Commission for Minorities, which visited Kandhamal in September 2008 and interacted with victim survivors in the relief camps, made the following observation in its report: “In every camp I visited, the main feeling was one of despair and hopelessness at the cruel turn of events. Practically everyone complained of the threats they had received that their return to their homes was predicated on their acceptance of the Hindu religion. I was even shown a letter addressed by name to one woman, stating that the only way she could return to her home and property again was if she returned to the village as Hindu.”

While all victim survivors suffered psychological violence pursuant to personal attacks or attacks/killings of their family members or by witnessing the brutal violence perpetrated on others, the mental trauma and other psychosocial problems faced by children and women has been particularly marked yet largely ignored.

Burning of residential premises
During the violence in Kandhamal residential property of Dalit and Adivasi Christians was burnt, destroyed entirely or damaged extensively. An illustrative example is that of Gajanan Digal of Shankarakhol village, Tikabali block, whose house was completely burnt down during the violence.
After conducting a household survey in Kandhamal district, Jan Vikas said that close to 5,000 houses were ruined – it puts the figure of fully and partially damaged houses at 4,864 while the government data states it to be 4,588.

Vandalism and looting of movable property
The vandalism and destruction of movable properties such as household articles, valuables, documents and certificates and looting of ornaments and cash was a recurring experience in survivor testimonies of the violence. Chanchla Nayak deposed to the tribunal as follows: “…a large crowd of about 3,000 people led by leaders of the Bajrang Dal such as Rinku Mishra, Chaita Bindhani, Dhiru Sahoo, Bhagwan Panda, began to attack and loot our houses. Once again we Christians tried to escape from the village, Barakhama. The rioters looted, destroyed and set fire to my house. All valuables of my family, including certificates, documents, money, ornaments and utensils, were completely destroyed.”

The importance given by victim survivors to their valuable documents is in complete contrast to the callous attitude of the police in registering such complaints, as is apparent from Rajnikant’s experience. Rajnikant Pradhan of Bapuria village fled from his house along with his wife as the violence started. In his hurry to flee, he could not carry valuable documents such as his vehicle registration papers, driving licence and his wife’s education certificates. He tried to register a complaint about the lost documents and household possessions at G. Udayagiri. He was asked to visit the police station a second time, only to be shunted to Tikabali police station and thereafter to Sarangada police station, on the pretext that Bapuria did not fall within the jurisdictions of the former two police stations. Despite repeated attempts, the police at Sarangada police station refused to register his complaint and are quoted to have informed him that they were taking complaints “only about those who have gone up (been killed)” and directed him to return to the relief camp.

Between July-December 2007, Hindutva forces organised rallies across Kandhamal, raising sentiments against Christians in the district. In December 2007, massive attacks took place, causing several deaths, looting, damage and destruction of several hundred houses, churches, shops, educational and health institutions. The violence in 2008 is thus a part of the continued attacks on Christians perpetrated by Hindutva forces.

Destruction and damage of places of worship
Many churches and prayer halls were damaged and destroyed and the religious artefacts desecrated. The Jan Vikas survey indicates that at least 264 churches and prayer halls were damaged while the government data states that 196 such places of worship were damaged. The Jan Vikas and MARG reports contain many photographs of damaged and destroyed places of worship of the Christian community.

Fr Basil Kullu’s description of the manner in which the Catholic church at Madhupur, Bargarh district, was attacked by the violent mob is perhaps representative of the nature of violence perpetrated: “…They started destroying the Kanski Dungri Maria grotto (Mother Mary’s statue), which the faithful venerate and respect. Then they came to the church, broke open and got inside the church and destroyed, damaged and defiled sacred articles, statues, places of worship, etc. They also burnt all the valuable documents, utensils, household items, clothes, boxes of the poor SC/ST children who were in the hostels. In front of the police and the deputed magistrate the rioters destroyed, burnt and ransacked everything, whatever they could in two hours. Many valuables were stolen. They completely destroyed the church, priest’s residence, hostels, convent, dispensary and Maria grottos.”

In addition to residential property and religious (Christian) institutions, it has been reported that many philanthropic institutions such as schools, orphanages, old age homes, leprosy homes, dispensaries, tuberculosis sanatoriums and NGO establishments were also looted, razed to the ground, burnt down and damaged.

Forced conversions
The MARG report states that during the violence in Kandhamal that commenced on August 25, 2008 there were reports of thousands of Christians being chased and herded in groups into Hindu temples and forced to undergo ‘reconversion’ ceremonies with their heads tonsured. They were made to drink cow-dung water as a mark of ‘purification’ and some of them were forced to burn Bibles or damage churches to prove that they had forsaken the Christian faith.

The ‘reconverted’ Christians were forced to sign ‘voluntary declarations’ stating that they were becoming Hindus voluntarily – a condition required by the anti-conversion law in Orissa. Others speak of being forcibly reconverted in order to save their families, after having been called to meetings where deadly weapons such as axes, swords and iron rods were displayed. They were asked to sign a piece of paper saying that they were “renouncing foreign religion”. The ‘converted’ were also forced to loudly say “Jai Shri Ram (Hail Lord Rama)” and “Jai Bajrang Bali (Hail Hanuman)”.

Scale of violence
The Jan Vikas report categorically states that more than 25,000 people have been direct victims who lost their family members, houses, properties and livestock. Valuables were looted, trees were felled, wells and water sources damaged, crops and cattle stolen; and hundreds of philanthropic institutions such as schools, orphanages, old age homes, leprosy homes, dispensaries, tuberculosis sanatoriums and NGO establishments were looted, razed to the ground or burnt down; and public/community infrastructure such as hostels, hospitals, community halls and anganwadi kendras (women and child care centres) were considerably damaged.

In addition to the statistics, the scale of violence can be discerned from the many testimonies of victim survivors who referred to the size of the mobs that attacked their villages. Chanchla Nayak informed the tribunal that a mob of more than 4,000 people came to their village, encircling the area from all directions. Prakash Kumar Nayak stated to the tribunal that a mob of more than 3,000 people approached their village. Manyabar Nayak spoke of a mob of more than 2,000 rioters who approached his village. Narasingho Digal witnessed a mob of 500-600 people approach his village. Lalit Digal, permanent resident of Sindrigaon village, Balliguda block, narrated that a mob of about 5,000-7,000 RSS men entered the village and broke all the 36 Christian houses in about 10 minutes. Sandhya Rani of Rudangia village told the Loyola College, Chennai, team that a large mob of about 10,000 people attacked their village from all four directions, leaving them very little scope for escape.

Brutality
One of the distinctive features of the violence in Kandhamal is the extreme brutality of the violence. Many victim survivors spoke of the brutality their family members were subjected to. Ranchi Pradhan of Tiangia village, G. Udayagiri block, narrated that her son Dasarotha Pradhan was killed for supporting Christians despite being an RSS activist. His hands and legs were cut off; some attackers assaulted him on his head with an iron rod. When he fell down and died in his neighbour’s house, the house was destroyed. However, his mother, Ranchi Pradhan, retrieved his body and protected it for three days from animals even as it started decomposing.

Attacks on senior citizens, children and pregnant women
The following testimonies indicate that senior citizens were not spared from the brutal violence:
“While running away from the house, I requested my old parents to come with us. But they told me that they are too old and unable to run. They also told me that nobody would harm the old persons. Thus both my parents stayed back at home and were brutally injured in the attack by the rioters… My wounded parents were taken to hospital at G. Udayagiri and then to the Medical College at Berhampur. Upon reaching Berhampur, my father breathed his last.” (Umesh Chandra Nayak)

A woman from Majumaha village in G. Udayagiri block narrated to a team from Nirmala Niketan College how her family had to leave behind at home her 70-year-old mother-in-law who could not walk, when they fled to the forest to escape from the violent mob. When they returned after three to four hours, they found that the perpetrators had stuffed chiwda (beaten rice) into her mouth in an attempt to choke her to death. She was in immense pain but alive. The family members tried to help her but were forced to return to the forest due to the threat to their lives. The old woman died alone, a painful death.
Similarly, children were not spared from being attacked during the violence. Sulokshana of Barakhama village said that her two small children were thrown around among the perpetrators as if they were balls.

Pregnant women were treated with extreme brutality during the violence. For example, the Loyola College report refers to an incident where a five-month pregnant woman was severely assaulted on her stomach and back with a piece of wood till she became senseless.

The jury, in its interim report, highlighted the brutality and heinous nature of the violence in the following words: “The jury records its shock and deep concern for the heinous and brutal manner in which the members of the Christian community, a vast majority of whom are Dalit and tribals, were killed, dismembered, sexually assaulted and tortured.”

Patterns, planning and preparation
The pattern of attacks on property and livelihood emerges from the following testimonies:
“When I returned from the relief camp after 10 months, I discovered that the rioters had burnt down two churches in my village, looted and set fire to all Christian houses. The rioters had looted paddy, goats, chicken and all valuables from Christian homes.” (Nalini Nayak)
Victim survivors’ testimonies repeatedly referred to the perpetrators wearing red headbands, carrying numerous weapons such as axes, daggers, swords, guns, crowbars, pickaxes, lathis, bows and arrows, lighted torches, bombs, petrol and kerosene barrels, trishuls (tridents), tangias (axes), pharsas (pickaxes), bhujalis (daggers) and bars.

Victim survivors also spoke to the tribunal of various aspects of planning and preparation for the attacks. Keshamati Pradhan, a social activist belonging to the Kuidina Forum for Peace and Justice, made the following observations to the tribunal: “It is sahukars [moneylenders] from the towns of different parts of Kandhamal who took the leadership in creating the violence, supplying weapons, arms and explosives like petrol and diesel to some of our people and also used them to create more violence in the district… The Hindu fundamentalists were collecting funds by means of illegal taxes from marketplaces.”

“The rioters were collecting rice and money from members of the Kui Samaj, some non-Christian SCs and STs, businessmen, traders and government employees of their communities since long.” (Premasheela Digal)

Preparatory meetings
Many affected persons referred to meetings held by perpetrators in/near their villages just prior to the attacks:
“The night prior to the attack there was a meeting at Majagada village organised by the accused persons. Next morning, the attackers, at around 6 a.m., came and pulled my father and started abusing, shouting in filthy language and dragged him…” (Narasingho Digal, whose mother, Priyatama Digal, was raped and killed and father, Meghnath Digal, was killed by a violent mob)

Survivor testimonies further referred to the complicity of public officials: “From August 3-20, 2008, I received repeated phone calls from Sohela police station inquiring about the registration numbers, places and number of different churches in my district. I also came to know about the series of meetings of the leaders and members of the Bajrang Dal and RSS which took place in Sohela town through a police official – Mr Sujit Kumar Pradhan of Sohela police station. The police were well aware of these gatherings, where the main agenda was about destroying the Madhupur church and killing me, as I was the church leader.” (Fr Basil Kullu)

A victim sits in the ruins of her home, Orissa 2008

Among members of the Christian community, human rights defenders who had established or worked in non-profit organisations are among those who have been adversely affected by the violence. These persons narrated to the tribunal the manner in which their residences and organisational premises were attacked, damaged, movable property looted, attacks and threats were made to their persons and, in addition, they were threatened by the mobs not to carry on with human rights activism.

Participation of women as perpetrators
A distinctive feature of the violence in Kandhamal is the mass mobilisation of women who formed violent mobs and perpetrated the attacks. Narratives of victim survivors before the tribunal referred to mobs of women attacking their villages. Women who were local leaders of Hindutva organisations had also reportedly convened preparatory meetings in villages where Hindus were instigated to attack Christians.
 
Destruction of evidence
Another distinctive feature of the Kandhamal violence of 2008 was the systematic destruction of evidence of the attacks. The jury of the tribunal specifically observed as follows in the preamble to the interim report: “The deliberate destruction of evidence pertaining to these crimes came to the attention of the jury.”
Some of the killings (attacks) narrated by the victim survivors to the tribunal, in which the evidence had been deliberately destroyed, are as follows:

• The body of Parikhita Nayak was cut into three pieces and burnt by pieces of wood, straw and kerosene; his half-burnt body was buried.
• The body of Rajani Majhi, the warden of an orphanage at Padampur, was burnt and, according to Nicholas Barla, who testified before the tribunal and quoted Fr Edward Sequeira, the lower part of her body was completely burnt so as to destroy all evidence of alleged gang rape.
• Ishwar Digal’s body was cut into three pieces and thrown into the river by the attackers, as witnessed by his wife, Runima Digal.
• Premasheela Digal’s uncle-in-law, Kantheswar Digal, was killed by cutting his throat and his dead body was thrown into the river and recovered only after some days by the police.
• The collector of Bargarh forced Fr Basil Kullu to remove all evidence of damage to and destruction of the Madhupur church and hostels and even sent some persons to clear the debris that was lying in the compound, indicating the nature and extent of the attack.

    
Attacks on Hindus who assisted Christians
It was brought to the notice of the tribunal that Hindu villagers who supported or protected Christians during the violence or tried to facilitate their return to the villages after the violence were also attacked. For example, the testimony of Iswar Digal refers to the killing of Sidheswar Pradhan, a non-Christian local RSS leader aged about 60, who was trying to offer protection to the Christian people and calm down the situation during the violence.

Kamala Sahoo, a Hindu Dalit woman who was a social worker associated with a non-profit organisation named Pollishree, narrated to the tribunal that her house and office were damaged and properties looted. Her son’s shop was also burnt after all the valuables were looted.
Satyabhama Nayak, a resident of Badapanga village, told a team from Loyola College that she had protected priests and nuns from the attacks by providing them food, shelter and clothing and that due to this, her neighbours discriminated against her and refused to assist her in any way.
The alleged sexual assault and brutal killing of Rajani Majhi, an Adivasi Hindu girl, is an instance of other attacks on Hindus. Nicholas Barla, an advocate and human rights defender from Sundargarh district of Orissa, stated to the tribunal details of the burning to death of Rajani Majhi, who was an inhabitant and warden at an orphanage run by Fr Edward Sequeira in Padampur, Bargarh district.

The tribunal also heard, in camera, the testimony of a survivor of gang rape and multiple sexual assaults. The victim survivor, whom this report will refer to as AB, is a Hindu woman who was gang-raped and sexually assaulted as revenge for her Christian uncle’s refusal to convert to Hinduism.
Couples who had inter-religious marriages were also targeted for attacks and threats of attacks. For example, a Christian woman and her Hindu husband were reportedly threatened and asked to leave Rudangia village, Tikabali block – a Hindu-dominated village that they resided in – or they would be killed.

The perpetrators
Almost all the victim survivors who testified before the tribunal described the perpetrators, their religious and organisational affiliation (RSS, BJP, VHP, Bajrang Dal), their appearance, the weapons they were bearing as well as the slogans they were shouting when they perpetrated the attack.
The perpetrators were not only men, as is usually the case, but, according to testimonies, consisted of mobs of women too, mainly from the Durga Vahini (women’s wing of the VHP).

Almost all victim survivors who testified before the tribunal have identified and named some of the perpetrators from the mob, including those who led the mobs, by name. The report of Nirmala Niketan College too finds that more than half the women interviewed were able to identify the perpetrators and that they were from the same village or local persons.

Forcible conversions from Christianity to Hinduism
Testimonies of victim survivors of the violence, presented before the tribunal, repeatedly referred to threats of being killed if they did not convert to Hinduism. Some such narratives are produced below:

• “We Christian families were made to gather together and Gaurango Kanhar, Basant Kanhar and Subhash Kanhar threatened to kill us if we did not become Hindus. Due to fear for life, we agreed to become Hindus. Two of our Christian families, under threats, got converted to Hindu religion. Rest of us eight families were forced to sit at the yagna [sacrificial rite] conducted by Hindu priests. We have been warned not to go to church.” (Narahari Kanhar)

The narratives of victim survivors presented before the tribunal also indicate that coercion to convert to Hinduism extended from villages prior to and at the time of the violence, to relief camps set up by the government.
The testimonies presented before the tribunal indicate that there were many victim survivors and their families who were eager to return to their villages from the relief camps partly because of the poor conditions in the camps and partly because their land, property and sources of livelihood were in the villages. However, many who attempted to return to their villages in the hope that normalcy had returned and that they would be able to reintegrate within their communities faced severe threats to convert to Hinduism. Those who did succeed in returning to their villages continue to live in fear of forcible conversions to Hinduism and impending attacks.

Role of the state and democratic institutions
There have been many questions raised about the role and responses of the state while the violence was being unleashed on the Dalit and Adivasi Christians of Kandhamal and other districts in Orissa. Was the state a helpless and powerless victim of the perpetrators? Was it a silent spectator and a mute witness to the orgy of violence and destruction? Or did it actively collude with the perpetrators to violate the human rights of the victim survivors?

Did the state and district administration diligently discharge their responsibilities to prevent the violence and protect human lives and properties, as mandated by the Constitution, domestic and international law? What was the role played by democratic institutions that have been established to safeguard the human rights of the people?

“The biggest question is: why was the procession with the dead body of Lakshmanananda and the communal forces allowed openly by the district administration, covering more than 175 km by [road from] Jalespata to Chakapad, when curfew under Section 144 [Code of Criminal Procedure] had been clamped? Who gave the order? Why was it not stopped and controlled? It was noticed that wherever the said procession went, the dead body was kept in front of Christian institutions and houses and there were inflammatory speeches against Christian communities. At that moment a group of fundamentalists went to kill and burn the houses of Christians…” (Mohini Nayak)

The NCM was also unequivocal in holding the state accountable for failure to prevent the funeral procession of Swami Lakshmanananda which inflamed passions and incited violence. The NCM, in its September 2008 report, observes as follows: “It was obvious that public reaction to the murder of a prominent religious leader like the swamiji would be extreme. Yet when options to be followed after the murder were being considered, there is little evidence that high-level political and official leadership offered guidance and support to the local district administration. Given the near certainty that a procession of over 170 km with the body of the slain leader was bound to arouse huge passions, it would have been proper for the senior leadership of the state to try to persuade the swami’s followers to avoid a long procession and bury him in the ashram where he was murdered. A reasoned analysis of the pros and cons does not appear to have taken place.”

The Jan Vikas report stated that Praveen Togadia, a national leader of the VHP who had been barred from entering different states for his role during the Gujarat carnage 2002, was allowed by the Orissa government to visit the state and the district during a very sensitive period. He arrived on August 25, 2008 and was escorted to travel a 300-km distance by road from Bhubaneswar to Jalespata and lead the procession.

It was further brought to the notice of the tribunal that the Orissa government failed to prevent hateful rumours from being propagated, which had the impact of inciting violence against the Adivasi and Dalit Christian community. The report counters each of the baseless rumours that served to increase the scale, intensity and barbarity of the violence that was unleashed.

Dereliction of duties
The following testimonies presented at the tribunal highlight the failure of the local police in promptly responding to violations and protecting human lives and property:
“On August 27, 2008… some miscreants with lethal weapons entered my house… forcefully dragged my husband, tied him to a nearby tree and burnt him alive in my presence… The incident was reported to the local police station by my son but the police did not turn up… Desperately, I watched the dead body for five days and also tried to protect the body from the dogs which almost consumed half of the body of my husband… The police came after 10 days and the body was taken out of the grave and post-mortem was made. Though I had mentioned specific names of the criminals involved in the incident and the GR case was registered vide No. 263/2008, no main culprits were arrested… No appropriate investigation was conducted… no initiative was taken to recover my looted property…” (Priyatama Nayak)

“Personnel of the local police camping in our village did not do anything to save us. Roads were blocked by rioters by felling trees. Personnel of the CRPF [Central Reserve Police Force] and Rapid Action Force [RAF], camped four km away, ran and reached to save us. If they had not arrived, all of us would have been killed and the whole village would have been destroyed.” (Christodas Nayak, whose wife was brutally killed by a violent mob)

In a group interview conducted by Loyola College at Katipada village, the victim survivors said that the homes of 32 Christian families in the village were burnt down. Villagers escaped to the forest and stayed there for three days. They said that the police officers from Balliguda police station were present during the attack but did not help the villagers and that they were silent spectators to the violence because they had some connection with and supported the attackers.

Dereliction of duties of police personnel has been officially acknowledged by the fact that five police officials were reportedly suspended in Sister Meena’s case [of gang rape in Nuagaon] for “misconduct and negligence of duty” on the basis of a joint report filed by the Kandhamal collector Krishan Kumar and superintendent of police (SP) Praveen Kumar. Further, in a letter written by AK Upadhyaya, who works as deputy inspector-general (DIG)-training at the Biju Patnaik State Police Academy, he accuses and names 13 police officials, including former director general of police (DGP) Gopal Nanda, of dereliction of duties in protecting the life and properties of the Christians in Kandhamal. He further recommended withdrawal of medals that had been awarded to four of them.

One of the distinctive features of the violence in Kandhamal is the extreme brutality of the violence… The jury, in its interim report, had recorded its shock and deep concern for the heinous and brutal manner in which the members of the Christian community, a vast majority of whom are Dalit and tribals, were killed, dismembered, sexually assaulted and tortured.

Refusal to register FIRs
Many victim survivors and witnesses deposed before the tribunal that the police had refused to register FIRs or had registered them in a delayed/incomplete manner so as to allow perpetrators to escape accountability. The police had also reportedly failed to take action pursuant to registration of FIRs, including arrest of the accused.

Indifference to the intimidation of victim survivors
According to reports presented before the tribunal, threatening of victim survivors and witnesses has been rampant and has reached an unprecedented level in the context of the Kandhamal violence, leading to a sense of extreme insecurity. Victim survivors narrated to the tribunal their experiences of approaching the authorities for protection from intimidation by perpetrators and their supporters. The following extract is an indication of the state response:

“I have already informed about the ongoing attacks and threatening in writing and also approached personally all the officials concerned like police in-charge officer (OIC), block development officer (BDO), tehsildar, district magistrate and SP, Kandhamal, but no appropriate action has been taken so far. I have also informed the matter to the chief minister of Orissa, DGP and also hon’ble governor of Orissa about the administrative inaction and protection of my life…” (Priyatama Nayak)

Collusion and complicity
In addition to failure to prevent, wilful negligence and dereliction of duty to protect, loss of lives and property, another aspect of state responsibility for the violence in Kandhamal is that of collusion and complicity of government officials prior to, during and in the aftermath of the violence.  
Testimonies of victim survivors indicate that the police and the district administration had prior knowledge of the impending attacks.

“The police and the district administration were aware of the strategies of the rioters before the incident took place because the rioters were organising meetings and rallies in the presence of the police and district administration in many places.” (Premasheela Digal)
Fr Basil Kullu of Madhupur church informed the tribunal that he came to know about a series of meetings of the leaders and members of the Bajrang Dal and RSS which took place in Sohela town through Mr Sujit Kumar Pradhan, a police official attached to Sohela police station. The main agenda of these meetings was how to destroy the Madhupur church and to kill the church leader Fr Basil Kullu. He said that the police was well aware of these gatherings, as Mr Pradhan had taken photos and prepared a CD of it. He questioned as to why nothing was done to prevent the violence despite prior knowledge of the attacks.

Fr Basil Kullu further informed the tribunal that he was repeatedly questioned by officials of Sohela police station about the Madhupur church that he headed, from August 3-20, 2008. He said that it was no coincidence that intensive inquiries about the church were made by the police a few days prior to the attacks and that the inquiries were perhaps a part of the preparation to attack.

Testimonies also pointed to police supporting, shielding and protecting the perpetrators prior to and subsequent to the violence:
“I gave complaints to the police, naming the culprits, but the police are protecting the criminals… The riots are well-planned and executed by the fundamentalists… The police are not taking sufficient action against them.” (Dashrath Digal)
“OIC, Tikabali, Mr Mahapatra, and one Mr Jena (police person) told me two months prior to the communal violence: ‘Your Christian leadership will not work anymore.’ Both of them were silent supporters of such fundamentalists… When the riot was going on, the RAF and CRPF were not utilised by the local police. Some RAF told us that the local police misguide us: When the message is given that in the east the village is burning, then the local police was sending the CRPF and the RAF to the west side. Due to the support of the local police, the communal forces went on killing and burning the Christian community.” (Mohini Nayak)

State participation in the violence was summed up by the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights in the following words: “The local government by and large not only stood by and silently watched as the horrendous events were unfolding but in several ways, according to the eyewitnesses, facilitated the gangs indulging in the destruction of human life and valuable property. What followed by way of administrative action – controlling the situation, relief measures for the afflicted and punishing the guilty – could only be described as formal, ritual motions to satisfy the letter of the law.”
Threatening of witnesses and destruction of evidence

Testimonies of victim survivors further highlighted the active role of the local police, tehsildars, BDOs and other local government officials in threatening of witnesses and scuttling of justice and accountability. The testimony of Mohini Nayak is a case in point:
“I am a leader of a women’s group. My house was destroyed by a mob of 300-400 persons led by Manoj Pradhan, the local MLA… As I was giving evidence in court against Manoj Pradhan, I was intimidated and threatened. The tehsildar of Raikia, Mr Reba Sankar Mohapatra, is threatening me, telling that ‘If you give witness against Manoj Pradhan, I will initiate a case against you on Regulation 2 of 1956. So you better withdraw your case.’ Mr Debabrata Jena, the BDO of Raikia, threatened me to withdraw the case against him otherwise he would cut my name from the dealership list and I would be in a problem. The local officers warned me that I and my daughter will be raped in public and forced to leave the village if I gave my testimony as a witness to the crimes committed by Manoj Pradhan.” (Mohini Nayak)

Victim survivors also testified to the fact that the collector had actively connived with the perpetrators by destroying evidence of the violence at the site of violence.
“Only on August 27, the collector, Mr Suresh [Prasad Padhy], came to see but he was not at all feeling sad and was telling that they were thieves, not any religious fanatics. When I asked for police protection, plainly he said: ‘I cannot give for 15 days.’ Instead, he forced me to remove all the things immediately, what was lying there, burnt and scattered. Surprisingly, he sent some people to clean and remove things which were lying in the compound as debris.” (Fr Basil Kullu, chief priest of Madhupur church which was attacked)
Another manner in which public officials participated in the violence is by making false allegations and threats of imposing false charges on victim survivors in order to silence them and prevent them from pursuing justice.

Relief and rehabilitation
The public officials reportedly committed grave dereliction of duty through acts of commission and omission with regard to relief and rehabilitation too. Some aspects are as follows:

• Preventing rescue, relief and rehabilitation activities in Kandhamal;
• Failure to respect the rights of victim survivors in the relief camps;
• Forcible return of victim survivors to their villages; and
• Negative role of public officials in village-level peace committees.
•  

Processes of justice and accountability
Failure and delay in registration of FIRs
Testimonies presented before the tribunal repeatedly spoke of the refusal of the police to register FIRs. Extracts of some testimonies are reproduced below:
“I had sent the FIR to OIC, Sarangada police station, with copies to the subdivisional police officer, Balliguda, SP and collector, Kandhamal, and DIG, Berhampur, by registered post on September 26, 2008. But my FIR has not yet been registered by the police station at Sarangada. The kingpins and the culprits are moving freely and no stringent action has been taken against the accused persons as yet and still there is danger to my life.” (Paul Pradhan)

“I was attacked during the 2008 riot and my house was burnt. I lodged an FIR in the local police station, Tikabali, which was not registered against the accused persons… I have repeatedly sought help from the local police station for my protection but no action was taken in spite of my petition dated May 19, 2010 against the criminals with specific names like Dahia Mallick, Sudhira Pradhan, Ajiban Mallick, Mantu Gauda and Biranchi Behera. My petition was not registered and no action was taken against the accused persons.” (Gajanan Digal)
One of the major actions that the police are duty-bound to take, in pursuance of registration of the FIR, is to arrest the perpetrators. Many victim survivors spoke to the tribunal of the failure of the police to arrest perpetrators despite the fact that the perpetrators were named in the complaints to the police.

False complaints against victim survivors
Victim survivors testified before the tribunal that they had been harassed through the lodging of false and baseless allegations against them or threatened that they would be arrested on false charges if they demanded accountability and continued pursuing justice:
“While we were in the relief camp, the secretary of the Sritiguda gram panchayat illegally entered our camp and told us to become Hindus… He contacted the police and instigated a false case against me for which I was arrested and was in the police station at Balliguda. I contacted the SP and at his intervention, I was set free from the police station. But the false case against me is still going on.” (Manyabar Nayak, resident of Kritingia village, Sarangada block)

Investigations, prosecutions and trials
The factors that have contributed to the scuttling of justice are highlighted in the letters of Sampradayik Hinsa Prapidita Sangathana (Association of Victims of Communal Violence in Kandhamal). The association wrote a letter to Mr Naveen Patnaik, the chief minister of Orissa, where aspects of justice processes in the two fast track courts are highlighted. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced below:

“We are not satisfied with the legal procedures undertaken in the two fast track courts established at Phulbani which seem to be in a hurry to dispose of the cases without proper trial and witness examination…
“In most of the cases finalised in the fast track courts at Phulbani, the accused are acquitted. The quality of the police charge sheets is doubtful and therefore we demand a CBI [Central Bureau of Investigation] inquiry into the cases for proper delivery of justice to the innocent people.”

Intimidation of victim survivors and witnesses
The narratives of victim survivors before the tribunal repeatedly referred to intimidation of witnesses with the purpose of scuttling processes of justice. Extracts of some such testimonies are produced below:
“Even in the judicial trial, I was repeatedly threatened by the miscreants not to give witness against the criminals and also pressurised to withdraw the case. Even in April 2010 the miscreants threatened my relatives, to kill me and my family members and also not to allow me to construct my house though it was on patta land, if I don’t withdraw the case… I am in a terrible condition till today. No action has been taken to arrest the criminals and also no protective measures have been arranged for the safety of my life, to lead a normal life in my native place.” (Priyatama Nayak)

Some spoke to the tribunal of how they were forced to live in hiding while pursuing the cases in courts that they were testifying in:
“I have been threatened against giving evidence in the court regarding the murder of my brother… in fear, I do not live in my village and am living in hiding with my family.” (Bipin Nayak)

While some victim survivors have testified in court and continue to live in fear, others spoke about their inability to testify in court if they were not given adequate protection:    
“I have been threatened by Shri Gobardhan Pradhan who is a leader of RSS, VHP and BJP… I am quite unable to give evidence in this case unless I am provided sufficient security.” (Rama Rao Nayak)

Some victim survivors spoke to the tribunal about how they had complained to the judge and the police about the threats and intimidation yet did not receive any assistance:
“Myself and my elder brother have gone to Phulbani to give witness in the fast track court-1. We were threatened by Biswanath Kanhar, Pabira Kanhar and Ajibana Mallick, saying that ‘we will kill you if you give evidence today’. I had complained before the judge and the hon’ble judge advised me to give a complaint to the government advocate. Till now, my life is in danger and the circumstances are not allowing me to go to Phulbani to give a complaint against the above-mentioned people.” (Antaryami Digal)

Acquittals and sentencing
Victim survivors also narrated to the tribunal that due to the destruction of the bodies of the victims, the perpetrators have been convicted for less severe crimes. An illustrative example is the brutal killing of Ishwar Digal. Runima Digal testified to the tribunal that she witnessed her husband’s body being cut into three pieces and thrown into a river by a violent mob. When she managed to take the SP to the spot, nothing was found there. She said: “I identified the accused and had to force the police to arrest the perpetrators. Still only one person was arrested and prosecuted… He was punished for five years for abduction and not for the actual murder, as the prosecution could not prove the murder. None of the people who killed my husband has been made accountable till now. The other accused are absconding.”

Crisis in the justice delivery system
A report of a meeting convened under the banners of the Common Concern and Orissa Manavik Adhikar Suraksha Abhijan on the justice delivery crisis highlights the varied dimensions of processes of justice and accountability that victim survivors have had to contend with.

• “Public prosecutors (PPs) are mostly found biased against the victims;
• In comparison with the skills, influence, clout and number of advocates favouring the accused persons, the strength of advocates needs to be improved;
• Faulty and biased methods of police investigation, framing the charge sheets and presentations in the courts weaken the cases;
• Absence of social and physical security of the victims and witnesses inside and outside the court;
• The provision that in GR cases only public prosecutors can argue, while the victim parties cannot appoint their own advocates privately, does not help the victims in cases where PPs are biased;
• Show of extra favour to the accused by some judges harasses the victims and their counsel;
• Lawyers counselling the victim parties are persuaded not to continue their legal assistance;
• Witnesses are threatened/allured to turn hostile;

Absence of democratic and left parties in comparison to the dominance of the BJP and RSS helps the culprits and corrupts the atmosphere of the courts.”

Relief and humanitarian assistance
Preventing rescue and relief work
The MARG report highlighted the fact that an “appalling feature” of the Kandhamal violence is the blockage of relief material to victim survivors and the prevention of rescue, relief and fact-finding work among them for several months subsequent to the violence. In the context of the December 2007 violence, a notification by Manish Kumar Verma, the collector of Kandhamal, banned the entry of non-profit organisations and humanitarian agencies, including church groups, into the district. The directive was finally quashed by the Supreme Court in May 2008.

However, the quashing did not cause any embarrassment to the district authorities who, subsequent to the August 2008 violence, once again prevented relief agencies, non-profit and charitable organisations from conducting relief work among the victim survivors. On the impact of the ban, the report stated that the state not only abdicated its responsibility towards providing relief measures in a prompt and adequate manner but also ensured that help did not reach the devastated victim survivors and that the attacks against the vulnerable population continued.

Annapoorna Digal narrated that her family had stayed for many days in the jungle without any food and clothing. When they approached a relief camp in Balliguda, they were sent back to their village by the camp officers who told them that there was no place to keep them and that the water in the camp had been poisoned. Subsequently, 30 kg of rice, one kg of dal and a vessel were delivered to their house by the camp officers.

The Jan Vikas report observes that while the administration claimed that the victims are well cared for and protected, these camps were devoid of basic facilities. All religious, cultural, civil and political activities were prohibited in these camps and permission denied to nuns, priests and local nurses for months. Many reports speak of appalling conditions in relief camps and clearly suggest the state government’s indifference to the plight of victim survivors.

The Orissa state government’s act of forcibly closing relief camps before the victim survivors felt secure enough to return to their places of habitual residence or resettle elsewhere is violative of the right of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to safe return or resettlement with dignity, states the MARG report.

Forcible return of victim survivors to their villages
The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom/ Women in Security Conflict Management and Peace report, based on the visit of a team to relief camps in January 2009, clearly indicated that state officials were attempting to return the victim survivors to their villages with little regard for their security and that there was a “very strong uneasiness” among victims to return to their villages according to this deadline.

Compensation
The state government had announced a compensation package that included an ex gratia payment of Rs one lakh to the next of kin of the deceased persons. After the August 2008 violence, the ex gratia payment was announced as Rs two lakh per deceased person, to be paid from the Chief Minister’s Relief Fund. Compensation for injury caused during the violence does not feature in the compensation package announced. The central government announced an additional Rs three lakh per deceased person as an ex gratia amount, entitling the next of kin of each deceased person to a total of Rs five lakh.
Referring to the compensation amounts announced, enhanced and awarded in other similar contexts, including the Gujarat carnage of 2002, anti-Sikh violence of 1984 and the Bhagalpur violence of 1989, the MARG report concludes that there are substantial disparities between amounts awarded by the state and central governments in other contexts of communal violence and that of Kandhamal. It highlighted the fact that there are no uniform criteria or principles laid down for compensation to victim survivors of communal violence, as a result of which the grant of compensation is determined arbitrarily by the concerned state governments.

Almost all the victim survivors who testified before the tribunal spoke of the wide disparity between the actual financial loss suffered by them, the compensation they were entitled to and the compensation amounts paid.
 
Compensation for places of worship
The MARG report states that initially the state government had been reluctant to compensate for damage to/destruction of religious institutions, stating that it was against the secular policy of the state to pay any compensation for the religious institutions. Due to the insistence of the NCM, which advocated for monetary compensation to aid the work of repair/reconstruction of the buildings, and directions of the Supreme Court, it announced a (measly) scheme for compensation.

Recommendations
Recommendations are generally made to the state government of Orissa unless otherwise recommended to other authorities.

Socio-economic and cultural rights
1. Apply the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act and other livelihood schemes of the state and central government to the affected community without any discrimination on the basis of caste, religion or gender.
2. Implement widow pension schemes and provide government jobs to individuals from families that lost their members in the violence on compassionate grounds. Reinstate/reappoint victim survivors engaged in government jobs prior to the violence and transferred to areas that they perceive to be safe and secure. Soft loans should be provided for commencement of small businesses.
3. Ensure that relief camps meet the minimum international standards of health, hygiene and privacy for IDPs… Provide medical and psychological, particularly trauma, counselling to the victims/survivors, with special attention to the needs of women survivors of sexual and gender-based violence.
4. Incorporate a separate section in the state policy on relief and rehabilitation that conforms to Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, as the guiding principle for all relief and rehabilitation work.
5. Recommend that the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights and the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes assess the needs of children, Dalits and Adivasis respectively from the affected Christian community in Kandhamal and make recommendations to appropriate agencies at the state and central levels for ensuring their rehabilitation at the earliest.
6. Address educational needs of the children who have suffered displacement as a result of the violence.
7. Address the long-standing problem of landlessness and land alienation of the Dalits and Adivasis in a comprehensive manner through land reform and redistribution.

Legal and judicial process
1. Identify unreported cases of sexual and gender-based violence and include the offence of sexual assault in FIRs in cases where it has been ignored and ensure that they are effectively investigated and prosecuted.
2. Inquire into the acts of all public officials named in this report and pursue stringent disciplinary, administrative and other legal action against them for grave dereliction of duty and for collusion and complicity in the crimes committed by the perpetrators.
3. Strictly enforce Sections 153A and B of the Indian Penal Code to proactively prevent programmes planned by Hindutva forces within the state, that are divisive, propagate hate and incite violence against religious minorities.
4. Constitute a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to re-examine the already registered FIRs for accuracy, examine registrations of fresh FIRs, the trials that resulted in acquittals due to intimidation and/or lack of evidence and recommend the trials that need be transferred or fresh trials be conducted outside Kandhamal.
5. Appoint special public prosecutors who discharge their duties with professional competence and integrity. At the appellate stage in the Orissa high court a special panel of lawyers to represent the victims of the Kandhamal violence be constituted.
6. Recommend that the State Legal Services Authority set up a legal cell to assist victims in their legal cases and interactions with the police and courts.
7. Provide protection to victims and witnesses before, during and after the trial process, according to the guidelines provided in the judgements of the Delhi and Punjab and Haryana high courts. Take proactive measures to prevent threats of sexual and gender-based violence to women survivors and their daughters and pay attention to the needs of the child witnesses involved in various proceedings related to the Kandhamal violence.
8. Accord special protection to human rights defenders and adequately compensate the damage to their residential and organisational properties.

Reparations
1. Adopt, at the very minimum, the 1984 anti-Sikh and 2002 anti-Muslim Gujarat compensation package to enhance the compensation already announced. In addition, victims of sexual and gender-based violence should be included as a ground eligible for compensation and employment.
2. Recognise the right of the internally displaced persons to return home and create enabling conditions to facilitate such safe return in accordance with the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement 2007 and the UN Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons should be effectively implemented.
3. Formulate and implement policies to provide victim survivors full reparations which include compensation, restitution, rehabilitation…
4. Include movable properties in the scheme of compensation.
5. Focus on revival of dignified livelihood options for the affected families and facilitate a resumption of the livelihood they had pursued prior to the violence.
6. Include members of the affected community, particularly women, in all confidence building and peace building initiatives by the state and district administration…

Minority rights
1. Protect the right to religious freedom and clarify that this freedom means and includes the right to remain animist, areligious and/or atheist, and make any form of forced conversion or reconversion illegal.
2. Formulate a policy/programme to urgently address the issue of institutional bias against the minority Christian community in Kandhamal and other parts of Orissa, through a combination of perspective building and stringent action that is intended at upholding the rule of law.
3. Review the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act to ensure that it does not violate the right to religious freedom as guaranteed by the Indian Constitution and international law.
4. Review the definition of the scheduled castes in the presidential order of 1950, on the basis of the discrimination experienced by members of scheduled castes even after conversion.
5. Implement the recommendations of the National Commission for Minorities, issued in the reports of January, April and September 2008, with immediate effect.    

(The final report of the National People’s Tribunal on Kandhamal, August 22-24, 2010, was released in Bhubaneswar on December 2, 2011.)

Archived from Communalism Combat, January 2012 Year 18    No.163, Cover Story  
 

The post Crying for Justice appeared first on SabrangIndia.

On June 8, 2006 when Zakiya Ahsan Jaffri, as-sisted by Mumbai-based Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), filed a mammoth 119-page complaint supported by 2,000 pages of documentary evidence, little did she know – or really expect – that the Supreme Court of India would actually conduct an investigation under its watch through a Special Investigation Team (SIT) and thereafter ensure through a detailed order that her complaint would be treated as an FIR and a charge sheet also be filed. In the event that the SIT files a closure report, the petitioners’ right to a protest petition has been allowed.

The course of the Supreme Court-monitored investigations over a one-year period revealed serious lacunae in the functioning of the SIT, including the SIT chairman’s attempt at exonerating Narendra Modi. The chairman’s efforts were checked by the report of his own investigating officer (IO), AK Malhotra, and the independent assessment provided by the amicus curiae in the matter, Raju Ramachandran. After Ramachandran submitted his 10-page preliminary note in January 2011, the Supreme Court had, in March 2011, directed the SIT to reassess its own findings submitted 10 months earlier.

If nothing else, the verdict of the Supreme Court delivered on September 12, 2011 is a huge victory for the rule of law and for those of us who believe in due process and transparency and accountability in governance.

While not wasting valuable column space on the banal attempts by Modi and his party to give himself, and themselves, a clean chit, it is worth looking carefully at paragraphs 8 and 9 of the order (uploaded on the CJP website, www.cjponline.org) which clearly state that under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the complaint – now to be treated as a de facto FIR – will, along with all relevant investigation papers, first be placed before a regular magistrate’s court and then, if so deemed, be committed to the court already hearing the Gulberg Society case. The task will be to file a substantive, expanded charge sheet against Modi and 61 others. What is more, according to the law, and a specific direction of the Supreme Court in this order, the complainants will be given a chance at every stage – in case the SIT baulks again, which is not unlikely, or the judge decides to exclude one or more individuals from among those named as accused – to be heard and carry their appeal right up to the Supreme Court.

The process will no doubt be arduous. And in the current climate where communalism and mass crimes do not commandeer national outrage as, say money matters in the 2G spectrum scam do, it will take every bit of effort to ensure that the battle, bravely fought, reaches an effective conclusion. For any one of the 20-odd magistrates before whom the SIT report/charge sheet could be placed, it will be a definitive test of independence and integrity.

Will a magistrate sitting in Ahmedabad be able to withstand the pressure, vitriol and vindictiveness of Modi’s administration? Difficult though it may be to keep the faith, at such a time we would do well to remember Judge SP Tamang, the Ahmedabad metropolitan magistrate inquiring into the Ishrat Jahan case, who, on September 7, 2009, submitted an exemplary report against all odds. The report indicted a number of police officers, including the then Ahmedabad police commissioner, for the murder in 2004 of the Mumbra-based teenager and three others that Modi and the central government had cynically made out to be hardened terrorists.

Contrary to popular belief, the Supreme Court verdict in the Zakiya Jaffri-CJP case exceeds the petitioners’ demands. While the now historic petition No. SLP 1088/2008 sought the registration of an FIR against Modi and 61 others, the Supreme Court order in fact goes several steps further, taking the criminal matter to the committal stage where cognisance will be taken, and prosecution begun, of the complaint.

Not surprisingly, the facts are at variance with the pernicious propaganda spread by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in this regard. Their views were unfortunately echoed on many of India’s television channels, raising questions about the media’s competence as well as its allegiances. Many in the broadcast media cheerfully announced a ‘clean chit’ for Modi early in the morning of September 12 and then tempered their telecasts as initial interviews with Tanvir Jaffri (son of Zakiya and the late Ahsan Jaffri) and Teesta Setalvad, and print interviews with amicus curiae Raju Ramachandran over the next few days, stated to the contrary. Far from being an exoneration of Modi and company, the recent judgement demonstrates that the apex court finds merit in the complaint and has now directed a lower court to take it forward as procedures allow.

The petitioners have never pleaded that the Supreme Court should directly indict Modi. They have never said and do not believe that anyone should be convicted without due process of law, hanged as they are so easily in RSS-desired Taliban-style kangaroo courts. They would also like to state for the record that they do not believe in the death penalty for anyone, not even a gun-wielding terrorist or a Narendra Modi who calculatedly employed all the resources at his command to paralyse his administration while murder stalked the streets. Apart from conspiracy to commit murder, other serious charges in the complaint include the deliberate efforts to doctor investigations through faulty registration of FIRs, the appointment of incompetent and ideologically biased public prosecutors, the destruction of evidence and terrorising witnesses into turning hostile.

All this and more is the subject matter of the criminal complaint filed in 2006. The only one of its kind in India, it is the first criminal complaint related to communal violence that goes beyond indicting individuals responsible for acts of violence to trace the outbreak of violence further, drawing links between the chief minister, his cabinet colleagues, leaders of empathetic political right-wing outfits and officials of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and the Indian Police Service (IPS) who bowed to the murderous designs of their political boss.

We must not allow ourselves to forget what Gujarat 2002 was about. Over 300 well-orchestrated incidents of violence spread across 19 of Gujarat’s 25 districts, the calculated murder of 2,500 innocents in reprisal killings, several instances of daylight rape, the destruction of Muslim-owned property worth Rs 4,000 crore and the destruction of 270 dargahs and masjids. Almost or just as bad as the violence itself is the deliberate subversion of justice, the destruction of evidence and the intimidation and influencing of witnesses.

The conclusion of the case so doggedly fought by Zakiya Ahsan Jaffri and Citizens for Justice and Peace will be a litmus test for the Indian system, to establish whether it has the courage to punish those responsible for some of its bleakest hours.

A unique trajectory

After the Gujarat police refused to entertain their complaint in June 2006, the petitioners moved the Gujarat high court for registration of an FIR against 62 persons and transfer of the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The high court dismissed their petition in November 2007. However, the petitioners efforts were subsequently rewarded when the Supreme Court took cognisance of the case on March 3, 2008. A little over a year later, on April 27, 2009, the Supreme Court handed over the investigation not to the CBI but to the Special Investigation Team headed by former CBI chief RK Raghavan, which had been appointed by the apex court 13 months earlier to reinvestigate nine major Gujarat carnage cases.

In May 2009, Communalism Combat had, in its cover story ‘The Accused’, detailed critical elements of this complaint which was substantively different from that of the Gulberg Society case, one of the nine major carnage cases being reinvestigated by the SIT. Yet both the SIT and the state of Gujarat kept confusing the two cases. The primary distinction between the carnage cases and this complaint is the list of accused and the offences.

The accused in the complaint of June 8, 2006 (now treated as an FIR by the Supreme Court) are: the chief minister, Narendra Modi, 11 state cabinet ministers, three MLAs, three members of the ruling party in the state, three office-bearers and three members of extremist right-wing organisations and 38 high-ranking police officers and bureaucrats, beginning with the director general of police, Gujarat.

The progress of this case has been marked by high drama and behind-the-scenes subterfuge. However, it received scant attention until January 20, 2011 when the newly appointed amicus curiae, Raju Ramachandran, submitted a preliminary note to the Supreme Court which resulted in the court issuing directions to the SIT to reassess its findings. Until then, the media seemed uninterested in the proceedings, choosing to overlook the additional substantive evidence that the petitioners had regularly filed in support of their original complaint. The January 2011 order was the first sign that the SIT’s pathetic attempts to exonerate Modi and others from prosecution, in spite of the investigations carried out by its own IO, AK Malhotra, would not be accepted by the court.

Within days of the amicus curiae’s report being submitted to the Supreme Court and the court’s directions in the matter, Rahul Sharma, a serving IPS officer whose upright testimonies had allowed crucial evidence to enter the public domain, was served with a show-cause notice by a vindictive Narendra Modi-led Gujarat government. The notice was served on February 4, 2011. Sharma was later charge-sheeted on August 13, 2011 for speaking to the Supreme Court-appointed SIT and the state-appointed Nanavati-Shah Commission (now the Nanavati-Mehta Commission). It was Rahul Sharma’s deposition before the Nanavati-Shah Commission in 2004, when he made available a CD containing vital cellphone call records, that enabled CJP to analyse this data and place it before the commission and the courts.

Each hearing of this and related cases in the Supreme Court was punctuated by dubious attempts by the state of Gujarat and even the SIT to mislead the court and malign the petitioners – especially after October 2009 when CJP questioned the quality of the investigations being conducted by the SIT in the nine carnage cases. CJP secretary Teesta Setalvad was a specific target.
​

In a report to the apex court during hearings held in September-October 2010, the SIT mentioned a routine call made by Setalvad to the public prosecutor in the Gulberg Society case, RC Kodekar, who claimed that she had tried to threaten him. In January 2011, during the hearing of the matter pertaining to the carnage cases, the amicus curiae in that matter, Harish Salve, pointed out correspondence between CJP and the Geneva-based United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the threats received by senior advocate SM Vohra, counsel for the victims in the Gulberg case. Unfortunate observations by the bench on this matter attracted media publicity which worked to the advantage of a state responsible for mass crimes and determined to target those who stood up against it.

During this period a national daily was also used, on or about the date of every hearing, to project complete victory for the Modi government. On December 3, 2010, the date of the Supreme Court hearing in the Gujarat 2002 matters, as in January 2011, blatant efforts were made by an accused and cornered Gujarat government to manipulate sections of the media (‘SIT clears Narendra Modi of wilfully allowing post-Godhra riots’, The Times of India, December 3, 2010).

And yet, through 2010, when the SIT investigations were underway, it was reports in The Times of India and The Hindu that drew attention to the 15 phone calls made between the chief minister’s office/secretariat and the Ahmedabad police commissioner, PC Pande, between 11 a.m. and 4 p.m. on February 28, 2002, significant because they were made around the same time that the massacres at Naroda Patiya and Gulberg Society were taking place even as the police did nothing. CJP submitted detailed analyses of important phone call records to the Nanavati-Shah Commission in May 2010 (reported in Communalism Combat’s cover story, ‘Dial M for Massacre’, in June 2010) and to the Supreme Court in July 2011.

But finally, it was the exhaustive coverage by Tehelka magazine, which scooped the SIT report and contrasted this with evidence that CJP had gathered and submitted to the court, in two important stories (‘Here’s the smoking gun’, February 12, 2011, and ‘I was there. Narendra Modi said let the people vent their anger’, February 19, 2011), that impacted on the entire discourse. Television channels were now forced to look at the issues that Jaffri and CJP had raised over the past five years.

A subsequent report by Tehelka, ‘Whose Amicus is Harish Salve?’, in its March 12, 2011 issue exposed that the conduct of senior lawyer Harish Salve as amicus curiae in the Gujarat carnage cases gave rise to a conflict of interest. The story revealed that even while he was amicus curiae in the crucial mass murder cases before the Supreme Court, Salve continued to lobby the Gujarat government for projects for his wealthy corporate client, Eros Energy (Kishore Lulla). Incidentally, RK Raghavan, chairperson of the Supreme Court-appointed SIT, happens to be a corporate security adviser at a Tata company.

In April 2011 events took another dramatic turn as the much publicised affidavit of deputy inspector-general of police Sanjiv Bhatt, filed before the Supreme Court, drew widespread attention to the illegal instructions issued at a secret meeting held by Modi on February 27, 2002 – almost nine years after details of this meeting were first revealed in Crime Against Humanity, the report of the Concerned Citizens Tribunal – Gujarat 2002. In the affidavit, submitted directly to the Supreme Court registry and amicus curiae Raju Ramachandran, Bhatt detailed among other things how his testimony before the SIT in November 2009 and early 2010 had been leaked to the state government and led to intimidation from his superiors. This provided further confirmation of the petitioners’ suspicions about the conduct and integrity of the SIT.

In March 2011 the SIT had recorded a subsequent, formal statement from Bhatt under Section 161 of the CrPC. With this, Bhatt also submitted voluminous documents from the State Intelligence Bureau (SIB), including material that would prove that Modi was personally aware of the impending attack on Gulberg Society on the morning of February 28, 2002 when he deliberately did not intervene but instead allowed the mobs to attack former parliamentarian Ahsan Jaffri and others. After first informing OP Singh, Modi’s personal assistant (PA), Bhatt is stated to have personally informed the chief minister of the worsening situation at Gulberg Society.

Sanjiv Bhatt was suspended from service on August 8, 2011 and then charge-sheeted on September 18 even as Narendra Modi was fasting for ‘sadbhavna’, or communal harmony! On Friday, September 30, he was arrested on apparently trumped-up charges.

Doubts have been raised about the authenticity of Bhatt’s disclosures ever since his dramatic and relatively late appearance in public view. In response to this, we would like to point out that Sanjiv Bhatt was in fact cited as a witness by the petitioners in their original complaint precisely because his name figured extensively in the SIB records available to them.

Bearing testimony

Extracts from the complaint

List of witnesses:

1. KC Kapoor, in 2006, principal secretary, home; 2. Manoj D. Antani, in 2002, superintendent of police (SP), Bharuch; 3. AS Gehlot, in 2002, SP, Mehsana; 4. Vivek Srivastava, in 2002, SP, Kutch; 5. Himanshu Bhatt, in 2002, SP, Banaskantha; 6. Piyush Patel, in 2002, deputy commissioner of police (DCP), Vadodara; 7. Maniram, in 2002, additional director general of police (ADGP), law and order; 8. Vinod Mall, in 2002, SP, Surendranagar; 9. Sanjiv Bhatt, in 2002, SP, security, State Intelligence Bureau; 10. Jayanti Ravi, in 2002, collector, Panchmahal; 11. Neerja Gotru, in 2003, special investigating officer assigned to reopen investigations in some riot-related cases; 12. Rahul Sharma, in 2002, SP, Bhavnagar; 13. RB Sreekumar, in 2002, ADGP, intelligence.

In their complaint, the petitioners have also pointed out that Modi held several secret, undocumented meetings during that period at which many witnesses were present, who should also be examined and interrogated for information.

The superintendents of police in the districts of Mehsana, Banaskantha, Sabarkantha, Patan, Gandhinagar, Ahmedabad rural, Anand, Kheda, Vadodara rural, Godhra and Dahod, where mass killings were reported during the riots, all need to be specifically interrogated for their roles as also their failure to document illegal and unconstitutional instructions from the chief minister and other representatives of the state government.

Archived from Communalism Combat, Sept.-October 2011,Year 18, No.160 – Cover Story

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CJP condemns the arrest of Sanjiv Bhatt

Citizens for Justice and Peace strongly condemns the vindictive action of the Gujarat government in arresting Sanjiv Bhatt, senior IPS officer, in an action that is nothing short of an attempt to intimidate an important witness in the Zakiya Ahsan Jaffri and CJP criminal complaint against chief minister Narendra Modi and 61 others. This action of the Gujarat police, under the direct instructions of the state’s home minister – Narendra Modi, amounts to tampering with evidence and direct intimidation of a key witness. It is also a cheap attempt to slur his character and standing.

Key issues need to be raised here. One, that through his affidavit before the hon’ble Supreme Court dated April 2011 he had testified to criminal and unconstitutional instructions being issued by Modi at a late-night meeting on February 27, 2002, the day of the Godhra incident. In his statements before the Supreme Court-appointed Special Investigation Team, he also gave documentary data about Modi’s abdication of responsibility on February 28, 2002, the day attacks on Gulberg Society and Naroda Patiya in Ahmedabad were in full swing. Finally, last but not least, in an affidavit filed before the Gujarat high court recently, Bhatt had even mentioned that both Modi and Amit Shah, former minister of state for home, had tried to intimidate and pressurise him into not giving facts and evidence in the possession of the State Intelligence Bureau, related to the assassination of former minister of state for revenue, Haren Pandya. The CBI investigation into the Pandya assassination has recently been severely criticised by the Gujarat high court.

Most critically, Bhatt had challenged this FIR for which he was arrested, through writ petition 135/2011 in the Supreme Court. (This criminal complaint is allegedly a fabricated FIR filed in June 2011 by KD Panth, his former driver, alleging that Bhatt had pressurised him into filing an affidavit to support the officer’s claim that he was present at the meeting held at the chief minister’s residence on February 27, 2002). The Supreme Court had issued notice to the Gujarat government on July 29, 2011. This hasty and vindictive, even desperate, action of the Gujarat police, while the matter is under consideration by the Supreme Court, raises serious issues of contempt of the highest court, due process and, most importantly, intimidating a witness critical to a trial to ensure public justice. With our matter now awaiting charge-sheeting before a Gujarat magistrate’s court, the arrest of Bhatt is also a clear attempt by the state of Gujarat to warn us all collectively and individually of repercussions if we struggle for justice. It is a pathetic subversion of the Constitution and the rule of law.

(Press release issued by Citizens for Justice and Peace on October 1, 2011.)

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The FIR, the SIT report and the data unearthed during CJP’s investigations contain considerable evidence of serious crimes and grave miscarriages of justice, leading to serious allegations that have emerged in this context. We examine some of them.
 
Allegation I: The decision to take the charred bodies of the victims of the Godhra arson to Ahmedabad, handing them over to an office-bearer of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), not to government officials. The bodies were handed over to the then state general secretary of the VHP, Dr Jaideep Patel, who is accused of instigating the mob in the Naroda Gaon case. The decision to parade them through Ahmedabad in unrestrained funeral processions during which mobs raised provocative slogans. The allegation in the FIR is that the decision to take the bodies in a ceremonial procession to Ahmedabad was a premeditated decision taken by chief minister Narendra Modi against the advice of the Panchmahal (Godhra) collector/district magistrate, Jayanti Ravi.

The SIT has in its findings stated that given the presence of the then minister of state for home, Gordhan Zadaphiya, at Godhra, it was a collective decision of the cabinet. Although Zadaphiya and Jaideep Patel initially concurred on this, Zadaphiya has since given a contrary statement to the SIT that implicates Modi. Investigating officer AK Malhotra speaks of two separate cremations at Ahmedabad on February 28, 2002 whereas SIT chairperson RK Raghavan casually mentions one. Neither of the two SIT officials gives weight to the documentary evidence provided in the Gujarat State Intelligence Bureau report (titled C/Dir/Smashan yatra/176/2002 and dated February 28, 2002) marked to Modi’s office and senior police officials, wherein the “likelihood of disturbances” after funeral processions was pointed out.

Call records of Jaideep Patel
An analysis of Jaideep Patel’s call records is revealing. It shows that between 8:03 p.m. and 11:58 p.m. on February 27, 2002 he made and received calls to/from Gordhan Zadaphiya. Patel was also in constant touch with police officers; we do not know why. His call records show that between 1:05 p.m. and 9:16 p.m. on February 27, 2002 he made and received calls to/from the then DCP (zone V), Ahmedabad, RJ Savani. CJP submitted details of Patel’s call records to Malhotra which show that he was also in close touch with chief minister Narendra Modi’s office. Malhotra is strangely silent on this. On February 28, 2002 Jaideep Patel had five telephone conversations with the chief minister’s office (CMO). Why?

The question that remains is whether it is normal procedure to hand over bodies of the victims of a tragedy in such a sensitive matter, which could have widespread repercussions on intercommunity peace and harmony, to an office-bearer of an organisation like the VHP which has a virulent track record of instigating violence but which happens to have powerful political patrons, including the chief minister and senior functionaries of the ruling party in the state?

Allegation II: The illegal instructions, to allow Hindus to vent their anger, issued by Modi at a top-level meeting held at the chief minister’s residence on February 27, 2002. It is clear from the SIT’s investigations that such a meeting did take place. It has also been established that no minutes of the proceedings were kept. The continuing dispute is about what transpired at the meeting.

The SIT recorded a joint statement from Justice PB Sawant, a former judge of the Supreme Court, and Justice Hosbet Suresh, a former judge of the Bombay high court, who had been members of the Concerned Citizens Tribunal – Gujarat 2002. They narrated details about the February 27 meeting from the confessions made to them by the late Haren Pandya, former minister of state for revenue, in mid-May 2002 when he deposed before the tribunal. In their statement before the SIT, they clearly stated that Pandya had testified before them that “Narendra Modi had made it clear that there would be a backlash from Hindus on the next day… and police should not come in their way”. The FIR also refers to Pandya’s testimony relating to a high-level meeting convened by the chief minister to which the then chief secretary, the then home secretary and senior policemen were summoned and to whom clear instructions were given “not to deal with the Hindu rioting mobs”.
Sanjiv Bhatt, who is currently making headlines, had earlier told the SIT that he would speak about this meeting and the illegal instructions issued at the meeting only if there was a legal obligation to do so. Bhatt, who in 2002 held the post of SP, security, in the SIB, also referred to a message received at the  control room on February 27, 2002 announcing that the chief minister had called for a situational review meeting. As is now well known, the SIT subsequently recorded a statement from Bhatt under Section 161 of the CrPC and he has since submitted an affidavit in this regard to the Supreme Court of India.

The FIR records that RB Sreekumar, who in 2002 held the post of ADGP, intelligence, had stated in an affidavit before the Nanavati-Shah Commission that the then director general of police (DGP), Gujarat, K. Chakravarti, had told him about the crucial meeting held by Chief Minister Modi on February 27, 2002. The chief minister had said at the meeting that “in communal riots, police takes action against Hindus and Muslims on one-to-one basis. This will not do now, allow Hindus to give vent to their anger” (paragraph 84 of RB Sreekumar’s fourth affidavit before the Nanavati-Shah Commission dated October 27, 2005).  

Allegation III: The illegal stationing of two ministers in the state and city police control rooms is a fact that has been established. The SIT admits this. However, there has been no attempt to further investigate the logical consequences of political interference with the proper functioning of the police i.e. preventing the police in several districts from doing their constitutional duty. The FIR refers to press reports of the time which documented the presence of senior cabinet ministers in the state and city police control rooms and their illegal interference in police functioning, their subversion of police rules and protocol by instructing policemen not to function and otherwise manipulating instructions.
 

Ringing evidence
Who was the chief minister calling while Gujarat burned?

The CMO makes 15 calls to the Ahmedabad police commissioner, PC Pande, on February 28, 2002. The CP does not step out of his office between 10:50 a.m. and 7:10 p.m. although the city was aflame from about 11 a.m. onwards. Were these calls directly correlated to the instructions given to top echelons of the police not to act?

The CMO makes contact with the VHP Gujarat general secretary, Dr Jaideep Patel (now an accused in the Naroda Gaon massacre), five times on February 28, 2002. This includes three conversations with Sanjay Bhavsar, officer on special duty to
the chief minister, and one with the chief minister’s PA, Tanmay Mehta.

The chief minister’s office numbers record only three telephone calls through the day that Ahmedabad was burning i.e. February 28, 2002. His residence records only two calls. Is this not unusual?

Allegation IV: The failure of the police to act, especially as a direct result of political interference. The FIR details several instances that corroborate this.

a) K. Chakravarti, the then DGP of Gujarat, had not given any special instructions about the preservation of law and order and no strict instructions on how mobs should be dealt with.

b) The then CP, Ahmedabad, PC Pande, commented on Newshour, Star News, on February 28, 2002 that: “These people also, they somehow get carried away by the overall general sentiment. That’s the whole trouble. The police are equally influenced by the overall general sentiments.”

c) Rahul Sharma, who in 2002 held the post of SP, Bhavnagar, stated during his cross-examination before the Nanavati-Shah Commission in 2004 that the attack on a madrassa housing hundreds of Muslim children, which took place under his jurisdiction on March 1, 2002, appeared to be an organised one. He also revealed that the minister of state for home, Gordhan Zadaphiya, had later complained to him about the greater number of Hindu deaths in police firing in Bhavnagar as compared to Muslims.

d) Police Inspector (PI) Khurshid Mysorewala, who was stationed at the Naroda police station in 2002, in an affidavit and during his cross-examination before the Nanavati-Shah Commission in 2004, averred that due to the lack of preventive measures, the instructions from superiors about system overload, the non-provision of reinforcements and other reasons, he was unable to avert the attacks or respond to the Muslim victims’ cries for help and stop the heinous crimes that took place in Naroda Patiya.

e) MK Tandon, in 2002, the JCP, Ahmedabad, stated in his cross-examination before the Nanavati-Shah Commission that when the incidents at Naroda Patiya and Gulberg Society, Meghaninagar, occurred, neither he nor the police commissioner were present; that none of the policemen who were present used force to try and disperse the mob; and that no inquiries were made by the state home minister regarding the breakdown of law and order. When the attack on Gulberg Society took place, two deputy superintendents of police, one PI and one officer of the Central Industrial Security Force were present but no strict measures were taken to disperse the mob.

Allegation V: The illegal instructions given by upper echelons of the Gujarat executive to senior policemen, recorded by the then ADGP, RB Sreekumar, in a handwritten personal register and detailed in the FIR.

a) RB Sreekumar, in his third affidavit before the Nanavati-Shah Commission dated April 9, 2005, records the attempts made by senior officers in his department and the then undersecretary, Dinesh Kapadia, the then secretary, law and order, GC Murmu, and the then government pleader, Arvind Pandya – after Sreekumar had filed his first affidavit before the commission – to pressurise him to refrain from filing further affidavits and from telling the truth before the commission i.e. to make him commit the criminal offence of perjury. Sreekumar stated that he was intimidated and warned by Murmu and Pandya to lie on oath and to avoid telling the whole truth.  
   
b) Paragraph 91 of Sreekumar’s fourth affidavit dated October 27, 2005 lists the names of several senior bureaucrats and police officials who, despite the expanded terms of reference of the Nanavati-Shah Commission (which, after July 2004, included within its ambit the “role and conduct of the then chief minister or any other ministers in his council of ministers, police officers, other individuals and organisations” in regard to the post-Godhra violence), bowed to pressure and did not file second affidavits that would have enlarged on the conduct of the chief minister Narendra Modi or any other ministers, etc.

Allegation VI: Officers of the state have been directly influenced to testify to falsified events and thereby commit the criminal act of perjury, as the FIR demonstrates. At the time when the FIR was prepared, this related to the lies and contradictions stated on oath by senior IPS and IAS officers in their affidavits before the Nanavati-Shah Commission.

Former Ahmedabad police commissioner PC Pande (accused No. 28 in the FIR) stated on oath before the Nanavati-Shah Commission that he had a memory lapse regarding what actually transpired at Gulberg Society on February 28, 2002. The commission failed to question him about why curfew was not imposed in Ahmedabad city until as late as 1 p.m. on February 28 when on February 27, 2002 itself at least 14 incidents of mob violence had been recorded in FIRs by the police. He was subsequently examined by the SIT on two occasions when, having apparently regained his memory, he denied being in possession of control room records and other crucial evidential material.

The absence of these documents was recorded by the SIT’s investigating officer, AK Malhotra. Listing the constraints faced by him as IO, he cites “destruction of critical documentary evidence” as one of the limitations he faced. Ironically, records were ostensibly destroyed in 2007 while the Supreme Court was seized of the matter thus amounting to contempt of court.

Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code, ‘Of False Evidence and Offences Against Public Justice’ (Sections 201-205), and Chapter X, ‘Of Contempts of the Lawful Authority of Public Servants’ (Sections 175, 177, 187 and 188), refer to offences by public servants of failing to assist the course of public justice, destroying evidence and so on. After the Supreme Court first indicated that it would look beyond the SIT’s dismissive conclusions (January 20, 2011) and the SIT began formally recording statements under Section 161 of the CrPC, PC Pande made an interesting turnabout.

In its earliar report submitted to the Supreme Court, the SIT did find Modi guilty of a brazenly communal mindset. It remains to be seen what shape the SIT report/charge sheet will now take

On April 11, 2011 AK Malhotra came to Mumbai to record the statement of CJP’s Teesta Setalvad under Section 161. She insisted on mentioning the destruction of records as a specific culpable, criminal offence whereupon Malhotra unexpectedly informed her that, post-January 20, while the SIT was recording his statement under Section 161, PC Pande had done a complete turnaround and submitted a CD containing 3,500 scanned pages of hitherto ‘destroyed’ documents. Setalvad had in a letter to the SIT dated April 21, 2011 pointed out that Pande’s selective suppression of records during the SIT’s earlier investigations, and the mysterious reappearance of these documents, itself merited thorough investigation.

Allegation VII: The top echelons of the state administration and police force deliberately ignored the reports and warnings issued by their own State Intelligence Bureau, and other indicators, as demonstrated in the FIR.

a) RB Sreekumar, in paragraph 17 of his first affidavit before the Nanavati-Shah Commission dated July 6, 2002, stated that in response to a message received from the Uttar Pradesh intelligence department (during the period preceding the Godhra incident), the Gujarat SIB had requested all SPs and police commissioners to inform the SP, Faizabad, about the movement of kar sevaks from their respective jurisdictions. Following this, on February 16, 2002 the SP, Western Railway, Vadodara, had informed the IGP, intelligence, Uttar Pradesh, that on February 22, 2002 Prahlad Patel, president of the Bajrang Dal, Mehsana, would be leading a group of 150-200 trishul-bearing Bajrang Dal activists to the Ayodhya Maha Yagna on the Sabarmati Express.

b) In paragraphs 18 and 19 of the affidavit, Sreekumar points to the failure of the central and Uttar Pradesh (police) intelligence departments to provide adequate and timely information to the Gujarat state or SIB about the return journey of the kar sevaks, their unruly behaviour while returning from Ayodhya aboard the Sabarmati Express and, more specifically, their altercation with Muslims when the latter attempted to board the train at Rudauli.

c) In addition to the reports relating to the trouble anticipated on and after February 28, 2002, as communal violence persisted beyond the initial phase, the Gujarat SIB continued to provide specific intelligence reports, as revealed in paragraph 26 of Sreekumar’s first affidavit. In two such reports dated April 15 and April 26, 2002, the SIB provided information about impending communal trouble, including among other things the plan by radical Hindu elements to launch a large-scale assault on a Muslim colony in Ahmedabad and a plan by Bajrang Dal leaders to distribute lethal weapons. None of these reports were acted upon by the police hierarchy or the state executive.

Allegation VIII: The punitive treatment meted out by the state to those police officers who acted constitutionally to maintain law and order. While the FIR mentions six officers who were so punished, since then, at least three more officers have received similar treatment at the hands of the state.

Allegation IX: The rewards given to the senior IAS and IPS officers who bowed to Chief Minister Modi’s diabolical, unconstitutional plans. The FIR names 14 officers who were so rewarded.

Allegation X: The subversion of the criminal justice system.

The appointment of public prosecutors (PPs) with allegiances to the groups that led the violence was covered exhaustively in the May 2009 issue of Communalism Combat. Since then, CJP has investigated further and filed applications under the Right to Information Act, especially after a report on NDTV on March 29, 2010 revealed that many of the defence lawyers appearing for the accused in the nine major carnage trials have been appointed special public prosecutors to be paid Rs 12-15,000 a day with a specially amended rule of the Gujarat government’s legal department stating that fees would even be paid for days of adjournment. Hence the state of Gujarat is footing the bill for many lawyers appearing for the key accused in the post-Godhra massacres.

• Gulberg Society trial: Defence counsel Mitesh Amin is also a special PP, Gujarat. (Amin was paid Rs 25,52,000 by the state between April 1, 2009 and March 31, 2010.)
• Sardarpura trial: Defence counsel HM Dhruv, BC Barot and JG Rajput (now retired) were appointed special PPs, Gujarat. (HM Dhruv was paid Rs 17,28,000 by the state between April 1, 2009 and March 31, 2010.)
• Naroda Patiya trial: Defence counsel NM Kikani, BO Sharma, NR Shah, Bharat J. Joshi, MJ Dagli, HC Patel, SR Patel, GS Solanki, KN Thakor and RN Kikani were appointed special PPs, Gujarat.
• Naroda Gaon trial: Defence counsel Chetan K. Shah, Rohit H. Verma, Rajesh N. Modi, MR Khandar, Nilesh Lodha, HC Patel and PO Sharma were appointed special PPs, Gujarat. (Chetan Shah was paid Rs 2,97,000 by the state between April 1, 2009 and March 31, 2010.)
• Odh trial: Defence counsel CK Patel, Bharat J. Joshi and Ashwin H. Dhagad were appointed special PPs, Gujarat.
• In its earliar report submitted to the Supreme Court, the SIT did find Modi guilty of a brazenly communal mindset. It remains to be seen what shape the SIT report/charge sheet will now take.     

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Modi and 62 others face investigation for mass murder

Almost three years ago, on June 8, 2006, a mammoth 119-page complaint was sent by Zakiya Ahsan Jaffri to the then director general of police (DGP), Gujarat, PC Pande, who, ironically, is listed as accused number 29 in the document. The legal action group, Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), through its secretary and trustee, Teesta Setalvad, had provided her with legal assistance in assimilating the material required for the historic exercise, which took over five months to draft. Although token gestures were made by the Gujarat police – the DGP sent the additional director general of police (ADGP), Mahapatra, to meet the complainant – despite 2,000 pages of devastating evidence, the Gujarat DGP saw nothing prima facie of incriminatory substance in the complaint.

Eight months after the Gujarat police refused, in spite of clear directives in law and practice, to register a first information report (FIR) and investigate the offences, the complainant and CJP jointly filed a petition in the Gujarat high court praying for directions from the court ordering the state police to register an FIR and investigate the complaint. The petition also argued for an independent investigation by the CBI since top echelons of the police hierarchy in the state were personally involved in the crimes that were alleged to have been committed. Advocates MM Tirmizi and MS Ganesh argued the matter over two days in September 2007 while advocate general, Kamal Trivedi, for the Gujarat government, strongly resisted the petitioners’ arguments. A week before judgement was delivered the petitioners had through an additional affidavit argued for the transcripts of the Tehelka exposé following its sting ‘Operation Kalank’ (made public on October 25, 2007) to be treated as extrajudicial confessions in the matter of the overarching criminal conspiracy and investigated. In November 2007 the Gujarat high court rejected both the petition and the affidavit.

Months later the petitioners filed a special leave petition in the apex court challenging the high court order. On March 3, 2008 – the first date of hearing – the apex court not only issued notice to the state and union but also appointed counsel, Prashant Bhushan, as amicus curiae to assist the court. Recognising the specificity and enormity of the complaint, the Supreme Court had observed, "What does a citizen do when it has such voluminous evidence and the police simply refuses to investigate? What is the remedy available for a citizen?"

After the usual logistical delays the matter was ultimately heard on April 27, 2009. By then the Supreme Court had also, on March 26, 2008, directed the appointment of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) headed by former CBI director, Dr RK Raghavan, to not only reinvestigate the eight other major trials but to oversee prosecution of the accused in these trials as well.

Acknowledging the worth and magnitude of this complaint, the Supreme Court, in a historic move, ordered the SIT to investigate the allegations and submit a report to the apex court within three months. Advocates Aparna Bhat, Ramesh Pukhrambam, MS Ganesh and Sanjay Parikh appeared for the petitioners during the proceedings in the Supreme Court.

Of the 63 persons named as accused in this complaint, 12 are politicians who were, in 2006, holding the rank of cabinet ministers in the state cabinet. Four of these 12, including Narendra Modi, the chief minister himself (who also holds several cabinet portfolios, including home, transport, industry and information and broadcasting), Amit Shah (minister of state for home), Indravijaysinh K. Jadeja (minister for roads and buildings) and Prabhatsinh Chauhan (minister of state for tribal development), continue in positions of power and authority. Ashok Bhatt, minister for law and judiciary until 2007, is currently the speaker of the state assembly.

Of the 63 persons named as accused in this complaint, 12 are politicians who were, in 2006, holding the rank of cabinet ministers in the state cabinet. Four of these 12, including Narendra Modi, the chief minister himself, continue in positions of power and authority

Of the remaining accused, three are MLAs from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), seven are office-bearers of the state BJP, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Bajrang Dal (including Dr Praveen Togadia, international general secretary of the VHP), 10 are officials of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and 28 are Indian Police Service (IPS) officers.

Accused number 23 in the complaint, Keshavram Kashiram Shastri, former chairman of the VHP’s Gujarat unit and editor of the Vishwa Hindu Samachar, published from Paldi, Ahmedabad, is dead. He had in the now infamous interview given to rediff.com in March 2002 proudly claimed a badge of honour for himself and his organisation, for the selective loot and destruction of Muslim lives and properties. "Karvunj pade, karvunj pade (It had to be done, it had to be done). We don’t like it but we were terribly angry. Lust and anger are blind." He had also outlined in graphic detail how VHP and Bajrang Dal workers had been provided with ownership details of key properties and establishments, which made their task of selectively targeting Muslim-owned ones somewhat easier.

As we go to press, the SIT begins this historic investigation, a first of its kind. Interestingly, the complaint of June 8, 2006 also lists a dozen or so witnesses in order to facilitate investigation. These witnesses are all from the Gujarat state IAS and IPS cadres. The material submitted as primary evidence along with the complaint includes affidavits and depositions by police officials that contain startling revelations made before the Nanavati-Shah-Mehta Commission of Inquiry.

List of witnesses:

1. KC Kapoor; in 2006, principal secretary (home).

2. Manoj D. Antani; in 2002, superintendent of police (SP), Bharuch.

3. AS Gehlot; in 2002, SP, Mehsana.

4. Vivek Srivastava; in 2002, SP, Kutch.

5. Himanshu Bhatt; in 2002, SP, Banaskantha.

6. Piyush Patel; in 2002, deputy commissioner of police, Vadodara.

7. Maniram; in 2002, ADGP (law and order).

8. Vinod Mall; in 2002, SP, Surendranagar.

9. Sanjiv Bhatt; in 2002, SP (security), State Intelligence Bureau.

10. Jayanti Ravi; in 2002, Collector, Panchmahal.

11. Neerja Gotru; in 2003, special investigating officer assigned to reopen investigations in some riot-related cases.

12. Rahul Sharma; in 2002, SP, Bhavnagar.

13. RB Sreekumar; in 2002, ADGP
(intelligence).

Archived from Communalism Combat,  May 2009 Year 15    No.140, Cover Story 1

The post The Accused appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Accused number one: Narendra Modi, chief minister of Gujarat

The BJP’s rumour machine coupled with the Indian mass media’s tardiness to investigate has allowed the impression to grow that there are no specific allegations against Chief Minister Narendra Modi in the complaint currently being investigated by the SIT.  Nothing could be further from the truth. The carefully constructed complaint lists more than 100 specific charges against Narendra Modi.

Major charges

Misconstruing Godhra

February 27, 2002. The tragic killings in the fire in coach S-6 of the Sabarmati Express train at Godhra were used and manipulated to justify a pre-orchestrated massacre which enjoyed the sanction of the constitutionally elected government in Gujarat.

The district magistrate (DM) and collector of Panchmahal (Godhra), Jayanti Ravi, called the incident at the station an accident, as did the then prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, making his official statement in Parliament at about 4 p.m. on February 27. By the evening of that day however, Modi – who arrived in Godhra around 2 p.m. surrounded by VHP confidants like Dr Jaideep Patel – had decided otherwise. At about 7.30 p.m. he said on an Akashwani Gujarati radio broadcast that the incident at Godhra was a preplanned ISI-driven conspiracy (executed by local Godhra Muslims, no doubt!). In the days that followed the union ministry of home affairs, manned by none less than Modi’s mentor, LK Advani, did its best to instil into public perception the theory of a conspiracy behind the Godhra incident. To date conspiracy has not been proven.

Modi did not stop at that. He expressed his intention to have the burnt coach transported to Ahmedabad, a move that DM Jayanti Ravi strongly opposed. Irritated, Modi did the next best thing. He assembled a motor cavalcade, ordered that the bodies be handed over to the then VHP state general secretary, Jaideep Patel, and sent them to the Sola Civil Hospital in Ahmedabad. There the bodies were paraded around. The next morning, on February 28, 2002, the Gujarati daily, Sandesh, carried a gory seven-column colour photograph of the burnt bodies wrapped in white shrouds, a trishul lying beside them.

Undeterred by the impact or fallout, unconcerned by facts, Modi set his Machiavellian plan into motion.

Secret meetings to plan carnage

February 27, 2002. Gandhinagar, Lunawada, Godhra. Late in the evening of February 27, Modi called a secret meeting in Gandhinagar, which he attended along with some members of his cabinet and top bureaucrats. At this meeting illegal instructions were issued, where policemen and bureaucrats were in fact instructed to perform illegal acts.

According to the report of the Concerned Citizens Tribunal – Gujarat 2002 by a panel including Justices VR Krishna Iyer and PB Sawant:

"The chief minister, Narendra Modi, took an active role along with at least three cabinet colleagues to instruct senior police personnel and civil administrators that a ‘Hindu reaction was to be expected and this must not be curtailed or controlled’."

"What is worse or as bad as the occurrences themselves is the now almost incontrovertible pointers/evidence, including statements made by a former cabinet minister of the state of Gujarat, that a high-level meeting was convened by the chief minister at which then chief secretary, Subbarao, and then [additional chief secretary (home)] Ashok Narayan, and senior policemen were summoned, at which clear instructions were given ‘not to deal with the Hindu rioting mobs’. Thereby clear sanction and sponsorship was given by the state to brute violence that included sexual violence of girls and women" (Crime Against Humanity, report of the Concerned Citizens Tribunal – Gujarat 2002).

A minister from Modi’s cabinet had testified about these details before the tribunal in mid-May 2002. His identity was kept anonymous. Soon after the report was released in November 2002 however, one of the panel members revealed Haren Pandya’s identity to Outlook magazine. Within months, Pandya was killed.

Other illegal meetings

There is other primary evidence of similar meetings to plan killings that were held in Lunawada and Godhra on February 27, 2002 at which cabinet ministers like Prabhatsinh Chauhan and others were present. Each of those present will need to be interrogated and investigated at the time of the SIT investigation.

Taking control of policing

The illegal attempts by senior members of the chief minister’s cabinet (Ashok Bhatt, accused number 2 in the complaint, and Indravijaysinh K. Jadeja, accused number 3) to influence the police were part of the collective design of the chief minister and his colleagues. Several reports in the press during that period described how the ministers sat in the police control rooms at Gandhinagar and Shahibag and actually subverted police rules and protocol by instructing policemen not to function and manipulating instructions in many cases to aid crimes and the destruction of evidence. Bhatt, state law minister in 2002 right up to 2007, is today the speaker of the Gujarat assembly. As head of Gujarat’s law and judiciary department, he had complete control over the appointment of public prosecutors until 2007 (see accompanying story, ‘Wheels of injustice’).

Proof of both the February 27 meeting as also the illegal activity of ministers located inside the Ahmedabad city and Gujarat state control rooms to influence police functioning, have corroborative evidence.

Modi’s ‘revenge’

February 28, 2002. The Tehelka tapes contain a confession or, rather, a gloating admission from a rapist from Naroda who speaks of Modi arriving in Naroda not long after 112 persons were humiliated, butchered and burnt, and euphorically congratulating the army of marauders even as he was surrounded by Black Cat commandos (who are therefore witnesses as well).

"(Suresh) Richard: [On the day of the massacre] we did whatever we did till quite late in the evening… at around 7.30… around 7.15, our Modibhai came… Right here, outside the house… My sisters garlanded him with roses… Tehelka: Narendrabhai Modi… Richard: Narendra Modi… He came with black commandos… got down from his Ambassador car and walked up here… All my sisters garlanded him… a big man is a big man after all… Tehelka: He came out on the road? Richard: Here, near this house… Then he went this way… Looked at how things were in Naroda… Tehelka: The day the Patiya incident happened…

Richard: The same evening… Tehelka: February 28… Richard: 28… Tehelka: 2002… Richard: He went around to all the places… He said our tribe was blessed… He said our mothers were blessed [for bearing us]… Tehelka: He came at about 5 o’clock or at 7? Richard: Around 7 or 7.30… At that time there was no electricity… Everything had been burnt to ashes in the riots…" (August 12, 2007, www.tehelka.com).

‘Operation Kalank’ was a sting operation carried out by Tehelka over several months and made public in October 2007. The tapes, recorded conversations with several persons who were in some way involved in the Gujarat genocide of 2002, have now been verified by the CBI and have the status of extrajudicial confessions.

The contents of these conversations are stark and revealing. Apart from brazen admissions of mass murder and rape, they describe the transportation of arms from other states and preparations for the Godhra and post-Godhra violence that were underway for several weeks before February 27, 2002. They also describe the chief minister, Narendra Modi’s direct role in fuelling mass rape and murder. These revelations call for the SIT to re-examine the veracity/authenticity of the recordings. The SIT must question/interrogate all those persons who spoke to Tehelka as well as the individuals they name no matter how powerful they may be.

One such conversation is with a man who worked in the accounts office at the Maharaja Sayajirao University, Vadodara. He also speaks of direct orders from Modi and Modi’s street operator, Babu Bajrangi.

The chief minister did not visit the riot-affected areas to meet the bruised and battered victims who had taken refuge in nearby relief camps. He went there, it seems, as a victorious messiah of evil.

Secret undocumented meetings held by Modi

Not only were no minutes or records kept of the infamous meeting held at Chief Minister Modi’s office on February 27, 2002 but several other such irregular meetings convened by higher authorities and attended by the following officers also went undocumented:

• Sanjiv Bhatt, the then SP (security), attended several such meetings as staff officer to GC Raiger, additional director general of police (ADGP) (intelligence), but failed to record the instructions he received.
• KN Sharma, the then inspector general of police (IGP), Ahmedabad range, under whose jurisdiction many people were killed in the riots, also attended such illegal confabulations.
• Deepak Swaroop, the then IGP, Vadodara range, under whose jurisdiction the Godhra incident had taken place and, moreover, many incidents of mass killing and other atrocities against minorities occurred, is also said to have participated.
• MK Tandon, the then assistant commissioner of police (ACP), Ahmedabad, under whose jurisdiction many gruesome incidents of mass murder (Naroda Patiya, Gulberg Society, etc) had taken place was a part of the close-knit group. Tandon was present when the survivors of Gulberg finally escaped to safety and when the bodies of the 70 slaughtered victims were still recognisable. Three days later, at the mass burial of 133 dead (including victims from Gulberg and Naroda), the bodies had been reduced to dismembered pieces. One of the accused in the Gulberg Society massacre, Madan Chawal, is on record as saying (during Tehelka’s ‘Operation Kalank’) that the accused played cricket with the skulls of the Gulberg dead. The moot question is whether Tandon also connived and participated in the dismembering of corpses?
• Amitabh Pathak, the then IGP, Gandhinagar range, under whose jurisdiction many people were killed during the post-Godhra riots, for instance, in Sardarpura in Mehsana district and several places in Sabarkantha district, was also part of this conspiracy.
• Shivanand Jha, the then additional CP, Ahmedabad, under whose jurisdiction many notorious atrocities against the minority community were committed, was a close confidant of the chief minister. Between 2004 and 2006, as home secretary, he filed several misleading affidavits on behalf of the state government in the Supreme Court. Ironically, today he is part of the SIT appointed by the apex court.
• DD Tuteja, the then commissioner of police (CP), Vadodara, under whose jurisdiction over three dozen incidents of violence, including the Best Bakery case, took place.

The superintendents of police in the districts of Mehsana, Banaskantha, Sabarkantha, Patan, Gandhinagar, Ahmedabad rural, Anand, Kheda, Vadodara rural, Godhra and Dahod, where mass killings were reported during the riots, all need to be specifically interrogated for their roles as also their failure to document illegal and unconstitutional instructions from the chief minister and other representatives of the state government.

No minutes of the meetings held by the chief minister and senior bureaucrats were recorded and such questionable instructions were mainly conveyed by telephone.

Not keeping minutes served the twin objectives of 1) field officers carrying out the conspiracy to execute a pogrom against the minorities and 2) avoidance of the subsequent monitoring of the actions of jurisdictional officers in the field.

The tragic killings in the fire in coach S-6 of the Sabarmati Express train at Godhra were used and manipulated to justify a pre-orchestrated massacre which enjoyed the sanction of the constitutionally elected government in Gujarat

Further corroboration of the unconstitutional meeting: February 27, 2002

Former DGP, Gujarat, RB Sreekumar, states in para 84 of his fourth affidavit before the Nanavati-Shah Commission that on February 28, 2002 his senior, the then DGP, K. Chakravarti, also told him about the late evening meeting on February 27. The meeting was held in Modi’s office after his return from Godhra. At this meeting the chief minister is reported to have said, "In communal riots police takes action against Hindus and Muslims on one-to-one basis. This will not do now, allow Hindus to give vent to their anger." None of the officers present at the meeting (which included PC Pande, the then CP, Ahmedabad, Ashok Narayan, additional chief secretary (home), etc) objected to these verbal instructions from the chief minister.

Chakravarti also observed in his conversation with Sreekumar that the chief minister’s attitude was proving to be a major obstacle to police officers in initiating action against Hindu communal elements who were on the rampage against minorities. He added that the act of parading the dead bodies of those killed in the Godhra train fire in Ahmedabad, including those who did not belong to the city, was highly objectionable and had made the situation more volatile by provoking rage among Hindu communal elements against the minority community. He also said that PC Pande had objected to this parading of dead bodies in Ahmedabad but the commissioner’s objections had been overruled by the chief minister.

Although Sreekumar suggested to Chakravarti that the latter should issue instructions to jurisdictional officers to act in accordance with the law, and follow the appropriate instructions regarding the strategy and tactics to be employed while handling communal riots, nothing of the sort was done.

DGP Chakravarti was quite critical of the presence of a cabinet minister, IK Jadeja, in his office during the days following the Godhra train fire and complained that this was adversely affecting his supervision of the riot situation. He also said that officers in critical situations were carrying out the verbal orders of leaders of the ruling party instead of following the directives of jurisdictional officers.

There is further corroboration of the meeting in the chief minister’s office.

Sreekumar, who bore the designation of additional director general of police at the time, was posted as head of the Gujarat state intelligence wing from April 2002. From April 2002 until September that year he maintained a contemporaneous record (a personal register) documenting the illegal instructions issued by Modi and his own superiors in the police department. These instructions were aimed not towards arresting the violence and booking the guilty but shielding the real accused and concocting false evidence. He got this document cross-signed by his immediate boss, OP Mathur, the IGP (administration and security).

In this register, Sreekumar documents that on June 7, 2002 PK Mishra, principal secretary to the chief minister and accused no 31 in the FIR, asked him, as chief of intelligence, to find out which minister from the Modi cabinet had met a private inquiry commission of which retired Supreme Court judge, VR Krishna Iyer, was a part. Mishra told Sreekumar that Haren Pandya, the then minister of state for revenue, was suspected to be the man concerned. He also gave Sreekumar the number of a mobile phone (98240 30629) and asked him to trace the call records.

Five days later, on June 12, 2002, Sreekumar informed Mishra that Haren Pandya was believed to be the minister concerned even as he stressed that the matter was a sensitive one and outside the State Intelligence Bureau (SIB)’s charter of duties. Call details of the above-mentioned mobile phone which, it turned out, did belong to Pandya, were however handed over to Mishra through IGP OP Mathur.

Modi was obviously keeping a close watch on any information leaks or dissent within his cabinet or hierarchy of officials.

The Charges

Charge One
Conspiracy and abetment to commit multiple offences of murder (Section 120-B, 114 r/w 302 IPC)

Charge Two
Furnishing false information (Section 177 IPC)    

Charge Three
Injuring and defiling place of worship (Section 295 IPC)

Charge Four
Outraging religious belief (Section 295-A IPC)

Charge Five
Criminal intimidation (Section 506 IPC)    

Charge Six
False statement as evidence (Section 199 IPC)    

Charge Seven
Giving false information about offences committed (Section 203 IPC)

Charge Eight
Obstructing public servant in discharge of duties (Section 186 IPC)

Charge Nine
Omission to assist public servant (Section 187 IPC)    

Charge Ten
Promoting enmity between peoples on grounds of religion (Section 153-A IPC)

Charge Eleven
Uttering words to wound religious feelings (Section 298 IPC)

Charge Twelve
Disobeying law with intent to cause injury to any person (Section 166 IPC)   

Modi forgives his men

No action was taken against officers like K. Chakravarti, the then DGP, Gujarat, PC Pande, the then CP, Ahmedabad, Ashok Narayan, the then additional chief secretary (home) or a large number of other senior functionaries in the state government for failure to act and control the violence. These are also the officers who filed incomplete, inaccurate and inadequate affidavits before the Nanavati-Shah Commission.

More Modi mischief

Ø Modi’s interview to the press in which he quoted Newton’s third law of motion to justify the atrocities against the Muslim community: "Every action has an equal and opposite reaction."

Ø There was no direction from Modi to Hindu organisations against the observance of a bandh on February 28, 2002.

Ø There was an unnecessary delay in the requisition for and deployment of the army even though anti-minority violence had broken out in the cities of Vadodara, Ahmedabad, etc on the afternoon of February 27 itself.

Modi failed to act against hate writing

No action was taken against the print media for carrying communally inflammatory reports despite the fact that the SIB and some field officers had recommended such action (as noted in Sreekumar’s first affidavit dated July 6, 2002 and during his cross-examination before the Nanavati-Shah Commission on August 31, 2004).

It is the state home department that is empowered to give clearance for initiating action to prosecute the errant media. Modi was Gujarat’s home minister then as he is even today.

More Tehelka revelations on Modi

Ø"To get me out on bail Narendrabhai changed judges thrice." – Babu Bajrangi Patel, Bajrang Dal leader and prime accused in the Naroda Patiya massacre case.

Ø "His rage was great." – Ramesh Dave, sangh diehard.

Ø "He has done what no CM ever has… he openly said that we had three days to do what we could… he said he would not give us time after that." – Haresh Bhatt, Bajrang Dal leader, Godhra.

Ø "Were Modi not a minister, he would have burst bombs." – Arvind Pandya, Gujarat government counsel before the Nanavati-Shah Commission.

Ø "Revenge was his promise…" – Rajendra Vyas, VHP Ahmedabad president.

Punish the good, reward the bad

The transfer of officers from field executive posts, in the thick of the 2002 riots, despite the DGP’s objection to these transfers, amounted to Modi, as chief executive, deliberately interfering in their duties.

The transfers were effected to facilitate the convenient placement, in crucial positions, of those persons among the IPS and IAS who were willing to subvert the system for personal benefit.

Similarly, Modi rewarded those senior officials who gave incomplete and questionable evidence before the Nanavati-Shah Commission with undue benefits. PC Pande, a Modi favourite, was rehabilitated into the CBI when Advani was home minister in February 2004, just when citizens’ groups were pleading for independent investigation into the riot cases. In a clear-cut directive, the Supreme Court ruled in October 2004 that he should be kept out of handling Gujarat 2002 cases. Defiant and undeterred, in 2006 the Modi government appointed him DGP of the state, a post that he occupied until six weeks before his retirement. A subsequent challenge to his appointment, by CJP in the Supreme Court, was rejected, after extensive arguments, in February 2009.

Another equally glaring example of rewards for the bad was the post-retirement appointment of Ashok Narayan, the then additional chief secretary, home department, to a two-year post as State Vigilance Commissioner, which was followed by further rewards in the form of five extensions of his tenure.
 

Courtesy: deshgujarat.com        All the chief minister’s men
 

Modi’s speeches during the gaurav yatra

Becharaji, Mehsana: Modi makes inflammatory speeches demonising Muslims in his build-up to the 2002 election campaign and then does his best to deny information about the same to the National Commission for Minorities (see box, ‘Tongue of flame’).

Modi ignores state intelligence reports

The Gujarat state intelligence department had sent cautionary and detailed reports to the state home department manned by additional chief secretary, Ashok Narayan, and home minister, Narendra Modi. These were dated April 24, June 15, August 20 and August 28, 2002. No follow-up action was taken by the home department on these reports, copies of which were appended to Sreekumar’s second affidavit dated October 6, 2004 before the Nanavati-Shah Commission.

These were not simply ignored by the government. At first, Modi tried to get Sreekumar to redo his reports in accordance with the state government’s ideological interpretation. This was recorded by the former intelligence chief in his personal register. When that did not work, and the ADGP (intelligence) actually provided an independent view to the Chief Election Commission (CEC) and the National Commission for Minorities (on Modi’s speech at Becharaji), Sreekumar was transferred out of this sensitive post.

What did the SIB reports say?

April 24, 2002: This candid five-page appraisal speaks of the strong resentment felt by the Muslim minority, given the disproportionate destruction of Muslim life and property as also the connivance of the state government through its police and law and judiciary department to protect the accused. The report details that "as on April 23, 2002, 636 Muslims were killed in the riots (of these, 91 were killed in police firing) as against 181 Hindus killed (76 in police firing). Nearly 329 Muslims had sustained injuries in arson as against 74 Hindus… Significantly, this trend of loss of life and damage to property is heavily weighted against Muslims in Ahmedabad city where 278 Muslims were killed in riots (including 57 in police firing) as against 91 Hindus (30 in police action). The persons injured in stabbing and arson, etc comes to 408 in Muslims as against 329 Hindu victims of stabbing and arson."

The report details the victim community’s deep animosity towards the police and the state for doctoring FIRs (not registering actual names of the accused) and clubbing together FIRs in order to reduce the magnitude of the crimes, for not seizing the property of Hindu accused arrested for serious non-bailable offences and for the appointment of partisan public prosecutors who belonged to the ruling party and extremist Hindu organisations.

On May 7, 2002 Modi summoned Sreekumar to his office and, on the pretext of asking for his assessment of the continuing violence in Ahmedabad, criticised the intelligence chief’s note of April 24, saying that it had drawn the wrong conclusions based "on partial data and defective presumptions". Modi told Sreekumar that the violence unleashed by Hindu mobs after the Godhra incident on February 27, was a natural, uncontrollable reaction that no police force could control. Sreekumar argued with the chief minister, saying that the authorities could not take such an attitude, especially not the police department whose primary duty was to maintain public order. Modi then became defensive, laying the blame on the DGP and CP, Ahmedabad, who had been given powers, he said, to control the violence. He then asked Sreekumar to concentrate on Muslim militants. Sreekumar urged the chief minister to take steps to restore the confidence of the minority community as outlined by him in his note. This included immediate and concrete steps to arrest the subversion of the criminal justice system, arrest the guilty criminals and initiate confidence building measures between the two communities. Instead of doing this, the police watched silently as VHP and Bajrang Dal criminals openly extorted monies, promoted the economic boycott of Muslim establishments and so on.

Modi was now visibly annoyed at Sreekumar’s suggestions and argued that it was Muslims who were on the offensive. Quoting statistics on high casualties among Muslims due to police firing during the riots, Sreekumar appealed to him to see reason and acknowledge that it was Hindus who were on the offensive. The chief minister instructed him not to concentrate on the sangh parivar, as they were not doing anything illegal. Sreekumar replied that it was his duty to report accurately on any developing situation and provide advance, actionable, preventive, real time intelligence that may have a bearing on public order and the unity and integrity of India even if that meant keeping tabs on the sangh. Understanding the significance of the response, the chief minister tried one last time to throw his weight around. Modi asserted that he (Modi) should be the intelligence chief’s "source" in tracking the sangh parivar and that Sreekumar need not look for sources elsewhere. (It was a clear hint that Sreekumar should not bother to collect data on the sangh parivar.)

The face-off continues

June 15, 2002: The Gujarat state intelligence department gave a detailed and critical report to the state home department advising against the government proposal to allow the annual Jagannath rath yatra and warned that given that sentiments were still raw following the recent widespread violence, there was a possibility of communally volatile situations developing. The intelligence department had also warned of simmering resentment within the minority community which had been at the receiving end of the violence and could mean the risk of attacks on the rath yatra.

June 25, 2002: The chief minister convened a conference of senior officers of and above the rank of SPs from all over the state. In his address to the officers, he asked them all to enforce the law according to their (Modi’s) reading of the situation. In his personal register, Sreekumar observes: "This is unethical and illegal advice because the police department has to work as per law and not according to the political atmosphere prevailing in the state." Sreekumar also records how Modi asked the "police not to be influenced by the JNU brand of secularism." The chief minister’s tacit message was that police officers should function as committed ideologues of the ruling party and not soldiers of the Indian Constitution.

August 20, 2002: Following a telephonic request from PS Shah, additional secretary (law and order), on August 20, 2002, the SIB submitted its own independent review of the law and order situation in the state. It is obvious that the state government was seeking acquiescence to enable it to justify its decision on July 19, 2002 to dissolve the state assembly and call for immediate elections.

In this report, the SIB observes that:

a) Incidents were reported from "993 villages and 151 towns covering 284 police stations (out of 464 police stations) spread over 54 assembly constituencies out of 182 assembly constituencies."

b) The communal divide between the Hindus and Muslims had widened to an unprecedented degree. The interaction between the two communities was practically negligible in social, commercial, financial and cultural fields. Large sections of the minorities, being the major victims in the recent riots, were still to develop adequate faith in the administration, police department and criminal justice system. The minorities also continued to complain that many rioters belonging to the Hindu community had not been arrested, as they held important positions in Hindu organisations.

c) The minorities were also dejected about non-implementation of most of the recommendations of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and National Commission for Minorities. They were also upset about the fact that of the 302 dargahs, 209 mosques and 30 madrassas damaged during the riots, only a handful had been repaired and restored to their original condition.

d) In many places, riots victims belonging to the minority community could not restart their commercial activities, or the small businesses they ran before the riots, due to a constant feeling of insecurity. In one incident that took place as late as July 4, 2002, a (Muslim) man and his son were murdered upon their return to their hometown in Vadodara district.

e) An estimated 75,500 persons from 13 districts had been shifted to other places and had yet to return home. If elections were to be held in this heightened atmosphere of insecurity, these persons would remain practically disenfranchised in the event of an election being held before their return to their hometowns. According to information that was received, interested political parties would in all probability collect such persons in large numbers and insist upon their voting rights on polling day. This would lead to confrontations between rival political groups and a resultant disruption of public order.

‘The chief minister, Narendra Modi, took an active role along with at least three cabinet colleagues to instruct senior police personnel and civil administrators that a Hindu reaction was to be expected and this must not be curtailed or controlled’

f) During the communal riots 10,472 houses, 12,588 shops and 2,724 larri/gallas were damaged or destroyed due to arson while 1,333 shops were ransacked. In this process thousands of people have lost all their documents of identity. Unless prompt remedial measures were taken, they would also pose a problem with regard to their re-enumeration as electors and subsequently, in exercising their franchise.

g) With so many persons having fled, it was unlikely that the elections would be free or fair.

August 28, 2002: In another report on the law and order scenario, the SIB once again details the atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion between communities and the danger posed by the propagation of fundamentalist literature on both sides that could widen the gulf. Hence it advises that the state home department issue specific instructions to district collectors/district magistrates ordering them to take strict action against the projection of communal issues in the campaign and to rigorously observe the law and guidelines on assembly of persons so as to avoid any clashes.

Additional chief secretary (home), Ashok Narayan, took exception to the SIB’s assessment, as reflected in deputy inspector general of police (DIG) E. Radhakrishna’s report of August 28, 2002 where he questions Sreekumar on this. Sreekumar replies on August 30, 2002. He states that the Election Commission of India has observed that SIB appraisal of the communal situation was in consonance with the inputs received by the commission as evident from its order dated August 16, 2002. In response to Narayan’s query on "whether the SIB’s assessment was based only on the input from some of your field officers or the input from other government officials and others connected with the administration of the state were taken into consideration", Sreekumar replies that the SIB assessment was "based on the intelligence gathered by SIB functionaries, including senior officers, and also data received from jurisdictional police officers. We did not collect any data from any non-police departmental sources."

Modi misleads CEC

The Gujarat state home department gave the CEC misleading reports about the ‘normalcy’ in the state in a crude bid to push for early assembly elections, riding high on a massacre. SIB chief, Sreekumar gave an opinion contrary to the "official version" in early August 2002. The assessment of the Gujarat state home department was adjudged to be false by the EC in its order dated August 16, 2002. Modi, as home minister, headed this department.

In his personal register, Sreekumar records that he was directed by home department officials to give favourable reports about the law and order situation so as to facilitate the holding of early elections. He chose instead to follow his conscience.

Modi’s government lies to the NHRC

The Modi government failed to create a situation conducive to the rehabilitation of riot victims notwithstanding its claims to the contrary in reports to the NHRC. Instead, the riot victims were pressurised to compromise with the perpetrators of the violence as a condition precedent to their safe return and rehabilitation.
 

Shah Alam Relief Camp
 

Ruthless suppression of evidence

On July 20, 2004, faced with a hostile government in New Delhi which had threatened to set up a parallel central commission of inquiry into the genocidal carnage of 2002, the Modi government expanded the terms of reference of the Nanavati-Shah Commission. The second term of reference requested the commission inter alia to inquire into the "role and conduct of the then chief minister (Narendra Modi) or any other ministers in his council of ministers, police officers, other individuals and organisations" relating "to the facts, circumstances and course of events of the subsequent incidents in the aftermath of the Godhra incidents."

But this was obviously a mere formality, meant only to appease the public. It is odd that the Nanavati-Shah Commission did not insist that the commission’s terms of reference be honoured by the state government and its representatives. RB Sreekumar and Rahul Sharma were among the few who deposed on this critical question. Meanwhile, senior officials who are also accused in this complaint conspired with Modi and his men to suppress the truth about 2002.

The following persons are conspicuous for their role in suppressing key evidence:

1. Ashok Narayan, the then additional chief secretary (home).

2. PK Mishra, the then principal secretary to the chief minister.

3. K. Chakravarti, the then DGP, Gujarat.

4. K. Nityanandam, the then home secretary.

5. PC Pande, the then CP, Ahmedabad.

6. KR Kaushik, in his capacity as ADGP (crime), supervising investigations into the Godhra train fire, and later, as CP, Ahmedabad, in May, 2002.

7. AK Bhargava, the then ADGP (administration) and later, DGP, Gujarat.

8. Maniram, the then ADGP (law and order), in charge of maintaining law and order across the entire state during the protracted riots in 2002.

9. GC Raiger, the then ADGP (intelligence), during the crucial period of the Gujarat riots i.e. from February 27 to April 9, 2002. He was among those who attended secret meetings convened by the chief minister, the chief secretary and additional chief secretary, Ashok Narayan.

Modi intimidates his officials: Do not tell the truth before the commission

Modi misused his power and the office of chief minister to pressurise and intimidate his officials into withholding critical evidence and not testifying before the Nanavati-Shah Commission.

The complaint quotes extensively from the affidavits of the then ADGP, Sreekumar, regarding the manner in which he was asked to withhold evidence and falsely testify before the commission.

After newspapers carried reports on Sreekumar’s first affidavit dated July 6, 2002, which he filed before the Nanavati-Shah Commission in mid-2002, the chief minister used his clout, and marshalled the services of senior IPS officers, to approach the ADGP with clear attempts to pressurise him into giving false evidence before a commission of inquiry set up under the Commission of Inquiry Act 1952 in the public interest.

On August 21, 2004 a middle-level officer in the home department, the then undersecretary (budget and coordination), Dinesh Kapadia, tried to persuade Sreekumar, who was to appear before the commission on August 31, to give a deposition favourable to the government. Kapadia told Sreekumar that no purpose would be served by telling the truth before the commission since its recommendations would not be accepted and said that all commissions were paper tigers. Three days after this endeavour, one that had obviously been carried out with Modi’s blessings, GC Murmu, the then secretary (law and order), home department, summoned the ADGP. On the evening of August 24, 2004 a "briefing session for tutoring Sreekumar" was held.

Murmu was ably aided and abetted in this illegal effort by Arvind Pandya, advocate for the Gujarat government before the commission. They directed this police officer to avoid making any statements that could embarrass the government. They stressed that they had similarly briefed all witnesses i.e. government officials on how to depose before the commission without harming the Gujarat government’s interests. When Sreekumar did not oblige, he was threatened… if he gave a statement that went against the interests of the state government, he would be declared a hostile witness and dealt with suitably later.

Sreekumar taped this blatantly illegal effort and has appended the tape and its transcript to his third affidavit before the commission.

Modi has protected the accused, had the evidence tampered with or destroyed, worked hard to ensure the impotence of the Nanavati-Shah Commission and subverted the justice process. In fact, having presided over the genocidal pogrom, he is now misusing his powers to ensure that justice is not done
 

This briefing and the directives issued by Murmu and Pandya were patent efforts to intimidate a witness and tamper with evidence, both of which are serious offences under the Indian Penal Code. Moreover, these actions were in total violation of the letter and spirit of the terms of reference of the commission as specified in the government notifications dated March 6, 2002 and July 20, 2004. In these notifications, the state legal department among other things stressed on inquiring into the "role and conduct of the then chief minister or any other ministers in his council of ministers, police officers, other individuals and organisations" in the Godhra and post-Godhra violence.

Instead of encouraging officers to assist the commission in arriving at the truth behind the collapse of law and order and the pogrom against Gujarat’s Muslims, at this in camera meeting attempts were made to influence and intimidate a senior officer of the Indian Police Service and a prime witness before the commission. He was being directed, at Modi’s behest, to lie under oath and avoid telling the whole truth.

Needless to say, Sreekumar refused to comply with these unlawful demands. Retribution came swiftly, however. He was denied his rightful promotion to the top police post in the state even as vicious attempts were made to charge-sheet him. He was separately charge-sheeted for sharing confidential government records before an inquiry commission investigating the cause of the outbreak of violence in 2002 and the persons responsible for it. He fought both cases and emerged vindicated. A day before his retirement on February 28, 2009 he was reinstated as DGP and thus retired in the very post that his vengeful political bosses had sought to deny him.

These are the instructions that Sreekumar received from the government’s emissaries:

1. Conceal the facts before the commission.

2. Accept the conspiracy theory with regard to the fire in coach-6 of the Sabarmati Express on February 27, 2002.

3. Do not reveal any data on acts of omission and commission by government functionaries and other senior officers.

4. Avoid any comment on the government’s inaction on reports he had submitted as ADGP (intelligence) from February to September 2002.

5. Do not provide additional facts which could result in the commission summoning more government functionaries for deposition.

6. He was warned that he would be made answerable to government through a departmental inquiry if he deposed in a manner contrary to the Gujarat government’s interests.

7. The duo also made critical remarks about the Supreme Court.

8. Undesirable comments were also made about the Gujarat high court.

9. Sreekumar was told that officers like him should be committed to the interests of the government, even at the cost of adherence to truth and so on.

It is unlikely that Murmu and Pandya acted on their own initiative. Two years after the carnage, the message they carried was clear. Conceal the truth about 2002 or else… Such intimidation by representatives of the government is unlikely to have occurred without Modi’s blessings.

Intimidation of witnesses

Over the past seven-and-a-half-years the discreet and overt intimidation of witnesses continues under the current Gujarat dispensation.

Contempt of the justice process

Despite recommendations by the CBI, which investigated the Bilkees Bano case, the state’s home department under Narendra Modi did not initiate departmental action against Jadeja, the then SP of Dahod district, for gross misconduct and destruction of evidence in this case. Aided by state-appointed doctors, the police officer had worked hard to destroy evidence of the murder of Bilkees’s daughter, Saleha, and sought to bury her body without proper investigations.

In August 2004, almost five years ago, Rahul Sharma submitted a critical piece of evidence, a CD containing the cellphone call records of BJP leaders and senior police officials, to the Nanavati-Shah Commission. It was only in 2008-2009, after the Supreme Court had appointed the SIT headed by Dr RK Raghavan, that some of these call records were verified by the SIT and the roles of influential accused in the Naroda Patiya and Gulberg Society cases (whose names had mysteriously vanished from the charge sheets) were exposed. In the two years prior to 2004 the investigating officers in these cases simply did not probe into the contents of this CD, which clearly suggests that they had received clear-cut instructions not to investigate the role of ministers, MLAs and leaders of the VHP and Bajrang Dal in the violence.

Slack review of 2,000 cases

Review of the 2,000-odd post-Godhra riot cases, as ordered by the Supreme Court in 2004, was conducted in a slack and unprofessional manner. This was achieved by entrusting the job to those senior officers who were either willing or constrained to act in accordance with the partisan interests of the BJP and the chief minister.

2004: Indictment by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court severely indicted the Gujarat government and the high court for the injustices done to the minority community and riot victims in the investigation of riot cases. The apex court transferred two cases, the Bilkees Bano case and the Best Bakery case, out of Gujarat, to Maharashtra.

Partisan investigations

The Gujarat government under Narendra Modi is guilty of betraying prejudice against riot victims belonging to the minority community, as revealed by Rahul Sharma, the then SP, Bhavnagar, during his cross-examination before the Nanavati-Shah Commission in 2004. He stated under oath that the then home minister, Gordhan Zadaphiya, reprimanded him for taking action against a mob that was about to set fire to a madrassa with 400 children inside.

Further indictment by the Supreme Court

Amit Shah, the then minister of state for home, along with Madhu Srivastava, a sitting MLA (formerly BJP) from Vadodara, influenced the key witness, Zahira Shaikh, and her immediate family while the Best Bakery trial was underway in Gujarat. After she fled to Gujarat in October-November 2004 (while the retrial was on in Mumbai) Shaikh was given commando protection and secretly housed at the Silver Oak club in Gandhinagar, which was closed to all other guests. Allegations were hurled at me (Teesta Setalvad, as secretary of CJP) and I approached the apex court for an impartial inquiry. On August 25, 2005 a report by the registrar general exonerated me completely and instead accused Zahira Shaikh of being bribed by Madhu Srivastava. But the Gujarat government under Narendra Modi initiated no action against Srivastava who was found guilty by the Supreme Court’s registrar general of intimidating and bribing witnesses.

2005: Mass graves dug up in Lunawada

After trying for three years to locate the remains of their near and dear ones, victim survivors of the Pandharwada and Kidiad massacres unearthed, in December 2005, the remains of their loved ones who had been illegally dumped in forest wasteland near the Paanam river outside Lunawada town. The Gujarat high court ordered the human remains to be sent for DNA testing and analysis, to be carried out at the forensic laboratory at Red Hill, Hyderabad, under CBI supervision. Overnight an FIR was registered against the victim survivors for illegal digging and they had to give their blood samples under threat of arrest. Instead of showing concern for relatives searching for the remains of their lost ones, the administration was vindictive. Seven months later the test results showed that samples from nine body remains matched the DNA samples taken from relatives of the massacre victims. Yet, three-and-a-half years later, the remains of those who were killed have still not been handed over to the victim survivors. In late 2007 CJP approached the Supreme Court for a directive that would enable quick access to the remains, which are still lying in Hyderabad, in order to ensure speedy burial. The apex court only directed CJP to approach the trial court in Godhra.

2006: Best Bakery retrial

The judgement of the Mumbai fast track trial court in the Best Bakery case sentenced nine accused to life imprisonment and also indicted senior police officials in Gujarat for their conduct during the trial, which amounted to suppression of evidence. These include the then CP, Vadodara, Deepak Swaroop, the IG (intelligence), K. Kumarswami and PI Pargi, who recorded doctored statements from the hostile witnesses while they were state guests of the Gujarat government!

2008: Bilkees Bano judgement

Judgement was pronounced by the Mumbai fast track court investigating the Bilkees Bano case where a total of 12 people were convicted, 11 of them being sentenced to life imprisonment. The 12 include three officers of the Gujarat police who were convicted for suppression of evidence. Speaking to the press after the judgement was read, Bilkees Bano said that she was still not safe in Gujarat.

Conclusion

The fact that the victims of the 2002 genocidal pogrom were predominantly from the Muslim community indicates that the criminals who committed the crimes and officers of the police and administration who were directed by politicians in power all worked together in pursuance of a conspiracy, to achieve the objectives and design of the chief minister, Narendra Modi.

The offences detailed in the complaint now being investigated by the SIT are wide-ranging and extremely grave. They establish prima facie that the accused number one had violated and is violating his oath of allegiance to the Constitution of India. Modi has done this by shaping the narrative of the Godhra train fire into one of preplanned conspiracy thus creating a climate conducive to "Hindu revenge". In short, he has, through the illegal use of the human and material resources at his command in a constitutionally elected post, protected the accused, had the evidence tampered with or destroyed, worked hard to ensure the impotence of the Nanavati-Shah Commission and subverted the justice process. In fact, having presided over the genocidal pogrom, he is now misusing his powers to ensure that justice is not done.

How far this investigation goes is a robust test for the Indian system.

Archived from Communalism Combat,  May 2009 Year 15    No.140, Cover Story 2
 

The post Villain of the piece appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Accused number 29: PC Pande, former commissioner of police, Ahmedabad

PC Pande, the former commissioner of police (CP), Ahmedabad, and later the DGP, Gujarat, who continues to enjoy special favour with the Modi dispensation, sent a confidential written communication to the then DGP, K. Chakravarti, on April 19, 2002. The letter implicates Bharat Barot, the then minister for food and civil supplies in the Gujarat government, as he directly instigated well-known gangsters of the Bajrang Dal and VHP to arson. Another such letter by the CP, written ten days later, was addressed to both DGP K. Chakravarti, and the then additional chief secretary (home), Ashok Narayan (accused numbers 25 and 28 respectively).
 

Both these letters were submitted to the Nanavati-Shah Commission in 2006 as appendices to the then ADGP, Mahapatra’s affidavit. Despite attempts by the commission to prevent copies of the letters from coming out, CJP managed to access the documents in 2006 itself and they were part of the Zakiya Jaffri petition in both the Gujarat high court and the Supreme Court.
 

On April 15, 2002, four days before Pande’s first letter to the DGP, a mob had gathered near the Amba Mata temple, near Kapadia High School outside Delhi Darwaja in Ahmedabad. This was at 9.30 a.m., in broad daylight. Bharat Barot, then a cabinet minister, drove up in a white private car, had a whispered confabulation with some members of the mob (named below) and drove off. As soon as he left, incidents of arson took place outside Delhi Darwaja and near Idgah Chowky.
 

The commissioner of police, Ahmedabad, while referring to this incident in the letter to his boss, the DGP, states that Harshad Panchal, Dipak Goradia and Dinesh Prajapati, all workers of the Bajrang Dal, were part of the mob. Pande, who was part of Narendra Modi’s major cover-up operation in 2002, also says that known leaders of the VHP and Bajrang Dal such as Raju Ravji Thakore, Kamlesh Babu Thakore, Bholiyo, Virambhai, Paresh Langdo and Mahendra Bachubhai were part of a mob that had launched attacks in the Madhavpura locality.
 

What steps did the police take? PC Pande, instead of booking the minister for incitement and abetment, politely requests his boss "to bring this matter to the knowledge of government" and to make arrangements to ensure that "Hon’ble ministers of government may not do (sic) such activity."
 

Yes, Pande does write the letter. But what more does he do? He keeps it under wraps until it is produced before the Nanavati-Shah Commission four years later.
 

Shielding extortion by the VHP/Bajrang Dal

Ten days later, on April 29, 2002, Pande makes other significant revelations in a second written communication, this one addressed to both Chakravarti and Ashok Narayan. This document, which was also accessed by CJP, was submitted to the Gujarat high court in 2007 as an annexure to the petition filed by Zakiya Jaffri and CJP, seeking directions from the court for registration of an FIR against Modi and 62 others. In 2008 it was also filed in the Supreme Court, in the litigation challenging the appointment of PC Pande as DGP of Gujarat.
 

In this letter, while reporting on the continued misbehaviour and criminal actions of the VHP and Bajrang Dal in Ahmedabad, Pande says "one and three quarter months (after the Godhra and post-Godhra violence) …when the situation in Ahmedabad is limping back to normal, some ugly activities are being carried out by parties that have the support of the government."

Why did the commissioner of police restrict himself to private pleas and in-house communications instead of acting to book the criminals for their illegal activities?
 

Specifically, he states that workers of the VHP and Bajrang Dal in Ahmedabad city were extorting money from businessmen under the pretext of providing them protection from the minority community. Though forced by the bullying tactics of the VHP and Bajrang Dal into paying out the amounts demanded, the businessmen had nonetheless complained about these illegal activities in public and also to the police.
 

Worse still, Pande also makes reference to complaints received by the police of threats faced by the minority community when they went to majority-dominated areas for work or work-related activities. Here too he says that the police had noted the active role played by workers of the VHP and Bajrang Dal.
 

(This from a man who suffered a sudden lapse of memory during his deposition before the Nanavati-Shah Commission and one who has protected the state government before and since.
 

Why does the commissioner of police restrict himself to private pleas and in-house communications instead of acting to book the criminals for their illegal activities?)
 

Pande also states in this letter that attempts were being made by criminals belonging to the VHP and Bajrang Dal to seize the properties of minorities after their homes had been destroyed by goons belonging to the majority community. He says that members of the minority community were not allowed to reclaim their properties and were being threatened if they did return.
 

Pande reveals all in confidential communications to his superiors but takes no steps to book the criminals, register complaints and protect the victims. He privately acknowledges the criminal activities of groups that enjoy the patronage of the top men in government as seen in these letters. He even appeals to the state government to stop their patronage and protection of criminal groups like the VHP and Bajrang Dal. Why does he do nothing more?

Archived from Communalism Combat,  May 2009 Year 15    No.140, Cover Story 3

The post The silent conspirator appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Questions for the Special Investigation Team

Criminal behaviour of kar sevaks at Rudauli near Faizabad
 

A detailed study of the Gujarat state intelligence and police documentation now before the Nanavati-Shah Commission through the affidavits of RB Sreekumar and Raahul Sharma reveals fairly high levels of communal mobilisation of members of sangh parivar outfits throughout February 2002. Field officers of the State Intelligence Bureau (SIB) submitted reports of such activity which were however ignored by the state government. Around mid-February 2002 there were two separate reports from the Gujarat SIB stating that Haresh Bhatt, Bajrang Dal leader (and former BJP MLA from Godhra), and Prahlad J. Patel, president of the Bajrang Dal, Mehsana, were among the group of kar sevaks who had gone to Ayodhya for the Ayodhya Maha Yagna.
 

On February 22, 2002 the Gujarat intelligence department received a fax message (of the same date) from the UP state intelligence department, informing them of the criminal behaviour of kar sevaks travelling on the Sabarmati Express S-6 special bogie. This is in all likelihood the same bogie that caught fire a few days later. The message from the UP intelligence department states that when some local people tried to enter the bogie at the Rudauli station near Faizabad the kar sevaks attacked them with trishuls and daggers and injured some of them. An FIR was also registered for the crime. Communalism Combat, in its ‘Genocide – Gujarat 2002’ issue of March-April 2002, had carried a report by Jan Morcha, Faizabad, (February 25, 2002) which had also reported these events. In fact, two days before the Godhra train fire the editors of Communalism Combat had issued a nationwide alert, sent out to the media and also to the president and chief justice of India, on the possible fallout of this sort of behaviour by the kar sevaks from Gujarat.
 

Now, seven years later, some curious, even sinister, connections can be drawn. All these linkages, the behaviour of kar sevaks and the build-up to the Godhra train fire and its aftermath, ought to find a place in the new investigation ordered by the Supreme Court on April 27, 2009.
 

Haresh Bhatt, who had gone to Faizabad, was one of the many persons who were caught off guard by Tehelka’s sting ‘Operation Kalank’, telecast on October 25, 2007. From reports received, it appears that the train bogie containing those kar sevaks who had misbehaved at Rudauli was the same one that returned on February 27 and was unfortunately burnt. Following revelations that Haresh Bhatt and Prahlad Patel also went to Ayodhya, and were integral parts of the plot to build up an arsenal in Gujarat prior to February 27, it is conceivable that they too were in the bogie that caught fire.
 

Tehelka’s conversation with Bhatt raises serious questions for the authorities and investigating agencies about the sinister accumulation of arms and ammunition by Bajrang Dal and VHP men all over Gujarat. During the same sting operation Tehelka also spoke to the then VHP district convener from Sabarkantha, Dhawal Patel. He too provides startling details about the stockpiling of ammunition and bombs. Why were sangh parivar members stocking up on ammunition prior to February 27, 2002? As part of its investigation into the wider conspiracy, the SIT will be required to probe this dangerous amassment of weapons as well.

Arms distribution before the execution of mass crimes

From Tehelka’s ‘Operation Kalank’:

Haresh Bhatt, the then BJP MLA from Godhra, to Tehelka:

Bhatt says a well-planned conspiracy was hatched to import large quantities of ammunition from outside Gujarat and also to manufacture weapons within the state. He names one Rohitbhai (VHP treasurer) as being a core member of the planning team. He says the plan to import arms, swords and other ammunition into Gujarat from Punjab and elsewhere was a long-standing one and that he brought swords and countrymade guns into Gujarat and distributed them all over.

He says that a large number of bombs, including diesel bombs and pipe bombs, were manufactured at his factory while rocket launchers were manufactured both at his factory and elsewhere. These rocket launchers, with stands, were made using thick pipes and filled with gunpowder and then sealed and blast using locally made ‘598 bombs’. The weapons were then distributed across Gujarat. Haresh Bhatt also said he previously owned a firecracker factory in Ahmedabad, one that was fully operational on February 27, 2002!

Questions raised:

a) Who were the conspirators involved?

b) When and where did they meet?

c) Did this meeting take place well before February 27, 2002, when the Godhra arson took place, and if so, what was the real intent, the motive?

d) When did Haresh Bhatt order two truckload consignments (of swords) from Punjab?

e) When did Bhatt order the consignment of desi guns from UP and MP?

f) How long does it take for a loaded truck to travel between Punjab and Gujarat?

g) How long does it take for a loaded truck to travel between UP and Gujarat?

h) Who are the manufacturers and suppliers of swords (in Punjab) and countrymade guns (in UP and MP)?

i) When did they receive the orders for consignment and when did they deliver these? Most importantly, who paid for them?

j) The consignment truck(s) must have passed through many states – Punjab, Haryana, UP, MP and Rajasthan. How was easy passage for the arms arranged?

k) When did the consignments actually arrive in Gujarat and where in Gujarat did they arrive?

l) Were these consignments delivered to locations other than Godhra? Did these destinations include Ahmedabad, for instance? (In the post-Godhra violence, Ahmedabad and Panchmahal district were the worst affected in terms of loss of life while Sabarkantha was the worst affected in terms of loss of property.)

These revelations suggest the existence of a well-organised and structured arms and ammunition network within Gujarat that has been in operation since well before the violence in 2002 and perhaps thereafter

m) If the consignments were ordered well before February 27, 2002, will this fact not have some bearing on the much touted Godhra conspiracy theory?

n) If the consignments arrived in Godhra, which is a hub of truck owners, hundreds of trucks could be available at short notice to supply consignments all over Gujarat. It is now well known that the genocidal carnage that Modi presided over spread to 19 of Gujarat’s 25 districts within hours of the news of the Godhra train burning.

o) What is the identity of the vehicles used for the supply of these arms and to whom did they belong?

p) To whom, and at which location/s, were these arms and ammunitions supplied?

q) Who were the officials, police, octroi department and others, who allowed these consignments safe passage?

More questions:

a) Who were/are the workers at Bhatt’s firecracker factory?

b) What were the products manufactured?

c) Was the factory operational on February 27 and 28?

d) Where, apart from Haresh Bhatt’s factory, were the rocket launchers manufactured?

Observations: These findings would then have to be corroborated with forensic reports of the Godhra train burning and mass burnings of women, men and children in many of Gujarat’s districts following the Godhra fire.

Apart from the revelations about arms consignments being ordered by prominent members of the sangh parivar, other aspects relating to the use of explosive materials in the systematic attacks on minorities bear consideration.

This writer and many others recovered a whitish powder from various sites of the genocidal carnage in Gujarat (some of it in unopened bags bearing labels stating that it was manufactured at Laxmi Industrial Estate, Hyderabad). It is thought possible that this powder enabled complete, to the bone, incineration of flesh (of those who were killed and/or burnt alive) at Gulberg Society, Naroda Gaon and Patiya, Vatwa and elsewhere. Were any traces of such a powder found on the burnt coach of the Sabarmati Express? This is especially relevant in view of the fact that serious questions have been raised about the train burning and the manner in which the fire spread (see Communalism Combat, ‘Genocide’s Aftermath – Part II’, July 2007).

Besides, in Naroda Gaon and Patiya, for weeks before the attack on minorities there was a gas cylinder shortage. However, from the morning of February 28, 2002 onwards, gas cylinders were used by the dozen, by assailants in Naroda Gaon and Patiya, Gulberg Society and other areas of Ahmedabad. In the first attack at Naroda Patiya, at the Noorani Masjid, gas cylinders were placed inside the mosque and then ignited to explode.

Stockpiling arms in Sabarkantha

Dhawal Jayantilal Patel, the then VHP zilla sanyojak (district convener), Sabarkantha, to Tehelka:

Patel says that he is a registered holder and supplier of dynamite used in quarrying in the district. He also said that he along with some others had been trained to make bombs. They made desi bombs that were then distributed and used in various areas.

Questions raised:

a) What was the quantity of dynamite stock as noted in the stock register maintained on Dhawal Patel’s premises on and before February 27, 2002?

b) How much stock did Patel receive?

c) From which government depot did he get the supply on requisition?

d) Did he acquire the stock from any other states?

e) What is the identity of the vehicles used for the supply of dynamite and to whom did they belong?

f) Where was the stock supplied to?

g) To whom was it delivered and in which village, town or city?

h) Who were the police and other officers responsible for allowing the consignment safe passage?

Anil Patel, the VHP’s vibhag pramukh (departmental chief) in Sabarkantha, spoke to Tehelka about bombs destined for Ahmedabad being smuggled in from quarries owned by VHP workers in Sabarkantha. This suggests the existence of a well-organised and structured arms and ammunition network within Gujarat that has been in operation since well before the violence in 2002 and perhaps thereafter.

Anil Patel also explains how sections of the Gujarat police, for example, ND Solanki, the then SP, Sabarkantha, were full-fledged supporters of the VHP. He adds that Solanki gave him full support and even enabled the quick release of a "co-minister", Arvind Soni (a VHP leader). Patel also refers to a fax message sent by "this IB officer, Sreekumar …to the Ahmedabad police commissioner, saying the Sabarkantha VHP had supplied weapons to Ahmedabad. The matter was inquired into, our block minister was arrested. The inspector who came for the inquiry was associated with the Sangh."

Patel’s revelations to Tehelka show the levels of complicity between the Gujarat police and outfits of the sangh parivar that are the fraternal organisations of the ruling BJP. This will be the most significant challenge for the SIT under Dr Raghavan. Will it be able to ensure that investigations are carried out by men of impeccable integrity?
 

Other startling revelations from the sting operation

Babu Bajrangi, Bajrang Dal leader, Naroda, Ahmedabad, to Tehelka:

Bajrangi (prime accused in the Naroda Patiya massacre) says he was present in Godhra at the time of the train fire and vowed to kill four times as many people in Patiya as the kar sevaks who died in Godhra.

Bajrangi boasts among other things of being the first to launch an attack in Naroda Patiya, of organising the use of bombs, ramming a diesel tanker into a mosque and setting it ablaze, slitting open the womb of a pregnant woman (the Kauser Bano case) and bribing witnesses and forcing them to flee.

Questions raised:

a) Bajrangi has admitted to calling the then home minister, Gordhan Zadaphiya. This can easily be corroborated with call records of the outgoing calls on his mobile phone.

b) He claims that Chief Minister Modi told the (police) commissioner to provide safe passage to Bajrangi and even arranged for his four-and-a-half-month stay at the Gujarat Bhavan in Mount Abu (Rajasthan) not long after the massacre, when he had still not been granted bail and was on the run from the police.

c) What was the room number of the room at Gujarat Bhavan that Bajrangi occupied?

d) Where there any others with him in Mount Abu?

e) Are there any relevant entries in the Gujarat Bhavan guest register?

f) Who provided the expenses for his stay in Mount Abu?

g) Bajrangi’s interview also indicts the Gujarat courts. These are extremely serious allegations that warrant investigation. He talks of how Judge Akshay Mehta had granted bail, to him and other accused, without even looking at the case files. He first says that when Dholakia and other judges simply refused to grant bail, Modi had the bench changed. This was done three times before the matter was heard by a more sympathetic judge – Akshay Mehta – which enabled him to get bail. Four and a half months after the Naroda massacre Bajrangi was a free man. He roams scot-free today.

Ramesh Dave, the then VHP zilla mantri (leader), Kalupur, Ahmedabad, to Tehelka:

Dave says that he took DCP (SK) Gadhvi to the terrace of a locked house (in Kalupur) after Gadhvi told him that there were several Muslims who had taken shelter nearby and he wanted to "set them straight". Once on the terrace, Gadhvi started firing and before they knew it, he had killed five persons (Muslims). Dave also claims that "all the policemen helped us, they all did. One shouldn’t say it, but they even gave us cartridges."

Questions raised:

a) Did Gadhvi shoot a service revolver – if so, the victims could not have been more than 20 feet away.

b) Did he shoot a .303 rifle – if so, the bullet would go through the victim, making a hole, and could be recovered later from the scene of the crime.

c) If the shots were fired from a revolver, the bullets should have struck the victims either in the head or the chest.

d) Five dead bodies must bear near identical injuries/bullet wounds.

e) Did the doctor performing the post-mortem examinations recover any bullets from the bodies of the victims?

This is a small but critical aspect of the detailed and independent investigation that is now expected of the Special Investigation Team. Given the deep-rooted communalisation of the Gujarat state police apparatus, which will undoubtedly be drawn in by the SIT to assist in its own investigations, the task ahead will prove an enormous challenge.

Archived from Communalism Combat,  May 2009 Year 15    No.140, Cover Story 5

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