Cultural Nationalism | SabrangIndia News Related to Human Rights Tue, 14 Aug 2018 10:22:07 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.2.2 https://sabrangindia.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Favicon_0.png Cultural Nationalism | SabrangIndia 32 32 Multicultural Nationalism https://sabrangindia.in/multicultural-nationalism/ Tue, 14 Aug 2018 10:22:07 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2018/08/14/multicultural-nationalism/ Does multicultural nationalism represent the political idea and tendency most likely to offer a feasible alternative rallying point to monocultural nationalism? Bristol, 2014. Flickr/ Evgeni. Some rights reserved. Tariq Modood, Bhikhu Parekh, Nasar Meer and Varun Uberoi and other scholars associated with the University of Bristol’s Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship represent […]

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Does multicultural nationalism represent the political idea and tendency most likely to offer a feasible alternative rallying point to monocultural nationalism?
bristol
Bristol, 2014. Flickr/ Evgeni. Some rights reserved.

Tariq Modood, Bhikhu Parekh, Nasar Meer and Varun Uberoi and other scholars associated with the University of Bristol’s Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship represent a distinctive and important school of multicultural political thought. Thanks go to Sage Journal ‘Ethnicities’ for giving us three months’ access to this background account of the ‘Bristol school of multiculturalism’ by Geoffrey Brahm Levey, which situates the Bristol school in the British context in which it arose, outlines its distinctive approach and principles and critically assesses its positions on liberalism and national identity. Levey explains how the school challenges the liberal biases of much of the corpus of multicultural political thinking and the nostrums of British and other western democracies regarding the status of the majority culture as well as of cultural minorities.

There is a lot of nationalism about today. So, Rosemary Bechler is doing us an important service in raising the question of monocultural nationalism in the openDemocracy debate about the rise of the hard right in liberal democracies.

Yet, what is often described as ‘a new nationalism’ arguably looks like the old nationalism. What is emerging as genuinely new are the identity-based nationalisms of the centre-left, sometimes called ‘liberal nationalism’ or ‘progressive patriotism’. I want to tell you about one such progressive view, what I call multicultural nationalism.
To get there, not only do I need to get you to think of nationalism in a new way but also multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism

You may think that multiculturalism is about persons valuing their personal diversity, having multiple identities – like Londoner, young, woman, with parents who are Indian and Scottish – and mixing freely with others who are equally mixed and who together produce ever changing further mixes. On this view group identities – forcing you to choose one over all others, e.g., having to be a good Indian girl or being Scottish but not British – can be stifling. And the worst kind are those that demand a singular loyalty to the nation.

On this view of multiculturalism, we should think of ourselves as citizens of the world and we should be free to live and work and travel to wherever we want to and so our policy goal should be to eliminate national borders. That is one version of multiculturalism. Let’s call it cosmopolitanism. It’s not the version of multiculturalism that I hold. 

Multiculturalism, as I understand it, is the idea that equality in the context of ‘difference’ cannot be achieved by individual rights or equality as sameness but has to be extended to include the positive inclusion of marginalised groups marked by race and their own sense of ethnocultural identities. It is not opposed to integration but emphasizes the importance of  respecting diverse identities. It should be understood as a mode of integration, just as assimilation is another mode of integration.

No state, including liberal democracies, is culturally neutral – all states support a certain language(s), a religious calendar in respect of national holidays, the teaching of religion(s) in schools and/or the funding of faith schools, certain arts, sports and leisure activities and so on. Naturally enough this language, religion, arts, sport and so on will be that of the majority population. For multiculturalism, it is a matter of extending this valued condition – of creating a society based on one’s cultural identity ­– to include minorities; minimally, the predominance that the cultural majority enjoys in the shaping of the national culture, symbols and institutions should not be exercised in a non-minority accommodating way. The distinctive goal of what we might call ‘multicultural nationalism’ is to allow people to hold, adapt, hyphenate, fuse and create identities important to them in the context of their being not just unique individuals but members of socio-cultural, ethnoracial and ethnoreligious groups, as well as national co-citizens.

So, note that I have now brought in two things that were missing from cosmopolitanism: firstly, the idea of a group identity, of belonging to an ethnoracial or ethnocultural or ethnoreligious group, of not just being a free-floating individual, mixing and matching elements of other people’s cultures. I have introduced the idea of having some rooted identity of your own, an identity that has to be shared because it is part of a group heritage or group membership, and which matters to people and which they want to pass on to the next generation and see it survive and flourish into the future.

Secondly, I have brought in the idea of national co-citizens: people who share a country, people who belong here and who care about their country. That country is not just another place on the map or workplace opportunity: it is where they belong, it is their country. So, on the version of multiculturalism I am now presenting, people can have group identities and they have attachments to specific countries – they are not just citizens of the world.

But of course that country – Britain – may not allow all its citizens to feel British, to be accepted as British; some may be treated as foreigners, or the wrong colour, second-class citizens. Multiculturalism is about changing that – it is, amongst other things, about ‘Rethinking the national story’. This was the most important – yet the most misunderstood – message of the report of the Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain in 2000; chaired by Lord Professor Bhikhu Parekh. It argued that the post-immigration challenge was not simply eliminating racial discrimination or alleviating racial disadvantage, important as these were to an equality strategy. Rather, the deeper challenge was to find inspiring visions of Britain – which showed us where we were coming from and where we were going, how history had brought us together and what we could make of our shared future.

No one should be rejected as culturally alien and not sufficiently British because of their ethnicity or religion but rather we had to reimagine Britain so that, for example, Muslims could see that Islam was part of Britain; and equally importantly, so that non-Muslims, especially secularists and Christians could see Muslims were part of the new, evolving Britishness.

Given that majoritarian nationalism seems to be the dominant politics in so many parts of the world today (in Russia, China, India, many Muslim-majority countries as well as the USA and across Europe) we have to come up with a better nationalism. I suggest that multicultural nationalism unites the concerns of some of those currently sympathetic to majoritarian nationalism and those who are pro-diversity and minority accommodationist in the way that liberalism (with its emphasis on individualism and national majorities) nor cosmopolitanism (with its disavowal of national belonging and championing of global open borders) does not. Multicultural nationalism therefore represents the political idea and tendency most likely to offer a feasible alternative rallying point to monocultural nationalism.

Tariq Modood is Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy and Director of the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship at the University of Bristol and a Fellow of the British Academy. His latest books include Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea and as co-editor The Problem of Religious Diversity: European Challenges, Asian Approaches.

Courtesy: https://www.opendemocracy.net

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Now, a Warning from Hindutva Hegemons https://sabrangindia.in/now-warning-hindutva-hegemons/ Tue, 21 Mar 2017 06:21:15 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2017/03/21/now-warning-hindutva-hegemons/ What is necessary is an all-inclusive and broad-based campaign to “Save the Constitution”, on the one hand, and, on the other, radical politics of mobilisation and involvement of peasantry, youth, and the working classes. Even while politicians and pundits are engaged in analysing the sweeping victory of the BJP at the polls in UP and […]

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What is necessary is an all-inclusive and broad-based campaign to “Save the Constitution”, on the one hand, and, on the other, radical politics of mobilisation and involvement of peasantry, youth, and the working classes.

Hindutva

Even while politicians and pundits are engaged in analysing the sweeping victory of the BJP at the polls in UP and are still discovering the lessons to be drawn , Hindutva forces have sent a ringing message, a warning, to the entire country.

It is not so much what was stated at the elite conclave by the supreme leader. It is not the latest slogan of “New India” laced with the gross rhetoric of everything having gone wrong in the last seven decades. Nor is it the oratorical flourish to start afresh a movement to reconstruct India from a scratch, as it were. This style which seeks to substitute substance is now familiar. But it assumes a new and sinister meaning when juxtaposed with the real-politick of the choice of CM for UP.

All the feints (or was it simply wishful thinking of the media) of floating names of different candidates for that important constitutional office soon came abruptly to an end. And the choice rested on the name which is most remembered for its authorship of or association with a bunch of crude and uncouth statements bordering on or amounting to incitement to communal disharmony. And even worse, for involvement in cases of communal rioting.

Also read: The real message from UP: Need for an alternative political narrative for mobilising the peasantry and the youth

Not long ago, the 'liberal' chatterati and the self- confessed protagonists of neo-liberalism were trying hard to convince themselves and others that the dispensation in New Delhi was distancing itself from the stray elements within its fold, whose staple diet was raw communalism and whose project was to push India into pre-modern medieval times. And many political novices were hoping against hope that this was so in reality. Growing evidence that it could be quite a different ball game was being ignored. Genuine apprehensions were being dismissed as political prejudice or helpless groans of the disgruntled elements of the earlier regime now out of power.

Now it should be easy to put two and two together even for the sympathisers of the New Delhi regime. Starting with Muzaffarnagar riots on the eve of the 2014 general elections; reaching a new high in the adroit decision of not finding even a single Muslim candidate deserving a BJP ticket for the 2017 assembly elections in the very state which has the largest Muslim population; and peaking in the crude, communalising innuendoes of Kabristan vs Samshan and Ramzan vs Diwali : communal polarisation has been and continues to be the overarching political theme and the strategy. The choice of CM says it all. And says it without any gloss or ambiguity.

This is an audacious extension of the Gujarat model of politics developed successfully by the Hindutva forces. Administering 'Shock and Awe' was the essence of the Gujarat strategy. The state machinery there connived at it, and turned its eyes away from mob crimes. That strategy effectively subdued the 9 percent strong minority of Gujarat.

One always thought that this strategy may not be expedient in a state like UP with its Ganga-Jamni tehzib, with little ghettoisation of its minority community, and above all, with the huge size of its minority and its close and enduring intertwining with the majority community. But ideologues of state power seem to be in a different mood. A point sought to be driven home is that subduing of the minority is possible in UP, ergo across the whole country. This cynical and sinister mood is rooted in the hubris of being in power at the Centre, on the one hand, and the popular appeal of the supreme leader, as re-vindicated in the UP assembly polls, on the other.

For this subduing to be achieved, what is necessary is not so much the actual communal conflagration, although the fear of the same erupting any moment must always be kept alive and real. What is essential is the generation of a feeling of hopelessness and acceptance in the minority community at large, particularly in affairs political. Equally important for the strategy to be successful is the co-generation in the majority community of the fear of the “enemy within”, so essential for the sustenance of the distorted and imported concept of “nationalism” cherished by the Hindutva legions. And the right moment for this seems to have arrived in the imagination of the Hindutva forces.

The history of Indian Republic is at the crossroads. The electoral majorities and adroit communal strategies are geared to make history take a decisive regressive turn. But it will never be a one-sided affair. The response has to come and will come from those who are sworn to the IDEA OF INDIA which is enshrined in our Constitution. Which itself was the product of a long and valiant freedom struggle against colonialism, a struggle which built an inclusive political platform seeking to overcome divisions and injustices which characterised the subjugated polity and society of the subcontinent.

The political response has to come primarily from the majority community believing in the Idea of India. And mere waving of the secular flag is not going to cut much ice either with the majority or minority community. What is necessary is an all-inclusive and broad-based campaign to “Save the Constitution”, on the one hand, and, on the other, radical politics of mobilisation and involvement of peasantry, youth, and the working classes on the minimum alternative agenda of agrarian reorganisation, right to work and provision of basic economic, social and personal security to all.

Nothing short of such a response will be adequate to meet the unfolding challenge to the Idea of India.

Times are difficult. The challenge is serious. But, as Lenin said in a different context, “We shall not lose heart, no matter which turn history takes. But we shall not allow history to take any turn without our participation, without the active intervention of the working class.”

(SP Shukla is former Finance Secretary to the Government of India. He is a retired bureaucrat who has spent his life working for the marginalised in India)

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The real message from UP: Need for an alternative political narrative for mobilising the peasantry and the youth https://sabrangindia.in/real-message-need-alternative-political-narrative-mobilising-peasantry-and-youth/ Wed, 15 Mar 2017 07:47:16 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2017/03/15/real-message-need-alternative-political-narrative-mobilising-peasantry-and-youth/ The more or most backward among other backward classes are but large chunks of marginal and small peasantry who are the worst affected by the present model of growth practised by all political parties including BJP as well as the regional parties like SP and BSP. Counter-mobilisation of these sections, on the promise of sharing […]

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The more or most backward among other backward classes are but large chunks of marginal and small peasantry who are the worst affected by the present model of growth practised by all political parties including BJP as well as the regional parties like SP and BSP. Counter-mobilisation of these sections, on the promise of sharing the state-power for whatever benefits it may offer in the short run, against those caste-identity parties who ruled so far, provides a strong appeal. Moreover, the appeal of a ‘wider identity’ based on cultural nationalism has some attraction for those who have been excluded or marignalised by the major “social justice” parties. 

UP Elections
Image: Indian Express

A lot has been written about the results of the UP assembly elections which seem to have confounded the critics as well as the participants in equal measure. 

Much of what has been said is more of a description than analysis. Take for example, the belated discovery, by participants as well as commentators, of a 'Modi Wave’ or a ‘Modi March’. 

Or for that matter, the tribute paid by a veteran opposition leader that PM Modi is “the most dominant figure in politics today”. 

Leaving aside the obvious wisdom of hindsight that inspires such comments, they hardly go beyond simply describing the outcome. Moreover, even that description is questionable. How is it that 'the wave' did not touch the shores of Punjab, Goa or Manipur although the elections in these states were held in the same time-frame? Why is it that the most dominant politician failed to dominate the outcome in those states? 

At another level, the analysis such as is presented, barely skims the surface. For example, it has been stressed that BJP/ RSS have well-oiled large cadres which Congress/ Regional parties do not possess. And that gave a handsome advantage to the BJP. 

It is also argued, and rightly, that 'communal polarisation' and 'social engineering' which the BJP succeeded in bringing about influenced the outcome decisively. But there is hardly anything new in either the presence or absence of cadres in different political parties. Equally, the 'social engineering' and the 'communal polarisation' projects of BJP are not new. They are part of the long- term socio-political strategy devised by the Hindutva forces who exploit them tactically in the elections almost invariably. 

The appeal of cultural nationalism, which is but another name for ‘communal polarisation’ has a catchment which includes the better-off sections, the upper castes, the so-called ‘aspirational’ youth and, of course, the die-hard Hindutva legions. The counter to this offered by the ‘secular’ plank has no popular appeal for the majority community as it once had.

More specifically, and a little differently put, the question that needs to be probed is: Why did they succeed in UP in 2014 and 2017, but, say, not in Bihar in 2015? And in answering that, one should steer clear of taking recourse to the obvious ( eg. the presence or absence of Mahagathbandhan) and try to understand what is happening in the wider context and a longer time-frame. 

The project of nation-building commenced with the first War of Independence in 1857. It was carried forward by the freedom movement represented by the Indian National Congress. The project was founded in anti-colonialism. It sought to weld together traditionally divided and unjust Indian society and polity across the sub-continent. Divisive religious, regional and social identities were sought to be moderated, if not superseded, by means of an appeal to an overarching, modern, pan-Indian and more just Idea of India. 

The project had its adversaries. Besides the overt suppression by the colonial power, it faced internal resistance from those indigenous elements who sought to fashion Indian nationhood as a replica of the European concept, based on religious and cultural identity and in antagonism of ‘enemy within’. This was a welcome development for the colonial rulers who encouraged and supported it. 

The net result was that the modern, pan-Indian project received a major set-back in the Partition which accompanied Independence. The resilience and inherent viability of the project reasserted itself in the adoption of the Constitution upholding the basics of the Idea of India. However, the failure of the Indian polity to transform itself into a truly egalitarian and just social and economic order has brought to surface the limitations and weaknesses of the project as it has been executed. 

The weakness of the transformative agenda of the project is most evident in the gross failure in handling the question of Indian peasantry. Equally, it is manifest in the adoption of the neo-liberal policies for accelerating ‘growth’ which has no solution in sight to burgeoning problem of unemployment. On both these counts, all the structured political parties have to share the blame. 

The conjuncture is most conducive to reassertion of identity politics. Emergence of politics of ‘social justice’ based simply on the identity of caste is an example. But this soon reaches its limits as the ‘growth’ continues to be jobless as well as iniquitous. The vested interests who are the beneficiaries and promoters of this kind of ‘growth’ find it convenient to play the card of ‘cultural nationalism’, on the one hand, and ‘social engineering’, on the other. The former seeks to mask the prevalent social and economic injustice and inequity and promote a majoritarian identity encompassing smaller identities. The latter seeks to take the caste- identity politics of ‘social justice’ to its logical end of unravelling. 

The Modi-Shah duo implemented this strategy in UP elections. And they succeeded because no credible alternative narrative was forthcoming from those opposing them. 

The more or most backward among other backward classes are but large chunks of marginal and small peasantry who are the worst affected by the present model of growth practised by all political parties including BJP as well as the regional parties like SP and BSP. 

In the circumstances, counter-mobilisation of these sections, on the promise of sharing the state-power for whatever benefits it may offer in the short run, against those caste-identity parties who ruled so far, provides a strong appeal. Moreover, the appeal of a ‘wider identity’ based on cultural nationalism has some attraction for those who have been excluded or marignalised by the major “social justice” parties. 

The appeal of cultural nationalism, which is but another name for ‘communal polarisation’ has a catchment which includes the better-off sections, the upper castes, the so-called ‘aspirational’ youth and, of course, the die-hard Hindutva legions. The counter to this offered by the ‘secular’ plank has no popular appeal for the majority community as it once had in the hey-days of the freedom movement when the anti-colonial struggle required a modern, united political front. 

Moreover, the practitioners of the secular politics, the Congress and regional parties in UP, have not covered themselves with glory when it comes to communal riots or covert discrimination or opportunist alliances with communal forces. The popular appeal of secularism thus gets reduced in practice to the religious minority which is genuinely and deeply anxious about its safety and welfare under the regime of cultural nationalists. And this is precisely picked up by the BJP to malign the secular politics as politics of appeasement of minority. The majority community no longer under the spell of secular politics of freedom movement finds the appeasement idiom plausible. 

There was no credible alternative political narrative in UP. Nor even a credible leadership offering a short- term political alternative, albeit without any transformational agenda, as it happened to be the case in Bihar in 2015. The result is there for all of us to see. 

The results of UP assembly elections are important not only because UP is the ‘heart of India’. Or because they clear the way for Modi in 2019, as even some opposition leaders have said. They are important because they expose the basic malady of Indian politics unambiguously and boldly. On the national scale, there is no alternative political narrative articulated by the political opposition. And there is no credible political alternative in sight, even without a transformative agenda. 

What is worrisome is not so much that PM Modi may get his way in 2019. It is the inherent unviability of that brand of politics and policies in our situation. It is more than just non-viability. 

The explosive potential of the peasantry in crisis cannot be overstated. Nor that of the burgeoning legions of youth seeking jobs with dignity. Today they could be won over by the slogans of cultural nationalism and the tactics of social engineering. But it would not be long before the hollowness of the strategy is exposed spreading massive discontent and unforeseen, anarchic upheavals. 

No nation-state can survive long, let alone prosper, with a huge population of 18 crores of its people sulking as second- class citizens and feeling insecure. No amount of ‘nationalist’ sloganeering can eradicate that fact. No amount of force can alter that fact. The only viable politics for India is that based on the inclusive and modern values of Equality, Liberty, Fraternity and Justice. We need to reinvigorate these fundamentals enshrined in our constitution and reconstruct the narrative of nation-building. 

The obvious starting point is that of the First War of Independence of 1857. The peasantry constituted the core and the peasant-soldiers in East India Company’s army constituted the striking phalanx of that mass struggle against the onslaught of colonialism then. The small and marginal peasantry of today being pauperised and the present generation of youth being denied work opportunities with dignity and fulfilment will now constitute the core and striking phalanx of the democratic struggle against the neo-liberal policies and the model of growth imposed by those policies. 

On the issue of agrarian crisis as well as that of unemployment, there are no solutions within the framework of neo-liberalism. And no easy solutions even otherwise. Eventually we have to move towards the change of mode of production, both in the agrarian and industrial economy. 

A beginning can be made by transition to cooperative farming as a peoples’ movement. A large scale programme of input-procurement and processing of output in agricultural sector, supplemented by an equally massive programme of watershed planning, water and soil conservation, social forestry, building rural infrastructure and, above all, a comprehensive provision of social and economic security for all, will provide immense work opportunities to our youth. 

This would have to be supported by appropriate industrial and trade policies at the national level. It is obvious that these initiatives imply the negation of neo-liberal policies and rejection of the model of growth that flows from those policies. With the retreat from globalisation and multilateralism in industrial countries, sustenance of neo-liberal policies in the developing world would become far more difficult. That should provide a niche for re-orienting current policies and moving away, step by step, from the policies of neo-liberalism. 

In other words, the political crisis underlined by the UP Elections calls for alternative narratives in the spheres of politics and political economy. The crisis can be perhaps postponed a while, if a credible political alternative is cobbled together, which is what seems to be the main pre-occupation of political practitioners. But that would not alter the underlying unviability of that kind of politics. Indeed it may simply add to the explosive potential of the underlying crisis. 

The solution lies in establishing an alternative political narrative and mobilising the peasantry and the youth around it. 

(SP Shukla retired from the Indian Administrative Service as former Finance Secretary)

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Cultural Nationalism is Nothing but Rogue Nationalism pitting ‘Us’ against the “Other” https://sabrangindia.in/cultural-nationalism-nothing-rogue-nationalism-pitting-us-against-other/ Sat, 09 Jul 2016 07:29:16 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2016/07/09/cultural-nationalism-nothing-rogue-nationalism-pitting-us-against-other/ Image Courtesy: rangashankara.org Sadanand Menon de-constructs cultural nationalism, majoritarian and exclusivist  What is visible today is a new hatred for the idea of democracy as we know it and for the rights as guaranteed in the Constitution. This is quite in keeping with the agenda of cultural nationalism, which strives-through generating a climate of intolerance […]

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Image Courtesy: rangashankara.org

Sadanand Menon de-constructs cultural nationalism, majoritarian and exclusivist

 What is visible today is a new hatred for the idea of democracy as we know it and for the rights as guaranteed in the Constitution. This is quite in keeping with the agenda of cultural nationalism, which strives-through generating a climate of intolerance and intimidation-to keep civil society in a state of constant agitation by subjecting it to constant attack.

–Sadanand Menon

 
Cultural nationalism, by any definition, is a rogue version of nationalism which is already present in concepts of the nation state. Its cunning agenda is to evacuate all ideas of political rights from the idea of a nation state and transplant in its place ideas of cultural rights, obviously weighted in favour of concepts of primogeniture, racial purity and genetic ancestry as contained in ideas like janmabhumi or birthland/homeland and other emotive aspects that touch upon shared language, food and consanguinity. It is a highly charged area of irrational self-beliefs that give little credence to claims of history or any other kind of scientific research. It is an imaginary homeland constructed out of imaginary enemies, who always belong to religions and regions not (you believe, are) your own. It is a strange, anxious individual who will not pay the slightest heed to one’s own proven hybridity. In history, nothing stays ‘pure’. Or, as Salman Rushdie would have it, it’s all subject to ‘mongrelization’.
 
“…In the Indian context, the RSS’s effort has been to construct a ‘national identity’ which is anterior to an elides over the colonial as well Islamic periods of recent times to reach out to an ‘authentic’ India of the hoary past, which remains emblematic of its ‘real’ culture – unique, untrammeled and unadulterated by colonial or Islamic hybridity. In the past, this version found favour with the reigning tenets of Orientalist thought which divided the world into neat, essentialized compartments of the ‘East’ and the ‘West’. The East was, then, nothing but ‘spiritual’. Partha Chatterjee, in Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse, has clearly argued how these tropes play out, sometimes straight and sometimes inverting their own claims.
 
“..A constant character of the manufacture of cultural nationalism, therefore, is the constant and nagging ‘unhappiness’ over the narratives of the past which digress from specious claims of purity, undifferentiated unity and political power. Every attempt then is to exhibit unbridled triumphalism over its own antiquity and past glories that anticipate similar fortunes in the future.
 
“..Soon after the NDA came to power in 1998 under Aral Bihari Vajpayee, an extraordinary event happened at the National Museum, Delhi. The Harappan Gallery in the museum was quickly ‘renovated’. As you entered that section, space had been created on the left wall of the gallery to inscribe a ‘civilizational timeline’. So there were Sumerian and Assyrian and Babylonian and Egyptian civilizations, all indicated through coloured bands of varying lengths as per their historic antiquity – from 1200 BCE to 2500 BCE. There were about ten or twelve bands in different colours and of diverse lengths. The Chinese civilization, which originated in 3200 BCE, was indicated by a long red band which went halfway across the wall. Above this was a saffron band proudly proclaiming ‘Indian Civilization 7000 BCE’, which went all the way across the wall, dwarfing every other band. The figure, which is a figment of the imagination, has been floating around in the Indian national consciousness since the time Bal Gangadhar Tilak, in his essay ‘The Arctic Home in the Vedas’, had somehow configured the Vedic period to be of around that antiquity. Sometimes these inflated figures were useful during the anti-colonial movement to mobilize nationalist opinion and to thumb your nose at the colonialist. However, post-Independence, even as these figures and strategies get contested through more rigorous research, they do get commandeered for purposes that aid in creating a majoritarian version of historic exceptionalism.”
 
“…Ideas of cultural nationalism emerged hand in hand with late nineteenth-century ideas of nationhood itself. Nationalist leaders like Tilak worked on constructing the idea of a glorious and ancient Indian past, heavily inflected with Hindu symbology, as a strategy to fight the imperialist. This was one of the ways in which the national movement hoped to forge a common Indian identity based on a glorious past (composed in equal parts of myth, legend and select incorporations of historical facts). The idea of the past that the national struggle sought to create in its early days was one of a pre-historic India of mythic origins that was divine, pure, monolithic and untainted by any polluting ‘external’ influence.
 
“..This itself was a myth, for the subcontinent has been host to an unending procession of cultures and claimants who have tromped through it over at least three millennia. Yet the attempt was to make culture the sole base for the formation of the independent nation. Inevitably, because of the majoritarian Hindu population and the national leadership that represented them, this notion of the past that was more or less upper caste and Hindu became conflated and interchangeable movement. In some cases, this was deliberate, in others it was inadvertent. The prototype of how cultural nationalism came to be constructed here can be divided into a few distinct phases.
 
“..The first phase is what would be best described as incipient nationalism. It begins with the early impulse to shape the country’s cultural identity by reforming Hinduism itself. English educated, upper-class/caste Indians of the period begin to take to heart the critique as well as construction of Hindu society by ‘well-meaning’ Western scholars. Customs considered ‘barbaric’ like child marriages, the practice of sati, the isolation of widows, the dedication of women to temples as ‘devadasis’, caste discrimination are all seen as retrograde and deplorable. Reformists like Raja Ram Mohan Roy emerge in the early part of the nineteenth century to campaign actively against such ‘evils’ and set the house in order.
 
“…The setting up of the Brahmo Samaj is clearly an early step in articulating a self-conscious new nationalism. It gets further articulated by more aggressive reformers later in the century like Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar and Jyotiba Phule. Swami Dayanand Saraswati sets up the Arya Samaj, which simultaneously calls for reform within the Hindu religion and builds defences against erosion by other religions through elaborate rituals of purity and restitution. The frenzied ‘ghar wapsi’ of today is not all that original an idea. Here the Vedas are considered to be the foundation of Indian nationalism. Hindu tradition is invoked for claiming cultural autonomy, for critiquing certain social practices, as well as for providing cultural foundations for assertive nationalism. Mohinder Singh, in ‘Crisis & Critique: Diagnosis of the Present in Nationalist Discourse in Hindi, 1870-1908’, has made the point that ‘nationalism absorbs traditions superficially; in truth it remains nationalism’s suppressed other’.


 Image Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons
“..As A.G. Noorani points out in his essay on the origins of Bharat Mata, a more militant version of nationalism is provided in 1882 by the publication of the novel Anandamath by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee. This was to soon assume the proportion of a manifesto for Hindu nationalism, as Bankim plays with all the tropes of exclusive nationalism – protecting his nation from any external defilement. His idealized nation is Anandamath. The deity he worships is an already militarized, ready-for-battle Krishna who will lead his chosen ones to victory. And, of course, ‘Vande Mataram’ is the battle cry around which he rouses the hordes. It is pertinent here to evoke Sudipta Kaviraj’s masterly study, The Unhappy Consciousness: Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay and the Formation of Nationalist Discourse in India, where he suggests how Bankim works around the fantasy of war against ‘outsiders’, which included the British and the Muslims. He thus provides a powerful imagery for a future nationalism, which was influential enough to be celebrated in theatre and cinema over the next seventy years. And ‘Vande Mataram’ itself (coupled with ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’) emerged as the new talisman with which to measure not only one’s patriotism but one’s very nationality. The sheer ecstasy and rapture into which Hindutva hacks went when A.R. Rahman performed in a virtuoso track of ‘Vande Mataram’ nearly a decade ago was never repeated for any of his other works.
 
“..In 1905, coinciding with the partition of Bengal, Abanindranath Tagore paints an image of ‘Banga Mata’ (Mother Bengal). This was soon to be recast as ‘Bharat Mata’ (Mother India), which marked one of the earliest attempts, building on those by Bankim, to cast the nation in the shape of a benevolent mother. This was still a benign image in the gentle wash style of the Bengal School, where the image is soft and radiant and holds promise of bounty, prosperity and benevolence. Subsequently, as the struggle for independence intensified, so did this image of the benevolent mother become increasingly ferocious, a cross between a Durga and a Kali, riding a tiger and fully armed. Bharat Mata took on a distinctly militant identity that was used to mobilize the Hindu flock, irrespective of political persuasion.
           
“…It must be said here that ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’ is not an attribute of patriotism, but of deep patriarchy. Extreme mother-love is a camouflage for extreme misogyny. Over the past few years in India. The nature of the violence inflicted on women during rapes, riots and caste retributions is of an order seldom witnessed before in any part of the world, except perhaps, in Bosnia during the civil war, or in the Congo, or in Sri Lanka during the final moments of the pogrom against the civilian Tamil population there. From the barbarity of the jawans of the Assam Rifles on Manorama Devi, to incessant mass rapes by soldiers in Kashmir, to the graphic and horrific brutalities (that were videotaped) on even pregnant women in Gujarat in 2002, to the Nirbhaya case in Delhi, there is no evidence to prove that devotion towards an abstract ‘Bharat Mata’ translates into even a semblance of affection or respect for real flesh-and-blood women. Indeed, here it is only literally the flesh and blood that seems to matter. Add to this the kind of vile trolling and rank verbal and mental abuse that independent women activists/writers who stand up for rights and against bullying-like, say, Kavita Krishnan, Teesta Setalvad, Arundhati Roy, Shabnam Hashmi, Shehla Rashid, Rana Ayyub and others – are attacked with indicates a level of morbidity and sexual repression that should be unsustainable in a democracy. Cultural nationalism can truly be said to have arrived when this confusion about one’s identity and sexuality produces a permanent pathology of inadequacy, about which Austrian psychoanalyst
 
Wilhelm Reich has so insightfully written in The Mass Psychology of Fascism (1993). For Reich, cultural nationalism is the basic emotional attitude of the suppressed man. He sees the ‘authoritarian family’ as the base of the middle classes, which is held together with the help of religious fears and rampant mysticism, infused in turn by sexual guilt embedded in their emotions. Religion, thus, leads to negation of sexual desire. Sexual disability results in lowering of self-confidence.
 
This is often compensated by the ‘brutalization of sexuality’. The good doctor was analysing Germany of the 1930s; he might as well have been putting contemporary India on the couch.
 

 (The author is adjunct faculty, Asian College of Journalism and at IIT, Madras. He is currently managing trustee of the Arts Foundation, SPACES, Chennai; this piece of writing is excerpted from Aleph's just published work, On Nationalism where Menon's essay is titled From National Culture to Cultural Nationalism)
 

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