The signs of the rise of the Right are evident across Europe. In France, the National Rally, despite not winning a majority in the end, became a key party in France winning 142 seats out of the National Assembly’s 577 seats. In January 2025, Jean-Marie Le Pen, one of Europe’s most prominent right-wing figures and founder of the National Rally, died aged 96. His daughter, Marine Le Pen, had long led the party he founded in 1972—the National Front (renamed National Rally in 2018). Jean-Marie was expelled from his party in August 2015 amidst a feud with his daughter.

In the National Front’s early days, Jean-Marie Le Pen was a pariah, his radical views on immigration and nationalism relegating him to France’s political fringes. His first presidential bid in 1974 garnered less than 1% of the vote, highlighting his marginal status at the time. In stark contrast, the 2002 election marked a significant leap for Le Pen, as he secured over 15% of the votes in the first round, propelling him into the second round against Jacques Chirac. This dramatic increase in support underscored the growing influence of his far-right ideology and the National Front’s rise from the political fringes to a major force in French politics.

Marine Le Pen transformed the party into a major force, renaming it National Rally to shed its racist and anti-Semitic associations. She softened its rhetoric, distanced it from her father’s extremist views, and rebranded it as a mainstream alternative. This “de-demonization” strategy enabled electoral breakthroughs. The journey from Jean-Marie’s early irrelevance to Marine’s mainstreaming of far-right ideology encapsulates this article’s theme: the rise of far-right movements in Europe, their evolution from marginal to influential players, and the disruptions they pose to the existing world order.

Historical Context

The rise of far-right movements was shaped by socio-economic anxieties, cultural shifts, and political opportunities. Post-war Western Europe experienced economic growth, wealth distribution, and social stability, but as this stability eroded, right-wing extremism and populism found new openings. Immigration, national identity, and sovereignty became central issues for far-right mobilization. The 1973 oil crisis marked the end of post-WWII prosperity, fuelling discontent. Rising opposition to the welfare state, and tax systems, and increased xenophobia amid non-European immigration further accelerated this trend.

Global Catalysts

Several world events reinforced far-right expansion. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 heightened anxieties over national identity and border security. Globalization caused economic disruptions, leaving many feelings marginalized. The rise of multiculturalism and the perceived decline of traditional values triggered a cultural backlash, which far-right movements exploited. These factors deepened insecurity and alienation, making certain segments of the population receptive to far-right rhetoric. It is within these conditions we find homophobia, racism, etc. today in Europe.

National Variations

The far right rose differently across Europe. In Germany, reunification in 1990 created economic and social strains, which the extreme right leveraged. In Austria, Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) gained influence, entering government in 2000. In France, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front capitalized on economic discontent and anti-immigrant sentiment. These cases illustrate how far-right movements adapted to specific national contexts, exploiting existing grievances to reshape political landscapes.

Current Political Landscape

The contemporary rise of far-right parties across Europe is marked by significant electoral gains and increased visibility. In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy has emerged as a dominant nationalist force. Recently, speaking at the United States’ Conservative Political Action Conference, she criticized what she saw as a double standard, noting that when Bill Clinton and Tony Blair built a global left-liberal network in the 1990s, they were hailed as statesmen, whereas figures like Trump, Meloni, Milei (Argentina’s President), and possibly Modi are now labelled as threats to democracy. Giorgia Meloni is arguably the most prominent face of the right-wing conservative parties in Europe although she has been described by some as pragmatic and shrewd in her politics.

In Germany, the AfD has become the second-largest party, capitalizing on economic grievances and anti-immigrant sentiments. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán has embraced far-right policies, consolidating power through nationalist and anti-immigrant rhetoric. And in France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally continues to challenge mainstream parties.

Frustration with the welfare state and tax policies, perceived as excessive, has further driven national populism. The failure of centrist parties to address these concerns has created a political vacuum that far-right movements exploit.

Cultural and social factors also play a key role. The 2015 migration crisis intensified fears of cultural displacement and strengthened anti-immigrant sentiments. Many national populist voters seek to reassert national identity, viewing globalization and international institutions as threats to their communities and traditions.

Political factors further enable the rise of the far right. The erosion of liberal and social democratic traditions has weakened centrist alternatives, while anti-establishment sentiment and political distrust push voters toward radical right-wing populism. Crises—whether economic, social, or security-related—provide fertile ground for far-right movements, which thrive on instability, inequality, and mistrust of mainstream politicians.

Understanding the reasons for the rise of Right

Gramscian hegemony provides a lens through which we can view the rise of the far-right as a challenge to the established cultural and political dominance of centrist ideologies. Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist theorist, argued that hegemony is the process by which a dominant group maintains its power not just through coercion, but also through consent. This consent is achieved through cultural and ideological means, making the dominant group’s worldview seem natural and inevitable.

In the context of contemporary Europe, the far-right can be seen as a counter-hegemonic force. They challenge the hegemonic narratives of centrist ideologies, which have long dominated European politics. By questioning the established order and offering alternative visions, far-right movements tap into the frustrations and grievances of segments of the population who feel marginalized or ignored by mainstream politics.

The neoliberal backlash theory suggests that the economic policies of the past few decades have created conditions ripe for far-right populism. Neoliberalism, characterized by free-market policies, deregulation, and reduced government intervention, has led to increased economic inequality and job insecurity. These economic conditions have driven voters to seek alternative solutions, making them more susceptible to the messages of far-right parties.

Far-right movements often capitalize on these economic anxieties by promising to restore economic stability and national pride. They appeal to voters who feel left behind by globalization and economic liberalization, offering a narrative that blames external forces and marginalized groups for their economic hardships.

Empirical research supports these theoretical perspectives. For instance, studies have shown that economic inequality and job insecurity are significant predictors of support for far-right parties.[1] Additionally, qualitative and quantitative analyses of right-wing populist groups across various European countries reveal common themes of anti-immigration sentiment, nationalism, and a rejection of the political establishment.[2]

The formation of the European Union (EU) has had a profound impact on cultural nationalism in Europe. The EU was designed to foster economic and political integration, creating a unified European identity. However, this process has also led to a sense of cultural homogenization, where local traditions and identities are sometimes overshadowed by a broader European culture. This has created a tension between the desire for a unified Europe and the need to preserve national and regional cultural identities.

Eurocentrism and Cultural Nationalism

The dominance of homogenized Western culture, particularly American influence, has further complicated the cultural landscape in Europe. The spread of Western media and multinational corporations has led to concerns about cultural erosion and the dilution of local traditions. This has fuelled a backlash against globalization and has provided fertile ground for cultural nationalist movements. These movements often position themselves as defenders of national identity against external influences, appealing to those who feel their cultural heritage is under threat.

The Rise of Right-Wing Political Parties

The rise of right-wing political parties in Europe can be seen as a response to these cultural and economic anxieties. These parties often capitalize on fears of cultural erosion and economic insecurity, promising to restore national pride and protect traditional values. For example, the refugee crisis in Europe, which brought over a million asylum seekers to Germany between 2015 and 2016, amplified fears of cultural and economic instability, leading to the rise of nationalist parties like Alternative for Germany (AfD). Similar anxieties have driven support for right-wing movements in Scandinavia, where concerns over immigration and cultural identity have surged.

What happened to the Left in Europe?

The European left has declined due to economic shifts, internal divisions, and cultural nationalism. Once dominant, left-wing parties have lost their traditional working-class base, leading to fragmentation between social democrats and progressives. Economic changes, such as the decline of industrial jobs and the rise of precarious labour, have weakened solidarity, while concerns over immigration and national identity have further eroded leftist appeal. Many voters see left-wing parties as ineffective in addressing these issues, fuelling distrust in their leadership.

Right-wing nationalism has surged by capitalizing on cultural anxieties, emphasizing sovereignty, and positioning itself as a defender of national identity. Left-wing parties struggle to counter this narrative, as their focus on economic justice and globalization often overlooks cultural concerns. While some resistance exists—seen in Portugal’s socialist government, Sweden’s centrist-left coalition against the far right, and Italian opposition to Giorgia Meloni—these efforts remain limited.

More recently—in the German elections—while AfD fared well, the Left Party also improved its performance by securing more than 8% of the vote. Although it is lesser than the AfD or the Conservatives, 25% of the young population between the ages of 18-24 voted for the Left Party in Germany. This shows a polarised electorate and indicates that the younger population’s support is up for grabs if the left can put efforts to secure it.

Implications of the Right’s Rise in the EU

The global rise of far-right movements challenges the post-WWII liberal order, undermining cooperation, human rights, and democratic norms. Nationalist policies promote protectionism and isolationism, weakening international institutions and efforts to address global issues like climate change. In Germany, the AfD’s opposition to climate action threatens international agreements. These risks create a fragmented world order where unity and global cooperation become increasingly difficult.

Challenges and Future Outlook

Despite their gains, far-right movements face several challenges. Electoral volatility is a significant factor, as their support can be fickle, often tied to specific issues or crises. Policy implementation is another hurdle, as the far-right’s radical proposals often face resistance from established institutions and the broader electorate. Additionally, shifting demographics, particularly the increasing diversity of European societies, may limit their long-term appeal.

Conclusion

The rise of the far-right in Europe is a complex phenomenon, rooted in historical grievances, economic anxieties, and cultural concerns. The rise of far-right movements in Europe is not an isolated phenomenon but part of a global tide of right-wing nationalism. From India to Argentina and the United States, right-wing parties are forming transnational networks to amplify their influence. Examples include Elon Musk’s support for Germany’s far-right AfD, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s appearance at the U.S. Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), where she framed herself as part of a global conservative coalition alongside figures like Donald Trump and Narendra Modi. These alliances reflect a strategic effort to legitimize far-right ideologies on the global stage.

Yet, the challenges facing these right-wing coalitions are significant. Their agendas—marked by climate denialism, opposition to immigration, and scepticism toward international cooperation—often clash with urgent global priorities like poverty alleviation and climate action. As scholars like Thomas Piketty have argued, there is a general movement in the world toward more equality and social change. Indeed, the internal contradictions within right-wing movements—such as tensions between economic liberalism and cultural nationalism—may limit their long-term viability.

Moreover, the far right’s reliance on fear and division risks alienating broader electorates, particularly as demographic shifts and civil society resistance intensify. While these parties may temporarily capitalize on instability, their inability to address systemic issues like climate change or inequality without undermining their core ideologies suggests their dominance could be short-lived. As history shows, movements built on exclusion rarely sustain themselves in an interconnected world. The future may yet belong to coalitions that prioritize inclusivity, equity, and global cooperation.

(The author is a legal researcher with the organisation)

[1] Gagatek, W. (n.d.). Explaining the Rise of the Radical Right in Europe 2. [online] Available at: https://www.martenscentre.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Martens-Centre-Policy-Brief.pdf.

[2] Wodak, R., KhosraviNik, M. and Mral, B., 2013. Right-wing populism in Europe: Politics and discourse (p. 179). Bloomsbury Academic.

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Jair Bolsonaro with his son Eduardo. Wikimedia Commons.

“The left must kick-start a response substituting insecurity for collective action and hope.”

On October 12, 2014, a group of artists convened in São Paulo to support Dilma Rousseff, the presidential candidate for the Workers’ Party (PT). Artists like Otto, Karina Buhr and Lucas Santana expressed their critical support for Dilma in an event called Thirteen Shades of Red. Aécio Neves, the conservative Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) candidate, was leading the polls.

The polarization of the campaign had been building up. The candidates were now adopting a visceral tone. You could sense the hate. Fear was being invoked. Both sides were betting on binary thinking.

Some minority currents within the PT were trying to update the party’s narrative with initiatives such as Podemos Mais, to try connect with the massive protests of June 2013. But Dilma Rousseff’s official campaign was a steamroller compressing the new narratives and practices which had emerged since 2013.

The Thirteen Shades of Red event was a breath of fresh air in the midst of the electoral quagmire. It sent a message to supporters of the PT’s unitary slogans and traditional symbols. Red of course, but thirteen shades of it.

The man behind the concerts’ lights and aesthetics was activist Paulinho Fluxus. Paulinho, who does not hide his leftist leanings, had been going around São Paulo for years dressed in pink, pushing a supermarket cart filled with plastic cannons. Pink was his new red. “That colour of fragility can become mighty. A supermarket trolley can stand up to fifty shock troopers and come out winning in the final picture”, he claimed in 2013 in Folha de São Paulo.

During the June days, Paulinho Fluxus and a group of activists fired a laser from a skyscraper right onto a Rede Globo’s newscaster face in São Paulo. His “aesthetic shots”, which forced the presenter to mention the demonstration that was going on at that moment close to the TV station, served as a metaphor for the polyphonic, fragmented and decentralized revolts in which all unitary messages were discarded. Both the right and the left tried to appropriate, unsuccessfully, the June days.

Dilma Rousseff’s presidential campaign in 2014 tried to wipe out the heterodox character of those protests. Forcing polarization against its traditional enemy, the PT’s aim was to control the game board.

Whipping up fear of the right brought critics from the left back to the fold and Dilma won the elections. But the PT’s strategy had unexpected consequences: an extreme anti-PT feeling which eventually crystallized in the form of a false outsider, Jair Bolsonaro.

Whipping up fear of the right brought critics from the left back to the fold and Dilma won the elections. But the PT’s strategy had unexpected consequences: an extreme anti-PT feeling which eventually crystallized in the form of a false outsider, Jair Bolsonaro. On the other side of polarization, a monster was born.

A new, different monster with a thousand heads. A hyper-fragmenting monster that would end up winning the battle by eschewing face to face combat.

In 2015, the demonstrators at the marches against Dilma defended, paradoxically, progressive guidelines and rejected the presence of politicians. These protests created an atmosphere for the June 2013 fragmentation which the PT disregarded.

The protests had not yet tilted to the far right. In 2016, Lula himself buried the possibility of understanding the segmented messages of the June days. On March 18, 2016 he gave a speech on Paulista Avenue in São Paulo which gave a finishing touch to the “them or us” frame of mind:
They “buy clothes” in Miami, he said, and we “by buy them at 25 de março” (a popular São Paulo street market). Left or right, red or blue, good and bad.

He did not suspect that his definition of a closed “us” was in fact feeding a vigorous, inclusive and diverse “them”. The “we” was wearing only red. The Brazilian flags waved by “them” at demonstrations were already 1001 shades of green-and-yellow and the demonstrators chanted 1001 cries of outrage.
 

Ready-to-wear speeches

A few months ago, Jair Bolsonaro’s campaign was just a slogan: “Brazil above everything, and God above us all”. Nationalism and religious morality. Family as a space for action. Fear lurking in the background.

Bolsonaro’s aggressive attacks against the left were the fuel. The simplicity of the campaign favoured appropriation. The people themselves created the messages, the memes, the videos. Everything was worthy, everything fitted.

Aesthetics, fonts, claims of all sorts. Civil society’s techno-political self-organization which had characterized the 2011 cycle of the occupied squares happened to be, in the Brazilian case, on Bolsonaro’s side.

Whereas the campaign of the PT was built on unitary messages of inclusion, justice and equality, Bolsonaro offered different, segmented speeches to address different audiences. And people broke the messages up and circulated them.

Here lies a major lesson for the left. Progressive intellectuals make manifestos; the far right encourages people to make videos and come up with memes for family WhatsApp groups. The left speaks about high ideals; Bolsonaro, Trump or Salvini deliver explosive speeches full of emotion, pride or violence.

Indeed, they make use of fake news. But the political lesson to extract here is not that they lie, but that disinformation fits perfectly with people’s real discomfort, wishes and subjectivities.

“Alternative facts are affective facts, bits of information evoking a feeling that is preferable than the truth underlined by facts”, writes Peter Zuurbier in a recent article, an academic who does research on affective theory.

The paradox is that the far right candidates appeal to order while sowing chaos. They present themselves as saviors after using a military strategy called psycho ops, which has been introduced in election campaigns by the SCL Group, the mother company of Cambrigde Analytica, accused of encouraging Brexit and helping Donald Trump get elected.

If the new left abandons its anti-establishment tone, the far right will fill in the vacant space strategically. If it were to talk only about order, it would lose its voter base. The great challenge for the left is to be able to present itself as an orderly solution to chaos while maintaining an anti-establishment tone.

On the other hand, not only does the Fascist label not fit with the hyper-fragmented reality of the 21st century, but it is almost harmless. Evoking anti-fascism awakens popular resistance for the most politicized sectors of the population, especially in Europe. But it seems inadequate to face the far right’s thousand-headed monster.

The maximalist discourse against fascism is not efficient against the millions who vote for the far right and do not consider themselves fascists.

The maximalist discourse against fascism is not efficient against the millions who vote for the far right and do not consider themselves fascists. As long as anti-Fascism remains a discourse and not a practice, a set of slogans and not neighborhood community action, the far right will keep on growing by presenting itself as a solution to people’s concrete problems and fears.
 

Simple people

In his campaign speeches, Jair Bolsonaro mentioned constantly the “simple citizens”. He also alluded to the cultures that are ill-considered (such as sertaneja or caipira music) and to forgotten regions (like the Midwest and the Amazon).

Bolsonaro won a landslide victory in these regions, forgotten and stigmatized by the progressive cultural elite. The brega Brazil (a term used for anything considered tasteless or tacky) raised its voice and voted. Brazilian journalist Leando Demori points out that Bolsonaro has brought into the fold the “less literate” people, the people who according to the left do not “have the level of education required to know what a transgender person is”, or do not understand the priority of bike lanes.

Bolsonaro’s core constituency is class C (lower middle class), just as Trump’s or Le Pen’s are the working class sectors confused and disoriented by globalization and ignored by cultural elites.

The moral superiority of the left, which stigmatizes “right-wing workers”, the unfortunate cultural decisions of the favela dwellers or the inhabitants of the Empty Spain described by Sergio del Molino, widens the gap.

The moral superiority of the left, which stigmatizes “right-wing workers”, the unfortunate cultural decisions of the favela dwellers or the inhabitants of the Empty Spain described by Sergio del Molino, widens the gap.

Talíria Petrone, who got elected member of the Brazilian Federal Congress for the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL) in Rio de Janeiro, is categorical: “the left must go back to the territories, not to carry any truth, but to listen”. The assertion applies equally to all of the world’s metropolitan areas and rural regions.

Bolsonaro’s boom in the most violent territories is related to the rise of the Evangelist churches. While progressive organizations were losing space in the favelas and in inland Brazil, the Evangelical churches were building a real mutual support and solidarity community network.
Even though some progressive Evangelical currents – such as the Integrated Mission Theology – do exist, the left has stigmatized the Evangelical world, and this has resulted in practice in an Evangelical-run monopoly of social action in many peripheries. The left, if it wants to dispute disenchantment in the peripheries, must go back to the territories.

Listening, building spaces to live in, facilitating self-organization without co-optation. The left in Spain has to also tolerate the tastes of the popular classes, however “unfortunate” it may consider them to be. Otherwise, Hurricane VOX will grow and grow.
The Homo Velanime collective is right in urging the “in-lawing” of political language, by which they mean that it is crucial to dispute the political field of the family. A progressive family discourse, especially in Latin America and Southern Europe, may be more useful to dispel fears of the future than the great values of the left.
 

National symbols

After the shock at the first round of the elections, the PT’s campaign changed radically. The green-and-yellow flag replaced the red one. It was a delayed reaction to Bolsonarism, which had taken control of the Brazilian flag.

Since the June 2013 revolts, the left had distanced itself from the patriotic symbols. From 2015 onwards, the green-and-yellow tide tide grew, and the flag and the Brazilian Football Confederation (CBF) T-shirts became its icons.

Abandoning the flag, in a nationalist country where even candomblé terreiros have their own flags and national football team is a religion, was the PT’s catastrophic mistake.

The right is taking advantage of identity patterns, especially of nationalism. Its economic nationalism, however, is a falsely inclusive, cheater patriotism. Disputing national symbols, resignifying them, weaving alliances with citizens in other countries, is one of the most complex tasks facing the left.

To avoid falling into simplistic nationalist populism, the strategy should combine popular and citizen narratives. Popular and red tinted narratives (even anti-fascist ones) for the already politicized. Multiple citizen narratives for a new mass of people who prefer specific campaigns to constant activism. Hyper-segmented discourses to win over each of the publics of neo-fascism’s highly fragmented Leviathan.

At the same time, the new left in government must implement forceful public policies aimed at the new excluded sectors of the population (especially the impoverished middle classes), without losing its anti-establishment tone regarding the elites.

And it must build digital and face-to-face platforms and devices to channel people’s discomforts and to give a voice to all cultural manifestations, including the unfortunate ones.

The left must kick-start a response substituting insecurity for collective action and hope. And it must bring forth a range of wishes larger than fear.  

This article was previously published by eldiario.es. Read the original here.

Bernardo Gutiérrez (@bernardosampa en Twitter) es un periodista, escritor e investigador hispano-brasileño residente en Madrid. Escribe de política, sociedad, tecnopolítica y tecnologías de la participación. Ha publicado el libros Calle Amazonas (Altaïr, 2010), colaborado en libros colectivos como ‘Amanhã vai ser maior’ (Anna Blume, 2014) o sido uno de los editores de ‘JUNHO: potência das ruas e das redes’ (Friedrich Ebert Siftung, 2014). Su último libro: “Pasado Mañana. Viaje a la España del cambio” (ARPA editores, 2017). Trabaja en el MediaLab Prado de Madrid.
 

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Boris Johnson arriving home in Thame, Oxfordshire, August 13, 2018. Steve Parsons/Press Association. All rights reeserved.

Much has been written recently about the rise of the far right and its growing impact on mainstream politics. While the campaign and election of Trump remains the most covered event, the strong performance of the Freedom Party in Austria, the Front National in France, the Lega in Italy and the victory of Brexit in the UK amongst others have made such discussions ubiquitous. Countless texts focus on the ways in which the discourse of parties and movements once considered toxic have evolved or been adapted.

While the concepts of ‘mainstream’ and ‘mainstreaming’ have commonly been invoked, their definition has been elusive, or rather avoided by scholars and experts on the topic – partly due to the fact that defining the mainstream is itself a challenge. Defining the mainstream is itself a challenge.

It is therefore not surprising that much of the scholarly work about the mainstreaming of the far right in Europe has been based on electoral performance. Yet, focusing solely on parties and electoral politics risks both underestimating and exaggerating certain phenomena. In the 2007 French presidential election, for example, the defeat of the Front National was only a result of Nicolas Sarkozy’s absorption of many of its ideas, leading in turn to the mainstreaming of the far right party and its return to the forefront of politics. UKIP faced a similar fate after the Brexit victory, and Farage, who has continued to receive disproportionate coverage, was only too happy to say as he stood down from the party leadership that “The Ukippers will have been the turkeys who voted for Christmas.” In the US, white supremacists such as Jason Kessler and Richard Spencer, whose electoral weight is close to nil, have also received disproportionate coverage, including by the more liberal media. This occurs in a context where the far right has endorsed and been supported and emboldened by Trump.

Therefore, we believe that it is essential to move beyond electoral politics to understand the way the far right is being mainstreamed. To do so, a few ‘common sense’ tropes must be challenged:

The mainstreaming of the far right is not new.
Despite the pledge across the west that Nazism and fascism would never be allowed to happen again, we have witnessed the resurgence of far right parties, movements and ideas and their absorption into the mainstream ever since and up to this day. Flirting with anti-immigration or openly racist rhetoric is not new, and mainstream politicians have done so for decades.

The mainstream’s meaning and position is constructed, contingent and fluid.
It is also dependent on what we contrast as ‘extreme’, which is just as contingent and fluid. What is mainstream or extreme at one point in time does not remain so. Ideas such as racism, sexism and homophobia, once acceptable in the mainstream, can be and were rejected, associated with the past and with extremism. Yet, such movements or ideas (together with the structures or institutions which underpin them) may not disappear, may adapt and change. Also, a backlash and revival may always occur.

Far-right parties also move both ways.
On the one hand, they can become more mainstream through their own choices and actions, usually through a discursive shift towards less overtly racist and authoritarian politics, as well as an expansion of their programmes away from anti-immigration as a single issue. They can also be disentangled from the mainstream and rendered ‘extreme’ as the mainstream changes.

On the other hand, their position can be influenced by the actions (or inaction) of other parties and political actors (including the media). Providing a media platform or engaging in ideological, political or discursive alliances and cooperation has played a major role in mainstreaming far right parties. Providing a media platform or engaging in ideological, political or discursive alliances and cooperation has played a major role in mainstreaming far right parties.

The mainstream is not essentially good.
The mainstream can move both ways, depending on circumstances. Mainstream parties can move towards more progressive politics, as much as they can move towards reaction when under real or perceived pressure from far-right parties or public opinion for example.

Progress is not unidirectional or inevitable.
A common narrative sees history and society moving  forward in a constant, unidirectional trajectory towards more freedom (in a liberal/capitalist sense) and equality of opportunity (based on systemic inequalities which remain unaddressed), overcoming injustices such as colonialism and slavery. However, this narrative fails to address the continuity of racism, sexism and homophobia, or the possibility of a backlash by reactionary forces.

The most notable case is that of the ‘post-racial’ where racism, supposedly overcome, has been predicated on individual achievements by persons of colour, representing racism in terms of the bad old days of Nazism. This has served to legitimise what we term ‘liberal racism’ and Islamophobia in particular, that is, attacks on Islam and Muslims in the name of liberal values as opposed to race. This can be seen most recently in Boris Johnson’s attack on the burqa or in the banning of religious symbols across Europe targeted directly at Islam in an unmistakably racist manner. Liberal racism can be seen most recently in Boris Johnson’s attack… targeted directly at Islam in an unmistakably racist manner.

Party politics and discourse can move together but they do not have to, or not at the same time.
Parties can move left or right faster or slower than public discourse does, putting them at odds with the political discussion and thus alienating or marginalising them.

Various levels of discourse must also be accounted for. Does elite discourse (media, academics and experts and politicians) reflect wider public discourse at the local or individual level? If these move separately, then which influences which and how? Are parties following public opinion or leading it?

The far-right or its (mis)perception may also pressure or influence the mainstream, based on a skewed account of its support, so much so that the mainstream may appropriate their ideas as they fear a loss in votes. The very idea of an EU referendum in the UK for example was accelerated by the constructed threat of UKIP which sent into panic mode both Labour and the Conservatives, and in turn fed the hype, despite the far-right party gathering at most 7% of the registered vote in all its history. The very idea of an EU referendum in the UK for example was accelerated by the constructed threat of UKIP which sent into panic mode both Labour and the Conservatives.

There is no such thing as public opinion.
In recent years, particularly through what has been termed populist hype, the mainstreaming of racism and the far-right has often been explained and legitimised in terms ‘public opinion’ and attributed to ‘the people’.  Did the British ‘people’ want a referendum on the EU or were they told they wanted it? Did all Trump voters vote for a white supremacist leadership or did they simply vote for the party they had always voted for? What happens when non-voters are taken into account? Does public opinion shape politics from scratch or do politicians and the media shape public opinion?

These are issues which would require far more space than is given to us here to discuss, but some leads can be explored briefly. As Maxwell McCoombs noted ‘most of the issues and concerns that engage our attention are not amenable to direct personal experience’, building on Walter Lippman’s belief that ‘the world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind’. This means that our knowledge of the world beyond our very limited direct experience has to be mediated, and, while mediation can come from a number of sources (family, friends, work etc), much of our political knowledge these days is acquired through the media, and the way politics is discussed within it, with certain actors having more powerful voices than others. This does not mean that the media or politicians will tell you what to think, but simply that they will tell you what to think about.

This does not mean that the media or politicians will tell you what to think, but that they will tell you what to think about. This is key when looking at the contemporary mainstreaming of the far right as much of it has been based on the simplistic idea that tougher measures on immigration for example are ‘what the people want’ or that Islam is not compatible ‘according to a majority of the (add any given nationality) people’. The data used to generate public discourse, whether through election results or opinion polls, is often based on selective interpretation, and frequently gives the impression that it is the people as a sovereign voice that is driving the mainstreaming process, rather than the elite through their misguided perception or inability to respond to current political crises.

Therefore, key to our approach is a particular focus here on discourse, moving away from electoral politics qua politics, towards a more holistic approach. To implement a comprehensive strategy, it is essential to separate electoral and ideological/discursive successes when talking about the mainstreaming of the far right and racism more generally. The fate of a political party or movement in terms of election is irrelevant if their ideas become front and centre. The fate of a political party or movement in terms of election is irrelevant if their ideas become front and centre.
This is something the far right has managed to turn to its advantage, in part through a radical transformation of its strategy initiated in intellectual circles in the 60s and 70s. Building on and perverting the theories of Antonio Gramsci on hegemony, far right intellectuals in France in particular devised their own way out of their post-war oblivion. They claimed that their revival would be based on the simple hegemonic principle that: cultural power must precede political power. It was therefore not surprising to see Steve Bannon cite these intellectuals as an inspiration, or to find that the Alt-Right directly borrowed from them.

While the far right itself remained at first on the margins, its ideas began to seep into the mainstream as they perfected their strategy and gained increased impact in the media and on public discourse in the 90s and 2000s. The second half of 2010s seems to have heralded a new stage in this mainstreaming whereby the far right’s ideas have become so normalised that their presence in government is no longer a surprise, and is in fact increasingly common, as exemplified by the Austrian and Italian cases.

In this context, while day-to-day, localised anti-racist action remains as essential as ever, we have reached a point where a broader response must be developed on the left. It is essential to aim beyond the far right itself and tackle the appeal to and activation of racism by and within the mainstream, as well as the roots of the continual and pervasive presence of racism in our societies, their structures and institutions, relying on critical and historical approaches.

Aurelien Mondon is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Bath University. Working with Aaron Winter, his work looks at the relationship between the far right and the mainstream, with a particular focus on racism. Their most recent article is ‘Articulations of Islamophobia: from the extreme to the mainstream?’ in Ethnic and Racial Studies (2017).

Courtesy: https://www.opendemocracy.net
 

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The death chamber of the lethal injection facility at San Quentin State Prison in San Quentin, California. Photo: Press Association/Eric Risberg.

Thank God, I’ve never had a child murdered. I hope I never do, and I hope that nobody else ever does. But tragically this is an occasional feature of our world, and of the people I’ve met who have lost children, the overwhelming sense I get is that it never leaves them. They learn to ‘live around it’, but they never ‘get over it’. And nothing, short of the impossible ask of bringing the child back, can ever fix it.

Which is just one of the reasons why the call by UKIP leader Paul Nuttall for the death penalty for child killers is wrong. Execution doesn’t take away the pain and it doesn’t provide closure. Speak to families of murder victims in the USA and, while different families want different things, one consistent thing is that the wrongs are not righted by killing a killer, even if justice is said to be done. For families who hoped it would be the end of their ordeal, the aftermath of execution can be bitter new stage of grief.

Many of the arguments about the death penalty have been repeated time and time again; prominent among them is the question of innocence. No justice system gets it right all the time, but you can’t release someone from death the way you can release them from prison. Indeed, of the three controversial cases that helped to end the death penalty in the UK, two of them involved men (Timothy Evans and Derek Bentley) whose were later found to be innocent, while in America, for every ten people executed since the 1970s (when new safeguards were put in place), one person has been exonerated. Less mentioned, but crucial for any victim-centred approach to the issue, is that wrongful executions mean the victim’s family will also have to live knowing that an innocent person died in the name of their loved one.

A central consideration of any issue of criminal justice, in fact of any issue full stop, should be: “What will do the most good and the least harm going forward, given where we are now?” The death penalty is not the least harmful response to murder, because of all the people it affects. The ripples spread far wider than just the killer, the victim and the victim’s family.

If you execute a child killer, then clearly somebody has to do the execution, but that also means someone has to carry the weight of doing it, of putting a fellow human to death. While there are some executioners who cope with their job (usually by focusing on it as ‘just a job’ that they try to do well), others do not. One former executioner in Kazakhstan, who was ‘initially chosen as an executioner because of his strong psychological coping capacity, reported frequent nightmares and deterioration into “a lonely and secluded life”’. American prison staff have developed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) because of their role in executions, while in Indonesia, prison guards who participate in executions get three days of mandatory spiritual guidance and psychological assistance afterwards, to help them deal with it. Prison systems come up with ways to try to stop people feeling like it was ‘their fault’: in Japan, three different staff press identical buttons to hang the prisoner, but only one button is live and they never find out ‘who did it’; in the USA, this diffusion of responsibility goes even further, with guards given apparently trivially small tasks such as tying down one leg of the prisoner to the lethal injection gurney. But when you have to work so hard to make something okay, maybe that’s a sign that it’s not okay.

Lawyers are also affected; as one from India put it in a report by Penal Reform International:

“I specialise in end-stage death cases … I dread these cases, and shudder every time a new one comes my way. Having taken it on, I feel I am living with a coffin tied to my back. It takes over my life, dominates my thoughts during the day, corrupts all pleasure and invades my dreams at night. I habitually have nightmares of executions, some of which I imagine are taking place in my apartment or just on the ledge outside the balcony where a scaffold has been erected, and the prisoner is being dropped from the balcony ledge with a rope tied to his neck. While preparing the case, I sometimes get so afraid that I am unable to work, and have to curl up under a blanket and go to sleep. Alcohol has a soothing effect on my nerves, and I have to stop myself from having more than one drink in the evening, or beginning the day with a gin and tonic. Ever since I started doing this work, people have been telling me that I age six years in six months.”

And then there is also the other family: the family and children of the person sentenced to death. Speaking to these children and the people who work with them, you get a sense of a group who are themselves innocent of a crime but suffer because of the crimes of others. They are traumatised, by the crime, by the death sentence and (if it happens) by the execution; they face the stigma of being related to a killer, which can remain long after the execution; and they have to live knowing that their parent will be put to death, and while they often recognise that the parent has done wrong, they still love them and would rather the parent was alive, even if in prison. When the child is related to both the killer and the victim (such as when the mother kills the father), it becomes even harder. A parental death sentence stays with a child for their whole life.

Unsurprisingly, people want the harshest sentence for the worst crimes. But that doesn’t mean the sentence should be as harsh as you can possibly imagine. We don’t need to kill to show how much we disapprove or how sad we are that a child has died. We should be asking for sentences that allow something better to come out of a horrible, tragic situation. We cannot undo what has already happened, but we can work to make a better future, to try to ensure there are no more crimes and no more victims. 

(Oliver Robertson is a Quaker working on issues of peace and human rights. He specialises in criminal justice matters, particularly the death penalty and children of prisoners, and on climate change).

This story was first published on openDemocracy.

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