Less than a month after the Jan. 6, 2021, assault on the U.S. Capitol, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin took the extraordinary step of pausing all operations for 24 hours to “address extremism in the ranks.” Pentagon officials had been shaken by service members’ prominent role in the events of Jan. 6.

Of the 884 criminal defendants charged to date with taking part in the insurrection, more than 80 were veterans. That’s almost 10% of those charged.

More remarkable, at least five of the rioters were serving in the military at the time of the assault: an active-duty Marine officer and four reservists.

Service members’ involvement in the insurrection has made the spread of extremism – particularly white nationalism – a significant issue for the U.S. military.

Solving the problem

A blue ribbon committee called the Countering Extremist Activity Working Group was quickly commissioned in April 2021 to evaluate the extent of the problem.

The group found about 100 substantiated cases of extremism in the U.S. armed forces in 2021.

The latest instance occurred in July 2022, when Francis Harker, a National Guard member with white supremacist connections, was sentenced to four years in prison for planning an anti-government attack on police. Harker, who carried a picture saying “there is no God but Hitler,” was planning to attack police officers in Virginia Beach, Virginia, with Molotov cocktails and semi-automatic rifles.

Worried, Austin has tightened the rules regarding political speech within the military. The new rules prohibit any statement that advocates for “violence to achieve goals that are political … or idealogical in nature.” The ban applies to members of the military both on and off duty.

Also, for the first time, the new rules prohibit statements on social media that “promote or otherwise endorse extremist activities.”

While the intent behind the new rules is laudable, political speech – even of an offensive or distasteful nature – goes to the core of U.S. democracy. Americans in uniform are still Americans, protected by the First Amendment and afforded the constitutional right of free speech.

In light of the stricter policy, it is useful to consider how courts apply the First Amendment in the military context.

Good order and discipline

While soldiers and sailors are certainly not excluded from the protection of the First Amendment, it is fair to say they operate under a diluted version of it.

As one federal judge observed, the “sweep of the protection is less comprehensive in the military context, given the different character of the military community and mission.”

The “right to speak out as a free American” must be balanced against “providing an effective fighting force for the defense of our Country,” a federal judge noted in a separate case.

These and other federal judges point to the military’s need for good order and discipline in justifying this approach.

While never precisely defined, good order and discipline is generally considered being obedient to orders, having respect for one’s chain of command and showing allegiance to the Constitution. Speech that “prevents the orderly accomplishment of the mission” or “promotes disloyalty and dissatisfaction” within the ranks harms good order and discipline, and can be restricted.

In 1974, for example, the Supreme Court ruled that the Army can punish an officer for encouraging subordinates to refuse to deploy.

The officer’s comments included: “The United States is wrong in being involved in the Vietnam War. I would refuse to go back to Vietnam if ordered to do so.”

In 1980, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Army could legally fire an ROTC cadet for making racist remarks during a newspaper interview.

Explaining his political philosophy, the cadet said: “What I am saying is that Blacks are obviously further behind the whites on the evolutionary scale.”

In 2012, a San Diego district court ruled that the Marine Corps can lawfully discharge a sergeant who mocked president Barack Obama while appearing on the “Chris Matthews Show.” At one point the sergeant told the host: “As an active duty Marine, I say screw Obama and I will not follow his orders.”

While each of these statements is protected by the First Amendment in civilian life, they crossed the line in military life because they were deemed harmful to morale and represented what one federal court described as more than “political discussion … at an enlisted or officers’ club.”

The military’s job is to fight, not debate

In deciding these First Amendment cases, courts often hark back to why the military exists in the first place.

“It is the primary business of armies and navies … to fight the nation’s wars should the occasion arise,” the Supreme Court said in 1955.

In a separate case, the Supreme Court declared: “An army is not a deliberate body. It is the executive arm. Its law is that of obedience.”

Quickly following orders can mark the difference between life and death in combat.

On a national level, the degree to which an army is disciplined can win or lose wars. A mindset of obedience does not come solely from classroom training but from repeated rehearsals under realistic conditions.

As a military judge observed in a 1972 decision, while service members are free to discuss political issues when off duty, the “primary function of a military organization is to execute orders, not to debate the wisdom of decisions that the Constitution entrusts” to Congress, the judiciary and the commander in chief.

New policy bans ‘liking’ extremist messages

The U.S. military’s revised approach to political speech prohibits retweeting or even “liking” messages that promote anti-government or white nationalist and other extremist groups.

Does a restriction this broad comply with legal precedent?

As a law professor who has served more than 20 years in the U.S military, I believe the broader rules will probably be upheld if challenged on First Amendment grounds.

The most comparable case is Blameuser v. Andrews, a 1980 case from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals where an ROTC cadet espoused white supremacist political views in a newspaper interview.

Amongst other extremist remarks, the cadet told the reporter: “You see, I believe that in the final analysis, the Nazi Socialist Party will take over America and possibly the whole world.”

Finding that the statements harmed good order and discipline, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Army did not violate the First Amendment when it subsequently removed him from the officer training program.

The cadet’s “views on race relations draw into question his ability to obey commands, especially in a situation in which he regards the military superior as socially inferior,” the Blameuser decision said.

The military has wide latitude in deciding who is deserving of the “special trust and confidence” that comes with military employment. Military officials are free to consider political and social beliefs that are “inimical to the vital mission of the agency” in making hiring and firing decisions, the Blameuser decision said.

Social media posts expressing support for violent political activities will likely be treated in the same way.

As the Seventh Circuit said in Blameuser, by liking or retweeting an extremist message, a service member’s actions are “demonstrably incompatible with the important public office” they hold.

Dwight Stirling, Lecturer in Law, University of Southern California

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Markus Soeder, State Premier Bavaria, Horst Seehofer, Federal Minister of the Interior, Manfred Weber, Chairman of the EPP group, take their seats to draw up CSU list for the European elections. Matthias Balk/ Press Association. All rights reserved.

I will never forget the day that I sent off the final manuscript of the English edition of On Extremism and Democracy in Europe. It was Friday November 13, 2015. Elated at having finally finished a task I thought would take much less time, I came home to celebrate with my wife. Barely inside the house, she asked me, “did you hear about Paris?” I had not, having been totally immersed in finishing the manuscript: but I knew it was not good news.

The last time Paris was big news was at the beginning of that year, when two brothers attacked the headquarters of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, killing twelve people, including most members of the editorial staff, including the famous cartoonists Jean Cabut (Cabu) and Stéphane Charbonnier (Charb). This time it was even worse. A small group of homegrown Jihadi terrorists had conducted a series of coordinated attacks at three diverse but highly public sites in Paris, killing 130 civilians and injuring 413. It was one of the darkest days in Europe this century.
 

Dark days

Although terrorist attacks have abated somewhat in recent years, at least in Europe, the continent is facing even bigger threats to liberal democracy today than on that day. Illiberal democracy has come to full fruition in Hungary, at the heart of the biggest liberal democratic project in history, the European Union. Not only did the EU fail to stop it, it actively enabled it, through lavish subsidies to the country and opportunistic political protection of the Orbán regime by the European People’s Party (EPP), the main political group in the European Parliament.

The Hungarian example has become an inspiration for authoritarian politicians across Europe, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, where leading politicians in aspiring (e.g. Macedonia) and current (e.g. Poland) member states have followed Orbán’s lead.

At the same time, Europe is part of a less and less predictable and more and more authoritarian world. Four of the five largest countries have seen an authoritarian turn in recent years, from China to India and from Brazil to the United States. Even in Indonesia authoritarian forces are prominent, albeit polling “only” in second place. And the EU is still limping from “crisis” to “crisis,” eagerly awaiting the final details of the Brexit deal, while bracing itself for another “populist backlash” in the 2019 European elections. Whatever the future holds, the key issues discussed in this book – the far right, populism, Euroscepticism and liberal democracy – will be at the forefront of the political struggles.
 

The normalization of the radical right

This book is a collection of op-eds I wrote, and interviews I gave, in the past decade or so. It is impossible to capture the political transformation that Europe has undergone in that period; in part, because it is still ongoing and the outcome, while looking increasingly grim, is far from certain. The political developments have also affected my own thinking, which can be seen from the various readings, which are published in chronological order, and have not been edited or updated, to provide a better insight into my own intellectual development as well as the mood of the time.

I started studying the far right as an undergraduate student at the University of Leiden, the Netherlands, in the early 1990s. It was still a marginal force within my own country, and, except for some specific countries (notably Austria and France), in Europe. Scholarship on the far right was in its infancy and strongly normative, with most people studying it from an explicitly “anti-fascist” perspective. Even “neutral” scholarship was frowned upon. Today, the far right has established itself at the center of European politics, while scholarship is predominantly “neutral”, although most scholars remain hostile to the far right itself (but increasingly sympathetic to its voters). Today, the far right has established itself at the center of European politics, while scholarship is predominantly “neutral”, although most scholars remain hostile to the far right itself (but increasingly sympathetic to its voters).

The public debate over the far right has fundamentally changed in the past decades. In the late twentieth century far right voices were either excluded or marginalized in the public debate. While the far right received disproportionate attention in the media, it was almost always within a strongly negative framework. Moreover, the media reported about the far right, but rarely gave the far right a direct voice.

In countries like Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, for example, op-eds by far right politicians were consistently rejected by mainstream media, to the extent that few would even bother to submit them. Compare that to today, when far right leaders like Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen can write op-eds for the New York Times and Wall Street Journal, and even AfD co-leader Alexander Gauland has published an op-ed in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

The normalization of the radical right is largely a consequence of the Rechtsruck of European politics, in part a calculated, and often opportunistic, response by center-right, and to some extent center-left, parties to the increased electoral success of radical right parties. The twenty-first century is so far the century of socio-cultural issues, with most elections dominated by non-economic issues centered around “identity” – with the notable exception of those countries most affected by the Great Recession, like Greece and Spain. In some ways, the radical right is setting the political agenda in Europe, by determining what we talk about and how we talk about it. But it can only do that with the tacit support of mainstream media and politics.

One of the most important consequences of the normalization of the far right is that far right politics is no longer limited to far right parties. Authoritarianism, nativism and populism are expressed, in more or less strident ways, by a broad variety of mainstream political parties. In fact, some parties have moved so far to the right, that it is no longer clear whether they are mainstream or radical right. This is certainly the case for Hungary’s Fidesz or Poland’s Law and Justice party, but similar concerns can be raised with regard to the Belgian New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), the British Conservative Party, the French The Republicans, the German Christian Social Union (CSU), and increasingly the Spanish Popular Party (PP). Similar concerns can be raised with regard to the Belgian New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), the British Conservative Party, the French The Republicans, the German Christian Social Union (CSU), and increasingly the Spanish Popular Party (PP).

While this Rechtsruck has given radical right parties more political influence, and made some of them Koalitionsfähig (again), it has also created an electoral challenge for them. In some countries, it has pushed the radical right further right, to remain distinctive from the mainstream right and regain the “radical” position on European integration and immigration (see the shift to Frexit and Nexit of Le Pen and Wilders, respectively). But in other countries the mainstream right went so far right, that the radical right saw no other possibility than to shift to the mainstream. This is the case, most notably, in Hungary, where Fidesz and Jobbik have shifted positions, and Jobbik is now campaigning against the “undemocratic” and “anti-European” Fidesz government.
 

Open extremists and career politicians

Another new phenomenon, long considered impossible within the academic literature, is the success of openly extreme right parties. With Golden Dawn (XA) in Greece and Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia in Slovakia, two neo-fascist parties are currently represented in a national parliament of an EU member state.

At the same time, members of the extreme right National Movement (RN) were elected to the Polish parliament on the list of the radical right Kukiz’15 movement and the longstanding German National Democratic Party (NPD) has a Member of the European Parliament. Outside of electoral politics, openly neo-fascist organizations like Casa Pound in Italy, or the slightly more guarded Identitarian Movement, are rearing their heads, building infrastructures and grabbing media attention with carefully crafted stunts.

What has become termed “the rise of populism”, meanwhile, is increasingly limited to the populist radical right. Since ignoring its own electoral promises, as well as its own referendum, and accepting the austerity policies associated with yet another bailout, SYRIZA has become an embarrassment rather than an inspiration for the European populist left. Podemos has lost electoral momentum, as it struggles with corruption scandals, the issue of Catalan independence, and an ideological and strategic disagreement over its left populist course. The last remaining hope comes from two movements led by true career politicians, i.e. Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s established Unbowed France (FI) and Oscar Lafontaine and Sarah Wagenknecht’s new Get Up movement.

For all the talk about populism, without a doubt the political buzzword of the twenty-first century so far, it has little policy implications. Political systems are not fundamentally revised, either at the national or at the European level, and referendums are more criticized than before the recent rise of populist parties. Political systems are not fundamentally revised, either at the national or at the European level, and referendums are more criticized than before the recent rise of populist parties.

While some mainstream right-wing politicians, like Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, claim that only “good” populism can defeat “bad” populism, they mostly refer to, and implement, nativist policies. And on the other side of the political spectrum, left-wing populism has gotten a new boost through the work of Belgian philosopher Chantal Mouffe, the widow of Ernesto Laclau, but their program is only “populist” according to their own definition.
 

Legitimate adversaries

This is not to say that populism is irrelevant, or no longer relevant. Populist attitudes are widespread across European populations, and are being fed and strengthened by an almost daily diet of sensationalist media coverage. They constitute a growing threat to liberal democracy in Europe, and around the globe, as they undermine consensus politics, while strengthening similarly intolerant anti-populist positions.

Moreover, although populism itself is not anti-democratic, it is logical that someone who is dissatisfied with the way democracy works for many years, will start wondering whether democracy as such is worthwhile. While I’m not a big fan of the “end of democracy” narrative, which is creating a growing, lucrative cottage industry in academia and punditry, it would be hard to argue that liberal democracy is alive and well.

Among the most important threats to liberal democracy in Europe are the rise of populist parties, the increasingly authoritarian responses to terrorism, and the opportunistic reaction to illiberal democracy within the European establishment. As several scholars have documented for the 1930s, including Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt, European democracies died at the hands of fascist outsiders, but with the crucial help of conservative insiders. A similar development is under way in contemporary Europe, in which the EPP played a major role in facilitating the creation of Orbán’s illiberal state. And while other political groups criticize Orbán and the EPP, they remain largely silent, or are much less outspoken, on authoritarian tendencies within their own member parties (such as SD-Smer or GERB). European democracies died at the hands of fascist outsiders, but with the crucial help of conservative insiders.

Grandstanding in the European Parliament might make for many likes on social media, but when not followed by actions, will strengthen the illiberal democrats directly and indirectly. It allows them to build their illiberal democratic regime, while at the same time pointing out the ineffectiveness, and hypocrisy, of liberal democracy. Moreover, fighting populism with anti-populism weakens rather than strengthens liberal democracy. It delegitimizes the political adversary, polarizes and simplifies differences and groups within society, and furthers a zero-sum type politics, which undermines the essence of the system: compromise between legitimate political adversaries.
 

The failure of the populist promise in Greece

It is here that Greece yet again features prominently, and not in a good way. After three years of populist coalition government, the populist promise has failed, and both ANEL and SYRIZA have plummeted in the polls. New Democracy has seen a modest uptake, but they are nowhere near pre-crisis levels, while other parties have remained stagnant in past years, despite ongoing political upheaval. The fact that few disappointed SYRIZA voters have found their way back to liberal democratic parties is not that surprising, given that parties like ND and PASOK mainly excel in anti-populism, opposing government policies almost irrespective of their merits.

This is not to say that SYRIZA has become a liberal democratic party. There have been too many attempts to circumvent or undermine the independent judiciary and media, for example, which mainly failed because of the incompetency of the populist forces and the dysfunctionality of the Greek state. But while anti-populism might make for effective opposition, it is no basis for government. So, when ND will return to power, possibly in coalition with the post-PASOK Movement for Change, it will do so with little positive agenda or support.
But let me try to end this introduction on a positive note. While the world has not become a better place since the English edition of this book was published, Greece has. Not only is the economic situation better, albeit far from good, the political situation is less precarious. SYRIZA has moderated and Golden Dawn has not become the main opposition party, as former Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis tirelessly predicted. Similarly, the EU has survived Brexit with more ease than was expected and is experiencing a serious Brexit bump in popularity. And, slowly but steadily, the EPP is finally starting to address the membership of Fidesz, while the EU is pressuring both Hungary and Poland, although to different extents.
 

Serious challenge to the loud and the silent

History does not repeat itself, but it also does not progress in a linear fashion. Liberal democracy is facing its most serious challenge in (Western) Europe since the end of the Second World War. As much as Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” was unsubstantiated and wrong, so are the growing claims of the “End of Liberalism” (and liberal democracy) premature and sensationalist at best.

European politics is transforming, which is not a bad thing. Whether it leads to the end or revitalization of liberal democracy is up to all of us, the loud minority of populists as well as the silent majority of liberal democrats.

Cas Mudde is the Stanley Wade Shelton UGAF Professor in the School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA) at the University of Georgia (USA) and a Professor II at the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) at the University of Oslo (Norway). Born in the Netherlands, where he got his M.A. and Ph.D. at Leiden University, his research addresses the question: how can liberal democracies defend themselves against political challenges without undermining their core values? His recent publications include The Far Right in America (Routledge, 2018), The Populist Radical Right: A Reader (Routledge, 2017), SYRIZA: The Failure of the Populist Promise (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), (with Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser) Populism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2017), and On Extremism and Democracy in Europe (Routledge, 2016). He is currently finishing The Far Right Today (Polity, 2019), is a columnist for the GuardianUS and Hope not Hate, and tweets at @casmudde.

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People often believe that terrorism is the weapon of the weak.
 

A memorial vigil for the victims of the shooting at the Tree of Life Synagogue where a shooter killed 11 and wounding six on Oct. 27, 2018. AP Photo/Gene J. Puskar

In other words, terrorism is practiced by marginalized groups that cannot influence government’s policies through legitimate means. However, developments on the violent far right since the victory of Donald Trump, I’d argue, present a different reality.

The attack at Pittsburgh’s Tree of Life Synagogue, as well as the sending of pipe bombs to critics of the current administration are just the latest examples of the consistent increase in the violence on the margins of the political camp currently controlling all branches of government. Because these acts were perpetrated by individuals with clear political agendas, I’d call them terrorism. While neither of these men were part of a named terrorist organization, and the synogogue shooting is being investigated as a hate crime, I’d argue that they are part of a virtual community that supported their political worldview.

The nonprofit Anti-Defamation League found that anti-Semitic incidents in the U.S. rose by 57 percent in 2017, the largest single year increase since it started recording such statistics. My own data set documents all far-right violent incidents since 1970 – not just anti-Semitic ones – and was first published in 2012. It reveals that in 2017 the United States experienced a 70 percent increase in violent attacks perpetrated in the name of far-right ideology.

Could a victory at the ballot box actually facilitate violence? Examples from other countries indicate that this may not be such a rare phenomenon. The two most brutal terrorist groups which emerged from the settlers’ movement in Israel – the Jewish Underground in the early 1980s and the Bat-Ayin Group in the early 2000s, operated in times when right-wing governing coalitions dominated the Israeli political system. Both groups were engaged in a campaign of violence against Palestinian civilians in the West Bank in order to undermine any policies designed to promote conciliation between the two sides.

Similarly, the electoral successes of European far-right parties in recent years, especially in local elections, were followed by increasing activity of related violent far-right groups and movements. The success of the AfD in Germany since 2016 was followed by acts of violence which were not seen in Germany since the times of the Nazi Party, such as the two days of violence against Jews and immigrants at the town of Chemnitz.

How can these trends can be explained? A research project which I’m currently conducting with two of my Ph.D. students at the University of Massachusetts Lowell tests three possible explanations.
 

Tolerant authorities

Potential perpetrators of violence may assume that the new political regime that they perceive to be supportive of their views will be more tolerant of politically motivated violence or illegal acts. These expectations are not without some basis.

Research I published in 2012 in the journal Security Studies showed that Israeli governments tended to use milder counterterrorism measures when they responded to the violence from groups that were ideologically close to them.

Similarly, studies focusing on the rise of left- and right-wing terrorism in Italy, and white supremacy groups in the American South, further confirmed that political officials are more reluctant to operate against groups which are located on their side of the political spectrum.

In the context of the U.S., individuals and groups that adhere to far-right ideology may interpret signals from government official as acceptance of their actions – or, at least, a sign that they can expect more lenient treatment from law enforcement. The Trump adminstration’s decision to focus its counterterrorism efforts on Islamic terrorism, and defund programs focusing on domestic radicalization may be one such signal. Another example is Trump’s reluctance to single out and criticize far-right groups and activities. His attitude was manifested after white supremacists marched in Charlottesville with Confederate battle flags, anti-Semitic placards and torches – activities Trump seemed loath to condemn. Lastly, conspiracy theories presented by some far-right pundits about the left’s involvement in the recent sending of pipe bombs, and the president’s decision to put the word “bomb” in quotation marks when addressing such incidents in his Twitter account may be read as tacit defense of such acts.
 

Empowerment

Another possibility we are testing is that perpetrators of violence feel empowered by Trump’s electoral victory in 2016. They feel his winning the election means their actions and ideology are gaining growing public legitimacy. In other words, they feel a sense of duty to continue to be engaged in political participation to ensure the implementation of their political ideology, as well as to attain a more visible position within the political arena.
 

Relative ‘disappointment’

A third explanation is based on political scientist Ted Gurr’s classical theory of relative deprivation. Gurr’s theory is that political violence often results from a gap between constituencies’ expectations and the actual goods provided by the government.

The reasoning here would go that the election of Trump led to high expectations in the American far right that the federal government would adopt at least some of their militant views and policy ideas. If, in the eyes of far-right activists, these expectations were not met, some of them may express their frustration via violent activities.

The difficulties of the current administration in implementing some of its immigration policies, as well as some willingness to compromise on the issue of gun legislation, may have frustrated activists who may feel the need to express their concerns via violent or illegal acts. For example, the Pittsburgh shooter felt Trump was a globalist not a nationalist, and influenced by his Jewish family and close associates.
 

Countering the violence

While our study is still ongoing, some initial findings can provide insights about the applicability of the above mentioned explanations.

The fact that the rise in the level of violence occurred immediately after the 2016 elections, and the relative success of the administration in delivering on many of its election promises – the travel ban, electing two justices to the Supreme Court – indicate that empowerment rather than a sense of deprivation may be responsible for the rise in the level of violence. The fact that the violence hasn’t increased since its peak in 2017 also suggests that the root causes of the violence are related more to the election results than subsequent policy developments. Moreover, the administration’s reluctance to delegitimize violent manifestations further enhance this sense of empowerment.

It is important to note that historical dynamics also support these insights. A study I published in 2012 shows that anti-abortion violence actually tends to increase following pro-life decisions of the Supreme Court. For example, between 1989 and 1992, a series of pro-life Supreme Court decisions upholding increased state supervision of abortion procedures empowered pro-life activists. Anti-abortion violence increased.

Coming back to today, the growing polarization of the American political system and the tendency to see elections as a zero sum game encourages each of the political parties to maximize the benefits of electoral victory. That, in turn, involves disregarding norms of cooperation and consensus building. What I would argue is that this need to exploit the fruits of victory may also encourage a few supporters of the winning political camp to use violence.
 

Arie Perliger, Director of Security Studies and Professor, University of Massachusetts Lowell

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Less than a week ago UK’s progressive South Asian organisations and Dalit groups had marched in their thousands to hand in a memorandum to President Kovind only to be told that their letter was not to be accepted under orders from the Indian government. Today, South Asia Solidarity Group and the SOAS India Society  said, in their statement:
 
‘The Indian government may not want to see our letter but the Modi government has nowhere to hide because the world is watching its crimes against its own people.’

 
The protest’s main  demands were

•  that the killers and attackers and propagators of hate be brought to justice
•  the Constitution be protected and upheld, the BJP must not be allowed to pursue it avowed project of replacing Ambedkar’s Constitution and its principles with the Manusmriti
•  and that the many political prisoners like severely disabled Professor G.N.Saibaba, Dalit leader Chandrashekhar Azad Ravan and the young Kashmiri photojournalist Kamran Yousuf be immediately released and the fake charges against them be dropped 

Nirmala Rajasingham on behalf of South Asia Solidarity Group said : ‘We stand with the many, many Indians who are rising in grief and rage against the horrificviolence choreographed by the Hindu supremacist Modi regime and its openly fascist parent organisation the RSS. Here in the UK too these Hindu  organisations are spreading their casteist venom and virulent Islamophobia. We will continue to confront them as we pledge to resist India’s descent into a Republic of Fear ‘
 

Rutuja Deshmukh of SOAS India Society said
‘From the lynchings of Muslims in the name of the cow, to the attack on a school bus over a film, and Justice Loya’ s mysterious death, there are more than enough reasons to conclude that the Indian state is turning into a fascist regime sooner than anyone imagined. It is our duty as responsible citizens to resist this advent of fascism.

Satpal Muman of the Dr Ambedkar Memorial Committee of Great Britain which also supported the vigil said: We are deeply concerned about the horrific attacks on Dalits which have escalated vastly under the Modi regime, about the hatred and violence against minorities and on all those who simply tell the truth. We cannot stand by while the democratic fabric of India is being threatened by the rise of Hindu supremacy
 
Also present at the vigil was Imran Dawood who had witnessed the murder of his familymembers who were visiting Gujarat on holiday from the UK, during the Gujarat massacresof 2002, while Modi was the Chief Minister of Gujarat 
 
The full statement of the organisers South Asia Solidarity Group and the SOAS Indian Society is as follows: 

This year has seen a continuation of the epidemic of mob lynching in which Muslims have been the main target. Whether the pretext has been claims of eating beef, cattle trading, so-called ‘love jihad’ or simply travelling while Muslim, these attacks have been instigated and organized by the network of vigilante groups and paramilitaries linked to the ruling BJP government and the openly fascist organisation which inspires and directs it, the RSS. Those who have been brutally murdered range from 15-year-old Junaid beaten to death in a train in UP, to Pehlu Khan lynched by cow vigilantes on a Rajasthan road. 

Their deaths have been met by resounding silence from the Prime Minister, justifications from his ministers, and waves of celebration from the army of hideously abusive online right-wing trolls, many of whom are followed by Narendra Modi, the man who himself oversaw the 2002 genocide of Muslims in Gujarat when he was Chief Minister. 

On December 6, millions of people witnessed the horror of Afrazul Khan, a migrant worker from Bengal, being hacked to death and burnt alive in Rajasthan, with the carnage being sickeningly videoed and circulated online by the perpetrator and his 14-year-old nephew. That the perpetrator Shambhulal was very far from a mentally disturbed lone wolf was confirmed by the celebrations of his crime and the protests against his arrest organized by the Hindu right wing organizations linked to the government, culminating in the replacing of the Indian flag by the saffron flag (representing Hindu supremacist power) atop the High Court building in Udaipur. Equally chilling was the fact that the murder was clearly pre-planned to take place on the anniversary of the demolition by RSS footsoldiers of the historic 16th century Babri Masjid (mosque) in 1992. 

December 2017 saw the continuation of attacks on Christians which have involved brutal assaults on churches and pastors, with the authorities colluding in the persecution of people celebrating Christmas in BJP-ruled Madhya Pradesh, where carol singers were first attacked by Hindu right-wing groups and then arrested by the police. 

This year has also seen the intensification of attacks on Dalits, and brutal attempts to crush their ongoing resistance to caste oppression, by the forces of the Hindu right. In UP where the rabidly communal and casteist hate preacher Yogi Adityanath was made Chief Minister in March 2017, we witnessed the burning of Dalit villages and the sexual assaults on Dalit women by upper caste mobs in Saharanpur. This was followed by the arrest of Chandrashekhar Azad (Raavan) the leader of the Bhim Army, a Dalit Human Rights Group. While Chandrashekhar Azad was granted bail by the Allahabad High Court on November 2, with the court observing that charges against him were “politically motivated” , the very next day the Uttar Pradesh government slapped the National Security Act (NSA) against him in an effort to silence him.

Most recently, as 2018 began, Hindu right wing terror groups carried out attacks on thousands of Dalit families who had gathered at Bhima Koregaon village in Maharashtra to commemorate the 200th anniversary of a battle which is central to Dalit identity.. Instead of arresting the key organisers of this violence (one of whom is a close associate of Modi) the police have carried out a witch hunt of Dalit youth and children, beating them up and arresting them on fabricated charges and telling their parents that these minors will be in prison for years.

Meanwhile the Modi government is ruthlessly seeking to silence all those who dissent from its agenda of creeping fascism. The cold-blooded assassination on September 5, 2017 of the courageous journalist Gauri Lankesh in Bangalore, who had fearlessly criticized and exposed the BJP and its associated groups, brought thousands onto the streets in mourning and protest. While the mainstream media have become loyal mouthpieces for the Modi government, whipping up hysteria against all those who criticize the government, alternative critical media outlets like The Wire have been threatened with massive lawsuits when they expose the terror unleashed by the Modi regime and its endemic corruption. We learnt too about the suspected murder of Justice Loya, the judge who dared to insist that Modi’s right- hand man Amit Shah appear in court in the Sohrabuddin murder case. And now the interference by the Modi-appointed Chief Justice in the investigation of Justice Loya’s death has led four of the five senior-most Supreme Court judges to take the unprecedented step of holding a press conference to warn of the ‘danger to democracy’ posed by the Modi government. Meanwhile, BJP leaders like Union Minister Anant Kumar Hegde have openly stated their intention to get rid of the Indian Constitution drafted by Ambedkar and its basic principles of liberty equality and fraternity, replacing it with the caste supremacist and misogynist principles of Manusmriti! 

As India descends rapidly into open fascism, we cannot afford to remain silent. We must stand by those whose very existence is under threat. We must show our solidarity with the thousands taking to the streets in India in protest against mob lynching, atrocities on Dalits, assassinations of dissidents and the Islamophobic, caste supremacist far-right regime of Narendra Modi. 

#NotInMyName #ResistTheRepublicOfFear #NoToFascismInIndia 
South Asia Solidarity Group www.southasiasolidarity.org @SAsiaSolidarity and SOAS India Society
 

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Freedom of thought needs an atmosphere of tolerance where people can speak their mind and no one is forced to accept the beliefs of others. In the Middle East, though, tolerance is in short supply and ideas that don't fit the expectations of society and governments are viewed as a threat.

Where religion is concerned, the "threat" can come from almost anyone with unorthodox ideas but especially from those who reject religion entirely.

Increasingly, atheists in Arab countries are characterised as dangerous extremists – to be feared no less than violent jihadists.

Persecuting atheists is the inevitable result of governments setting themselves up as guardians of faith. Among the 22 Arab League countries, Islam is "the religion of the state" in 16 of them: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the UAE and Yemen. 

For most of them, this is more than just a token gesture; it also serves political purposes. Embracing religion and posing as guardians of morality is one way for regimes to acquire some legitimacy, and claiming a mandate from God can be useful if they don't have a mandate from the public.

State religions, in their most innocuous form, signal an official preference for one particular kind of faith and, by implication, a lesser status for others. But the effects become far more obtrusive when governments rely on state religion as an aid to legitimacy – in which case the state religion has to be actively supported and policed. That, in turn, de-legitimises other belief systems and legitimises intolerance and discrimination directed against them. 

The policing of religion in Arab countries takes many forms, from governments appointing clerics and setting the theme for weekly sermons to the enforcement of fasting during Ramadan. 

To shield the government-approved version of religion from criticism, a variety of mechanisms can be deployed. These include laws against "defaming" religion and proselytising by non-Muslims but general laws regarding public order, telecommunications and the media may also apply.

In Algeria, for instance, the law forbids making, storing, or distributing printed or audiovisual materials with the intention of "shaking the faith" of a Muslim. In Oman, using the internet in ways that "might prejudice public order or religious values" is an imprisonable offence.

For Muslims who publicly abandon Islam the problem is even worse. In Mauritania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen anyone convicted of apostasy faces the threat – at least in theory – of execution.

Using a state religion as an aid to legitimacy turns the personal beliefs of individuals into a political issue, because disagreeing with the state's theological position also implies disloyalty to the state. Those who happen to disagree must either conform or risk becoming not only a religious dissident but a political one too.

Equating religious conformity with loyalty to the state allows Arab governments to label non-conformists not merely as dissidents but extremists. This in turn provides an excuse for suppressing them, as has been seen in Egypt with the Sisi regime's campaign against atheism and in Saudi Arabia where "promotion of atheist thought" became officially classified as terrorism.

Although Saudi Arabia's war on atheists stems from fundamentalist theology, in Egypt it's the opposite: the Sisi regime presents itself as a beacon of religious moderation. To describe the Sisi brand of Islam as moderate, though, is rather misleading. "Militantly mainstream" might be a better term. Theologically speaking it is middle-of the-road and relatively bland but also illiberal and authoritarian in character.

The result in Egypt is a kind of enforced centrism. While allowing some scope for tolerance – of other monotheistic religions, for example – the regime sets limits on discourse about religion in order to confine it to the middle ground. The main intention, obviously, was to place Islamist theology beyond the bounds of acceptability but at the other end of the spectrum it also means that atheism, scepticism and liberal interpretations of Islam have become forms of extremism.

Defining 'extremism'

Absurd as it might seem to place atheists in the same category as extremists such as terrorists and jihadists, the issue hinges on how "extremism" is defined: extreme in relation to what? Violent and intolerant extremism is a global phenomenon but confusion arises when governments try to define it by reference to national or culture-specific values.

Arab states are not the only offenders in this respect, though. They have been assisted by western governments defining "extremism" in a similar way – as rejection of a specific national culture rather than rejection of universal rights and international norms.

In its effort to prevent radicalisation of students, for example, the British government defined extremism as "vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values". Also in the context of eradicating extremism, the education minister talked about actively promoting "British values" in schools.

Approaching the problem in this way invites other countries to do likewise – even if their own national and cultural values would be considered extreme in relation to universal rights and international norms. Thus, Saudis can justifiably claim that atheism is contrary to fundamental Saudi values. Furthermore, the British minister's idea of instilling British values into British schoolchildren is not very different in principle from "instilling the Islamic faith" in young Saudis – which the kingdom's Basic Law stipulates as one of the main goals of education.

This article was first published on al-Bab.
 

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The female Jamaat activists were holding a clandestine meting on Sunday night

 

Police have detained 37 activists of Jamaat-e-Islami’s women wing, including its Narail unit chief, with a huge stockpile of Jihadi books from the town’s Bhouakhali area.

Narail Police Superintendent Rakibul Islam said they had been tipped off about a clandestine meeting of the female Jamaat members at the residence of the party’s district unit chief Ashak-e-Elahi on Sunday night.

He said they had found a large number of Jihadi books and donation receipts at the house.

“We detained 37 female activists, including their district unit leader Hosne Ara,” the SP added.

Republished with permission from Dhaka Tribune.

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Businessman Alamgir Hossain from the capital’s Kazipara handed over his two sons to police after he became suspicious that they had been indoctrinated in religious extremism.

The man was hoping that the police would help with the rehabilitation of his sons. However, police produced the two boys in court on April 11, 16 days after their detainment on March 25, although they are legally required to bring detainees before court within 24 hours.

The frustrated father is now saying that law enforcement agencies were too busy collecting information from his sons instead of helping them rehabilitate to a normal life.

“Our finding is that about 82% of the arrested militants were radicalised by online writings and conversations. They were misled by militant outfits when they were out trying to sate their curiosity about their own religion:” Dhaka police

On January 14, authorities of Mymensingh Ishwarganj Girls High School and Women College found leaflets containing anti-state speeches and false misguiding information about Islam in the hands of students. They later saw a person clad in burka distributing the leaflets on their CCTV footage.

Since the Holey Artisan and Sholakia attacks in 2016, law enforcement has cracked down on radical militants. Almost 50 militants have been killed in confrontations with law enforcement and the army, and more than 100 militants have been nabbed.

The government, however, appears to be giving far less priority to protecting young boys and girls from getting easily drawn to violent radical ideologies.
Most of steps to prevent radical ideologies from spreading among the public have gone unnoticed or been ineffective.
 

The government has taken many initiatives to fight radicalisation, key among them is engaging imams of mosques to preach against extremism. However, experts say massive educational reform and social initiative is required. Photo Credit: Dhaka Tribune

Bangladesh police’s Counter-Terrorism Focal Point and police headquarters assistant inspector general Md Moniruzzaman said: “Our finding is that about 82% of the arrested militants were radicalised by online writings and conversations. They were misled by militant outfits when they were out trying to sate their curiosity about their own religion.”

Experts are blaming a lack of coordination amongst the concerned ministries, lack of initiatives from different national and regional socio-cultural organisations and lack of unity amongst the country’s political parties.

Dhaka University’s History Professor Dr Muntassir Mamoon said: “Psychological change among the people is necessary to combat extremism.

“The government took many initiatives to counter radicalisation and militancy, which were praiseworthy and partially successful.  But this is not enough. Nationwide socio-cultural movement and effective changes in the education system is necessary.”
 

A radical change in the country’s education system is must, the academic said.

“We need to synchronise the syllabi of Qawmi and Alia madrasas with mainstream education. Besides, social values and cultural movements must be strengthened in order to get rid of the problem permanently,” he said.

Ali Riaz, a professor of politics at Illinois State University, told the Dhaka Tribune: “Bangladesh has to dissolve the conditions favourable to radicalisation, like limitations to practice democratic rights, hindrance to expressing opinions, extremist speeches in politics, political imbalance and violence.
 

“The native socio-political crisis when mixed with the global trend of militancy and extremism creates a hazardous situation for the whole country,” he said.
Home Ministry sources said there is no budget for nationwide anti-militancy campaigns.

A Home Ministry official seeking anonymity said people still think that the responsibility of de-radicalisation lies with the government, so they are not taking up any initiatives themselves.

Social scientist Dr Anupam Sen said: “People are not involved with cultural activities that much anymore. The cultural field has been captured by small groups. This is a cause behind radicalisation among youths.”

Islamic Foundation Director General Shamim Afzal Khan, however, claimed the foundation was almost successful with its anti-militancy campaign.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina last week assured that militants and extremists wanting to get back to normal life would be given support so that they can reintegrate into society.

This story, first published on Dhaka Tribune, is being republished with permission.
 

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Data on violent incidents in the US reveal that focus on Islamist extremism since 9/11 may be misguided

A woman holds a flag as she looks out over the National Sept. 11 Memorial and Museum. REUTERS/Lucas Jackson

On a Tuesday morning in September 2001, the American experience with terrorism was fundamentally altered. Two thousand, nine hundred and ninety-six people were murdered in New York, Virginia and Pennsylvania. Thousands more, including many first responders, lost their lives to health complications from working at or being near Ground Zero.

The 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by Islamist extremists, resulting in nearly 18 times more deaths than America’s second most devastating terrorist attack – the Oklahoma City bombing. More than any other terrorist event in U.S. history, 9/11 drives Americans’ perspectives on who and what ideologies are associated with violent extremism.

But focusing solely on Islamist extremism when investigating, researching and developing counterterrorism policies goes against what the numbers tell us. Far-right extremism also poses a significant threat to the lives and well-being of Americans. This risk is often ignored or underestimated because of the devastating impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

We have spent more than 10 years collecting and analyzing empirical data that show us how these ideologies vary in important ways that can inform policy decisions. Our conclusion is that a “one size fits all” approach to countering violent extremism may not be effective.

By the numbers

Historically, the U.S. has been home to adherents of many types of extremist ideologies. The two current most prominent threats are motivated by Islamist extremism and far-right extremism.

To help assess these threats, the Department of Homeland Security and recently the Department of Justice have funded the Extremist Crime Database to collect data on crimes committed by ideologically motivated extremists in the United States. The results of our analyses are published in peer-reviewed journals and on the website for the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism & Responses to Terrorism.

The ECDB includes data on ideologically motivated homicides committed by both Islamist extremists and far-right extremists going back more than 25 years.

Between 1990 and 2014, the ECDB has identified 38 homicide events motivated by Islamist extremism that killed 62 people. When you include 9/11, those numbers jump dramatically to 39 homicide events and 3,058 killed.

The database also identified 177 homicide events motivated by far-right extremism, with 245 killed. And when you include the Oklahoma City bombing, it rises to 178 homicide events and 413 killed.

Although our data for 2015 through 2017 are still being verified, we counted five homicide events perpetrated by Islamist extremists that resulted in the murders of 74 people. This includes the Pulse nightclub massacre in Orlando, which killed 49 people. In the same time period, there were eight homicide events committed by far-right extremists that killed 27 people.

These data reveal that far-right extremists tend to be more active in committing homicides, yet Islamist extremists tend to be more deadly.

Our research has also identified violent Islamist extremist plots against 272 targets that were either foiled or failed between 2001 and 2014. We are in the process of compiling similar data on far-right plots. Although data collection is only about 50 percent complete, we have already identified 213 far-right targets from the same time period.

The locations of violent extremist activity also differ by ideology. Our data show that between 1990 and 2014, most Islamist extremist attacks occurred in the South (56.5 percent), and most far-right extremist attacks occurred in the West (34.7 percent). Both forms of violence were least likely to occur in the Midwest, with only three incidents committed by Islamist extremists (4.8 percent) and 33 events committed by far-right extremists (13.5 percent).

Targets of violence also vary across the two ideologies. For example, 63 percent of the Islamist extremism victims were targeted for no apparent reason. They just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, often visiting symbolic locations or crowded venues such as the World Trade Center or military installations.

In contrast, 53 percent of victims killed by far-right extremists were targeted for their actual or perceived race or ethnicity. Far-right extremists, such as neo-Nazis, skinheads and white supremacists, often target religious, racial and ethnic, and sexual orientation and gender identity minorities.

Motives and methods

There are also differences in violent extremists across demographics, motives and methods. For instance, data show that guns were the weapon of choice in approximately 73 percent of Islamist extremist homicides and in only 63 percent of far-right extremist homicides. We attribute these differences to far-right extremists using more personal forms of violence, such as beating or stabbing victims to death.

We have also found that suicide missions are not unique to Islamist extremists.

From 1990 to 2014, we identified three suicide missions in which at least one person was killed connected to Islamist extremism, including the 9/11 attacks as one event. In contrast, there were 15 suicide missions committed by far-right extremists.

Our analyses found that compared to Islamist extremists, far-right extremists were significantly more likely to be economically deprived, have served in the military and have a higher level of commitment to their ideology. Far-right extremists were also significantly more likely to be less educated, single, young and to have participated in training by a group associated with their extremist ideology.

Threat to law enforcement and military

Terrorists associated with Islamist and far-right extremist ideologies do not only attack civilians. They also pose a deadly threat to law enforcement and military personnel. During the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 72 law enforcement officers and 55 military personnel were killed by members of Al-Qaida. On April 19, 1995, 13 law enforcement officers and four military personnel were killed when the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building was bombed by an anti-government far-right extremist in Oklahoma City.

Outside of these two events, Islamist extremists are responsible for the murders of 18 military personnel in three incidents, and seven law enforcement officers were killed in five incidents between 1990 and 2015. Far-right extremists have murdered 57 law enforcement officers in 46 incidents, but have never directly targeted military personnel.

Far-right extremists, who typically harbor anti-government sentiments, have a higher likelihood of escalating routine law enforcement contacts into fatal encounters. These homicides pose unique challenges to local law enforcement officers who are disproportionately targeted by the far right.

Moving forward

The events of 9/11 will continue to skew both our real and perceived risks of violent extremism in the United States. To focus solely on Islamist extremism is to ignore the murders perpetrated by the extreme far right and their place in a constantly changing threat environment.

Some have even warned that there is potential for collaboration between these extremist movements. Our own survey research suggests this is a concern of law enforcement.

Focusing on national counterterrorism efforts against both Islamist and far-right extremism acknowledges that there are differences between these two violent movements.

Focusing solely on one, while ignoring the other, will increase the risk of domestic terrorism and future acts of violence.

Both ideologies continue to pose real, unique threats to all Americans. Evidence shows far-right violent extremism poses a particular threat to law enforcement and racial, ethnic, religious and other minorities. Islamist violent extremism is a specific danger to military members, law enforcement, certain minorities and society at large. It remains imperative to support policies, programs and research aimed at countering all forms of violent extremism.

(This story is republished from The Conversation. The original story may be read here).

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The recent data released by the National Investigating Agency (NIA) regarding cases of terrorism in 2016 took the national media by surprise. One of the ‘surprising’ elements that came out of the NIA briefing was the only about 20% madrasa graduates had been found to be involved in terror related cases. The majority of Muslim youth who are implicated in terror cases by the NIA are graduates of regular colleges, some even having engineering degrees. But why is it surprising at all. It fits the pattern of overall association of modern educated Muslims and their fascination for aligning with terrorism.

In majority of the cases of terror related activities, university and college educated Muslim youth far outnumber madrasa graduates. After all, Osama was not a madrasa graduate, neither were Muhammad Atta and others who made 9/11 a possibility.

While this must come as a huge relief to madrasas who are always under the scanner of intelligence agencies and have been accused of being involved in promoting terror, it should not be made out that nothing is wrong is with these madrasas. But we will come to that later.

The traditional focus on madrasas as a site of jihadi extremism should thus be jettisoned in favour a broader focus on the lure of Islamism, the existing pedagogical practices within Islam and the Muslim-Kafir dichotomous worldview which many readings of Islam today provide.

The simple reason in the Indian context why madrasas are not knee deep in terror is because they just do not have the capacity to do so. The sophistication that is required for arms training and the knowledge that accompanies such training simply eludes a madrasa graduate.

Within their madrasas they are too engrossed in literal textual hair splitting and in repeating a knowledge system which has absolutely no relationship with the present world. When an average madrasa graduate in India cannot locate USA on the world map, then it is too much to expect from him to be involved in the obliteration of America. When average madrasa graduate is taught that it is the Shia and the Ahmadias who are the enemies of Islam, then it is natural that their energy will be channelized in countering them rather than thinking about waging jihad against the Hindus.

When an average Barelwi madrasa student is too busy learning that Deobandis are spreading kufr, then there is no way he can be planning in terms of destroying India. The simple argument therefore is that madrasas do not have the time to think of Christians or Hindus to paint them as the enemy. They are too busy and consumed by the internal enemies of Islam, that countering them becomes the first priority. It is therefore not a surprise that madrasas are not in any position to produce graduates who would be willing to wage a jihad against India.

The more troubling part of course that came out in the NIA brief was the involvement of AhleHadis in terror related activities in India. Now it will be a long shot to call the AhleHadis a terrorist organization but there will be some questions asked if this pattern continues that members of AhleHadis are found to be involved in such activities. Similar allegations have been thrown at them in the context of Kashmir militancy. In the valley it is not just acts of terror but also their involvement in the anti-Sufi tirade has long been commented on. It is time perhaps that the AhleHadis in India comes out with a categorical statement making its stand clear in relation to Islamic terrorism in India.

But perhaps the most surprising part of the NIA brief was the involvement of TablighiJamaat. Owing allegiance to Deoband, the Tablighi Jamaat has been understood as a movement of piety which shuns violence. Its parent body, the Deoband, has denounced terrorism in categorical terms. Some policy pundits have gone to the extent of calling the TablighJamaat as the role model for Muslims across the globe to follow. So what has gone wrong with this quietist movement? The answers will always be complex and of course a lot will depend upon the individual biographies of members who are involved in such activities. But what can be said is that no one is immune from the murderous charms of Islamism. And denouncing terrorism does not mean that one has denounced the worldview which gives rise to such acts in the first place.

The fact the no Barelwis where found to be involved in such activities should also be taken with a pinch of salt. Just because so far there has been no involvement of the Barelwis so far does not mean that concepts like jihad, kufr and kafir have become redundant for them. Before the liberal camp starts celebrating this face of moderate Islam, they will do well to remember that the killer of Salman Taseer was a Barelwi and that till his eventual hanging, he was utterly convinced that killing the infidel Taseer was a divine Islamic commandment.

The traditional focus on madrasas as a site of jihadi extremism should thus be jettisoned in favour a broader focus on the lure of Islamism, the existing pedagogical practices within Islam and the Muslim-Kafir dichotomous worldview which many readings of Islam today provide.

(Arshad Alam is a NewAgeIslam.com columnist)

This article was first published on New Age Islam.
 

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