The emergence of digital platforms and social media has drastically altered the nature and reach of speech. It has amplified individual voices and democratized access to discourse but has also resulted in the rapid proliferation of hate speech, misinformation, and digitally mediated harassment. As a result, the Indian judiciary is increasingly called upon to interpret Article 19(1)(a) in new and complex contexts involving viral speech, horizontal harms, satire, and artistic or academic dissent.

This legal resource undertakes a detailed doctrinal analysis of four recent, and significant, Supreme Court cases:

1. Wazahat Khan v. Union of India (July 14, 2025)
2. SMA Cure Foundation v. UOI & Ranveer Allahabadia v. UOI (July 15, 2025)
3. Hemant Malviya v. State of Madhya Pradesh (July 15, 2025)
4. Ali Khan Mahmudabad v. State of Haryana (July 16, 2025)

Each of these cases involves a critical inquiry into the nature, scope, and limits of free speech in India’s constitutional framework, and together they reveal emerging patterns in the Court’s jurisprudential approach to speech rights in the digital age.

Case summaries, oral observations and judicial reasoning

• Wazahat Khan v. Union of India (W.P. (Crl.) No. 247/2025)

Bench: Justices B.V. Nagarathna and K.V. Viswanathan

Background: Wazahat Khan, a Kolkata-based citizen, was booked in multiple FIRs across Assam, Maharashtra, Delhi, and Haryana for social media posts allegedly containing derogatory comments about Hindu deities and festivals, deemed capable of inciting communal hatred. Ironically, the FIRs were registered in retaliation to an earlier complaint filed by Khan that had led to the arrest of another influencer, Sharmistha Panoli. Sharmistha Panoli had earlier been arrested following Khan’s complaint, after she allegedly made inflammatory social media posts that mocked Islamic practices and targeted Muslim identity. Khan’s petition before the Supreme Court sought the quashing or consolidation of these FIRs and protection from arrest. 

Key observations during the hearing: The bench did not deliver a final order but made powerful oral remarks. Justice Nagarathna emphasised that Article 19(1)(a) is not an unqualified right and must be interpreted in light of the values of fraternity, unity, and integrity as articulated in the Preamble. She introduced a significant concept: the “horizontal dimension” of free speech—that is, the idea that speech may harm other citizens, not just involve state action.

“If they (citizens) want to enjoy the fundamental right of speech and expression, it should be with the reasonable restrictions also. Apart from that, there must be self-restraint and regulation also, to enjoy the valuable freedom, not like this abuse. Article 19 is against the state, what you call it – verticality. What about horizontality?”

The Court, as per the report of LiveLaw, expressed concern about the sheer volume of litigation arising from social media abuse and the burden it places on law enforcement. Justice Viswanathan stressed the role of social awareness and social boycott of hate content as preferable to state censorship. The Court hinted at the possibility of issuing guidelines or norms for digital speech and invited senior counsel to assist.

“This is happening in the country. There is no restraint freedom of speech and expression is a very very important freedom and a fundamental right. If there is abuse of that freedom leading to litigation and clogging of courts…There are also other criminal cases the police can attend to instead of chasing these kind of cases. What is the solution to this? We are not from the point of view of state, we are asking from the point of view of citizens.”

The order of the Court may be read here.

• SMA Cure Foundation v. Union of India & Ranveer Allahabadia v. Union of India (W.P. (Crl.) Nos. 83, 85/2025; W.P. (C) No. 460/2025)

Bench: Justices Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi

Background: SMA Cure Foundation, an advocacy organization for persons with disabilities, filed a petition alleging that comedians Samay Raina, Vipun Goyal, Balraj Ghai, Sonali Thakkar, and Nishant Tanwar had made demeaning jokes targeting the disability community. Parallelly, YouTubers Ranveer Allahabadia and Ashish Chanchlani faced multiple FIRs for obscene and vulgar content posted as part of the “India’s Got Latent” controversy.

Key observations during the hearing: The bench, as per the LiveLaw report, made a striking doctrinal assertion: that the right to freedom of speech cannot override the right to dignity under Article 21. Justice Surya Kant explicitly stated:

Individual misconducts, which are under scrutiny, will continue to be examined. Foundation has raised serious issue. Something very disturbing. Right to dignity also emanates from right which someone else is claiming…Article 19 can’t overpower Article 21…Article 21 must prevail if any competition takes place”

The Court showed disapproval of online content that mocked marginalised groups and questioned whether comedians and digital influencers, who wield significant public influence, could be held to higher standards of accountability.

Importantly, the Court did not order any punitive measures but instead called for wider debate on formulating enforceable guidelines. It invited the Attorney General to assist and welcomed participation from the Bar and other stakeholders. This reflects a shift in judicial function—from adjudication to constitutional norm-building.

“For that, we can grant more time…we would like to test the guidelines…you have to have guidelines which are in conformity with constitutional principles, comprising both parts – freedom, where limit of that freedom ends, and where duties start…we would like to invite open debate on that…members of Bar, stakeholders and all so-called stakeholders, all invited”

The order of the Court may be read here.

• Hemant Malviya v. State of Madhya Pradesh (SLP (Crl.) No. 9906/2025)

Bench: Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Aravind Kumar

Background: Indore-based cartoonist Hemant Malviya faced FIRs for a satirical cartoon, originally published in 2021, depicting a figure in RSS uniform receiving a COVID-19 vaccine from a caricature of PM Modi. The cartoon was later re-shared in May 2025 with new commentary on caste census, which the police claimed was derogatory and communally provocative.

Key observations during the hearing: The High Court had denied Malviya anticipatory bail, observing that his speech was malicious and repeat in nature. The Supreme Court disagreed, offering interim protection and accepting a written apology.

Justice Dhulia noted that while speech may be offensive, it must still fall within the scope of permissible criticism or satire unless it meets the thresholds of incitement or criminality. The Court rejected ASG Nataraj’s attempts to rely on unrelated social media posts and refused to expand the scope of inquiry.

The bench emphasised proportionality and due process, suggesting that criticism of public figures, even when expressed through satire, deserves constitutional protection unless it crosses specific statutory thresholds.

The order of the Court may be read here.

• Ali Khan Mahmudabad v. State of Haryana (W.P. (Crl.) No. 219/2025)

Bench: Justices Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi

Background: Professor Mahmudabad was arrested over two posts relating to “Operation Sindoor”—a term associated with India’s counterterrorism operations following an attack in Pahalgam. The FIR alleged that the posts promoted disharmony and questioned national sovereignty. The Court had earlier directed the formation of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) comprising senior IPS officers not connected to Haryana or Delhi.

Key observations during the hearing: The SIT submitted an interim report revealing that Mahmudabad’s electronic devices had been seized and sent for forensic examination. The Court took exception to this scope creep, reiterating that its previous order had clearly limited the SIT’s inquiry to the contents of the two posts.

Justice Kant rebuked the State: “You don’t require him (Mahmudabad); you require a dictionary.”

The Judge emphasised that Mahmudabad’s full cooperation had been noted and that he need not be summoned again. The Court clarified that the conditions imposed on his bail were limited to refraining from commenting on sub-judice issues and did not prevent him from writing on other subjects.

The order of the Court may be read here.

Emerging themes

1. Dignity vs. speech: The Court is increasingly foregrounding Article 21 (right to dignity) as a counterweight to Article 19(1) (a), especially in contexts where speech targets marginalised groups (e.g., PwDs, minorities).
2. Horizontal constitutionalism: Free speech harms are being judicially recognised as capable of violating the rights of fellow citizens, not just triggering state restrictions.
3. Proportionality and overreach: The Court is attentive to investigative excesses. It has insisted on narrowly tailored inquiries limited to the impugned speech, especially where speech is political or academic.
4. Restorative justice models: The preference for apology, deletion, and voluntary restraint over punitive action is becoming evident. The Court appears to favour reconciliation and reform over retribution.
5. Judicial guidance on digital speech: All four cases underscore the urgent need for a principled legal framework, judicial or legislative, to navigate the evolving challenges of digital speech, satire, and platform responsibility.
6. Academic and artistic freedom: Dissent, satire, and political commentary remain protected categories. However, speech that incites violence or promotes enmity is not shielded by Article 19(1) (a).

Conclusion

These four 2025 Supreme Court cases collectively represent a jurisprudential moment of recalibration. Rather than treating freedom of speech as an unqualified right, the Court is moving toward a value-based, relational model of free expression—one that recognizes its entwinement with dignity, fraternity, and public order.

Yet, this emerging framework remains under construction. The Court has, thus far, avoided prescribing hard norms. It has instead exercised judicial nudging—advising, hinting, and calling for broader debate. In doing so, it aims to balance constitutional fidelity with pragmatic caution.

As the Court navigates these complexities, it must be vigilant against the misuse of dignity and harmony as tools for suppressing legitimate dissent. What lies ahead is a judicially supervised regime of responsible, contextual, and inclusive free speech—one that reflects both the rights and the duties of Indian citizenship in the digital age.

Related:

Truth on Trial: Why Karnataka’s Misinformation and Fake News (Prohibition) Bill, 2025 threatens free speech, due process, and democracy

Dissent Note: The alarming scope of Maharashtra’s Special Public Safety Bill, 2024

India’s Hate Speech Surge | Who’s Spreading It & Who It Targets | CJP’s Fight Against Hate

The post Recalibrating Free Speech: The Supreme Court’s constitutional turn in the digital age appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The poem did not name any religion or community but lamented injustice, questioned state power, and called for non-violence as a means of resistance. The complaint alleged it incited religious hatred and disturbed social harmony.

What was at stake was far greater than one poem or one politician—it was the scope of criminal law in regulating political speech, the meaning of “incitement”, and whether popular offence can override constitutional values.

Background: A poem, a platform, and a prosecution

On December 29, 2024, during a mass wedding programme in Jamnagar, Gujarat, organised by a local councillor, Imran Pratapgarhi recited a poem that was later posted as a video on his verified social media account on the platform ‘X’. The poem included verses such as:

“ए ख़ून के प्यासों बात सुनो
गर हक़ की लड़ाई ज़ुल्म सही
हम ज़ुल्म से इश्क़ निभा देंगे…”

Translated broadly:

“O you blood-thirsty, listen!
If the fight for rights brings injustice,
We will meet that injustice with love…”

The FIR accused the appellant of promoting enmity between communities and disturbing national harmony. Shockingly, he was charged under Sections 196, 197(1), 302, 299, 57 and 3(5) of the BNS—provisions dealing with incitement, hate speech, religious disharmony, and even abetment of violence. Through the FIR, it was alleged that the spoken words of the poem incite people of one community against another, and it hurts a community’s religious and social sentiments. It was further alleged that the song had lyrics that incited people of other communities to fight for the community’s rights. It was claimed that the video posted by the appellant created enmity between two communities at the national level and hatred towards each other. It was further alleged that it had a detrimental effect on national unity.

Key observations of the Court

1. Constitutional Voice vs. State Machinery: A foundational tension

At the heart of this judgment lies an old constitutional paradox: the State is both the guarantor and violator of fundamental rights. Justice Oka, with characteristic candour, begins by confronting this tension head-on:

“This case shows that even after 75 years of the existence of our Constitution, the law enforcement machinery of the State is either ignorant about this important fundamental right or does not care for this fundamental right.” (Para 1)

In this opening salvo of the judgment, Justice Abhay S. Oka sets the tone for a judgment that is as much an indictment of institutional apathy as it is a reaffirmation of constitutional values. The observation that even after 75 years of constitutional existence, law enforcement remains either ignorant of or indifferent to the fundamental right to freedom of expression, reveals a profound structural dysfunction. This remark is not made in passing—it is a judicial rebuke aimed squarely at a State apparatus that defaults to coercion over constitutional engagement. By framing the issue as one of institutional disrepair rather than individual excess, the Court shifts the spotlight from the accused citizen to the accuser state, raising critical questions about how routinely—and with what legal illiteracy—criminal law is weaponised to suppress dissent.

What emerges from this framing is the Court’s role not as a mere adjudicator of facts, but as a constitutional conscience-keeper. Rather than balancing “free speech” against “law and order,” the judgment asserts that the State’s repeated resort to criminal prosecution for expressive acts is itself an affront to the constitutional order. This is not just about a misreading of a poem—it is about the State’s deep discomfort with metaphor, criticism, and resistance. The Court’s insistence that the rule of law includes a duty to respect rights, not merely regulate them, transforms the case into a referendum on how faithfully the State embodies the very freedoms it claims to guarantee. In doing so, the Court subtly but powerfully reclaims constitutional morality as an active, living principle—not a hollow preamble.

2. A Theory of Free Speech: From libertarian tolerance to affirmative protection

This judgment doesn’t merely shield speech—it underlines its necessity. Justice Oka, who had authored the judgment on the behalf of the Bench, frames Article 19(1) (a) as not merely a right but as a structural precondition for human dignity and democratic engagement, thereby locating it within the broader penumbra of Article 21:

“Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or groups of individuals is an integral part of a healthy, civilised society. Without freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. In a healthy democracy, the views, opinions or thoughts expressed by an individual or group of individuals must be countered by expressing another point of view. Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected.” (Para 38)

This convergence of Articles 19 and 21 reflects a distinctly substantive conception of liberty, moving beyond formal non-interference toward affirmative obligation. The State (including the police and judiciary) is thus required not just to refrain from suppressing speech but to actively ensure its flourishing.

“The reasonable restrictions provided for in Article 19(2) must remain reasonable and not fanciful and oppressive. Article 19(2) cannot be allowed to overshadow the substantive rights under Article 19(1), including the right to freedom of speech and expression.” (Para 29)

3.  The law’s elasticity: From ambiguity to abuse

The charges levelled against Pratapgarhi under Sections 196, 197, 299, 302, and 57 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita represent an alarming instance of legal overbreadth being used as a political weapon. The BNS, like its predecessor IPC, contains clauses so capaciously worded (e.g., “feelings of enmity”, “disharmony”, “outraging religious beliefs”) that they leave room for subjective interpretation and state-led abuse.

Justice Oka (and J Bhuyan) cut through this ambiguity:

“By no stretch of imagination does it promote enmity… The poem refers to injustice and offers non-violence as a response. It cannot be seen as a cause of communal disharmony.” (Para 10)

This is a clear attempt to re-inscribe constitutional interpretation over statutory vagueness, requiring any criminal allegation under these sections to pass a high threshold of intent, clarity, and demonstrable harm.

4. From Lalita Kumari to BNSS: Rethinking FIR registration

The Court’s discussion on Section 173(3) of the BNSS is an important departure from earlier CrPC jurisprudence under Lalita Kumari.

Where Lalita Kumari limited the police’s discretion, the BNSS introduces a structured preliminary inquiry model for offences punishable by 3–7 years—like many speech-related provisions.

The Supreme Court insists that in all speech-related cases where this discretion is available, it must be exercised:

“If an option under sub-Section (3) is not exercised by the police officer in such a case, he may end up registering an FIR against a person who has exercised his fundamental right under Article 19 (1)(a) even though clause (2) of Article 19 is not attracted. If, in such cases, the option under sub-Section (3) of Section 173 is not exercised, it will defeat the very object of incorporating sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS and will also defeat the obligation of the police under Article 51-A (a).” (Para 29)

This means the police must now interpret the text of the speech itself, not just the complaint—an approach that, while normatively sound, places interpretive responsibility on officers often untrained in the subtleties of metaphor, political critique, or artistic licence.

5. Institutional analysis: The High Court’s abdication and the Supreme Court’s role as rights sentinel

The Gujarat High Court, by deferring to the early stage of the investigation, abdicated its constitutional responsibility to scrutinise rights violations at the threshold.

The Supreme Court rebuked this stance:

      “We fail to understand how the High Court concluded that the message was posted in a manner that would certainly disturb social harmony. Thereafter, the High Court gave a reason that the investigation was at a nascent stage. There is no absolute rule that when the investigation is at a nascent stage, the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to quash an offence by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the CrPC equivalent to Section 528 of the BNSS. When the High Court, in the given case, finds that no offence was made out on the face of it, to prevent abuse of the process of law, it can always interfere even though the investigation is at the nascent stage.” (Para 37)

This reaffirms that judicial intervention in the early stages of political or speech-related prosecutions is not just permissible but necessary. The longer the case proceeds, the more the process itself becomes punishment. This view counters a dangerous trend: judicial evasion in politically sensitive matters, often under the guise of deference to procedure. Here, the Court restores its duty as a constitutional firewall, refusing to be paralysed by formalism.

6. The Reasonable Reader standard: Sedition, hate Speech, and judicial empathy

A key analytical move in the judgment is the revival of the “reasonable, strong-minded” observer standard from Bhagwati Charan Shukla:

“When an offence punishable under Section 196 of BNS is alleged, the effect of the spoken or written words will have to be considered based on standards of reasonable, strongminded, firm and courageous individuals and not based on the standards of people with weak and oscillating minds. The effect of the spoken or written words cannot be judged on the basis of the standards of people who always have a sense of insecurity or of those who always perceive criticism as a threat to their power or position.” (Para 33)

This interpretive lens displaces subjective offence with an objective, resilient baseline, thereby protecting robust discourse. It delegitimises state action based solely on hurt sentiments or perceived disrespect to power. This is especially important in India’s contemporary climate, where claims of communal hurt are often wielded as instruments of political repression.

7. Literature as democratic praxis: The place of poetry in the Constitutional Order

In recognising the poem’s form and context, the Court refrains from sterilising language into literalism. Justice Oka honours the metaphorical richness of poetic expression and its political function:

“…the poem does not encourage violence. On the contrary, it encourages people to desist from resorting to violence and to face injustice with love. It states that if our fight with injustice results into the death of our near and dear ones, we would be happy to bury their bodies.” (Para 10)

Poetry here is not ornamental—it is political speech in its most potent, imaginative form. The Court recognises that to penalise such speech is to criminalise dissent itself. This judgment contributes to an emerging jurisprudence where art is recognised as both speech and constitutional engagement, not as a diluted cousin of prose but as its fiercest challenger.

8. Toward a doctrine of “Constitutional offence”

Perhaps the most striking analytical thread is the Court’s suggestion that some state actions themselves verge on a constitutional offence:

      “Even while dealing with the performance of an obligation under sub-Section (1) of Section 173, where the commission of the offence is based on spoken or written words, the police officer concerned will have to keep in mind the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) read with an exception carved out under clause (2) of Article 19. The reason is that he is under an obligation to abide by the Constitution and to respect the ideals under the Constitution. The Constitution is more than 75 years old. By this time, the police officers ought to have been sensitized about their duty of abiding by the Constitution and respecting the ideals of the Constitution.” (Para 30)

Here, Justice Oka (and Justice Bhuyan) aren’t merely interpreting law—they are charging the State with constitutional delinquency. In doing so, they lay the groundwork for a potential doctrine where misuse of criminal process to silence dissent could itself be a rights violation subject to public law remedy.

This is not explicitly framed in the language of compensation or tort—but it hints at a growing judicial recognition that abuse of power is not neutral—it is a rights violation in itself.

Legal analysis of offences under BNS: A systematic dismantling

In the judgment, the Supreme Court, has also meticulously analysed the ingredients of each alleged offence and found all of them legally untenable.

1. Section 196 (Promoting enmity between groups)

      “The poem does not refer to any religion, caste or language. It does not refer to persons belonging to any religion. By no stretch of imagination, does it promote enmity between different groups. We fail to understand how the statements therein are detrimental to national unity and how the statements will affect national unity. On its plain reading, the poem does not purport to affect anyone’s religious feelings.” (Para 12)

Based on precedent (Manzar Sayeed Khan, Patricia Mukhim, Javed Ahmad Hajam), the Court reaffirmed that criminalising speech requires a showing of deliberate intent (mens rea). Without it, the mere content of speech, however provocative to some, is not criminal.

      “Mens rea will have to be read into Section 196 of the BNS… it is impossible to attribute any mens rea to the appellant.” (Para 34)

2. Section 197 (Prejudicial to national integration)

Therefore, as the Supreme Court, read both facts and the law, the poem by Imran Pratapgarhi did not attract the offence under Section 197 as it:

• Did not cast doubt on the loyalty of any group.
• Did not assert the denial of citizenship rights.
• Did not jeopardise national unity.

      “…the poem does not make or publish any imputation and is not concerned with any religious, racial, language, regional group, caste, or community. It does not suggest that any class of persons have been denied rights as citizens because they are members of a religious, racial, language, regional group, caste, or community. It does not make or publish any assertion, counsel, plea or appeal likely to cause disharmony or feeling of enmity or hatred or ill will. The poem does not publish or make any false or misleading information.” (Para 16)

3. Section 299 & Section 302 (Religious insult or wounding religious sentiment)

The Court termed these charges “ridiculous”:

      “To say the least, it is ridiculous to say that the act of the appellant is intended to outrage the religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs. The poem only tells the rulers what the reaction will be if the fight for rights is met with injustice.” (Para 17)

4. Section 57 (Abetment by public)

      “We fail to understand, even if it is assumed that the appellant has committed some offence, how he has abetted the commission of an offence by the public generally or by any number or class of persons exceeding ten.” (Para 19)

The Supreme Court’s systematic dismantling of the charges against Imran Pratapgarhi reflects a jurisprudence grounded in constitutional fidelity and statutory precision. In addressing Section 196 of the BNS—concerning promotion of enmity between groups—the Court reiterates a long-standing doctrinal principle: that the mere capacity of speech to provoke cannot substitute for a demonstrable, deliberate intent to incite enmity. Drawing from precedents like Manzar Sayeed Khan, Patricia Mukhim, and Javed Ahmad Hajam, the Court makes it clear that mens rea—a deliberate, malicious state of mind—is essential for liability. The poem in question, devoid of any reference to religion, caste, or community, could not be interpreted as promoting group enmity, and to criminalise it would be a distortion of both the statute and the Constitution. The Court’s reading imposes a constitutional filter on the BNS provision, ensuring it cannot be misused to punish subjective offence or perceived disrespect.

This logic extends seamlessly to the rejection of charges under Sections 197, 299, 302, and 57. Under Section 197, which deals with acts prejudicial to national integration, the Court’s reasoning is particularly illuminating. Justice Oka dissects the elements of the offence and finds none fulfilled: the poem neither impugns any group’s loyalty nor suggests the denial of citizenship rights, nor does it propagate disinformation. Similarly, the invocation of Section 299 and 302 for religious insult is dismissed as “ridiculous,” with the Court recognising that the poem critiques state injustice, not religious belief. Most striking is the Court’s incredulity at the Section 57 charge—abetment by the public—highlighting not only the absence of any instigated act but also the absurdity of imagining that poetic expression could be interpreted as a generalised call to criminal conduct. This cluster of analyses reveals not only the hollowness of the FIR but also the deeper pathology of criminal law’s misuse: charges laid without regard for statutory thresholds, constitutional limits, or evidentiary plausibility. Justice Oka and Justice Bhuyan’s reasoning is a potent reminder that law, especially criminal law, cannot be driven by sentiment, conjecture, or political expediency—it must be anchored in demonstrable harm, clear intent, and legal fidelity.

The Court as guardian of the Republic’s imagination

Imran Pratapgarhi judgement is not merely about poetry—it is about power, protest, and the place of dissent in India’s constitutional framework. This judgment revitalises the meaning of free speech in an age where criminal law is increasingly wielded to silence opposition. It teaches us that:

• Law is not merely a set of punishments but a moral language.
• Courts must defend expression, even if the State finds it discomforting.
• Poetry, critique, and satire are not seditious—they are the scaffolding of a free republic.

In this moment, the Supreme Court does not merely defend a poem—it defends the possibility of dissent itself. And that makes it one of the most important judgments on freedom of speech in recent Indian history.

To borrow the Court’s own words:

      “Courts, particularly the constitutional Courts, must be at the forefront to zealously protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. It is the bounden duty of the Courts to ensure that the Constitution and the ideals of the Constitution are not trampled upon.” (Para 39)

Conclusion: A Constitutional anthem for the right to dissent

The Imran Pratapgarhi judgment stands as a powerful reaffirmation that the Constitution of India is not a brittle document to be bruised by sentiment, nor a tool to be twisted by the might of the State. It is, instead, a living charter that guarantees not only the right to speak, but the right to disturb, to provoke, and to dissent—particularly through art, poetry, and political expression. Justice Oka’s reasoning does not merely rescue one man from a legally untenable prosecution; it reclaims the constitutional promise that the State cannot demand silence in exchange for citizenship.

By scrupulously dismantling every charge brought under the BNS and holding law enforcement accountable to constitutional ideals, the judgment delivers a rare, lucid defence of free speech in an era when such freedoms are frequently under siege. It goes beyond the judicial role of error correction and enters the moral terrain of democratic defence. This case is not just precedent—it is a call to conscience for the police, for the lower judiciary, and for civil society. In drawing a firm constitutional line between law and power, it sends an unequivocal message: poetic dissent is not criminal, and the Constitution does not flinch before uncomfortable truths.

Ultimately, this is not merely a judgment about the legality of a poem—it is a resounding assertion of the Republic’s constitutional soul. It reminds us that the true test of democracy is not how the State treats speech that flatters, but how it responds to speech that resists. On that test, the Supreme Court has spoken with uncommon clarity and courage.

The complete judgment may be read below.

Related:

Judicial Setback: Supreme Court dilutes Bombay HC’s bold stand on police accountability in custodial killing in Badlapur case

India’s Free Speech Crisis Deepens: 329 violations recorded in just four months of 2025

“Nothing but an abuse of the process of law”: SC bars second Foreigners Tribunal case against same person, reinforces finality of citizenship verdicts

The post A Republic That Listens: The Supreme Court’s poetic defence of dissent through Imran Pratapgarhi judgment appeared first on SabrangIndia.

If we observe the glorification of Dr. BR Ambedkar by the RSS-BJP rulers on his birth anniversary, it appears that they, the sangh parivar are the most loyal followers of him, none other. According to Prime Minister Modi, Ambedkar was ‘architect of the Constitution of India’ and ‘Messiha of the Schedule Castes’.

The UP government has announced a grand celebration of ‘Ambedkar Jayanti’ beginning with a series of programmes from the morning of April 13 (2025), leading up to the main celebrations on April 14 at Lucknow which will be attended by the Hindutva icon, chief minister, Adityanath. These programmes “aim to acquaint the younger generation with Dr Ambedkar’s remarkable life, visionary leadership, and his unwavering commitment to justice, equality, and social reform”.

Dr. Ambedkar is receiving fullsome praise after his death. In life, the RSS and its bandwagon which included the VD Savarkar-led Hindu Mahasabha, never missed an opportunity to denigrate him, often resorted to the burning of his effigy! If Dr. Ambedkar were to appear now, in the India ruled by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) cadres, make no mistake, he would be either lynched or put in jail under terror laws for his trenchant opposition to Caste and the attendant denigration of Sudras, Women. Especially his sharp critique of Privileged Castes hegemony and Hindutva.

1. Ambedkar supported the burning of Manusmriti

The RSS wants Indian constitution to be replaced by the Manusmriti or Manu Code or laws of Manu which is known for its derogatory and inhuman references to Sudras, Untouchables and women. This is the very Book that Babasaheb burned.  The Constituent Assembly of India finalised the Constitution of India on November 26, 1949, RSS was not happy. Its organ, Organiser in an editorial on November 30, 1949, complained:

“But in our Constitution, there is no mention of the unique constitutional development in ancient Bharat. Manu’s Laws were written long before Lycurgus of Sparta or Solon of Persia. To this day his laws as enunciated in the Manusmriti excite the admiration of the world and elicit spontaneous obedience and conformity. But to our constitutional pundits that means nothing.”

By demanding promulgation of laws of Manu in an Independent India, the RSS was simply following its mentor, philosopher and guide VD Savarkar who declared that,

“Manusmriti is that scripture which is most worship-able after Vedas for our Hindu Nation and which from ancient times has become the basis of our culture-customs, thought and practice. This book for centuries has codified the spiritual and divine march of our nation. Even today the rules which are followed by the crores of Hindus in their lives and practice are based on Manusmriti. Today Manusmriti is Hindu Law.”

It is to be noted here that a copy of Manusmriti was burnt as a protest in the presence of Dr. BR Ambedkar during historic Mahad agitation on December 25, 1927. He also called for burning Manusmriti on December 25 each year.

2. Ambedkar held ‘High’ (Privileged) Caste Hindus which control Hindutva politics responsible for the miserable life of Hindus and hatred for Muslims

He was crystal clear in his view, that,

“[The] high caste Hindus are bad as leaders. They have a trait of character which often leads the Hindus to disaster. This trait is formed by their acquisitive instinct and aversion to share with others the good things of life. They have a monopoly of education and wealth, and with wealth and education they have captured the State. To keep this monopoly to themselves has been the ambition and goal of their life. Charged with this selfish idea of class domination, they take every move to exclude the lower classes of Hindus from wealth, education and power, the surest and the most effective being the preparation of scriptures, inculcating upon the minds of the lower classes of Hindus the teaching that their duty in life is only to serve the higher classes. In keeping this monopoly in their own hands and excluding the lower classes from any share in it, the high caste Hindus have succeeded for a long time and beyond measure…

“This attitude of keeping education, wealth and power as a close preserve for themselves and refusing to share it, which the high caste Hindus have developed in their relation with the lower classes of Hindus, is sought to be extended by them to the Muslims. They want to exclude the Muslims from place and power, as they have done to the lower-class Hindus. This trait of the high caste Hindus is the key to the understanding of their politics.”

[B.R. Ambedkar, Pakistan or the Partition of India (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1990), p. 123, first Published December 1940, Thackers Publishers, Bombay.]

3. Ambedkar renounced Hinduism

Ambedkar, in his historic speech in Nagpur on October 15, 1956, a day after he had embraced Buddhism, said,

“The movement to leave the Hindu religion was taken in hand by us in 1935, when a resolution was made in Yeola. Even though I was born in the Hindu religion, I will not die in the Hindu religion. This oath I made earlier; yesterday, I proved it true. I am happy; I am ecstatic! I have left hell — this is how I feel. I do not want any blind followers. Those who come into the Buddhist religion should come with an understanding; they should consciously accept that religion.”

If he tries to convert now we can imagine what terrible fate he will meet!

4. Ambedkar fought for equal rights for women

For the RSS Hindu women are inferior in every respect. The outfit, demands promulgation of Manusmriti as constitution of India which shockingly denigrates women as we will see in the following [few out of dozens]:

1. Day and night woman must be kept in dependence by the males (of) their (families), and, if they attach themselves to sensual enjoyments, they must be kept under one’s control.
2. Her father protects (her) in childhood, her husband protects (her) in youth, and her sons protect (her) in old age; a woman is never fit for independence.
3. Women do not care for beauty, nor is their attention fixed on age; (thinking), ‘(It is enough that) he is a man,’ they give themselves to the handsome and to the ugly.
4. Through their passion for men, through their mutable temper, through their natural heartlessness, they become disloyal towards their husbands, however carefully they may be guarded in this (world).
5. (When creating them) Manu allotted to women (a love of their) bed, (of their) seat and (of) ornament, impure desires, wrath, dishonesty, malice, and bad conduct.
6. For women no (sacramental) rite (is performed) with sacred texts, thus the law is settled; women (who are) destitute of strength and destitute of (the knowledge of) Vedic texts, (are as impure as) falsehood (itself), that is a fixed rule.

Sharply to the contrary, Dr. Ambedkar believed in equality for women. He was clear that, “We shall see better days soon and our progress will be greatly accelerated if male education is persuaded side by side with female education…” He went on to stress that “I measure the progress of community by the degree of progress which women had achieved”. He advised Dalit women, “Never regard yourself as Untouchables, live a clean life. Dress yourselves as touchable ladies. Never mind, if your dress is full of patches, but see that it is clean. None can restrict your freedom in the choice of your garments. Attend more to the cultivation of the mind and spirit of self-Help.”

Liquor was a bane in Dalit families and in order remedy it he asked women “do not feed in any case your spouse and sons if they are drunkards. Send your children to schools. Education is as necessary for females as it is for males. If you know how to read and write, there would be much progress. As you are, so your children will be.”

5. Ambedkar did not subscribe to the idea of Hindu nation and decried Hindutva

Dr. Ambedkar, a keen researcher of the communal politics in pre-independence India, while underlying the affinity and camaraderie between Hindu Mahasabha and Muslim League on the issue of Two-Nation Theory wrote:

“Strange it may appear, Mr. Savarkar and Mr. Jinnah instead of being opposed to each other on the one nation versus two nations issue are in complete agreement about it. Both agree, not only agree but insist that there are two nations in India—one the Muslim nation and the other Hindu nation.”

According to him, the idea of “Hindustan for Hindus…is not merely arrogant but is arrant nonsense”. He was emphatic in warning that,

“If Hindu Raj does become a fact, it will, no doubt, be the greatest calamity for this country… [It] is a menace to liberty, equality and fraternity. On that account it is incompatible with democracy. Hindu Raj must be prevented at any cost.”

6. Ambedkar believed in Socialism

Jawaharlal Nehru introduced the Objective Resolution [OR] on December 13, 1946. Dr. Ambedkar’s turn to respond to OR came on 17 December 1946. He stated:

“If this resolution has a reality behind it and a sincerity, of which I have not the least doubt, coming as it does from the mover of the resolution [Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru], I should have expected some provision whereby it would have been possible for the state to make economic, social and political justice a reality and i should have from that point of view expected the resolution to state in most explicit terms that in order that there may be social and economic justice in the country, that there would be nationalisation of industry and nationalisation of land, I do not understand how it could be possible for any future government which believes in doing justice socially, economically and politically, unless its economy is a socialistic economy.”

7. Ambedkar’s antipathy towards ‘Hindutva ‘nationalists’ & ‘Patriots’

Dr Ambedkar, as early as 1931, said that whenever he demanded equality for lower Castes, marginalised sections and Depressed classes he would be called a communalist and anti-national. He was forthright in telling the ‘nationalists’ & ‘patriots’:

“India is a peculiar country, and her nationalists and patriots are a peculiar people. A patriot and a nationalist in India is one who sees with open eyes his fellowmen treated as being less than men. But his humanity does not rise in protest. He knows that men and women for no cause are denied their human rights. But it does not prick his civic sense to helpful action. He finds the whole class of people shut out from public employment. But it does not rouse his sense of justice and fair play. Hundreds of evil practices that injure man and society are perceived by him. But they do not sicken him with disgust. The patriot’s one cry is power and more power for him and for his class. I am glad I do not belong to that class of patriots. I belong to that class which takes its stand on democracy, and which seeks to destroy monopoly in a very shape and form. Our aim is to realise in practice our ideal of one man one value in all walks of life, political, economic and social.”

[Dr BR Ambedkar in the Plenary Session of Round Table Conference, London, 8^th Sitting, January 19, 1931.]

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

Related:

Rediscovering Ambedkar to Fight Against Hindutva

Hindutva Forces Want to Appropriate Ambedkar but not Impart his Teachings

Babasaheb Ambedkar’s Scathing Attacks on Hindutva and Hindu Rashtra

The post On his 135th birth anniversary, we ask, would Ambedkar be allowed free speech in India today? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This case, arising from an FIR registered against Imran Pratapgarhi, a Member of the Rajya Sabha, for offenses related to a poem he shared on social media, specifically addressed the application of Section 173 of the BNS, which governs the procedure for handling information in cognisable cases and the subsequent registration of FIR.

Brief Facts and Background

Parliament Member Imran Pratapgarhi posted a video in which a poem was shared, which according to a complainant, promoted enmity between religious communities, and that it constituted imputations that are prejudicial to the national integrity.

The FIR was filed with offences under Section 302 (Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings of any person), Section 299 (Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs), Section 57 (Abetting commission of offence by public or by more than ten persons).

Mr. Pratapgarhi approached the High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS read with Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the FIR. Section 528 of the BNSS states that nothing in the BNSS limits or affects the inherent powers of the High Court to pass such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under BNSS or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India provides High Courts with the power to issue certain writs to any person or authority, including Government in appropriate cases for enforcing fundamental rights provided under Part III of the Constitution, or for any other purpose.

The High Court refused to intervene. Aggrieved, Mr. Pratapgarhi approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court examined the poem in question and opined, first, that there is nothing in the poem which attracted the offences mentioned before. Later, it went on to deal with the question of whether, in this case, it was obligatory under Section 173(1) of the BNSS to register FIR or not.

Provisions and case law

Section 173(1) of the BNSS states that every information relating to the commission of a cognisable offence, irrespective of the area where the offence is committed, may be given (orally or via electronic communication) to an office in-charge of a police station and if given orally, such officer shall reduce it to writing by him or under his direction, read it over to the informant, and have it signed by the informant.

Essentially, when one gives a complaint over a cognisable offence, the police will have to record it in writing and take signature of the complainant. This record is commonly known as a First Information Report (FIR). Section 173(2) states that a copy of the FIR be given to the complainant free of cost.

Section 173(3) states that when an information relating to commission of a cognisable offence which is punishable with three years or more but less than seven years of imprisonment, the officer in charge of the police station may with the prior permission from an officer, not below the rank of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, considering the nature and gravity of the offence,

1. proceed to conduct preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter within a period of fourteen days; or
2. proceed with investigation when there exists a prima facie case.

There exists a conflict between Section 173 (1)—which states FIR should be registered when cognizable offence related information comes and Section 173 (3)—which states that a preliminary investigation ought to be done for cognizable offences which are punishable for more than three but less than seven years.

In Lalita Kumari vs Government of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court stated that the condition sine qua non (essential condition) for registering FIR is that there must be information, and the information discloses commission of cognisable offence, the reasonableness or credibility of information is not a condition precedent for the registration of FIR.

Supreme Court resolved this contradiction in Imran Pratapgarhi vs. State of Gujarat (2025 INSC 410).

Judgement and its reasoning

On Section 173

While Section 173 (1) is the general rule, according to the court, Section 173 (3) is an exception to the rule. This means that when information is given to the police, if prima facie, a cognizable offence is made out, an FIR is to be registered unless the offence is covered under Section 173 (3) in which case a preliminary investigation could follow (Para 25).

According to the court, Section 173 (3) of the BNS thus introduces a notable exception, granting the police the discretion to conduct a preliminary assessment even when the information received might disclose a cognisable offense, if it is falling within the specified punishment range.

This pronouncement highlights a significant deviation from the general principle of immediate FIR registration for cognisable offenses, as previously emphasized by the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(CrPC).

On free speech and usage of Section 173(3)

In its judgment, the Supreme Court laid significant emphasis on the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression enshrined in Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court went further to characterize the registration of the FIR against Mr. Pratapgarhi as a “mechanical exercise” and a clear “abuse of the process of law” (Para 36).

This strong condemnation implies that the police acted without a proper appreciation of the nuances of free speech and potentially misconstrued the intent and message of the poem. The Court also highlighted the societal value of various forms of artistic expression, including poetry, literature, drama, films, and satire, emphasizing their role in enriching human life and the necessity of their protection under the umbrella of free speech (Para 38).

In this case, the Supreme Court specifically ruled that when an allegation concerns an offence that falls under the ambit of the restrictions on free speech outlined in Article 19 (2) of the Constitution, it is invariably appropriate to conduct a preliminary inquiry under Section 173 (3) of the BNS before proceeding to register an FIR (Para 29).

The Court reasoned that when allegations are predicated on spoken or written words, it is incumbent upon the police officer to carefully examine the content to ascertain whether it indeed constitutes a cognizable offense

According to the Court, this initial assessment of the material does not equate to a preliminary inquiry that would be impermissible under Section 173 (1) when the information already discloses a cognizable offense. The Court underscored that the failure to utilize the option of conducting a preliminary inquiry under Section 173 (3) in cases where potential free speech violations are at issue could result in the registration of an FIR against an individual merely for exercising their fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (a), even if the restrictions stipulated under Article 19 (2) are not applicable.

Furthermore, the Court opined that neglecting to invoke Section 173 (3) in such circumstances would undermine the very purpose for which this sub-section was incorporated into the BNSS (Para 29). It would also contravene the constitutional obligation of the police under Article 51-A (a) to uphold the Constitution and respect its ideals, according to the Court.

To this end, the Supreme Court suggested that the higher police officer, whose permission is required under Section 173(3), should ordinarily grant such permission to conduct a preliminary inquiry in cases involving the exercise of free speech where the potential punishment falls within the range of three to seven years (Para 29).

This directive indicates a clear expectation from the apex court that superior officers should facilitate the process of preliminary inquiry in such scenarios to ensure that the fundamental right to freedom of speech is adequately protected from unwarranted criminal prosecution at the very outset.

Conclusion: a paradigm shift in policing free speech

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat marks a transformative moment in the jurisprudence of free speech and police powers, recalibrating the balance between constitutional rights and procedural obligations. By mandating preliminary inquiries under Section 173 (3) of the BNS for allegations implicating Article 19 (2) restrictions, the Court has introduced a safeguard against precipitate criminalization of speech. This intervention is not merely procedural but foundational, ensuring that the exercise of free expression—particularly in artistic or public discourse—is shielded from arbitrary state action.

The ruling underscores that police discretion under Section 173 (3) is not a license for inaction but a constitutional duty to scrutinise allegations rigorously. By requiring higher police authorities to authorise preliminary inquiries, the judgment institutionalizes accountability, preventing FIRs from becoming tools of harassment. This is especially critical in speech-related cases, where the line between lawful dissent and cognizable offenses is often blurred by subjective interpretations. The Court’s emphasis on the societal value of poetry, satire, and other forms of expression serves as a reminder that democratic robustness thrives on diversity of thought, even when contentious.

Critically, the judgment does not dilute the obligation to act on cognisable offenses but contextualises it. By distinguishing between immediate FIR registration under Section 173 (1) and the need for preliminary assessment under Section 173 (3), the Court harmonises competing imperatives: the necessity of prompt action in grave crimes versus the imperative to protect speech from overzealous policing. This nuanced approach ensures that the police remain guardians of both law and liberty, rather than arbiters of societal consensus.

While the judgment does not absolve individuals of accountability for speech that incites violence or undermines public order, it raises the threshold for criminal prosecution. This is a welcome check on the expanding criminalisation of political and artistic expression, which has historically been weaponised to stifle dissent.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

Related:

‘Courts, Police Have Duty to Protect Freedom of Speech’: SC on FIR against Congress MP Over Poem

The post SC: Recent judgment in the Imran Pratapgarhi case, what are police powers under section 173 (3) BNS? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Shh…don’t make jokes. The jesters are thrown into the sea if the king feels bad. Don’t insult the king, or his deputy or his deputy’s deputy’s deputy’s deputy, or any of the men on the throne. Don’t talk about the demolition, the houses being turned to rubble, the bulldozers and their power. They are hunting voices. They are finding the loudest and clearest and the fearless and they are stringing them up on the market square so everyone shall see them and shut their tiny mouths. Quell the dissent. They don’t like art, oh no it makes them very angry. They don’t understand it, they don’t enjoy it and they’ll tolerate it if they have to unless it’s about them. It’s not easy being the butt of every joke, you know. It hurts.

Shh…don’t hurt their feelings. They don’t like it and they don’t know how to cry properly so they’ll pick you up, yes you, the young students, the trannies, the women, the Muslims, the Dalits, the artists, the reporters, and the dissenters. The question-askers and the answer-tellers and those who listen to them. You are only excluded and marginalised and untouchable until it is time to throw you into jail. Then they will grab you however required and shove you in a box.

Shh…don’t wake the people. They want to discuss the temples in the sea and the temples underground and the temples in the mosque and the comedians and the actors and actresses and their divorces and the gods and the goddesses and which one is sad and hurt and how one god is better than the rest. The people are sleeping, the people are gossiping, the people cannot see how the thieves have entered their houses to steal their food and take away their freedom but do not wake the people. They want to be asleep. If you wake them they will still ask about the temples and sad orange men and about which flag is better and who wore what when and they will watch the thieves take everything and they will let them. They will let their children be snatched and their houses be broken and all their money taken away and they will wake up and ask where the temple is, where the temples went and where new temples shall be built.

Shh…don’t ask questions. They will ask you to keep your mouth shut and they will turn you against one another and the blue will fight the green and then the orange wins. But this is a democracy after all so the only king you can question is the one who died more than 300 years ago, and the one that died 61 years ago, and all their children because there is a statute of limitations on these things. You can uproot their graves and celebrate your festivals in their houses of worship and say whatever you want about them.

Shh…don’t talk about Palestine. Of the hungry children, or the missing children, or even the parts of the children, the ones severed from their little bodies. Don’t talk about Palestine, because don-don and Mr. X and all their friends will get very sad and then they’ll get very mad and then they’ll lock you right up where all the naughty children go. Is that where the children of Gaza went? If yes then I want to go there, I want to play with them and I want to eat with them and roll around in the mud with them and race them to see who’s faster but it’s always them because hiding from guns and running from bombs gives you speed like no other. No they won’t send you where the children of Palestine went because even in confinement even in death they will not let you be together.

Shh…enjoy your freedom. You can break the rooms where the people are heard, where songs are sung, where poetry is recited. You can kill your neighbours, you can rape their women, and rape your wives, you can hate the colour green, vandalise their property, break their shops. You can bring back untouchability, be proud of your superior identity, eat your cow dung, beat the farmers, kill the students, send those with a voice to jail and abandon your wife. But you cannot love. You cannot love your wife and you cannot love your neighbour and you cannot love art and poetry and you must cheer when the jester is beheaded and you must bow to the king and celebrate his wars. You can criticise kings of the past and disrupt their graves but the kings that sit today on their throne of lies must not be hurt.

Shh…for silence is golden and violence is platinum and cow dung is a treasure and if you fall in line, keep the gold, wield the platinum then they will stuff your mouth with the treasure and it will replace all the love, all the freedom, all the art you’ve ever wanted.

(The author is a student of law in Mumbai and can be contacted at parulekarpriyanka02@gmail.com)

Related:

Comedian Kunal Kamra faces state-sponsored intimidation over satirical remarks on Deputy CM Eknath Shinde

D*ck or fist

A Licence to Violate: Chhattisgarh HC’s ruling on marital rape exposes a legal travesty’

The post Shh..Silence is golden and violence is platinum…shh appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Now, as the video uploaded by Kamra has gone viral, he is facing state-backed intimidation for daring to mock Maharashtra Deputy Chief Minister Eknath Shinde in a satirical stand-up routine. Within hours of uploading his show, an FIR was filed against him, Shiv Sena (Shinde faction) workers vandalised a Mumbai venue, and senior political leaders issued open threats, warning that Kamra would not be allowed to move freely unless he apologised. Meanwhile, those responsible for the violence were swiftly granted bail, exposing the stark reality of political power shielding its own while silencing critics. This blatant abuse of state machinery to suppress satire sets a chilling precedent for free speech in India.

Political violence and the state’s selective action

In a blatant display of political intimidation, a group of Shiv Sena (Shinde faction) workers vandalised the Habitat Studio and Hotel Unicontinental in Mumbai’s Khar area, claiming the video had been filmed at these locations. Among those involved in the destruction were several party workers, including social media in-charge Rahul Kanal and leader Kunal Sarmalkar. While 11 individuals were arrested for vandalism, all were granted bail within hours, highlighting the leniency afforded to political loyalists engaging in violent retaliation.

Despite the clear criminality of their actions, Shiv Sena leaders faced minimal consequences, whereas Kamra, whose only ‘offence’ was a joke, is being subjected to legal action. This incident underscores a disturbing double standard: dissenters and critics face police action, while those committing politically motivated violence operate with near impunity.

Explicit threats and calls for retaliation

The campaign against Kamra took an even more sinister turn when Shiv Sena MLA Murji Patel demanded an apology within two days, threatening that the comedian “would not be allowed to move freely in Mumbai” if he refused. Patel went as far as to say that if Kamra was seen in public, Shiv Sainiks would blacken his face—a direct incitement to mob violence. These threats were echoed by Shiv Sena MP Naresh Mhaske, who baselessly accused Kamra of being a ‘hired comedian’ making comments for monetary gain.

Further fanning the flames, political leader Sanjay Nirupam—who recently joined the Shinde-led Shiv Sena—declared publicly that Kamra would be “taught a lesson” at 11 AM the next day. Such statements, made without fear of legal repercussions, indicate a deep-rooted culture of impunity among political actors aligned with those in power.

Adding to the outrage, Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis stated that Kamra “should apologise” for his remarks and implied that comedy must have boundaries dictated by political sensibilities. “There is freedom to do stand-up comedy, but he cannot say whatever he wants,” he said, essentially arguing that speech must conform to the government’s approval. He also dismissed Kamra’s symbolic use of the Constitution, claiming, “Kunal Kamra has posted the same red Constitution book shown by Rahul Gandhi. Both of them have not read the Constitution.” His comments make it evident that Maharashtra’s leadership seeks to redefine free speech by placing political limitations on it.

Maharashtra CM Devendra Fadnavis says, “There is freedom to do stand-up comedy, but he cannot speak whatever he wants. The people of Maharashtra have decided who the traitor is. Kunal Kamra should apologize. This will not be tolerated. There is the right to comedy, but if it is… pic.twitter.com/g7UVXEyfDC

— ANI (@ANI) March 24, 2025

Weaponising the law to suppress speech

The response from Maharashtra’s government further cemented the state’s role in enabling political censorship. Fadnavis’ remarks reflect an authoritarian mind-set where freedom of speech exists only within the confines of state approval. His claim that Kamra was attempting to ‘defame’ Eknath Shinde reveals a fundamental misunderstanding—or deliberate misinterpretation—of free expression. Satire, political critique, and parody have historically been protected speech in democratic societies, and an elected official being offended by a joke does not justify state intervention.

Deputy Chief Minister Ajit Pawar attempted to strike a neutral tone but ultimately reinforced the same logic, stating, “Nobody should go beyond the law, Constitution, and rules.” However, his remarks failed to acknowledge the hypocrisy of the state’s reaction—while Kamra faces legal scrutiny for satire, Shiv Sena workers responsible for actual violence were released on bail within hours.

Crushing artistic spaces through fear

In the wake of the controversy, Habitat Studio, a prominent venue for independent performances, announced a temporary shutdown. The studio issued a statement calling for “constructive conversations, not destruction” and condemning violence as an antithesis to art and dialogue. The forced closure of a venue due to political pressure illustrates the chilling effect such incidents have on creative spaces. When comedians, artists, and venues fear violent repercussions for hosting dissenting voices, the very essence of a democracy is undermined.

https://www.instagram.com/indiehabitat/?utm_source=ig_embed&ig_rid=2d583eff-8829-4cba-a143-187ff34afdcd

The dangerous precedent being set

The Kunal Kamra case is not an isolated incident but part of a worrying pattern where comedians, journalists, and dissenters are systematically targeted for criticising the ruling establishment. The use of legal mechanisms against Kamra, juxtaposed with the state’s lenient treatment of those who resort to violence, sets a dangerous precedent. It signals that speech critical of those in power will be met with legal harassment, while politically sanctioned violence will be tolerated and even encouraged.

In a functioning democracy, public figures—especially elected officials—must be open to criticism and satire. The weaponisation of state machinery against a comedian over a joke signals an alarming drift toward authoritarianism, where dissent is not just discouraged but actively punished. Kamra’s response to this intimidation was simple yet profound—he posted an image of himself holding the Constitution with the caption, “The only way forward.” In doing so, he reaffirmed a principle that the Maharashtra government appears eager to erase: the right to free speech is non-negotiable, and satire is not a crime.

The only way forward… pic.twitter.com/nfVFZz7MtY

— Kunal Kamra (@kunalkamra88) March 23, 2025

Related:

For us to be truly free & independent, both media & judiciary need one another: (Justice) S Muralidhar

Arresting dissent: Punjab Government’s U-turn on farmer protests, protest site bulldozed, farmer leaders detained

Shielded by Power? How Prashant Koratkar’s remains un-arrested, even after making derogatory comments against Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj

“It’s not Aurangzeb’s grave, but a plot to uproot Shivaji Maharaj’s valour!”

The post Comedian Kunal Kamra faces state-sponsored intimidation over satirical remarks on Deputy CM Eknath Shinde appeared first on SabrangIndia.

“Media trials are defined as certain regional or national news ‘events’ in which the criminal justice system is co-opted by the media as a source of high drama and entertainment”

– M Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra [1962 AIR 605]

No right guaranteed to the citizens of India, including fundamental freedoms granted by the Constitution of India, are absolute in nature. Press or media, considered the fourth pillar of democracy, derive rights from the right to freedom of speech and expression in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, but the same are also subject to reasonable restriction. Through provisions and judicial precedents, these caveats have evolved over decades. Some guidelines have also been issued to ensure that the conduct of media channels and anchors remain responsible, neutral, unbiased and professional, meeting the Constitutional mandate. Conduct of television channels remains in the breach, however.

Public platforms, especially the commercial “mainstream” channels, have come under serious scrutiny by courts, especially in recent times, for running contentious shows, some amounting to outright media trials. Since these channels play a significant role in affecting the opinions of a wide populace, the courts have, time and again, defined their limits and emphasised upon the media entering the court’s arena by touching upon matters that are sub-judice or criminal in nature, running a parallel media trial.

There have been many judgements delivered by Constitutional Courts where they have laid down the caveats on freedom of speech and expression for the media. The Supreme Courts in the Harijai Singh and Anr [AIR1997SC73], a bench led by Justice Kuldip Singh had held that press freedom is neither total nor infinite.

“But it has to be remembered that this freedom of press is not absolute, unlimited and unfettered at all times and in all circumstances as giving an unrestricted freedom of the speech and expression would amount to an uncontrolled licence. If it were wholly free even from reasonable restraints it would lead to disorder and anarchy. The freedom is not to be misunderstood as to be a press free to disregard its duty to be responsible. In fact, the element of responsibility must be present in the conscience of the journalists. In an organised society, the rights of the press have to be recognised with its duties and responsibilities towards the society. Public order, decency, morality and such other things must be safeguarded. The protective cover of press freedom must not be thrown open for wrong doings.” (Para 10)

In this judgement the Supreme Court has also emphasised that media discussions on ongoing investigations and cases need to stay within responsible limits to ensure that a thorough investigation and an impartial trial of are conducted. As per the Court, when such media trials and coverage of cases cross the moral, ethical and legal line, and are televised only to generate a sensation and to draw profit out it, the same must be prohibited by law.

“It is the duty of a true and responsible journalist to strive to inform the people with accurate and impartial presentation of news and their views after dispassionate evaluation of the facts and information received by them and to be published as a news item. The presentation of the news should be truthful, objective and comprehensive without any false and distorted expression.” (Para 10)

In another case of Venkatesh @ Chandra and Anr vs. State of Karnataka [Criminal Appeal Nos. 1476-1477 of 2018], the Supreme Court of India bench of former Justices U.U. Lalit and P S Narasimha had briefly dealt with the issue of media trials while delivering a judgment on conviction on offense of dacoity. In the judgment, the bench had criticised the practice of prosecuting agency recording the entire statement of the accused rather than only that part of the statement which leads to the discovery of facts as per Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The Court observed that only that part of the statement should be covered that leads to discovery as such statements may have a direct tendency to influence and prejudice the mind of the Court. 

In the same judgment, the court had emphasised that matters relation to crime, including what forms a conclusive piece of evidence, must be dealt by courts and not by media. According to the Court, holding any debates or discussions that touch upon matters that fall within the domain of Courts “amount to direct interference in administration of Criminal Justice.”

“What has further aggravated the situation is the fact that said statements on DVD recorded by the Investigating Agency were played and published in a program named “Putta Mutta” by Udaya TV. Allowing said DVD to go into the hands of a private TV channel so that it could be played and published in a program is nothing but dereliction of duty and direct interference in the administration of Justice. All matters relating to the crime and whether a particular thing happens to be a conclusive piece of evidence must be dealt with by a Court of Law and not through a TV channel. If at all there was a voluntary statement, the matter would be dealt with by the Court of Law. The public platform is not a place for such debate or proof of what otherwise is the exclusive domain and function of Courts of law. Any such debate or discussion touching upon matters which are in the domain of Courts would amount to direct interference in administration of Criminal Justice.” (Para 21)

While the aforementioned cases briefly touched upon the issue of media trials, they also touched upon the impact on the on minds of viewers and the harm that it causes in the administration of justice.

Finally, the issue of media trials was fully dealt with by the Bombay High Court in the case of Nilesh Navalakha and ors vs Union of India and ors. [PIL (ST) No. 92252 of 2020], wherein the bench led by the then Chief Justice Dipankar Dutta had considered Public Interest Litigations (PILs) filed against the media trials being run by certain TV channels in the name of “investigative journalism” and the role that electronic media played in derogation of characters of those being investigated by police and courts in the Sushant Singh Rajput case. The bench, also comprising Justice Girish Kulkarni, had admonished media houses of indulging in such a media trial while reiterating the role of statutory authorities under the Cable Television Networks Act and directed them to take necessary action in complaints received by them.

Nilesh Navalakha and ors vs Union of India and ors

Facts of the case:

On June 14, 2020, actor Sushant Singh Rajput was reported to have died an unnatural death in his house in Mumbai. Pursuant to the news of his death, various TV channels initiated intense discussion during prime time on the probable cause of death of the actor. Some of such channels, under the guise of “investigative journalism”, spread the message among its viewers that the Mumbai Police has been passing off a homicidal death as a suicidal death. On this premise, the news channel ran their parallel trial and a close acquaintance of the actor, who herself is an actress, was repeatedly accused of orchestrating Rajput’s death. Even as the Supreme Court of India, Central Bureau of Investigation, Enforcement Directorate and the Narcotics Control Bureau were investigating the multiple facets of the case, TV channels were indulging in their own separate trials and theories.

Issues highlighted and relief sought by the petitions filed:

The judgment dealt with four different petitions pertaining to media coverage by certain news channels on the suicide case of actor Sushant Singh Rajput which led to a media trial affecting the rights of the accused as well as maligning the reputation of Mumbai Police. The petitioners included individuals Prerna Arora, Asim Sarode, Nilesh Navalakha and others; Mahesh Narayan Singh (former IPS) and other retired civil servants as well as an NGO named In Pursuit of Justice.

In the petitions moved before the Supreme Court, the issue highlighted with reference to the SSR case was that some of the TV channels in their programmes displayed headlines which, in effect, taunt the actor for dying by suicide and raised question as to whether he was into consumption of drugs. The insensitivity of such TV channels was emphasised upon in the pleas filed, when the petitioners highlighted the headlines/questions that were displayed/posed knowing fully well that the same would/could never be rebutted by the individual to whom it is directed.

The court noted that all but one of the writ petitions raised common issues with regard to the role of the electronic media in reporting matters concerning investigation into the unnatural death of the actor, thus amounting to a ‘media trial’. In view of the same, the petitioners had alleged that the electronic media in derogation of their legitimate media rights were broadcasting irresponsible and unethical news programmes of a nature amounting to slander and also amounting to a direct interference in the course of investigation, as undertaken by the investigating agencies, of a highly prejudicial nature. The petitioners further contended that some of the television channels had televised interviews with material witnesses and even indulged in cross-examining witnesses.

It was mainly asserted by the petitioner that the electronic media took upon themselves the role of the investigating agencies, prosecutors and adjudicators in pronouncing persons guilty of committing an offence, even before the formal investigation was completed by the investigating agencies. Additionally, it was claimed that the news channels had also resorted to reckless reporting against the state agencies on whom the powers of investigation are conferred by law. It is the petitioners’ main contention that such interference by the electronic media in the course of a lawful investigation of any alleged crime defies all cannons of legal legitimacy.

Based on these grounds, the reliefs sought by the petitioners were for the issuance of necessary directions to the media channels by courts urging for temporary postponement of news reporting in any form of a media trial or parallel investigation into the probe being done regarding the alleged unnatural death of the actor. The petitioners had also prayed for the issuance of the writ of mandamus containing directions/guidelines not to allow electronic, radio, internet or any other form of media from publishing any false, derogatory and scandalous news reports which may either jeopardize the reputation of the police and affect administration of justice, and to only indulge in a balanced ethical and objective reporting.

Observations made by the Court on freedom of speech of electronic media:

The 251-page judgment of the Bombay High Court, a constitutional court, is now the most recent jurisprudential marker on established standards for media publications, electronic media and networks when they report ongoing investigations and legal proceedings. While laying down several norms specifying the conduct that needs to be followed by anchors during debates and programmes, the Court noted that the petitioners had not urged the Court for a gag order, but had rather moved the courts to right a wrong in view of the apathy of the Union of India and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. (Para 212)

Through the judgment, one of the main questions dealt by the Court was whether media conducting a trial when a police investigation is in progress amounts to obstruction in administration of justice and thus amounts to criminal contempt of court.

“…we hold that any act done or publication made which is presumed by the appropriate court (having power to punish for contempt) to cause prejudice to mankind and affect a fair investigation of crime as well as a fair trial of the accused, being essential steps for “administration of justice”, could attract sub-clause (iii) of section 2(c) of the CoC (Contempt of Court) Act depending upon the circumstances and be dealt with in accordance with law.” (Para 248)

The court also observed that “a person cannot be dehumanized, disreputed, vilified and maligned qua his societal existence at the hands of the media in an attempt to sensationalize any crime which is under investigation.” (Para 247)

In its judgement, the Court had acknowledged that ‘Freedom of speech and expression’ guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is indeed the life blood of our democracy. The court had further deemed the said right to be crucial as it ensures free flow of opinions and ideas essential to sustain the collective life of the citizenry. However, the Court had stated that the right to freedom of speech and expression like all other rights in the Constitution is also not absolute; it is subject to imposition of reasonable restrictions. Re-iterating this, the Court had stated that

“Notwithstanding that freedom of speech is the bulwark of a democratic government and the role of the press/media to discover the truth and to ensure proper functioning of the democratic process is undoubtedly salutary, at the same time, the press/media must remember that its concern for discovery of truth and maintenance of purity in all streams of good governance by opening up channels of free discussion of issues should stop short of exceeding the permissible legal and Constitutional means.” (Para 228)

The court also emphasised upon the role that media plays in moulding the opinion of the common person in India, making it all the more essential for them to abide by the rules of responsibility, neutrality and impartiality in their reporting.

“Given the circumstance that the press/media has the ability to mould the opinion of the society by publicity of certain facets of an investigative process, which could give rise to strong public emotions and prejudice the case of one party or the other, it ought to refrain from taking stances in its presentations which are biased and show a predilection for a particular point of view having enormous potential of deflecting the course of justice.” (Para 312)

While the Court recognised the existence of many judgments of the Supreme Court as well as guidelines issued by self-regulatory mechanisms that aims to keep media under check, it emphasised the need for courts to bring in some corrective measures.

“Drawing from experience, there is good enough reason to conclude that the hope and trust are belied and the self-regulatory mechanism has failed to deliver in adequate measure in keeping erring media houses under check. It is now time that some corrective action is taken, lest judicial independence remains only on paper and right-thinking people start losing faith in the justice delivery system and doubt the capacity of the Courts to correct what needs to be corrected.” (Para 316)

Observations made by the Court on media playing the role of investigator(s):

In the judgment, the Court had specifically mentioned the programmes that were run by Times Now and Republic TV. Commenting on the claims made by these channels, the Court remarked upon the various concerns in their coverage, from lack of courtesy toward women, propagation of unfounded theories and uncalled scathing attacks against Mumbai Police.

“In the process, in an attempt to out-smart each other (for reasons which we need not discuss here), these two TV channels started a vicious campaign of masquerading as the crusaders of truth and justice and the saviours of the situation thereby exposing, what in their perception, Mumbai Police had suppressed, caring less for the rights of other stakeholders and throwing the commands of the Cr.P.C. and all sense of propriety to the winds. It amuses us not a little that Republic TV doffed its own hat, in appreciation of what its team had achieved, without realizing that it could be irking and invite adverse comments.” (Para 329)

“These TV channels took upon themselves the role of the investigator, the prosecutor as well as the Judge and delivered the verdict as if, during the pandemic, except they all organs of the State were in slumber.” (Para 329)

On the media deeming the investigation of the Mumbai Police to be shoddy even as the Supreme Court had expressed their prima facie satisfaction of Mumbai Police not having indulged in any wrong doing, the Court stated the same to be disregard of the rule of law. In the judgment, the court held the same to be lacking in bona fides and aimed at interfering with and/or obstructing administration of justice. Furthermore, the court found the same to have the propensity to shake the public confidence in the capability of the police machinery and the efficacy of the judiciary.

“We have no hesitation to record that this sort of reporting by the media is immensely prejudicial to the interests of the accused and could dent the process of a future fair trial and derail due administration of criminal justice, once the matter reaches the appropriate court having jurisdiction.” (Para 329)

On the issue of programmes levying unfounded accusations and allegations, in this case against Mumbai Police, even as the cases await verdict in court, the Court instructed media houses to not display any biased information or incorrect reporting.

“Any biased information or incorrect reporting may damage not only the good and clean reputation of a police officer, built over the years, but also the institution to which he belongs. We need to remind that every journalist/reporter has an overriding duty to the society of educating the masses with fair, accurate, trustworthy and responsible reports relating to reportable events/incidents and above all to the standards of his/her profession. Thus, the temptation to sensationalize should be resisted.” (Para 331)

Specific directions issued by the Court:

The court issued the following specific restrictions on press/media and directed the media to refrain from displaying/printing any news item or initiating debate/discussion in the nature:

1. In relation to death by suicide, depicting the deceased as one having a weak character or intruding in any manner on the privacy of the deceased;

2. That causes prejudice to an ongoing inquiry/investigation by:

i) Referring to the character of the accused/victim and creating an atmosphere of prejudice for both;

ii) Holding interviews with the victim, the witnesses and/or any of their family members and displaying it on screen;

iii) Analysing versions of witnesses, whose evidence could be vital at the stage of trial;

iv) Publishing a confession allegedly made to a police officer by an accused and trying to make the public believe that the same is a piece of evidence which is admissible before a Court and there is no reason for the Court not to act upon it, without letting the public know the nitty-gritty of the Evidence Act, 1872;

v) Printing photographs of an accused and thereby facilitating his identification;

vi) Criticising the investigative agency based on half-baked information without proper research;

vii) Pronouncing on the merits of the case, including pre-judging the guilt or innocence qua an accused or an individual not yet wanted in a case, as the case may be;

viii) Recreating/reconstructing a crime scene and depicting how the accused committed the crime;

ix) Predicting the proposed/future course of action including steps that ought to be taken in a particular direction to complete the investigation; and

x) Leaking sensitive and confidential information from materials collected by the investigating agency;

3. Acting in any manner so as to violate the provisions of the Programme Code as prescribed under section 5 of the CTVN Act read with rule 6 of the CTVN Rules and thereby inviting contempt of court; and

4. Indulging in character assassination of any individual and thereby mar his reputation. (Para 349)

The court held that these directions are not exhaustive but indicative and any news report by press/media ought to conform to Programme Code, the norms of journalistic standards and the Code of Ethics and Broadcasting Regulations; and any default would invite not only action from concerned authorities under the law but would also amount to criminal contempt of court under the CoC Act. (Para 350)

Directions for responsibly inviting guests at debates:

In the judgment, the court also took into consideration the contention raised by media houses that when guests are invited to speak, it is difficult to censor their statements. The court held that while that may be true, it does not grant any speaker the license to either abuse or defame any particular individual which would make the channel as well as the individual liable for defamation and in case it amounts to obstruction to administration of justice then both the media house and the speaker can be liable for criminal contempt of court.

“It has been urged on behalf of the media houses that on diverse occasions, the guests are invited to speak and address the audience on a particular topic during programmes which are telecast live and, in such cases, it is difficult for the media houses to censor the statements of such guests. What the media houses say could be true, but that would not grant any speaker the license to either abuse or defame any particular individual, who could be the target of the speech, to tarnish his reputation in the eyes of the viewers or to indulge in interference with and/or obstruction to administration of justice by such public speaking.” (Para 351)

The bench did not limit themselves to only the conduct of the anchors during the programmes, but also issued guidelines for when guests are invited to the programmes for their opinions. The court held that in case a defamatory statement is made, the targeted individual could sue the media as well as the speaker. On the other hand, if any speaker indulges in interference with and/or obstruction to administration of justice by such public speaking, both the media house and the speaker may be proceeded against for criminal contempt.

“It would not be enough for the media house to put up a disclaimer at the end of the programme that it does not associate itself with the views of the speaker and thereby evade liability. To obviate such situation, the media houses would be well advised to inform, guide and advise the guest speakers to refrain from making public utterances which are likely to interfere with and/or obstruct administration of justice and thereby attract contempt.” (Para 351)

The court further emphasised upon the essential role that anchor plays to ensure that debates do not drift away from topics of discussions and drift away from permissible limits.

“The role of the anchor, in such cases, is also important. It is for him/her to apply his/her mind and avoid the programme from drifting beyond the permissible limits. Muting the speaker if he flies off or shows tendency of flying off at a tangent could be one of several ways to avoid embarrassment as well as contempt.” (Para 351)

Furthermore, the following fundamental directives were also issued by the Court:

• The privacy and dignity of the victim must always be respected;
• The sensitive information related to the case should never be made public.
• The confession/admission made in front of an investigator cannot published;
• The interviews of anyone who is connected to the case may not be undertaken when the matter is sub-judice.

Forming the conclusion of the judgment were similar other observations of the Court emphasised that the press must deliver news stories in their genuine and accurate form. The Court further stated that it must include the account of the events as it was honestly recorded, without exaggeration or bias, and any form of distortion and the incidence should not be overemphasised for the sake of gaining more and more viewers.

The complete judgment can be read below:

Bombay High Court reiterates Nilesh Navalakha judgment:

The Bombay High Court was faced with another case where media houses had crossed a line and published objectionable content in a criminal case, harming the reputation of the parties involved.

Facts of the case:

In Pune, a Class 10 student had fallen off the balcony of her house and died. After this incident, various print and electronic media started circulating news alleging that the deceased was having illicit relations with one Y. Around 12 audio clips of alleged conversations of daughter X with some unknown persons were circulated by political parties and media, the contents of which were to defame the name and image of the Petitioner and his family and his daughter.

The Counsel for the petitioner, Shirish Gupte, cited the directions and guidelines issued by the Bombay High Court bench headed by Chief Justice Dipankar Dutta in Nilesh Navalakha v. UOI and ors. The counsel had provided how the High Court bench had reprimanded the media houses and warned them against conducting ‘media trials’ and had said that that if news channels had in fact found any incriminating evidence pertaining to any case, they should provide it to the police.

Order of the Court:

The bench comprising Justices Manish Pitale and SS Shinde issued notice to the respondents and in the interim directed them to scrupulously follow the guidelines in the Nilesh Navlakha case and not to publish or give any unnecessary publicity to the incident of death of the daughter X of the Petitioner and further alleged illicit relationship with Y.

The order can be read here:

Concrete implementation remains lacking, anchors continue with media trials:

“The role of the anchor is very important. Hate speech either takes place in the mainstream television or it takes place in the social media. Social media is largely unregulated. As far as mainstream television channel is concerned, we still hold sway, there the role of anchor is very critical because the moment you see somebody going into hate speech, it’s the duty of the anchor to immediately see that he doesn’t allow that person to say anything further.”

Retired Supreme Court Justice KM Joseph, along with Justice Hrishikesh Roy, had emphasised the importance of press freedom and role of anchor while hearing a clutch of 11 writ petitions seeking the court’s intervention to regulate hate speech. On September 21, 2022 the Supreme Court bench in the matter of Shaheen Abdullah vs. Union of India [W.P.(C) No. 940/2022] had singled out the debates conducted on the electronic media which they held were “the chief medium of hate speech”.

During the hearings of the case, which is still being heard in the Supreme Court albeit by a different bench, had once again brought the issue of the negative role that anchors have been playing and the spread of hate and misinformation through media. Notably, in the said matter the necessity of regulating media and laying down laws for the same was also highlighted.

Justice Joseph observed, “We should have a proper legal framework unless we will have a framework people will continue and the most important point is where is our nation headed, if it is hate speech on which we are feeding on where is our nation headed”.

An additional factor was highlighted in this comment by Justice Roy: “Hate drives TRPs, drives profit.” The said observation had shed light on the issue of media houses picking up contentious issues and thinking of themselves as “profit centres”, enabling and allowing people to make unchecked controversial remarks on television.  The court pointed out that while television hosts permit certain panellists to make venomous remarks, they prevent the opposite side from airing its opposing viewpoints by muting their microphones. The bench then ruled that errant news anchors should face stern punishment and be removed from the broadcast.

Justices Joseph and Roy have asked the government to come back with proposals of what can be done to regulate the media on hate speech and suggested that perhaps something along the lines of the Vishaka guidelines, issued by the Supreme Court in 1997 before the law on sexual harassment was enacted in 2013, could be considered.

No such regulations have been issued, to date, by the Union government.

The order can be read here:

Court scrutiny on anchors and media continues:

In August 2023, the Supreme Court had deemed the limit of Rs 1 lakh on imposition of fine on television channels for airing disputed news by the self-regulatory mechanism by News Broadcasters and Digital Association (NBDA) to be ineffective. The said observation was made by the Supreme Court bench while hearing a petition by the NBDA challenging the Bombay high court’s aforementioned judgment in Nilesh Navalakha. The NBDA had challenged the 2021 verdict as it contained adverse observations about the lack of teeth in the self-regulation of TV channels.

A three judged bench of the Supreme Court, led by the Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud and comprising Justice JB Pardiwala, and Justice Manoj Misra, had questioned the proportionality of the penalties imposed on TV channels for airing disputed news, stating that the same should be equal to the profits earned by the channels, rather than being limited to Rs 1 lakh fine. The court had also noted that the said limitation of 1 lakh on fines was fixed way back in 2008.

During the arguments, the acknowledged NBDA’s stance against pre-censorship or post-censorship on news channels through statutory mechanism, while stressing upon the necessity for an effective self-regulatory mechanism. As highlighted in the order of the Court, the bench urged that there was a need to strengthen the self-regulatory mechanism and stated that it will issue guidelines to strengthen the regulation of TV channels.

Notably, the said guidelines are yet to be issued by the Supreme Court.

The full order of the Court can be viewed here:

Related:

Media fraternity condemns government directed ban of independent media channels

On Women’s Day DUJ Call for a Less Polarized, More Inclusive Media

Social media giants summoned at US Senate hearing for internet safety

The post How free is free and can there be freedom without responsibility: Courts on media coverage of trials, erring conduct of anchors appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The letter has alleged that peaceful protests were met with fake encounters, abductions and demolition of houses belonging to the protesters by police and other government instrumentalities.

“Even when some of the most oppressed and exploited sections of the country, the Adivasis of Odisha, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra etc., engaged in prolonged peaceful mass movements against mining-based displacement and rapid militarisation of their lands, the people are met with fake encounters, abductions and uprooting of their homes for exercising their democratic rights, demanding fair Gram Sabhas and the implementation of the Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act, 1996,” the letter states.

“From Srinagar to Silger, all democratic dissent is attacked with varied degrees of violence and branded with the tag of Maoists and separatists. Journalists… arrested, people being violently displaced for the sake of corporate interests, internet shutdown bringing life back to the dark ages, academics in jail and retired judges forbidden from speaking in the country’s capital, where is the safety valve for democracy?” it asked.

In Chhattisgarh’s Silger, youth and the women had held one of the longest sit-ins to protest police firing on Adivasis opposing “rapacious mining and militarisation of their homes”.

The 135 signatories to the letter include Deepak Kumar, a political activist with the Campaign Against State Repression (CASR); G. Haragopal, a retired professor of the Hyderabad University and an activist; the Telangana Civil Liberties Commission; S.R. Darapuri, a retired IPS officer; the All India People’s Front; Manoranjan Mohanty, a retired professor of Delhi University; Nandita Narain, an associate professor of St. Stephen’s College, Delhi University; N.D. Pancholi, advocate at the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL); Shamsul Islam, author and retired faculty member of Delhi University; and A.S. Vasantha Kumari, a civil liberty activist.

The letter said the most recent incident occurred on December 10, 2023, when the world celebrated the 75th anniversary of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights as “Human Rights Day”. The signatories alleged that Parliament Street Police Station denied permission for a gathering to mark this occasion.

They alleged that though permission was sought 12 days in advance by the Campaign Against State Repression (CASR) — a coalition of 40 democratic progressive organisations — the organisers were informed about the cancellation of the permission less than 14 hours before the scheduled event.

The writers also expressed dismay at how a public discussion on March 15, 2023, organised by the CASR to address issues such as the “Media Blackout in Kashmir”, suppression of the free press, freedom of speech and expression, and the attack on journalists in the Valley had to be cancelled. They said the police cancelled the permission for the event with a two-hour notice and barricaded the venue at Gandhi Peace Foundation despite the fact that it was to be addressed by Justice Hussain Masoodi, a retired judge of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, along with former legislators, renowned democratic rights activists and academics.

For a similar event, the “Bharat Bachao National Convention”, held at HKS Surjeet Bhavan in New Delhi, the organisers had to seek permission from the Delhi High Court after the Delhi police cancelled its permission and coerced the venue administration to scrap the bookings in March last year, the letter states.

According to the letter, police permission for all these events and many more had been cancelled citing vague arguments of “law & order/security”.

“Yet, the practices of the Delhi Police continue to push in the direction where democratic spaces are curtailed with impunity and the notions of liberties and dissent are attacked. When CASR sought permission for its gathering at Jantar Mantar, one of the historic spots of democratic gatherings for Indian democracy on 10th December, it was denied.

“When peaceful gatherings for civil discourse are sought at private venues, the police barricade the events and threaten the venue owners. When peaceful gatherings for democratic rights are sought at public spaces designated for such activities like Jantar Mantar, the permits are cancelled strategically at night to ensure no alternative is found. When these actions are protested by the people, we are assaulted, beaten with the butts of guns, detained, abducted and even threatened with our lives,” the letter said.

The letter added: “After all this, the women and LGBT persons who participated in the protests and gave their own contact details to the police received phone calls at their residences, not at the contacts they gave but directly to their families. Their family members were told by police officers to discourage their daughters from participating in protests and the police resorted to using patriarchy against adults to silence dissent.”

Text of the Open Letter:

To D.Y. Chandrachud,
The Chief Justice of India,
Supreme Court of India
2nd January 2024

Dear Justice Chandrachud,

We write this letter to you as a members of democratic-minded civil society and activists who are working on issues concerning democratic ethos of the people and the protection of their civic, democratic, and constitutional rights. We write this letter to you as an appeal, as well as a query regarding people’s right to freedom of speech and expression, a right that has been fought hard to achieve by our great people and forbearers and is also protected under the constitution. This right, along with the overall democratic rights of our people, some of them guaranteed under the Indian Constitution, are seeing an overall deterioration that alarms us.

Recently, a concerning trend of cancelling permissions for any programme focused on any social critique has emerged, along with the banning of peaceful protest gatherings and public meetings on various issues concerning democratic and Constitutional right of the people. The most recent case occurred on 10th December 2023, when the world celebrated the 75th anniversary of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights as “Human Rights Day.” The Parliament Street Police Station chose to deny the permission for a gathering to mark this occasion and discuss the event, less than 14 hours before the event even though the permission for the same was sought for 12 days prior on 28th November. The organizers of the gathering, Campaign Against State Repression (CASR), a coalition of 40 democratic progressive organizations, was informed about cancellation of the permission with less than 24 hours’ notice, on 9th December at around 9:15 pm. It is pertinent to mention that this is not the first time that police has resorted to such measures. On 15th March of this year, the same organizers were holding an indoor public discussion on “Media Blackout in Kashmir” to discuss suppression of free press, freedom of speech and expression, and the attack on journalists in Kashmir. Police cancelled the permission of the event with a 2 hours’ notice and barricaded the Gandhi Peace Foundation (GPF) venue at ITO, despite the fact that the event was to be addressed by Justice Hussain Masoodi, retired from the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, along with former legislators, renowned democratic rights activists and academics. Furthermore, a similar event by the name of “Bharat Bachao National Convention” held at HKS Surjeet Bhawan in New Delhi had to seek permission from the Delhi High Court after the Delhi police cancelled its permission and coerced the venue administration to cancel the bookings in March, 2023. Police permission of all these events and many more events/gatherings have been cancelled on grounds of vague arguments of “law & order/security.”

French philosopher and democrat, Jean-Jacques Rousseau proclaimed, “to renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to surrender the rights [and duties] of humanity.” Even the Hon’ble Supreme Court itself has stated that “citizens have a fundamental right to assembly and peaceful protest which cannot be taken away by an arbitrary executive or legislative action,” in Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, Union of India 2012. Yet, the practices of the Delhi Police continue to push in the direction where democratic spaces are curtailed with impunity and the notions of liberties and dissent are attacked. When CASR sought permission for its gathering at Jantar Mantar, one of the historic spots of democratic gatherings for Indian democracy on 10th December, it was denied. When CASR-affiliated organizations chose to protest against this arbitrary action and mockery of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the protestors were attacked by police and the BSF, with horrifying scenes of police personnel openly threatening to fire on women and LGBT activists in front of the Rashtrapati Bhawan and the Lok Sabha in session! In front of the residence of the head of state of the Republic of India, the President herself, a student of journalism from Delhi University was separated from the protestors, brutally beaten by the police and was missing while in police detention for 7 hours, with no one aware of his whereabouts, for no actionable cause. When peaceful gatherings for civil discourse are sought at private venues, the police barricade the events and threatens the venue owners. When peaceful gatherings for democratic rights are sought at public spaces designated for such activities like Jantar Mantar, the permits are cancelled strategically at night to ensure no alternative is found. When these actions are protested by the people, we are assaulted, beaten with the butts of guns, detained, abducted and even threatened with our lives.  After all this, the women and LGBT persons who participated in the protests and gave their own contact details to the police received phone calls at their residences, not at the contacts they gave but directly to their families. Their family members were told by police officers to discourage their daughters from participating in protests and the police resorted to using patriarchy against adults to silence dissent.

Dear sir, you once said, “dissent is the safety valve of democracy” and have reiterated the need of democratic ethos. Yet, space for dissent is disappearing right in front of our eyes, to the point that we are seeing a cornering of people’s space for any democratic discourse and dissent. Dr. Ambedkar, in his famous address to the Constituent Assembly of India on 25th November 1949 said, “when there was no way left for constitutional methods for achieving economic and social objectives, there was a great deal of justification for unconstitutional methods.” When dissent is curtailed to such an extent where constitutional methods are robbed from the people, will the safety valve not break and lead to the protest that occurred on 13th December 2023 by Neelam Azad, Amol Shinde, Manoranjan D, Sagar Sharma, Lalit Jha and Vishal Sharma? In light of such developments, curtailment of a constitutionally-sound protest mere 3 days prior, how is it that their protest is reduced to a concern of ‘security breach’ and draconian ‘anti-terror’ law like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 are utilized against them?

The recent events themselves are part of a larger chain of affairs that are creating the realization that space for democratic dissent does not exist in India. From the arresting of Delhi University’s Dr. G.N. Saibaba in 2016, the mass arrests in the Bhima Koregaon-Elgaar Parishad case of democratic rights activists in 2018, the snapping of internet and phone connectivity in Kashmir in 2019 to initiate the longest internet shutdown in any country claiming to be a democracy, the arresting of prominent journalists from Kashmir and rest of India under anti-state charges, the mass arrests of democratic activists of the anti-CAA protests during the COVID-19 lockdown along with the glorification of the bulldozering of their homes to the present, a grim picture is painted for the people of India regarding democratic rights. Even when some of the most oppressed and exploited sections of the country, the Adivasis of Odisha, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra etc., engaged in prolonged peaceful mass movements against mining-based displacement and rapid militarization of their lands, the people are met with fake encounters, abductions and uprooting of their homes for exercising their democratic rights, demanding fair Gram Sabhas and the implementation of the Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act, 1996. In Silger, Chhattisgarh, the youth and the women conducted one of the longest sit-in protests where thousands of Adivasis of Bastar gathered to protest the police open-firing on Adivasis for opposing rapacious mining and militarization of their homes. From Srinagar to Silger, all democratic dissent is attacked with varied degrees of violence and branded with the tag of Maoists and separatists. Journalists arrested, a people being violently displaced for the sake of corporate interests, internet shutdown bringing life back to the dark ages, academics in jail and retired judges forbidden from speaking in the country’s capital, where is the safety valve for democracy?

We would like to draw your attention to this alarming situation. If a retired High Court judge and former legislators are not allowed to speak in a conference, if people are not allowed to gather and protest peacefully even at places like Jantar Mantar, one could only wonder, what right to freedom of Speech and Expression do the poor people from far away regions of the country have. We would like to know whether a blanket and sweeping powers can be granted to police and administrative bodies to cancel permissions without any reasonable justification expect other than a vague and an undefined term such as “law and order”. Have the constitutional guarantees been so broken and weakened that a mere two-line order citing three-word reason can stifle our rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution? Do the oppressed and exploited not have the right to defend their liberty? Are we not humans? Or is it that India, claiming to be the world’s largest democracy, not a signatory to United Nations Declaration of Human Rights? We want to remind you and your fellow members of the judiciary of the words of John Rawls, a jurist you will surely remember from your days of legal education. “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought….. Laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust…… for this reason, justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others….. therefore, in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.”

These are some of many questions that are affecting us and various sections of the country. If the people are not allowed to raise their concerns, their disagreement and their views, how are we supposed to grow into a more democratic society and progress? If people are stopped from peaceful protests, what is to come next and towards which trajectory are we heading. Suppression of freedom of expression of the people and democracy are not coherent and one shall be the end of the other. Going by the words of our great martyr and freedom fighter Bhagat Singh “the sanctity of a law can only be maintained as long as it is the reflection of the will of the people” and these unjust and arbitrary orders are not one.

Therefore, we appeal you to take this matter into suo moto cognizance, to defend the democratic rights and spaces of people, to uphold the liberty and dispel justice by preserving the rights and freedom of the Indian people, including the right to dissent, to express freely. We hope that some positive steps will be taken by the Supreme Court of India to direct the police and administrative bodies to stop stifling dissent in the name of “law and order”.

Thanking you

Signed,

1. Deepak Kumar, Political Activist, Campaign Against State Repression (CASR)
2. G. Haragopal, Retd. Professor from Hyderabad University and Activist, Telangana Civil Liberties Commission
3. S.R. Darapuri, Retd. IPS Officer, All India People’s Front
4. Manoranjan Mohanty, Retd. Professor, Delhi University
5. Nandita Narain, Associate Professor, St. Stephen’s College, Delhi University
6. N.D. Pancholi, Advocate, People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL)
7. Shamsul Islam, Author and Retd. Faculty, Delhi University
8. AS Vasantha Kumari, Activist
9. John Dayal, Author and Human Rights Activist
10. Seema Azad, Human Rights Activist, People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL)
11. Safoora Zargar, Researcher
12. Karen Gabriel, Professor, St. Stephen’s College, Delhi University
13. Dr. Pramod Kumar Bagde, Faculty, Benaras Hindu University, Varanasi
14. Prem Kumar Vijayan, Faculty, Hindu College, Delhi University
15. K. Muralidharan, Author
16. Wahid Shaikh, Teacher, Innocence Network
17. Asish Gupta, Journalist
18. Manish Azad, Political Activist
19. Amita Sheereen, Author and Translator
20. Ira Raja, Faculty, Delhi University
21. Ashutosh Kumar, Faculty, Delhi University
22. Tushar Kanti, Journalist, Author and Translator
23. Atikur Rahman, Activist
24. Jagmohan Singh, Teacher, All India Forum For Right to Education (AIFRTE)
25. K.R. Ravi Chander, Activist, Forum Against State Repression
26. Roop Rekha Verma, Retired Professor
27. Prabhakaran Hebbar Illath, Professor, University of Calicut
28. Lanu Longkumer, Faculty, Nagaland University
29. Preethi Krishnan, Faculty, O.P. Jindal Global University
30. M.R. Nandan, Retired Teacher, Founding Member, Karnataka Physics Association
31. Arun, Retd. Lecturer, VIRASAM (Revolutionary Writers’ Association)
32. Dr. SG Vombatkere, Engineer, National Alliance for People’s Movements (NAPM)
33. Gopalji Pradhan, Teacher, Democratic Teachers Initiative
34. Joseph Victor Edwin, Teacher
35. G. Rosanna, Rayalseema Vidyavanthula Vedika
36. Susan John Puthusseril, SIVY ( Society for the Inculcation of Values in Youth)
37. Dr. D.M Diwakar, DRI Jalsain
38. Neeraj Malik, Faculty, Delhi University
39. Kranthi Chaitanya, Advocate, Civil Liberties Committee
40. Siddhanth Raj, Lawyer and Trade Unionist, IFTU (Sarwahara)
41. Kanwaljeet Khanna, General Secretary, Inqlabi Kendra Punjab
42. Aga Syed Muntazir Mehdi, Advocate
43. Julius Tudu, Advocate, Legal Cell for Human Rights Guwahati
44. Thomas Pallithanam, Advocate, People’s Action for Rural Awakening
45. Vikas Attri, Advocate, Progressive Lawyers Association
46. Lovepreet Kaur, Advocate
47. Buta Singh, Writer, Translator and Journalist, Association for Democratic Rights
48. Bajrang Bihari, Writer, Janvadi Lekhak Singh
49. Shalu Nigam, Lawyer and Independent Researcher
50. Padma Kondiparthi, Advocate
51. Feroze Mithiborwala, Freelance Writer, Bharat Bachao Andolan
52. C.K.Theivammal, Advocate
53. Navjot Kaur, Advocate
54. Ravinder Singh, Advocate
55. Vibha Wahi, Social Activist, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA)
56. Himanshu Kumar, Human Rights Activist, VCA Dantewada
57. Sukoon, Writer
58. Arjun Prasad Singh, Social-Political Activist, Democratic People’s Forum
59. Kanwarjit Singh, Bharatiya Kisan Union (Ekta Ugrahaan)
60. S.P. Udayakumar, Social worker, Green Tamil Nadu Party
61. Sumeet Singh, Tarksheel Society Punjab
62. Thomas Franco, Social Activist, People First
63. Sharanya Nayak, Social Activist, Independent Consultant
64. Shabnam Hashmi, Social Activist, Anhad
65. Sudha, Therapist and Trainer, CNVC
66. Neelima Sharma, Theatre, Nishant Natya Manch
67. Lal Prakash Rahi, Social Work, Disha Foundation
68. Shakeel Ahmad, Scholar, Benaras Hindu University Varanasi
69. Navneet Singh, Research Scholar, Delhi University
70. Pritpal Singh, Rights Activist, Association for Democratic Rights
71. Nihar, Farmer, All India Kisan Mazdoor Sangh (AIKMS)
72. Rajeev Yadav, Activist, Rihai Manch
73. Abhijit Dasgupta, Activist
74. Dr. Anil Kumar Roy, Activist
75. Ramsharan Joshi, Journalist
76. Sumar Raj R, Retired Business Person, Nishant Natya Manch
77. Nagargere Ramesh, Karnataka Janashakti
78. Ramesh Shivamogga, Akila Karnataka vicharavadi Trust Bengaluru
79. Muniza Khan, Researcher, Gandhian Institute of Studies
80. Dr. Joseph Xavier, Researcher, IDEAS Mumbai
81. Dr. Vikash Sharma, Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) Delhi
82. G. Vijaya Bhaskara Reddy, Retd. Office Superintendent, BSNL Kurnool, Honorary District President, BSNL Employees Union, Kurnool & Co Convenor, Rayalaseema Vidyavanthula Vedika
83. K.C.Venkateswarlu, Pensioner, Palamuru Adhyayana Vedika
84. Sandeep Kumar, Poet
85. Aflatoon, Samajwadi Jan Parishad
86. Vinod Kumar Singh, Independent Researcher
87. Snehashish Chhaterjee, Healthcare Worker
88. Mahnoor, Drama Therapist
89. Kaushik Tadvi, Artist
90. Frazer Mascarenhas, Academic Administrator
91. Pravith, Software Developer
92. Sushil Benjamin, Serviceman
93. Amar PM, Software Engineer
94. Sudarshan Ramiengar, Self Employed Engineer
95. Suresh Joshi, Serviceman
96. Ramchandra, Student Activist, Inqalabi Chhatra Morcha (ICM)
97. Baadal, Student, Bhagat Singh Chatra Ekta Manch (bsCEM)
98. Najih Ettiyakath, Student, DISSC
99. Mukundan M Nair, Student, Sangharsh Democratic Students’ Collective
100. Ajay, Student, bsCEM
101. Richa, Student
102. Sumanth, , Student
103. Avanti , Student, bsCEM
104. Eksimar Singh, Student, Delhi University
105. Rifah Luqman, Student
106. Japneet Kaur, Student
107. Sneha Dwivedi, Student
108. AWM, Student
109. Swapnendu Chakraborty, Student, Revolutionary Students’ Front (RSF)
110. Shree Pal, Student, RSF
111. Abhinash Satapathy, Student
112. Sumaiya Fatima, Student
113. Arya, Student
114. Nishka, Student
115. Indranuj Ray, Student, RSF
116. Anirban Chakraborty, Student, RSF
117. Ankitaa Bal, Student, Calcutta University
118. Affan Alig, Student, bsCEM
119. Vallika, Student, Nazariya Magazine
120. Aishwarya, Student, BSJAY
121. Priyanshu, Medical Student
122. Parthipan, Student
123. Madhuri
124. Archita Sharma
125. Asha S Babu
126. Raghav
127. Astha
128. Ahlaam Rafiq
129. Ramnit
130. Ava Schneider
131. Azad
132. Dhir Pratap
133. S.V. Raman
134. Prateek
135. Thomas Kavalakatt

The post Stifling of right to protest, freedom: Open letter to CJI Chandrachud appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Deshpande, during his virtual lecture on September 6, mentioned Zakaria Zubeidi, a Palestinian activist who is currently in an Israeli prison, and designated the Palestinian  movement as a “freedom struggle.” Read Sudhanva Deshpande’s statement released after the controversy broke out here.

On November 6, a lecture was held at the Indian Institute of Technology Bombay (IIT-B) wherein a 2004 documentary film, ‘Arna’s Children’, made by Juliano Mer Khamis, an Israeli Jewish filmmaker, actor and theatre director was shown. As an introduction to the documentary, Deshpande had been invited to give a lecture by Prof. Saha. Certain students attending the lecture and otherwise have deemed the introductory lecture to be pro-Hamas and pro-violence. Furthermore, objections have been raised by some over the alleged glorification of “militant terrorists” by Deshpande. A complaint has now been registered against Prof. Saha, which questions the appropriateness of the professor’s actions in extending the invitation.

In his statement released on September  9, Sudhanva Deshpaande had explained, “ Zakaria Zubeidi is a former military commander of the armed wing of Fatah, the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Fatah is the political party founded by Yasser Arafat. When I met Zubeidi in Palestine in 2015, he had given up arms and was advocating cultural resistance. He had highlighted the value of culture in the Palestinian freedom struggle. He co-founded The Freedom Theatre in the West Bank to fulfil his vision. I had referred to Zubeidi as a ‘visionary’, because in his conversation with me, he envisaged a future where the entire territory of historic Palestine would be a single nation, in which ALL its citizens — Arabs, Jews, Christians, and others — would have equal rights.

The protesters, which included Vivek Tidke, a leader from Vivek Vichar Manch, demanded the immediate arrest of both Deshpande and the faculty member, accusing them of “glorifying terrorists and their heinous acts.”

According to its own website, the Vivek Vichar Manch is an organisation “dedicated to constitutional values.” In addition to this, they also claim to have a wing called Sawarkar Smarak Adhyasan Kendra.

According to Sabrang India’s sources, the protest did not have more than 10 students, and the total number of protestors, including passer-bys, was about 100. This suggests, according to the source, that there is a sustained effort to designate the protest by the group as one that reflects the sentiments of the larger student community at IIT-B.

The group of protestors who have organised the protest has furthermore filed a complaint against Deshpande with the city police. Israel’s consul general in Mumbai, Kobbi Shoshani, too voiced criticism against Deshpande’s  remarks.

Shocking to read about the screening of a documentary of terrorists at @IITBombay.

I am happy that alert students and office bearers of @iitbforbharat caught them red handed.

I will be happy to visit there and share the real. https://t.co/3TZCMJZQAO

— Kobbi Shoshani (@KobbiShoshani) November 8, 2023

At the protest against the event, Ashok Tidke condemned the event at the IIT-B campus, questioning why such incidents occur in a place where students have earned “global recognition”. Tidke specifically denounced the support of terrorism and spoke about “brainwashing,” especially among students from rural backgrounds who could be swayed by such perspectives.

Conversely, the Ambedkar Periyar Phule Circle, IIT-B, released a statement on X on November 11, asking if the “politics of hate” has become so “easy?” The post also alleges that slogans such as “Goli Maron Salon Ko” (Shoot these rascals) were also raised at the protest at the institute’s gate. This infamous slogan has been used by the extreme Hindutva right-wing after the February 2020 violence in Delhi, especially aimed at vilifying the minority-led anti-CAA, anti-NRC protests.

A tiny group of students, along with right wing political groups outside IITB, has been attempting to create an environment of fear in IIT Bombay campus, throughout this week. Has this politics of hate became so easy and obvious @PMOIndia? pic.twitter.com/VtXBrRb6yG

— APPSC IIT Bombay (@AppscIITb) November 11, 2023

What is this all about?

Earlier, on November 6, a programme was organised at the IIT-B which featured a 2004 documentary ‘Arna’s Children’ by Israeli filmmaker Juliano Mer Khamis. Deshpande, who was invited by a professor, provided the remarks and an introduction for the documentary, according to Sabrang India.

On November 9, 2023, in response to the escalating controversy, Deshpande has further issued a statement defending his comments and decrying what he labelled a “disinformation campaign” against him; he even decried the Times Now programme which featured his comments and described him as sympathising with “terrorists”. He further clarified in his statement that Zubeidi, formerly a military commander of Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, had renounced violence and was promoting cultural resistance during Deshpande’s meeting with him in Occupied Palestine in 2015, stating “I had referred to Zubeidi as a ‘visionary’, because in his conversation with me, he envisaged a future where the entire territory of historic Palestine would be a single nation, in which ALL its citizens – Arabs, Jews, Christians, and others – would have equal rights.”

Another  lecture on the Israel-Palestine conflict by writer and academician Achin Vanaik was also cancelled by the IIT-B administration. The last-minute cancellation and the complaint against Deshpande sparked criticism from the student community, who condemned the incident as an attack on “intimidation” and a loss of academic freedom.

Related:

Filmmaker Sudhanva Deshpande releases statement accusing Times Now of spreading malicious misinformation against him

CJP sends complaint to Times Now Navbharat over debate shows giving communal colour to the Israel-Hamas Conflict

Withdraw FIRs filed against protestors for participating in pro-Palestine protests: PUCL

Israeli airstrike on Gaza hospital kills at least 500, Israel blame game continues

The post Right-wing group protests a talk on Palestine, demands faculty who organised event be arrested: IIT-Bombay appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Fascists are known for their highly manipulative strategies which are meticulously planned. Top on their priority list is to throttle freedom of speech and expression, to curb every form of dissent and to do all they can to hide the plain truth and grim reality. They leave no stone unturned in order to attain their insidious ends: they threaten, they coopt, they compromise, they foist false cases, they intimidate and harass, use draconian laws like the UAPA to curb dissent; they misuse official agencies like the ED, the NIA, the CBI and even the police, to hound those who take visible and vocal stands; they incarcerate and even kill. It is not easy for journalists in India today to speak truth to power: journalism is under great duress!

It did not come as a great surprise that in the World Press Freedom Index, 2023, released last May, that India had reached an abysmal low rank of 161 out of 180 countries; slipping eleven notches from its previous ranking; freedom of the press in India is much worse than even its neighbours like Pakistan and Sri Lanka. This does not augur well for the future of democracy! Once the fourth pillar of democracy is throttled, made subservient to the whims and facies of the political masters, it does not leave much of an imagination to realise, that more than half the battle is lost.

The World Press Index 2023, says it all, as it minces no words commenting on the pathetic state of the press in India stating, “the violence against journalists, the politically partisan media and the concentration of media ownership all demonstrate that press freedom is in crisis in “the world’s largest democracy”, ruled since 2014 by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the embodiment of the Hindu nationalist right.”

The highly professional and authentically objective report continues to say, “with an average of three or four journalists killed in connection with their work every year, India is one of the world’s most dangerous countries for the media. Journalists are exposed to all kinds of physical violence including police violence, ambushes by political activists, and deadly reprisals by criminal groups or corrupt local officials. Supporters of Hindutva, the ideology that spawned the Hindu far right, wage all-out online attacks on any views that conflict with their thinking. Terrifying coordinated campaigns of hatred and calls for murder are conducted on social media, campaigns that are often even more violent when they target women journalists, whose personal data may be posted online as an additional incitement to violence. The situation is also still very worrisome in Kashmir, where reporters are often harassed by police and paramilitaries, with some being subjected to so-called “provisional” detention for several years.”

Where then, does Catholic journalism stand, in the wake of the onslaught that media in India in general, is subject to? Do they have the courage to exercise the prophetic mission to speak truth to power? Or have they also succumbed to the fears and duress to which media in general has fallen to? Questions which are rhetoric in nature, because the answers are obvious! By and large (barring a few notable exceptions) Catholic journalists and Catholic media in general, have abdicated their prime responsibility of speaking truth to power!

In January 2004, the General Assembly of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of India (CBCI) held in Thrissur, Kerala, produced a path-breaking statement, ‘Called to be a Communicating Church’ in which they highlighted “that media have a prophetic role, indeed a vocation: to speak out against the false gods and ideals of the day — materialism, hedonism, consumerism and narrow nationalism”. The statement called for a Pastoral Plan for Communications which was meant to be implemented in every Diocese in India. How many of our Dioceses are today actually implementing this plan with empowered Communications Commissions (and with lay members) to monitor them? How many have spokespersons, particularly in the vernacular?

It is true that journalism today, is under duress! But should Catholic journalists also enter this comfort zone and continue with its projects, productions and ‘feel-good’ ‘sitting-on-the-fence’ communications? Don’t they have the moral and non-negotiable responsibility of responding to the cries of the poor and the vulnerable, the excluded and exploited, the marginalised and the minorities of the country? How many have written incisive articles on the reality which is destroying Manipur and the victimisation of the Muslims of Haryana? How many have written/done productions against the sedition, the UAPA and other draconian laws? the illegal incarceration of human rights defenders? the unconstitutional abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A regarding Kashmir? Has there been any concerted effort to rubbish false propaganda movies like the ‘Kashmir Files’ or the ‘Kerala Story’? the anti-conversion laws? the three farm bills and the labour codes? the monstrous and extravagant Central Vista project?  The mining mafia which is looting the country of its natural resources and denying the Adivasis of their jal, jungle aur jameen? what about the legitimate rights of the Dalits, LGBTQI and other vulnerable communities? the growing unemployment and spiralling prices? and much more? Catholic journalists must have the prophetic courage to take on the fascist and fundamentalist forces which are working overtime, to destroy the sanctity of the Constitution and the secular, pluralistic fabric of our beloved nation.

Indian Catholic journalists must take a cue from and be inspired by St Titus Brandsma. St. Titus, a Dutch Carmelite priest was a fearless, prophetic journalist. He was spiritual adviser to the Dutch Association of Catholic Journalists in 1935 and became its president after the Nazi invasion of the Netherlands. He worked with the Dutch bishops’ in crafting their message opposing Nazi ideology and the forced publication of propaganda in Catholic newspapers. Following Germany’s invasion of the Netherlands in 1940, Brandsma defended the freedom of Catholic education and the Catholic press against Nazi pressure. In the face of great risk, he visited the offices of Catholic media outlets around the country over the course of ten days, encouraging editors to resist pressure to publish Nazi propaganda. His actions drew the ire of the Nazi regime who arrested him in 1942. Several months later, he was transported to the Dachau concentration camp where he was killed by a lethal injection of carbolic acid. He had to pay the ultimate price for his visible and vocal stand against Nazim. St. John Paul II, who beatified him on 3 November 1985, defined Brandsma as a “valiant journalist” and a “martyr of freedom of expression against the tyranny of the dictatorship.”

The poem ‘Freedom’ of our Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore, should inspire Catholic journalists to move into a more meaningful and fearless realm:

Freedom from fear is the freedom

I claim for you, my motherland!

Freedom from the burden of the ages, bending your head,

breaking your back, blinding your eyes to the beckoning

call of the future;

Freedom from the shackles of slumber wherewith

you fasten yourself in night’s stillness,

mistrusting the star that speaks of truth’s adventurous paths;

freedom from the anarchy of destiny

whole sails are weakly yielded to the blind uncertain winds,

and the helm to a hand ever rigid and cold as death.

Freedom from the insult of dwelling in a puppet’s world,

where movements are started through brainless wires,

repeated through mindless habits,

where figures wait with patience and obedience for the

master of show,

to be stirred into a mimicry of life.

It is certainly not easy to be a journalist in India today: one thing is clear, that if you stick your neck out, if you are visible and vocal, if you stand up for truth and justice; you will have to pay the price: and that price is heavy indeed! It is however worth it, for the future of our country!  Brandsma and Tagore show the way!

(The author is a human rights, reconciliation and peace activist/writer. He is the recipient of several international and national awards including ICPA’s ‘Louis Careno Award’ in 2021).

Related:

Manipur is Burning but who cares?

Freedom of Expression: Driver for All other Human Rights

Bishops of India must protest & speak out for peace, against injustices in Manipur & India: Jesuit priest

The post Speaking truth to power often means paying the price: India in 2023 appeared first on SabrangIndia.