The BSP won Ambedkar Nagar, Amroha, Bijnor, Ghazipur, Ghosi, Jaunpur, Lalganj, Nagina, Saharanpur and Shrawasti. The SP won Azamgarh, Mainpuri, Moradabad, Rampur and Sambhal. While BJP ally Apna Dal picked up Mirzapur and Robertsganj, the rest were all won by the BJP.

Ever since the election results were declared, political pundits, professors and senior journalists have been feverishly trying to explain how the caste quotient worked in UP.

The caste conundrum: What do experts say?
According to Athar Husain, Director, Centre for Objective Research and Development (CORD), “More than 70% Muslims, Jatavs and Yadavs and 35% Jats voted for the Gathbandhan. On the other hand, more than 70% upper castes and non-Yadav OBCs, and around 55% non-Jatav Dalits and 55% Jats backed the BJP.” Explaining the significance of these numbers, he explains, “Muslims, Yadavs and Dalits constitute around 49% in UP. Remove non-Jatav Dalits, which is around 10% of the population, and that reduces the Gathbandhan ‘s core constituency to 39%. This percentage is not spread evenly across the state. The BJP ability to draw non-Jatav Dalits on its side was crucial. So, here I want to emphasise that Gathbandhan was hugely successful in garnering its core vote and reached the figure of 40% which is huge by any count, but overwhelming consolidation of Upper Caste Hindu vote with huge chunk of MBC’s (non-Yadav OBCs) and non Jatav Dalits went to BJP which gave it roughly a lead of 9-10%.”

Which means that the Gathbandhan’s simplistic assumption that, to consolidate their main caste base –and also tactically give representation to those among the Kurmis, Nishadhs and Patels – would work, was simply not enough. That the ‘grand old party’, the Congress chose this particular election ‘to effect a comeback’ in UP and go it alone, also did not help. Our calculations show that in at least 13 seats it was the INC that stole victory from the Gathbandhan. Which assumes then, that even if it had been within the alliance, of the 80 parliamentary seats in UP, only approximately 28 were assured. Simple vote and caste arithmetic appear to have been beaten by the gross use of a money and resource funded publicity campaign and attendant dissemination/organisation.
Meanwhile, Christophe Jaffrelot and Gilles Verniers have made another important observation about upper castes dominating the new Lok Sabha in this piece in the Indian Express. Citing data from the Trivedi Center for Political Data (Ashoka University) and the CERI (Sciences Po), the duo have chosen to focus on the Hindi belt calling it the “crucible of the Mandalisation of Indian politics in the 1990s”.

Jaffrelot is Senior Research Fellow at CERI-Sciences Po/CNRS, Paris, Professor of Indian Politics & Sociology at King’s India Institute, London, and non-resident scholar at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Gilles Verniers is Assistant Professor of political science, and Co-Director, Trivedi Centre for Political Data, Ashoka University.

They go on to write, “This decade saw the percentage of OBC MPs doubling – from 11% to 22% – at the expense of the upper castes, largely because of the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party, but also because of the nomination of lower caste candidates by the Congress and the BJP, a party that used to be known as a “Banya/Brahmin” party, but which realised in the 1990s that OBCs could not be ignored anymore – as evident from the appointment of Kalyan Singh as Chief Minister in 1991.

“However, the last decade has seen the return of the savarn (upper caste) – and the erosion of OBC representation – along with the rise of the BJP. This trend started in 2009, but the Modi wave of 2014 has confirmed it and the last elections have resulted in a certain consolidation of this come back to the pre-Mandal scenario.

Data from SPINPER project – The Social Profile of the Indian National and Provincial Elected Representatives. 
 
Highlighting BJP’s return to its savarna heavy cadre, they say, “BJP has nominated 88 upper caste candidates out of 147 non-reserved seats in the Hindi belt and 80 of them have been elected.”
Jaffrelot and Gilles also highlight how the BJP has chosen to stick with Brahmins and Rajputs. They write, “… out of 199 BJP candidates in the Hindi belt, 37 were Brahmins and 30 were Rajputs – 33 and 27 have been respectively elected.”

It appears that the BJP has also tried to counter the Yadav votes (that typically go to the SP) by pitching eight Kurmi candidates (7 got elected) and many others from smaller OBC ‘jaatis’. Similarly, to counter the Jatav votes (that typically go to the BSP) the BJP fielded candidates from non-Jatav communities. The BSP has increasingly been come to be known as solelyu representative of the Jatav section among Dalits. The BJP also fielded 14 Jat candidates.

This chart shows the caste distribution of BJP and INC candidates.

Data from SPINPER project. 

What do the subalterns want?
Both these analyses are on point when it comes to statistics, but understanding the motivations and sentiments requires a more complex and layered approach. Are the needs of the Yadavs different from those of the non-Yadavs? Has the SP by being seen as solely a “Yadav” party self-limited itself ? Have the Jatavs and non-Jatavs Dalits experienced different forms of oppression and exclusion? Or is it that by being exclusive of other Dalit sections the BSP has itself not followed the ‘Bahujan’ concept as politically conceptualised by Kanshiram? How homogenous are these caste identities? Is there scope for heterogeneity even within the same caste? Do they all vote alike? What do they want from their elected representatives?

Is it still just an existential struggle about roti-kapda-makaan and bijli-paani-sadak? The BJP famously drove home the ‘success’ of their many populist schemes including Ujjwala Gas, Swachha Bharat and PM Awas Yojana through an ingenuous misuse of advertisement and marketing resources.  In this piece in Firstpost Parth MN shows how the BJP showed it all as work in progress and used that to encourage people to vote them back into power.

He writes, “I travelled through the Hindi heartland for three months ahead of the results on 23 May. It was impossible to not hear the paeans of Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana, Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana and the Swachch Bharat Abhiyan, especially in rural areas, where the Opposition expected to make inroads using agrarian crisis and unemployment.”

He goes on to say, “I met families who benefited from these schemes. I met people who are waiting for the schemes to reach them. More importantly, those who have not yet availed of the schemes know it has reached their neighbourhoods.” Comparing the BJP’s strategy to Hirschman’s Tunnel Effect, he says, “… if people belonging to your class, caste or religion are seen to be part of a sort of a transformation, you tend to be more patient towards the process. Hirschman’s Tunnel Effect has played a significant role in Narendra Modi’s success during the 2019 Lok Sabha election.”

Parth MN also echoes the longstanding belief that the BJP targets specific castes. He writes, “The politics of welfare has also helped Modi consolidate his caste arithmetic. In Uttar Pradesh, for example, the BJP’s focus has been on the non-Yadav OBCs, and non-Jatav Dalits. They are the ones largely considered to be the swing factor, with Yadavs and Jatavs firmly behind the Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party respectively.”

Also one cannot ignore the aspirations of young Dalits, Adivasis and Bahujans, and their idea of India. Did the feverishly jingoistic pitch of the BJP’s post-Pulwama ‘nationalist’ campaign capture the imagination of the savarna and subaltern voter alike?

Let us also not forget this piece in The Caravan that highlights the caste of Pulwama martyrs saying, “…the Hindutva nationalism of the urban middle-class, largely spearheaded by right-wing groups, conveniently exploits the sacrifices of the downtrodden.” Given how many men from socio-economically deprived backgrounds, including several from historically oppressed castes end up enrolling in various defence and para-military forces, the ‘nationalist’ sentiment among the youth in these communities cannot be ignored.

What women want?
Add to this the calibrated approach of the women’s wing of the RSS in reaching out to women voters in UP, recognising their need to be recognised as a part of the political process. The communication was customised to appeal to urban women, rural women and even Muslim women. Speaking to us exclusively on the condition of anonymity, a woman who is a part of the Rashtriya Sevika Samiti and went door to door speaking to women voters, told us, “Before the campaigns, the members of the women’s wing were given some tips on talking to the women voters. We were even provided with specialised and specific data that cannot be collected by the common man.” Although the women’s wing didn’t explicitly request the women voters to vote for BJP, their meetings were designed  to hint towards the Modi government and its policies. They discussed the various schemes launched during Modi’s regime such as ‘Beti Bachao Beti Padhao’, ‘Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana’, ‘Swachh Bharat Abhiyan’ among others. Read our exclusive story here. 

Women, especially those from historically oppressed castes and socio-economically backward communities, face multiple layers of oppression on account of their gender, caste and economic background. With a gradual but steady increase in awareness and education, and also after surviving domestic violence and sexual harassment for generations, it is ludicrous to presume that these women will vote only as directed by the men in their families and communities.

Remember how the women’s vote had swung the election in favour of Nitish Kumar who promised prohibition if he came to power during the Bihar assembly elections in 2015. It remains to be seen how the Dalit, Bahujan and Adivasi woman voted.

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Kashi Vishwanath Temple and Gyanvapi Mosque

The elections in Varanasi are taking place at a delicate juncture. It is not just Modi and BJP versus Gathbandhan. Varanasi has symbolised a richly vibrant syncretic culture that emerged over the centuries. Kabir and Raidas (or Ravidas) contributed to it as did various Urdu shayars of yore. Premchand and Dhumil arose from here, as did Bismillah Khan. Mandirs and masjids coexisted as did weavers’ guilds and unions of mallahs. All this is sought to be crushed under a ritualistic and regressive juggernaut, ignorant of history and culture.

Uttar Pradesh, over the last five years, has been a hotbed of communal politics. Since the Muzaffarnagar riots in 2013, the state has witnessed a vicious brand of communal politics actively organised by the Sangh and the BJP. The rise of the Yogi regime further aggravated this trend. In Varanasi too there have been concerted efforts at communal polarisation.

It is understandable why Varanasi would be a soft target for the Hindutva brigade. Varanasi has a history of temple-mosque politics which is similar to that of Ayodhya before the Babri Masjid was demolished. The Sangh believes that the Gyanvapi masjid in Varanasi stands on the same ground that the original Kashi Vishwanath temple stood upon. One of the slogans raised during the Babri masjid demolition was “Yeh toh sirf jhanki hai, Kashi-Mathura baki hai.” Over the years, this issue has been consistently used by the Sangh to whip up communal sentiments. In fact, locals allege that the current demolition drive in the area to create the Kashi Vishwanath corridor brings the Hindutva brigade one step closer to demolishing the mosque.

Another reason why Varanasi has been such an important target for the BJP is that it has historically been a symbol of cultural and social syncretism. The famed Ganga-Jamuni tehzeeb of the region, which involves mixing and acceptance of different cultures and religions, has for long found strong expression in Varanasi. Traditionally, the cultural ethos of the city has gone beyond the narrow “peacekeeping” notion of secularism to that of whole-hearted mutual embrace.   
 
One of the greatest musicians to ever come from Varanasi was Bismillah Khan, the shehnai maestro, who single-handedly brought the instrument that was earlier only played in temples and weddings into mainstream Hindustani classical music. Bismillah Khan embodied the syncretism of Varanasi, embracing many religions and traditions at once. He would often say that music was his true religion. He had an undying love for the city. At a time when most other music practitioners of some fame, like Ravi Shankar, decided to move on to greener pastures and never look back, Bismillah Khan never left Varanasi.

The relationship between Varanasi and literature is also rich and diverse. As against popular perception, the city finds mention not only in Hindu scriptures, but also in the imagination of Urdu poets such as Ghalib. Ghalib composed a poem of 108 couplets, Chirag-e-dair (The Lamp of the Temple), based on Vanarasi, which he visited in 1827. About Varanasi he had to say: “Zamane bhar Mein / yeh sthal / Mukaam-e-fakher / kehlata hain// Dehli shaher bhi / iski / parikarma ko / Aata Hain.”

Varanasi itself has seen many Urdu poets, like Nazeer Banarasi and Rashid Banarasi, both of who belonged to the weavers’ community. Nazeer Banarasi wrote extensively about India, its festivals and politics. Rashid Banarasi, in one of his poems, says that the Ganga protects those who respond to the conch of Hindus, the call to prayer of Muslims, the devotional songs of Sikhs, and the church bells of Christians. Not only Urdu poets, the city has produced legendary Hindi poets as well. Dhoomil (Sudama Pandey), was widely known for his revolutionary poetry, who was also from Varanasi. A host of other progressive writers, such as Premchand, Kashinath Singh, and Namvar Singh, who were ahead of their times in the themes they wrote about, also hailed from Varanasi.

Varanasi’s tryst with poetry of tolerance and syncretism of course goes much further back. Two saint poets, who stood for their own unique and emancipatory philosophy, both from Varanasi, were Kabir and Raidas (or Ravidas). Kabir denounced both Islam and Hinduism, even while embracing them both. He belonged to the working class, whereas Raidas was a dalit who was not even allowed to enter the city. Both are still as relevant and revolutionary today as they were in their lifetimes.

It is worth mentioning here that a large part of the economy of Varanasi consists of the production and trade of sarees. The weavers who make these sarees and silk materials are Muslims, and they are traded by Hindus. The famed Banarasi Saree is largely crafted by Muslim weavers in the area.  

Though Varanasi has been simmering since the demolition of the Babri Masjid and has mostly seen the BJP in power in recent times, the city was also once a bastion of the Left. This was due to a large number of trade unions, not just in the saree and silk trade, but also among the artisans who produce wooden toys and brass goods which the areas is known for. There have also been prominent leaders of the left, such as Rustam Satin, who have made lasting contributions to the cultural vibrancy of Varanasi.

As we enter the last phase of polling, it is important to remember all that is at stake here. Hanging in the balance is our prized composite inheritance. What can be said about Varanasi can also be said about the country as a whole. The very secular fabric of our nation is being destroyed by the Hindutva brigade, and it must be stopped.

Courtesy: Indian Cultural Forum

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Image Courtesy: Countercurrents
 

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