Image Courtesy: Jonathan Stening/Flickr, CC BY-NC

One in three women around the world currently experience gender-based violence. Harmful practices such as trafficking, forced marriage, domestic violence and female genital mutilation occur both in public and in private spaces. Today, these forms of violence are recognised as a major violation of human rights, a public health challenge and one of the clearest forms of gender discrimination. It’s also widely acknowledged that women experience heightened levels of violence in cities.

Tens of thousands of delegates from right across the globe met in Quito, Ecuador, to discuss the future of cities at the UN’s Habitat III conference, where the fifth and final version of the New Urban Agenda was adopted by member states. The document will help to guide urban policy around the world for the next 20 years. Which begs the question: how have women’s voices and gender issues been incorporated into it?

Impressively, with each new draft of this latest document, women’s views are increasingly being taken on board. Consultation took place at a range of levels, with notable contributions from important global networks that fight for women’s rights and gender equality, such as Slum Dwellers International (SDI), Women in Informal Employment: Globalising and Organising (WIEGO) and the Huairou Commission.

Living without fear

From the first draft to the final document, references to women more than doubled from 14 paragraphs to 32, out of 175. The final document explicitly states that cities should:

Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls, ensuring women’s full and effective participation and equal rights in all fields and in leadership at all levels of decision-making, and by ensuring decent work and equal pay for equal work, or work of equal value for all women, as well as preventing and eliminating all forms of discrimination, violence and harassment against women and girls in private and public spaces.

The fact that these commitments explicitly address the prevention and elimination of violence against women and girls in public and private spaces, as well as safety and security for women in cities, is a major achievement.

In particular, there are three commitments that have the potential, not just to empower individual women, but also to transform gender power relations in cities. These include land tenure rights for women, which gives women individual titles to land. When integrated into land regulation procedures, measures like these can transform gender power relations because it means women no longer have to depend on men in order to access land, as seen in Recife, Brazil.

Another key commitment relates to informal economy opportunities for women in terms of “livelihoods, working conditions, income security, legal and social protection”. Access to an independent income for those working in the informal economy – such as waste-pickers and recyclers – empowers women, while successfully contesting legal rights can change structural power relations by reducing their dependence on men for financial resources.
 

Image Courtesy: Jonathan Stening/Flickr, CC BY-NC

The third commitment relates to calls for cities with “public spaces and streets, free from crime and violence, including sexual harassment and gender-based violence”. This empowers women by enhancing their mobility, and access to both education and employment opportunities, which can allow them to live more independent lives.

Watered down

Yet some measures to address violence against women and girls were diluted throughout the five drafts. The first draft not only identified the importance of preventing and eliminating violence against women and girls in cities, it also specified how it should be addressed: through a range of measures, including the “investigation, prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators”.

It also called for the provision of services for survivors, recognition “that the treatment of women and girls can be a broader reflection of societal norms” and a commitment to “using education and public awareness campaigns as a further tool against abuse”.

But by the final draft, making places safer for women and girls had become a matter relating merely to the design and management of infrastructure and urban public spaces – for instance, by ensuring transport is accessible and improving urban sanitation. There was no acknowledgement that many of the problems faced by women and girls are caused by underlying gender inequalities in society. And in the paragraph on urban safety, crime and violence prevention, women are entirely ignored.

Throughout the agenda, women are typically referred to as part of a composite, monolithic and vulnerable group. There are continual references to “age and gender-responsive” interventions – but very little clarity as to what this means or involves in practice.

In fact, only one practical commitment was made, to age and gender-responsive budgeting. This involves strengthening the capacity of national, sub-national and local governments to ensure that there are equal numbers of women represented throughout all state institutions, and to take women’s needs into account in the allocation of state budgets.

Compromises have to be made when agreeing on global agendas and the inclusion of women is complex and contradictory. But if the UN’s agenda is to effectively address issues of violence against women and girls, it needs to clarify the meaning of generic “gender-responsive” commitments, and consider women specifically, rather than as part of a larger group of “vulnerable” citizens.

While design and management can play an important role in forging safer cities, it is essential to move beyond these aspects, in order to transform gender relations in urban spaces around the world over the next 20 years.

(Cathy McIlwaine,professor of Geography, Queen Mary University of London; Caroline Moser, Emeritus Professor, University of Manchester).

(This is part of a series on publicly funded UK research at the UN Habitat III summit in Quito, Ecuador. It is a collaboration between the Urban Transformations Network, UK Economic and Social Research Council and The Conversation UK. The original story may be accessed here.)
 

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(In 2003, professor Asma Barlas delivered a keynote address at Ithaca College based on her book, “Believing Women” in Islam, Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur’an, dealing with the Qur’an’s position on sexual equality. A modified version of her talk was published in three parts by The Daily Times, Pakistan a few months later. We are republishing an abridged version of the articles as they have a direct bearing on the current debates in India, within and outside the Supreme Court, on the issues of triple talaq, halala marriages and polygamy)  
 
My interest in studying Islam grew out of experiences in Pakistan, which is my home country and where I lived until 1983, and in the US where I’ve spent the last twenty years of my life.
 
It is easy to assume that the prevailing culture in Pakistan is Islamic because 98% of the people are Muslims and it wasn’t until I no longer was embedded in that culture that I came to realise show much of what passes as Islam actually ignores or violates the Qur’an’s teachings. (The reason I use the Qur’an as a yardstick to evaluate Muslim practices is because I believe that a scripture offers the most authoritative and compelling exposition of a religion.)
 
A case in point was the introduction of segments of Muslim law, the Sharia, into the country by its previous military ruler, Zia ul Haq. The Sharia, unfortunately, legalises sexual inequality by equating the testimony of two women to that of one man and it also fails to distinguish between rape, adultery, and extramarital sex, for all of which it prescribes stoning to death, something that the Qur’an itself does not sanction for any crime in any context.
 
Is the Qur’an a patriarchal or misogynistic text? No. Can the Qur’an be a source for women’s liberation? Yes.

Such laws naturally had devastating consequences for women. One particularly notorious case involved the rape of a blind woman who became pregnant. The court took this as evidence that she was guilty of extramarital sex and sentenced her to be stoned, though the sentence was later stayed.
 
Meanwhile, the rapist went free because, being blind, she couldn’t identify him. However, even if she had been able to see him, the court would still have discounted her testimony because it wasn’t corroborated by another woman. This, however, is a gross misreading of the Qur’an since in only one out of several instances of evidence-giving does the Qur’an say that two women can serve as witnesses to a financial transaction if a man is not available.
 
In the other cases, it does not distinguish between women’s and men’s testimonies and in the case of adultery, it privileges the woman’s testimony. If a man accuses his wife of adultery and cannot produce four male witnesses to corroborate his testimony, the Qur’an allows the wife to be her own witness; if she swears her innocence, it gives her husband no further legal recourse against her.
 
But the Sharia clearly does not see the Qur’anic privilege given to women in this instance as proof that women’s evidence isn’t automatically half that of a man’s. So, even before I left Pakistan, I had become aware of the “striking difference between what can be safely inferred from the Qur’an itself and what has frequently been read into it” (Neal Robinson, Discovering the Quran, London: SCM Press, 1996: 29).
 
[There is a] “striking difference between what can be safely inferred from the Qur’an itself and what has frequently been read into it.”

This realisation grew in the US where people ascribe all sorts of stuff to Islam that either has nothing to do with it or isn’t Islamic in its particular manifestations, such as the harem, the veil, and female circumcision, and after 9/11, the concept of holy war. There is, however, no concept of holy war or of female circumcision in the Qur’an, and the forms of polygyny most Muslims practice violate the Qur’anic provisions on marriage, as do many forms of veiling…
 
I raise two sets of questions in my book (‘Believing Women’ in Islam, Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur’an, University of Texas Press, 2002) as a way to flesh out the Qur’an’s position on equality.
 
First, is the Qur’an a patriarchal or misogynistic text? When I ask this question, “I am asking whether it represents God as Father/male or teaches that God has a special relationship with males or that males embody divine attributes and that women are by nature weak, unclean, or sinful. Further, does it teach that the father/husband is divinely ordained and an earthly continuation of God’s Rule, as religious and traditional patriarchies claim? Alternatively, does the Qur’an advocate gender differentiation, dualisms, or inequality on the basis of sexual (biological) differences between women and men? In other words, does it privilege men over women in their biological capacity as males, or treat man as the Self… and woman as the Other, or view women and men as binary opposites, as modern patriarchal theories of sexual differentiation and inequality do?”
 
Second, I ask whether we can read the Qur’an for liberation. When I ask this question, “I am asking whether its teachings about God as well as about human creation, ontology, sexuality, and marital relationships challenge sexual inequality and patriarchy. Alternatively, do the teachings of the Qur’an allow us to theorise the equality, sameness, similarity, or equivalence, as the context demands, of women and men?” (Asma Barlas, “Believing Women,” in Islam 2002:1).
 
Contrary to what many Muslims claim, the Qur’an does not establish men as ontologically superior to women or as rulers over them; rather, it designates women and men each other’s ‘guides’ (awliya) and establishes love and mutuality as the basis of marriage.

As is obvious, these questions presuppose a particular view of patriarchy and in passing I should mention that no one until now had applied a definition of patriarchy to read the Qur’an even though, as I noted earlier, many Muslims regularly condemn Islam as a patriarchal religion.
 
I define patriarchy in both a narrow (specific) and a broad (universal) sense in order to make the definition as comprehensive as possible. Narrowly defined, patriarchy is a historically specific mode of rule by fathers that, in its religious and traditional forms, assumes a real as well as symbolic continuum between a patriarchalised view of God as Father/male, and a theory of father-right, extending to the husband’s claim to rule over his wife and children. I apply this definition in reading the Qur’an because the Qur’an was revealed in the context of a traditional patriarchy, and my aim is to see if it endorsed this mode of patriarchy by representing God as Father or by representing the father or husband as ruler over his wife and children.
 
Since the Qur’an’s teachings are universal and since father’s rule has reconstituted itself, I also define patriarchy more broadly, as a politics of sexual differentiation that privileges males by ‘transforming biological sex into politicised gender, which prioritises the male while making the woman different (unequal), less than, or the ‘Other’”( Zillah Eisenstein,
Feminism and Sexual Equality: Crisis in Liberal America, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984: 90. I should note that in her later work, Eisenstein does clarify that difference doesn’t mean inequality, which is a crucial point to which I will return).
 
Using this definition, I show that it is possible “to answer the first set of questions — is the Qur’an a patriarchal or misogynistic text — in the negative, while [answering…] the second
— can the Qur’an be a source for women’s liberation — in the affirmative”(Barlas, p. 2)
 
Since patriarchies do transgress against women’s rights by oppressing them, I argue that the Qur’an cannot possibly endorse them and we should read its provisions with this idea in mind.

To begin with, the Qur’an does not represent God as Father or male; indeed, it explicitly forbids sacralising God as Father or using similitude for God. Nor does it sacralise fathers or fatherhood. It does recognise that in historically existing patriarchies, men are the locus of authority and it does address patriarchies, but addressing a patriarchy is not the same as condoning or advocating one and indeed, the Qur’an repeatedly says that “following the ways of the father” has prevented people from the path of God.

My reading of the Qur’anic accounts of the prophets Abraham and Muhammad, also suggests an inherent conflict between monotheism and patriarchy inasmuch as the latter
sacralises men and their authority over women and children, which the Qur’an does not do.
 
Thus, contrary to what many Muslims claim, the Qur’an does not establish men as ontologically superior to women or as rulers over them; rather, it designates women and men each other’s “guides” (awliya) and establishes love and mutuality as the basis of marriage. Moreover, in Islam sexual equality is ontological in that the Qur’an teaches that God created humans from a single self (nafs). It does not privilege the man’s creation or endow him with attributes or faculties not given to the woman. Rather, humans “manifest the whole” (Sachiko Murata, The Tao of Islam: A Sourcebook on Gender Relationships in Islamic Thought, Albany: SUNY, 1992, p. 43; her emphasis).
 
The Qur’an also does not define men and women as opposites, or portray women as lesser or defective men, or the two sexes as incompatible, incommensurable, or unequal. In fact, it does not even associate sex with gender; thus, while the Qur’an recognises biological differences, it does not assign them any gender symbolism making it difficult to derive a theory of sexual and gender inequality from its teachings. The Qur’an also does not link women and men to specific gender roles. There is not a single verse that suggests that men’s gender roles are a function of their biology, or that biological differences between men and women make them unequal.
 
Therefore, while the Qur’an does treat women and men differently with respect to some issues this doesn’t mean that it establishes them as unequal. For one thing, difference in itself does not imply inequality. For another, the Qur’an does not tie its different treatment of women and men to any claims about biological superiority or inferiority.
 
The only basis on which Islam does distinguish between human beings is on the basis of their moral praxis…; as Sachiko Murata (p. 44) says it “distinguishes between those who have faith and those who do not: the 'believers' and the 'unbelievers.' In all the perspectives of Islamic life and thought people are separated into groups according to the degree to which they fulfill the purpose of life.’”
 
It is not just on the basis of such teachings that I describe the Qur’an as anti-patriarchal, but also on the basis of the claim that the anti-patriarchal nature of Qur’anic epistemology flows from Islamic conceptualisations of God. This part of my argument maintains that since there is an intrinsic relationship between God Being’s and God’s Speech, we need to connect them, which means we need to base our readings of the Qur’an in our understanding of God.
 
For instance, the doctrine of Tawhid maintains that God is One and God’s sovereignty/rule is indivisible. To my mind, this means that we should not read the Qur’an as designating men as rulers over women, or as intermediaries between God and women, since this constitutes shirk. Similarly, the Qur’an teaches that God is Just and never does zulm
to people (zulm, in the Qur’anic context, means transgressing against another’s rights). As such, I believe God’s Speech also cannot teach transgression against the rights of humans.
 
Since patriarchies do transgress against women’s rights by oppressing them, I argue that the Qur’an cannot possibly endorse them and we should read its provisions with this idea in mind. Likewise, the Qur’an teaches that God is un-representable; as such, linguistic references to God as “He” should be seen as limitations of human language and not accurate statements about God’s Reality.
 
If we apply such criteria to read the Qur’an and also read it for its best meanings and as a thematic whole, privileging its clear verses over its allegorical, as the Qur’an itself recommends, then we arrive at an interpretation that captures the radically egalitarian nature of its teachings.

 
If, as I have argued, the Qur’an does not endorse theories of male privilege and female inferiority and subordination, then the question becomes why haven’t Muslims read it as an anti-patriarchal and liberatory text? I want to address this problem, as well as the larger issue of interpretation, in the last part of my talk.
 
I believe that the reason Muslims have failed to read the Qur’an as an anti-patriarchal text has to do with “who has read it (basically men), the contexts in which they have read it (basically patriarchal), and the method by which they have read it (basically one that ignores the hermeneutic and theological principles that the Qur’an suggests for its own reading)” (Asma Barlas, “Challenging Patriarchal Interpretations of Islam,” Anderberg Lecture, University of Nebraska, 2002).
 
Much of the religious knowledge Muslims regard as canonical today is the product of a method that has been described as linear, atomistic, and hermeneutically flawed. However, because of how religious knowledge and authority came to be structured in Muslim societies historically, most Muslims continue to regard these interpretations and this methodology as Islamic.
 
Much of this religious knowledge also was produced by male scholars in the first few centuries of Islam which were co-terminus with the medieval period of European history. Even though Muslim civilisation was at its zenith during this period of European decline, this was nonetheless an era of enormous misogyny that was cross-cultural and inter-national in its scope.
 
Added to this is the fact that many of the Qur’an’s provisions threatened existing relationships of power between women and men and between the rulers and the ruled and produced a strong conservative resistance that extended to de-radicalising parts of its message very early on. For instance, Fatima Mernissi shows how many Muslim men tried to misread the verses that extended inalienable rights to women (The Veil and the Male Elite, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1991).
 
Similarly, Louise Marlow argues that as early as the second Islamic century, Muslim ulema had begun to dilute the egalitarian impulse in various parts of tradition, by justifying hierarchical "models of kingship” in a society whose Scripture extolled the virtues of egalitarianism. Thus, the ulema who had “gained incontestable possession of the moral high ground [refused to] translate the anti-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian moral at the heart of their scholarly tradition into an active social and political opposition.”
 
Instead, they sought to justify not only hierarchies, but quietism as well, even though some of them “felt obliged to defend their quietism, since it was activism that had been suggested most strongly by early Muslim experience.” By the third Islamic century, even Quranic exegesis showed that the egalitarianism once associated with the Qur’an had lost its “subversive connotation” (Hierarchy and Egalitarianism in Islamic Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977: 93; 66).
 
On its part, the early Muslim state also became involved in promoting certain interpretive practices and certain readings of Islam that were oppressive to women. This has been documented by several scholars, including Leila Ahmed, who also points out that different readings of the same texts yield “fundamentally different Islams” for women (Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, Yale University Press, 1992).
 
All this suggests, of course, that hermeneutical and existential questions are connected and to the extent they are, it is reasonable to argue that one cannot read scriptures in liberatory modes by means of flawed methodologies and in oppressive and anti-democratic circumstances. Many people, including disillusioned Muslims, believe that Islam itself is anti-democratic, but I reject such essentialism because, as my own work shows, a religion is always polysemic (has a multiplicity of meanings) and we can read it in more than one way.

The early Muslim state also became involved in promoting certain interpretive practices and certain readings of Islam that were oppressive to women. This has been documented by several scholars, including Leila Ahmed, who also points out that different readings of the same texts yield “fundamentally different Islams” for women.
 
To me, then, the more appropriate question becomes “why does a community come to regard certain interpretations and ideas as authentic, authoritative, or canonical?” And that takes us back to such issues as how knowledge itself is produced and the contexts in which it is produced.
 
If we look at Muslim societies today, we find a rather dismal picture. Most of the regimes in power are viewed by their own people as illegitimate, oppressive, and un-Islamic. Moreover, as a result partly of Western support of such regimes and partly of the legacy of Western colonialism, Muslim societies have experienced modernisation not as economic development or political freedoms, but as a “coercive secularism” (Karen Armstrong,
Islam: A Short History, New York: Modern Library, 2000: 166).
 
This brings me to how non-Muslim Westerners view Islam and to the role of the US in keeping anti-democratic regimes in power in Muslim societies, and around the world generally. I have argued elsewhere that in spite of a 1,400 year long shared history, and in spite of the fact that Islam is as much a part of Abrahamic monotheism as are Judaism and Christianity, there is very little understanding of Islam in the US and the West. Even and perhaps, especially, in the Academy, only certain types of discourses on Islam get fore-grounded that continue to perpetuate ignorant and damaging stereotypes about it.
 
My own view is that this ignorance “is cultivated, not accidental, and that it arises in an age
-old politics of misrecognition that ‘confuses Islam with Muslims, disregards the role of political, economic, cultural, and historical factors in shaping not only Muslim attitudes and actions, but also their readings of Islam, and denies Western complicity in creating many of the conditions that are conducive’ to religious extremism and not just on the part of some Muslims” (Asma Barlas, “Jihad=Holy War=Terrorism: the Politics of Conflation and Denial,”
American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Winter 2003: 1).
 
In such a milieu, learning about Islam requires unlearning deeply entrenched modes of ignorance and non-recognition and while some people are open to such a possibility, most can see no stake in it because of the instrumentalist belief that there’s no value in learning about things that don’t impact their own lives in immediate and tangible ways. However, one of the things 9/11 should have brought home to us — and I intend the pun here — is that even as we secure ourselves behind imaginary borders of inside/outside, in real life, what happens “out there” is likely to have repercussions “in here” sooner or later as well.
 
This is why I believe US-Americans have a stake in the foreign policies that governments pursue in their names and which, for the most part, are conducive to oppression, not democracy. I also believe that US-Americans have a stake in egalitarian readings of Islam and of their own religions (and secular ideologies, for that matter) because we need to devise more egalitarian modes of “knowing one another,” to use a Qur’anic phrase. In the absence of mutual recognition based in mutual knowledge and understanding, we will be hard put to live peaceably together.
 
Asma Barlas is professor of politics, Ithaca College, USA.
 
 

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Whichever way you look at it – in simple human terms, rationally, constitutionally or theologically – the dogged refusal of the bulk of the ulema in India and the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) to call for an end to the Muslim male right to triple talaq (instant divorce) defies comprehension.

In human terms, in terms of any notion of gender justice, the unilateral, arbitrary and whimsical right of a Muslim male to divorce his wife in an instant – a letter, telegram, telephone, telex, fax even an SMS would do – cannot be described as anything but inhuman and anti-women.

In rational terms it defies any definition of justice or equity. Triple talaq cannot but be unconstitutional because it is so blatantly unjust, unfair, arbitrary and discriminatory.

Even theologically, it is difficult to digest the position long held by the ulema and until recently accepted by the courts: "Though bad in theology (haram, sinful), triple talaq is good in law".

What this means in simple terms is that the moment a Muslim male utters talaq, talaq, talaq, his wife becomes unlawful to him, even if he has uttered those words under coercion, in a fit of rage or in a drunken state and regrets his utterance the very next moment. The only way out for the couple to resume their marital relation, the ulema say, is through halala: the woman must marry someone else, consummate the marriage, get the second husband to divorce her and then remarry the first husband.

It is repeatedly claimed, not by Muslims alone but also by many non-Muslim scholars, that justice and equality are the key social message of Islam. How can the practice of triple talaq be squared with any notion of justice or equity? It is not known if the ulema or the AIMPLB have ever asked themselves this question, and, if so, what their answer is.

It is repeatedly claimed, not by Muslims alone but also by many non-Muslim scholars, that justice and equality are the key social message of Islam. How can the practice of triple talaq be squared with any notion of justice or equity? It is not known if the ulema or the AIMPLB have ever asked themselves this question, and, if so, what their answer is.

Not all the ulema and not all members of the Board accept triple talaq as lawful. Besides, the triple talaq practice is today unlawful in an overwhelming majority of Muslim countries, even though Islam is declared to be the State religion.

For the first time since its inception in 1972, the AIMPLB resolved in its meeting of July 4, 2004 to take some concrete, if highly inadequate, steps to give justice to Muslim women. The Board resolved:

(1) To launch a nation-wide campaign to create awareness in the Muslim community that the prevalent practice of triple talaq was wrongful and to educate them on the Islamic way of divorce.

(2) To prepare and popularise a model nikahnama that both husband and wife be asked to sign at the time of marriage, committing themselves to not seeking a divorce except in the correct Islamic way as spelt out in the model nikahnama.

(3) To ensure that Muslim women get a share in agricultural property.

(4) To establish Darul Qaza (Islamic courts) in different parts of the country to settle marital disputes and to strive for constitutional status to these courts (so that its orders become legally enforceable).

The Board has fallen between two stools. These resolutions have left the Muslim fundamentalists aghast at the very thought that the AIMPLB is contemplating the unthinkable: bringing any change in Muslim Personal Law.

On the other hand, the proposed measures have not impressed women’s groups and other secular organisations in the least. And this is so for several reasons.

So long as you keep reiterating the position that triple talaq is good in law but bad in theology, what would be the efficacy of any campaign against it, even assuming (and this is a very big assumption) the Board has the machinery to run a nation-wide campaign and the mechanisms to ensure its success. As for a model nikahnama, the same Board has been sitting on a model nikahnama suggested by some of its own members for ten years. How many more decades before an approved nikahnama goes into mass circulation? How do you create mass opinion in its favour?

No less objectionable is the fourth resolution, asking for a religious body to be integrated as part of the judicial apparatus in a secular State. How can any secular State grant such legitimacy to any religious organisation? How would anyone react to the demand for a Hindu Dharam Sansad as an integral part of the courts’ set up in India?

The only saving grace in these four resolutions is the one concerning restoration of Muslim women’s right to agricultural property. It is a welcome development for more than one reason. In demanding fresh legislation to ensure Muslim women’s rights to agricultural property (a right that has been denied to them since 1937 with the connivance of the ulema), the Board will nullify the oft-repeated though baseless claim that any change in Muslim Personal Law is interference in God-given laws.

Even as there is endless debate over whether those concerned with gender justice should engage with or ignore the Board, victims of triple talaq (Muslim women) have kept knocking at the doors of constitutional courts in search of justice. And surprisingly, though neither the media nor the Muslim masses have awakened to its implications, a big, big change is evident here.

It is clear from a spate of judgements by the high courts and even a division bench of the Supreme Court since 1998 that the upper echelon of the judiciary is no longer willing to buy the "bad in theology, good in law" line of the ulema. There now seems to be a near consensus among them that unless it is for a reasonable cause and is preceded by efforts at reconciliation, talaq is un-Islamic and unlawful.

What this could mean for a victim of arbitrary talaq is best understood from a brief recount of the September 18, 2002 judgement of a division bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justice RC Lahoti (now Chief Justice of India) and Justice P. Venkatarama Reddi in the case of Shamim Ara v. State of UP and another, (2002) 7 SCC 518.

Shamim Ara from Allahabad got married to Abrar Ahmed in 1968. In 1979, she filed an application before a family court seeking maintenance from her husband under Section 125, CrPC, on the ground that he had deserted her.

In 1990, the husband filed a written statement to claim he had divorced her in 1987 and so she was not entitled to any maintenance. Accepting the husband’s contention that she had already been divorced, the family court, in its judgement in 1993, dismissed the wife’s plea for maintenance.
On her appeal, the high court (Allahabad) held that the communication of talaq stood completed in 1990 with the filing of the written statement by the husband.

But on September 18, 2002, the Supreme Court ruled that "neither the marriage between the parties stands dissolved on December 5, 1990 nor does the liability of the husband to pay maintenance come to an end on that day. The husband shall continue to remain liable for payment of maintenance until the obligation comes to an end in accordance with law."

The judges held that the mere plea of a husband of having divorced his wife sometime in the past was of no use as, "There are no reasons substantiated in justification of talaq and no plea of proof that any effort at reconciliation preceded the talaq".

The courts of secular India are the only hope for the countless victims of triple talaq.

Archived from Communalism Combat, July 2004 Year 10   No. 99, Cover Story 1
 

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The question of Muslim personal law has become not only a question of Muslim identity but also a question with deeper political implications. The Muslim leadership doggedly resists any reform in certain aspects of the law particularly pertaining to marriage and divorce and the Hindu communal leadership would not accept anything short of complete abolition of personal law pertaining to Muslims. As a result the Muslim women face problems and in some cases pretty serious ones.

The Muslim leadership resists any change on the ground that Muslim personal law is divine and no one can tamper with divine law and the Hindu communalists maintain that there should be one law for one country. Both positions are fundamentally flawed. The Muslim personal law is not divine in the sense the Quranic injunctions are. Firstly, Shariah is based on human interpretations of divine injunctions and is an endeavour to understand divine will and it is for this reason that there are several interpretations of Quranic verses and four different schools in Sunni Islam itself – Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki and Hanbali, besides Zahiri and Shiah schools like Ithna Ashari and Ismaili.

These different schools of Shariah law came into existence as a result of different human interpretations and to that extent there is always a scope for new and creative interpretations in keeping with changed circumstances. A noted Islamic scholar and historian Muhammad Mujib who was also vice-chancellor of Jamiah Milliah Islamiah had described shariah as a human approach to the divine will. It is quite an apt description of the evolution of the Shariah laws.

The Shariah law had been quite dynamic even during the Mughal period. The Fatawa Alamgiri, set of fatwas obtained during Aurangzebs period on various questions pertaining to Shariah are far more dynamic and liberal to women than the Muslim personal law enacted by the British.

And, besides new creative interpretations there is tremendous scope for what is called borrowing from another school if one’s own school is creating problem. This practice was followed in Turkey during the Ottoman period in as early as nineteenth century. This method was also followed in drafting the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. When Muslim women found it problematic to wait for 90 years if their husbands were missing according to the Hanafi School, the ulama, in order to overcome this difficulty, borrowed the rule from the Maliki School which allows the woman to wait only for a period of four years.

According to this [1939] Act, a Muslim woman can obtain decree for dissolution of her marriage on as much as eight grounds including disappearance of her husband for four years, neglect to pay maintenance by her husband for more than two years, if the husband has been sentenced for a period exceeding seven years, or if the husband is found impotent or insane or suffering from virulent venereal disease etc. This enactment immensely benefited many Muslim women who were unable to get relief within the Hanafi law.

It is important to note that the Muslim personal law is a British enactment and is being followed by Indian courts by virtue of this enactment and not because it is divine law. The British rulers had their own agenda and made personal laws totally static by this enactment. The Shariah law had been quite dynamic even during the Mughal period. The Fatawa Alamgiri, set of fatwas obtained during Aurangzebs period on various questions pertaining to Shariah are far more dynamic and liberal to women than the Muslim personal law enacted by the British. Even the provision for maintenance to women is much more progressive and if followed, could have avoided the Shah Bano movement.

The British themselves called the enactment, not shariah law, but significantly called it Anglo-Mohammedan Law which itself is indicative of the fact that it was a secular enactment by a secular government. Also, it must be noted that the British applied the western notion of Justice, equity and good conscience to all personal laws which itself is alien to the concept of Shariah law which Muslims consider as divine. The Shariah law is supposed to be inherently just and there is no question of any external notion of justice, equity and good conscience. This single phrase allowed, says Scout Kugle, a USA scholar, massive invasion of British juristic authority, despite caveat that English law itself was not to be introduced.

A Muslim Qadi was well aware of these differences, conflicting precedents, rulings and deductions and thus ruled in a particular case in the best interest of the victim. However, such benefits were not available to the victim, particularly women in matters of marriage, divorce or maintenance, as after the British enactment of the Anglo-Mohammedan Law, the British judges began to treat law as quite static and went more by the precedents than by consideration of relieving the victims of suffering.

In this connection it is also important to understand that before the British the Shariah law was administered by well qualified Qadis who had properly imbibed the spirit of Islamic laws. They not only used to be thorough scholars of shariah and knew provisions of other schools of law and applied those provisions if justice so demanded. But the British judges, and following them other Indian judges, pronounced judgements in keeping with the letter of the law and followed them mechanically from Hanafi School based on Hedaya, a translation of compilation of Hanafi law by [Charles] Hamilton.

It is also important to note that the Qadis decided the cases by themselves and were not bound to follow their predecessors. However, the British and subsequently Indian judges decided cases on precedence rather than on the merit or situation of the case itself. The decision of one Qadi, in other words, did not bind the other Qadi. They followed the juristic principle of ikhtilaf, i.e., mutual co-existence of differences in interpretation to give benefit to the victim. They always filled the space between legal rhetoric and social reality with interpretation in favour of the sufferer.

As Aziz al-Azmeh points out in his 'Islams and Modernisms' the shariah is a nominal umbrella of a variety of different things and is by no means univocal. The majority of its rulings do not have the finality attributed to them by modern studies. With few exceptions, Islamic law is a body of differences and of general rulings… they (Islamic legal elaborations in addition to governmental statutes) adduce a multiplicity of conflicting precedents, rulings, deductions, all of which are considered equally legitimate.

A Muslim Qadi was well aware of these differences, conflicting precedents, rulings and deductions and thus ruled in a particular case in the best interest of the victim. However, such benefits were not available to the victim, particularly women in matters of marriage, divorce or maintenance, as after the British enactment of the Anglo-Mohammedan Law, the British judges began to treat law as quite static and went more by the precedents than by consideration of relieving the victims of suffering.

The 2nd caliph Umar enforced it in the third year of his reign to combat its misuse by some unscrupulous elements. But in certain schools of Sunni Islam it became a part of shariah because of the rulings given by some noted jurists in its favour and today it is considered a part of divine law which it is not. Triple divorce, it must be noted, is not universally accepted by all schools of Sunni law, let alone Shias and Ismailis.

The Muslim leaders need to understand this today and work sincerely for much needed reforms in Muslim personal law particularly in matters of marriage, divorce and maintenance. They should not treat the enactment by secular government as divine and static. They should also note, as pointed out above, the cases are decided not by the Qadis but by secular judges. The secular judges, as is obvious, cannot follow the spirit of Islamic law but the law as laid down by the enactment. Unfortunately it is commonly believed by the Muslims that the personal law as enacted in India is divine. There is urgent need to remove this misconception and pave the way for necessary reforms within the Islamic framework.

It is also necessary to understand that the Caliphs also issued certain injunctions from time to time known in the shariah terminology as tazir which were necessitated by developing situation and these injunctions too, though not divine, became integral part of Shariah over a period of time. The triple divorce in one sitting, for example, was not practiced during the holy prophet’s time, during the first caliph Hazrat Abubakr’s time, nor during first two years of second caliph Hazrat Umar’s time.

The 2nd caliph Umar enforced it in the third year of his reign to combat its misuse by some unscrupulous elements. But in certain schools of Sunni Islam it became a part of shariah because of the rulings given by some noted jurists in its favour and today it is considered a part of divine law which it is not. Triple divorce, it must be noted, is not universally accepted by all schools of Sunni law, let alone Shias and Ismailis.

The great theologian of 14th century Imam Ibn Taymiyyah decisively rejected it and considered it as against the principles of Islam. He wrote extensively refuting the practice.

Ahl-e-Hadis, among Sunni Muslims also reject it and question its validity. However, it has become an integral part of Muslim personal law in India as most of the Muslims are Hanafis and Hanafi school accepts its validity. There are Shafii Muslims in South, particularly in Tamilnadu and Kerala and Shafii school also permits it. But today this form of divorce is causing suffering to many Muslim women and it needs to be reformed.

The ulama should take initiative as they did in 1939 and got the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act. An alim of the stature of Maulana Ashraf Thanvi had then taken the initiative in getting this provision enacted to relieve suffering of many Muslim women who had to wait for inordinately long period according to the Hanafi Law in case their husbands were missing.

Such an initiative is urgently needed today to relieve Muslim women of suffering due to triple divorce too. In fact, the Muslim personal law as it operates today in India needs to be thoroughly overhauled and compiled properly. The British enactment cannot be perpetuated forever under the misconception of divinity. As it results in injustices to women it loses its Islamic character. As far as Islam is concerned justice is the central value. One cannot think of Islamic value-system without justice.
 
No doubt it is a Herculean task to undertake compilation of Muslim personal law and very difficult to evolve consensus but nevertheless it is highly necessary. One will have to borrow provisions from different schools of law to evolve a just compilation. And, as pointed out above, this practice is not alien to Islam. In fact it was resorted to from time to time to serve the ends of justice and give benefit of provisions of other schools to the suffering women. The precedent of Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 is also there to follow.

Unfortunately the ulama, particularly the Muslim Personal Law Board has adopted a very rigid stance on the question of reform. Their usual argument is that it will open floodgates of change and interference from government. This is not a sound logic in any case. Justice is far more important than imaginary fear. The ulama took initiative in 1939 and it did not open floodgates of reform or interference. It did, on the other hand, immense good to hundreds of suffering Muslim women. No law can remain static over a long period of time without causing suffering to those for whom it is meant.

If the Quranic provisions of marriage and divorce are enforced it would do immense good to Muslim women. The Quran neither permits easy divorce nor unrestricted polygamy. It is true these verses pertaining to marriage and divorce have been differently interpreted. The ulama will have to evolve a consensus around the interpretations best suited to the rights of women. Many Muslim countries have done it already and just because Muslims are in minority in India the ulama should not deter the process of reform and change within the Islamic framework. They should remember that Muslim women are also a minority within Muslim minority and they also need justice.

(This article by the late Islamic scholar Asghar Ali Engineer was first published in November 1999 by the group, Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML).
 

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Aims:
Raise awareness within British Muslims and the wider public, of democracy particularly ‘secular democracy’ helping to contribute to a shared vision of citizenship (the separation of faith and state, so faiths exert no undue influence on policies and there is a shared public space).

• Encourage religious understanding and harmony, respect for different systems of beliefs, and encourage an understanding and celebration of the variety of Muslim cultures, values and traditions which are present in British society.

bmsd will achieve this by:

• Facilitating discourse and raising awareness of democracy particularly ‘secular democracy’ and its benefits.
• Facilitating broad and enlightened theological discourses, to enable British Muslims and the wider public to be better informed about the Islamic faith.
• Raising awareness of religious influence on UK domestic and foreign policies, particularly those which may lead to undue effect on civil liberties.
• Addressing Islamophobia and prejudice against Muslims and Muslim communities.
• Working with UK and global Muslim and other organisations, opposing radicalism and intolerant beliefs.
• Ensuring that politicians and community leaders encourage and practise transparency and ensure legitimate voting practices are followed.
• Engaging with marginalised Muslim communities, helping to identify root causes of deprivation and social exclusion, and help work towards a solution.
• Providing a lively and interesting social/educational programme which showcases the variety of Muslim histories, cultures, values and traditions in the UK today.
• Be responsive to the changing needs and pressures on succeeding generations of British Muslims and adjust and add to its programmes and projects accordingly.

About bmsd: bmsd was founded in 2006 by Nasreen Rehman and Yasmin Alibhai-Brown. We bring together a diverse group of Muslim democrats from a variety of ethnic and social backgrounds. We want to challenge perceptions, ideas and current thinking about British Muslims as a collectivity and the issues that affect the wider society. bmsd is not a theological group but one that advocates civic engagement and good citizenship. We are not concerned with judging or being judged on the basis of religious practice. If you call yourself a ‘Muslim’, you are most welcome to be a part of our movement. If you are non-Muslim, we equally welcome your association.

bmsd is about social inclusion, co-existence and harmony. Together we can all make a difference. It is now time to work towards this goal. bmsd aims to:
Raise awareness within British Muslims and the wider public, of democracy particularly ‘secular democracy’ helping to contribute to a shared vision of citizenship (the separation of faith and state, so faiths exert no undue influence on policies and there is a shared public space).

Encourage religious understanding and harmony, respect for different systems of beliefs, and encourage an understanding and celebration of the variety of Muslim cultures, values and traditions which are present in British society.

Contact: Not available on website

Website: http://bmsd.org.uk/

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Manifesto
We, non-believers, atheists, and ex-Muslims, are establishing or joining the Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain to insist that no one be pigeonholed as Muslims with culturally relative rights nor deemed to be represented by regressive Islamic organisations and ‘Muslim community leaders’.

Those of us who have come forward with our names and photographs represent countless others who are unable or unwilling to do so because of the threats faced by those considered ‘apostates’ – punishable by death in countries under Islamic law.

By doing so, we are breaking the taboo that comes with renouncing Islam but also taking a stand for reason, universal rights and values, and secularism.

Whilst religion or the lack thereof is a private affair, the increasing intervention of and devastation caused by religion and particularly Islam in contemporary society has necessitated our public renunciation and declaration. We represent a majority in Europe and a vast secular and humanist protest movement in countries like Iran.

Taking the lead from the Central Council of Ex-Muslims in Germany, we demand:

1. Universal rights and equal citizenship for all. We are opposed to cultural relativism and the tolerance of inhuman beliefs, discrimination and abuse in the name of respecting religion or culture.
2. Freedom to criticise religion. Prohibition of restrictions on unconditional freedom of criticism and expression using so-called religious ‘sanctities’.
3. Freedom of religion and atheism.
4. Separation of religion from the state and legal and educational system.
5. Prohibition of religious customs, rules, ceremonies or activities that are incompatible with or infringe people’s rights and freedoms.
6. Abolition of all restrictive and repressive cultural and religious customs which hinder and contradict woman’s independence, free will and equality. Prohibition of segregation of sexes.
7. Prohibition of interference by any authority, family members or relatives, or official authorities in the private lives of women and men and their personal, emotional and sexual relationships and sexuality.
8. Protection of children from manipulation and abuse by religion and religious institutions.
9. Prohibition of any kind of financial, material or moral support by the state or state institutions to religion and religious activities and institutions.
10. Prohibition of all forms of religious intimidation and threats.

Contact: exmuslimcouncil@googlemail.com

Website: http://ex-muslim.org.uk/
 

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Objects: Exposing deviant ideologies, extremism, terrorism and their proponents

About: No details provided on the organisation’s website

Contact: Message box provided on the website

Website: http://www.islamagainstextremism.com/
 

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Mission:

10 Principles:
Collective Identity
We accept as Muslim anyone who identifies as such. The veracity and integrity of that claim is between the individual and God, and is not a matter for the state nor an issue which other individuals can or should judge. We welcome all who are interested in discussing, promoting and working for the implementation of progressive values – human rights, freedom of expression, and separation of church and state – as well as inclusive and tolerant understandings of Islam.

Equality
We affirm the equal worth of all human beings, regardless of race, sex, gender, gender identification, ethnicity, nationality, creed, sexual orientation, or ability. We are committed to work toward global societies that ensure social, political, educational, and economic opportunities for all.

Separation of Religious and State Authorities
We believe that freedom of conscience is not only essential to all human societies but integral to the Qur’anic view of humanity. We believe that secular government is the only way to achieve the Islamic ideal of freedom from compulsion in matters of faith.

Freedom of speech
We support freedom of expression and freedom of dissent. No one should be legally prosecuted, imprisoned or detained for declaring or promoting unpopular opinions whether political, artistic, social or religious, even when that expression may be offensive and that dissent may be considered blasphemous.

Universal Human rights
We are committed to social, economic and environmental justice. We believe that the full self-realization of all people, in a safe and sustainable world, is a prerequisite for freedom, civility, and peace. We support efforts for universal health care, universal public education, the protection of our environment, and the eradication of poverty.

Gender equality
We support women’s agency and self-determination in every aspect of their lives. We believe in women’s full participation in society at every level. We affirm our commitment to reproductive justice and empowering women to make healthy decisions regarding their bodies, sexuality and reproduction.

LGBTQI Inclusion
We endorse the human and civil rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI) individuals. We affirm our commitment to ending discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity and we support full equality and inclusion of all individuals, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity, in society and in the Muslim community.

Critical analysis and interpretation
We promote interpretations that reflect traditional Qur’anic principles of tolerance, inclusiveness, mercy, compassion, and fairness. We call for critical engagement with Islamic scripture, traditional jurisprudence, and current Muslim discourses. We believe that critical thinking is essential to spiritual development.

Compassion
We affirm that justice and compassion should be the guiding principles for all aspects of human conduct. We repudiate violence, whether on an individual, organizational, or national level.

Diversity
We embrace pluralism and the diversity of inspirations that motivate people to embrace justice. We affirm that one’s religion and belief system is not the exclusive source of truth. We engage with a diversity of philosophical and spiritual traditions to pursue a more just, peaceful and sustainable world.

Contact: info@mpvusa.org
Website: www.mpvusa.org/
 

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Motto:

Declaration:

PREAMBLE
We are Muslims who live in the 21st century. We stand for a respectful, merciful and inclusive interpretation of Islam. We are in a battle for the soul of Islam, and an Islamic renewal must defeat the ideology of Islamism, or politicized Islam, which seeks to create Islamic states, as well as an Islamic caliphate. We seek to reclaim the progressive spirit with which Islam was born in the 7th century to fast forward it into the 21st century. We support the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by United Nations member states in 1948.
 
We reject interpretations of Islam that call for any violence, social injustice and politicized Islam. Facing the threat of terrorism, intolerance, and social injustice in the name of Islam, we have reflected on how we can transform our communities based on three principles: peace, human rights and secular governance. We announce the formation of an international initiative: the Muslim Reform Movement.
 
We have courageous reformers from around the world who have written our Declaration for Muslim Reform, a living document that we will continue to enhance as our journey continues. We invite our fellow Muslims and neighbors to join us.
 
A. Peace: National Security, Counterterrorism and Foreign Policy

1. We stand for universal peace, love and compassion. We reject violent jihad. We believe we must target the ideology of violent Islamist extremism in order to liberate individuals from the scourge of oppression and terrorism both in Muslim-majority societies and the West.
2. We stand for the protection of all people of all faiths and non-faith who seek freedom from dictatorships, theocracies and Islamist extremists.
3. We reject bigotry, oppression and violence against all people based on any prejudice, including ethnicity, gender, language, belief, religion, sexual orientation and gender expression.

B. Human Rights: Women's Rights and Minority Rights

1. We stand for human rights and justice. We support equal rights and dignity for all people, including minorities. We support the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.
2. We reject tribalism, castes, monarchies and patriarchies and consider all people equal with no birth rights other than human rights. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Muslims don't have an exclusive right to "heaven."
3. We support equal rights for women, including equal rights to inheritance, witness, work, mobility, personal law, education, and employment. Men and women have equal rights in mosques, boards, leadership and all spheres of society. We reject sexism and misogyny.

C. Secular Governance: Freedom of Speech and Religion

1. We are for secular governance, democracy and liberty. We are against political movements in the name of religion. We separate mosque and state. We are loyal to the nations in which we live. We reject the idea of the Islamic state. There is no need for an Islamic caliphate. We oppose institutionalized sharia. Sharia is manmade.
2. We believe in life, joy, free speech and the beauty all around us. Every individual has the right to publicly express criticism of Islam. Ideas do not have rights. Human beings have rights. We reject blasphemy laws. They are a cover for the restriction of freedom of speech and religion. We affirm every individual's right to participate equally in ijtihad, or critical thinking, and we seek a revival of ijtihad.
3. We believe in freedom of religion and the right of all people to express and practice their faith, or non-faith, without threat of intimidation, persecution, discrimination or violence. Apostasy is not a crime. Our ummah–our community–is not just Muslims, but all of humanity.

We stand for peace, human rights and secular governance. Please stand with us!

Launch: In the early morning of Friday, Dec. 4, 2015, courageous Muslim reformers from Europe, Canada and the United States stood at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., announcing the formation of a new initiative, the Muslim Reform Movement, each one reading a precept from the movement's Declaration of Reform.

In each one of their communities, from Copenhagen, Denmark, to Phoeniz, Arizona, each one of these reformers have been fighting against violent Islamist ideologies, social injustice and political Islam, motivated by a vision for an Islam of peace, human rights and secular governance. 

A group of the reformers piled into a Kia Rodando and a yellow taxi to journey west on Massachusetts Avenue, to the Islamic Center of Washington, a mosque largely run by the government of Saudi Arabia. There, the brave group posted the Declaration of Reform on the doors of the mosque and, after the pleas of men to the mosque managers, three women from the Muslim Reform Movement prayed in the main hall of the mosque, otherwise forbidden to women on the Muslim holy day of Friday. 

Muslim reform has begun. The revolution has begun. We invite you to join us!

Founding signatories: 
1. Tahir Gora, Author, Journalist, Activist, Toronto, Canada
2. Tawfik Hamid, Islamic Thinker and Reformer, Oakton, VA, USA
3. Usama Hasan, Imam, Quilliam Foundation, London, UK
4. Arif Humayun, Senior Fellow, American Islamic Forum for Democracy, Portland, OR, USA
5. Farahnaz Ispahani, Author, Former Member of Parliament, Pakistan, Washington, D.C., USA,
6. Zuhdi Jasser, M.D., President, American Islamic Forum for Democracy, Phoenix, AZ USA
7. Naser Khader, Member, Danish Parliament, Muslim democracy activist, Copenhagen, Denmark
8. Courtney Lonergan, Community Outreach Director, American Islamic Forum for Democracy, Professional facilitator
9. Hasan Mahmud, Resident expert in sharia, Muslims Facing Tomorrow, Toronto, Canada
10. Asra Nomani, Journalist, Author, Morgantown, WV, USA
11. Raheel Raza, Founder, Muslims Facing Tomorrow, Toronto, Canada
12. Sohail Raza, Vice President, Coalition of Progressive Canadian Muslim Organizations
13. Salma Siddiqui, President, Coalition of Progressive Canadian Muslim Organizations, Toronto, Canada

Contact: MuslimReformMovement@gmail.com
Website: http://muslimreformmovement.org/
 

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