Context and allegations

According to the complaint filed by Eshwari Padmunja of Puttur taluk, Bhat’s address to the gathering contained statements that were inflammatory, derogatory toward women, and targeted religious minorities, especially Muslim women, in a way alleged to incite communal disharmony. The complaint says that in the speech, Bhat stated that Hindu women who had more than two children were derided for “giving birth like dogs”, whereas Muslim women having larger families apparently were not subject to the same remarks. He reportedly urged Hindu women to have at least three children, rhetorically asking: “If we don’t have children, who will go to the temples?” He also cited a supposed “survey” in which a Muslim woman aged 46-47 had borne 13 children and was pregnant again—this apparently to invoke fear of demographic threat. He additionally made reference to voter demographics and comparative fertility of communities in a manner the complainant argues was calculated to provoke communal tension.

In consequence of the complaint, the Puttur Rural Police registered a case (FIR) on 25 October under multiple provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) — namely Sections 79 (insult to the modesty of a woman), 196 (promoting enmity between groups on religious/linguistic grounds and prejudicial to harmony), 299 (deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings), 302 (deliberate wounding of religious feelings) and 3(5) (criminal act by several persons in furtherance of a common intention). The registration of the FIR followed media reports of a video of the event being circulated, in particular via the YouTube channel “Kahale News”.

Legal developments and court order

In reaction to the FIR and the consequent police notice summoning Bhat for questioning, Bhat filed a petition before the Puttur Sessions Court. He argued that the FIR is motivated by malice, politically influenced, and lacks genuine merit. He claimed the case is a tool to silence his freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and to stifle the ideological work of the RSS.

On October 28, the Court accepted his petition at the interim stage and directed no coercive action against him until the next hearing on October 29; it also issued notice to the police, asking them to respond to Bhat’s petition and the allegations in the FIR. In effect, the court has placed a stay on arrests or detentions relating to the case until further order.

Political and institutional reactions

Following the case, the Karnataka Government, through its Rural Development & Panchayat Raj Minister Priyank Kharge, publicly criticised Bhat’s remarks and questioned whether any individual is “above the law or the Constitution.” He specifically referenced the RSS’s plan to hold a “padayatra” (march) on November 2 in Chittapur, stating that permission from the court is required and that any attempt to proceed without lawful approval will invite action under law. He emphasised that people who disturb communal peace through public speeches will face FIRs under existing law.

On the other side, leaders of the BJP and RSS have accused the Congress-led state government of using state machinery to intimidate Hindu organisations and single out Hindu activists under the guise of “hate speech” policing. Some have alleged the FIR and summons against Bhat reflect “appeasement politics” and a selective targeting of Hindu voices in coastal Karnataka.

Historical Pattern and Background

This is not the first FIR registered against Kalladka Prabhakar Bhat. The present case builds on a pattern of complaints and FIRs involving Bhat and the RSS in the coastal Karnataka region, raising larger questions about law-enforcement, freedom of speech, communal harmony and political discourse.

Over the past decade, Bhat has been named in multiple police complaints and FIRs across Dakshina Kannada, often for statements made at public rallies, religious gatherings, and Sangh Parivar events. His speeches—typically invoking themes of Hindu unity against “anti-national” or “communal” forces—have repeatedly crossed into language that demonises Muslims, Christians, and women.

• 2018: Civil society groups filed complaints after Bhat’s inflammatory address during a Hindu Samajotsava in Mangaluru, where he allegedly said that Hindus must “teach a lesson” to those who “betray the nation.” The speech triggered widespread criticism and a petition before the Karnataka State Human Rights Commission. No prosecution followed.
• 2019: Another complaint was filed in Udupi after Bhat referred to Muslim traders as “enemies of dharma.” The police acknowledged receiving the complaint but cited lack of “direct incitement” to justify inaction.
• 2022: Following the Udupi hijab controversy, Bhat addressed several rallies supporting uniform restrictions, where he allegedly described the hijab as a “symbol of separatism.” A complaint under Sections 153A and 295A IPC was filed by a local activist collective, but the FIR was not registered.
• 2023: In the wake of communal tensions in Belthangady, video clips of Bhat’s speeches circulated online, showing him calling for a “strong Hindu response” to “love jihad.” Again, while fact-checking portals verified the authenticity of the clips, the local police treated the speech as “political expression,” and no FIR was lodged.
• February 2024: Following a speech in Bantwal, where Bhat allegedly said that “those opposing the Ram Mandir should not live in India,” local organisations filed complaints before the Puttur and Sullia police stations. Both complaints were acknowledged, but no arrests were made.

Across these incidents, a clear procedural pattern emerges: FIRs are delayed or not registered, magistrate cognizance is deferred, and when cases are filed, they tend to stagnate without charge-sheets. No case has yet resulted in prosecution or conviction.

Conclusion

Kalladka Prabhakar Bhat’s record illustrates how hate speech prosecutions in India often collapse at the intersection of political patronage, institutional hesitation, and legal ambiguity. The recurring cycle of complaint, delay, and deflection has allowed incendiary speech to thrive unchecked — particularly when uttered under the banner of “religious mobilisation.” As the Puttur FIR inches forward under judicial scrutiny, the question remains whether Karnataka’s justice system will finally break that cycle, or replay the familiar pattern of rhetorical accountability without consequence.

Related:

Kalladka Prabhakar Bhat booked for Babri Masjid demolition play in school

Karnataka Police’s massive crackdown on habitual hate offenders in Dakshina Kannada region

Can majoritarian societal pressure re-write the rulebook? The illegality behind forced non-veg shutdowns during festivals

CJP flags casteist, anti-Dalit videos on YouTube targeting CJI Gavai; seeks urgent takedown

From Words to Bulldozers: How a Chief Minister’s rhetoric triggered and normalised punitive policing in Bareilly

The post Court stays proceedings against RSS leader Kalladka Prabhakar Bhat over alleged derogatory remarks targeting Muslim women appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As reported by The Telegraph, it was Giriraj Singh, the BJP’s MP from Begusarai, who told a poll rally in Arwal district on Saturday that “citizens who accept government welfare have a moral obligation to vote for the ruling party.” Twisting perversely the very fundamentals of republican democratic governance, he clearly appeared to use the term for Muslims who are beneficiaries of the schemes declared by the current regime at the Centre but do not support the BJP.

In a video of the speech, Singh recounted a reported conversation with a cleric. “So I told him that one who doesn’t acknowledge help is called a namak haram,” the minister is heard saying.

“I told him, ‘Maulvi Saheb, I don’t want the votes of the namak haram’,” he said.

Despite facing criticism on Sunday (October 19), Singh stood by his remarks, telling reporters he meant only to highlight that government welfare schemes were non-discriminatory.

The comments drew strong and immediate criticism.

Shiv Sena (UBT) leader Sanjay Raut demanded the minister’s removal, asking, “If someone doesn’t vote for you, does that make them namak haram?” The Bihar Congress called Singh “mentally unstable.”

The BJP’s main ally in Bihar, the Janata Dal (United), was more cautious in its response. Spokesperson Rajeev Ranjan said voters “make decisions beyond such comments,” while another party leader defended Singh.

The minister’s provocative statement was the most high-profile of several communally charged incidents involving BJP leaders over the weekend. In Pune, on Sunday, Rajya Sabha MP Medha Kulkarni led a protest organised by the Patit Pavan Sanghatna and other Hindu outfits at the historic Shaniwarwada fort, reported The Indian Express.

After a video showed Muslim women offering prayers at the site, Kulkarni and activists “purified” the spot with cow urine and performed a Hindu ritual. “We will not allow ‘namaz’ in Shaniwarwada, Hindu community has now become awakened,” she tweeted before the protest. She later defended the action, stating, “It is a symbol of Hindavi Swaraj… We cannot allow anyone to offer namaz here. It is not a mosque.”

The move was slammed by political opponents as an attempt to polarise voters ahead of local civic polls. Sachin Sawant of the Maharashtra Congress noted the fort’s diverse history, adding, “The BJP MP is also protesting against the ‘dargah’ outside Shaniwarwada. When the Peshwas had no problem, what is her problem?”

Separately, a video showed BJP leader Pragya Thakur urging parents to use violence to control their daughters, reported The Financial Express. She warned that girls welcomed as “Lakshmi or Saraswati” grow up to become “mianin” (a derogatory term for a Muslim man’s wife).

“Strengthen your mind, and make it so strong that if our daughter does not obey us, if she goes to a non-believer’s house, leave no stone unturned in considering breaking her legs,” Thakur said.

She added that parents should not “step back” from beating their children for their own good! These incidents come as Bihar prepares for elections, with the first phase of polling on November 6, the second on November 11, and counting on November 14.

Related:

Unifying cultural celebration weaponised: Ganesh processions turned into stages for hate speech & moral policing

India’s Hate Speech Crisis: 1,165 cases recorded in 2024, up 74.4% from 2023

CJP files three complaints against pro-right-wing leader and BJP Minister Nitesh Rane over alleged hate speech in Maharashtra

The post Bihar Elections Build-up: ‘Won’t allow namaz’, ‘namak haram’, BJP MPs’ communal hate-filled remarks draw fire appeared first on SabrangIndia.

While the speech originated as a local executive response to the Bareilly protest, its propagation and amplification were largely mediated through national and regional media, especially Hindi television channels like Times Now Navbharat, Zee News Hindi, and News18 Hindi, which paired the CM’s words with dramatic visuals of protests, police action, and property demolitions. Short-form clips circulated widely on social media, creating a feedback loop that magnified both the rhetoric and the state response.

This media-driven amplification transformed a local law-and-order issue into a nationally visible spectacle of punitive governance, normalising coercive enforcement and targeting of a religious community. The timing and scale of dissemination may also have significant political resonance, particularly with the upcoming Bihar elections, as the Hindi-language media networks ensured that the CM’s rhetoric reached a broad, politically significant audience.

Within days the state response in Bareilly intensified: large-scale arrests, property-sealing and demolition actions, 48-hour internet suspensions, criminal FIRs (running into hundreds or thousands in some counts), and administrative notices against aides of the cleric who called the Bareilly protest. That sequence of ‘protest → CM rhetoric → heavy-handed enforcement’ raises three connected questions the rest of this piece examines in depth:

• Did the CM’s speech cross legal lines such as incitement or unlawful discrimination?
• Did the state response follow due process and the Supreme Court’s own safeguards (including the duty to investigate hate speech suo moto)?
• What are the measurable social, legal and media consequences of that political rhetoric?

What happened — a timeline

The trigger (September 4–9, 2025): The flashpoint began on September 4 when an illuminated board/banners reading “I Love Muhammad” appeared during an Eid-e-Milad-un-Nabi procession in parts of Kanpur (Syed Nagar/Rawatpur). Local objections, framed by some Hindu groups as a “deviation from tradition”, led the police to register an FIR on September 9 against 24 persons (9 named, 15 unknown) for allegedly disturbing communal harmony. The complaint, according to the report of India Today, centred on shifting tents/banners into a location on a public road near a gate used by Ram Navami processions. That apparently small ritual alteration escalated as news and social media spread the story to other districts.

Escalation and the Bareilly protest (September 26–27, 2025): On September 26, a public gathering in Bareilly — called in sympathy with the “I Love Muhammad” campaign and associated with cleric Tauqeer Raza Khan — clashed with police after Friday prayers; police used lathi-charge and reported stone-pelting and injuries to officers. According to a report of Times of India, authorities say the protest had been called without permission; police also said the gathering showed signs of pre-planning through social media groups. Multiple FIRs and detentions followed. Local reporting states dozens detained with FIRs filed against hundreds — and some outlets report FIR counts running into the thousands across multiple stations. Shortly after the clashes, the cleric and several aides were arrested.

The Chief Minister’s response (September 28, 2025): Speaking at a public ‘Viksit UP’ event, CM Yogi Adityanath warned that those who “vandalise in the name of faith… attack the police… we won’t let you go… chedhoge to chodenge nahi aur chodenge nahi toh fir chootoge bhi nahi.” He used phrases such as “denting and painting must be done” and framed the response as necessary to protect festivals and public safety. These comments were widely reported and repeated across national news outlets the same day and the day after.

The contentious speeches delivered by CM Adityanath are:

अगर बेटी की सुरक्षा पर हाथ डालने का प्रयास किया,
व्यापारी के प्रतिष्ठान में आग लगाने का प्रयास किया,
उत्सव में अराजकता पैदा करने प्रयास किया तो,

यह रास्ता सीधे नर्क में जाने का होगा… pic.twitter.com/gUV9vkYnRX

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

‘गजवा-ए-हिंद’ हिन्दुस्तान की धरती पर नहीं होगा,

अगर किसी को जहन्नुम में जाना हो तो ‘गजवा-ए-हिंद’ के नाम पर अराजकता पैदा करने का कुत्सित प्रयास करे…

देर-सबेर ‘छांगुर’ जैसे हाल तो उनके भी होने ही हैं… pic.twitter.com/8V6MXvZbgm

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

छोटे-छोटे बच्चों को जिनके हाथों में कलम होनी चाहिए, जिनके हाथों में नोटबुक होनी चाहिए, विज्ञान और गणित की पुस्तकें होनी चाहिए, उनके हाथों में I Love Muhammad का पोस्टर…

…इनको यह भी नहीं मालूम कि उनकी जिंदगी तो बर्बाद है ही लेकिन इन बच्चों की भी जिंदगी ये लोग बर्बाद करने पर… pic.twitter.com/rhCBIxoh71

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

याद रखना!

जब भी दुस्साहस करोगे, ऐसे ही पिटोगे जैसे बरेली के अंदर पीटे गए हो… pic.twitter.com/AZWOU4m495

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

लव-जिहाद, धर्मांतरण और गो-तस्करी जैसी राष्ट्र विरोधी गतिविधियों के प्रति हमें सतर्क रहना होगा,

अगर कहीं कोई भूल से भी इस प्रकार की गतिविधियों में लिप्त है, उसकी सूचना ससमय पुलिस और प्रशासन को उपलब्ध करवाइए,

उपचार की व्यवस्था हम स्वयं कर लेंगे… pic.twitter.com/wLTyTcChgD

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

2025): After the violence and speeches, the district administration moved decisively: large-scale arrests and FIRs were filed, properties linked to accused persons were sealed or demolished by the local authority demolished including a banquet hall and other structures allegedly used by those arrested, administrative notices, for example, power-theft notices, were issued against associates of the cleric, and internet and SMS services in Bareilly district were suspended for 48 hours citing maintenance of public order, as per The Economic Times. Several human-rights and legal activists have already filed petitions and complaints alleging lack of prior notice for demolition and possible collective punishment. Political parties and civil-society delegations have begun to visit the city; opposition leaders are demanding investigations.

The problem with the speech itself

1. Targeting + personal reference. The CM specifically attacked a cleric’s actions, namely Tauqeer Raza Khan, and conduct in public, saying that the “Maulana forgot who is in power” and promising retribution that would be remembered by “future generations.” Targeting an identifiable leader and associating him and his followers with violence elevates the rhetoric beyond abstract law-and-order language.
2. Punitive metaphors taken literally. The repeated use of “denting and painting” and explicit references to the “bulldozer” rhetorical universe, and actual demolitions in other recent UP campaigns, is not merely figurative; in the current UP context it has an institutional history as a public performance of punishment — a state spectacle with material consequences. The phrase therefore reads as both a policy cue and a public warning.
3. Promise of force / deterrence directed at a community act. Even if the immediate trigger was violence, the CM’s formula — “If you trouble us, we will not spare you” — was framed to deter a specific form of expressive action, such as displaying I Love Muhammad posters, that political actors and some civil-society figures had defended as speech. The combination of delegitimisation, portraying the slogan as manipulation of children or anarchy, plus promise of collective discipline is consequential.

Those three features — naming, punitive metaphor, and generalised deterrence — are the elements that make legal and normative analysis urgent.

Media: Who amplified, and how amplification changed the story

The media ecosystem played a decisive role in transforming Yogi Adityanath’s remarks from a local political reaction into a nationally mediated performance of power. Within hours of his speech, both television and print outlets had front-paged his most aggressive lines — “chedhoge to chodenge nahi” and “denting and painting must be done” — turning threats of retribution into viral catchphrases.

National and regional broadcasters, including Times Now Navbharat, Zee News Hindi, and News18 Hindi, ran segments that paired these quotes with dramatic visuals of protests, lathicharges, and property demolitions. The YouTube thumbnails and on-screen tickers themselves became an extension of the state’s messaging — text overlays like “Maulana bhool gaya kaun sarkar mein hai” or “Bareilly mein danga, sarkar ki kathor karwai” visually encoded the CM’s warning as spectacle and slogan.

This media choreography had a dual effect. First, it nationalised the CM’s rhetoric, ensuring that what began as a local communal disturbance was recast as a state-wide law-and-order triumph. Second, the widespread replaying of his lines — often stripped of context and accompanied by enforcement footage — normalised the language of punishment and deterrence. Even platforms that did not editorially endorse the speech contributed to its amplification through repetition and aestheticisation.

Some outlets, such as The Wire and The Indian Express, offered a countervailing frame: detailed timelines, verification of police claims about “online toolkits,” and critical analysis of the administration’s disproportionate use of force. But these were exceptions within an overwhelming current of performative law-and-order coverage. The split in framing — between law-and-order narratives and civil-liberties scrutiny — reveals how editorial positioning directly shapes the moral valence of communal incidents.

Short-form videos from these channels, extracted as YouTube shorts and Twitter/X reels, circulated widely on social media. These clips — the CM’s warning juxtaposed with scenes of violence and police deployment — fed a feedback loop: the more viral the visual, the stronger the administrative justification for subsequent measures like internet suspension and mass arrests. In effect, the media ecology and the state’s coercive apparatus became mutually reinforcing.

This convergence also raises a constitutional question about mediated governance. When executive speech, journalistic amplification, and administrative coercion operate in sync, the boundary between state messaging and independent reportage collapses. The outcome is not merely the spread of information, but the construction of a “performance of control”, where the appearance of decisive governance substitutes for adherence to due process.

Attached is a collection of YouTube thumbnails from Times Now Navbharat, Zee News Hindi, and News18 Hindi demonstrates this vividly — a montage of headlines that blur the line between news coverage and narrative reinforcement, framing punitive action as political virtue.

Legal frame: what the law says and where courts have drawn the line

Three interlocking legal rules matter here:

• The statutory toolbox for “hate” / public-order speech: India’s criminal law criminalises speech that promotes enmity or hatred between groups (e.g., IPC Section 153A/Section 198 BNS), imputations prejudicial to national integration (IPC Section 153B/Section 197 BNS), deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings (IPC Section 295A/Section 298 BNS), and statements likely to create terror or public alarm (IPC Section 505/Section 356 BNS). These are the provisions courts and police typically invoke in communal-speech cases. The Supreme Court has emphasised that lawful restrictions must be precisely applied and proportionate
• The Supreme Court’s duty-to-act on hate speech: Shaheen Abdulla and follow-up orders: In Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India (2022), the Supreme Court highlighted the “growing climate of hate” and directed police chiefs to take suo motu action in hate-speech incidents — specifically instructing registration and investigation under IPC sections such as 153A, 295A and 505 without waiting for a private complaint. These directions were later extended to all States/UTs; the court took the view that proactive policing is essential to preserve the secular fabric envisaged by the Preamble. That jurisprudence puts an onus on state police: if a public utterance plausibly constitutes hate speech, police must investigate it on their own motion.
• The constitutional limit: incitement and proximity to violence: Indian courts have insisted on a context-sensitive test. The classic guide is Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962), where the Supreme Court upheld sedition law only for words that have the “tendency or intention of creating public disorder” or inciting violence; mere abusive or critical expression cannot be criminalised. Modern caselaw returns to the same principle: to punish speech the state must show an intention or proximate tendency to produce imminent lawless action — not merely dislikeable or provocative words. This high threshold matters because it keeps robust political speech protected while allowing punishment where speech is truly dangerous.

Apply the law to the facts: Did the UP CM cross the line?

This is the crucial, uncomfortable question. Courts usually apply a two-part analysis to political speech by powerful actors:

• Does the speech itself contain elements of the statutory offences?

The Chief Minister’s speech went beyond mere governance rhetoric. It singled out a specific cleric and his supporters, implicitly ascribing collective culpability to a religious community. The language of punishment and humiliation—phrases such as “denting and painting” or “beaten as in Bareilly”—was not random metaphor; it invoked a visual and historical grammar of state-sanctioned coercion. These expressions are deeply loaded in Uttar Pradesh’s recent political lexicon, symbolising demolition drives, police beatings, and targeted action that disproportionately affect Muslim localities.

Further, the assertion that “future generations” would be taught a lesson carries the unmistakable tone of collective retribution, extending the threat from present offenders to an entire community across time. Such language constructs Muslims not as citizens subject to law, but as an enduring adversarial category — a perpetual “other” against whom exemplary force is justified.

Under Sections 153A (now Section 196 of BNS) and 295A (now Section 298 of BNS)  of the Indian Penal Code, the test for criminality hinges not merely on overt incitement but also on whether the speech promotes enmity, targets a community, or is likely to disturb public tranquillity. Read against the backdrop of recent police actions in UP—demolition of Muslim-owned properties, custodial violence, and selective FIRs—the Chief Minister’s words may reasonably be understood as an endorsement and encouragement of discriminatory state practices.

Moreover, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in cases such as Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2020) clarifies that when influential figures make statements capable of mobilising real-world hostility, the likelihood of incitement must be assessed contextually, not in isolation. From that perspective, Yogi Adityanath’s remarks arguably cross the boundary from administrative assertion into speech that legitimises and incites discrimination.

In sum, while the speech may not contain an explicit call to violence, it performs a dog-whistle function: normalising state-backed hostility and signalling permissibility for coercive action against a targeted religious group. In legal terms, that makes it a fit case for prima facie examination under Sections 153A, 295A, and 505(2) IPC, especially given the speaker’s constitutional position and the demonstrable pattern of violence that followed.

• What changed after the speech? (state action and proportionality)

The true constitutional stakes emerge not merely from what was said, but from what followed. When a Chief Minister’s public rhetoric is swiftly mirrored by administrative action—bulldozers rolling in, FIRs multiplying overnight, and digital blackouts silencing affected districts—the question is no longer one of abstract speech, but of state power animated by speech.

In the immediate aftermath of Yogi Adityanath’s address, municipal and police authorities in multiple UP districts launched coordinated operations: mass detentions of Muslim youth, property demolitions framed as “encroachments,” and sweeping suspension of internet services. These were not isolated law-and-order responses but a choreographed display of retribution, executed without adequate notice, hearing, or judicial oversight.

Courts have repeatedly emphasised that executive spectacle cannot substitute due process. In its observations concerning “bulldozer justice,” the Supreme Court has held that demolitions carried out as instantaneous punishment for alleged offences are unconstitutional unless preceded by notice, opportunity to respond, and adherence to municipal laws (Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2022). The law draws a bright line: urban planning cannot be weaponised as penal theatre. Yet, in Uttar Pradesh, the chain of events—fiery speech followed by visible coercive measures—suggests a punitive motive masquerading as law enforcement.

Equally significant is the Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India (2022) principle, which imposes a positive duty on the police: they must initiate suo-moto FIRs against hate speech, irrespective of the speaker’s political stature. The judgment underscored that inaction is complicity, and selective enforcement deepens discrimination. In this case, law enforcement pursued alleged protestors with urgency but failed to act on the Chief Minister’s inflammatory remarks, despite clear statutory grounds under Sections 153A, 295A, and 505(2) IPC.

The constitutional doctrine of proportionality also comes into play. Administrative actions must bear a rational nexus to legitimate aims, employ the least restrictive means, and avoid discriminatory impact. Yet the scale and selectivity of post-speech measures—demolitions confined largely to Muslim-majority neighbourhoods, police raids on specific youth groups, and the near-complete absence of accountability for vigilante actors—suggest a pattern of collective punishment rather than targeted, proportionate law enforcement.

As many have noted, when executive speech operates as a signal and the bureaucratic apparatus responds with coercive overreach, the boundary between political rhetoric and state sanction collapses. The state ceases to act as a neutral arbiter and instead becomes a performer in its own moral spectacle, projecting deterrence through fear.

In sum, while Yogi Adityanath’s speech might be defensible as political expression if viewed in isolation, the temporal and causal sequence of events—immediate arrests, sweeping FIRs, and punitive demolitions—creates a compelling case that state power was deployed not for justice but for signalling. Such a pattern raises grave constitutional concerns under Articles 14, 19, and 21, even if establishing direct criminal culpability for the speech remains legally complex.

The ground reality: Evidence of disproportionate enforcement and social fallout

The aftermath of the Bareilly clashes reveals a pattern that extends far beyond a conventional law-and-order response. It reflects a multi-tiered exercise of coercive state power, activated in the wake of the Chief Minister’s speech and sustained through both formal and informal mechanisms of punishment.

• Mass arrests and sweeping FIRs: In the immediate aftermath, police operations intensified across Bareilly and adjoining districts. Reports cited dozens of detentions within hours, and FIRs naming hundreds—sometimes even thousands—of individuals. According to The Times of India, nearly 2,000 people were named across multiple police stations, though the exact number varied by outlet. The breadth of these FIRs—often containing generalised allegations—raises serious questions about collective culpability and the use of preventive detention as a form of intimidation rather than targeted investigation.
• Property sealing and demolitions: Municipal and development authorities undertook swift demolition and sealing drives against properties allegedly linked to the accused—among them a banquet hall and other commercial structures. Families reported that no prior notice or opportunity to be heard was provided, prompting complaints to the Uttar Pradesh Human Rights Commission. As The Times of India noted, these measures echo the state’s recent pattern of bulldozer-led punitive actions, widely criticised by rights groups as performative retribution designed to convey dominance rather than ensure compliance with planning laws. The recurrence of such demolitions immediately after communal incidents suggests a deliberate conflation of criminal liability with property ownership and community identity.
• Administrative and regulatory reprisals: Alongside police action, the administration issued a series of “ancillary punishments”—including power-theft notices, income recovery claims, and regulatory sanctions against persons associated with the cleric at the centre of the protests. These quasi-civil penalties compounded the economic and psychological burden on affected families. The simultaneity of these measures—each lawful in isolation but collectively disproportionate—points to a pattern of cumulative punishment through bureaucratic instruments.
• Communications blackouts: Authorities imposed a 48-hour suspension of mobile internet, broadband, and SMS services across Bareilly district, citing the need to curb rumours and prevent mobilisation. The Economic Times reported that this was one of several recent instances where internet shutdowns have become the default administrative reflex during communal tensions. Such measures, while framed as precautionary, raise acute proportionality and necessity concerns under the Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of Indiav (2020) standard, which requires narrowly tailored, time-bound restrictions and periodic review.
• Societal reverberations and exclusionary practices: The social aftershocks were equally significant. Civil-society observers and media, such as LiveMint documented a perceptible tightening of social boundaries in the weeks following the incident. Muslims reportedly faced pressure to abstain from participating in garba celebrations and other public festivities, and instances were noted where Hindutva groups sought to monitor or exclude Muslim presence at cultural events. Though less quantifiable, these developments illustrate how executive rhetoric and coercive enforcement combine to legitimise exclusion at the community level, embedding state-endorsed bias within everyday social interactions.

Taken together, these events depict not an isolated breakdown of order but a coordinated sequence: rhetoric, repression, and social sanction. The cycle of speech, enforcement, spectacle, and exclusion forms a distinctive template of governance—where administrative action doubles as political performance, and punishment itself becomes a form of public messaging.

The Political Economy of Hard-line Rhetoric: How speech translates into power

Whether by deliberate strategy or downstream effect, hard-line public rhetoric by state leaders like Yogi Adityanath yields three tangible advantages for majoritarian or vigilante actors operating at the political margins. It converts language into action, rhetoric into legitimacy, and coercion into spectacle.

1. Implicit legitimisation of vigilante policing: When a head of government publicly vows “uncompromising action” and uses metaphors of retribution—such as “denting and painting” or “we will not spare you”—the message travels well beyond the bureaucracy. It functions as a symbolic green light for local affiliates, vigilante groups, and ideological sympathisers. These actors interpret the rhetoric as moral endorsement for “citizen policing” or social intimidation campaigns under the guise of defending faith or nationalism. Civil-society reports document a consistent pattern: Hindutva outfits intensify surveillance of Muslim participation in cultural events—such as garba celebrations or processions—soon after high-profile communal statements. In practice, this rhetoric lowers the cost of vigilantism, creating a permissive environment where harassment appears state-sanctioned.
2. Narrative control and inversion: Strongman rhetoric also reshapes the moral sequence of events. By branding expressive or devotional acts—such as the “I Love Muhammad” posters—as “provocations,” the state repositions itself as the neutral guarantor of order, while protestors are recast as disruptors. This narrative inversion turns a community’s assertion of faith into a law-and-order problem, allowing the administration to deploy coercion with minimal public pushback.
   As The Wire and other critical outlets observed, media framing plays a decisive role: channels that foreground “riots” and “discipline” amplify the executive’s preferred storyline, while those that question due process or disproportionality are marginalised as “soft on disorder.” The result is a feedback loop where political rhetoric and editorial selection co-produce legitimacy.
3. Electoral signalling and mobilisation gains: Beyond its immediate administrative use, hard-line speech operates as a performative display of strength aimed at a political constituency. The imagery of bulldozers, swift arrests, and collective punishment serves as a spectacle of decisive governance, projecting control and dominance. Scholars of South Asian populism have noted that such performances of punishment—what The Loop terms “punitive populism”—transform the machinery of justice into an instrument of emotional reassurance for the majority. Each demolition or crackdown becomes not just an act of enforcement but a ritual reaffirmation of political identity, blurring the lines between public order and electoral theatre.

Taken together, these three dynamics show how rhetoric, media, and enforcement converge into a single ecosystem of majoritarian power. In this model, punishment is not merely administered—it is performed, televised, and voted upon.

Accountability gaps and legal remedies

The aftermath of the Bareilly episode demands more than commentary — it demands accountability. When executive speech, administrative action, and media amplification intersect to produce coercive outcomes, the constitutional order must provide correctives. The following lines of legal and institutional response arise directly from existing Supreme Court jurisprudence and human-rights practice:

1. Suo moto inquiry into the Chief Minister’s speech under the Shaheen Abdulla directions: The Supreme Court has made it unequivocally clear that police are under a continuing duty to register suo moto FIRs in cases of hate speech, regardless of the speaker’s political position. Inaction in the face of potentially inflammatory statements by high public officials amounts to contempt of the Court’s directions. A representation to the High Court or Supreme Court seeking compliance would therefore be legally tenable if no inquiry has yet been initiated.
2. Judicial review of demolitions and sealing drives for arbitrariness and disproportionality: The Supreme Court’s November 2024 observations on “bulldozer justice” caution that demolitions used as instant punishment violate due process. Every affected person is entitled to prior notice, an opportunity to be heard, and independent adjudication before property action. Where municipal or development authorities acted immediately after communal incidents, those demolitions merit judicial scrutiny as punitive theatre rather than lawful urban regulation.
3. Human-rights complaints and public-interest petitions documenting the full sequence: The timeline itself — from the Kanpur FIRs to the Bareilly clashes, the CM’s speeches, and the administrative crackdown — forms crucial evidence of state overreach and selective enforcement. Complaints to the NHRC, the State Human Rights Commission, or the jurisdictional High Court can seek independent inquiry, victim compensation, and publication of findings. Precedents show that such petitions have successfully compelled state responses and stayed coercive action.
4. Media accountability and transparency demands: Given the central role of television and digital platforms in magnifying punitive rhetoric, transparency measures are essential. Broadcasters and social media intermediaries should be required to preserve all footage, thumbnails, and metadata for future scrutiny. Outlets that used sensational promos can be asked to issue contextual clarifications or corrections through the NBDSA process. Simultaneously, police and civic authorities must disclose the legal basis for mass FIRs, demolition orders, and internet suspensions. Public disclosure often becomes the first step toward halting unchecked executive excess.

Conclusions — legal risk, democratic cost

The Bareilly “I Love Muhammad” row and its aftermath sit at a critical intersection of power and speech in contemporary India. What began as an expressive act — a slogan, a banner, a theological or identity affirmation — was transformed rapidly under political and administrative force into a narrative of provocation, then into a sequence of punitive state interventions.

Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath’s rhetoric did more than warn: it arguably furnished the legal and moral scaffolding for escalated state action — actions that, according to credible reportage, stretched procedural norms, threatened minority rights, chilled speech, and disrupted daily life for many. Legal redress is challenging but not impossible: the constitutional framework, statutory provisions, and Supreme Court precedents exist to push back against such overreach.

Bareilly is therefore not just a local incident. It’s a test case. If the judicial system, civil society, and media fail to rigorously examine speech + enforcement, the precedent is troubling: political speech that combines identity, faith, punitive promise and spectacle becomes a license to marginalise. For democracy to survive in such moments, the invisible boundary between “law-and-order” and state overreach must be policed with the same seriousness with which we monitor overt dissent.

References:

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/take-suo-motu-action-against-hate-speech-crimes-without-waiting-for-complaint-supreme-court-212282

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The complaint, addressed to NCM Chairperson Iqbal Singh Lalpura, seeks urgent intervention under Section 9(1)(d) of the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992, requesting a full inquiry, registration of FIRs against hate speech offenders, and preventive directions to curb vigilante activity and incitement.

Background: The hate campaign after “Operation Sindoor”

According to the complaint, the rise in hate speech is not random but follows a pattern of political and administrative hostility that began after the launch of Operation Sindoor in April 2025. CJP states that post the said operation, arbitrary action officially framed as a crackdown on illegal immigration has increased, degenerating into a campaign of ethnic profiling and arbitrary expulsions, resulting in over 1,500 people being “pushed out” into Bangladesh between May and July 2025 without legal verification by Foreigners Tribunals or access to legal aid.

CJP warns that these actions have created a climate of fear among Bengali-speaking Muslims, especially migrant workers in cities like Mumbai, Delhi, and Ahmedabad, who now face harassment, eviction, and assault under the guise of “protecting the state from infiltrators.”

Scope of incidents documented

The complaint meticulously catalogues over two dozen hate speech incidents between June and September 2025, with supporting links from mainstream and independent media as well as verified social media posts.

• Assam: The epicentre of anti-Muslim rhetoric

CJP identifies Assam as the focal point of the hate campaign. Under the banner of the “Miya Kheda Andolon” (“Expel the Miyas Movement”), local organisations and political figures have launched public drives to evict Bengali-speaking Muslims, often with violent undertones.
Among those named are:

• Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, who made inflammatory remarks alleging that “newly arrived Muslims” weaponise beef consumption and have built mosques near Satras “to drive out Hindus.”
• Situ Barua of Jatiya Sangrami Sena and Milan Buragohain of All Tai Ahom Students’ Union, both accused of stopping buses and threatening Muslim labourers to “vacate Upper Assam.”
• Bir Lachit Sen, whose followers reportedly conducted door-to-door “document checks” and forced evictions.

CJP documents 18 rallies and nine incidents of targeted violence across 14 districts of Assam in just three weeks (July 9–30, 2025), pointing to a coordinated effort to normalise vigilantism against Bengali-origin Muslims.

• Bihar: Hate speech for electoral gain

As the Bihar Assembly elections approach, CJP notes a strategic deployment of hate speech to polarise voters. Union Home Minister Amit Shah, Union Minister Giriraj Singh, and several BJP leaders including Jagannath Sarka and Samik Bhattacharya are cited for using communal rhetoric in public rallies. CJP highlights a disturbing pattern — speeches describing Bengali-origin Muslims as “demons,” “Rohingya infiltrators,” and “threats to Hindu women” — all couched in the language of demographic panic and cultural invasion.

The complaint underscores that no voter deletions have occurred on the basis of foreign nationality in Bihar’s updated electoral rolls, exposing the falsehood behind the “infiltrator” narrative. Instead, the rhetoric has dehumanised entire groups of internal migrant workers.

• Hate speech spreading nationwide

The complaint lists similar hate-laced incidents across Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, and Maharashtra, including:

• Kapil Mishra’s speech at Delhi’s PGDAV College claiming a “Rohingya and Bangladeshi settlement conspiracy.”
• Nitesh Rane’s rally in Navi Mumbai urging Hindus to avoid “goltopis and dadiwallas.”
• Mahadev Baba’s hate-filled tirade in Lucknow describing Muslims as “cannibalistic infiltrators.”
• A mob attack at the Constitution Club of India that disrupted a civil society event on Assam’s detention and eviction crisis with chants of “Desh ke gaddaron ko, goli maaro saalon ko.”

Legal and constitutional analysis

CJP’s complaint goes beyond documenting hate speech — it situates these acts within the framework of criminal and constitutional law, citing the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Sections 196, 197, 352, 353) and Section 125 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
The organisation argues that these offences are cognisable and non-bailable, and must invite suo motu action by police in compliance with the Supreme Court’s directives in Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India (2023).

The complaint draws on key judicial precedents:

• Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan (2014) – defining hate speech as an act of marginalisation and de-legitimisation of vulnerable groups.
• Tehseen Poonawalla (2018) – directing states to curb vigilante violence and appoint nodal officers to monitor hate crimes.
• Amish Devgan (2020) – establishing a higher standard of responsibility for influential figures in public life.

CJP contends that the repeated participation of ministers and legislators in inflammatory campaigns represents a violation of constitutional morality and betrays the secular fabric of the Indian state protected under Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25–30 of the Constitution.

CJP’s key demands to the NCM

The complaint calls upon the Commission to:

1. Take legal cognisance under the NCM Act and initiate an inquiry.
2. Direct registration of FIRs against individuals and organisations spreading hate.
3. Curb vigilante activity by outfits like Bir Lachit Sen and All Tai Ahom Students’ Union.
4. Ensure police compliance with Supreme Court orders on suo motu action.
5. Enforce preventive measures, such as videographing rallies and banning repeat hate offenders.
6. Urge social media platforms to remove hateful content.
7. Launch a fact-finding mission on the profiling, harassment, and eviction of Bengali-origin Muslims nationwide.

Conclusion

CJP’s complaint represents one of the most exhaustive compilations of hate speech documentation in recent months, combining legal precision with humanitarian concern.
It frames the current climate not as a communal clash but as a “systematic campaign of hate speech that slurs, stigmatises, and instigates violence against lawful citizens.”

By appealing to the National Commission for Minorities, CJP has sought to reclaim the constitutional promise of equality and secularism, urging that the language of hate not become the language of governance.

The complete complaint may be read below:

Related:

CJP calls for action by NCM against hate speeches at Dharam Sansad and Trishul Deekha events, files 2 complaints

CJP moves NCM against arms training camps, weapon distribution events in Assam and Rajasthan

CJP complains to NCM over Uttarakhand Muslim exodus; seeks urgent action

CJP moves NCM against Shiladitya Dev for targeting the ‘Miya Muslim’ community of Assam

The post CJP urges NCM action against hate speech campaign vilifying Bengali Muslims as ‘Infiltrators’ appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This organised rhetoric, amplified at political rallies and religious gatherings, lays the ideological groundwork for the Union’s policy of nationwide profiling, detention, and covert deportations of suspected foreign nationals. The present escalation was triggered in April 2025 by Operation Sindoor, a military operation targeting cross-border terror camps, which catalysed a wave of jingoism and a new national purpose in spotting, detaining, and deporting illegal immigrants. This has led to a coordinated drive where more than 1,500 people were “pushed out” into Bangladesh in five weeks between May – July 2025. The scale and manner of these deportations – the absence of formal orders, access to legal aid, or verification by Foreigners Tribunals – reveal a disturbing trend of expulsions without due process.

The result has been a targeted attack on largely poor migrant workers from West Bengal who moved to cities such as Mumbai, Delhi, and Ahmedabad in search of jobs. Those working in the unorganised sector, such as domestic workers, vegetable vendors, and rickshaw pullers, are frequently targeted by individuals and groups affiliated with the Hindu far-right. Families say that men and women are being picked up in sudden raids, transported to Assam, and coerced across unguarded sections of the border by the Border Security Force (BSF). From lawful citizens vanishing in midnight raids to migrant workers being harassed, humiliated, and forcefully evicted, the pattern of systemic persecution demonstrates a calculated effort to terrorise Bengali-speaking Muslims working in different parts of the country under the pretext of them being Bangladeshi infiltrators.

This report tracks the incidents of hate speech during August – September 2025. The data shows a systemic, ideologically-driven campaign that leverages historic tensions and is enabled by state complicity. With elections approaching, this orchestrated fear-mongering reflects a calculated political strategy to stigmatize minorities, displacing democracy with majoritarianism. The rhetoric and tropes, from Gazwa-e-Hind to Love Jihad, are strategically deployed to create a climate of conspiratorial fear. The propaganda is designed to foster a public imagination in which the targeted community has no place in ‘Bharat,’ the Hindu Rashtra.

The Multiplier Effect: How Propaganda Works to Manufacture Consent

The sequence of raids and deportations targeting Bengali Muslim migrant workers is sustained by organised propaganda. The BJP’s campaign during the 2024 Lok Sabha elections is a crucial case study to understand how the ‘infiltrator’ rhetoric, initially used to popularize an electoral agenda, was given fire by the highest political figures. Even prior to 2024, in fact playback to 2014 and even before, the right wing party’s persistent rhetoric of “orchestrated demographic change” through “illegal immigration (the term ghuspetiya is the most weaponised adjective of the same) has been carefully used at election time, to fuel insecurities and cause voter division.

On April 21, 2024, Modi delivered one of his most inflammatory speeches at Banswara, Rajasthan, invoking the “infiltrator” bogey as a dog whistle against Muslim citizens. The speech remains publicly available on his YouTube and Facebook pages, where it has garnered over one million views.

“When they (the opposition) were in power, they said that Muslims had the first right to the properties of the state. This means that they would collect these properties and give them to the ones who have more kids (insinuating Muslims). They will give it to the ghuspaithiye (infiltrators). Do you want to give away your hard-earned money to the intruders? These urban naxals will not even spare the mothers and sisters or their mangal sutra. They will go that far.”

– Narendra Modi, Speech at Banswara

Modi continued to replicate similar hate speeches across India during the election campaign, delivering 63 hate speeches between April 21 and May 30.^[1]

This was followed up by Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath. In a May 21, 2024 speech in Shravasti, he declared, “After conducting an X-ray of your wealth, they will distribute it to infiltrators—Bangladeshi infiltrators, Pakistani infiltrators, or any other Muslim infiltrators.”

 National leaders such as Narendra Modi and Amit Shah, along with powerful regional figures like Yogi Adityanath and Nitish Rane, seed this rhetoric from the top. This is seamlessly woven into campaign strategies and state addresses. Their authoritarian stature lends immediate credibility to the narrative, with every local election speech reaching nationwide audiences.

Once their signal words are introduced into political discourse, the rhetoric spirals outward. “Infiltrators” soon became common parlance among Hindu far-right and mainstream Indian media.

Concentrated ownership of mainstream media makes it a hyper-competitive market where survival depends on government approval. Furthering outrage and violence through disinformation makes the business of the media (both mainstream and digital) profitable. The ‘marketplace of ideas’ is a contest to see which channel can amplify hate and hysteria the loudest.

Leading the amplification is Sudarshan News’ Suresh Chavhanke, whose ‘Janata NRC’ campaign advocates for a vigilante-style “citizen-led” version of the National Register of Citizens (NRC), encouraging ordinary people to identify and expose “Bangladeshi infiltrators” or “illegal Muslims” in their neighbourhoods. CJP has filed 3 MCC violation complaints with CEO Maharashtra against Suresh Chavhanke in 2024.

Digital media is the most potent element of the propaganda flow. It allows hate speeches, often delivered at in-person mass gatherings like political rallies, religious parades, marches, and demonstrations, to transcend physical boundaries and amplify their reach far beyond their immediate audiences. Live streams are particularly crucial for hate actors, as they allow them to circumvent content moderation rules on hate speech and amplify their messages in real-time. Hindutva influencers like Kajal Hindustani and self-proclaimed monks like Mahant Raju Das frequently use Facebook Live to broadcast hate speech. This is then strategically clipped and reposted across platforms for maximum reach – from a full-length YouTube video to a 30-second Instagram reel. Tailored clips find a crucial delivery mechanism in private, tightly networked, and unmoderated WhatsApp channels (of which the BJP alone operates an estimated 50 lakh), which are ideal for closed-group persuasion, rapid peer endorsement, and sustaining echo chambers.

At the local level, amplified hate is converted into tangible action, mobilisation, and policy execution by BJP leaders, Hindu far-right organizations, and religious figures. The signal words penetrate hate speeches, communal rallies, and public interest litigations, justifying calls for violence, economic boycotts, and vigilante evictions. India Hate Lab reports that in 2024, 22% of hate speeches invoking the “Bangladeshi infiltrator” bogey included direct calls for violence.

Since the rhetoric has come all the way from the top, these ground groups are effectively granted impunity, operating with tacit state sanction that discourages police to file FIRs or pursue accountability.

The interplay between top-down and bottom-up hate speech flows saturates political discourse with narratives that vilify and threaten Muslims, effectively crowding out space for meaningful democratic debate.

Weaponising Historic Tensions: the Miya Kheda Andolon in Assam

The border state of Assam provides crucial historical context for the nationwide crackdown on Bengali-origin Muslims. For decades, fears about demographic change, purportedly caused by Muslim migration from Bangladesh, have been mobilised by the Hindu far-right to shape politics and policy in the state. These anxieties eventually led to the creation of the National Register of Citizens (NRC), a controversial mechanism aimed at identifying undocumented immigrants. The NRC was designed to “recognise and expel illegal immigrants” by determining “who was born in Assam and is therefore Indian, and who might be a migrant from neighbouring Bangladesh.” However, during its 2019 implementation, 1.9 million people, including several thousand Hindus, were excluded from the register. Muslims left out of the NRC faced disproportionately severe consequences, including detention in government-run facilities and harsh living conditions.

Since early June, Assam has witnessed a sharp escalation in hate speech, targeted harassment, violence, and state-led evictions against Bengali-origin Muslims, under the campaign to remove “illegal Bangladeshi immigrants.” Between July 9 and July 30, India Hate Lab (IHL) documented 18 rallies and protests across 14 districts, and nine cases of targeted violence and harassment.^[2]

Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has been a powerful and consistent propagator of hateful rhetoric. Sarma has repeatedly referred to the evicted families as “illegal Bangladeshis” in several posts on X, asserted that the government will continue with its anti-encroachment drives to protect the ‘jati,’ and given a public appeal that people not provide shelter to those evicted.

On May 15, 2025, speaking at a rally in Giridih, Jharkhand, Sarma framed Muslim “infiltration” as an existential threat, claiming “Infiltrators are entering Jharkhand and are forcefully marrying Adivasi women [referencing the ‘original inhabitants’ of India]. These Muslim infiltrators are again becoming citizens and are grabbing lands in Jharkhand…. They came in thousands, then in lakhs, and now they are in crores. Today, we (Hindus) have to fight daily for our existence.”

On May 28, 2025, speaking at a press briefing, Sarma announced a new scheme to issue arms licenses to indigenous residents of “vulnerable and remote areas,” particularly those living along the Bangladesh border. He specifically named five districts with significant Muslim populations as the initial focus areas, stating that the initiative was intended to “tackle unlawful threats from hostile quarters.”

On June 9, 2025, Sarma claimed that “newly arrived” Muslims have weaponized the consumption of beef and the call to prayer as tactics to drive out local Hindus.

On July 21, 2025, at a state event in Darrang, he referred to Bengali-origin Muslims as “suspected Bangladeshis,” dismissed slogans of communal harmony as naive, and claimed that reclaimed land from Muslims was being put to better use.

On July 24, 2025, responding to a question about whether this situation might turn violent, Sarma replied that he wanted the “situation in Assam to be explosive,” adding that Assamese people could only survive if armed.

On August 2, at an election rally in Udalguri, Sarma said there was no need to ask for documents from those he referred to as “our people.” He claimed that documents should be demanded from people who were recently evicted and alleged that people from Bangladesh were entering Assam daily. He urged the public to recognise who the real enemies of Assam are.

This rhetoric was repeated by the local ethno nationalist organization, Bir Lachit Sena, whose chief Shrinkhal Chaliha stated that his group would carry out evictions themselves if the police failed to act. In the Sivasagar district, the Sena along with at least six other organisations have been conducting house-to-house searches to verify the documents of people working as labourers and staying on rent, with the object of forcing people of “suspect nationality” to “go back to where they came from.

On July 25, Bir Lachit Sena protested against illegal Bangladeshi infiltrators in Kaliabor. Members stopped vehicles on roads and questioned them, leading to a chaotic situation eventually requiring police intervention.

On August 10, a maktab in Tinsukia district was demolished. Shahin Alam, a teacher at the maktab, was harassed to show his Aadhaar card and threatened by a group of people saying, “Toi iyar pora jaboi lagibo” (You must leave this place). A recording of the demolition shows a group of youth chanting slogans such as “Jai Aai Axom” (Hail mother Assam) and “Bir Lachit Sena Zindabad.”

Veer Lachit Sena, All Tai Ahom Students’ Union, Hindu Suraksha Sena, and AHP-Rashtriya Bajrang Dal have been undertaking similar harassment and vigilante eviction drives.

On September 5, Veer Lachit Sena staged a protest at the Police station in Dhemaji over allegations that Bengali-origin Muslim men assaulted an Assamese rickshaw driver, raising slogans targeting the community like “Bangladeshi Miya go back,” “Remove Miyas, save Dhemaji,” and “Miya hooliganism won’t be allowed.”

On September 2, at a meeting of AHP-Rashtriya Bajrang Dal-Rashtriya Mahila Parishad in Bongaigaon, leader Debajit targeted Muslims, alleging that over a thousand villages had been taken over by “Bangladeshis.” He claimed that places with names like Islampur were being established across the district and called it a conspiracy to turn India into an “Islamic State” by buying land at high prices to prevent Hindus from purchasing it.

On August 31, at an AHP-Rashtriya Bajrang Dal meeting in Rangia, Kamrup, state president Dinesh Kalita targeted Muslims, alleging that wherever their population increases, Hindus are attacked and women assaulted and killed. He promoted the conspiracy theory of “love jihad”, claiming those involved in the district are RSS-Rashtriya Muslim Manch leaders. He called for strengthening their organisation to stop the “intimidation of Bangladeshi-Miyas” and kill those who shelter them in villages.

On August 28, Hindu Suraksha Sena staged a protest in Barpeta, chanting slogans such as “Bangladeshi Miya be warned,” “Islamic expansion won’t be allowed in Assam,” and demanding that those they deemed traitors of the country be shot. They also burned effigies of Mahmood Madani and Syeda Hamid for opposing the recent eviction drives targeting Bengali-origin Muslims.

On August 8, NewsNow circulated a video showing vigilantes in Tinsukia district demanding NRC documents from a woman.

On August 5, following the direction of the president Milan Buragohain, the union intercepted 16 “Miyas” near a bus stand in Tinsukia town. These persons were on their way to Arunachal Pradesh to work as masons and construction labourers, but were made to return home to western Assam’s Barpeta, Dhubri, and South Salmara-Mankachar districts. The union also said it issued a month’s notice to some 50 families of “illegal immigrants” to leave an area near the district’s coal-rich Margherita town.

The Miya Muslims of Assam live predominantly in the flood-prone Char Chapori (river islands and embankments) areas, where thousands have lost their land to river erosion. Many landless families have resettled on government land or migrated to different cities and other districts within Assam in search of livelihoods.^[3] The term “Miya” is now used pejoratively and often as a slur against Bengali Muslims, who are accused of “weaponising” beef consumption, polluting Hindu areas, and threatening Assamese identity. The eviction drives in Assam have disproportionately affected Miya Muslims, many of whom have lived there for decades. Assam news channels have published videos showing vigilante groups going door to door in Upper Assam, threatening Miya Muslims to leave within 24 to 48 hours.

On August 8, a public meeting in Sivasagar district called for homeowners to check tenants’ documents before renting out properties, in a bid to keep Upper Assam “free from illegal Bangladeshis.” An attendee told a reporter from the Wire that Miya migrant workers from Lower Assam resemble “Bangladeshi people” – because they wear lungis and tupis (skull caps) – sparking “anxiety” among “indigenous communities”, as people cannot identify who is a ‘Miya’ and who is a Bangladeshi.

Also on August 8, indigenous Assamese Muslim woman Wazida Begum stirred controversy with her strong statements distancing ‘Assamese Muslims’ from ‘Miya Muslims’ amid an ongoing eviction drive in Upper Assam. “A section of Assamese Muslims in Upper Assam have provided shelter to Miya Muslims and even entered into marital relations with them. This is extremely alarming.” She further warned that cultural assimilation through intermarriage could threaten indigenous identity by stating, “Marriage with Miya Muslims must be barred. We are Assamese by birth and we must live and die in Assam.” Wazida added, “One mistake by a local marrying a Miya girl has jeopardized the entire Sonari town today. In another remark she said, “When indigenous communities begin marrying Miya Muslims, it legitimizes their stay. We must not allow such marriages or give them shelter.”

On August 3, Situ Barua, a member of the Jatiya Sangrami Sena, is seen warning a man from Hojai district: “Shut up, you Miya… Miyas have to vacate Upper Assam within 24 hours.”

Assam is scheduled to go to polls in 2026, making the ‘Miya Kheda Andolon’ (movement to drive away the Miyas) a timely electoral tool. By stoking xenophobic anxieties and communal fear, the campaign diverts public attention from pressing governance failures and corruption scandals, such as the ‘Gir Cow Scam’ – a controversy involving allegations of corruption, mismanagement, and favouritism in a government-backed dairy initiative under the Gorukhuti Bahumukhi Krishi Prakalpa (GBKP), which implicates BJP ministers and has sparked protests across the state. The political opportunism of the xenophonic narrative serves not just to exclude a minority, but to shield the political elite from accountability.

Political Opportunism and the Consolidation of the Majoritarian Vote in Bihar

In Bihar, the political campaign against Bengali-origin Muslims has been weaponized to secure electoral gains ahead of the assembly elections. This has been synchronised with a state-level administrative exercise – the Special Intensive Revision (SIR). This exercise by the Election Commission began on June 25, tasking booth-level officers tasked with collecting enumeration forms from 7.89 crore voters in the state within 31 days. While the opposition is demanding a rollback, the BJP has framed the process as necessary to “purge” foreign nationals from the voter list.

On July 22, BJP leader and Deputy CM Samrat Choudhary accused RJD chief Lalu Prasad and West Bengal CM Mamata Banerjee of being ‘anti-national’ for opposing the SIR, claiming, “for vote bank politics, they want to keep lakhs of infiltrators in the voter list and are opposing the ongoing SIR of the electoral rolls in Bihar.”

On July 23, Hindutva channel Sudarshan News repeated the claim that the opposition is rattled because their vote bank “thrives on fake identities and infiltrators.”

On July 25, BJP MP Jagannath Sarkar alleged that “Rohingya Muslims from Bangladesh have learned Bengali and changed their names to obtain Aadhaar and voter cards” in India.

This political leveraging of the SIR to attack the opposition and reinforce the ‘infiltrator’ narrative has also spread to neighbouring states. West Bengal is a key ideological battleground, where Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee has publicly accused BJP-ruled states of using deportations to harass Bengali-speaking Indians.

On July 25, West Bengal BJP President Samik Bhattacharya called for the implementation of the SIR, warning that failing to do so could result in the state becoming “West Bangladesh.”

On July 31, BJP leader and the Leader of Opposition in the West Bengal Assembly, Suvendu Adhikari, vowed that not a single Rohingya or Bangladeshi intruder would stay in Bengal if BJP comes to power. “First, these Rohingyas and Bangladeshi Muslim intruders should be deleted from the voter list. Then they should be expelled from the country, the way the Haryana government and other governments are doing. Not a single Bangladeshi Muslim intruder or Rohingya will stay here. This is our commitment,” he said

The much-publicised draft of electoral rolls was released by the Election Commission on August 1, after the first phase of the SIR was completed. Contrary to the widespread claims, not a single voter’s name was deleted on the ground of alleged infiltrators from Bangladesh, Nepal, or Myanmar. However, the propaganda continued unabated.

On August 2, Union Minister Rajiv Ranjan Singh dismissed claims of harassment of Bengali-speaking migrants in BJP-ruled states. He reasserted that the verification process is also part of efforts to identify Bangladeshi infiltrators who may be living illegally in India using fake documents such as Aadhaar cards.

On August 8, Union Home Minister Amit Shah backed the Bihar SIR, declaring “Names of infiltrators must be removed from the voters’ lists. They have no right to vote.” He further attacked the opposition, saying “Lalu Prasad, Tejashwi Prasad and Rahul Gandhi should answer who they want to save — those from Bangladesh who devour jobs of the people of Bihar? Bihar people will never accept infiltrators who Rahul Gandhi and Tejashwi want to use as vote bank.”

On August 24, BJP national secretary and IT cell head Amit Malviya said that Aadhar card cannot be used as a valid document for citizenship. “The truth is simple: SIR is intact, Aadhaar alone cannot get you enrolled; dead, fake, Bangladeshi and Rohingya names will be removed and only Indian citizens will elect the next government – not foreigners,” he said.

On August 25, Union Minister and BJP MP Giriraj Singh, speaking at an NDA alliance meeting in Purnia, referred to alleged Bangladeshi immigrants as “demons,” asked attendees if they should be killed, and urged them to buy only from Hindu vendors, eat only jhatka meat, and avoid halal.” Singh denounced statements by a former-UPA official alleging that they “aimed at carrying out a Ghazwa-e-Hind.”

On September 15, speaking at an election rally in Purnia, Modi launched a sharp attack on Congress and RJD, accusing them of supporting illegal infiltrators for vote-bank politics. “Congress and RJD have not only threatened the honour of Bihar but also the identity of Bihar,” he said. “Today, a huge demographic crisis has arisen due to infiltrators in Seemanchal and Eastern India. People of Bihar, Bengal, Assam and many states are worried about the safety of their sisters and daughters. That is why I have announced the Demography Mission from the Red Fort.”

On September 16, BJP national spokesperson Rohan Gupta supported the Prime Minister’s stance, repeating that infiltrators are a “serious threat to national security.” Speaking at Ahmedabad, Gupta claimed, “Aadhaar card registration in Seemanchal has reached 108 percent and even 110 percent. This means there are more Aadhaar cards than people. This is a warning signal. This is not just data manipulation, but a direct threat to our internal security.” Gupta said that infiltrators weaken the demographic structure, strain resources, and create law and order problems.

On September 18, Amit Shah asserted that SIR) would remove “impurities” from voters’ list in Bihar. Speaking at back-to-back workers’ conclaves at Dehri-on-Sone and Begusarai, which were attended by party activists from 20 of the state’s 38 districts, Shah called upon party workers to “visit every house in the state and spread the message that all districts of Bihar will be left teeming with infiltrators from Bangladesh if they (Congress, RJD and Left combine) came to power, even by fluke.”

Also on September 18, Giriraj Singh alleged that mosques in Bihar are sheltering infiltrators from Bangladesh to boost the Muslim vote-bank. Speaking in Patna, he claimed that around 25 lakh votes were removed in Begusarai and accused RJD leader Tejashwi Yadav and Congress MP Rahul Gandhi of protecting infiltrators through their yatras. Giriraj Singh compared the situation to Bengal, saying Hindus have become a minority in many districts.

The chief target of the SIR campaign has been the Seemanchal belt in northeast Bihar. This region, flanked by Nepal and West Bengal, comprises the four districts of Purnia, Katihar, Araria, and Kishanganj, where the Muslim population is far higher than the rest of the state. Various ‘sources’ in the Election Commission have claimed that the real aim of this voter-list revision is to flush out Bangladeshi infiltrators in Seemanchal.^[4]

After the first phase of the revision, not a single ‘infiltrator’ was identified in Seemchal. However, the exercise did strike off a total of 65 lakh voters, with 7.6 lakh from Seemchal, on other grounds. The majority are workers from Patna, East Champaran and Madhubani. This data strongly suggests that the SIR is not a purge of infiltrators, but a calculated political ploy that disproportionately targets migrant labourers—many of them Bengali-speaking Muslims—who are away from home and unable to verify their enrolment.

The entire operation, from political mudslinging by Modi and Shah, to hate speeches by Giriraj Singh, to the Election Commission’s SIR, serve a cohesive political and ideological purpose. By relentlessly branding Muslims as “infiltrators” and creating a “demographic crisis” bogeyman, the campaign simultaneously attempts to suppress the minority vote while galvanizing the majority Hindu vote. This consolidation is essential in the Hindu Rashtra framework, the administrative process of voter deletion is transformed into a performative act of “purifying” the nation, cementing the idea that the only legitimate citizen is one who fits the dominant religious and cultural identity.

Propaganda Tropes and their Ideological Underpinnings

The ‘Bangladeshi infiltrator’ bogeyman and the hateful rhetoric that accompanies it is not haphazard, but a meticulously constructed architecture of exclusion that serves political, patriarchal, and ideological goals.

Hindutva is a political project of nation-building which conceptualises Bharat as the land of the Hindus, and a Hindu as one for whom Hindustan is not only a Pitribhu (Fatherland) but also a Punyabhu (Holyland). Followers of Islam and Christianity, whose holy sites lie outside India, are perpetual ideological outsiders – infiltrators. This ideological denial of a community’s sacred belonging is then translated into a territorial mandate. By delegitimising their citizenship, the propaganda cements Muslims as an internal enemy whose very presence undermines the nation’s integrity. The call to expel “ghuspaithiye” is thus presented as a necessary act of national purification.

On Independence Day, members of Antarashtriya Hindu Parishad and Rashtriya Bajrang Dal held a slogan march in Balrampur, Uttar Pradesh, demanding an “Akhand Bharat” and calling to drive out “Bangladeshi ghuspaithiya” (infiltrators). A few days before, on August 11, AHP-Rashtriya Bajrang Dal members held a procession in Haldwani, Uttarakhand, chanting slogans demanding the eviction of those they alleged to be Bangladeshi ghuspaithiya (infiltrators).

As we can already see, the ideological architecture is built upon specific, repeated propaganda tropes.

Trope 1: Demographic Supremacy: “Population Jihad” and the Great Replacement Bogey

This trope is designed to create a manufactured sense of existential threat and economic scarcity among the Hindu majority. For years, Hindu nationalists have mobilized anti-Muslim sentiments around an imagined threat of “population jihad,” which rooted in the unsubstantiated claim that Muslims will take over India’s population by intentionally producing more children than Hindus. This argument about demographic change is now being made by invoking the “Bangladeshi infiltrator” bogey.

On August 22, AHP–Rashtriya Bajrang Dal staged a protest in Garoth, Mandsaur, Madhya Pradesh and submitted a memorandum to the SDM, targeting Muslims, fear-mongering over their population, and demanding population control laws and action against alleged Bangladeshi and Rohingya “ghuspaiths” (infiltrators).

On July 31, AHP-Rashtriya Bajrang Dal staged a protest in Aonla, Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh, demanding a population control law, alleging that the country’s population growth is driven by the infiltration of Bangladeshi Muslims. They called for the eviction of those they termed as infiltrators and urged measures to curb the Muslim population.

The ‘infiltrator’ narrative, therefore, feeds on and reinforces a fear of demographic change in India based on bogus claims of “explosive population growth” among Muslims, which will lead to Muslim domination and the eradication of Hindus. The coordinated demand for discriminatory population control laws translates abstract demographic anxiety into concrete political policy.

This demographic fear is immediately weaponized by political leaders to invoke economic scarcity, recasting systemic socio-economic failures as the direct fault of the minority community.

On August 25, at a Varaha Jayanti celebration organised by Vishwa Hindu Kranti Sanghatan in Navi Mumbai, BJP MLA Nitesh Rane fearmongered about alleged Rohingya and Bangladeshi “infiltrators” taking jobs and casting votes to make non-Hindu candidates win. He spread anti-Muslim conspiracy theories of “love jihad” and “land jihad”, declaring, “We are not goltopis or dadiwallas; we are Hindus!”

Hindu far-right leaders like Nitish Rane frequently demonized Indian Muslims as parasitic and thieving, alleging that they were either wrongfully granted resources that rightfully belonged to Hindus or were stealing Hindu wealth through acts of aggression. This narrative manufactures an artificial fear of resource scarcity amongst the local population, creating fear and panic among marginalized groups that are the most reliant on social services (e.g., subsidized ration, public healthcare) and most prone to unemployment. The lie that “infiltrators” are illegally obtaining identification documents and claiming indigenous land makes the constitutional rights of Indian Muslims seem like an act of aggression against the majority.

Trope 2: “Love Jihad” and Conversion Hysteria

“Love Jihad” is a fear manifested from Brahmanical Patriarchy. The trope defines Hindu women as naive, unintelligent, or brainwashed, justifying the constant surveillance and control of their bodies and choices by Hindu men. Simultaneously, it portrays the Muslim man as inherently lustful and predatory, whose interest in a Hindu woman is never based on consent or genuine affection, but is part of a wider, organized, terrorist plot to convert and co-opt the “vessel of the Hindu Rashtra” – the body of upper-case women.

On August 15, at a government school in Budwa, Shahdol, Madhya Pradesh, BJP leader Durgesh Tiwari peddled all three components of the trope: anti-Muslim conspiracy theories of “love jihad,” the economic threat of Bangladeshi/Pakistani “ghuspaithiye” (infiltrators), and the claim that Muslims and Christian missionaries were carrying out religious conversions.

On August 20, at the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) Foundation Day celebration at PGDAV College, Lajpat Nagar, Delhi Cabinet Minister Kapil Mishra spread fear over alleged demographic change and claimed that Rohingya and Bangladeshi “ghuspaith” (infiltrators) have been settled in several states. He also peddled the anti-Muslim “love jihad” conspiracy theory and stoked fears of religious conversion.

“Love Jihad” is the gendered face of the wider conversion hysteria, leveraging sexual anxiety to reinforce the political demand for national purity, Hindu patriarchy, and Muslim exclusion.

Trope 3: Othering & Dehumanisation: Sanctioning Violence and Eliminating Dissent

Dehumanisation is the ultimate rhetorical tool in the architecture of exclusion. Its primary goal is to strip the targeted community— Bengali-origin Muslims and anyone who speaks up for them—of their human status, moral consideration, and constitutional rights.

On September 8, speaking at a yoga programme in Dagarpur village, Baghpat, Uttar Pradesh MLA Nandkishore Gurjar (BJP) claimed, “Swines and Bangladeshi Rohingyas are being settled here, and they will ruin the country. I am fighting with them every day.”

On August 25, at an Akhand Aryavarta Arya Mahasabha event in Lucknow, speaker Mahadev Baba claimed that Bangladeshis and Rohingyas are cannibalistic and “eat human flesh,” alleging they are obtaining Aadhaar cards in India. He targeted Muslims with slogans like “We two, our forty, everyone with an AK-47 in hand” and “We two, our seventy, everyone with bricks and stones in hand,” and questioned who would protect Hindu women from them.

Again, we see how framing the minority as a savage, inhumane threat to Hindu women – the honour of the Hindu community – sanctions aggressive pre-emptive action against Muslim men.

On August 26, the Association for Protection of Civil Rights (APCR) and Karwan-e-Mohabbat jointly convened a public tribunal titled ‘People’s Tribunal on Assam: Evictions, Detentions and the Right to Belong’ at the Constitution Club of India. The event was disrupted by a mob with aggressive and communal sloganeering, including “Desh ke Gaddaro ko / Goli maaro saalo ko” (Shoot the ones who are traitors to the nation).

This report demonstrates how civil society’s attempt to address state-led human rights violations is immediately and aggressively characterized as anti-national activity, thus suppressing democratic dissent in favour of authoritarian majoritarianism.

The Final Test: Invalidation of Constitutional Citizenship

The repeated political rhetoric of the ‘Bangladeshi infiltrator’ ensures that the public consciousness is primed to view Bengali-speaking Muslims as illegal aliens, predatory savages, inhuman – in other words, immediate and acceptable targets for attack.

Reports from Odisha in August 2025 demonstrate the immediate and brutal translation of high-level political hate speech into on-ground action, as Bengali-speaking Muslim migrant workers faced targeted violence in Sambalpur, Keonjhar, Jagatsinghpur, Kendrapara and Bhadrak districts.

Journalists reported that BJP leaders roughed up and handed over 34 Bengali-speaking Muslim migrant workers engaged in the construction sector to the police. The police later released them after verifying that they were from West Bengal, not Bangladesh.

27-year old Noorul Sheikh, a hawker from Chunakhali village (West Bengal), was attacked, beaten and injured by a group of people with saffron flags. “I failed to convince them that I am from West Bengal, not Bangladesh, despite providing my Aadhar card and other residential documents. They dismissed them as fake and were adamant about targeting us for being Bengali-speaking Muslims,” he reported to TwoCircles.

A mason recounted that Bengali-speaking Muslims were made easy targets by individuals carrying saffron flags and loudly chanting “Jai Shri Ram.” “They used vulgar language against Muslims and our religion, Islam, abused us, threatened us to go back to Bangladesh, and attacked and beat some of us despite us showing our Aadhar and Voter ID cards upon request. With folded hands, we repeatedly told them that we are Indian residents of Murshidabad and not Bangladeshi Muslims, but they refused to accept it.”

The pattern of profiling and violence is replicated by state actors across India. On September 8, 18 migrant hawkers from West Bengal were detained for five days by police in Uttar Pradesh’s Basti district after allegedly being labelled as illegal Bangladeshi immigrants. The workers, all residents of Murshidabad district, claimed that they were detained despite possessing valid Aadhaar and voter ID cards. Police first detained four or five of the migrants. Their landlord then told the remaining workers to go to the Nagar police station with their identity documents for verification.

The ‘infiltrator’ rhetoric therefore provides ideological cover for state-aligned political groups to conduct arbitrary violence and detention against Indian citizens, based solely on their linguistic identity and religious affiliation. Citizenship, the rule of law, and documentation are all rendered invalid in the face of majoritarian fervour.

The Complete Circuit: Ideology to State-Policy

The incidents recorded during the last few months demonstrate that the systematic targeting of Bengali-origin Muslims as “Bangladeshis” or “ghuspaithiye” (infiltrators) is a targeted campaign of communal nation-building: Indian citizenship is defined not by constitutional rights but by religious identity, aligning with the exclusionary tenets of Hindutva.

The data shows that the hate campaign leverages pre-existing ethnic and communal tensions for electoral gain. The ideological arrow is pushed from the top down: originating from elected ministers like Kapil Mishra and Nitesh Rane, amplified by party subsidiaries (AHP, VHP, Rashtriya Bajrang Dal) and media, and enacted by state police and vigilante mobs.

The rhetorical architecture, encompassing Population Jihad, Love Jihad, and Dehumanisation, converges on the citizen question. By denying the community their Pitribhumi and Punyabhumi, the campaign strips them of the fundamental premise of rights, from which all other civil and democratic rights arise.

The constant, coordinated nature of the campaign, from rallies organized solely for hate speech to the relentless electronic media bombardments, is designed to normalize the narrative. These regurgitated narratives aim to rewrite truth and history through continuous repetition. By the time complaints or judicial processes are put into action, the damage is already done through physical violence, economic deprivation, or deportation.

To dismantle this architecture of exclusion and uphold the constitutional mandate of India, immediate and coordinated action is required from all branches of the state and civil society.

1. Halt Displacement and Ensure Due Process: The state authorities in Assam and other states must immediately halt all eviction and demolition drives targeting Bengali-origin Muslim communities. Due process and rehabilitation for all those evicted must be ensured.
2. Hold State Actors Accountable: State officials, political leaders, and vigilante groups who incite hate or enable communal violence must be held accountable through effective prosecution.
3. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) should launch a fact-finding mission into human rights violations related to demolitions, hate speech, and displacement.
4. Indian courts should take suo moto cognizance of mass evictions and hate mobilizations to ensure the safety and security of minorities.
5. The Supreme Court’s guidelines on hate speech must be strictly enforced. Concrete steps must be taken to ensure that police stations are not left alone; handbooks detailing these guidelines should be printed in regional languages and provided to all police personnel for education and immediate reference.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this legal resource has been worked on by Raaz)

Footnotes:

^[1] India Hate Lab, ‘Hate Speech Events in India – Report 2024’ (February 6, 2025)

^[2] India Hate Lab, ‘Data Reveals Rising Hate and Violence Against Bengali-Origin Muslims in Assam’ (July 31, 2025)

^[3] Kazi Sharowar Hussain, ‘’You’re Bangladeshi’: ‘Nationalist’ Groups Target Miya Muslims, Give Ultimatum to Leave Upper Assam’ (The Wire, August 14, 2025)

^[4] Yogendra Yadav, ‘Bihar SIR: 789 pages, 1 B.I.G. lie, 0 foreigners’ (National Herald, August 2, 2025)

Related:

1. A Targeted Campaign: The orchestrated crackdown on Bengali Migrants and the rising pushback from courts, Bengal government, and civil society
2. India’s Stealthy Pushback: Thousands of alleged “Bangladeshi immigrants” deported without due process across states

The post How the Hindutva propaganda machine turns citizens into ‘infiltrators’ appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As political power shifted and the presence of an aggressive exclusion-driven right-wing party emerged, these ideas of inclusion slowly vanished also from the community-driven Ganesh Chaturthi.  Nowhere is this more evident than this year, 2025. Turning turtle on the tradition of social commentary which was essentially progressive, the 10-day long festivities were exploited by Hindutva groups in various municipalities to manufacture a sense of othering, even hate. Political power has always dominated these community expressions, with the dominant political force, “capturing” the dozens of “Ganpati mandals.” This year, Hindutva groups engaged in furthering their central political agenda by promoting conspiracy theories about “love jihad,” conversions, and fears of demographic change. All this under the garb of cultural and religious devotion.

Some key incidents from the Ganesh Chaturthi 2025 celebrations:

Bangalore, Karnataka

On August 3, in Bangalore, a Hindutva leader by the name of Mohan Gouda uttered remarks at a gathering, under the pretext of encouraging people to celebrate participation in the Ganesh festival, but his comments soon took a turn towards the communal. Gouda said people should attend this festival, but also advocated for a supposed “Hindu Rashtra” merging the religious celebration into a political-religious ideology. He argued that English medium education was a tool to segregate Hindus from their culture, claiming it intended to “make Hindus mentally Christian.” He evoked the theme of “love jihad” again, as well as conversions happening systematically, arguing that these conspiracies were detrimental to Hindus and Hindu society.

Through video and social clips being distributed on HindutvaWatch’s Telegram channel- and reproduced on both Facebook and Instagram- you can hear his comments and witness his ridiculous claims first-hand.  He states: “English medium education was introduced to separate Hindus from their culture and make them mentally Christian.”

His remarks are more than mere political rhetoric at a festival; they turn a moment of religious observance into a statement of political exclusion. Gouda’s comments convey to worshippers that it is a particular religious identity that delineates loyalty, and that any existence/involvement of minorities in that moment is a form of “internal threat.”

Kota, Rajasthan

On August 27, a flashpoint erupted in Kota’s Vigyan Nagar over a local non-vegetarian restaurant that posted wishes for Ganesh Chaturthi along with pictures of its menu. Activists from the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) – Bajrang Dal saw the post and descended on the location, accused the place of promoting religious enmity, and claimed that by associating images of Ganesh with its non-vegetarian food, they were hurting the sentiments of Hindus. The municipal authorities, clearly under duress, arrived on-site and soon sealed off the restaurant!

Clarion India reported the incident via HindutvaWatch, which added further details to what had unfolded. According to Clarion, a restaurant owner and two others were arrested and police confirmed that the person responsible for preparing the poster, the restaurant, and the person preparing the posters for printing had all been detained. A minor was also detained for allegedly posting the content but was later let go. Regarding the arrest, Kota City Superintendent of Police, Tejaswini Gautam, stated the case is being handled with seriousness and assured that compliance with the law would occur and that everyone accused except the minor would be charged in accordance with the appropriate legal statues. Clarion also reported that during the protest, workers prayed the Hanuman Chalisa in front of the restaurant site and requested justice until police intervened.

None from the media have queried the police authorities about which law has been violated in posting or conceiving an image with Ganesh Chaturthi with a non-vegetarian menu. On the contrary, the right to life and right to do business freely (Article 21 and Article 19) of the restaurant owner stand violated.

Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh

On August 31, 2025, in Ashok Nagar, Bilaspur, observances around Ganesh Chaturthi took a distinctly communal turn. At the local function, Hindu nationalist figure Thakur Ram Singh grabbed the mic to insult Christians and Muslims, claiming they were causing conversions. He referred to them as “illegitimate children of Chadar-Father” in an overtly inflammatory way, attempting to ‘de-legitimize’ them as an identity group, in public. The implication of conversion, especially at a religious function, no doubt heightened fears of encroachment on Hindu faith, resulting in minorities becoming enemies within.

At the time of writing, mainstream/legacy media have not detailed the police or administrative responses to that particular speech. Bilaspur has begun to be a recurring place of communal tension and mobilisation: just months prior, it was reported that Thakur Ram Singh and others had led police to raid Christian prayer meetings as part of a “conversion campaign,” as well.  The Bilaspur event can be viewed as part of a pattern, for religious festivals in our context have evolved into not just sites for communal signalling, but actually exclusion; prejudice cloaked as religious rhetoric towards political mobilization.

Dehradun, Uttarakhand

On August 31, 2025, in Dehradun, a rally celebrating Ganesh Chaturthi hosted by the Hindu Raksha Dal included Swami Darshan Bharti, who delivered a speech that condemned Muslims. He reportedly insisted that Islam needed to be “crushed” in Uttarakhand and that “Allahu Akbar” could not be shouted in a territory of Hindus and Hindu gods. Accompanying Bharti was Bhupendra ‘Pinki’ Chaudhury, the President of Hindu Raksha Dal, who used derogatory language and communal identifiers to label Muslims “topi-dariwale,” “burkhewale,” “kuthmulle,” and “jihadi.” Apart from the slur and denigration of Muslims, such a speech also engendered a sense of fear (at witnessing assertions of religion, chanting of prayers etc) and demographic anxiety. Hence, a public religious event, marked traditionally with community celebration, saw –through the presence and hate speech delivered by hate offenders— the assembly transformed into a site of communal exclusion.

So far, no information is available from mainstream newspapers (in English or regional) about any action, arrest or filing of FIRs pertaining to this speech. The absence of any visible response from authorities together with the public nature of the event and speech contribute to ongoing contexts of impunity and normalization of this kind of hate discourse under the guise of religious ceremonies.

Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh

On September 4, 2025, at a Ganesh Chaturthi celebration in Purushottam Nagar, Bhopal, an event organized by VHP-Bajrang Dal leader Manish Saini delivered incendiary diatribes against non-Hindus. He claimed that non-Hindus have ‘a deliberate agenda to attack Hindu women’, mentioned cow slaughter, and cited the popular conspiracy theory of “love jihad.” He framed religious minorities as predatory agents who are actively destroying the social fabric of Hindu community from within and implied that Hindu women were perpetually at risk of either forced conversion to Islam or being ‘snared’.

A video of the event can be accessed on social media and has been shared on HindutvaWatch’s Telegram and Facebook broadcasting platforms.

In addition to the contents of the speech, little media or local official coverage has reported on subsequent activity — such as FIR lodging, arrests, or administrative censure. There has not been a public response from municipal authorities or police in Bhopal that indicates whether they would hold Saini accountable for this incitement in a public setting. This absence of public condemnation or visible follow-up action, to an explicit example of hate speech throws up the question of impunity around such crimes that result in the normalisation of hate and exclusion.

From Devotion to Division

Ganesh Chaturthi, a festival that was in previous decades, an occasion for collective bonding, is seeing signs of being turned into a platform for hate and violence in its entirety. From Bangalore to Bhopal, the festival was utilized to, amongst other things, legitimate conspiracy theories, justify the vilification of minorities, and monitor the social and economic lives of vulnerable communities. These instances signal how quickly a space intended for devotion can be co-opted for exclusionary politics when law enforcement abandons its duties and the government remains silent. The commissioning of such incendiary speech during religious observances poses a distinct threat not only to minorities, but to the democratic and secular fabric of the country. If immediate steps are not taken to reign in the instigators, and return festivals to their inclusive or so-called “original” form, hate will only continue to grow.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Image: Representational Image

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Gujarat: 15-year-old Muslim boy dies by suicide after alleged communal harrassment

The post Unifying cultural celebration weaponised: Ganesh processions turned into stages for hate speech & moral policing appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The report, jointly compiled by the Association for Protection of Civil Rights (APCR) and the Quill Foundation, has recorded 947 hate-related incidents from June 7, 2024, to June 7, 2025. These include 602 hate crimes and 345 instances of hate speech, many of them linked to members or affiliates of Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

“Despite the increasing intensity and occurrences, there is no institutional effort to record or document hate crimes,” the report said. It noted that while atrocities against Dalits are tracked under Indian law, no similar mechanism exists for religious minorities.

Muslims were the primary victims, with 1,460 affected in 419 incidents. Christians, while fewer in incident count, accounted for 1,504 victims in 85 attacks. At least 25 Muslims were killed, and 173 incidents involved physical violence.

Recently, Citizens for Justice & Peace documented 180 such hate attacks post the Pahalgam terror attack on April 22. Of these 37% were tied to ‘revenge’ against the minority (Muslims). The graphic visualization of this may be seen and read here.

In this new report, hate speech was also recorded to have intensified, with 178 of the 345 incidents attributed to BJP-linked individuals, including Prime Minister Modi and several chief ministers. Two judges and a governor were also reported to have made inflammatory remarks, sparking concern about the institutional normalisation of hate.

Uttar Pradesh topped the list of affected states, followed by Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Jharkhand—all BJP-governed. The report suggests a correlation between election activity and spikes in hate incidents, with inflammatory speeches and violence increasing during campaign periods.

Incidents ranged from mob attacks over cow slaughter allegations to assaults during religious festivals and campaigns targeting interfaith couples and businesses owned by Muslims. In March 2025, 267 Christians were affected during a wave of attacks on churches and prayer meetings.

Children and the elderly persons from the minority have not been not spared. The report documented 32 hate crimes targeting minors and 10 incidents involving senior citizens, most of them Muslims.

Only 13% of hate crimes resulted in formal police complaints (FIRs), highlighting gaps in accountability and justice. “This figure is indicative of the worsening atmosphere Indian Muslims are undergoing and a lag in the criminal justice system,” the authors wrote.

The study warns of the lasting social consequences of unchecked hate and calls for institutional mechanisms to track and combat targeted violence. “Hate crimes and hate speech never occur in isolation,” the report states. “They impact families, communities, and the nation.”

Related:

30 FIRs Registered against Hate Speech and Hate Crimes: DGP, Maharashtra

As the date for the general assembly election approaches, hate crimes in India continue

The post Hate crimes: Report documents 602 hate crimes, 345 hate speech incidents in 1st year of Modi’s third term appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Targeted Violence in April and May

In the months of April and May, CJP documented 180 instances of targeted violence against Indian Muslims post the Pahalgam attack. Of these, 77 took place in April, and 103 in May. These spanned from outright cases of murder (3 specific instances, 3 victims) to nearly 99 cases of hate speech (made by politicians, proponents of Hindutva and other individuals and organisations with affiliations to the Hindu-right). The attacks spiked between April 23 and 25 (10, 12 and 18 cases respectively), following a near-steady course of events right through May. The following is a visualisation of this pattern of violence across the month.

Graph representing number of incidences of communal violence in relation to time

CJP is dedicated to finding and bringing to light instances of Hate Speech, so that the bigots propagating these venomous ideas can be unmasked and brought to justice. To learn more about our campaign against hate speech, please become a member. To support our initiatives, please donate now!

These attacks were spread out across India, as demonstrated by this map – although they were majorly spatially concentrated in northern and central India – with Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Haryana being the 5 worst offenders – with 29, 28, 22, 21 and 10 instances respectively.

Pie-chart representing the percentage of targeted violence per-state

Many (at least 66 out of 180 incidents had the assailants referring to the Pahalgam attack or accusing the victims of allegiance to Pakistan, thus directly relating it to the same and the state’s narrativisation of the violence – thus bringing up the percentage to 36.66%. This does not obviously include incidents which did not have the perpetrators bringing up the attack or alluding some association to it, although, in most cases one can make the assumption that the spike in attacks is related to the perception of the attack) of these incidents were direct outcomes of the Pahalgam attack, with many of the perpetrators citing it as the reason for the same.

A chilling example would be the video of a man claiming responsibility for the killing of a young Muslim man, who was shot dead near a restaurant located on Shilpgram Road in Tajganj police station area, in Agra, Uttar Pradesh. The man in the video identifies himself as a member of ‘Kshatriya Gauraksha Dal’. “Bharat Mata ki saugandh, 26 ka badla agar 2,600 se na liya toh mei Bharat Mata ka putr nahi, Jai shri Ram, Jai Hindu Rashtra, Bharat Mata ki Jai”, the man is heard saying. The two men have knives and a pistol tucked inside their waist. Reacting to the viral video, Agra Police said, “Regarding the viral video on social media, it is to be informed that no organization named Kshatriya Gau Raksha Dal is working in Agra.”

This recent spike in attacks on India’s religious minorities must be contextualized — there is an establishment of a “new normal”. This systemic violent targeting of India’s Muslims (and Christians) can be traced back to 2014, when a new avatar of the Bharatiya Janata Party assumed control at the centre. The Centre for Study of Society and Secularism writes, “Historically, communal riots often involved groups from two religious communities clashing, with both sides inflicting and suffering losses … However, in recent years, the nature of larger riots has shifted. Instead of clashes between two communities, many significant riots now involve state actions disproportionately targeting the Muslim community. These actions include using bulldozers to demolish properties owned by Muslims, causing significant economic damage. Additionally, the state has slapped cases and implicated the members of the Muslim community, even in instances where they are victims of violence during communal riots. The disproportionate and seemingly one-sided state action has led to social discord, communal consciousness, and polarization. This atmosphere of communal tension has been steadily intensifying over recent years. For instance, the Pew Research Center, a respected research institution, categorized India in 2022 as “very high” on its Social Hostilities Index (SHI), with a score of 9.3. Social hostilities index (SHI) factors in levels of religion-related harassment, mob violence, terrorism, militant activity, and conflicts over religious conversions or the use of religious symbols and attire.” This also tracks with the India Hate Lab report, which stated that there was a 74.4% surge in hate speech in 2024, driven by the BJP, Hindutva outfits, and unchecked social media amplification.

Media, politics, and the act of communalisation

India has noticed a growing entrenchment of the systematisation of communalism and ensuing violence over the last decade. However, this is not a singular event that has stemmed from uniquely specific factors. This is a product of the country’s long history of communal tensions and Hindutva outfits’ responsibility in stoking the fires in ensuring that said tensions evolve into deeper, more dangerous rifts whose brunt is borne by the Muslim civilians in the country. Tanika Sarkar, well-known intellectual and former professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University – who has written largely on Indian politics, society and religion, told DW, a global news TV program broadcast by German public state-owned international broadcaster Deutsche Welle (DW). “What happens is that war does not immediately translate into violence at home but it translates into very bitter memories and histories and allegations. I don’t know how it is on the Pakistani side, I suppose very much the same thing … In the latest conflict in particular, India’s news channels did not help. Between May 8 and May 10, some of the most viewed channels reported sensational, unverified information which later turned out to be false. That, coupled with messages circulated on WhatsApp, created an environment of fear. This is a situation where you can’t believe or disbelieve anything. And in that situation if you are so minded, then you will start looking at every Muslim with suspicion … Even if these attacks aren’t the norm, they create a psyche of fear in the hearts of every Muslim who lives in India.” CJP has, in a sustained campaign, complained against such media outlets and is pursuing some of these cases with the NBDSA even now.

What Sarkar mentions needs to be highlighted, because Indian news media has attained a near vitriolic status when it comes to war-mongering and proselytizing Islamophobia. TV anchors called for “Israel-like final solutions” and repeatedly attempted to mobilize public opinion against a possible ceasefire. The attitude of the unprofessional conduct of entrenched electronic media channels was a subject matter of comment on international media. Political commentators trying to provide more nuanced takes on the situation at hand were silenced or side-lined. Nupur J. Sharma, editor of OpIndia, tweeted, ““Nobody cares. keep your candles. Keep your apples. Keep your shawls. Keep your Kashmiriyat. Stop the bloody drama,” in response to a candle march held by Kashmiris in condemnation of the attack.

Columnist and political researcher Asim Ali wrote for The Telegraph, “The function of the communally-coded messaging broadcast on news channels is not to ‘reflect’ the anger of the audience, as they claim. It is to create and sustain an angry, communal subject that identifies with the incendiary scripts and is conditioned to demand revenge on a shady ‘Muslim’ enemy as well as its political supporters. It is to reinforce the authority of the political executive even though it has failed to fulfil the substantive demands of the citizenry, now transformed into a passive Hindu audience with its exogenously- seeded communal demands.

Historical Context

Ali writes, “The foundational moment of the present regime can, arguably, be located in the 2002 Gujarat riots where this political experiment of constructing and exorcising a Muslim enemy had been carried out to fruition. That experiment culminated in the re-election of the Modi-led state government over thousands of dead bodies. We have already seen several reports of attacks on Kashmiri students by right-wing vigilantes from different states in the last few days.” Ali connecting Pahalgam to the Gujarat riots is very well-founded, because this chamber of violence is not neo-natal in its construction. It has been tried, tested and perfected over decades of institutionalizing codes of conduct of perpetuating harm towards the Islamic “other”.

To contextualize this further, one could look at the media coverage of the 2002 riots and the differences in its approach. In the Concerned Citizens Tribunal Report, Crimes Against Humanity released in November 2002, the Tribunal noted, “On February 28, the two largest circulation, multiple-edition Gujarati newspapers, Sandesh and  Gujarat Samachar, which are fairly dependent on the state government’s largesse, played up the unsubstantiated official version of there being a ‘foreign hand’ behind the Godhra tragedy. It was only 3-4 weeks later that reports rubbishing this theory began to appear in newspapers. But by that time, the damage had already been done. Sandesh and Gujarat Samachar have been playing a blatantly communal role since the BJP returned to power in Gujarat in 1998. The BJP government’s patronage of these dailies needs to be looked into carefully, so that they do not continue to act as mere government agents. In the recent carnage, too, the role of Sandesh was particularly mischievous, while some smaller circulation newspapers like Gujarat Today, Sadhbhav and Gujarat Mitra acted responsibly.”

A study done by Saifuddin Ahmed titled The Role of the Media during Communal Riots in India points out that national television media coverage of the riots had been “bold and independent” with journalists like Rajdeep Sardesai and Barkha Dutt at Star News repeatedly condemning the victimisation of the Muslims in Gujarat during the riots. Print publications like The Times of India and The Indian Express carried headlines that highlighted the atrocities faced by the Muslim communities. This of course resulted in them receiving a lot of flak from the BJP administration in Gujarat and the centre. According to Ahmed, “The Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, addressed the nation a day after the attacks, regretting the “disgraceful” violence. He later on added that the news media were presenting an “exaggerated” account of the situation in Gujarat. The BJP and the state government under Narendra Modi singled out STAR News and banned cable operators from showing the channel in the state. The viewers in Ahmedabad, one of the worst affected regions in the riots, were left with blank television screens, unaware of the reality happening on the streets. Cable operators received calls from local officials in Ahmedabad and other cities to completely blackout STAR News, Zee News, CNN and Aaj Tak. Dossiers and “hitlists” on journalists were reportedly prepared while the channels which dared to reveal the truth and were critical of the Chief Minister and his plan of actions were not invited to the press conferences and hence were denied the basic right to information by the state itself.”

One sees this model amplified in its worst possible form with – whose control is currently concentrated in the hands of corporate conglomerates with firm affiliations to the Indian state apparatus. This facilitation of the development of a monolithic opinion that centralizes hate is strengthened by the hostile crackdown on independent media outlets covering communal hatred and opposing the regime’s machinery. Over the course of the last month, the websites of multiple independent news media platforms such as that of The Wire, Maktoob Media, have been blocked by the government. One could also think of the temporarily blocking of the X account of Anuradha Bhasin, editor of Kashmir Times. In the last few years, the Indian government has zeroed down on completely dismantling press freedom by revoking non-profit status from independent news media outlets, routinely charging journalists with sedition and terrorism – and even monitoring them with the Israeli spyware, Pegasus. One must also remember, that several of the most powerful accused of the Gujarat riots have been released, and now roam free, having escaped through loopholes and intentional pardoning.

This however does not absolve less powerful or non-media actors of their role in furthering the bile of “revenge”. Al Jazeera found almost 20 songs that built on Hindutva-aligning sentiments that were meant to be incendiary. While H-Pop (Hindutva Pop) with a high degree of hate content has been a visible phenomenon over the past decade, Caravan and CJP have analysed these, Pahalgam gave this new hate music market a new focus and twist. All of these songs infiltrated into the timelines of Indian social media users, with outright calls for Hindus to identify the “traitors within the country”. At the same time, politicians and members of the Hindu right continued with the single focus agenda which is to lace every issue, every speech with its own peculiar dose of targeted hate.

According to our data, there were over 100 instances of hate speeches in the country. Here is an example, on May 5, in Bankura, West Bengal BJP MP Saumitra Khan, while submitting a memorandum demanding the deportation of alleged Pakistani nationals residing in the state, “urged Hindus to sell their land and houses only to fellow Hindus. He alleged that once their children move away and they pass away, Rohingyas would eventually occupy their homes”. In another instance, on May 4, BJP MLA Ravinder Singh Negi, “speaking at a religious event in a temple, claimed that Muslims train their children to become extremists in madrasas instead of providing them with proper education. He questioned why Hindus could not raise their children as extremists in temples. He also invoked the Pahalgam attack and dog-whistled for a boycott of those he described as ‘traitors’ within the country.”

One often sees politicians attributing the rise in communalism to the populace, rather than the multiple perpetrators of the same. Here, we could think of the concept of Astroturfing — which “is the deceptive practice of hiding the sponsors of an orchestrated message or organization (e.g., political, economic, advertising, religious, or public relations) to make it appear as though it originates from, and is supported by, unsolicited grassroots participants.” This could simply be translated to this: it is a process where a top-down method of dissemination is falsely recognised or propagated as a bottom-up one. If we were to integrate this conceptual framework with what Nalin Mehta writes in Modi and the Camera: The Politics of Television in the 2002 Gujarat Riots — “For our purpose, John B. Thompson’s notion of ‘mediated communication’, where he taps into the hermeneutic tradition to postulate that individuals are not passive recipients of symbolic messages from the communication media, is also pertinent. Messages from the mass media are received in settings spatially and temporally remote from the original context of production and the recipient’s own assumptions and expectations regulate how they are interpreted and appropriated,” – we would understand why things are the way they happen to be.

Responses

The institutional / state response to most of these hate crimes have not been very appropriate, with an observable systemic apathy in the nature of action taken by the administration / police forces. Most Chief Ministers of the states in question have not addressed the rising  tensions within their respective states, instead focusing on urging for befitting replies and prices that need to be paid. The police have been no better, in most cases being entirely absent from the scenes of violence, in others being complicit in institutional violence.

Graph representing the response of police in respective cases of hate crimes

Out of 180 data entries that were made situations where it was
Unclear if there was a case filed: 135 cases
Institutional Violence: 7 cases
Appropriate / Immediate police action: 15 cases
Definitively no case filed: 6
Police took action that harmed the Muslim victim: 17 cases

Out of the 39 cases that had clear police involvement, 53% or 24 of those cases were ones where the police were complicit outright. The other thing to be mentioned here is in all the cases where we are dealing with unclear police involvement, we are unsure whether no case has been filed or whether attempts were made and then rejected.

The worst affected, however, have been Kashmiris and Kashmiri Muslims, in particular. Following the Pahalgam attack, surveillance has intensified in Kashmir. According to Kashmir Times, “In the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack, security forces have launched extensive operations across Kashmir, demolishing about a dozen houses using explosives and conducting widespread searches and detentions. At least 1500 people are said to have been detained. The demolitions have occurred in multiple districts including Pulwama, Shopian, Anantnag, Kupwara, and Bandipora”.  There have been multiple incidents of Kashmiri students being harassed in other states, creating an almost paranoid sense of hypervigilance among these individuals. Kashmiri businessmen have also found themselves in trouble, where selling their wares has become near-impossible within the current climate.

Mirza Waheed, writer born in Srinagar, Kashmir, wrote for The Guardian, “Kashmiris have never wanted to be a bone of contention between the two states; they have paid a staggeringly steep price for this 75-year relationship of attrition. Internally, Kashmir has never really been normal, despite the narrative push and despite the appearance of normality, scripted elsewhere and executed on the ground through a security-administrative complex. Underneath the quiet, there is growing resentment at what Kashmiris see as their incremental and cumulative dispossession and disempowerment, in the form of new domicile and land laws, and in the absence of any real representational politics. Human rights activists, journalists and politicians remain in jail under harsh anti-terror laws. Nobody is allowed to speak; surveillance is probably at its highest since the start of the armed insurgency in the late 1980s; a previously independent and robust press has almost entirely been forced into a supine, compliant role. Most accounts from Kashmir speak of suppressed anger at the growing powerlessness and the humiliating deprivation of agency. Many Kashmiris talk about dham, a quiet, bruising suffocation, with no space to breathe. That all this is fertile ground for militancy is hardly a surprise, whether local or Pakistan-sponsored.”

All seems to remain unwell, in the land of what has turned out to be the homeland of misdiagnosed glory and gore.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this graphic visualisation report has been worked on by Saptaparma Samajdar)

Sources

1. https://m.thewire.in/article/media/communalisation-pahalgam-reinforcing-anti-muslim-sentiment
2. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/29/traitors-hate-filled-songs-target-indian-muslims-after-kashmir-attack
3. https://muslimmirror.com/right-wing-media-channels-peddle-anti-muslim-narratives-after-pahalgam-attack/
4. https://www.deccanherald.com/india/uttarakhand/uttarakhand-cm-condemns-terror-attack-in-jks-pahalgam-3505295
5. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/kashmir-domicile-law-raises-fears-of-losing-land-culture-idUSKCN24T007/
6. https://www.amnesty.org.uk/blogs/country-specialists/five-years-silence-and-struggle-kashmir
7. https://article-14.com/post/-what-did-i-do-after-pahalgam-attack-kashmiri-students-in-at-least-4-northern-states-face-intimidation-threats-isolation–680b16d1a8d53
8. https://www.thehindu.com/education/pahalgam-attack-casts-a-shadow-over-jammu-and-kashmir-students-outside-state/article69531760.ece
9. https://www.dw.com/en/india-pakistan-conflict-risks-deepening-religious-tensions/a-72529635
10. https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400601031989
11. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/03/india-media-freedom-under-threat#:~:text=Amid%20growing%20restrictions%20on%20media,spyware%20Pegasus%20to%20target%20journalists.
12. https://cjp.org.in/role-of-the-media-how-hate-was-spread-in-2002-in-gujarat/

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However, an examination of the Court’s free speech jurisprudence in recent months reveals a disquieting pattern of contradiction and inconsistency. Alongside landmark judgments that have robustly defended expressive freedoms, there has emerged a parallel and conflicting stream of pronouncements, delivered through interim orders and expansive bail conditions. These orders have imposed sweeping prior restraints on speech, frequently without substantive reasoning and based on subjective assessments of morality or public sentiment. This trend represents a significant deviation from the Court’s larger constitutional role. It departs from established doctrines that demand a high threshold for restricting speech and, in doing so, fosters a climate of legal uncertainty. This analysis contends that this jurisprudential dissonance not only undermines the predictability of law but also creates a tangible “chilling effect” on public discourse, thereby weakening the very democratic fabric the Court is duty-bound to protect.

The doctrinal anchor: Article 19(1)(a) and the high bar for restriction

The Supreme Court’s traditional role as a bulwark for free expression is rooted in a series of foundational precedents. In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950), the Court established that the freedom of speech lies at the core of all democratic organizations. It held that any restriction must be evaluated from the perspective of its directness and proximity to the specified grounds in Article 19(2), such as public order or the security of the State. This principle evolved over decades, culminating in the landmark verdict in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015).

In Shreya Singhal, the Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, for being unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.[1] Crucially, it fortified the “incitement” standard, clarifying that speech can only be restricted when it rises to the level of “incitement to an offence.” This test requires a clear nexus between the expression and the likelihood of imminent lawless action. Mere advocacy, discussion, or even offensive and unpopular speech is constitutionally protected.[2] This judgment, along with the effective suspension of the colonial-era sedition law (Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code) in May 2022 due to its rampant misuse, represents the doctrinal high-water mark of free speech protection in India. Whether the Court should have suspended the provision or not, in the context of the discourse around judicial activism and overreach is a different debate.

These rulings firmly embody the Court’s constitutional role: to set clear, objective, and high standards for any State action that seeks to curtail expression. It is against this established doctrinal backdrop that the recent developments must be assessed.

The changing trajectory: Judicial paternalism and unreasoned restraints

The recent cases of Ranveer Allahabadia and Professor Ali Khan Mahmudabad serve as stark illustrations of a judicial approach that appears untethered from the principles laid down in Shreya Singhal.

In the matter involving podcaster Ranveer Allahabadia, the Court was approached for the consolidation of multiple First Information Reports (FIRs) filed against him for allegedly obscene content in an online show. While granting interim protection from arrest, the bench imposed a blanket, unreasoned gag order, prohibiting him from airing any shows on any platform. This order was a classic act of prior restraint, imposed without any adjudicatory finding that the content was, in fact, legally obscene. The Court’s oral remarks, condemning the language as “dirty” and “perverted” suggested a departure from objective legal analysis towards a subjective, moralistic critique. While this sweeping ban was later modified, it was conditioned on an undertaking that future content would “maintain the desired standards of decency and morality so that viewers of any age group can watch.” Such a condition is inherently vague and places the judiciary in the role of a super-censor, dictating amorphous “societal norms” for creative expression. This judicial paternalism (as Anmol Jain mentions it) stands in direct conflict with the principle that the Court’s role is to be a legal arbiter, not a moral guardian. Furthermore, the bench’s stated inclination to expand the scope of this proceeding to devise regulatory measures for online content signals a potential overstepping of the judicial function into the legislative domain.

Even more troubling is the case of Professor Ali Khan Mahmudabad, who faced multiple FIRs, including for sedition, over a Facebook post commenting on India’s recent military operation—Operation Sindhoor. The Supreme Court, while granting interim bail, imposed an exceptionally broad gag order, restraining him from expressing any opinion on the underlying conflict. It also directed the confiscation of his passport. Critically, the Court refrained from undertaking a prima facie analysis of whether the speech in question met the stringent incitement-to-violence threshold. It delegated the task of interpreting the “complexity of the phraseology” to a Special Investigation Team (SIT) of police officers. For this very broad set of restrictions to have been put, one would expect a deep reasoning as to why a person’s free speech is being restricted on this level for a simple Facebook post that has not incited any violence anywhere. However, the Court finds a way to not meet this reasonable expectation by giving a 2-page order. Not even a prima facie mentioning of the remarks or saying how they engaged with them is done by the Court. While it is a simple interim bail order, the restrictions placed on the petitioner warrant the reasoning, something that would not have been expected of the Court if not for the restrictions.

This raises a pertinent question. Does the Supreme Court not have the responsibility to be well reasoned it its order, especially in an order that curtails the freedom of speech of a person? In a democracy like India, the Court does have such responsibility.

These cases demonstrate a worrying departure from constitutional first principles. They prioritize executive concerns over individual liberty, impose prior restraints without robust reasoning, and apply vague, subjective standards of decency or propriety that are alien to the rigorous tests established in prior judgments.

The counter-Narrative: enduring fidelity to constitutional principles

The restrictive turn is, however, not a complete narrative. The Supreme Court has also delivered powerful judgments that reaffirm its commitment to free expression, creating a landscape of profound jurisprudential dissonance.

In Mohammed Zubair v. State of NCT of Delhi (2022), the Court was faced with a similar situation of multiple FIRs filed against a journalist for his tweets. The State explicitly requested a bail condition barring him from tweeting. The bench, which notably included one of the same justices as in the Allahabadia case, unequivocally rejected this plea. It reasoned that such a gag order would be a “disproportionate.” The Court declared that a blanket ban on expression could not be imposed as a condition of liberty.

Similarly, in Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat (2025), the Court quashed an FIR against a Member of Parliament over a poem alleged to have promoted disharmony. Justice Abhay S. Oka, writing for the bench, asserted that speech must be judged by the standards of a “strong-minded, firm and courageous” individual, not those of a “weak and oscillating” mind prone to taking offense.

These judgments stand as a testament to the enduring strength of the constitutional framework. They apply the high-threshold tests for restricting speech, reject the notion of pre-emptive gags as a routine measure, and refuse to entertain the “heckler’s veto” by protecting speech from the easily offended. Yet, their co-existence with the orders in Allahabadia and Mahmudabad creates an environment of acute legal uncertainty.

The chilling cascade: consequences of jurisprudential inconsistency

The primary casualty of this judicial inconsistency is the rule of law itself. When the country’s apex court applies contradictory principles to similar fact patterns, it becomes impossible for citizens, journalists, artists, and academics to predict the legal boundaries of permissible speech. This unpredictability is the very engine of the “chilling effect.” Expression is not only chilled by direct censorship but also by the fear that a legitimate, constitutionally protected opinion could be ensnared in a web of litigation, culminating in a restrictive gag order issued at the interim stage by the highest court itself.

This phenomenon has a cascading impact. When the Supreme Court imposes gag orders as bail conditions, it normalises such practices, signalling to lower courts and law enforcement agencies that these are acceptable tools for managing speech-related offenses. The result is a systemic shift where bail, a mechanism intended to secure liberty, is weaponised to curtail it. The core constitutional role of the Supreme Court is not merely to adjudicate disputes but to provide clear, consistent, and principled legal guidance for the entire nation by functioning as the supreme interpreter of the Constitution. By issuing contradictory pronouncements, the Court detours from this vital function, leaving a vacuum filled by uncertainty and fear. This leads to a public sphere characterized by self-censorship, where critical inquiry and challenging discourse are stifled, not by authoritarian laws, but by an unpredictable judiciary.

Conclusion: A call for constitutional reaffirmation

The Supreme Court of India stands at a critical juncture. The recent inconsistent rulings on free speech threatens to erode its legacy as the unwavering protector of fundamental rights. While landmark decisions continue to uphold the sanctity of Article 19(1)(a), the parallel trend of imposing ad-hoc, unreasoned, and paternalistic restrictions represents a significant deviation from its constitutional charter. This inconsistency is more than a mere academic curiosity; it has profound real-world consequences for the health of India’s democracy.

To restore constitutional equilibrium, the Court must return to a position of principled consistency. This requires a steadfast refusal to impose prior restraints without satisfying the highest standards of justification. It demands that all restrictions on speech be grounded in clear, reasoned orders that adhere to the established tests of necessity and proportionality. The judiciary must consciously resist the temptation to act as a moral arbiter, grounding its decisions in objective legal standards, not subjective notions of public taste.

The freedom of speech is too vital to be left to the vagaries of shifting judicial moods. The responsibility rests squarely with the Supreme Court to reaffirm its constitutional role, ensuring that the marketplace of ideas remains open and that its gavel serves to protect, not inadvertently gag, the diverse voices that animate the world’s largest democracy.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

[1] Para 98, (2013) 12 S.C.C. 73

[2] Ibid, Para 44

Related:

Free Speech Upheld: Bombay HC strikes down IT (Amendment) Rules, 2023 as unconstitutional

Judges differ on challenge against IT amendments of 2023, right to freedom of speech & expression hangs in balance

2023 Amendment to Broadcasting Rules are clear case of censorship nothing less: Justice GS Patel, Bombay HC

IT Rules 2023: Union Government can now flag content relating to any of its “businesses” as “misleading”

The post Mixed Messaging: Free speech jurisprudence from the Supreme Court appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Hindustan Times report triggers response

Sibal’s comments came in the wake of a June 9 Hindustan Times report which revealed that the Supreme Court had initiated preparations for an in-house inquiry against Justice Yadav — who allegedly made communal and Islamophobic remarks at a Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) event in December 2023 — but dropped the plan after receiving a categorical communication from the Rajya Sabha Secretariat asserting exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. Sources cited in the report claimed that then CJI Sanjiv Khanna had begun preliminary steps based on an adverse report from the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court, but halted the process following a letter from the Secretariat claiming that the matter was already under parliamentary consideration.

Sibal: “This is discriminatory and constitutionally perverse”

Sibal minced no words in calling out what he viewed as an institutional derailment of accountability. “This is very unfortunate and smacks of discrimination,” Sibal said during the press conference. “The in-house procedure has nothing to do with the impeachment motion. It’s an internal judicial process initiated by the Chief Justice of India to assess whether allegations warrant further action. By informing the Supreme Court that the motion was pending in the Rajya Sabha — despite it not even being admitted — the Chairman effectively paralysed the judiciary’s internal scrutiny mechanism.”

He reminded the public that the impeachment motion was submitted on December 13, 2024, bearing 55 signatures — more than the required 50 under the Judges (Inquiry) Act. Yet, he noted, the Rajya Sabha Secretariat has still not completed signature verification, nearly six months later.

“How long does it take to verify 55 signatures?” he asked. “Why is this process being deliberately delayed? Is the government trying to protect Justice Yadav, who is set to retire in early 2026?”

On Justice Yadav’s speech and Supreme Court’s role

Justice Yadav’s speech, delivered on December 8, 2023, at a VHP event, stirred nationwide controversy. During the speech, Justice Yadav declared that “this is Hindustan” and that the country must run according to the majority, while endorsing the Uniform Civil Code and making derogatory comparisons between Hindu and Muslim personal laws. His statements were widely seen as communal in nature. (Detailed report may be read here and here.)

Sibal pointed out that the Supreme Court had taken note of the speech and sought an explanation from Justice Yadav. The Allahabad High Court Chief Justice reportedly submitted a negative report, further warranting an in-house investigation. However, Sibal noted that after Rajya Sabha Chairperson Dhankhar told Parliament on February 13, 2025, that the matter should be left to Parliament, the Supreme Court backed off.

“This subversion of the in-house procedure — which exists precisely to safeguard constitutional standards in the judiciary — is deeply concerning,” said Sibal. “It shows that the Government and Parliament are stifling independent judicial mechanisms.”

Impeachment panel may be formed

A June 10 Indian Express report suggested that Rajya Sabha Chairman may now be considering constituting a committee to examine the charges against Justice Yadav. The report confirms that the signature verification process is still ongoing, and that one signature was duplicated due to a clerical error — though Opposition sources, according to the report, insist that the requisite number remains intact.

Dhankhar had earlier stated in Parliament on March 21 that two rounds of emails were sent to MPs for signature verification. “One member denied having signed, and his name appears twice,” Dhankhar had said, implying that further scrutiny was needed.

Opposition sources. According to the IE report, explained that multiple sets of representation papers had been prepared and circulated for the motion, and the duplication was a result of confusion — not fraud. “Even if one signature is invalid, there are still more than 50 valid ones. The threshold is met,” a source said.

Sibal warns against using in-house procedure to remove Justice Yashwant Varma

In an important aside, Sibal also raised serious concerns about reports that the Government is trying to remove Delhi High Court judge Justice Yashwant Varma using the findings of an in-house committee report, without invoking the Judges (Inquiry) Act. “If that is true, it’s completely unconstitutional. The in-house report is meant only for the CJI, not for executive action or removal proceedings,” he warned.

“This sets a dangerous precedent. If judges can be removed on the basis of in-house reports alone, judicial independence is in grave peril. There’s a constitutional process under Article 124 and the Judges (Inquiry) Act. Skipping that is a clear overreach by the executive,” Sibal asserted.

Targeting judiciary, shielding allies?

Sibal also took aim at Vice President Dhankhar’s selective outrage, referring to his recent criticism of the Supreme Court’s use of Article 142 in the Tamil Nadu Governor-Bill Assent matter. Dhankhar had accused the Supreme Court of treating Article 142 like a “nuclear missile” and questioned whether timelines could be imposed on constitutional authorities like the President and Governors.

“Today, we are talking about the same thing,” Sibal retorted. “No Court can force the Chairman to admit an impeachment motion within a certain timeline — but equally, the Chairman cannot use that discretion to permanently stall a constitutional process. Six months have passed without even verifying signatures. Is this constitutional silence — or constitutional sabotage?”

Legal and constitutional context

Under Article 124(4) of the Constitution, a Supreme Court judge can be removed for “proved misbehavior or incapacity” following a parliamentary inquiry and approval by a two-thirds majority in both Houses. The same provision applies to High Court judges via Article 218.

The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 sets out the procedure: at least 50 Rajya Sabha MPs or 100 Lok Sabha MPs must submit a notice for impeachment. Upon prima facie satisfaction, the Chairman/Speaker constitutes a three-member inquiry committee.

Sibal emphasised that the in-house mechanism developed by the Supreme Court is entirely independent of this process — it is an internal ethical accountability measure, not a substitute for impeachment, nor subordinate to Parliament.

Conclusion

Sibal’s remarks underscore deep concerns about political interference in judicial accountability mechanisms and what appears to be deliberate inertia in processing a serious impeachment motion. As Parliament prepares for the Monsoon Session on July 21, all eyes will be on whether Rajya Sabha Chairman Jagdeep Dhankhar finally takes forward the motion — or continues to allow what Sibal has described as a “dangerous constitutional standstill” to persist.

Related:

Does India have a lawfully established procedure on ‘deportation’, or are actions governed by Executive secrecy and overreach?

Justice Yadav, a sitting HC judge, and his speech at VHP event that was riddled with anti-Muslim rhetoric and majoritarian undertones

SC Collegium summons Allahabad HC Judge, Justice Shekhar Kumar Yadav over remarks on Muslims

Impeach the Judge, INDIA bloc set to move impeachment motion against HC judge who made communal hate-speeches

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