The incidents documented this month of September range from demands linked to the Mathura temple-mosque dispute and provocative religious sloganeering outside a mosque to warnings against alleged “infiltrators”, claims of Hindu demographic decline and repeated exhortations to acquire weapons. While the speakers and settings differ, the rhetoric follows recognisable patterns of exclusion and otherisation.

From a place of worship to a demand for its “liberation”

Location: Basti, Uttar Pradesh

Date: September 4

On the occasion of Krishna Janmashtami, Vishva Hindu Mahasangh leader Akhilesh Singh asserted that if those celebrating Janmashtami had taken an oath to celebrate it only after demolishing the mosque in Mathura, similar to the Babri Masjid, and “freeing” the temple, it would have been “freed” long ago. He claimed that Krishna had been imprisoned in a jail and that the temple had been occupied. He also announced a march for “Krishna Janmabhoomi” in October.

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On September 4 in Basti, Uttar Pradesh, Vishva Hindu Mahasangh leader Akhilesh Singh used the occasion of Krishna Janmashtami to invoke the Mathura mosque-temple dispute. He said that if those celebrating Janmashtami had taken an oath to celebrate it only after demolishing the mosque in Mathura, “like the Babri Masjid”, and “freeing” the temple, it would have been “freed” long ago. He also announced a march for “Krishna Janmabhoomi” in October.

The significance of this rhetoric lies in the transformation of a contested place of worship into a religious obligation. The mosque is not presented simply as a structure involved in an ongoing legal and political dispute. Its presence is rhetorically framed as an obstacle to the fulfilment of a Hindu religious claim.

The invocation of the Babri Masjid demolition is particularly concerning. A constitutional and legal dispute over a place of worship is thereby connected to a historical episode in which a mosque was demolished by a extremist mobilisation. The language of “liberation” further recasts the removal of a Muslim religious site as an act of religious restoration. This is one of the recurring mechanisms through which religious difference becomes exclusionary: a particular religious community is represented as occupying space that rightfully belongs to another.

When religious practice becomes a public assertion against Muslims

Location: Achalpur, Amravati, Maharashtra

Date: September 8

During a grand Kanwar Yatra organised by Jableshwar Baba Mitra Mandal, participants recited the Hanuman Chalisa and raised “Jai Shri Ram” slogans outside a mosque, with former MP Navneet Rana seen reciting the Hanuman Chalisa. The religious recitation and slogan-shouting reportedly led to brief communal tension, following which security was tightened in the area.

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A similar dynamic appeared in Achalpur, Amravati, on September 8, where participants in a Kanwar Yatra organised by Jableshwar Baba Mitra Mandal recited the Hanuman Chalisa and raised “Jai Shri Ram” slogans outside a mosque. Former MP Navneet Rana was seen participating in the recitation. The incident reportedly generated brief communal tension, after which security was increased.

When religious activity is deliberately performed outside another community’s place of worship and accompanied by slogans that have acquired a powerful political resonance, religion can cease to function merely as an expression of personal faith. It can become a public demonstration of dominance, particularly where the immediate setting is already communally sensitive. The issue, therefore, is not the Hanuman Chalisa itself. It is the use of religious symbolism in a setting where the identity of another religious community becomes part of the spectacle.

Constructing the Muslim as the outsider

Location: Howrah, West Bengal

Date: September 11

A Hindu nationalist speaker, defending religious preacher Dhirendra Shastri’s comment about banning non-vegetarian food from Durga Puja, warned that anyone who insulted a saint again would be “beaten so badly” that they would be unable to get up. He targeted those he termed “Bangladeshi infiltrators”, accusing them of disrespecting Bengali culture and vandalising Durga Puja pandals, breaking Saraswati idols, and setting fire to pandals. He named Muslim leaders from opposition parties and alleged that such people had “become Bengalis” and accused “intellectuals” of abusing Hindus who worship Durga and Saraswati. He claimed that efforts had begun in Bengal to get rid of this “drug” from their minds.

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In Howrah, West Bengal, on September 11, a Hindu nationalist speaker defending religious preacher Dhirendra Shastri’s remarks on non-vegetarian food during Durga Puja threatened that anyone who insulted a saint again would be “beaten so badly” that they would be unable to get up. The speech then moved from defending a religious figure to identifying an alleged enemy.

The speaker referred to people he described as “Bangladeshi infiltrators” and accused them of disrespecting Bengali culture, vandalising Durga Puja pandals, breaking Saraswati idols and setting fire to pandals. Muslim political leaders were named, while “intellectuals” were accused of abusing Hindus who worship Durga and Saraswati. This is a familiar form of otherisation: disparate questions of nationality, religion, culture, political affiliation and alleged criminality are collapsed into a single hostile category.

The label “Bangladeshi infiltrator” is particularly potent in this construction. It does not merely describe an alleged immigration status. In the speech, it becomes attached to a broader image of the Muslim as someone who does not belong to Bengal, does not respect its culture and is therefore positioned outside the legitimate social body. The result is a rhetorical equation in which defending Hindu religious culture is presented as requiring resistance to an allegedly Muslim threat.

From demographic anxiety to militarisation

Location: Rasdhan, Kanpur Dehat, Uttar Pradesh

Date: September 14

During a Ganesh Utsav program, far-right monk Madhuram Sharan Shiva, leader of the armed monks’ group Shiva Shakti Akhada, invoked Partition to claim that Hindus were again facing a similar “tragedy” because they were “weapon less.” He claimed that 10 lakh Hindus were killed during Partition and suggested that a similar number of “Miya” could have been killed had Hindus been armed. He contrasted Hindus’ worship of Ram with his killing of demons and urged Hindus to take up weapons to protect their religion. He also alleged that Hindus were converting to Christianity and Islam because they lacked knowledge of Hindu deities and religious teachings. He urged organisers to establish classes in temples to teach children aged 6–14 about Hindu deities, arguing that merely installing Ganesh idols was not enough to establish dharma.

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The speeches by far-right monk Madhuram Sharan Shiva across Uttar Pradesh in September took this logic further. At a Ganesh Utsav programme in Rasdhan, Kanpur Dehat, on September 14, Shiva invoked Partition to claim that Hindus were again facing a similar “tragedy” because they were “weapon less”. He referred to the deaths of Hindus during Partition and suggested that a comparable number of “Miya” could have been killed had Hindus been armed. He invoked Ram’s killing of demons and urged Hindus to take up weapons to protect their religion.

Location: Kanpur Nagar, Uttar Pradesh

Date: September 15

During a Ganesh Utsav program, far-right monk Madhuram Sharan Shiva, leader of the armed monks’ group Shiva Shakti Akhada, questioned why the Ganesh idol does not carry weapons and alleged that Hindus were gradually declining across the world because they had abandoned weapons. He claimed that religious scriptures are torn and places of worship destroyed when Hindus do not practise weapons training, asserting that “if there is knowledge of dharma and shaastra (religious scriptures), that knowledge is incomplete without weapons.”

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The following day, at another Ganesh Utsav programme in Kanpur Nagar, he questioned why the Ganesh idol did not carry weapons and argued that religious knowledge was incomplete without weapons.

Location: Makhi, Unnao, Uttar Pradesh

Date: September 16

During a Ganesh Utsav program, far-right monk Madhuram Sharan Shiva, leader of the armed monks’ group Shiva Shakti Akhada, fearmongered about the decline of the Hindu population, citing Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh and alleging that Hindu populations in nine states had fallen from around 90% to as low as 5–10%, leaving Hindus unable to organise religious events. He claimed that religious scriptures are torn and places of worship destroyed when Hindus do not practise weapons training, alleging that more than 500,000 temples were destroyed over 500 years. He questioned why “no god” came to protect temples when the Ram temple and Somnath temple were destroyed, arguing that Hindu religious teachings require Hindus to protect their own faith and that “without weapons, protection is impossible.” He urged Hindus to study their religious scriptures and become “dharma yoddhas,” declaring that those who carry weapons become “veers” (brave warriors).

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On September 16 in Makhi, Unnao, the rhetoric centred on alleged Hindu demographic decline. Shiva invoked Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh and made claims about the Hindu population having fallen dramatically in several Indian states. He also alleged that hundreds of thousands of temples had been destroyed over centuries and asked why Hindu gods had not protected temples such as the Ram temple and Somnath. His conclusion was that Hindus themselves must become “dharma yoddhas” and that protection of the faith was impossible without weapons.

The argument begins with fear. Hindus are portrayed as a community in demographic decline, surrounded by hostile forces and historically dispossessed of temples. That fear is then connected to a solution: Hindu unity, physical preparedness and weapons. Religion thus becomes not simply an identity but a justification for militarisation.

The invocation of Hindu gods and religious texts plays an important role in this process. Religious figures are selectively interpreted through the vocabulary of battle, while the distinction between spiritual instruction and physical confrontation is deliberately narrowed. The implied message is that to be a sufficiently committed Hindu, one must be prepared to defend the community against an identified adversary.

The making of an internal enemy

The rhetoric also repeatedly moves beyond an abstract “threat” to identify Muslims as the people against whom Hindu unity must be consolidated. That distinction matters. A speech about preserving one’s religion does not automatically constitute hate speech. But when religious preservation is constructed through the identification of another religious community as dangerous, disloyal, invasive or responsible for historical and contemporary grievances, religious identity becomes a mechanism of exclusion.

The September speeches repeatedly follow this trajectory. Muslims are represented variously as occupants of Hindu sacred spaces, cultural outsiders, demographic threats, political enemies or people against whom Hindus must physically organise. The vocabulary changes, but the underlying structure remains strikingly similar.

From “Hindu culture” to political ownership

Location: Dongri, Mumbai, Maharashtra

Date: September 23

During a Ganesh celebration, BJP MLA Nitesh Rane declared that India was a Hindu Rashtra and said that in Dongri he wanted to hear “Har Har Mahadev” and not “I Love Mohammed”, while describing the government as one based on Hindutva ideology. He also referred to Muslims as “green snakes” and said he would always stand with Hindus in disputes with Muslims.

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The September 23 incident in Mumbai brought this directly into electoral and political language. During a Ganesh celebration in Dongri, BJP MLA Nitesh Rane declared that India was a Hindu Rashtra and said that he wanted to hear “Har Har Mahadev” rather than “I Love Mohammed” in Dongri. He described the government as one based on Hindutva ideology, referred to Muslims as “green snakes” and said he would stand with Hindus in disputes involving Muslims. Here, religious identity is explicitly linked to political authority and territorial belonging.

Dongri is not merely a neighbourhood in this formulation. It becomes a symbolic site in which one religious expression is presented as belonging and another as something that should not be heard. The contrast between “Har Har Mahadev” and “I Love Mohammed” is particularly revealing. It converts religious expression into a test of communal ownership: one slogan is presented as appropriate to the space, while the other is implicitly marked as alien. The reference to Muslims as “green snakes” goes a step further by reducing an entire religious community to a dehumanising metaphor.

A recurring grammar of exclusion

Read individually, these incidents come from different contexts. Taken together, however, they reveal a recurring rhetorical grammar.

First step: Sacred injury- A mosque is presented as occupying a Hindu sacred site. A temple is described as having been destroyed. A religious figure is portrayed as having been insulted. Hindu festivals are presented as being under threat.

Second step: Collective identification- The alleged perpetrator is no longer an individual. “Muslims”, “Miya”, “Bangladeshi infiltrators” or an undefined Muslim political establishment become collective categories.

Third step: Invoke fear- The community is portrayed as demographically declining, culturally threatened, historically victimised or physically vulnerable.

Final step: Mobilisation- The proposed response ranges from marches and public religious assertions to demands for religious unity and, in the most extreme speeches, weapons training and physical confrontation.

This progression is important because hate speech does not always begin with an explicit call for violence. It can begin by changing how a community is imagined. A mosque becomes an encroachment. A Muslim becomes an outsider. A demographic change becomes an existential threat. A historical grievance becomes a present danger. Religious self-defence becomes a justification for arming. And eventually, violence or confrontation can be presented as the logical consequence of protecting the community.

Religion as an instrument of otherisation

The central issue running through these September incidents is therefore not religious belief itself. It is the political use of religious identity to divide the population into those who supposedly belong and those who supposedly threaten that belonging. Hindu festivals provide the setting. Temples and mosques provide the symbols. Religious figures provide moral authority. Historical episodes provide grievance. Demographic claims provide fear. Political slogans provide mobilisation. Muslims are repeatedly positioned at the other end of this construction.

This matters because constitutional secularism does not require citizens to abandon their religions. It requires the State and public institutions to recognise citizens as equal members of the political community regardless of religion. The danger in this rhetoric lies precisely in the opposite proposition: that religious identity determines who has a stronger claim to public space, cultural legitimacy or political belonging.

Related:

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The Kanwar Yatra: Between devotion and domination

From Statelessness to Citizenship: CJP helps Adori Bibi reclaim her Indian identity

Hate Watch: Jihad rhetoric, forced sloganeering mark UP-Uttarakhand week

Clashes, Slogans, Stone-Pelting: How Eid Milad processions turned tense across India

The post ‘Free the Temple’, ‘Protect the Faith’, ‘Take Up Weapons’: How September’s festivals became stages for anti-Muslim hate appeared first on SabrangIndia.

What led to the violent disruption of the reading circle on August 27 at the AUDA Garden in Vastrapur this year? Was it just the two books – ‘I Am Malala’ and ‘Anne Frank: The Diary of a Young Girl’ that provoked the violent mob led by the Bajrang Dal? Or was this part of a much larger pattern of violence in the Hindu version of Taliban where everything – from books, clothes, food, to films, comedy and protests – offends them?

More troubling is the role of a section of parents who brought in Bajrang Dal elements to “solve” their issues with the school management. Why would they willingly invite extremist hindutva elements into a school their wards studied in? While they sought to force changes in curriculum and administration, did these parents think that bringing in goons was the best way to do so?   

How it all started

The genesis of the reading circle was the decision of the Anand Niketan School, a private upmarket school in Ahmedabad to remove the books – the memoirs of Malala Yousafzai, the Pakistani education activist and Nobel Peace Prize winner and the diary of the German Jew and holocaust victim Anne Frank from its reading list after protests from a section of parents and right-wing groups.

But even before the books became the target of these parents and their rightwing supporters, a food safety issue at the school had pitted parents against the school administration. On August 12, a piece of glass was found in the canteen food, and the school authorities, rushed to get the student X-rayed to assure his parents that it was not swallowed.

The angry parents did not trust the report and soon the issue escalated. Other, unconfirmed reports said that a student had found worms in vegetables and   parents protested about eggs being cooked in the school canteen.

Target of Attack Shifted From Food to Books

The parents then chose to target a Muslim curriculum consultant who had been associated with the school for several years. They objected to the books ‘I Am Malala’ and ‘The Diary of a Young Girl’ being on the optional reading list. According to reports, some parents called Bajrang Dal members to fight the school administration on their behalf and on Aug 14, a mob led by Bajrang Dal leader Hiren Rabari climbed the gate and the boundary wall of the school to demand the removal of the books from the curriculum.

The issue snowballed from then on and the school administration decided to remove the books as well as terminate the contract of the consultant.

A young businessman in the city found the controversy over the books troubling and wanted to organise a silent reading in protest. He reached out to core members of the Students and Youth Collective (SYCA), Ahmedabad, and the collective co-organised the reading.

Violent Disruption of a Peaceful Reading

 The reading went on peacefully from 4 p.m. to about 6:15 p.m. at a park near the DEO office in Vastrapur. Around 6:30, as the group was dispersing, about 40 men entered the park shouting “Jai Shree Ram” and carrying thick wooden sticks, metal rods and baseball bats. Some wore saffron scarves. They had left more sticks outside the park, near the entrance.

Their body language was aggressive from the start, and the first thing they objected to was I Am Malala, though we also had books on Sardar Patel, Gandhi, Nehru and Ambedkar. They shouted, “Kya bola tha Malala ne Kashmir ke baare mein?” and “Usko padhne wale desh drohi hain.”

I was standing a little behind the group, filming. Two of them were staring at me, and I asked, “Kya hai, ghoor kyun rahe ho?” They said, “Tujhe dikkat hai to bahar chali ja, humein jo karna hai hum karenge.” Another said, “Zyada bolegi to pakad lo isko.” A second woman who was recording was told, “Kal tak gayab kar denge tujhe.” The man who appeared to be leading the mob gave his name: Hiren Rabari.

I could see this would turn violent quickly. A call was made to the police helpline. Some people tried to sit the men down and talk calmly, but they had no interest in a dialogue. To buy time, some of the readers began singing the national anthem; the attackers objected to that too, claiming one person’s shoulders had moved and that this was disrespect!

Then they began pushing and beating people. They shouted, “Inke pant utar ke check karo ye Musalman hai ki nahin.” Two or three ran towards the gate and tried to shut it so no one could come in to help. I ran over and stood there so they could not, shouting, “Aapki private property nahi hai ye, jo darwaza band kar sakte ho.”

By then, they were chasing people down the street in separate groups. It was about 7 p.m., peak office hours, and the street was full of people walking and riding two-wheelers. Residents of Casa Vyoma, the society directly opposite the park, were also watching.

Despite telling the police that the mob had assembled in large numbers, only two policemen arrived in a van — one in uniform, the driver in casuals. When the officer in uniform tried to stop the assault, the attackers beat him too, in front of everyone. No one watching said or did anything.

A man came up asking questions, giving the impression that he might be able to help. In my panic, I told him we had been reading books silently and that Bajrang Dal goons had come and started hitting us. He immediately began shouting, “Aeee, gunda kisko bola?” I said, “Jo dande leke aayega aur pitai karega wo gunda hi hai,” and he turned aggressive himself, advancing on me and repeating the question multiple times.

Another woman was hit with a stick. I saw that a friend was being beaten and ran towards him. By then, the police officer was panicking and instructing us to get into the van. We tried, but the attackers kept pulling my friends back out and slapping them. Both policemen looked badly shaken. “Kaise bhi jaldi baitho van mein, hum tumhe police station le ja rahe hain. Yahan ruke to ye log tumhe maar dalenge,” they said.

We reached Vastrapur police station. Others arrived with the books, and with sticks left behind in the park to show both the range of what we had been reading and the weapons used. We gathered in one room and began explaining the sequence of events. The PI, G M Chaudhary, spoke to us but did not pay attention to the details.

She watched some of the videos we had taken and asked the writer to record our statement, who wrote a single summary paragraph that left out everything specific. Seeing this, we said we would give a written complaint instead of an oral one. Some lawyers and senior activists had reached the station by then. We went over the draft several times, since each detail could determine a corresponding criminal charge.

We gave Hiren Rabari’s name. We had also identified some other attackers by matching our videos to their Instagram accounts — after Bajrang Dal Gujarat’s official account posted a video of the attack, boasting that they had taught us a lesson in their own language. The algorithm began pushing similar accounts to us, and we identified another attacker as Jimit Rabari.

The police brought three young attackers to the station, and they sat in the same space as us, quite casually. Soon, more of them began arriving, as though they were sitting in a park. It was very intimidating and triggering. We recognised at least 20 to 25 of their faces from the park. Two or three senior Bajrang Dal men came to the station and spoke to the PI for a long time behind a closed door.

Unlike the businessman, who had protested for the first time in his life, perhaps the rest of us did not look gullible. The PI shrewdly took him aside, recorded his statement — which again left out crucial details from our written complaint — and persuaded him to sign it. The rest of us, the primary complainants, witnesses and informants, were left out of the FIR process without our consent.

The PI kept saying she would match the details later, that she needed to eat, that she wanted to go home. We left the station at 2:15 a.m. The FIR, without the details we had been promised, was uploaded at 3 a.m., and, based on the messages we received in response, all three of those arrested were released at the same time.

No arrests, no further police action against the mob

There have been no arrests since. We filed an additional complaint setting out the differences between our written complaint and the FIR, had it inwarded from the DCP office and met the DCP Harshadkumar Patel, who said action would be taken within a week. Nothing followed. We were attacked on 27th August. On 31st, we held a press conference demanding the arrest of the two primary accused, Hiren Rabari and Jimit Rabari, within 72 hours; a ban on Bajrang Dal in Gujarat and across India; and a response and apology from Home Minister Harsh Sanghvi for failing to protect us and to deliver justice.

Twenty days on, we are still waiting. We hold responsible not only Bajrang Dal, the state government and the police — for a grave violation of our safety, for rioting, and inciting religious violence — but also the section of Anand Niketan parents and the people on the street, who have let Gujarat become a factory of hate and crime over the decades. These elements have given complete impunity to state-sponsored terrorism and culture wars.

These are the people who countenance violence against Muslims and Dalits every Navratri, or behave with cowardice and hypocrisy even when their own friends are attacked by saffron-clad men. These are the Brahmin and Jain men who eat meat in private while the administrators of their children’s school claim “all the students are strictly vegetarian.” They laugh at cheap jokes on caste, gender and class. They laugh at pronouns and the Palestinian flag and blame reservation for everything.

However, there is a pushback. The reading circle itself had emerged as a coming together of two groups -one led by students and the other, by working professionals – who were undoubtedly part of privileged castes and classes and would have been otherwise invested in the status quo of a post-2002 pogrom model of a “rising” Gujarat.

What follows now is a contest between the collusion of these elite hate mongers and the persistence of not-so-privileged young people who refuse to be cowed by political and social violence. We won’t be silenced!

*(The writer, who prefers to remain anonymous, was a participant in the reading circle and a witness to the violent mob’s disruption of it.)

Courtesy: Free Speech Collective

The post Anatomy of a Censoring Mob Threatened by Book Reading in Public appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Uttar Pradesh & Uttarakhand, June 28 – July 5, 2026

Chronology of Incidents

June 28- Ilaichipur, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh

BJP MLA for Loni, Nandkishore Gurjar at the inauguration of local development projects is seen addressing a large crowd stating that 99 percent of Indian Muslims were originally Hindus. He added that those who were “weak” converted while those who were “strong” fought “demons” rather than convert.

This was not an isolated incident during the reporting period. Gurjar was also implicated in another hate speech delivered on July 3, which will be listed down in the chronology. (See incident number 6)

CJP is dedicated to finding and bringing to light instances of Hate Speech, so that the bigots propagating these venomous ideas can be unmasked and brought to justice. To learn more about our campaign against hate speech, please become a member. To support our initiatives, please donate now!

Incidentally, two hate speeches in 2025 according to IHL’s report traces directly to Gurjar. On March 17,  2025 in Loni, Uttar Pradesh, Gurjar referred to Muslims as “demons” and “beasts” while glorifying the demolition of Babri mosque. On April 26, he administered an oath to protest attendees, urging them to identify and expel all those who “support Pakistan,” referring to them as “topiwallas,” “jihadis,” and “Rohingya Bangladeshis.”

In addition to this documented history of communal speeches, Association for Democratic Reforms records show that Gurjar has multiple criminal cases in which charges have been framed, including:

• IPC Section 295: Injuring or defiling a place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class.
• IPC Section 436: Mischief by fire or explosive substance with intent to destroy a house or other property.
• IPC Section 332: Voluntarily causing hurt to deter a public servant from the discharge of duty.
• IPC Section 506: Criminal intimidation.
• Three charges under IPC Section 147: Rioting.
• Two charges under IPC Section 148: Rioting while armed with a deadly weapon.
• Two charges under IPC Section 353: Assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from the discharge of duty.
• IPC Section 427: Mischief causing damage.
• IPC Section 504: Intentional insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace.

All of this taken together indicates a recurring pattern of inflammatory public statements—often a precursor to targeted violence- alongside a long-standing record of criminal proceedings.

June 29– Champawat, Uttarakhand

Chief Minister of Uttarakhand, Pushkar Singh Dhami, at a Mukhya Sevak Samvad outreach event, Dhami credited his government with implementing the state’s amended anti-conversion law, running Operation Kalnemi, and “freeing” over 12,000 acres of government land from what he called “land jihad.” He also invoked “love jihad,” “thook jihad” (spit jihad) and “mazar jihad” (shrine jihad), calling them anti-social and anti-national. He further accused the political opposition of appeasement politics for opposing action against “illegal” encroachments and mazars (Muslim shrines).

https://www.facebook.com/hindutvawatchIn/videos/location-champawat-uttarakhanddate-june-29at-the-mukhya-sevak-samvad-program-chi/1751173735881458/

This rhetoric is a verbatim repetition of Dhami’s script which he has used in at least half a dozen recorded speeches since 2024 in Haridwar, Dehradun, Chamoli and Sagar. Reported by The Quint and Deccan Herald.

According to IHL, Dhami has “emerged as the most prolific hates speech actor in 2025, with 71 speeches.”

“CM Dhami and his colleagues frequently invoked the anti-Muslim conspiracies of “love jihad,” “land jihad,” and “spit jihad” alongside fear-mongering about demographic change,” the report states.

June 30– Dehradun, Uttarakhand

A Vishwa Hindu Parshad-Bajrang Dal leader Vikas Verma, at a weekly Hanuman Chalisa gathering cited an unverified case of Hindu students allegedly forced to remove their tilak, kalava and janeu at school. He accused Christianity and Islam of long targeting Sanatan Dharma and welcomed Uttarakhand’s dissolution of the Madrasa Board as he alleged madrasas teach students that non-Muslims are “kafirs” who should be beheaded. He also claimed that those who choose to educate from madrasas will not hesitate to practise terrorism.

Verma has delivered near-identical claims about mosques, madrasas and “anarchists” at the same weekly event before. Im May this year, he also led a right-wing group to a prominent footwear showroom in Dehradhun and a clip was circulated where they were purportedly seen selectively confronting Muslim staff and even snatching their name tags and writing “jihadi” on it.

An investigation published by The Wire found Dehradun Bajrang Dal members running dedicated social-media pages built around similar content.

June 30– Loni, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh

Hindu Raksha Dal leader Sunny Bajrangi, at a Hanuman Chalisa event called “love jihad” a “termite” eating away at Hindu society. He alleged “jihadis” hide their identity to trap Hindu women, and warned that demographic change would become unstoppable within 20 years unless Hindus unite.

July 1- Domariaganj, Siddharthnagar, Uttar Pradesh

Former BJP MLA Raghvendra Pratap Singh at an event marking Shyama Prasad Mukherjee’s birth anniversary said “love jihad” was rising rapidly and cited an unverified ‘kidnapping’ allegation of a Hindu woman against a “Mulla.” Singh urged BJP workers to watch for “vidharmi” (heretic/anti-faith) and “kukarmi” (evildoer) elements. He also called for scrutiny of Christian missionary activity.

https://www.instagram.com/reel/DaavObxMIgW/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igsh=NTc4MTIwNjQ2YQ==

In February 2022, a report by Citizens for Justice and Peace documented two FIRs for hate speech against Singh. CJP quoted far more extreme past remarks, including threats to “get their blood tested” against Hindus who did not vote for him. Read the report here.

July 3- Loni, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh

The incident again implicates Nandkishore Gurjar, the BJP MLA for Loni who was also the perpetrator in the current reported incident 1. At the inauguration of a road-widening project, Gurjar called Muslims “pigs” and a “disease.” He praised a village for barring any “jihadi” from settling there, and said hospitals now stood where   these “pigs” once roamed. He warned residents against renting warehouses to “Bangladeshis” and vowed to drive them out.

https://www.instagram.com/reel/Dad_ttrsEyL/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igsh=NTc4MTIwNjQ2YQ==

Ten months earlier, in September 2025, Gurjar was filmed at a yoga event in Baghpat saying, “Swines and Bangladeshi Rohingyas are being settled here, and they will ruin the country.”

July 4- Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh

Vimlesh Sharma of the Shri Ram Sanatan Seva Samiti and the Gau Raksha Dal along with a group of 15-20 men confronted a Muslim man over alleged remarks about a cow. In the video, they are seen repeatedly slapping and hurling abuses at him as he tries to offer an explanation. The group dragged him to a shed, and forced him to kneel and touch a calf’s legs and later chants “Jai Shri Ram.” Sources also document that he was forced to drink cow urine.

Location:Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh, India ,
According to reports, Vimlesh Sharma, State President of the Shri Ram Sanatan Seva Samiti, along with members of the Gau Raksha Dal, allegedly assaulted a Muslim man after accusing him of making objectionable remarks about a cow.

The… pic.twitter.com/BFPrrT5Ik1

— Rising Falcon (@TheRFTeam) July 5, 2026

The Siasat Daily also reports that the Hindutva group’s own Instagram post accused the man of threatening a violent, blood-soaked Holi.

In a video posted on X, Vimlesh Sharma justified the assault by alleging that the victim had abused their mothers and sisters and mocked their dietary practices, stating that these actions prompted the group to respond as they did.

Location: Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh

Vimalesh Sharma, the state president of Shri Ram Sanatan Seva Samiti, released a video in which he said that he beat a Muslim man accused of making offensive remarks about cows and forcibly made him drink cow urine. https://t.co/K8zCAB2L17 pic.twitter.com/eYt8ux4M8Q

— The Muslim (@TheMuslim786) July 7, 2026

According to media reports, the Public Relations Officer (PRO) of the Barabanki Superintendent of Police stated that the police were unaware of the incident.

Congress MP Syed Naseer Hussain has condemned such acts of forced religious worship and described it as “deeply disturbing.”

The assault and humiliation of a Muslim man in Barabanki, including forcing him to perform religious acts against his will, is deeply disturbing. Such acts are not expressions of faith but crimes that violate human dignity and the Constitution.

When vigilante groups believe they… pic.twitter.com/jq7Hlgb0Ki

— Dr Syed Naseer Hussain, M P (@NasirHussainINC) July 4, 2026

July 5- Kaintholi, Tehri Garhwal, Uttarakhand

One, Amit Thapliyal along with a few associates stopped a Christian Sunday prayer meeting, asserting that Hinduism is the village’s only permitted religion. Thapiyal accused attendees of attending for payment, and told them to surrender their Scheduled Caste (SC) reservation benefits if they wished to practice Christianity.

Assessment

No reports of any FIR or case registered has emerged against any of these incidents. Most, in fact, were not found reported in mainstream media at the time of writing. This unfortunately is evidence if such were needed of the cavalier and casual manner in which legacy and mainstream media treats such hate speech; avoidance of which allows for a continued prevalence of a culture of impunity. However, the videos show a pattern of anti-minority mobilisation that is consistent with established scholarship on communal politics, majoritarian nationalism, and hate speech in India. They demonstrate how political rhetoric, vigilante action, and symbolic performances of dominance reinforce one another to construct religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Christians, as threats to the nation, culture, and social order.

The incidents are examples of moral panic and conspiracy framing in which minority communities are portrayed as engaging in coordinated efforts to undermine the demographic, territorial, or cultural integrity of the Hindu majority. This assessment is not to paint any one community as total saints and another as perpetrators. However, such rhizomatic organisation and hate speech by creating an atmosphere of perceived threat only legitimises exceptional state action and public hostility.  They create an imagined internal enemy whose existence justifies exclusionary politics.

The repeated and exhausting invocation of various forms of ‘jihad,’ portrayal of Muslims as ‘Bangladeshis,’ or ‘swines,’ disruption of Christian prayer meetings, and performative humiliation by asking someone to forcefully chant a religious slogan suggest diffusion of a shared ideological repertoire of how political authority and vigilante mobilisation reinforce one another.

Importantly, 3 out of 8 incidents have been attributed to a sitting Chief Minister and an MLA. This convergence of official political speech and vigilante action is a significant feature of democratic backsliding and ethno nationalism. Uttarakhand held municipal elections on June 9, 2026, and Uttar Pradesh has delayed its three-tier panchayat elections, with voter-list work underway through the summer of 2026 across nearly 58,000 gram panchayats

But a similar language appearing across chief ministerial speeches, local political leaders, and organisations such as the Bajrang Dal, Hindu Raksha Dal, and cow-protection groups suggests the diffusion of a shared ideological repertoire. One that is unconstitutional. However, such language has frequently been used, even at a national level, including from the head of government.

The trajectory of hate speech leading up to the 2024 General Elections has been documented by India Hate Speech Monitor. It can be accessed here.

Several of these incidents cannot be separated from a broader, well-documented campaign. Since May 2025, Indian authorities have detained and, in many cases, summarily expelled thousands of people to Bangladesh, a substantial number of them Bengali-speaking Indian Muslims with valid citizenship documents. UP has seen its own share of wrongful detentions of West Bengal migrant workers holding valid Aadhaar and voter identification.

In Uttrakhand, disruption of prayer meetings is documented. In July 2024, an 11-person FIR followed a mob attack on a Dehradun prayer meeting that vandalised a crucifix.

Uttarakhand: Hindutva mob attacks Christian prayer meet in Dehradun. A group of Hindutva ‘activists’ barged into the house and assaulted people including women present inside, Forcefully entered inside the house and vandalised a Christian cross, prayer room and bedroom, made… pic.twitter.com/BLD7vbXp2Y

— Mohammed Zubair (@zoo_bear) July 16, 2024

Similarly, in May 2022 in Purola,Uttarakhand a prayer meeting was stormed by an armed group. The coercive demand to renounce SC reservation status is a recognisable feature of this genre nationally. However, the groups are also apprehensive of forced-conversion practices.

Sections 196 and 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 penalises promoting disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will. This is the only remedy for hate speech between religious, racial, linguistic or regional groups. The maximum sentence is three years, rising to five if the act occurs at a place of worship or religious ceremony.

However, the structural problem, independent of any single case, is enforcement and conviction rates. In May this year, the Supreme Court said that separate guidelines for heat speech were unnecessary. This climb-down by the apex court to its own earlier interventionist directions and orders around such mobilisations is also a sign of institutional disregard to a culture of growing anti-minority public rhetoric. A detailed analysis on the Supreme Court’s final judgement on the issue may be read here and here.

According to IHL, documented 1,318 hate speech events nationally in 2025, roughly four events a day, with 98 percent targeting Muslims either alone or alongside Christians.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

Related:

Targeted as ‘Bangladeshis’: The hate speech fuelling deportations

A Targeted Campaign: The orchestrated crackdown on Bengali Migrants and the rising pushback from courts, Bengal government, and civil society

India Hate Lab Report 2025: How Hate Speech has been normalised in the public sphere

The post A week of anti-minority hate that grips UP-Uttarakhand appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Released by the Washington D.C.-based Centre for the Study of Organized Hate (CSOH), the report, Profiting from Hate Music, examines what researchers describe as the rapidly expanding ecosystem of Hindutva pop music, or “H-Pop”—a genre that combines devotional, nationalist and popular musical styles with rhetoric targeting Muslims and Christians. According to the report, this music is no longer confined to fringe corners of the internet. Instead, it is thriving across some of the world’s largest technology platforms, generating millions of views, streams and shares while simultaneously producing revenue for creators and, indirectly, the platforms themselves.

Authored by journalist Kunal Purohit, whose book H-Pop: The Secretive World of Hindutva Pop Stars further documented the rise of the genre, along with CSOH researchers Tavishi and Hamaad Meer, the report presents itself as the first comprehensive effort to map the scale, reach and monetisation of hate music in India. Supported through a grant from the Human Rights Foundation, the study argues that major technology companies are not merely hosting such content but are enabling its amplification and profitability despite maintaining public policies against hate speech and incitement.

At the heart of the report lies a stark claim: online platforms have become critical infrastructure for the production, dissemination and monetisation of music that allegedly promotes hatred, dehumanisation and violence against religious minorities.

Over a year before Kunal Purohit’s H-Pop… was released on November 22, 2023, on October 10, 2022 Citizens for Justice and Peace was among the first to conduct its own investigation into YouTube and other platform’s promotion of hate lyrics. Hate through music, lyrics and visuals: Hindutva pop. CJP’s The online eco-system hosts a plethora of videos peddling hate may be read here. Four months before that, in June 2022, Caravan had also done its own investigation into Hindutva’s hate music: Hindu Rashtra OST authored by Samriddhi Sakuniya that can be read here. The CSOH’s recent report is then a logical, research driven extension to earlier work done that exposed this further capture of ‘culture’ by the majoritarian far right.

From white supremacist rock to Hindutva pop

The report situates Hindutva hate music within a broader global history of extremist music cultures. Researchers trace parallels with white power music in Europe and the United States, particularly the rise of white supremacist bands in the 1980s that used music as a vehicle for recruitment, radicalisation and political mobilisation. Similar patterns, the report notes, have emerged in other contexts, including Rwanda and Myanmar, where music was used to reinforce ethnic and religious hostility before or during periods of violence.

According to the authors, Hindutva pop has evolved into a distinctly Indian manifestation of this phenomenon. Unlike conventional devotional music, these songs frequently depict Muslims and Christians as enemies, invaders, traitors or existential threats. The report argues that many songs go beyond ideological messaging and explicitly advocate discrimination, exclusion, boycotts or violence.

The researchers further link the growth of the genre to broader political and social developments in India, including increasing incidents of anti-minority hate speech and communal polarisation. Citing data from India Hate Lab, the report notes that hate speech incidents documented in India increased dramatically in recent years, providing a social and political backdrop against which Hindutva music has flourished.

Importantly, the report does not portray these songs as isolated cultural products. Rather, it argues that they form part of a larger ecosystem in which music is used during religious processions, political gatherings, social media campaigns and community mobilisation efforts. Several incidents of communal tension and violence, the report notes, have involved processions playing songs containing anti-Muslim themes or violent rhetoric.

Building a database of hate music

One of the report’s most significant contributions is methodological. Rather than relying on anecdotal examples, the researchers spent a year building what they describe as a comprehensive database of Hindutva hate music across multiple platforms.

The study examined four major platforms: YouTube, Spotify, Apple Music and Meta’s Music Library, which powers audio used in Instagram Reels. Before identifying songs, researchers first analysed each platform’s published policies governing hate speech, incitement to violence and discriminatory content. These policies then became the framework through which songs were assessed.

Data collection occurred between January 2025 and January 2026 and involved multiple research techniques. Researchers conducted keyword searches in English and Hindi, monitored social media accounts of prominent Hindutva influencers, reviewed footage of religious processions and tracked channels and creators repeatedly associated with such music. Songs identified through one platform were subsequently traced across others to determine their broader distribution.

The resulting database contains 523 songs that researchers concluded violated the content policies of at least one platform. These songs were then categorised according to the type of violation involved, including direct incitement to violence, dehumanisation, promotion of supremacist beliefs and other forms of hateful content.

The researchers also tested platform accountability by reporting a sample of songs and tracking platform responses over several months. In addition, they investigated how creators and platforms monetised such content through advertising, subscriptions, and fan funding and other revenue streams.

A vast digital ecosystem

The report’s findings suggest that hate music is not confined to a few isolated uploads but forms a substantial and highly visible digital ecosystem. Across the four platforms studied, researchers identified 523 songs that they argue violate platform policies. Of these, 210 were found on YouTube, 109 on Spotify, 103 within Meta’s Music Library, and 101 on Apple Music.

The scale of engagement documented in the report is striking. The YouTube songs alone accumulated more than 198 million views, while songs available through Meta’s Music Library were used in over 5.9 million Instagram Reels. Researchers argue that the actual audience exposure is likely far greater because each Reel can be viewed, shared and recommended repeatedly through Instagram’s algorithmic systems.

Perhaps most significantly, the report concludes that roughly half of all identified songs contain explicit calls for violence. Researchers found that 263 of the 523 songs directly threatened, encouraged or glorified violence against religious minorities, while the remaining songs primarily relied on dehumanisation, conspiracy theories, derogatory stereotypes and other forms of hateful rhetoric.

According to the report, Muslims were overwhelmingly the primary targets. Many songs promoted familiar Hindu nationalist narratives, including allegations of “love jihad,” demographic replacement theories, claims that Muslims pose an existential threat to Hindu society, and demands that India be transformed into an explicitly Hindu nation.

The researchers argue that these narratives do not merely express political opinions but function as tools of radicalisation. By repeatedly portraying minorities as enemies, traitors or invaders, the music allegedly normalises hostility and creates conditions in which discrimination and violence become easier to justify.

YouTube: The largest hub

Among all platforms studied, YouTube emerged as the most significant repository of Hindutva hate music. The report identified 210 allegedly violative songs uploaded across 100 channels with a combined subscriber base exceeding 76 million. Researchers found that nearly half of these songs contained direct threats or calls for violence against Muslims.

Particularly notable was the concentration of content among a relatively small number of channels. According to the report, three channels alone accounted for more than 40 percent of the identified songs. Despite repeatedly hosting content that researchers argue violates YouTube’s own hate speech policies, these channels allegedly remained active, verified and monetised.

The report further argues that YouTube’s own systems may be helping such content spread. Researchers note that the platform automatically generates videos for music tracks even when creators do not upload visual content, thereby ensuring additional visibility for songs distributed through music services.

Spotify, Meta and Apple: A pattern across platforms

While YouTube accounted for the largest number of allegedly violative songs, the report argues that the problem extends well beyond video-sharing platforms. Researchers found what they describe as a consistent pattern across Spotify, Meta’s Music Library and Apple Music, with songs containing anti-Muslim hate speech, conspiracy theories and incitement to violence remaining available despite each platform maintaining policies that prohibit such content.

The report argues that this demonstrates a systemic moderation failure rather than isolated lapses in enforcement. Although each platform adopts different approaches to content moderation and community standards, the researchers contend that all four companies continue to host content that appears to violate their own published rules.

Spotify: Hate music available beside mainstream artists

Spotify, the world’s largest music streaming platform, hosts 109 songs that the report argues violate its Platform Rules. Researchers found that 51 of these songs explicitly praise or encourage violence against Muslims, while 44 others promote hatred, dehumanisation or harmful stereotypes directed at the community.

According to the report, Spotify’s own rules prohibit content that promotes hatred or violence against protected groups based on characteristics including religion. Yet researchers argue that songs encouraging violence against Muslims, promoting the “love jihad” conspiracy theory, or portraying religious minorities as enemies of the nation remained easily accessible through ordinary searches.

The report also highlights Spotify’s recommendation architecture. Unlike traditional music stores where users actively purchase specific tracks, streaming services recommend songs, playlists and artists based on listening behaviour. Researchers argue that this recommendation system can inadvertently increase the reach of extremist content once a listener engages with similar material.

Another concern identified is the coexistence of such songs alongside mainstream music. The report argues that users do not encounter these tracks in isolated corners of the platform; instead, they exist within the same searchable ecosystem as Bollywood music, devotional songs and popular commercial artists, making discovery significantly easier.

Instagram Reels and Meta’s Music Library: Turning hate into viral content

Perhaps the report’s most striking findings concern Meta’s Music Library, the catalogue of licensed music available to users creating Instagram Reels. Researchers identified 103 songs within Meta’s music catalogue that they argue violate the company’s Hate Speech Community Standard. Of these, 46 songs actively encourage or incite violence against Muslims, while another 57 use abusive language, slurs or dehumanising rhetoric targeting the community.

What makes Meta’s ecosystem particularly significant, the report argues, is the extraordinary scale of amplification. Rather than simply existing as songs available for listening, these tracks have been incorporated into more than 5.9 million Instagram Reels, transforming music into a reusable soundtrack for millions of user-generated videos.

Researchers contend that every Reel using a hate song effectively creates another distribution channel for the underlying message. Since Instagram’s recommendation algorithm actively promotes short-form videos beyond a creator’s followers, songs embedded in viral Reels can rapidly reach audiences far larger than those who might deliberately search for the original track.

The report provides numerous examples illustrating this phenomenon. One of the most widely circulated songs documented is “Bharat Ka Bacha Bacha Jai Shri Ram Bolega.” According to the report, the song had already been used in over 730,000 Instagram Reels. Researchers note that some individual Reels featuring the song accumulated millions of views, vastly exceeding the reach of the original audio itself. One Reel showing a DJ performing the song before a large public audience reportedly received over 5.7 million views and hundreds of thousands of likes.

Similarly, the song “Gau Mata“, which the report says contains anti-Muslim slurs and threats of violence, had been used in more than 40,000 Instagram Reels. Researchers observed that many of these videos were posted by self-described cow vigilante groups or supporters, often depicting vehicle chases, confrontations or assaults involving alleged cattle transporters while the song played in the background.

Another frequently used track, “Bhagwa Se Dar Lagta Hai Toh Bharat Chod Do,” had reportedly been used in over 104,000 Reels by May 2026. The report documents examples where the song accompanied videos of Ram Navami processions, saffron flag displays and other communal imagery, with individual Reels reaching hundreds of thousands of viewers.

The report argues that Meta’s music catalogue effectively allows hateful audio to be endlessly repurposed, giving songs an afterlife far beyond their original release.

Apple Music: Minimal hate speech standards

Among the four platforms examined, researchers identify Apple Music as having the least detailed public standards specifically addressing hate speech. Unlike YouTube, Meta and Spotify, Apple does not publish an extensive standalone hate speech policy governing music content. Instead, the company requires artists to comply with local laws, cultural sensitivities and general standards of appropriateness.

Applying Indian legal standards as well as the report’s analytical framework, researchers identified 101 songs on Apple Music that they argue should not remain available. Several songs promote the discredited conspiracy theory of “love jihad,” alleging that Muslim men systematically target Hindu women for religious conversion. The report notes that the Government of India itself informed Parliament in 2020 that the term has no legal basis, yet multiple songs continue to invoke it as an established fact while encouraging hostility against Muslims.

Researchers also criticise Apple’s moderation of album artwork. According to the report, several songs employ imagery that reinforces anti-Muslim narratives, including depictions of veiled Muslim women intended to portray interfaith relationships or Islamic identity as inherently threatening.

The report argues that visual imagery, combined with inflammatory lyrics, contributes to a broader ecosystem of communal propaganda rather than functioning merely as artistic expression.

Violence is not an exception—it is a central theme

One of the report’s most significant conclusion concerns the nature of the content itself. Researchers argue that violent rhetoric is not confined to a handful of fringe songs but constitutes one of the defining characteristics of the Hindutva pop ecosystem.

Across platforms, they found:

• 104 YouTube songs containing explicit violent themes targeting minorities;
• 51 Spotify songs praising or encouraging violence;
• 46 Meta Music Library tracks directly calling for violence;
• 67 Apple Music songs encouraging or glorifying violence against minorities.

Beyond explicit threats, the report identifies recurring themes that appear repeatedly across hundreds of songs. These include portraying Muslims as traitors or foreign invaders; invoking historical grievances involving Mughal rulers; calling for the demolition of mosques and construction of temples in their place; depicting demographic change as an existential threat; promoting conspiracy theories such as “love jihad” and “Ghazwa-e-Hind”; glorifying cow vigilantism; and encouraging Hindus to prepare for what songs describe as an inevitable religious conflict.

According to the researchers, these recurring narratives collectively create a worldview in which violence against minorities is portrayed not as criminal conduct but as a legitimate form of self-defence or historical justice.

The report therefore argues that the danger lies not only in individual songs but in the cumulative effect of hundreds of tracks repeating similar messages across multiple platforms, reinforcing one another through algorithms, recommendations and user-generated content.

Profiting From Hate: How platforms monetise extremist music

One of the report’s most serious allegations is that technology companies are not merely failing to remove hateful content—they are also profiting from it. The report argues that while companies publicly maintain zero-tolerance policies towards hate speech, many of the creators producing anti-Muslim songs continue to benefit from platform monetisation tools, while the platforms themselves earn advertising and subscription revenue generated by user engagement with this content.

Researchers contend that this creates what they describe as a perverse incentive structure. The more popular a hate song becomes, the more advertisements it attracts, the more revenue it generates for both the creator and the platform, and the more likely platform algorithms are to recommend it to additional users. According to the report, this commercial ecosystem transforms communal hatred into profitable digital content.

YouTube’s monetisation ecosystem

The report identifies YouTube as the platform where monetisation is most visible. Researchers found that many channels repeatedly uploading songs that allegedly violate YouTube’s hate speech policies remain eligible for monetisation through the YouTube Partner Program. This allows creators to earn money from advertisements shown before or during videos, while also accessing features such as Super Thanks, Super Chats, Channel Memberships and paid subscriptions.

The report notes that the 210 songs identified on YouTube had collectively amassed approximately 198 million views, generating substantial audience engagement through more than 3.1 million likes across roughly 100 channels with a combined subscriber base exceeding 76 million subscribers. Researchers argue that these figures indicate that Hindutva hate music is not a niche phenomenon but a commercially successful content category operating within YouTube’s broader creator economy.

The report also raises concerns about YouTube’s own automated systems. Even where artists did not upload music videos themselves, YouTube automatically generated videos—known as “Art Tracks”—using album artwork and audio files. According to the researchers, this meant that hateful songs could continue circulating on YouTube even without dedicated video production, further expanding their visibility through YouTube Music integration and algorithmic recommendations. Researchers argue that these automated uploads demonstrate how platform infrastructure itself can contribute to the dissemination of harmful content.

Brand advertising beside hate content

One of the most troubling commercial finding concerns advertising. The report states that advertisements from internationally recognised companies appeared before or alongside videos containing anti-Muslim hate music.

Researchers documented advertisements from major multinational brands—including technology companies, consumer goods manufacturers and financial services firms—being served on videos that they argue contain hate speech and incitement. The report stresses that there is no suggestion that these companies intentionally chose to advertise on such videos. Rather, advertisements were placed through automated advertising systems that purchase inventory across YouTube. Nevertheless, the report argues that automated advertising effectively channels corporate advertising budgets towards creators producing hateful material. This, researchers contend, raises broader questions about advertiser oversight, brand safety mechanisms and the adequacy of platform controls designed to prevent commercial support for extremist content.

A small network, massive reach

Another important finding is the concentration of influence. Rather than thousands of independent creators, the report identifies a relatively small network of artists and YouTube channels responsible for producing a disproportionately large share of Hindutva hate music.

The researchers profiled dozens of prominent singers and creators who repeatedly produced songs centred on similar themes: portraying Muslims as enemies of the nation, glorifying violence, advocating the demolition of mosques, promoting conspiracy theories such as “love jihad” and “Ghazwa-e-Hind,” and encouraging Hindus to prepare for religious conflict. According to the report, this demonstrates that Hindutva hate music is not a spontaneous or decentralised phenomenon but an identifiable ecosystem with recurring artists, production houses, distribution channels and audiences.

The report argues that because the same creators repeatedly upload allegedly violative content across multiple platforms, enforcement against a relatively limited number of accounts could significantly reduce the overall reach of the ecosystem.

Music and offline communal mobilisation

A recurring theme throughout the report is the relationship between online music and offline communal mobilisation. Researchers emphasise that the songs they identified are not simply consumed privately through headphones. Instead, they frequently accompany religious processions, political rallies, vigilante activities, election campaigns and public demonstrations, giving digital content a tangible presence in physical spaces.

Several songs documented in the report call for the demolition of mosques, the construction of Hindu temples at disputed sites, retaliation for historical grievances associated with Mughal rule, or violent action against individuals portrayed as threatening Hindu society. Others celebrate cow vigilantism or invoke slogans commonly associated with Hindu nationalist mobilisation.

The report argues that when such music becomes embedded within public processions and viral social media videos, it helps normalise hostile narratives against minorities and reinforces communal identities through repetitive cultural messaging.

The Pahalgam attack and the rapid weaponisation of tragedy

The report devotes particular attention to the aftermath of the April 22, 2025 terrorist attack in Pahalgam, in which 26 civilians were killed. According to the researchers, Hindutva pop artists responded with remarkable speed. Within hours and days of the attack, multiple songs were released portraying Indian Muslims collectively as responsible or urging Hindus to unite against an alleged internal enemy.

Five songs released immediately after the attack reportedly accumulated more than 1.1 million YouTube views within a short period. Several rapidly spread to Spotify, Apple Music and Instagram Reels, where users created thousands of videos using the songs as background audio.

The report does not claim a direct causal relationship between these songs and subsequent incidents of communal violence. However, it argues that they contributed to an environment in which anti-Muslim hostility intensified.

Researchers cite monitoring by India Hate Lab, which documented 64 anti-Muslim hate rallies within ten days of the attack and 113 hate speech incidents and hate crimes within approximately three weeks. The report presents this as evidence that online hate music formed part of a broader ecosystem of communal mobilisation during a period of heightened national tension. Detailed report may be read here.

Less than two months after the Pahalgam attack, Citizens for Justice and Peace had mapped the rising hate attacks against Muslims, across five key states. The data based investigation had, on June 19, 2025, published 180 plus attacks with 37 % tied to ‘revenge’ for Pahalgam. CJP’s Mapping Hate: The Pahalgam Attack and its ripple effects may be read here.

Testing the platforms

Beyond documenting content, the researchers also sought to assess whether technology companies acted when alerted. The report explains that researchers formally reported numerous songs through the platforms’ own complaint mechanisms and monitored the outcomes over several months.

According to the report, most of the reported content remained available despite allegedly violating the platforms’ published hate speech policies. Researchers argue that this demonstrates substantial inconsistencies between the companies’ stated rules and their enforcement practices.

The report contends that the persistence of such content, despite repeated reporting, raises broader questions about transparency, accountability and the effectiveness of automated moderation systems, particularly in languages other than English.

Recommendations and a warning for Big Tech

The report concludes with an extensive set of recommendations directed at YouTube, Meta, Spotify and Apple. Among other measures, researchers call on platforms to:

• proactively identify and remove music that promotes hatred or violence against protected groups;
• improve moderation of music and audio content rather than focusing primarily on text and video;
• strengthen moderation capacity in Indian languages;
• ensure that creators repeatedly producing hate content are ineligible for monetisation;
• increase transparency regarding enforcement decisions;
• improve advertiser safeguards so that brands are not inadvertently funding extremist content; and
• invest in specialised moderation teams capable of recognising coded forms of communal hate speech.

Ultimately, Profiting from Hate Music argues that music has become one of the most powerful yet understudied vehicles for spreading communal hatred online. Rather than treating songs as merely another form of entertainment, the authors urge policymakers, researchers and technology companies to recognise them as influential political and cultural artefacts capable of shaping public attitudes at enormous scale. The study significantly expands the conversation around online hate speech in India. It shifts attention beyond viral speeches and inflammatory posts to an ecosystem where melody, repetition and algorithmic amplification intersect—raising difficult questions about the responsibilities of digital platforms when content that allegedly promotes hatred is not only hosted, but also recommended, monetised and transformed into a profitable business model.

The complete report may be read below:

Related:

CJP flags casteist, anti-Dalit videos on YouTube targeting CJI Gavai; seeks urgent takedown

Central Government silent over the number of YouTube channels blocked in last 5 years; dismisses concern about press freedom and internet shutdowns

YouTube allows content containing false and incendiary information about India’s elections: report

From Outrage to Acquittal: The Raja Singh hate speech case comes to a close

The Supreme Court blinks when it comes to Hate Speech

CJP files complaint against BJP MLA & Minister Nitesh Rane and right-wing leaders over alleged hate speeches in Maharashtra and West Bengal

The post How big tech is profiting from Hindutva hate music appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Almost immediately after Additional District and Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan sentenced the accused to life imprisonment, on June 12, 2026, the focus of public discourse shifted away from the evidence, the findings of the court and the legal reasoning contained in the judgment. Instead, the controversy was deliberately reframed around the religious identity of the judge. Rather than questioning the correctness of the verdict through legal argument, sections of the cow vigilante movement, Hindutva organisations and right-wing commentators portrayed the decision as the product of the judge’s Muslim identity. The result was the systematic communalisation of an ordinary criminal proceeding.

As reported by Newslaundry, the atmosphere outside the courtroom became tense immediately after the judgment was pronounced. Family members of the convicted men protested as the police began taking the convicts into custody. Relatives reportedly lay down in front of police vehicles in an attempt to prevent their transportation. According to Hazari Lal Gurjar, President of the local Bar Association, it was during these immediate protests that the issue first began to acquire a communal colour. What had begun as emotional reactions by the families of convicted persons quickly transformed into a larger narrative portraying the judgment itself as an attack on Hindus because the presiding judge happened to be Muslim.

The shift was significant. Criminal courts are expected to determine guilt on the basis of evidence placed before them. The personal religion, caste or background of a judge has no legal relevance to the adjudicatory process. Yet, rather than engaging with the court’s findings regarding unlawful assembly, common object, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and the brutality of the assault, attention rapidly shifted towards Judge Khan herself. In effect, the messenger of justice became more important than the message.

Background of the judgment

Before discussing the communal campaign against Judge Tabassum Khan, it is important to understand the significance of the judgment itself. The controversy did not arise in a legal vacuum. It followed a detailed trial concerning the brutal lynching of Nazir Ahmed, who was attacked while transporting cattle through Madhya Pradesh in August 2022. After examining eyewitness testimonies, medical evidence, forensic reports, recoveries made during investigation and other documentary material, the Sessions Court concluded that the prosecution had established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The court held that the accused had formed an unlawful assembly, intercepted the vehicle, violently assaulted the victims with deadly weapons and were collectively responsible for the murder of Nazir Ahmed and the attempted murder of the two surviving victims.

In a significant aspect of the judgment, Additional District and Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan expressly recognised the offence as one of mob lynching, observing that the prosecution had successfully established that the accused had acted as members of an unlawful assembly and had committed a brutal act of collective violence. While considering the question of sentence, the Court treated the mob nature of the crime as an aggravating circumstance. It emphasised the exceptional brutality of the assault, the fatal injuries inflicted upon Nazir Ahmed, the serious injuries suffered by the surviving victims, and the fact that the accused had acted in concert while armed with deadly weapons. The judgment thus acknowledged not merely the commission of murder but the distinct menace posed by vigilante violence carried out by organised groups.

The Court nevertheless declined to impose the death penalty. Relying on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, Machi Singh v. State of Punjab and Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra (or as cited in the judgment, Santosh Kumar Singh), Judge Khan held that the case did not satisfy the stringent “rarest of rare” threshold governing capital punishment. Instead, the accused were sentenced to life imprisonment for murder under Sections 302 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, along with separate sentences for rioting and the attempted murder of the surviving victims. The judgment thus represented a careful application of settled criminal law principles, balancing the gravity of the offence with the constitutional limitations governing the imposition of the death penalty. Most crucially, it upheld the path of reformative rather than retributive justice.

Far from being an arbitrary or summary decision, the verdict was a reasoned judicial determination running through the evidence in considerable detail. Yet, rather than engaging with the Court’s legal reasoning or challenging its findings before the appellate courts, the public discourse surrounding the case rapidly shifted away from the judgment itself. The evidence, legal analysis and findings of the trial court were overshadowed by a campaign that sought to question the verdict on the basis of the religious identity of the judge, setting the stage for one of the most disturbing instances of communal targeting of a serving judicial officer in recent years.

The detailed report may be read here.

Organised protests and the manufacture of a communal narrative

What initially appeared to be local dissatisfaction soon evolved into a coordinated campaign extending beyond the district in which the trial had taken place. Reports published by Newslaundry, Siasat and other news organisations indicate that several self-described cow protection organisations and Hindutva groups organised protests condemning the verdict, not primarily on legal grounds but by questioning the religious identity and impartiality of the judge.

Among the most visible organisations participating in these protests was the Gau Raksha Parishad. Demonstrations were organised in which effigies of Judge Tabassum Khan were publicly burnt while slogans branding her “anti-Hindu” were raised. Rather than calling for appellate review of the judgment, the demonstrations sought to portray the conviction itself as an act of religious discrimination against Hindus. The symbolism of burning a judge’s effigy represented a significant escalation from criticism of a judicial decision to the personal targeting of a serving judicial officer.

According to Newslaundry, these demonstrations did not remain confined to Madhya Pradesh. On June 22, members of Gau Raksha Parishad organised a ‘protest’ in Peer Muchalla in Mohali, Punjab, where demonstrators burned an effigy of Judge Khan while shouting slogans demanding the release of the convicted men. Similar protests were subsequently reported from Uttar Pradesh, where members of the Antarrashtriya Hindu Parishad-Rashtriya Bajrang Dal staged demonstrations against the judgment inside government premises! Authorities in that state allowed these unchecked. The geographical spread of these ‘protests’ suggested that the issue had acquired national dimensions, fuelled largely through coordinated organisational and social media mobilisation rather than any fresh legal developments in the case. As significantly, they signified powerful political patronage behind the acts.

Equally revealing was the language adopted by many protesters. Instead of describing the judgment as legally incorrect or identifying alleged errors in the appreciation of evidence, the demonstrations repeatedly referred to Judge Khan’s religion. Her Muslim identity became the principal basis upon which the legitimacy of the judgment was questioned. This represented a dangerous inversion of constitutional values. Judicial decisions are meant to be evaluated through legal reasoning, not through the religious identity of the individual delivering them.

Social media as a vehicle for intimidation

The campaign rapidly migrated from public demonstrations to social media, where it assumed an even more disturbing form. An extensive online campaign filled with communal abuse, personal attacks and threats directed specifically at Judge Khan.

Numerous social media posts reportedly described her as “anti-Hindu” and questioned her ability to dispense impartial justice because she was Muslim. Others employed openly derogatory communal slurs directed at Muslim women. These posts did not merely criticise the verdict; they sought to delegitimise Judge Khan’s authority as a judicial officer by reducing her identity to her religion. Gender dimensions of targeted majoritarian abuse have been increasingly common phenomenon witnessed by Muslim women in public life at multiple levels.

Several videos circulated widely across social media platforms, amplifying these narratives before large audiences. One of the most disturbing videos reportedly featured an individual using deeply offensive communal language while referring to the judge and warning that there would be a “bloodbath” if the convicted men were not released within ten days. The individual threatened violence extending beyond Madhya Pradesh and attempted to portray the judicial verdict as justification for communal mobilisation.

Judge: ADJ Tabassum Khan

14 गौ रक्षकों को सुनाई उमर क़ैद की सजा

ADJ Tabassum Khan जैसे लोग कितना भी
पढ़ ले मक़सद इनका एक ही रहता है हिंदू काफिर है

जो पहले अपने मजबह को देखते बाद में संविधान
को वो कभी न्याय नहीं कर सकते

हिंदुओं ऐसे लोगो से देश से भगाना जरूरी है pic.twitter.com/mNHeVWSbvQ

— Amrendra Bahubali (@TheBahubali_IND) June 17, 2026

Hindutva Scum calls for killing of a judge who sent 7 criminals to jail for lynching a Muslim

Instead of arresting the scum,MHA
Cyber Cell sent me a notice to remove the video or face action

Only in India,a criminal goes scot free while the whistleblower faces intimidation pic.twitter.com/VKcLJRLUDL

— Nehr_who? (@Nher_who) June 26, 2026

Another widely circulated video showed a self-described cow protector standing beside a truck transporting cattle. Rather than discussing the legal findings of the Sessions Court, he argued that cow protection groups should no longer intercept vehicles because those who had done so in the present case had been sentenced to life imprisonment. He went further by declaring that Judge Tabassum Khan would have to reverse her decision and called upon cow protection groups from Agra and other regions to organise protests against her.

Such statements represented an outright attack on India’s constitutional structure governing criminal justice. Judicial orders are not reversed because of public demonstrations or threats of violence. They are challenged through appeals before superior courts. The repeated demands that the judge herself “reverse” the judgment fundamentally misunderstood—and arguably rejected—the institutional framework of the Indian judiciary.

Amplification by influential public figures

The controversy received additional momentum when influential right-wing personalities publicly endorsed the campaign against the judgment. Among the most prominent was Sudarshan News editor Suresh Chavhanke.

14 गौ रक्षकों को उम्रक़ैद.. जज तबस्सुम ख़ान के फैसले पर न्याय संग्राम

देखें #बिंदास_बोल मेरे साथ @DrMohanYadav51 https://t.co/4gJZkzlUfh

— Dr. Suresh Chavhanke “Sudarshan News” (@SureshChavhanke) June 19, 2026

As reported by Newslaundry, Chavhanke described the Sessions Court’s judgment as “judicial lynching” during a televised programme. Declaring his solidarity with the convicted men and their families, he stated: “We stand with all the gau-rakshaks and their families. This fight is not yours alone; it is ours too.”

The significance of such statements lies not merely in their criticism of the verdict but in the authority and reach of the platform from which they were delivered. When prominent media personalities portray judicial decisions as manifestations of religious bias without engaging with the reasoning contained in the judgment, they contribute to the erosion of public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. Such narratives risk encouraging audiences to view judges not as neutral adjudicators but as representatives of religious communities.

Police intervention and criminal investigation

As the campaign intensified, law enforcement authorities eventually intervened. According to Newslaundry, the Seoni Malwa Police registered a First Information Report after taking suo- motu cognisance of the communal and threatening material circulating online.

Station House Officer Sudhakar Bhaskar confirmed that the FIR had been registered against individuals responsible for communal posts and videos under relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. He further stated that the cyber cell had been tasked with identifying the origin of the viral videos, tracing those responsible for their circulation and continuously monitoring social media platforms for additional inflammatory content.

The registration of the FIR reflected official recognition that the controversy had moved beyond ordinary criticism of a judicial verdict. The campaign contained elements capable of promoting communal hostility, intimidating a judicial officer and potentially disturbing public order. Police intervention therefore became necessary not to suppress legitimate criticism but to investigate conduct that allegedly crossed the threshold into criminal intimidation and hate speech.

Concern within the legal community

The developments also generated widespread concern among members of the legal fraternity. Hazari Lal Gurjar, President of the Bar Association, questioned why stronger institutional measures had not been initiated despite the communal targeting of a serving judicial officer. Speaking to Newslaundry, he expressed concern that a woman judge was facing communal abuse, gendered insults and threats of violence while the higher judiciary had not initiated suo motu contempt proceedings or taken more visible action to protect judicial independence.

Former Chief Judicial Magistrate Pawan Kumar similarly emphasised that the rule of law provides an established remedy for any litigant dissatisfied with a judgment. The correctness of judicial decisions is examined by appellate courts through structured legal procedures, not by personal attacks directed at judges. Public confidence in the judiciary depends upon preserving this distinction.

Several lawyers also reportedly observed that many of those criticising the judgment had not actually read it. According to Advocate Sumit Gehlot, quoted by Newslaundry, much of the outrage appeared to stem from hearsay rather than any informed engagement with the evidence analysed by the court.

Senior Congress leader Pawan Khera also spoke out on social media in support of Judge Tabassum Khan, and said “On June 12, 2026, First Additional Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan sentenced seven men to life imprisonment for the 2022 lynching of Najir Ahmed. All the convicts are indeed Hindu men. But they were not convicted because of their religion; they were convicted because the investigation found them guilty of rioting, attempted murder and murder. Yet our Hindu brother in the video is not outraged by their behaviour. His outrage is reserved for one fact alone: that the judge who convicted them is a Muslim woman. In any civilised society, such bigotry would invite swift legal action. In Modi’s India, however, this man spewing hate walks free while notices are sent to those questioning his conduct. Jai ho!”

On June 12, 2026, First Additional Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan sentenced seven men to life imprisonment for the 2022 lynching of Najir Ahmed.

All the convicts are indeed Hindu men. But they were not convicted because of their religion; they were convicted because the… https://t.co/xzccM88CHv

— Pawan Khera ಪವನ್ ಖೇರಾ (@Pawankhera) June 26, 2026

An attack on judicial independence

The events following Judge Tabassum Khan’s verdict raise constitutional concerns extending far beyond the facts of one criminal case. Judicial independence forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution and requires judges to decide cases without fear, favour, affection or ill will. This principle necessarily includes protection from organised campaigns of communal intimidation.

Public criticism of judicial decisions is entirely legitimate in a constitutional democracy. Courts are not immune from scrutiny, and judgments are frequently debated, criticised and overturned by appellate courts. However, there exists a profound distinction between criticising judicial reasoning and attacking a judge because of her religion.

The campaign against Judge Khan sought to erase this distinction. Rather than analysing the evidence relied upon by the Sessions Court or identifying legal errors warranting appellate interference, sections of the protest movement suggested that the judgment itself lacked legitimacy because it had been authored by a Muslim judge. Such narratives threaten to transform the judiciary into another arena of communal polarisation, where judicial authority depends not upon constitutional office but upon religious identity.

The implications extend well beyond one individual judge. If judges are made to fear organised campaigns of vilification whenever they deliver decisions against politically influential groups, the independence of the judiciary itself is weakened. The message conveyed is that legal reasoning may become secondary to identity-based mobilisation and that adverse judgments may invite not merely appeals but sustained communal intimidation. In a legal system governed by the rule of law, judges must be assessed on the strength of their reasoning and the legality of their decisions; not on the basis of their religion, gender or personal identity. Preserving that principle is essential not only for the safety of individual judges but for maintaining public confidence in the impartial administration of justice itself.

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Another cow lynching in Nashik, one dead

Maharashtra’s shame: Cow lynching episode reported in Nashik

Allahabad HC points out misuse of cow slaughter law

K’taka: Bail to cow vigilante, Puneeth Kerehalli, accused of killing Muslim man

Cow vigilantism casts its ugly shadow on Maharashtra

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The post Judging the Judge: The communal backlash against a lynching verdict appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In many places, the festival passed peacefully. Families gathered after morning namaz, meat was distributed among relatives and poorer households, and local communities quietly adjusted practices to avoid confrontation. But in several cities and towns, Bakri Eid also became the centre of communal disputes over goats, housing societies, slaughter spaces, public prayer, and even the visibility of Muslim religious life itself.

The result was a festival that revealed two India’s simultaneously: one still capable of accommodation and coexistence, and another where Muslim festivals are increasingly subjected to suspicion, policing, and political contestation. Authorities across the country remained on high alert in the days leading up to Eid-ul-Adha. Police deployments were increased, livestock transportation was monitored, housing societies issued restrictions, and state governments reiterated cattle slaughter regulations. The atmosphere reflected the growing politicisation of Bakri Eid itself.

The festival under regulation

One of the clearest patterns this year was the extent to which Eid celebrations became governed through administrative control and legal regulation. As Moneycontrol reported in a detailed nationwide survey of cattle slaughter laws ahead of Bakri Eid, state governments issued extensive advisories and intensified enforcement drives around livestock transport, slaughterhouses, and sacrificial practices.

The report highlighted how India’s fragmented legal landscape around cattle slaughter shaped Eid observances differently across states. Maharashtra strictly enforced provisions under the Maharashtra Animal Preservation Act, which bans slaughter of cows, bulls, and bullocks. Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat continued to enforce some of the country’s harshest anti-cow slaughter laws, with penalties extending to life imprisonment in certain circumstances. Assam intensified enforcement under the Assam Cattle Preservation Act, while Karnataka reiterated provisions under its stringent 2020 anti-cattle slaughter legislation.

In Delhi, minister Kapil Mishra publicly warned that sacrifice of prohibited bovine species would invite criminal prosecution. Rapid response teams were formed across districts to monitor transport and slaughter activities.

Municipal corporations and local administrations across cities also insisted that qurbani be conducted only at officially designated spaces. In Mumbai, the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation reportedly designated 109 authorised slaughter locations and discouraged sacrifice in residential societies and chawls.

Increasingly, the question was no longer merely what Muslims could sacrifice during Eid, but where, how visibly, and under whose permission.

Pandharpur and the other possibility

Yet even amid this tense atmosphere, there were moments that reflected a very different social reality. Perhaps the most striking example came from Pandharpur in Maharashtra. As reported by Hindustan Times, the town’s Muslim community voluntarily decided to defer goat sacrifice because Bakri Eid coincided with Adhik Maas Ekadashi, an occasion of deep significance for devotees of Lord Vitthal.

Members of the Muslim community told reporters that they wanted to honour the sentiments of Hindu pilgrims visiting the temple town. Some residents reportedly said that Muslims in Pandharpur had long-standing emotional and spiritual connections with the town’s religious culture and had similarly deferred sacrifice in previous years when such overlaps occurred. The symbolism mattered. At a time when Muslim religious practices were being intensely scrutinised elsewhere, Pandharpur offered a reminder that coexistence in India has historically depended less on legal coercion and more on negotiated accommodation and everyday mutual recognition. The story received wide attention precisely because it contrasted so sharply with the hostility unfolding elsewhere.

Mira Road: From housing dispute to communal flashpoint

The most widely discussed communal tensions around Bakri Eid this year emerged from Mira Road near Mumbai. What began as a disagreement by a few inside a housing society over goats being kept ahead of Eid soon escalated into a much larger communal controversy involving right-wing groups, police intervention, counter-protests, and allegations of deliberate provocation.

Detailed report by SabrangIndia may be read here.

Tensions erupted at Poonam Cluster Society after some residents objected to goats being housed within the premises. Muslim residents maintained that they had obtained municipal permission and pointed out that the practice had existed for years within the society. The dispute quickly moved beyond internal society negotiations.

As provided in our report, fringe elements associated with organisations such as the Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad entered the scene. What followed was an escalation marked by religious sloganeering, clashes, and eventually one of the most disturbing incidents reported during this year’s Eid period: attempts to bring pigs into the housing society as a counter-protest to the legally valid presence of goats.

The symbolism was unmistakable. And yet, what happened afterward was equally important.

Three days later, the same society celebrated Eid peacefully under police protection. In a follow-up report, Hindustan Times quoted residents insisting that “outsiders” had aggravated what was initially a manageable internal disagreement.

Residents described years of communal coexistence inside the society. Muslim families explained that the temporary goat sheds had existed for years with proper drainage and regular cleaning arrangements. Hindu and Muslim neighbours reportedly exchanged Eid greetings despite the violence of previous days.

The Mira Road episode therefore became more than a local dispute. It illustrated how quickly ordinary disagreements over shared residential space can now be communalised through organised intervention and political mobilisation. At the same time, it also revealed the persistence of local social relationships that continue to resist complete polarisation.

Kalyan and the politics of religious space

Another major point of friction emerged in Kalyan, Maharashtra. As reported by The Hindu, police-imposed restrictions on animal sacrifice inside several housing societies and heavily barricaded the area around the historic Durgadi Fort complex during Eid prayers.

The site is politically and communally sensitive because a temple and mosque exist in close proximity within the fort complex. According to the report, temporary restrictions on temple access during Eid prayers led to protests by members of both Shiv Sena factions and Hindu organisations. Groups gathered nearby to recite the Hanuman Chalisa after prayers concluded, while demonstrations were organised around allegations that Hindu devotees were being prevented from entering the temple.

The issue carried deep historical resonance. The Hindu noted that the Durgadi Fort dispute has remained politically charged since the 1980s and is closely linked to the legacy of Shiv Sena strongman Anand Dighe. Bakri Eid here became not just a religious event but a symbolic battleground over ownership of public and sacred space.

Political language and “new Hindutva”

The tensions surrounding Bakri Eid also triggered overt political commentary. Shiv Sena (UBT) MP Sanjay Raut accused certain groups of attempting to communalise the festival through what he described as “new Hindutva.” According to reports published by News The Truth, Raut argued that Maharashtra historically represented a culture of coexistence and criticised what he viewed as selective outrage around Muslim animal sacrifice while remaining silent on sacrifices associated with other traditions.

His remarks reflected a broader political argument emerging this year: that opposition to Bakri Eid practices was no longer being framed merely through animal welfare or civic regulation, but increasingly through majoritarian identity politics. At the same time, Hindu nationalist groups repeatedly framed their protests around language of “public hygiene,” “society rules,” “religious sensitivity,” and “illegal sacrifice.”

The conflict was therefore rarely articulated openly as anti-Muslim hostility. Instead, it often appeared through the bureaucratic and civic vocabulary of regulation, sanitation, legality, and public order.

Varanasi and the economics of Eid

The tensions surrounding Bakri Eid were not only communal or political. They were also economic. In Varanasi, authorities sealed the city’s decades-old Benia Bagh goat market just days before Eid, triggering panic among traders. According to reports carried by Indian Express, the market — one of eastern Uttar Pradesh’s largest seasonal livestock bazaars — had functioned for nearly four decades before authorities abruptly shut it down citing sanitation complaints and overcrowding.

Traders alleged that they were given little warning and faced devastating losses after travelling from multiple districts with goats purchased on credit.

Several traders reportedly said they had mortgaged valuables and borrowed money at high interest rates to participate in Eid livestock trade and now feared financial ruin if they could not sell their animals.

The closure highlighted another dimension of Eid increasingly overlooked in public discourse: the festival sustains a vast informal economy involving livestock farmers, transport workers, traders, butchers, leather workers, and local markets. Administrative crackdowns therefore carry not only symbolic implications, but material consequences for livelihoods as well.

Prayer, surveillance, and preventive policing

Even public prayer itself became contested in some areas. Reports circulated from Agra that Hindu nationalist leaders planned protests over temporary free entry arrangements at the Taj Mahal for Eid namaz. Police responded by placing several individuals under house arrest to prevent escalation. Elsewhere, social media videos documented protests around Eid prayers and public recitations of the Hanuman Chalisa near Muslim gatherings.

The visible police presence across cities became one of the defining features of Bakri Eid this year. In Mira Road alone, dozens of police personnel were reportedly stationed around sensitive housing societies to prevent further escalation.

The scale of preventive policing reflected both administrative caution and the extent to which Muslim festivals are increasingly treated as potential law-and-order situations.

The festival that revealed the country

Bakri Eid in India this year cannot be reduced either to a story of communal harmony or one of inevitable communal conflict. Both realities existed simultaneously.

There were stories of accommodation: Muslims in Pandharpur postponing sacrifice to respect Ekadashi; local communities negotiating solutions quietly; residents insisting that coexistence mattered more than provocation; neighbours exchanging Eid greetings despite recent tensions.

But there were also unmistakable signs of a changing political climate: housing societies policing Muslim practices; right-wing mobilisation around goats and sacrifice; counter-protests involving pigs; increasing restrictions on where Muslims may pray or perform qurbani; administrative language increasingly framing Eid through surveillance and control.

The deeper significance of Bakri Eid this year lay not merely in the incidents themselves, but in what they revealed about the condition of public life in India.

Questions that once belonged largely to the private domain of religious observance — where goats may be kept, where sacrifice may occur, whether namaz may be offered in a particular place — are now increasingly contested in public and political arenas. And yet, despite everything, the festival still passed. Families prayed. Communities negotiated fragile peace. And in many places, ordinary people continued to protect coexistence even when political actors attempted to fracture it. Bakri Eid in 2026 therefore became a portrait of contemporary India itself: anxious, polarised, heavily policed — but still, in countless everyday ways, struggling to hold together.

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The post Between Celebration and Suspicion: How Bakri Eid passed across india in 2026 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

CJP stated in the complaints that the alleged hate speeches violated constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 15 and 21 and attracted offences under provisions relating to promotion of enmity between groups, criminal intimidation, statements conducing to public mischief, deliberate acts intended to outrage religious feelings, and incitement to violence.

The complaints concern speeches delivered in Chandivali and Malad Malvani in Mumbai, Kalyani in Nadia district of West Bengal, and Junnar in Pune district.

Complaint against Nitesh Narayan Rane over Chandivali speech: May 12, 2026

In a complaint dated May 12, 2026, addressed to Shri Nikhil Gupta, Additional Director General (Law & Order), Maharashtra, Addl. Commissioner of Police, West Region, Mumbai, and Senior Police Inspector, Sakinaka Police Station, Mumbai, CJP sought registration of an FIR against BJP MLA and Maharashtra Cabinet Minister Nitesh Narayan Rane for allegedly delivering a divisive communal speech during a Hindu convention held in Chandivali, Mumbai on May 3, 2026.

CJP stated in the complaint that Rane utilised dehumanising language against Muslims, spread conspiracy theories regarding “Love Jihad,” “Land Jihad,” “Corporate Jihad,” and “Ghazwa-e-Hind,” and openly encouraged social and economic boycott of Muslims. The complaint alleged that the speech attempted to create fear and hostility by portraying Muslims as an existential threat to Hindus and India.

According to CJP, Rane repeatedly referred to Muslims as “green snakes” and urged the audience to confront them. The complaint reproduces the speech transcript, including the following statements:

“[They] should come to Maharashtra. This writhing of green snakes (referring to Muslims) must stop. That is why the saffron flag has been unfurled in Maharashtra, remember this.”

“And therefore, while moving around as a Hindu, do so with self-confidence. Move with courage. If any green snake is writhing here, take guidance from Tai and then give me a call.”

The complaint further stated that Rane repeatedly described India as a “Hindu Rashtra” and suggested that Muslims were attempting to convert India into an Islamic nation through organised conspiracies.

CJP also stated in the complaint that Rane attempted to create fear among Hindus by claiming that Muslims would prevent Hindu religious practices if their population increased.

The complaint reproduces the following statements:

“You won’t be able to perform puja in your home. This saffron flag won’t be able to fly here. You won’t be able to apply the Tilak on your forehead.”

“Mothers and sisters won’t be able to apply vermilion (Sindoor) on their heads.”

According to CJP, the speech also included references to alleged communal incidents in Palghar and Virar to reinforce hostility against Muslims. The complaint additionally highlighted Rane’s remarks calling for economic boycott of Muslims:

“So, when we are dealing with them, buying from them, or giving them jobs—first, if someone is sitting at a shop, even if the shop’s signboard says ‘Jay Shri Ram,’ sometimes Abdul is sitting inside.”

“First tell him, ‘Recite the Hanuman Chalisa for me first.’ If you recite the Hanuman Chalisa only then will I buy from you, otherwise I won’t.”

“Therefore, if jobs are to be given or purchases are to be made, it should only be for Hindus—this should be the stance of all of us.”

CJP stated in the complaint that these remarks amounted to explicit encouragement of discrimination and exclusion of citizens based on religion and constituted a direct appeal for economic boycott of Muslims.

A copy of complaint dated May 12, 2026 can be accessed here

Complaint against Nitesh Rane over Malad Malvani speech during Ram Navami Yatra

In another complaint dated April 28, 2026, addressed to Maharashtra Police authorities, CJP sought registration of an FIR against Nitesh Narayan Rane over a speech delivered during the Ram Navami Yatra held in Malad Malvani, Mumbai, on March 26, 2026.

According to CJP, the speech promoted communal hostility, issued direct threats of violence, and attempted to alienate Muslims by declaring India a “Hindu Rashtra” and describing the locality as belonging exclusively to “saffron-clad” Hindus.

CJP stated in the complaint that Rane used references to “Pakistan” as a dog-whistle against Muslims and openly threatened those opposing Hindutva ideology.

The complaint reproduces the following portions of the speech:

“Perhaps some people here in Malvani have forgotten that this is our Hindu Rashtra, this is not someone’s Pakistan. If anyone tries to remove that saffron flag, we will not let their cylinder come up again. If anyone again looks at our saffron flag with dirty eyes, then their eyes will be taken out and played with like marbles.”

CJP alleged that these remarks amounted to open threats of violence and intimidation. The complaint further stated that Rane specifically directed slogans toward a mosque in the locality, thereby attempting to provoke confrontation and disturb communal harmony. The reproduced statement reads:

“That voice must reach the big mosque.”

According to CJP, such statements sought to intimidate the Muslim community and portray them as outsiders within the constitutional framework of India. The complaint also alleged that Rane invoked the authority of a “government with a Hindutva ideology” to suggest political backing for aggressive communal mobilisation.

A copy of complaint dated April 28, 2026 can be accessed here

Complaint against Hari Mishra in West Bengal over hate speech during election campaign in Nadia

In a complaint dated May 6, 2026 addressed to the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police in Nadia district, West Bengal, CJP sought registration of an FIR under Sections 196, 197, 299, 302, 352 and 353 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 against BJP leader Hari Mishra for a speech delivered during an election campaign in Kalyani, Nadia district, on April 23, 2026. CJP stated in the complaint that Mishra spread anti-Muslim conspiracy theories and falsely claimed that Hindu festivals could not be celebrated in Muslim-majority areas.

The complaint reproduces portions of the speech including:

“In any area where the Muslim population is above 30-35%, Saraswati Puja will not happen. In places like Malda and Murshidabad… you first have to take permission from the nearest mosque. A situation worse than Bangladesh is going to happen on the soil of West Bengal.”

CJP further alleged that Mishra falsely claimed that the Constitution of India did not function in parts of West Bengal. The reproduced transcript includes:

“The Constitution of India does not work in many parts of Malda and Murshidabad. In about 25-30% of the areas in Malda and Murshidabad, the Constitution, rules, laws, and regulations of India do not apply.”

The complaint also referred to statements linking demographic change with political exclusion: “The day Muslims reach above 40-45%, not a single Hindu MP, MLA, counselor, or chairman will remain in West Bengal.”

According to CJP, these remarks sought to portray Muslims as a threat to democratic institutions and communal coexistence and were intended to create fear and polarisation during the election period.

A copy of complaint dated May 6, 2026 can be accessed here

Complaint against Harshu Thakur in Junnar, Pune over speech delivered at Virat Hindu Sammelan

In a separate complaint dated May 6, 2026, addressed to the Additional Director General (Law & Order), Maharashtra, the Superintendent of Police, Pune Rural, and the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Junnar Division, CJP sought registration of an FIR against Harshu Thakur over a speech delivered at the Virat Hindu Sammelan held in Junnar, Pune district, on April 19, 2026. CJP stated in the complaint that Thakur spread anti-Muslim rhetoric through references to “Forest Jihad,” “Love Jihad,” and “Land Jihad,” while also making statements encouraging militarised responses and targeting Islamic institutions and burial practices.

The complaint reproduces the following statements:

“Wherever there is open land, there are graves. If you start funding madrasas, then only terrorists will be produced there. Mulla-Maulvis give them training on how to trap girls in ‘Love Jihad’ and how to carry out ‘Land Jihad’. They are taught how to make bombs.”

CJP further highlighted remarks targeting Muslim men and encouraging women to arm themselves:

“All these ‘Abduls’ are the same. Every Hindu woman just needs to be given a weapon.”

The complaint also alleged that Thakur attempted to frame Muslims as inherently violent while encouraging religious segregation and hostility.

A copy of complaint dated May 6, 2026 can be accessed here

Judicial precedents on which CJP relied upon

In the complaints submitted before police authorities in Maharashtra and West Bengal, CJP also relied upon multiple judicial precedents of the Supreme Court concerning hate speech, communal targeting, and the constitutional obligation of authorities to act against inflammatory rhetoric. Referring to the Supreme Court judgment in Firoz Iqbal Khan vs Union of India [W.P. (Civ.) No. 956 of 2020], CJP highlighted the Court’s observations that “the edifice of a democratic society committed to the rule of law under a regime of constitutional rights, values and duties is founded on the co-existence of communities. India is a melting pot of civilisations, cultures, religions and languages. Any attempt to vilify a religious community must be viewed with grave disfavour by this Court as the custodian of constitutional values.”

CJP stated that the speeches delivered by Nitesh Rane, Hari Mishra, and Harshu Thakur collectively portrayed Muslims as conspirators, outsiders, extremists, and demographic threats, thereby directly undermining constitutional values of equality, fraternity, and peaceful coexistence. The complaints further referred to Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India [AIR 2014 SC 1591], where the Supreme Court observed that “hate speech is an effort to marginalise individuals based on their membership to a group,” and warned that such speech can lay the groundwork for discrimination, ostracism, violence, and even genocide. CJP stated that the repeated references to “Love Jihad,” “Land Jihad,” “Forest Jihad,” “Corporate Jihad,” alleged demographic conspiracies, and calls for economic boycott sought to institutionalise fear and hostility against Muslims and therefore warranted immediate criminal action.

The complaints additionally cited the Supreme Court’s order dated April 28, 2023 in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India [W.P. (C) No. 943 of 2021], wherein all States and Union Territories were directed to register suo moto FIRs against hate speech irrespective of religion whenever offences under Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 505 IPC and related provisions are attracted.

Provisions related to hate speech under BNS, 2023

CJP further stated that the speeches attract multiple provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, particularly Sections 196, 197, 299, 302, 352 and 353. According to the complaints, the repeated targeting of Muslim religious institutions, educational spaces, and social identity through references such as “green snakes,” “Forest Jihad,” “Land Jihad,” and allegations that madrasas produce “only terrorists” amounted to promoting enmity between religious groups and acts prejudicial to communal harmony under Section 196 BNS.

CJP stated that the speeches also made imputations against the constitutional allegiance of an entire community by portraying Muslims and Islamic institutions as threats to the State, thereby attracting Section 197 BNS. The complaints further alleged that mocking Dargahs, Mazars, burial practices, Islamic scholars, and Muslim religious practices constituted deliberate insults to religion and religious beliefs under Sections 299 and 302 BNS.

CJP additionally argued that the repeated calls for mobilisation, warnings regarding demographic change, threats of violence, references to arming civilians, and calls for economic boycott amounted to intentional provocation intended to breach public peace under Section 352 BNS and dissemination of false information likely to create fear and communal unrest under Section 353 BNS.

The complaints maintained that the speeches delivered across Mumbai, Pune, and Nadia reflected a continuing pattern of inflammatory communal rhetoric aimed at deepening religious polarisation and normalising hostility against Muslims, thereby necessitating immediate registration of FIRs and preventive intervention by the concerned police authorities in compliance with constitutional obligations and Supreme Court directives.

Maharashtra DGP circulars cited by CJP

CJP also referred to circulars issued by the Director General of Police, Maharashtra, in February and April 2023 concerning preventive and penal action against hate speech.

According to the complaint, Circular No. DGP 20/Petition No.940/2022/54.2023 dated February 2, 2023 highlighted the Supreme Court’s order dated January 13, 2023 directing police authorities to take suo motu action whenever speeches attract offences under Sections 153A, 153B, 295A and 505 IPC.

The circular had directed all Unit Commanders to follow the Supreme Court order and entails “measures to be taken to maintain law and order due to agitations, morchas, speeches etc.”

It gives detailed instructions on what steps are to be taken when any morchas are to be held:

“2. All the Unit Commanders should hold a meeting with the concerned organisers before such a morcha and fix the route of the morcha with appropriate terms and condition. A combined meeting of all social groups should be taken to convey clearly to all that they should maintain peace and keep law and order during the morcha. Preventive action against Anti-social elements should be taken. Those elements who help in maintaining peace and harmony should be encouraged. Audio Video recording of the morcha should be done. Police Head Quarters should ensure adequate supply of equipment’s, like Lathi, Helmets, etc. to police men deployed for morcha bandobast. If any law-and-order situation arises, offences should be registered immediately and arrest should be made. Intelligence machinery should be activated to collect advance information about morcha, agitation and efforts should be made to pre-empt any communal incidents.”

Supreme Court directions on preventing/prosecuting hate speakers

CJP further referred to multiple Supreme Court orders concerning hate speech and preventive policing. According to the complaints, on February 3, 2023, the Supreme Court issued directions regarding a proposed event by Sakal Hindu Samaj in Mumbai and directed that if permission was granted for the event, it would be subject to the condition that no hate speech would be delivered.

The court also outlined directives with respect to taking preventive action in such cases:

“We also direct that the Officer(s), in case, permission is granted and, in case, the occasion arises for invoking the power under Section 151 of Cr.P.C. as aforesaid, it shall be the duty of the Officer(s) concerned to invoke the said power and to act as per the mandate of Section 151 of the Cr.P.C.” 

Even in 2024 itself, while on January 17, the Supreme Court bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Dipankar Datta had expressed their anguish at the petitioners being forced to approach the Supreme Court multiple times against individuals and organisations even after there being guidelines for tacking and taking action against hate speeches. During the said hearing, the Supreme Court issued an order directing the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police at Yavatmal, Maharashtra and Raipur, Chhattisgarh to take ‘appropriate steps’ to ensure that no incitement to hate speech occurs at the rallies scheduled in the said districts in the coming few days of January.

The said order was passed following the concerns raised by the petitioners over delivery of potential hate speeches at rallies planned by Hindu Janjagruti Samiti and Bharatiya Janata Party Legislator T Raja Singh in the month of January.

CJP stated that the court had outlined directives with respect to taking preventive action in such cases:

“We would require the authorities to be conscious that no incitement to violence and hate speech are permissible. The concerned District Magistrates and Superintendent of Police of Yavatmal, Maharashtra and Raipur, Chhattisgarh will take necessary steps, as may be required. If necessary and deemed appropriate, police/administration will install CCTV Cameras having recording facility, so as to ensure identification of the perpetrators in the event of any violence/hate speech.”

Background: Profile of Nitesh Rane and previous complaints filed by CJP

CJP stated in its complaints that the speeches delivered in Chandivali and Malad Malvani were not isolated incidents but formed part of a continuing pattern of inflammatory speeches allegedly delivered by Nitesh Rane across Maharashtra. According to CJP, the organisation had previously filed complaints dated March 7, March 18, and March 28, 2025 concerning speeches delivered by Rane in Sindhudurg, Pune, and Ratnagiri districts.

The complaints related to events including:

• “Hindu Rashtra Adhiveshan” in Kundal on February 8, 2025
• “Shivjanmostav” event in Sawantwadi on February 19, 2025
• Public felicitation programme at Nanijdham, Ratnagiri on February 20, 2025
• Religious gathering in Wagholi, Pune on February 5, 2025

CJP stated that across these events, Rane repeatedly invoked terms such as “Love Jihad” and “Land Jihad,” portrayed Muslims as a collective threat, and made statements capable of inciting hostility, fear, and social boycott against the Muslim community. The complaints further stated that such rhetoric, particularly when delivered by a sitting Cabinet Minister, was inflammatory, unsupported by evidence, and violative of constitutional protections.

FIRs and ongoing legal scrutiny against Nitesh Rane

Under the judicial oversight of the Bombay High Court in Aftab Siddique & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra (2024), multiple FIRs have already been registered against Nitesh Rane in connection with alleged hate speech cases. CJP reproduced details of these FIRs in its complaints and stated that they reflected a continuing pattern of communal speeches delivered by Rane in different parts of Maharashtra.

Mankhurd Police Station (C.R. No. 152/2024)

Registered against Nitesh Rane under Sections 153A, 503, 504 and 505 IPC. According to the complaint, this case originated from speeches perceived as threatening to the Muslim community and capable of inciting public disorder.

Ghatkopar Police Station (C.R. No. 521/2024)

Registered against Nitesh Rane and Subhash Ahir under Sections 153A, 504, 506 and 188 IPC in connection with inflammatory speeches delivered in Mumbai suburbs.

Kashimira Police Station (C.R. No. 259/2024)

Registered against Nitesh Rane and Geeta Jain in relation to the Mira-Bhayander incidents under Sections 153A, 153B, 143, 504 and 506 IPC along with Section 37(1) read with Section 135 of the Maharashtra Police Act.

Malwani Police Station (C.R. No. 298/2024)

Originally registered against Bhagwan Thakur, with Nitesh Rane later added as an accused under Sections 153A, 504 and 506 IPC in relation to speeches targeting specific religious communities.

CJP further pointed out that Nitesh Rane’s October 2024 election affidavit reportedly disclosed 38 FIRs registered against him, including 20 cases relating specifically to allegations of hate speech.

Related

Free and Fair Elections: CJP’s 2025 fight against hate and voter intimidation

CJP’s 2025 intervention against ‘Digital Hate’: Holding television news channels accountable before the NBDSA

Law as Resistance: A year of CJP’s interventions against a rising tide of hate

The post CJP files complaint against BJP MLA & Minister Nitesh Rane and right-wing leaders over alleged hate speeches in Maharashtra and West Bengal appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The incidents documented across India in 2025, when read collectively, mark a decisive shift in the nature of anti-Christian hostility. What was once episodic violence or localised discrimination has now hardened into a pattern of systemic persecution—socially legitimised, politically emboldened, and administratively enabled. Christians were not merely attacked as individuals or congregations; they were recast as a civilisational problem, a demographic threat, and a suspect population whose very presence required surveillance, regulation, and punishment.

This article undertakes a deep, incident-driven analysis of the violence, intimidation, discrimination, and institutional harassment faced by Christians throughout 2025. Drawing exclusively from the documented incidents provided, it traces how hate speech translated into physical violence, how law was repurposed as a tool of repression, and how everyday Christian life—worship, burial, marriage, education, and celebration—was progressively criminalised. The focus is not merely on what happened, but on how these events collectively reveal an architecture of otherisation that corrodes constitutional guarantees and reshapes citizenship itself. 

Manufacturing the Enemy: Christians as ‘foreign’, ‘anti-national’, and ‘dangerous’

A central pillar of anti-Christian mobilisation in 2025 was the persistent portrayal of Christians as outsiders to the Indian nation. Speakers across states repeatedly asserted that Christianity is inherently foreign—linked to the Vatican, Western powers, or colonial rule—and therefore incompatible with Indian culture. This rhetoric erased the long history of Indian Christianity, including indigenous traditions dating back centuries, and reframed faith as a marker of disloyalty.

The “holy land” disqualification: In Maharashtra and beyond, influential voices like Dhananjay Desai propagated a dangerous geopolitical argument: that because the “holy places” of Christians (the Vatican) and Muslims (Arabia) lie outside India, their loyalty to the Indian state is fundamentally compromised. This narrative effectively created a “Permanent Outsider” status, suggesting that a Christian can never be a “true” Indian.[1]

Public rallies and religious gatherings consistently advanced the idea that “true Indians” cannot be Christian. By redefining national belonging through religious identity, these narratives transformed Christians into conditional citizens—present but perpetually suspect. This framing proved crucial in legitimising subsequent acts of exclusion: if Christians are not truly Indian, then denying them burial rights, worship spaces, or legal protection can be portrayed as acts of cultural defence rather than discrimination.

The ‘foreign religion’ trope also intersected with anxieties about land, resources, and sovereignty. Christians—particularly among Adivasi communities—were accused of acting as agents of foreign interests, allegedly facilitating land grabs or undermining tribal traditions. These claims, devoid of evidence, circulated freely at public events, often in the presence of political leaders, lending them a veneer of legitimacy. 

The ideological framework – language as a weapon

Before the first stone was cast thrown in 2025, the groundwork was laid through a sophisticated linguistic campaign of dehumanisation. The “Otherisation” process relied on specific tropes designed to make the Christian community appear “un-Indian.”

The year 2025 saw the mainstreaming of derogatory slurs:

• “Rice bag” Christians: A trope used by figures like Kajal Hindustani to suggest that faith is a transaction and that converts are “purchasable” and thus lack integrity. (Also read CJP’s Hate Buster on this perennial slur against Indian Christians here.)
• “Chaddar and Father”: A rhyming slur used by Raju Das and Gautam Khattar to group Muslims and Christians into a single “alien threat,” often referred to as a “demonic illness” or a “cancer” that needs to be “cured” through violence.
• The “shoe” metaphor: In Haryana, Mahant Shukrai Nath Yogi explicitly stated he began wearing shoes specifically to “confront” missionaries, a metaphor for crushing and humiliating the “Other.” This was later echoed in Jhabua with slogans like “Isai ke dalalo ko, joote maaro saalo ko” (Beat the agents of Christianity with shoes). 

Conspiracy theories as political technology

Throughout 2025, conspiracy theories functioned as a key technology of mobilisation. The discourse of “love jihad,” initially directed at Muslims, was increasingly redeployed against Christians. Hindu nationalist leaders warned that Christian men were luring Hindu women into relationships to facilitate conversion, framing intimacy and marriage as weapons of religious warfare.

Equally pervasive was the narrative of “rice-bag conversions,” which cast Christian converts—especially Dalits and Adivasis—as morally weak, economically desperate, and incapable of exercising genuine choice. Conversion was framed not as conscience but as corruption. This discourse carried a deeply casteist subtext: it denied marginalised communities’ agency while reinforcing upper-caste paternalism.

Other conspiracies— “land jihad,” “drug jihad,” demographic replacement—were invoked to suggest that Christians operate through hidden networks aimed at destabilising Hindu society. The repetition of these narratives across regions points to ideological coordination rather than spontaneous fear.

Hate speech as infrastructure for violence

Hate speech in 2025 did not merely express prejudice; it actively prepared the ground for violence. Speeches openly called for social boycotts, forced reconversion, and the physical elimination of Christian presence. Chants advocating the destruction of missionaries crossed into explicit incitement.

Speakers frequently invoked mythological violence, comparing Christians to demons or invaders whose defeat was framed as a sacred duty. References to weapons, martial training, and vigilantism were common, signalling a shift from symbolic hostility to endorsement of physical force.

The impunity enjoyed by hate speakers is critical. Despite the public nature of these speeches, legal consequences were rare. The absence of state intervention functioned as tacit sanction, emboldening followers and normalising extremist rhetoric.

 Policing Worship: Raids, surveillance, and the criminalisation of Christian prayer

Throughout 2025, Christian worship—particularly prayer meetings held in private homes—became one of the most visible and repeatedly targeted sites of persecution. The incident record shows a consistent, cross-state pattern: Hindu nationalist groups would accuse Christians of engaging in forced or fraudulent conversions; mobs would arrive at prayer meetings, disrupt worship, and summon the police; law enforcement would then detain pastors or hosts, seize Bibles and religious material, and register cases under anti-conversion or public order laws.

These raids occurred across Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Odisha, and Chhattisgarh. In Uttar Pradesh alone, multiple prayer meetings were raided following complaints by Bajrang Dal or VHP activists, even when attendees stated on record that they were participating voluntarily. In several cases, worship was forcibly stopped mid-prayer, with congregants verbally abused, threatened with violence, or compelled to chant Hindu religious slogans.

In Maharashtra, women attending Bible study gatherings were filmed and interrogated by Hindu vigilantes, accused of illegal religious activity, and pressured to disclose personal information. In Bihar and Rajasthan, elderly worshippers and women were forced to disperse while pastors were taken to police stations for questioning. In Odisha, prayer gatherings were followed by police violence against worshippers, including physical assaults documented by fact-finding teams.

These incidents collectively establish that Christian worship itself was treated as presumptively illegal. The home—constitutionally protected as a private sphere—was transformed into a surveilled space where religious expression invited state intervention. The cumulative effect of these raids was not merely disruption but deterrence: Christians learned that gathering to pray could lead to public humiliation, arrest, and long-term harassment.

Instances:

1. Location: Mayapur, Sidhi, Madhya Pradesh

Date: January 17

Bajrang Dal members, led by Rishi Shukla, raided a Christian prayer meeting held at a household. They harassed the attendees, accused them of engaging in religious conversions, and called the police.

2. Location: Fatehpur, Uttar Pradesh

Date: January 27

Members of Bajrang Dal, along with the police, raided a Christian family’s house accusing them of engaging in religious conversion. They presented the Bibles in the house as evidence and arrested the couple.

3. Location: Khargapur, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh

Date: February 9

Members of the Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha attempted to raid a Christian Sunday prayer meeting held in a church at a residence, accusing the attendees of religious conversion. The police confirmed that the church is registered and holds regular prayer meetings but directed them to suspend gatherings until the investigation is complete.

4. Location: Bargarh, Odisha

Date: February 9

Members of Bajrang Dal raided a Christian prayer meeting, alleging forced religious conversions and demanding it be stopped. The attendees pushed back, questioning their authority. https://t.me/hindutvawatchin/1444

5. Location: Bikaner, Rajasthan

Date: February 16

Members of Bajrang Dal and Hindu Jagran Manch raided a Christian prayer meeting at a private residence, assaulting attendees and vandalising the property while accusing them of indulging in religious conversion. During the attack, they chanted slogans of “Jai Shree Ram” and “Narendra Modi Zindabad” as part of their protest. The police detained 6-7 individuals on accusations of religious conversion.

6. Location: Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh

Date: March 20

Members of Hindu nationalist organisations, led by Thakur Ram Singh and backed by the police, raided a Christian prayer meeting at a conference hall. They alleged that attendees were being trained to brainwash and convert Hindus. The police arrested three individuals acting on their complaint.

Anti-Conversion Laws: Legal architecture of suspicion and control

Anti-conversion laws operated throughout 2025 as the primary legal framework through which Christian life was criminalised. While framed as safeguards against coercion, the documented incidents show that these laws were overwhelmingly used against Christians on the basis of unverified complaints by Hindu nationalist groups rather than testimonies of affected individuals.

Across Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha, pastors, prayer leaders, and ordinary believers were arrested during or after prayer meetings. FIRs were registered even when alleged converts explicitly denied any force, inducement, or deception. In several Uttar Pradesh cases, police booked Christian couples or pastors under the state’s anti-conversion law solely because prayer was taking place in a domestic setting.

The first reported convictions of Christians under certain state anti-conversion laws marked a critical escalation. These convictions sent a chilling message beyond the individuals involved: Christian worship and evangelism—even when peaceful and consensual—could result in imprisonment. In Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, anti-conversion provisions were frequently combined with charges of unlawful assembly or public nuisance, enabling prolonged detention and heightened intimidation.

Rather than preventing coercion, these laws functioned as instruments of surveillance and discipline. They legitimised mob vigilance, emboldened police intervention, and transformed religious belief into a legally suspect activity.

Instances:

1. Location: Gokarna, Karnataka

Date: June 22

Far-right Hindu nationalists barged into a private Christian prayer meeting; instead of acting against the attackers, police filed an FIR against the worshippers over false conversion claims.

2. Location: Burhanpur, Madhya Pradesh

Date: June 25

Far-right Hindu nationalists brutally stripped, beat, and interrogated Adivasi Christians, falsely accusing them of religious conversions. Police filed an FIR against six Christians, while the attackers faced no action. As the video went viral, demands grew to prosecute the assailants, who, according to the victims, are upper-caste men affiliated with the Bajrang Dal.

Police complicity and administrative alignment

The role of the police across the documented incidents reveals a systemic collapse of institutional neutrality. In numerous cases, police arrived at prayer meetings alongside Hindu nationalist mobs or acted directly on their complaints without independent verification. Christians were detained, questioned, or arrested, while aggressors were rarely booked.

In Uttar Pradesh, there were repeated instances where pastors were detained while the individuals who disrupted worship faced no consequences. In one incident, a pastor’s wife was arrested following an attack on their prayer meeting, while those who assaulted the congregation went uncharged. In Odisha, fact-finding reports documented police assaulting Christian worshippers—including children and priests—during raids on church premises.

Administrative authorities also played a role in reinforcing exclusion. In Chhattisgarh villages where Christian families were denied burial rights, sarpanches and local officials justified the exclusion as adherence to “local custom.” Police were present during several burial denials yet failed to intervene, effectively endorsing the discrimination.

This alignment between police, administration, and vigilante groups produced a regime of structural impunity. Christians were left without effective legal recourse, trapped between mob violence and state hostility.

Institutional response and media coverage

Despite the violence, high-level official response was muted. Occasionally courts intervened (e.g. Supreme Court rebuked Chhattisgarh in the tribal burial case), but on the whole, police and governments largely upheld anti-conversion crackdowns. In regions where BJP governments held power, anti-Christian laws were zealously enforced (e.g. first UP conviction). BJP leaders voiced no regret over extremists’ speeches, and sometimes echoed the fear rhetoric themselves.

Mainstream media coverage of anti-Christian incidents in 2025 frequently diluted their communal character. Raids on prayer meetings were framed as routine law-and-order actions; burial denials were described as village disputes; arrests under anti-conversion laws were reported without scrutiny of evidentiary basis.

By contrast, independent media outlets and civil society organisations documented patterns across states, tracking hate speeches, arrests, and coordinated attacks. Their reporting reveals the scale, consistency, and ideological coherence of the persecution that mainstream narratives often obscured.

This narrative dilution played a crucial role in normalisation. When violence is fragmented into isolated events and stripped of its structural context, it becomes easier for society and institutions to accept persecution as ordinary governance rather than constitutional breakdown.

In summary, the institutional picture is one of complicity or wilful negligence. Police frequently treated Christian worship as a crime, and only rarely held Hindu attackers accountable. For example, after mobs raided an Odisha village burning Bibles, local police were slow to file charges; journalists had to push coverage for any action. Even when arrests were made, they were usually of Christians under anti-conversion laws (not the mobs). Several incident reports note explicitly that police either joined the persecutors (as at Bilaspur, CG) or simply failed to prevent ongoing intimidation.

Denial of Dignity: Burials, death, and civil exclusion

One of the most severe and symbolically devastating forms of persecution documented in 2025 was the repeated denial of burial rights to Christians. In multiple villages in Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh, Christian families—often Dalit or Adivasi—were prevented from burying their dead in common burial grounds.

In several incidents, families were forced to transport bodies over long distances to find a place for burial, sometimes under police escort. In one prominent case, the denial of burial to an elderly Christian man in a tribal area prompted judicial intervention, with higher courts reprimanding the state for failing to protect basic dignity.

Other incidents reveal even harsher coercion: local leaders demanded that families undergo reconversion to Hinduism as a condition for allowing burial. These acts were not spontaneous expressions of social prejudice but organised practices of exclusion, enforced through threats and administrative inaction.

Denial of burial constitutes a form of civil death. It communicates that Christians are excluded from the moral and social community—not only in life, but even in death. These practices closely mirror historical caste-based exclusions, revealing how religious persecution in 2025 intersected with entrenched hierarchies of purity and pollution. The denial of burial is the ultimate expression of “Otherisation.” It suggests that the Christian body is so “alien” that it cannot even be permitted to decompose in the soil of its own homeland.

Instances:

1. Location: Surat, Gujarat

Date: February 1

Hindu nationalists, led by Narendra Choudhary, forced out a group of Christian individuals who had come to collect a man’s body for burial. The Christian group claimed that the man was Christian and the family called them. However, the goons accused them of forcefully converting Hindus, and made them leave along with the coffin.

2. Location: Sanaud, Durg, Chhattisgarh

Date: May 26

During the burial of a Christian woman, villagers—pressured by Hindu nationalists and a village sarpanch sympathetic to Hindu nationalist ideology—refused to allow her burial at the public Muktidham, claiming the land was reserved for Adivasi tribals. Despite the presence of police and the SDM, officials did not intervene. The family buried her 30 km away in Dhamtari.

3. Location: Parsoda, Durg, Chhattisgarh

Date: December 8

Members of VHP-Bajrang Dal, along with other villagers, staged a protest opposing the burial of an 85-year-old Dalit Christian man in the public cremation ground. Tension escalated as both sides refused to back down. Police intervened to control the situation. Authorities later directed the family to bury the body on their privately owned land instead of the public cremation ground.

Cultural Erasure: Festivals, symbols, institutions, and public space

Beyond physical violence and legal harassment, 2025 witnessed sustained attempts to erase Christian presence from public and cultural life. Christmas celebrations were repeatedly targeted. In Gujarat, shopkeepers were threatened and pressured to remove Christmas decorations and religious items. In other states, public displays associated with Christian festivals were portrayed as cultural provocation.

Educational institutions also came under pressure. Universities and colleges cancelled lectures or academic events following objections by Hindu nationalist groups alleging religious propaganda. These cancellations extended the logic of persecution into intellectual and cultural spaces, framing even discussion of Christianity as suspect.

Church structures and prayer halls were demolished or sealed in parts of Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh, often with administrative backing. These actions were justified on technical or zoning grounds, masking their communal intent. The cumulative effect was the shrinking of public space available to Christians for worship, celebration, and community life.

Cultural erasure complemented physical violence by rendering Christianity increasingly invisible, reinforcing the message that Christian identity must remain private, silent, and subordinate.

A detailed report may be read here.

Territorial Warfare – Schools and the battle for the mind

In 2025, the “Otherisation” project moved into the classroom. Christian missionary schools—long respected for their contribution to Indian education—were reframed as “conversion factories.”

Forcible ritualism: In Hojai, Assam (Feb 14), the Rashtriya Bajrang Dal staged a Saraswati Puja at the gates of a Christian school. This was an act of “territorial marking,” asserting that the majority’s rituals must supersede the school’s private character.

Iconoclasm and dress codes: In Burhanpur, MP, the removal of a plaque with a quote from Jesus Christ illustrated a desire to scrub the public landscape of Christian thought. Furthermore, leaders like Suresh Chavhanke attacked the very attire of Christian teachers, labeling “Isai dress” as a psychological threat to children. By attacking the symbols and clothes of the community, the movement sought to make the Christian presence invisible.

Intersectionality: Caste, tribe, gender, and the differential impact of persecution

The incidents recorded in 2025 demonstrate that anti-Christian persecution operated through intersecting axes of vulnerability. Dalit and Adivasi Christians were disproportionately affected. In tribal regions of Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh, Christian families faced threats of eviction, social boycott, denial of burial, and forced reconversion.

Conversion among marginalised communities was framed as betrayal—both of Hindu religion and of caste order. This framing justified intensified punishment and surveillance. The language used against Dalit and Adivasi Christians often echoed older casteist tropes of impurity and contamination.

Intersectionality magnified vulnerability: faith, caste, tribe, and gender converged to produce heightened exposure to violence and exclusion. Analysis of the data shows that Hindu militants often targeted socially vulnerable Christians. Tribal and Dalit Christians were singled out in multiple incidents. For example, in Durg (Chhattisgarh) villagers blocked the burial of an 85-year-old Dalit Christian man at the public ground, explicitly citing tribal land rights to exclude him. Similarly, a tribal Christian woman in Sanaud was denied a resting place at the village cremation ground. In Assam, Hindutva leaders accused Christian missionaries of undermining tribal society, part of a broader narrative of “protecting Adivasi culture” from conversion. In Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand, Christian converts from local tribes or Dalit castes were especially vulnerable to accusations of “stealing” tribals from Hindu fold (for example the Khapabhat raid).

Gender was another axis. Women were often the direct targets of conversion gossip and social pressure. Incidents in Mumbai and West Bengal show women being publicly humiliated for their faith. Even when men were attacked, their Christian daughters and wives were threatened – e.g. a Kanker (Chhattisgarh) case where girls were shouted at to renounce Christianity under threat of eviction. The logic of “protecting Hindu women” underpinned many hate speeches and attacks. The intersection of gender and religion thus magnified the harassment of female Christians, who were portrayed as spoils of conversion conspiracies.

Caste bias intersected: several persecuted Christian families belonged to lower castes. In several villages, families were pressured to sign documents renouncing Christianity or face ostracism. A MaktoobMedia report notes tribal families in one Chhattisgarh village were forced to sign a “pact” to convert back within days. Even police actions showed caste dimensions: often the accused Christians were Tribals or Dalits, while the accusers were higher-caste Hindus. These layers of caste and gender made it harder for Christian victims to seek redress, as local power structures favoured the Hindu aggressors.

Geography and Escalation: From local attacks to a national pattern

The incidents span much of India, but some states saw particularly high frequency. Uttar Pradesh (37 incidents in the list) and Madhya Pradesh (35) were the worst-hit, reflecting both active VHP-Bajrang Dal chapters and strict anti-conversion laws. These states witnessed many police raids on pastors and prayer meetings, as well as major hate rallies. Chhattisgarh (26 incidents) was also notable, partly due to its large tribal Christian population and local Hindu chauvinist cells (Chhattisgarh saw everything from villages denying burials to BJP-minister-led hate speeches). In the West, Maharashtra (17 incidents) had frequent church raids (e.g. Mumbai and Nashik) and provocative temple ceremonies near Christian schools. Gujarat (9 incidents) saw actions like forcing shopkeepers to curb Christmas sales and at least one case of Bajrang Dal harassment of a Christian family. Eastern and southern states were not immune: Odisha and Bengal had mob attacks on Christians (Odisha families were violently threatened in June; a Bengal mob forcibly imposed a tulsi shrine on a Christian home). Even Nepal’s Terai region saw hate speeches against Christians in January, showing the cross-border spread of these narratives.

Temporally, incidents clustered around Hindu religious or national events. January (just after Ram Mandir consecration) saw several hate-speech gatherings (e.g. Garhwa, Jharkhand) and anti-Christmas actions. February–March featured VHP-sponsored school pujas and rallies (e.g. Saraswati Puja disruptions, several raids by Bajrang Dal). Notably, the highest count was in September (26 incidents) – a period when state elections (e.g. Chhattisgarh MP, Mizoram) and Hindu festivals like Ganesh Chaturthi took place, possibly spurring extremist visibility. Another spike came in December (19 incidents), reflecting year-end polarization (for example, arrests after Republic Day protests).

Overall, the pattern is escalatory and sustained: incidents continued each month with shifting focus (speech rallies give way to mob actions and police crackdowns). No period saw a complete lull. The unbroken string of events from January to December suggests a systemic campaign rather than isolated flare-ups.

Role of Hindu nationalist (read supremacist) organisations

A clear pattern emerges in the perpetrators: the vast majority are linked to Hindu nationalist groups. Bajrang Dal and VHP feature in almost every state account. Bajrang Dal cadres raided prayer meetings in UP, Bihar, MP and Maharashtra, often accompanied by police. The VHP sponsored large events preaching anti-Christian rhetoric (e.g. press conferences in MP, strategy meetings in Balaghat). RSS-affiliated outfits also took part: for example, at an Adivasi conference in Alirajpur (MP), BJP minister Nagarsingh Chauhan warned that Christian conversions among tribals would ignite conflict. The Ayodhya and Kumbh events were spurred by RSS leaders advocating armed “self-defense.”

Smaller groups like Hindu Jagran Manch (HJM) and Hindu Mahasabha were also active. In Mumbai and Assam, HJM members disrupted prayer services and harassed congregants. The Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha attempted to storm a Lucknow church on February 9. These fringe groups often coordinate with VHP-Bajrang Dal outings (e.g. marking Trishul Deeksha ceremonies), using religion to justify street aggression.

Major BJP politicians and influencers lent indirect support. BJP MPs like Bhojraj Nag (Chhattisgarh) equated tribals converting to Christianity with “anti-national activities,” even misquoting the Supreme Court to forbid Christian cremations in Fifth Schedule areas. Some state BJP leaders shared or did not repudiate extremist podium speeches – in Maharashtra a BJP adviser sanctioned Dhananjay Desai’s hate speech on “holy places in Arabia and Vatican”. More subtly, no major party figure vigorously condemned these attacks; indeed, BJP-run state administrations have often defended anti-conversion laws or appealed for Hindu unity in the name of nationalism, tacitly encouraging extremists. Even government-published Hindu religious calendars made headlines by warning Hindus to avoid Christian places (e.g. Andhra Pradesh’s 2025 calendar, though not in our incidents list, followed this trend).

Outside activists have noted this complicity. Christian organisations have written to top officials (including Prime Minister’s office and Human Rights Commission), highlighting that “even the dead aren’t spared” – as one film-maker put it of Pastor Baghel’s burial case. These groups point out that ultra-right vigilantes enjoy de facto impunity in many regions, and allege that local administrations either support or ignore anti-Christian mobs.

Summary of patterns

The 2025 incidents demonstrate systematic persecution of Christians driven by organized hate ideology. Key patterns include:

• Recurring hate narratives: Leaders regularly invoked conspiracies (“love jihad,” “conversion rackets,” foreign backing) that framed Christianity as a national danger. These narratives guided the actions of mobs and organizers.
• Coordinated militant actions: Groups like Bajrang Dal, VHP, RSS-affiliates, and vigilante outfits colluded in raids on homes and churches across multiple states.
• State-sanctioned harassment: Many raids and arrests were carried out jointly by Bajrang Dal activists and police or by police on Hindutva complaints. This shows institutional bias in enforcing anti-conversion laws.
• Geographic hotspots: While nearly every region saw incidents, UP, MP, Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra stand out as epicenters of legal and physical assaults. Eastern states saw new forms of intimidation (e.g. forced religious homicides in Odisha and West Bengal).
• Cultural marginalisation: Attacks extended beyond physical violence to cultural exclusion: Christian festivals and symbols were suppressed (Christmas items banned), burials were obstructed, and Christian education was targeted.
• Intersectional targeting: Marginalised-caste and tribal Christians, as well as women, bore the brunt of violence. Social prejudices overlapped – e.g. Dalit Christians faced casteist burial bans, and women were singled out in conversion narratives.

In all, the compiled data from 2025 indicates an organised campaign of persecution rather than sporadic incidents. The interplay of hate speech (spread at public events and online), legal tools (anti-conversion laws, biased policing) and communal violence paints a picture of institutionalized harassment. Right-wing groups exploited narratives of national security and cultural purity to justify attacks. Without accountability or countervailing political will, Christians remained vulnerable to both mob violence and state repression throughout the year.

Conclusion: 2025 as a year of systemic otherisation and constitutional breakdown

The year 2025 was not just a year of “attacks”; it was a year of “erasure.” The data shows a community being systematically pushed out of the public square, the classroom, the legal system, and the graveyard.

The “Otherisation” of Christians in 2025 was achieved by:

1. Stripping Agency: Treating all conversion as “bribed” or “forced.”
2. Stripping Dignity: Using slurs and physical humiliation (shoes, sticks).
3. Stripping Territory: Removing Christian symbols from schools and bodies from villages.

The incidents of 2025 serve as a stark warning. When the state and the mob align to define who is a “true” citizen based on faith, the very concept of a secular, democratic India is under existential threat. The Christian community in 2025 became the “canary in the coal mine,” signalling a broader collapse of constitutional values and the rise of a majoritarian order that seeks to define India not by its diversity, but by its exclusions.

The incidents documented across 2025 do not describe a series of unfortunate excesses or isolated communal flare-ups. Taken together, they reveal a systematic process of otherisation in which Christians were progressively stripped of constitutional protection, civic dignity, and social legitimacy. What emerges is not episodic violence, but a patterned regime of control.

Christian worship was transformed into an object of suspicion; prayer became a trigger for police action. Anti-conversion laws supplied the legal vocabulary through which belief itself was criminalised, while vigilante accusations were absorbed seamlessly into state action. Policing practices collapsed the distinction between complainant and accused, allowing mobs to function as de facto extensions of law enforcement. Even death did not interrupt exclusion: burial denials marked the most extreme assertion that Christians could be expelled from the moral community altogether.

Equally significant was the attempt to erase Christianity from public and cultural space. Festivals were suppressed, symbols removed, institutions pressured into silence. This shrinking of visibility worked alongside physical violence to communicate a single message: Christian identity was permissible only if invisible, silent, and politically irrelevant.

The media’s fragmentation of these events into localised disputes completed the architecture of persecution. By denying structural context, public discourse neutralised outrage and normalised exclusion. Violence became governance; discrimination became administration.

The persecution of Christians in 2025 must therefore be understood as a constitutional failure. When freedom of religion is subordinated to majoritarian ideology, equality before law becomes illusory. When police and administration align with prejudice, citizenship fractures along religious lines. The question raised by 2025 is not merely about the safety of one minority, but about the survivability of secular democracy itself.

2025 stands as a warning year — a record of how swiftly constitutional guarantees can be hollowed out when law, institutions, and public narratives are mobilised against a community. Ignoring this record risks accepting a future in which belonging is conditional, rights are selective, and democracy itself becomes exclusionary by design.

The analysis above is based entirely on incidents documented in the provided compilation.

References:

The article also lists the following external references, which corroborate and expand on these events:

• https://maktoobmedia.com/india/sc-slams-chhattisgarh-govt-as-tribal-christian-man-unable-to-bury-father/
• https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/were-pained-supreme-court-on-plea-of-christian-man-unable-to-bury-father-in-native-village-in-chhattisgarh-281453
• https://maktoobmedia.com/india/christian-collective-reports-245-incidents-of-violence-against-christians-within-the-last-3-months-in-india/
• https://thewire.in/communalism/chhattisgarh-christian-family-hounded-by-hindutva-mob-forced-into-hiding-police-refuses-fir#:~:text=Zeeshan%20Kaskar,church%20service%20was%20in%20progress.
•  https://persecution.org/2025/01/27/christian-husband-wife-first-to-be-convicted-under-anti-conversion-law/
• https://www.ucanews.com/news/police-arrest-7-indian-christians-for-conversion-on-republic-day/107706
• https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil-nadu/2025/Mar/10/university-of-madras-cancels-lecture-on-christianity-after-social-media-backlash
• https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kerala/pc-george-stirs-another-controversy-calls-for-early-marriage-of-christian-girls-citing-love-jihad/article69313391.ece
• https://sabrangindia.in/from-protectors-to-perpetrators-police-assaulted-women-children-christian-priests-in-odisha-fact-finding-report/    
• https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/hindu-extremists-threaten-genocide-against-christians
• https://persecution.org/2025/06/30/hindu-nationalist-mob-attacks-20-christian-families-in-odisha/
• https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kerala/church-mouthpiece-slams-bjps-double-standards-amid-push-to-woo-christians-in-kerala/article69809988.ece
• https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/pune/christian-groups-protest-mla-padalkars-religious-leaders-10114467/
• https://muslimmirror.com/tamil-nadu-dalit-christians-allege-denial-of-entry-from-church-rituals-stage-protest-demanding-swift-action/ 
• https://cjp.org.in/no-rest-even-in-death-christians-in-india-and-the-growing-targeted-violence-in-chhattisgarh/
• https://www.christiandaily.com/news/church-members-in-india-afraid-to-attend-worship-after-assault

[1] This is a propaganda outcome of the original hardline far right argument for a ‘Hindu nation’originally conceived by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in his book, written in the Cellular Jail under the title “Essentials pf Hindutva” in 1923. Characterising the ‘Hindu’ through Religion, Faith, Nationality and Belonging he coined the phrashes ‘Pitrabhoomi’ (Land of the Ancestors, Fatherland) and ‘Punyabhoomi’ (Holy Land). By extension of this exclusivist definition, the loyalty and belonging of ‘others’ like Christians and Muslims is forever in question because their points of worship and faith lie outside the geographical boundaries of the nation.

The post The Siege of Faith: A year-long analysis of the persecution and otherisation of Christians in India appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The complaint underscores how Shingla’s speech—delivered from the stage of a Hanuman Katha organised by Dayanidhi Dham Seva Sanstha—constituted a deliberate attempt to weaponise religion, gender, and fear to polarise the electorate and vitiate the electoral atmosphere in one of India’s most diverse and politically sensitive cities.

A religious platform turned into a site of electoral polarisation

According to the complaint, the Model Code of Conduct came into effect on December 15, 2025, following the announcement of municipal elections. Despite this, Shingla used a religious congregation to propagate the discredited and incendiary conspiracy theory of “love jihad”, making sweeping allegations against Muslim men and publicly demeaning Muslim women in language that was both communal and gendered.

At the event, she claimed that her organisation or associates had “brought back 2,500 women in Mumbai from Abduls”—a statement that uses a Muslim name as a proxy for criminality and casts interfaith relationships as coercive, conspiratorial, and inherently illegitimate. The complaint notes that such assertions are not only entirely unverified, but mirror a pattern of rhetoric repeatedly rejected by courts and investigating agencies for lacking any factual basis.

Gendered hate speech and the public shaming of Muslim identity

One of the most disturbing aspects of the speech, as highlighted by CJP, was Shingla’s exhortation to the crowd through the slogan: “Be Durga, be Kali, never be a ‘burqewali.’”

The complaint explains that this slogan operates on multiple levels of harm: it pits Hindu religious symbolism against Muslim identity, portrays Muslim women as objects of shame, and urges the rejection—indeed erasure—of Muslim identity in public life. By instrumentalising women’s bodies and choices to advance a communal narrative, the speech amounts to gendered hate speech, intensifying religious hostility through misogyny.

The video of the speech, now widely circulated online and annexed with the complaint, shows Shingla repeatedly mobilising fear and suspicion by invoking religion, gender, and an imagined Muslim threat before a public audience.

Clear and multiple violations of the Model Code of Conduct

CJP’s complaint details how the speech violates core prohibitions under Part I of the Model Code of Conduct, including:

• Appeals to religion to influence voters
• Use of religious platforms and events for political mobilisation
• Statements that promote hatred and aggravate differences between communities
• Campaign practices that corrupt the free and fair electoral environment

Importantly, the complaint stresses that the MCC applies not only to candidates, but also to any individual whose actions are intended to influence the political climate during elections—a principle repeatedly affirmed by the Election Commission in past cases.

Offences under the Representation of the People Act, 1951

Beyond the MCC, the complaint invokes serious statutory violations under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, including:

• Section 123(3): Appeal to religion, through the invocation of Hindu deities in opposition to Muslim identity
• Section 123(3A): Promotion of enmity and hatred between religious communities
• Section 125: Promoting enmity in connection with elections, a penal offence

CJP argues that Shingla’s speech squarely falls within these provisions, as it was delivered during an election period and was designed to reshape political consciousness along religious lines.

Assault on constitutional values of equality, dignity, and secularism

The complaint situates the speech within a broader constitutional framework, warning that such rhetoric strikes at the heart of India’s constitutional order. By collectively stereotyping Muslims, demeaning Muslim women, and legitimising religious exclusion, the speech violates:

• Article 14 (Equality before the law)
• Article 15 (Non-discrimination on religious grounds)
• Article 21 (Right to dignity, particularly of women)
• The secular, egalitarian, and fraternal values enshrined in the Preamble

CJP notes that the Supreme Court has consistently held that inflammatory speech and incitement cannot be shielded by free speech, especially in the electoral context where the stakes involve democratic participation and social peace.

Threat to free and fair elections in a plural city

Mumbai’s religious diversity makes it particularly vulnerable to the consequences of such polarising rhetoric. The complaint warns that speeches like Shingla’s:

• Create fear and mistrust between communities
• Intimidate minority voters and suppress participation
• Normalise communal hostility as a political strategy
• Risk triggering social tension and unrest

Allowing such conduct to go unchecked, CJP argues, would erode the level playing field essential to democratic elections.

Accountability of event organisers

The complaint also flags the role of Dayanidhi Dham Seva Sanstha, the organiser of the Hanuman Katha, for allowing a religious platform to be used for communal mobilisation during the election period. CJP reminds the Election Commission that organisers of religious events cannot abdicate responsibility when their platforms are used to violate electoral norms.

CJP’s demand for immediate and decisive action

In its prayer, CJP has urged the State Election Commission of Maharashtra to:

• Take immediate cognisance of the complaint and video evidence
• Initiate proceedings under the Model Code of Conduct against Kajal Shingla
• Restrain her from making further communal speeches during the election period
• Examine the role of the organising body
• Issue a general advisory reaffirming that religious platforms cannot be used for communal propaganda during elections.

The complete complaint may be read here.

Related:

From Fringe to Framework: How AHP’s hate ecosystem reconfigured law, society, and electoral politics

Communal Dog-Whistles in an Election Season: CJP flags hate speech by BJP’s Ameet Satam to election authorities

From Hate Speech to State Action: How communal vigilantism at Malabar Hill continues unchecked

CJP flags serial inflammatory speeches by Kalicharan Maharaj, seeks urgent action over repeated calls for Muslim exclusion and vigilantism

The post Complaint exposes misuse of religious event to inflame fear and violate electoral norms in Mumbai appeared first on SabrangIndia.

“This report does not critique religion or its festivals. It examines whether public religious mobilisations are being used to spread exclusionary rhetoric and whether authorities are responding.”

Background: Sanatan Hindu Ekta Padyatra

Launched by prominent right-wing Hindutva leaders, the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra is being promoted as a socio-spiritual movement. Led by Dhirendra Krishna Shastri of Bageshwar Dham, the yatra was flagged off from Delhi with the stated objectives of establishing a Hindu nation, eradicating casteism, and fostering social unity. Scheduled from November 7 to 16, it passed through 422 village panchayats across Delhi, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh.

As part of the campaign, seven resolutions were announced, like promoting social harmony and supporting the “grand construction” of the Shri Janmabhoomi temple. The controversy primarily stems from the first and central resolution: the demand to declare India a Hindu Rashtra. This directly conflicts with the Constitution’s commitment to a secular state and violates the guarantees of freedom of religion under Article 25 as well as equality and non-discrimination under Articles 14 and 15.

However, the publicly stated resolutions tell only part of the story. Across multiple stops in Delhi, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh, several speakers, including the Padyatra’s principal organisers, delivered inflammatory speeches that went far beyond calls for spiritual unity or social harmony. These speeches invoked communal conspiracy theories (“love jihad,” “land jihad”), portrayed Muslims as demographic threats, justified vigilante violence, and openly advocated for religious segregation and economic boycotts. Many of these statements raise serious concerns under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), and established Supreme Court jurisprudence on hate speech and incitement. 

Details of the Hate Speech Delivered

Below is a consolidated analysis of the most objectionable statements made during the Sanatan Hindu Ekta Padyatra, grouped under 3 main themes and mapped against the relevant legal frameworks.
The reference links of the speeches, with timestamps mentioned, are given below-

Ghaziabad, Nov 3

Palwal, Nov 10

Palwal, Nov 12

Chhatarpur, Nov 14

Faridabad, Nov 8

Banchari, Nov 12

Mathura, Nov 15

Palwal, Haryana, Nov 10

Banchari, Nov 12

A.  Direct Hate Speech (Violence, Hostility, Social Boycott)

(Statements advocating violence, hostility, coercion, or social/economic boycott; calls for expulsion; explicit majoritarian supremacy)

Across multiple stops of the Sanatan Hindu Ekta Padyatra, speakers issued direct calls that clearly cross the constitutional threshold into incitement as interpreted in Amish Devgan and Shreya Singhal. In Ghaziabad (Nov 3), the speaker declared that India “should become a Hindu Rashtra” (0:39–0:42) and added that population decline “should happen to those who follow the ‘chadar’ and the ‘father’,” (1:17–1:20) a statement which the Supreme Court would classify as high-intensity dehumanising hate speech. Similarly, in Palwal (Nov 10), a public oath was taken to ensure that “love jihad and aaved dharmantaran will not be allowed” (0:20–0:27), effectively encouraging vigilantism against interfaith couples and converts. Under Patricia Mukhim, such statements, though framed as “protection,” amount to direct incitement toward unlawful acts.

In Delhi (Nov 7), hostility was escalated through demographic-war rhetoric: “tumhari sampatti tumhari hogi, kabza unka hoga” (2:30–2:44), and by invoking civilisational conflict through “ye desh Babar ka nahi, Raghuvar ka hai” (2:58–3:02). The Court in Amish Devgan specifically flagged the use of derogatory historical figures to mobilise hatred in the present. In Faridabad (Nov 10), a speaker warned: “jab desh lutega… tumhari beti love jihad mei pad jayegi… tumhara beta jis din shukravar ko jaane lagega,” (2:34–2:56) creating a direct incentive to treat Muslim men as targets of suspicion and implying moral justifications for coercive action.

Following the Delhi car blast, Dhirendra Shastri, addressing Palwal (Nov 12), asked: “yehi (Muslims) kyu aatangwadi hote hain?” (0:27–0:39), treating the entire community as terrorists. He further warned that unless Hindus united, bomb blasts like Delhi would occur “in every gali” (0:57–1:26), which satisfies the proximity test under Shreya Singhal. In Chhatarpur, MP (Nov 14), dissenters to Hindu symbols were told to “get their ticket to Lahore” (0:00–0:13), echoing classic expulsion rhetoric the Court has treated as unprotected. The chant recorded in Faridabad (Nov 8) — “tel lagao Dabur ka, naam mita do Babur ka; jo Ram ka nahi wo kisi kaam ka nahi” — directly targets Muslims through symbolic eradication. In Banchari, Palwal (Nov 12), speakers vowed to conduct compulsory “ghar wapsi” for those who had “left Sanatan” (0:29–0:46), amounting to a call for coercive reconversion, contrary to Shafin Jahan (Hadiya), which protects decisional autonomy in matters of faith.

Finally, in Mathura (Nov 15), spiritual leader Devkinandan Thakur invoked the Babri Masjid demolition (“4:20–4:50”) while urging the crowd to “move toward Mathura and Vrindavan,” hinting at mobilisation to claim the Shahi Idgah Mosque. The Supreme Court in the Ayodhya judgment warned that religious disputes must not be weaponised for incitement. These statements collectively amount to direct hate speech under Indian constitutional and criminal jurisprudence.

B. Discriminatory / Exclusionary “Othering”

(Normalising prejudice, othering minorities, delegitimising citizenship, religious tests for belonging)

Several speeches sought to redefine citizenship and community belonging in expressly exclusionary terms. In Ghaziabad (Nov 3), the speaker framed Hindu women as victims of Muslim men by warning that “our daughters fall into love jihad” (0:44–1:01), establishing a stereotype that casts Muslim men as predatory. He also suggested that Hindus “are not extremist,” implying that extremism is inherent to other communities (1:32–1:39). Such rhetorical othering aligns with what Patricia Mukhim describes as hate speech that delegitimises equal citizenship.

In Delhi (Nov 7), converts were described as outsiders: “Hindu issai mei converted hota hai toh ‘sister’ aur ‘sir’ kehlata hai… Hindu Musalman mei converted hota hai toh ‘bhai-jaan, amma-jaan’ kehlata hai,” followed by a suggestion that Hindus should first identify only as “Hindu” before any caste label (1:47–2:22). This constructs religious identity as the sole marker of national legitimacy. In Haryana (Nov 10), the crowd was asked if they want to see their children “wearing topi” or “going to church on Sunday” (0:04–0:25), depicting basic religious expression by minorities as inherently undesirable. The line “jab topi walo ki ekta ho sakti, toh tilak walo ki kyu nahi” (0:30–0:37) frames religious groups as competing blocs, contradicting the constitutional ideal of fraternity.

Kajal Hindusthani, in Palwal (Nov 10), urged the crowd to “be Hindus, buy from Hindus, employ only Hindus” (0:20–0:33), an explicit economic boycott. Section 196 of BNS emphasises that no citizen can be coerced into religious conformity; here, exclusion is extended to everyday economic life. In Chhatarpur (Nov 14), slogans like “jo Ram ka nahi, wo kisi kaam ka nahi” (0:24–0:33) reduce non-Hindus to second-class status. The DNA-testing analogy used to delegitimise dissenter’s mirrors what Amish Devgan classifies as dehumanising metaphors, which have no constitutional protection. In Banchari (Nov 12), Nagendra Maharaj’s line— “those who object to Vande Mataram or Ram should go to Pakistan or Afghanistan” (0:33–0:41)—constructs a religious test for belonging, contrary to the secular character upheld repeatedly by the Supreme Court.

Such statements normalise hostility and social exclusion, and the Court in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan explicitly warned that such majoritarian narratives fuel discrimination and justify vigilantism, attracting Sections 196 (Promoting enmity between different groups), Section 197 (assertions prejudicial to national integration), and Section 299 (Deliberate acts, intended to outrage religious feelings).

C. Fearmongering & Demographic Conspiracy Claims

(Alarmist misinformation about population, survival, territorial takeover; invoking existential threat narratives)

A consistent theme throughout the padyatra was the portrayal of Hindus as being on the verge of demographic extinction. In Ghaziabad (Nov 3), the speaker claimed that Hindus are “khatam ho rahe hai” despite India’s overwhelming Hindu majority, and that once “Hindus do not unite, they will not be safe” (1:55–2:06). He also asserted that Hindus are declining “day by day” (1:04–1:16), ignoring census realities. This comes under spreading demographic conspiracy narratives constitutes incitement because it fosters suspicion and hostility against minorities.

In Delhi (Nov 7), the crowd was told that “20 saal baad, Bharat ka Hindu apne astitva ki ladai lad raha hoga” (0:38–), and that minorities would seize Hindu property: “sampatti tumhari hogi, kabza unka hoga” (2:30–2:44). Such claims resemble classic “replacement” conspiracy theories. When combined with militaristic lines like “na toh pad rehna hai, na kad rehna hai” (0:55–0:58), the rhetoric urges mobilisation against an imagined security threat. In Haryana (Nov 10), Partition was invoked (“Jinnah ki leadership mein… alag Pakistan bana”), followed by an analogy that if “Sanatan Dharma ke naam par” India does not become a Hindu Rashtra, it will face a “Bangladesh-like situation” where “haq kisi aur ka hoga” (1:53–2:06). The Supreme Court in Pravasi Bhalai explicitly noted that selective historical parallels are often used to trigger fear and justify majoritarian aggression.

After the Delhi blast, Dhirendra Shastri claimed that unless Hindus unite, “aisa har gali mein hoga” (0:57–1:26), and asserted that the arrested individual— “doctor, musalman… crore-o ki jaan lene ki tayaari”—was preparing mass murder, furthering the narrative that Muslims pose a blanket existential threat. Fear of demographic loss was also invoked repeatedly: in Delhi (Nov 7), the claim that Hindus have become minorities in “9 states” is factually incorrect yet presented as imminent collapse. In Banchari (Nov 12), Nagendra Maharaj warned that Hindus could be “expelled from their homes like Srinagar,” framing political developments as religious persecution.

Such narratives fall squarely within the Supreme Court’s treatment of misinformation that has a proximate connection to public disorder (Shreya Singhal). Fearmongering of this kind shifts the public mindset from coexistence to hostility, creating conditions for violence without issuing explicit violent commands.

Legal Framework

India’s constitutional and statutory framework places clear limits on speech that promotes enmity, incites violence, or undermines the country’s secular structure. Several statements delivered during the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra appear to contravene these provisions.

Constitutional Provisions

Various provisions of the Indian Constitution safeguard against hate speech and communal othering.

1. Article 14 — Equality before law

Communal othering, demographic fear-mongering, and calls for exclusion (“be Hindus, buy only from Hindus”) violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection to all communities.

2. Article 15 — Non-discrimination on grounds of religion

Calls for a ‘Hindu Rashtra’, alongside statements urging economic segregation, employment discrimination, or “ghar wapsi” of all converts, contradict the constitutional prohibition against discrimination on religious grounds.

3. Article 19(1)(a) & 19(2) — Freedom of speech and its reasonable restrictions

Speech that threatens public order, incites violence, or promotes communal disharmony falls squarely within the restrictions permitted under Article 19(2).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that advocacy crossing into incitement is not protected speech.

4. Article 25 — Freedom of religion

Sections of the BNS

1. Section 196 of BNS: Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony

(1) Whoever—

• by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or through electronic communication or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities; or Liability of owner, occupier, etc., of land on which an unlawful assembly or riot takes place. Affray. Assaulting or obstructing a public servant when suppressing a riot, etc.
  (b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity;

2. Section 197 of BNS: Imputations, assertions prejudicial to national integration.

(1) Whoever, by words either spoken or written or by signs or by visible representations or through electronic communication or otherwise, —

(a) makes or publishes any imputation that any class of persons cannot, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established or uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India; or

(c) makes or publishes any assertion, counsel, plea or appeal concerning the obligation of any class of persons, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, and such assertion, counsel, plea or appeal causes or is likely to cause disharmony or feelings of enmity or hatred or ill-will between such members and other persons; or

3. Section 299: Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs. 

Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or through electronic means or otherwise, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

4. Section 352: Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace.

 Whoever intentionally insults in any manner, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

5. Section 353: Statements conducing to public mischief.

 (1) Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement, false information, rumour, or report, including through electronic means—

(b) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public, or to any section of the public whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or against the public tranquillity; or

(c) with intent to incite, or which is likely to incite, any class or community of persons to commit any offence against any other class or community, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

Judicial Precedents

Indian constitutional jurisprudence has consistently sought to balance freedom of expression with the imperative of preserving public order, equality, and the secular fabric of the nation. While there is no universally accepted definition of ‘hate speech’, the Supreme Court has laid down clear principles that define when speech crosses the boundary from protected expression into unlawful incitement or communal hatred.

The foundational judgment in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962) affirmed that criminal provisions affecting speech must be interpreted narrowly. The statute is constitutionally valid only to the extent it punishes speech that has the intention or tendency to create disorder or incitement to violence or disturbance of law and order.

The Padyatra speeches, alleging demographic conquest, “love jihad,” and calling for social boycotts and vigilante resistance, demonstrate a direct intention to cause disharmony between religious groups travelling through communally sensitive regions of Delhi, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh. The route’s culmination at Banke Bihari Temple, Vrindavan, a site recently embroiled in controversy, heightens the imminent potential for communal mobilisation.

A decade later, Kesavananda Bharati v. Union of India (1973) reaffirmed the inviolable constitutional commitment to secularism, equality, and fundamental rights by introducing the Basic Structure doctrine. Through this, the Court held that any attempt, legislative or otherwise, that undermines the secular character of the Republic would be unconstitutional at its core. This principle shapes the broader legal environment within which communal speech is assessed.

On debates around ‘love jihad’ and ‘illegal conversion’, the Supreme Court in the Hadiya Marriage Case (2018), held that the right to marry a person of one’s choice is integral to Article 21, and the choice of a partner lies within the exclusive domain of an individual, and is a part of the core zone of privacy, which is inviolable.

The modern understanding of hate speech was articulated in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India (2014), where the Supreme Court held that

Hate speech is an effort to marginalise individuals based on their membership in a group. Using expression that exposes the group to hatred, hate speech seeks to delegitimize group members in the eyes of the majority, reducing their social standing and acceptance within society. Hate speech, therefore, rises beyond causing distress to individual group members. It can have a societal impact.

Responding to this mandate, the Law Commission’s 267th Report proposed a structured framework for understanding hate speech. Para 5.2 laid down the criteria for identifying hate speech:

(i) The extremity of the speech

(ii) Incitement

(iii) Status of the author of the speech

(iv) Status of victims of the speech

(v) Potentiality of the speech

(vi) Context of the Speech

The Court’s earlier ruling in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) further clarified that only speech amounting to “incitement to imminent lawless action” can be legitimately restricted under Article 19(2), reinforcing the centrality of context, intent, and likely consequences.

In Patricia vs State of Meghalaya (2021), the Supreme Court quashed a FIR against a journalist, concluding that the post was a genuine plea for justice and equality rather than an attempt to promote hatred or communal discord. In Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2020), the court further stated that: the mode of exercise of free speech, the context and the extent of abuse of freedom are important in determining the contours of permissible restrictions.

Aftermath of Padyatra

The Sanatan Ekta Padyatra triggered immediate political and social pushback across several states. The Azaad Samaj Party (ASP) condemned the march on constitutional grounds, arguing that India’s identity as a secular republic cannot be undermined by a public movement openly calling for a “Hindu Rashtra.” ASP formally petitioned the President to halt the yatra, while the Dalit Pichda Samaj Sanathan (DPSS) joined ASP in filing a PIL before the Supreme Court seeking a complete stop to the march and a ban on its “inflammatory” speeches. In response, Gwalior-based politician Damodar Singh Yadav announced a counter-mobilisation titled the Samvidhan Bachao Yatra, set to begin on November 16, framing it as a defence of constitutional values.

On the ground, several areas witnessed unrest directly linked to the padyatra. Samagra Bharat reported that on 9 November in Indergarh (Datia district, MP), residents gathered at Ambedkar Park and attempted to burn an effigy of Dhirendra Shastri, alleging that his speeches promoted caste humiliation and communal hatred. Members of the Hindu Sangathan retaliated with stone-pelting, leading to a police lathi-charge when tensions escalated. Locals later filed an FIR against Shastri, but authorities have taken no concrete action. A week later, on 17 November, Patrika reported a scuffle at Vrindavan’s Banke Bihari Temple during Shastri’s visit, where a confrontation between temple priests and the police resulted in torn garments and allegations that the padyatra’s politicised presence compromised the sanctity and security of the temple premises.

Broader Pattern of Impunity towards Hate Speeches

The fallout from the padyatra reflects a broader pattern in which communal mobilisation and hate speech by far-right Hindutva leaders are met with minimal institutional response. India has witnessed repeated episodes of religiously charged violence—such as the 2019 lynching of Tabrez Ansari in Jharkhand, where the victim was forced to chant “Jai Shri Ram”—and mass events like the 2024 Ayodhya Ram Mandir consecration have increasingly become sites for majoritarian mobilisation. Despite this backdrop, police responses remain inconsistent, especially when politically influential individuals are involved. NDTV reports that although five FIRs were filed over two years against BJP legislator T. Raja Singh for comments such as “The Old City of Hyderabad is a mmini-Pakistan” two were closed, and the remaining three have seen no decisive progress.

Legal scrutiny has extended to Baba Dhirendra Shastri as well, with multiple complaints for delivering hate speeches in Udaipur, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh. In 2023, a PIL before the Gujarat High Court sought enforcement of the Supreme Court’s Tehseen Poonawalla guidelines—requiring preventive intelligence units, immediate action against hate speech, and punitive steps against officials who fail to curb mob violence—but the petition was declined. This pattern of judicial reluctance, combined with police inaction, underscores a systemic tolerance toward inflammatory communal rhetoric, even when it directly violates constitutional guarantees and statutory prohibitions under the BNS. The result is a public environment where speeches like those delivered during the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra, openly calling for a Hindu Rashtra and targeting minority communities, continue largely unchecked, emboldening majoritarian mobilisation while eroding constitutional safeguards.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this has been worked on by Shyamli Pengoriya)

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