The poem did not name any religion or community but lamented injustice, questioned state power, and called for non-violence as a means of resistance. The complaint alleged it incited religious hatred and disturbed social harmony.

What was at stake was far greater than one poem or one politician—it was the scope of criminal law in regulating political speech, the meaning of “incitement”, and whether popular offence can override constitutional values.

Background: A poem, a platform, and a prosecution

On December 29, 2024, during a mass wedding programme in Jamnagar, Gujarat, organised by a local councillor, Imran Pratapgarhi recited a poem that was later posted as a video on his verified social media account on the platform ‘X’. The poem included verses such as:

“ए ख़ून के प्यासों बात सुनो
गर हक़ की लड़ाई ज़ुल्म सही
हम ज़ुल्म से इश्क़ निभा देंगे…”

Translated broadly:

“O you blood-thirsty, listen!
If the fight for rights brings injustice,
We will meet that injustice with love…”

The FIR accused the appellant of promoting enmity between communities and disturbing national harmony. Shockingly, he was charged under Sections 196, 197(1), 302, 299, 57 and 3(5) of the BNS—provisions dealing with incitement, hate speech, religious disharmony, and even abetment of violence. Through the FIR, it was alleged that the spoken words of the poem incite people of one community against another, and it hurts a community’s religious and social sentiments. It was further alleged that the song had lyrics that incited people of other communities to fight for the community’s rights. It was claimed that the video posted by the appellant created enmity between two communities at the national level and hatred towards each other. It was further alleged that it had a detrimental effect on national unity.

Key observations of the Court

1. Constitutional Voice vs. State Machinery: A foundational tension

At the heart of this judgment lies an old constitutional paradox: the State is both the guarantor and violator of fundamental rights. Justice Oka, with characteristic candour, begins by confronting this tension head-on:

“This case shows that even after 75 years of the existence of our Constitution, the law enforcement machinery of the State is either ignorant about this important fundamental right or does not care for this fundamental right.” (Para 1)

In this opening salvo of the judgment, Justice Abhay S. Oka sets the tone for a judgment that is as much an indictment of institutional apathy as it is a reaffirmation of constitutional values. The observation that even after 75 years of constitutional existence, law enforcement remains either ignorant of or indifferent to the fundamental right to freedom of expression, reveals a profound structural dysfunction. This remark is not made in passing—it is a judicial rebuke aimed squarely at a State apparatus that defaults to coercion over constitutional engagement. By framing the issue as one of institutional disrepair rather than individual excess, the Court shifts the spotlight from the accused citizen to the accuser state, raising critical questions about how routinely—and with what legal illiteracy—criminal law is weaponised to suppress dissent.

What emerges from this framing is the Court’s role not as a mere adjudicator of facts, but as a constitutional conscience-keeper. Rather than balancing “free speech” against “law and order,” the judgment asserts that the State’s repeated resort to criminal prosecution for expressive acts is itself an affront to the constitutional order. This is not just about a misreading of a poem—it is about the State’s deep discomfort with metaphor, criticism, and resistance. The Court’s insistence that the rule of law includes a duty to respect rights, not merely regulate them, transforms the case into a referendum on how faithfully the State embodies the very freedoms it claims to guarantee. In doing so, the Court subtly but powerfully reclaims constitutional morality as an active, living principle—not a hollow preamble.

2. A Theory of Free Speech: From libertarian tolerance to affirmative protection

This judgment doesn’t merely shield speech—it underlines its necessity. Justice Oka, who had authored the judgment on the behalf of the Bench, frames Article 19(1) (a) as not merely a right but as a structural precondition for human dignity and democratic engagement, thereby locating it within the broader penumbra of Article 21:

“Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or groups of individuals is an integral part of a healthy, civilised society. Without freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. In a healthy democracy, the views, opinions or thoughts expressed by an individual or group of individuals must be countered by expressing another point of view. Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected.” (Para 38)

This convergence of Articles 19 and 21 reflects a distinctly substantive conception of liberty, moving beyond formal non-interference toward affirmative obligation. The State (including the police and judiciary) is thus required not just to refrain from suppressing speech but to actively ensure its flourishing.

“The reasonable restrictions provided for in Article 19(2) must remain reasonable and not fanciful and oppressive. Article 19(2) cannot be allowed to overshadow the substantive rights under Article 19(1), including the right to freedom of speech and expression.” (Para 29)

3.  The law’s elasticity: From ambiguity to abuse

The charges levelled against Pratapgarhi under Sections 196, 197, 299, 302, and 57 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita represent an alarming instance of legal overbreadth being used as a political weapon. The BNS, like its predecessor IPC, contains clauses so capaciously worded (e.g., “feelings of enmity”, “disharmony”, “outraging religious beliefs”) that they leave room for subjective interpretation and state-led abuse.

Justice Oka (and J Bhuyan) cut through this ambiguity:

“By no stretch of imagination does it promote enmity… The poem refers to injustice and offers non-violence as a response. It cannot be seen as a cause of communal disharmony.” (Para 10)

This is a clear attempt to re-inscribe constitutional interpretation over statutory vagueness, requiring any criminal allegation under these sections to pass a high threshold of intent, clarity, and demonstrable harm.

4. From Lalita Kumari to BNSS: Rethinking FIR registration

The Court’s discussion on Section 173(3) of the BNSS is an important departure from earlier CrPC jurisprudence under Lalita Kumari.

Where Lalita Kumari limited the police’s discretion, the BNSS introduces a structured preliminary inquiry model for offences punishable by 3–7 years—like many speech-related provisions.

The Supreme Court insists that in all speech-related cases where this discretion is available, it must be exercised:

“If an option under sub-Section (3) is not exercised by the police officer in such a case, he may end up registering an FIR against a person who has exercised his fundamental right under Article 19 (1)(a) even though clause (2) of Article 19 is not attracted. If, in such cases, the option under sub-Section (3) of Section 173 is not exercised, it will defeat the very object of incorporating sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS and will also defeat the obligation of the police under Article 51-A (a).” (Para 29)

This means the police must now interpret the text of the speech itself, not just the complaint—an approach that, while normatively sound, places interpretive responsibility on officers often untrained in the subtleties of metaphor, political critique, or artistic licence.

5. Institutional analysis: The High Court’s abdication and the Supreme Court’s role as rights sentinel

The Gujarat High Court, by deferring to the early stage of the investigation, abdicated its constitutional responsibility to scrutinise rights violations at the threshold.

The Supreme Court rebuked this stance:

      “We fail to understand how the High Court concluded that the message was posted in a manner that would certainly disturb social harmony. Thereafter, the High Court gave a reason that the investigation was at a nascent stage. There is no absolute rule that when the investigation is at a nascent stage, the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to quash an offence by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the CrPC equivalent to Section 528 of the BNSS. When the High Court, in the given case, finds that no offence was made out on the face of it, to prevent abuse of the process of law, it can always interfere even though the investigation is at the nascent stage.” (Para 37)

This reaffirms that judicial intervention in the early stages of political or speech-related prosecutions is not just permissible but necessary. The longer the case proceeds, the more the process itself becomes punishment. This view counters a dangerous trend: judicial evasion in politically sensitive matters, often under the guise of deference to procedure. Here, the Court restores its duty as a constitutional firewall, refusing to be paralysed by formalism.

6. The Reasonable Reader standard: Sedition, hate Speech, and judicial empathy

A key analytical move in the judgment is the revival of the “reasonable, strong-minded” observer standard from Bhagwati Charan Shukla:

“When an offence punishable under Section 196 of BNS is alleged, the effect of the spoken or written words will have to be considered based on standards of reasonable, strongminded, firm and courageous individuals and not based on the standards of people with weak and oscillating minds. The effect of the spoken or written words cannot be judged on the basis of the standards of people who always have a sense of insecurity or of those who always perceive criticism as a threat to their power or position.” (Para 33)

This interpretive lens displaces subjective offence with an objective, resilient baseline, thereby protecting robust discourse. It delegitimises state action based solely on hurt sentiments or perceived disrespect to power. This is especially important in India’s contemporary climate, where claims of communal hurt are often wielded as instruments of political repression.

7. Literature as democratic praxis: The place of poetry in the Constitutional Order

In recognising the poem’s form and context, the Court refrains from sterilising language into literalism. Justice Oka honours the metaphorical richness of poetic expression and its political function:

“…the poem does not encourage violence. On the contrary, it encourages people to desist from resorting to violence and to face injustice with love. It states that if our fight with injustice results into the death of our near and dear ones, we would be happy to bury their bodies.” (Para 10)

Poetry here is not ornamental—it is political speech in its most potent, imaginative form. The Court recognises that to penalise such speech is to criminalise dissent itself. This judgment contributes to an emerging jurisprudence where art is recognised as both speech and constitutional engagement, not as a diluted cousin of prose but as its fiercest challenger.

8. Toward a doctrine of “Constitutional offence”

Perhaps the most striking analytical thread is the Court’s suggestion that some state actions themselves verge on a constitutional offence:

      “Even while dealing with the performance of an obligation under sub-Section (1) of Section 173, where the commission of the offence is based on spoken or written words, the police officer concerned will have to keep in mind the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) read with an exception carved out under clause (2) of Article 19. The reason is that he is under an obligation to abide by the Constitution and to respect the ideals under the Constitution. The Constitution is more than 75 years old. By this time, the police officers ought to have been sensitized about their duty of abiding by the Constitution and respecting the ideals of the Constitution.” (Para 30)

Here, Justice Oka (and Justice Bhuyan) aren’t merely interpreting law—they are charging the State with constitutional delinquency. In doing so, they lay the groundwork for a potential doctrine where misuse of criminal process to silence dissent could itself be a rights violation subject to public law remedy.

This is not explicitly framed in the language of compensation or tort—but it hints at a growing judicial recognition that abuse of power is not neutral—it is a rights violation in itself.

Legal analysis of offences under BNS: A systematic dismantling

In the judgment, the Supreme Court, has also meticulously analysed the ingredients of each alleged offence and found all of them legally untenable.

1. Section 196 (Promoting enmity between groups)

      “The poem does not refer to any religion, caste or language. It does not refer to persons belonging to any religion. By no stretch of imagination, does it promote enmity between different groups. We fail to understand how the statements therein are detrimental to national unity and how the statements will affect national unity. On its plain reading, the poem does not purport to affect anyone’s religious feelings.” (Para 12)

Based on precedent (Manzar Sayeed Khan, Patricia Mukhim, Javed Ahmad Hajam), the Court reaffirmed that criminalising speech requires a showing of deliberate intent (mens rea). Without it, the mere content of speech, however provocative to some, is not criminal.

      “Mens rea will have to be read into Section 196 of the BNS… it is impossible to attribute any mens rea to the appellant.” (Para 34)

2. Section 197 (Prejudicial to national integration)

Therefore, as the Supreme Court, read both facts and the law, the poem by Imran Pratapgarhi did not attract the offence under Section 197 as it:

• Did not cast doubt on the loyalty of any group.
• Did not assert the denial of citizenship rights.
• Did not jeopardise national unity.

      “…the poem does not make or publish any imputation and is not concerned with any religious, racial, language, regional group, caste, or community. It does not suggest that any class of persons have been denied rights as citizens because they are members of a religious, racial, language, regional group, caste, or community. It does not make or publish any assertion, counsel, plea or appeal likely to cause disharmony or feeling of enmity or hatred or ill will. The poem does not publish or make any false or misleading information.” (Para 16)

3. Section 299 & Section 302 (Religious insult or wounding religious sentiment)

The Court termed these charges “ridiculous”:

      “To say the least, it is ridiculous to say that the act of the appellant is intended to outrage the religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs. The poem only tells the rulers what the reaction will be if the fight for rights is met with injustice.” (Para 17)

4. Section 57 (Abetment by public)

      “We fail to understand, even if it is assumed that the appellant has committed some offence, how he has abetted the commission of an offence by the public generally or by any number or class of persons exceeding ten.” (Para 19)

The Supreme Court’s systematic dismantling of the charges against Imran Pratapgarhi reflects a jurisprudence grounded in constitutional fidelity and statutory precision. In addressing Section 196 of the BNS—concerning promotion of enmity between groups—the Court reiterates a long-standing doctrinal principle: that the mere capacity of speech to provoke cannot substitute for a demonstrable, deliberate intent to incite enmity. Drawing from precedents like Manzar Sayeed Khan, Patricia Mukhim, and Javed Ahmad Hajam, the Court makes it clear that mens rea—a deliberate, malicious state of mind—is essential for liability. The poem in question, devoid of any reference to religion, caste, or community, could not be interpreted as promoting group enmity, and to criminalise it would be a distortion of both the statute and the Constitution. The Court’s reading imposes a constitutional filter on the BNS provision, ensuring it cannot be misused to punish subjective offence or perceived disrespect.

This logic extends seamlessly to the rejection of charges under Sections 197, 299, 302, and 57. Under Section 197, which deals with acts prejudicial to national integration, the Court’s reasoning is particularly illuminating. Justice Oka dissects the elements of the offence and finds none fulfilled: the poem neither impugns any group’s loyalty nor suggests the denial of citizenship rights, nor does it propagate disinformation. Similarly, the invocation of Section 299 and 302 for religious insult is dismissed as “ridiculous,” with the Court recognising that the poem critiques state injustice, not religious belief. Most striking is the Court’s incredulity at the Section 57 charge—abetment by the public—highlighting not only the absence of any instigated act but also the absurdity of imagining that poetic expression could be interpreted as a generalised call to criminal conduct. This cluster of analyses reveals not only the hollowness of the FIR but also the deeper pathology of criminal law’s misuse: charges laid without regard for statutory thresholds, constitutional limits, or evidentiary plausibility. Justice Oka and Justice Bhuyan’s reasoning is a potent reminder that law, especially criminal law, cannot be driven by sentiment, conjecture, or political expediency—it must be anchored in demonstrable harm, clear intent, and legal fidelity.

The Court as guardian of the Republic’s imagination

Imran Pratapgarhi judgement is not merely about poetry—it is about power, protest, and the place of dissent in India’s constitutional framework. This judgment revitalises the meaning of free speech in an age where criminal law is increasingly wielded to silence opposition. It teaches us that:

• Law is not merely a set of punishments but a moral language.
• Courts must defend expression, even if the State finds it discomforting.
• Poetry, critique, and satire are not seditious—they are the scaffolding of a free republic.

In this moment, the Supreme Court does not merely defend a poem—it defends the possibility of dissent itself. And that makes it one of the most important judgments on freedom of speech in recent Indian history.

To borrow the Court’s own words:

      “Courts, particularly the constitutional Courts, must be at the forefront to zealously protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. It is the bounden duty of the Courts to ensure that the Constitution and the ideals of the Constitution are not trampled upon.” (Para 39)

Conclusion: A Constitutional anthem for the right to dissent

The Imran Pratapgarhi judgment stands as a powerful reaffirmation that the Constitution of India is not a brittle document to be bruised by sentiment, nor a tool to be twisted by the might of the State. It is, instead, a living charter that guarantees not only the right to speak, but the right to disturb, to provoke, and to dissent—particularly through art, poetry, and political expression. Justice Oka’s reasoning does not merely rescue one man from a legally untenable prosecution; it reclaims the constitutional promise that the State cannot demand silence in exchange for citizenship.

By scrupulously dismantling every charge brought under the BNS and holding law enforcement accountable to constitutional ideals, the judgment delivers a rare, lucid defence of free speech in an era when such freedoms are frequently under siege. It goes beyond the judicial role of error correction and enters the moral terrain of democratic defence. This case is not just precedent—it is a call to conscience for the police, for the lower judiciary, and for civil society. In drawing a firm constitutional line between law and power, it sends an unequivocal message: poetic dissent is not criminal, and the Constitution does not flinch before uncomfortable truths.

Ultimately, this is not merely a judgment about the legality of a poem—it is a resounding assertion of the Republic’s constitutional soul. It reminds us that the true test of democracy is not how the State treats speech that flatters, but how it responds to speech that resists. On that test, the Supreme Court has spoken with uncommon clarity and courage.

The complete judgment may be read below.

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The post A Republic That Listens: The Supreme Court’s poetic defence of dissent through Imran Pratapgarhi judgment appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This case, arising from an FIR registered against Imran Pratapgarhi, a Member of the Rajya Sabha, for offenses related to a poem he shared on social media, specifically addressed the application of Section 173 of the BNS, which governs the procedure for handling information in cognisable cases and the subsequent registration of FIR.

Brief Facts and Background

Parliament Member Imran Pratapgarhi posted a video in which a poem was shared, which according to a complainant, promoted enmity between religious communities, and that it constituted imputations that are prejudicial to the national integrity.

The FIR was filed with offences under Section 302 (Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings of any person), Section 299 (Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs), Section 57 (Abetting commission of offence by public or by more than ten persons).

Mr. Pratapgarhi approached the High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS read with Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the FIR. Section 528 of the BNSS states that nothing in the BNSS limits or affects the inherent powers of the High Court to pass such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under BNSS or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India provides High Courts with the power to issue certain writs to any person or authority, including Government in appropriate cases for enforcing fundamental rights provided under Part III of the Constitution, or for any other purpose.

The High Court refused to intervene. Aggrieved, Mr. Pratapgarhi approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court examined the poem in question and opined, first, that there is nothing in the poem which attracted the offences mentioned before. Later, it went on to deal with the question of whether, in this case, it was obligatory under Section 173(1) of the BNSS to register FIR or not.

Provisions and case law

Section 173(1) of the BNSS states that every information relating to the commission of a cognisable offence, irrespective of the area where the offence is committed, may be given (orally or via electronic communication) to an office in-charge of a police station and if given orally, such officer shall reduce it to writing by him or under his direction, read it over to the informant, and have it signed by the informant.

Essentially, when one gives a complaint over a cognisable offence, the police will have to record it in writing and take signature of the complainant. This record is commonly known as a First Information Report (FIR). Section 173(2) states that a copy of the FIR be given to the complainant free of cost.

Section 173(3) states that when an information relating to commission of a cognisable offence which is punishable with three years or more but less than seven years of imprisonment, the officer in charge of the police station may with the prior permission from an officer, not below the rank of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, considering the nature and gravity of the offence,

1. proceed to conduct preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter within a period of fourteen days; or
2. proceed with investigation when there exists a prima facie case.

There exists a conflict between Section 173 (1)—which states FIR should be registered when cognizable offence related information comes and Section 173 (3)—which states that a preliminary investigation ought to be done for cognizable offences which are punishable for more than three but less than seven years.

In Lalita Kumari vs Government of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court stated that the condition sine qua non (essential condition) for registering FIR is that there must be information, and the information discloses commission of cognisable offence, the reasonableness or credibility of information is not a condition precedent for the registration of FIR.

Supreme Court resolved this contradiction in Imran Pratapgarhi vs. State of Gujarat (2025 INSC 410).

Judgement and its reasoning

On Section 173

While Section 173 (1) is the general rule, according to the court, Section 173 (3) is an exception to the rule. This means that when information is given to the police, if prima facie, a cognizable offence is made out, an FIR is to be registered unless the offence is covered under Section 173 (3) in which case a preliminary investigation could follow (Para 25).

According to the court, Section 173 (3) of the BNS thus introduces a notable exception, granting the police the discretion to conduct a preliminary assessment even when the information received might disclose a cognisable offense, if it is falling within the specified punishment range.

This pronouncement highlights a significant deviation from the general principle of immediate FIR registration for cognisable offenses, as previously emphasized by the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(CrPC).

On free speech and usage of Section 173(3)

In its judgment, the Supreme Court laid significant emphasis on the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression enshrined in Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court went further to characterize the registration of the FIR against Mr. Pratapgarhi as a “mechanical exercise” and a clear “abuse of the process of law” (Para 36).

This strong condemnation implies that the police acted without a proper appreciation of the nuances of free speech and potentially misconstrued the intent and message of the poem. The Court also highlighted the societal value of various forms of artistic expression, including poetry, literature, drama, films, and satire, emphasizing their role in enriching human life and the necessity of their protection under the umbrella of free speech (Para 38).

In this case, the Supreme Court specifically ruled that when an allegation concerns an offence that falls under the ambit of the restrictions on free speech outlined in Article 19 (2) of the Constitution, it is invariably appropriate to conduct a preliminary inquiry under Section 173 (3) of the BNS before proceeding to register an FIR (Para 29).

The Court reasoned that when allegations are predicated on spoken or written words, it is incumbent upon the police officer to carefully examine the content to ascertain whether it indeed constitutes a cognizable offense

According to the Court, this initial assessment of the material does not equate to a preliminary inquiry that would be impermissible under Section 173 (1) when the information already discloses a cognizable offense. The Court underscored that the failure to utilize the option of conducting a preliminary inquiry under Section 173 (3) in cases where potential free speech violations are at issue could result in the registration of an FIR against an individual merely for exercising their fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (a), even if the restrictions stipulated under Article 19 (2) are not applicable.

Furthermore, the Court opined that neglecting to invoke Section 173 (3) in such circumstances would undermine the very purpose for which this sub-section was incorporated into the BNSS (Para 29). It would also contravene the constitutional obligation of the police under Article 51-A (a) to uphold the Constitution and respect its ideals, according to the Court.

To this end, the Supreme Court suggested that the higher police officer, whose permission is required under Section 173(3), should ordinarily grant such permission to conduct a preliminary inquiry in cases involving the exercise of free speech where the potential punishment falls within the range of three to seven years (Para 29).

This directive indicates a clear expectation from the apex court that superior officers should facilitate the process of preliminary inquiry in such scenarios to ensure that the fundamental right to freedom of speech is adequately protected from unwarranted criminal prosecution at the very outset.

Conclusion: a paradigm shift in policing free speech

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat marks a transformative moment in the jurisprudence of free speech and police powers, recalibrating the balance between constitutional rights and procedural obligations. By mandating preliminary inquiries under Section 173 (3) of the BNS for allegations implicating Article 19 (2) restrictions, the Court has introduced a safeguard against precipitate criminalization of speech. This intervention is not merely procedural but foundational, ensuring that the exercise of free expression—particularly in artistic or public discourse—is shielded from arbitrary state action.

The ruling underscores that police discretion under Section 173 (3) is not a license for inaction but a constitutional duty to scrutinise allegations rigorously. By requiring higher police authorities to authorise preliminary inquiries, the judgment institutionalizes accountability, preventing FIRs from becoming tools of harassment. This is especially critical in speech-related cases, where the line between lawful dissent and cognizable offenses is often blurred by subjective interpretations. The Court’s emphasis on the societal value of poetry, satire, and other forms of expression serves as a reminder that democratic robustness thrives on diversity of thought, even when contentious.

Critically, the judgment does not dilute the obligation to act on cognisable offenses but contextualises it. By distinguishing between immediate FIR registration under Section 173 (1) and the need for preliminary assessment under Section 173 (3), the Court harmonises competing imperatives: the necessity of prompt action in grave crimes versus the imperative to protect speech from overzealous policing. This nuanced approach ensures that the police remain guardians of both law and liberty, rather than arbiters of societal consensus.

While the judgment does not absolve individuals of accountability for speech that incites violence or undermines public order, it raises the threshold for criminal prosecution. This is a welcome check on the expanding criminalisation of political and artistic expression, which has historically been weaponised to stifle dissent.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

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‘Courts, Police Have Duty to Protect Freedom of Speech’: SC on FIR against Congress MP Over Poem

The post SC: Recent judgment in the Imran Pratapgarhi case, what are police powers under section 173 (3) BNS? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Supreme Court was hearing Prataphgarhi’s petition challenging an FIR filed by the Gujarat police over his Instagram post featuring a video clip with the poem “Ae khoon ke pyase baat suno”. The poem in question, titled “Ae khoon ke pyase baat suno” (Listen, oh bloodthirsty ones), was featured in the background of a mass marriage video and was posted by Pratapgarhi on the social media platform X. Pratapgarhi created the post after attending the mass marriage in Jamnagar. Allowing Pratapgarhi’s appeal against the high court order, the Supreme Court, however, took a firm stance against the high court’s reasoning.

“Literate and arts make life more meaningful; freedom of expression is necessary for a dignified life. Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or groups of individuals is an integral part of a healthy civilized society. Without freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. In a healthy democracy, the views of thoughts expressed by an individual or group of individuals must be countered by expressing another point of view.

“Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of person to express the views must be respected and protected. Literature including poetry, dramas, films, satire, and art make the life of human beings more meaningful.”

The court also reportedly criticised the Gujarat high court for not quashing the FIR against Pratapgarhi. On January 17, 2025, the Gujarat high court had refused to quash the FIR saying that the poem had references to “the throne” and that responses to the post suggested a potential disturbance in social harmony, the report said.

The court said, that the MP should have known the repercussions of such a post and should have refrained from promoting public disharmony. It observed that further investigation was necessary Pratapgarhi then challenged the high court’s decision before the Supreme Court, which provided interim relief to him on January 25.

“The Courts are duty bound to uphold and enforce the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Sometimes we the judges may not like the spoken or written words, but still, it is our duty to uphold the fundamental rights under Article 19(1). We judges are also under an obligation to uphold the Constitution and the respective ideals. It is the duty of the court to step in and to protect the fundamental rights. Particularly, the Constitutional courts must be at the forefront to zealously protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. It is the bounden duty of the court to ensure that the Constitution and ideals of the Constitution are not trampled upon.

The endeavour of the Court should be to always protect and promote the fundamental rights including the freedom of speech and expression which is the most important right citizens can have in all liberal constitutional democracy,” the court said.

About the police officers’ haste in filing an FIR, the court said, “The police officer must abide by the Constitution and respect the ideals. The philosophy of the constitutional ideals can be found in the Constitution itself. In the preamble, it is laid down that the people of India solemnly decided to constitute India into a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic and to secure for all its citizens liberty of thought and expression. Therefore, liberty of thought and expression is one of the ideals of our constitution. The police officers being citizens are bound to abide by the constitution and they are bound to uphold the right.”

The FIR against the Congress MP was filed under Sections 196, 197, 299, 302, and 57 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Section 196 pertains to promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony.

For the offence under Section 196 of the BNS, the court said, “The effect of spoken or written words cannot be judged on the basis of standards of the people who always have the sense of insecurity or those who always perceive criticism as a threat to their power or position.

Gujarat high court had refused to quash FIR

Justice Sandeep Mehta of the Gujarat HC had refused to quash the FIR. The Supreme Court on Friday quashed the first information report (FIR) against Congress Rajya Sabha parliamentarian Imran Pratapgarhi, underlining the significance of free speech and reproaching the Gujarat police authorities for seeking to criminally prosecute a person for ostensibly delivering a message of peace through a poem that Pratapgarhi posted on social media. “No offence was attracted at all,” held a bench of justices Abhay S Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, while reading out the operative part of the judgment.

The bench emphasised that the free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or groups is an integral part of a healthy, civilized society.

“Without freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. In a healthy democracy, the views of thoughts expressed by an individual or group must be countered by expressing another point of view,” the court observed.

This case against Pratapgarhi stems from the FIR filed in a Jamnagar police station on January 3, invoking various provisions under the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita (BNS) relating to promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, and doing acts prejudicial to harmony.

In its judgment, the Supreme Court reinforced that “even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected. Literature, including poetry, dramas, films, satire, and art, makes human life more meaningful.”

“The courts are duty-bound to uphold and enforce the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Sometimes we, the judges, may not like spoken or written words, but still, it is our duty to uphold the fundamental rights under Article 19(1). We judges are also under an obligation to uphold the Constitution and its respective ideals,” the bench noted.

The judgment further stressed that it is the duty of the courts, particularly constitutional courts, to zealously protect fundamental rights.

“It is the bounden duty of the court to ensure that the Constitution and ideals of the Constitution are not trampled upon. Constitutional courts must be at the forefront to protect the fundamental rights of individuals, including free speech, which is one of the most cherished fundamental rights for a healthy and vibrant democracy”, it read.

The court observed that the “endeavour of the judiciary should always be to protect and promote fundamental rights, including the freedom of speech and expression, which is the most important right citizens can have in any liberal constitutional democracy.”

The ruling also delivered a stern message to law enforcement, asserting that “police officers must abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals. The philosophy of constitutional ideals can be found in the Constitution itself.”

The entire judgement may be read here:

Related:

Censorship vs. free speech: The Allahbadia controversy

Targeting Press Freedom: The unexplained censorship of Vikatan and the erosion of free speech

‘Free speech under threat’: again, Jamia student moves court against ‘highhanded’ suspension

The post ‘Courts, Police Have Duty to Protect Freedom of Speech’: SC on FIR against Congress MP Over Poem appeared first on SabrangIndia.