The Bombay High Court granted bail to an accused alleged to be an ISIS member, while observing that he had spent a considerable time in prison and the trial would not be completed in near future. The Division bench of Justices SS Shinde and NJ Jamadar observed that denial of bail, in such circumstances would render the procedure not only unreasonable but unconscionable as well. 

The bench referred, among other judgements, the case earlier this year where the Supreme Court had granted bail to an accused under UAPA, on the basis of long incarceration and the violation of right to speedy justice as also the right to life.

The appellant, Iqbal Ahmed Kabir Ahmed filed the appeal under section 21 of the NIA Act against an order passed by Special Judge denying him bail, in May 2019. The appellant was arrested in 2016 under sections of Indian Penal Code, Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) and Explosive Substances Act. Chargesheet was filed by ATS in October 2016 and after the case was transferred to NIA, another chargesheet was filed in July 2019. The allegations against him is that he was a co-conspirator with other accused who were members of ISIS and had procured material to prepare IED.

Arguments

Senior Advocate Mihir Desai appearing for the appellant argued that the Special Judge fell in error in not properly appreciating the role attributed to the appellant when no explosives were found in the possession of the appellant and nothing incriminating was recovered from him. He further contended that having regard to the fact that the appellant has been in custody for almost five years, and it is very unlikely that the trial would be concluded in reasonable time. Hence, he submitted that, on this count of the prolonged incarceration also the appellant deserves to be released on bail, lest the constitutional guarantee of right to life and personal liberty would be jeopardised.

Special Public Prosecutor AS Pai opposed the appeal and said that in the backdrop of the grave nature of allegations and the material on record which prima facie indicates that the allegations against the accused are true, the bail was rightly denied by the Special Court. She argued that the offence of criminal conspiracy was prima facie made out based on the statements of witnesses. Additionally, there was evidence of recovery of oath of joining ISIS and the electric switch board where the IED was soldered.

Court’s observations

The court stated that in NIA vs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC 1, the apex court had observed that there is a degree of difference between the satisfaction to be recorded for the purpose of UAPA that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is “prima facie true”.

The court pointed out that a greater degree of satisfaction is required to record an opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence, albeit prima facie. The court also cited Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713 where the Supreme Court had observed that the bail conditions under UAPA were less stringent than those under NDPS, where the court needs to be satisfied that prima facie the accused is not guilty and that he is unlikely to commit another offence while on bail.

The court perused the material on record and observed that the statements made by the other accused that they got together and discussed the threats to Islam and the actions of ISIS were in the realm of discussion and deliberation which the accused and those witnesses had. The court stated that there was no prima facie material to indicate that the appellant instigated the commission of offence or insurgency or that he advocated violent reactions.

Further, the recovery of the oath form from the appellant’s house also does not incriminate him, the court said since it pointed out that the accused no.1 stated that these forms were distributed to many persons and the handwriting on the oath form is not of the appellant. The mere possession of such oath form, without subscribing thereto, prima facie, does not appear to be an incriminating circumstance, the court said.

Court’s findings

The court observed that the material which is pressed into service against the appellant, prima facie, does not appear to be of such quality as to sustain a reasonable belief that the accusation against the appellant is true.

The court also considered the long incarceration period and noted that the recording of evidence is yet to commence with more than 150 witnesses to be examined. As of April 19, 2021, the learned special Judge, seized with the NIA Case No.3 of 2018, had 225 cases on his file, including 16 NIA special cases, 43 MCOCA special cases and 64 Sessions Cases, the court pointed out.

“If all these factors are considered in juxtaposition with each other, there is no likelihood of the instant case being decided within reasonable time in near future,” the court said.

“In the aforesaid setting of the matter, right of accused to speedy trial, which flows from the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution, comes to the fore. This right to speedy trial, in the prosecutions where the special enactments restrict the powers of the Court to grant bail, faces a competing claim of the interest of society and security of State. In such prosecutions, if the trials are not concluded expeditiously, the procedure which deprives the personal liberty for an inordinate period is then put to the test of fairness and reasonableness, envisaged by Article 21 of the Constitution. Where the period of incarceration awaiting adjudication of guilt become unduly long, the right to life and the protection of fair and reasonable procedure, envisaged by Article 21, are jeopardized,” the court observed.

The court cited the apex court in Saheen Welfare Association vs. Union of India 1996 SCC (2) 61 where it stated that, “While it is essential that innocent people should be protected from terrorists and disruptionists, it is equally necessary that terrorists and disruptionists are speedily tried and punished. In fact, the protection to innocent civilians is dependent on such speedily trial and punishment. The conflict is generated on account of the gross delay in the trial of such persons. This delay may contribute to absence of proper evidence at the trial so that the really guilty may have to be ultimately acquitted.”

The Supreme Court in KA Najeeb case emphasised that under trials cannot be detained indefinitely pending trial, and that once it is found that timely conclusion of trial would not be possible and accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the Court would be obligated to enlarge the accused on bail. In this case, the apex court “exposited the legal position that the statutory restriction like section 43-D(5) of the UAPA per se does not operate as an impediment on the powers of the constitutional Court to grant bail, if a case of infringement of the constitutional guarantee of protection of life and personal liberty is made out, and the rigours of such statutory restriction would melt down in the face of long incarceration of an under trial prisoner”.

The court thus observed that in such a situation, the prayer of entitlement for bail on the count of prolonged delay in conclusion of trial is required to be appreciated in the backdrop of period of incarceration, the prospect of completion of trial in a reasonable time, the gravity of the charge and attendant circumstances.

The court also observed that maximum sentence for the offences may extend to life imprisonment but the appellant has undergone more than half of the maximum punishment prescribed for the offences (7 years or 10 years), other than ones which entail imprisonment for life.

The court said that further incarceration of the appellant, in the face of extremely unlikely situation of the trial being completed in near future, would be in negation of the protection of life and personal liberty under Article 21 and that denial of bail would render the procedure not only unreasonable but unconscionable as well.

The court thus granted bail to the appellant on merits and on the ground of prolonged incarceration and set aside the Special court order denying him bail. The court ordered that the appellant be released on bail on furnishing a PR bond in the sum of Rupees One Lakh and one or two solvent sureties in the like amount.

The complete judgement may be read here:

Related:

Bhima Koregaon case: NIA files draft charges under UAPA, sedition & conspiracy against 15 accused
1,948 arrests under UAPA, but only 485 cases sent for trial in 2019: Centre
Time that UAPA is made to Quit India!

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A Bombay High Court Bench of Justices SS Shinde and Manish Pitale have upheld the Special Court’s order granting bail to Areeb Majeed, accused of having links with terror outfit ISIS, reported Bar & Bench.

The Bench was hearing an appeal filed by the central investigation agency NIA, against the Special Court’s order which granted bail to Majeed on merits. Imposing a bail bond of Rupees One Lakh, the court observed that he should be released as he has been in jail for six years and the trial will not end anytime sooner.

According to the media, he has been directed to stay with his family in his residential home and report to the nearest police station twice a day for the first two months. He has also been barred from making any statements to the media and posting anything related to the case on social media.

The Additional Solicitor General Anil Singh reportedly requested for a stay but the High Court rejected his prayer. The court said, “…this is a question of liberty and that the detention of the accused for this long worked in his favour”, reported the Indian Express.

Majeed had travelled to Syria to allegedly join ISIS and was arrested on his return to India in 2014 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and was lodged in Arthur Road Jail since then. As per a report in Bar & Bench, he has been charged with the commission of offences under Section 125 (waging war against government) of the Indian Penal Code as well as Section 16 (punishment for terrorist act) and Section 18 (punishment for conspiracy) of the UAPA.

Anil Singh (appearing for NIA) had argued that Majeed had returned to India in November, 2014, with an intention to carry out terrorist activities. He submitted a picture of Majeed, where he was holding a purported weapon and made the judges review video clips produced by the NIA to exhibit that he has been involved with terrorist organisations, as per the IE.

However, Majeed, had argued that the entire charge is about being in Iraq between June and November, 2014 and that the present trial is not for any offences in India, against India or anything pertaining to India. He also submitted that on an application by his father, the NIA through the Indian consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, had made arrangements for his return from Istanbul but were reluctant to accept the role they played.

He also placed reliance on the recent Supreme Court judgment Union of India vs K.A Najeeb which held that constitutional courts have the power to grant bail to people accused of offences under UAPA irrespective of Section 43-D (5), so as to enforce the right to speedy trial which is guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

During a hearing on February 5, Bar & Bench had quoted the court saying, “Why would a 21 yr old go to Iraq for people who he has never met in his life by leaving his family behind? Don’t you have enough suffering around you? You may be immature.. like you said. You have no idea what your parents had to go through.” 

Related:

Does the new SC judgment offer hope for bail under UAPA?
What does it take to secure bail under UAPA?

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Joint winners of the Nobel Peace Prize: Nadia Murad (left) with Congolese doctor Denis Mukwege. EPA-EFE/Stephanie Lecocq

Mukwege is “the helper” who has provided medical care and surgery for thousands of survivors of sexual violence in his country, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In 1999 he founded the Panzi Hospital that’s become known for its comprehensive support to over 48,482 survivors of sexual violence.

Mukwege´s response to the Nobel Committee was both a call to action and a promise to all survivors of sexual violence that
 

the world refuses to sit idly in the face of your suffering.

For her part, Murad is “the witness”. A young woman from the Yazidi community in northern Iraq, she was abducted and held captive by the Islamic State just over four years ago. Now she’s a global voice against sexual violence, human trafficking and genocide. Murad displays relentless courage as an author, human rights activist, and story teller. As a survivor of human trafficking and sexual violence, she has challenged the UN, national governments, and international organisations to take action to ensure that she truly is “The Last Girl” to experience such horrors.

The recognition of the role played by these two people matters enormously in strengthening the campaign against the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war. Although this isn’t a new concept, it’s nevertheless taken an eternity to be acknowledged.

Patterns

Forms of conflict-related sexual violence include – but are not limited to – rape, forced pregnancy, slavery and torture.

Sexual violence can serve the purpose of humiliation, rewarding recruits, instilling fear or as a mechanism of ethnic cleansing. As such, it can become widespread, systematic and organised; or targeted, indiscriminate, opportunistic and merely tolerated; or a combination of both.

Patterns of sexual violence in wartime are extraordinarily varied and complex. It’s often perpetrated by a few armed actors, rather than all of them. The Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict data set shows that not all armed groups commit this violence.

My own research has provided additional insights. I reviewed post-war sexual violence reports between 1989 and 2011, of 23 armed actors in sub-Saharan Africa. Five didn’t have any sexual violence events attributed to them following settlement. Only eight were reported as responsible for 68% of abuses and assaults.

Reliance on material benefits is one explanation for brutal behaviour against unarmed civilians. Living in an area with valuable commodities and natural resources has often been associated with the prevalence of wartime sexual violence. For example, in eastern DRC, the presence of minerals has contributed to organised armed violence, wartime rape and other forms of sexual violence.

This is backed up by research which has found a higher risk of experiencing sexual violence outside of domestic relations, in close proximity to mines and armed actors. One factor seems to be that easy access to weapons, lootable resources, and financing seems to make armed groups more organisationally incoherent. This means that they are prone to under-investing in discipline. In turn this leads to forced recruitment and other cheap and coercive means for mobilisation. Leaders who don’t need civilian support or who have abducted their foot soldiers, strikingly, seem to enable gang rape as a form of socialisation within the ranks.
 

The burden

Other forms of violence in wartime can linger in the bodies and psyches of men and women for a long time. However, while soldiers are recognised for their heroism or courage, recompensed with a pension or integrated into a new army, survivors of sexual violence are silenced and ignored.

And yet many cannot bear children and are cast out of their communities as “polluted” or “unmarriageable”. They suffer from disease, chronic illness and complicated sexual and reproductive health concerns. They must endure long-term, recurrent depression and anxiety, among many psycho-social-spiritual costs. They are made to feel worthless, disposable to society, marginal. They are often poorer, less able or likely to access education, training and opportunities.

These consequences intersect with social and familial constraints – stigma, impoverishment, alienation, fragmentation – which can accompany war and humanitarian crisis and have particularly negative consequences for survivors of sexual violence.
 

Addressing the costs

In the absence of structures and institutions and processes to address these consequences, Mukwege and Murad strive to shift stigma and shame away from the survivors, and to call on all to respond with social justice.

Mukwege’s work at the Panzi Hospital in Bukavu, in South Kivu, is increasingly taken up with more than general medicine. The foundation that grew from this facility now also provides social, economic, judicial and psychological assistance.

For its part, the Nadia Initiative works with advocacy tools to make life in the Sinjar province in northern Iraq of the Yazidi community possible, and to seek justice for sexual violence survivors.

Both Nobel laureates are highlighting the need to do more. Survivors and their communities deserve recognition for the atrocities that have been committed against them. But they also need material support in the form of services and fundamental human rights and justice.
A Nobel Prize for this work means recognising sexual violence as a weapon of war. But Mukwege and Murad probably don’t want us to stop there. After all, they and the women and men they champion need resources for health care, education and legal assistance and post-conflict reconstruction. Just as their bodies and spirits need healing, so do their countries and communities.

Research assistants Christiana Lang and Chiara Tulp contributed to this article.
 

Angela Muvumba Sellström, Researcher, Department of Peace and Conflict, Uppsala University, Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme (FMSH) – USPC

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Taliban insurgents turn themselves in to Afghan National Security Forces, 2010. Image: ResoluteSupportMedia (CC BY 2.0). Behind the scenes, a remarkable new alliance is being sought in Afghanistan. At ground level the country’s long war is as disparate and complex as ever, but this emerging realignment may well give it a different flavour. 

On the surface, these five events seem to have little enough in common:

* The Trump administration is encouraging United States and Afghan troops to concentrate on safeguarding the main towns and cities, even if that means that the Taliban seize more of the rural areas where three-quarters of Afghans live 
* A US government agency, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, reports that the Taliban currently controls 59 of Afghanistan’s 407 districts, and actively contests a further 119. Many of the latter could well fall under its authority
* A three-day ceasefire organised by the Afghan government under the country’s president, Ashraf Ghani, produced some positive results. Several local Taliban leaders reportedly met local officials. At the same time, a preliminary meeting was held in Qatar between Taliban officials and Alice Wells, the US’s most senior diplomat for south Asia
* US and Afghan government forces continued to take the fight to the Taliban in some areas  (see Gabriel Dominguez, “Afghan and allied forces up pressure on militant groups”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 August 2018). This comes in the wake of Trump’s reluctant commitment of 5,000 more troops to Afghanistan, after a period when the trend was the other way
* Islamic State in Khorasan province (ISK, or ISKP) – as the local affiliate of ISIS is now commonly termed – is growing ever more bold in Afghanistan. A suicide-bombing in Kabul, claimed by ISK, killed twelve people and narrowly missed the vice-president, while the group has mounted numerous other attacks. These incidents fuel a wider perception that the US will come to focus more on the overall ISIS threat than the particular Taliban one. 
Afghanistan’s current war is approaching its eighteenth year. If these recent events are seen in the context of that whole period, then Washington’s emerging focus may become clearer.

The road from 9/11
The Taliban do now hold sway over large swathes of rural Afghanistan, but ISK too is gaining traction. It’s little wonder that the US, in light of its fresh experience in Iraq and Syria, views this ISIS affiliate as the major threat. The logic of that judgment leads to Washington’s support for Ashraf Ghani’s attempts to negotiate with the Taliban. If the US does now see the Taliban in a new light, it’s hard to overstate what a stunning reversal that represents. A brief digest of US involvement in Afghanistan in the post-9/11 years illustrates the point.

By November 2001, only ten weeks after the attacks on New York and Washington, the situation in Afghanistan had been transformed by the termination of the Taliban regime and the dispersal of al-Qaida. But this was not military victory or defeat in a conventional sense. Rather, the Taliban forces and their al-Qaida guerrilla comrades had merely ceased fighting, and chosen to redeploy into Afghan towns and villages or across the border into Pakistan – with many of their arms intact.

By January 2002, the George W Bush administration had effectively handed over post-war Afghanistan to the Europeans, while it moved on to confront the newly designated “axis of evil” of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea – with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq first in line.

At that time, some experienced United Nations officials and knowledgeable Afghans strongly recommended the immediate injection of a stabilisation force to fill the security vacuum: 30,000-plus troops was a figure often quoted. In its absence, went the argument, growing disorder would lead to ever greater ungoverned spaces, perfect conditions for diverse militias to put down roots and ensure a much longer war..

But neither the Europeans nor the Americans would provide this much needed support. Instead, a Nato-backed International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was set up – only 5,000-strong at the start – which could do little more than provide security in Kabul and a few other Afghan urban centres. Most regions and districts in the country were not part of a coherent plan to deliver security, a neglect which helped facilitate the return of the Taliban. Within three years, ISAF was facing rapid, fluid and costly guerrilla combat for which it was unprepared.

From 2006, the number of foreign soldiers in Afghanistan was increasing steadily; it reached around 100,000 by the time of the 2008 presidential election in the United States which brought Barack Obama to power. Yet the Taliban remained entrenched and effective, inflicting losses on twenty-nine of the national contingents operating under the coalition banner. The even more damaging conflict in Iraq led Obama to focus his campaign on the theme of withdrawing US forces from that country, but after much internal debate, and mindful of the Afghan connection to 9/11, he vowed to see the mission in Afghanistan through to the end.

If that ultimate aim was ambiguous, so was the hybrid approach Obama eventually pursued. This borrowed from John McCain, his opponent in the presidential race, the idea of a 30,000-troop “surge”, but instead of this being seen as part of a strategy to defeat the Taliban (as McCain consistently wanted), Obama’s aim was to weaken the Taliban and bolster the rule of the Kabul government to the extent that US troops could be safely withdrawn.

That plan faced constant setbacks on the ground, but despite the lack of progress the US forces were (as in Iraq) slowly extracted under Obama’s administration. Its hope was that the Afghan national army (ANA) – which the US had poured great resources into building, training, and equipping – would hold on. But the military initiative remained with the Taliban, and as Obama departed the scene and Trump arrived the calculation in Washington shifted once more: opting for that modest increase in American troop numbers but also towards slow acceptance of the need to negotiate with the Taliban.

The morphing war
The US’s hope now is that a deal can be done that achieves two valued outcomes: the negotiated entry of the Taliban into parts of Afghanistan’s governance, alongside the conversion of the post-deal Taliban into a body able and willing to assist in the control – and quite possibly the eventual defeat – of ISK.

This would still require a remarkable turnaround. But stepping back from Afghanistan to view the wider picture, the notion makes strategic sense. For a new manifestation of ISIS is taking shape after its setbacks in Iraq and Syria. The group is on the way to mounting a guerrilla-style insurgency in these two countries; is expanding into north Africa and the Sahel; is making connections with Islamist paramilitaries in the southern Philippines and Indonesia; and not least, has a growing impact in Afghanistan itself in the shape of ISK.

Thus western states, despite what they might say in public, are ready to accept that the way to prevent an uncontainable Afghan insurgency is to form a necessary – if strictly unofficial – alliance with the Taliban. The major transnational threat of the US and its allies is the emerging ISIS, and Taliban involvement is considered essential if ISK is to be stopped (see Antonio Giustozzi, The Islamic State in Khorasan Afghanistan, Pakistan and the New Central Asian Jihad [C Hurst, 2018]).

The seventeen-year “war on terror” has made for strange alliances. Just as Iranian militias became quietly linked to the US-led campaign against ISIS in Iraq, so the US-led anti-ISIS alliance in Afghanistan is set informally to embrace the Taliban. This may cause discomfort in polite western circles, but its political reality is as stark as can be.

Paul Rogers is professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University, northern England. He is openDemocracy’s international security adviser, and has been writing a weekly column on global security since 28 September 2001; he also writes a monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group. His latest book is Irregular War: ISIS and the New Threat from the Margins (IB Tauris, 2016), which follows Why We’re Losing the War on Terror (Polity, 2007), and Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century (Pluto Press, 3rd edition, 2010). He is on Twitter at: @ProfPRogers

Courtesy: https://www.opendemocracy.ne

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(Both these photographs are from the Daily Mail , dated April 14)  

With the Syrian missile attacks being declared as a one-of-action by the US, the immediate threat of further escalation has receded. The catch is in the premise of the strike: it was a punitive action by France, UK and the US – FUKUS – in response to Assad government’s alleged chemical attack on Ghouta. This means that if the strike was indeed engineered by Jaish al Islam, or al Qaeda lite—as has been claimed by the Syrian and Russian governments—the promise of such a response from the US/NATO will act as an incentive for rebels to stage similar chemical attacks. A collision course between the Russian-China-Iranian and NATO has now been set, with the control of the future in the hands of the ISIS, al Qaeda and similar forces. 

Russia has made clear that any future attack will have major consequences, and also has promised to arm the Syrian forces with more advanced S-300 and S-400 anti-missile batteries to stop any such strikes. 

There are three questions that need to be addressed. One is whether the Russians were informed of the impending strikes and targets. Second is the number of sites targeted by the US. The third is, how many missiles were interdicted by the Syrian anti-missile batteries, and if indeed 60 per cent of missiles were shot down, how could Syrian air defence, which is of Soviet vintage, i.e. pre 1990’s, be so effective? 

We will deal with the allegations of Syria’s chemical weapons use separately. For all, who follow what is happening in Syria, it is beyond belief that the Assad government, which is clearly winning the war against the US and its “rebels”, should use chemical weapons at this juncture. This is even less believable, when we see that the Ghouta rebels were on the verge of surrendering their arms in lieu of a safe passage. Why would Syrian government forces take such a step, which would not only have international repercussions, but also invite the US to intervene? That too, specifically after Trump’s statement that he wanted to withdraw all US troops from Syria . 

If we go by who has benefitted from the crime of the use of chemical weapons, it is certainly the rebels; or the proxy warriors for the US and its allies. If indeed chemical weapons were really used, and the Ghouta incident is just not a video production by the White Helmets, the group funded and trained by British intelligence . 

The US and its allies launched – according to the briefing given by General Kenneth McKenzie, the Director of the Joint Staff – 105 missiles. All the missiles performed as planned, and hit three targets, one in Damascus and two in Homs. All the three are supposed to be chemical weapon development or storage sites. 

The Russians and Syrians have contested the claims that only three sites were attacked, and said that a number of other targets such as Damascus airport, and critical installations were also attacked, but these missiles were brought down by the Syrian air defence.  

The cruise missiles were launched by three US ships, one US submarine, and aircrafts. The aircrafts used were US B-1B strategic bombers, French Rafaeles and British Tornadoes. From the routes of the missiles, and the airports from which the aircrafts took off, it is clear that Turkey, Qatar, Gulf Emirates and Jordan have cooperated with the US and its allies. Turkey, used to a number of flip flops on Syria, again executed another flop ; they announced that their cooperation with the US forces in carrying out strikes was due to Syria’s use of chemical weapons. 
The Joint Chief of Staff of US Armed Forces General Dunford, in his press conference with General Mathis, the US Secretary of Defence, held that the US did not “ … do any coordination with Russia on these strikes, and neither did we pre-notify them”. Answering a specific question, General Dunford said that only “the normal deconfliction of the airspace” information was shared with the Russians. 

Is this simply Orwellian doublespeak, meaning that the only difference between “deconfiction information” and “sharing information regarding strikes” is the information on specific targets? The rest is the same, meaning the Russians would have known well in advance when the strikes would take place, from where they would originate and the air path that would be followed. From this, the targets – or at least the broad areas being targeted would be easy to deduce. 

There is evidence that the Russians did inform the Syrians of the impending strikes five hours before they took place. The Russians and the Syrians pulled out men and materials from possible strike sites. That would explain why the only casualties in this high visibility exercise are three Syrians being wounded, and three buildings and two bunkers being demolished.

The site Sic Semper Tyrannis say s:
Russia was told where we were going to strike. Russia in turn warned the Syrians. Both the Syrians and the Russians evacuated key personnel and equipment from the target sites. Any claim by the United States that we caused devastating damage or destroyed essential capabilities is total fantasy.

The Dunford and Mathis briefing also talked about how every missile hit its target. The above article continues on how many of the 105 missiles hit their targets:

The second issue concerns the imagined success of the U.S. TLAM strike. Before General Mattis (retired) approached the podium Friday night, he knew full well that a significant number of the inbound missiles had been shot down inside Syria…The Russians and Syrians were not lying when they claimed to have downed more than 70 of the U.S., UK and French missiles.

The Russians and the Syrians have said that the bulk of the missiles – more than 70 – were shot down by the anti-missiles defences of the Syrian forces. Most were shot down by missiles using 1970’s Soviet technology. For those who believe in the technical superiority of the west, which includes Indian defence “experts”, this must be an unwelcome shock. 

The US has also released pictures of the strikes. Such pictures are available from satellite imagery as well. Again, defence experts seem to concur that the amount of damage – three buildings and two bunkers – do not amount to more than a 100 missiles hitting such targets. 

The US has also claimed that this time, they were targetting chemical weapon production and storage sites, not the delivery systems. There are pictures of people without any protective clothing and masks looking at or wandering around such bombed “chemical weapon” sites. We give below pictures, carried by UK’s Daily Mail , of the Barzah Research Centre in Damascus, struck by missiles on Saturday morning, and photographed a few hours later.

If indeed this was a chemical weapons site, such pictures, with people going about without any protection, is unbelievable. Similar pictures are also available for the other two sites near Homs that were hit.  All these indicate that Syrians are right when they say these are not functioning chemical weapons sites.

The Syrians have said that these sites were dismantled as chemical weapon manufacture or storage sites in 2013. OPCW has verified periodically that these facilities are no longer in operation. Therefore, the story that the US and its allies are presenting to the world of the Assad government still continuing its chemical weapons program has no basis. At least on the basis of any evidence that the US and its allies have been able to produce.

Courtesy: Newsclick.in
 

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From macabre hide-and-seek exercises, in which children hunt and kill enemy prisoners in specially constructed mazes, to the mass execution and decapitation of adult soldiers, young people living under IS have been indoctrinated and encouraged to engage in violence.

Meanwhile, IS’s quasi-government instituted an education system explicitly aimed at indoctrinating and weaponising the children living under it.

Mathematics was practised by determining how many more fighters IS has than an opposing force. Chemistry was taught by discussion of methods of gas inhalation. And physical education focused on the correct body positions for firing various weapons.

Their education has been compounded by the retaliatory and sometimes excessive violence of the vast array of forces committed to destroying IS. Through this, children have been exposed to horrific violence on a daily basis – thus generating trauma and, undoubtedly, genuine long-term grievances.
 

How IS’s use of child soldiers differs

There is a fundamental difference between IS’s use of child soldiers and the practice elsewhere.

IS hasn’t just recruited child soldiers. It systematically militarised the education systems of captured Iraqi and Syrian territory to turn the region’s children into ideological timebombs.

These children, saturated in IS’s particular brand of violent and uncompromising “religious” instruction from about the age of five, were trained in the use of small arms before their teenage years. They constitute a new challenge for the international community.

IS’s state-building efforts appear to have been thwarted for now. But saving the children exposed and potentially indoctrinated in its ideology is key to avoiding further terror attacks in the West, tackling the root causes of regional upheaval, and working toward a future where children play instead of fight, and schools teach instead of drill.
 

What children have been taught

Military activity, superiority based on IS’s interpretation of Islam, and the need to defeat unbelievers are embedded in its school textbooks.

Various videos, produced both through journalistic investigation and by IS itself, show the more practical side of education under the group’s rule. Children are taught how to fire small arms and use hand grenades.

Although IS extensively forced children into its ranks, many joined voluntarily – with or without their families’ blessing. But, in the long term, it doesn’t matter whether a child is forcibly recruited or not. And this is the matter of gravest concern.

IS’s primary concern is building and maintaining the children’s loyalty. The phrase “cubs of the caliphate” is a microcosm of how it views them. Cubs are unruly, ill-disciplined and dependent on strong (sometimes violent) guidance from their elders.

However, with time, resources and patience they can turn into a generation of fighters and idealists who will foster IS’s ideology even if its current military setbacks prove terminal.
 

Programs need to take a new approach

Disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation programs designed to reintegrate child soldiers into post-conflict society have significantly progressed in recent years. This represents the continued evolution of military-civil partnerships in the quest for a conflict-free world.

But IS’s systematic and meticulous radicalisation of an entire region’s children presents new challenges.

It’s understandable to interpret IS’s rapid retreat as its death knell, and thereby view traditional rehabilitation techniques as an appropriate remedy for yet another region recovering from violence at the hands of a radical armed insurgency. However, this conflict has been highly unusual in its pace, tactics and impacts – both now and potentially in the future.

So, we must revisit the fundamental assumptions of what it means to inspire peace within a society. This starts with the children subjected to the ideological extremism of IS and other armed groups.

If there is to be sustainable peace in the areas liberated from IS control, rehabilitation programs must be viewed as a community-wide process. Even if children did not directly participate in IS activities, the group has moulded their worldview and underpinning life philosophies.

Such philosophies may be especially productive in a region where resentment of perceived foreign – Western – interference and exploitation is long-lasting and multifaceted.
 

What can be done

The regular processes of identifying child combatants, disarming and reintegrating them into their communities through rehabilitation (such as by ensuring they are physically and mentally capable of rejoining their communities) and reconciliation (developing peace, trust and justice among children and their communities) are all necessary. But they are vastly insufficient in this instance.

Rarely has there been such systematic youth radicalisation and militarisation. So, the international response must be equally far-reaching and methodical.

Rapid reimplementation and revisiting of pre-IS school curricula is of the highest priority. National and local governments should ensure children are shielded from further recruitment by instituting a curriculum drawn from principles of tolerance and inclusion.

It’s essential to develop locally run initiatives to measure the level of radicalisation among a community’s children and to construct child-friendly spaces for young people to socialise, reconnect with their wider community and “unlearn” what they adopted under IS.

Such practices will help to heal the wounds of IS occupation and ensure the potential for cyclical violence is removed. Done right, it will hinder IS’s ability to rise anew.

James S. Morris, PhD Student in International Security and Child Rights, The University of Queensland and Tristan Dunning, Lecturer in Modern Middle East History, School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, The University of Queensland

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

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Syrian Democratic Forces looking toward the northern town of Tabqa, Syria. Syrian Democratic Forces, via AP

After all, few experts foresaw Anwar al-Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem in 1977, which led to the first peace treaty between Israel and an Arab state, nor did they predict the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 or the Arab uprisings of 2010-11. Having taught and written about the Middle East for three decades, however, I feel confident in making the following forecast for the region in 2018.
 

1. The Syrian conflict will drag on without resolution.

In Syria, the government will continue to reconquer territory, but will not be able to expand its control across the entire country.

There are four reasons for this.

First, regime opponents who have borne the brunt of the regime’s brutality for the past seven years know better than to throw themselves on its mercy now. In the past, they have treated government offers of amnesty with scorn. They will continue to do so.

Second, the government is too weak. Most of the territorial gains the government made during the past two years were accomplished by subcontractors – Hezbollah, Iranian units, Iranian-trained and controlled militias and private militias – not by the depleted government forces.

Third, the overwhelming majority of opposition groups operate within the confines of a single province. This indicates that they are local forces under the control of a local power broker. Having experienced the lighter hand of the government for the past six years, they are unlikely to willingly surrender their hard-won autonomy.

Finally, the Syrian civil war has been a proxy war with the West and Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies supporting the opposition. While that aid will certainly decline as a result of donor fatigue and logistical problems, it will probably not end. As a result, the opposition will not surrender from sheer exhaustion.
The former Arab League and United Nations peace envoy to Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, will be proved correct. Several years ago, he predicted the Syrian civil war would end with the “Somalization” of Syria.

Like Somalia, Syria will have an internationally recognized government and permanent representation at the United Nations. It will continue to issue and stamp passports and, if it so chooses, will send a team to the Olympics. However, like the government of Somalia, the government of Syria will reign, not rule, over the entirety of its internationally recognized borders.
 

2. Saudi Arabia’s ‘reforms’ will fizzle.

Saudi Arabia will continue to make reforms under the direction of Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman, but those reforms will be purely cosmetic.

Although the crown prince has been portrayed as a reformer, it is important to remember that Bashar al-Assad, the president of Syria, once played that role as well.

Saudi Arabia’s Muhammed bin Salman Al Saud. REUTERS/Nicolas Asfonri/Pool

The crown prince will continue to try to consolidate power in his branch of the ruling family. So far, he has imprisoned other princes and economic elites on charges of corruption, while spending US$300 million on a house in France.

He has also taken power away from another pillar of the Saudi ruling group – the religious establishment. In fact, the so-called “loosening” of restrictions in Saudi Arabia – allowing women to drive, opening entertainment centers, stripping the religious police of the power to make arrests and promoting a “more moderate” Islam – are all aspects of his campaign to divest the religious establishment of its power and centralize power in the hands of his immediate family.

Only by releasing prisoners of conscience from Saudi jails and ending the barbaric war in Yemen might the crown prince demonstrate he is a true reformer.

The crown prince’s push to liberalize the Saudi economy will also fail. Two years ago he announced his “Vision 2030.” It includes a list of off-the-shelf neo-liberal recommendations intended to turn Saudi Arabia into a market economy within 14 years.

The implementation of Vision 2030 would mean ending a governmental tradition of buying the loyalty of Saudi citizens through subsidies and employment. It would mean ensuring a free flow of information in a country that, in 2017, Reporters Without Borders ranked 168th of 180 countries in terms of press freedom.

It would mean dramatically increasing female workforce participation from 22 percent to a stated goal of 30 percent – still well below the global norm of 49 percent – and adding 2.5 million private sector jobs. Finally, it means changing attitudes toward work in a country in which 11 million guest workers literally do all the heavy lifting.

All in 12 years.
 

3. The caliphate will be gone, but not the Islamic State.

If 2014 was the year in which IS seemed unstoppable, 2015 was the year the IS caliphate began to slide into oblivion.

At its height, IS controlled 40 percent of Iraq. At the beginning of 2017, that number slipped to 10 percent, and IS lost 70 percent of its territory in Syria. The caliphate also lost all the major towns it had taken. The caliphate is finished.

But what about IS, the movement? Some IS fighters have already given up. They have tried to melt into local populations or return home, although they have met resistance from populations out for vengeance and fearful foreign governments.

For the rest, there are two likely scenarios. First, since a significant number of IS fighters from Iraq, along with their leaders, joined IS because they harbored grievances against the Shiite-dominated government in Iraq, it is entirely possible that they will continue to wage an insurgency against that government. This is just what the Taliban in Afghanistan did after the Americans overthrew their government.

Second, it is even more likely that former fighters and freelancers will continue their attacks globally, with or without organizational backing. The world is not lacking in gullible and disturbed individuals.

Nevertheless, because IS will lack a base from which to disseminate its sophisticated propaganda, and because the appeal of high-risk but ineffectual ideologies wane over time, so too will IS’ appeal.
 

4. Trump’s ‘ultimate deal?’ Gone for now.

Birds fly on a foggy day near the Dome of the Rock, located in Jerusalem’s Old City. REUTERS/Ammar Awad

When the U.S. recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, it put another nail – quite possibly the final nail – into the coffin of the Oslo agreements, which set the parameters for negotiating a two-state solution.

In spite of the protestations from the Trump administration, an Israeli government secure in the embrace of the United States lacks incentive to concede anything. The United States has been down this road before, multiple times, and to no avail.

In addition, the polarized politics of the Middle East further erodes the possibility of resolving the conflict. In 2002, the Saudis proposed a peace plan: If Israel made peace with the Palestinians, the Arab states would normalize relations with it.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States and Israel are now in de facto alliance against Iran. The Palestinian issue has dropped by the wayside and another incentive for Israel to make peace has disappeared.
 

5. Yemen will sink further into the abyss.

Down the road, the most important underreported crisis in the Middle East is the war in Yemen, which Saudi Arabia, with American support, is waging against an indigenous uprising. There is no end in sight.

The Saudis claim the Houthis – rebellious members of the dominant clan of Shiites who live mainly in the north of that country – are Iranian proxies. The Saudis have thus entered the war on the side of a government that took power after a rigged “national dialogue” and an election won by the only candidate – a Saudi-supported candidate – allowed to run. The Houthi rebellion in fact began in 2004, long before the Saudis noticed Iranian conspiracies throughout the region.

The Saudis have engaged in a massive bombing campaign of civilian areas and have blockaded the ports of a country that is dependent on imports for 90 percent of its food. Yemen is the poorest Arab country. As a result of the Saudi campaign, which not only has killed 12,000 Yemenis but has kept a civil war going, 50,000 children faced starvation at the end of 2017. Between April and August 2017, 20,000 Yemenis died of cholera.

The United States supports the Saudi war effort. Yet, like Saudi Arabia, it accuses Iran of being the greatest purveyor of terrorism in the region.

James L. Gelvin, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History, University of California, Los Angeles
 

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

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Uttar Pradesh — India’s most populous state — reported the most (17) arrests, followed by Maharashtra (16), Telangana (16), Kerala (14) and Karnataka (8), said this reply to the Rajya Sabha (upper house of Parliament) by Hansraj Gangaram Ahir, minister of state for ministry of home affairs, on December 20, 2017.
 
These states accounted for 69% of all arrests across 14 states.
 
“Very few individuals [from India] have come to the notice of the central and state security agencies who (sic) have joined ISIS,” Ahir said in his reply to the Parliament.
 
Telangana had most arrests per 100,000 Muslim population in the state, followed by Uttarakhand, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra.
 

Source: Rajya Sabha; Population data from Census 2011; Telangana Statistical Year-Book 2017.
 
The NIA registered a case against five ISIS sympathisers from Kerala’s Kannur district on December 17, 2017, the Times of India reported on December 17, 2017. The case was registered under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967.
 
Indian youth are lured by offering house, meat, chocolates and women by ISIS operatives, India Today reported on May 30, 2017.   
 
Over 100 people from Kerala are suspected to have joined ISIS over the years, Kerala police said, India Today reported on November 11, 2017.
 
ISIS responsible for 25 deaths every day in 2016
 
ISIS is a designated global terrorist organisation that has recruited thousands of foreign fighters with violent extremist ideology inciting terrorist acts.
 
ISIS was responsible for most attacks (1,133) and deaths (9,114) by any terrorist organisation in 2016, according to the Country Reports On Terrorism 2016 released on July 2017 by the US Department of State.
 
ISIS was responsible for nearly 25 deaths — including perpetrators — every day worldwide in 2016, up from 17 every day in 2015.
 

Source: Department of State, United State of America, Note: * Includes perpetrators; ** Excludes attacks attributed to branches of ISIS or ISIS-inspired individuals
 
Deaths caused by ISIS increased 48% from 6,178 in 2015 to 9,114 in 2016 while persons kidnapped or taken hostage by ISIS increased 74% from 4,805 in 2015 to 8,379 in 2016.
 
Attacks by ISIS outside Syria and Iraq increased 80% from 44 in 2015 to 79 in 2016.
 
(Mallapur is an analyst with IndiaSpend.)

Courtesy: India Spend
 

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ISIS has been using fantastical propaganda on social media that describes the Islamic State as a land that is full of happiness to recruit supporters. shutterstock.com

In September, the Indonesian police said that around 600 Indonesians have joined ISIS. What pulled them to uproot their lives life and join ISIS?

The stories of two Indonesian women, Leefa and Nur, who returned home after joining ISIS, can provide some clues.

Both said they flew to Raqqa after they saw ISIS’s photos and videos about Islamic State on the internet. Leefa said that from the videos she imagined it to be a better place to live.

ISIS has been using fantastical propaganda on social media that describes the Islamic State as a land that is full of happiness to recruit supporters.
 

Islamic utopia

Charlie Winter, a senior research fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), in his report, Documenting the Virtual “Caliphate” (2015), wrote that ISIS has six instruments to improve its existence and strategic goals. One of them is Islamic utopia. The others are brutality, mercy, victimhood, war and belonging.

Islamic utopia is the basis of ISIS’s fantastical propaganda. According to Winter, this is ISIS’s most important instrument. They develop stories on how Muslims will live full of joy and happiness under the ISIS caliphate and Islamic law.

ISIS develops its fantasy of Islamic State from seven themes, namely religion, economic activity, governance, justice, social life, expansion, and nature and landscapes. Among those, governance, religion and economy are the top three themes.

ISIS builds narratives that its Islamic State is an effective governmental system that is equipped with good social facilities and a flourishing economy. ISIS also claims that its “state” is the only implementer of true Islam. This narrative is depicted through videos showing people jointly practising religious activities, such as praying and breaking fast.

Aaron Zelin, a Richard Borow Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, looked at ISIS media releases between April 18 and April 24 2015. He found 32 media releases that depict fantastical ideas around government, hisba (moral policing) and the promotion of the caliphate. In those releases ISIS describes its Islamic state as a naturally beautiful caliphate with high-quality social services as well as respect for justice.
 

Fantasy

Fantasy, pleasant imagination that is not based on reality, is an important element of the human mind. As humans, we not only make sense of our world based on what we see and feel but also based on what we think or imagine. An individual or a group of people can create fantasies for political and strategic purposes.

Potential targets for ISIS recruitment are usually individuals who have a black-and-white view of the world. They tend to think in categorical terms, such as good and bad, or right and wrong. They also usually harbor feelings of being “inadequate, disrespected, full of unfulfilled ambitions, angry at real or perceived injustices, and who are blaming other people or institutions for their woes”.

Some others dream of having better religious experiences. By exploiting their grievances and black-white mentality, ISIS potentially transforms this kind of people into supporters.
 

Attracting Indonesians

To attract Indonesian audiences, ISIS released online videos of ISIS members from Indonesia inviting Indonesians to join them.

Leefa said she later regretted joining ISIS. Leefa explained she travelled to Raqqa because she imagined ISIS territory was a better place to live and to become a real Muslim. She had hoped to get good health services as well as to have surgery for her neck problem.

Leefa said she had talked to ISIS members before deciding to travel to Syria and to join ISIS. One-on-one chats with potential recruits are part of ISIS recruitment strategies because ISIS understands that personal or private messages are more effective in persuading people.

ISIS members also hold religious meetings at mosques to spread their fantastical propaganda.

They promised everyone who travelled to Islamic State territory would have a better life and be provided with free public services, such as water, electricity and houses. They even promised all people would get monthly allowances as well as free food and health services.

However, the reality shows otherwise. Leefa and Nur acknowledged that once they arrived in ISIS territory they discovered that the information as well as the Islamic State they imagined was completely different from the reality.

Leefa, Nur and other Indonesians only heard the stories from one side, the ISIS side. They lacked accurate information about ISIS for two reasons.

In the current post-truth era facts have become less important than personal beliefs. People tend only to want to hear information that is in line with their beliefs. To cherry-pick information and to selectively read media/news are common in this kind of society. Hence, people only get one side of the story.

The distance between Indonesia and ISIS territory in the Middle East also makes it difficult for Indonesians to acquire direct and accurate information about ISIS and the real situation in their controlled land.

ISIS may have lost most of their territory, but it’s important to be aware that ISIS can still utilise the Internet and social media to recruit people and to spread their fantastical propaganda.

This recruitment method has been proved effective to attract lots of people to join ISIS. So, this is the time for us to find ways to counter this kind of propaganda as well as to safeguard people from it.

Wendy Andhika Prajuli, Lecturer in International Relations, Bina Nusantara University

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

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Islamic State information on a hand-held device (via LobeLog)

Cyberspace is the ideal platform for terrorists because, unlike conventional warfare, barriers to entry into cyberspace are much lower. The price of entry is an Internet connection. The surreptitious use of the Internet to advance terrorist group objectives has created a new brand of Holy War—“virtual jihad”—that gains thousands of new adherents each day. Long after the current terrorist groups have ceased to be a major threat from a physical perspective, they will remain omnipresent in cyberspace, promoting a virtual caliphate from their safe haven behind computer keyboards around the world. Islamic extremists are natural candidates to transition to a virtual world that offers them automatic citizenship beyond the nation-state.

Since the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) was founded, its leaders have deftly and continually rewritten the narrative to claim that the group’s desired caliphate exists, has a specific location, and maintains a defined group of adherents. Unconstrained by the absence of a definitive Quranic guideline for what constitutes a caliphate, IS created its own self-promoting doctrine. The group expanded its caliphate narrative to include a wide range of options for participation: membership included everyone from the passive observer reading a blog or curiously following a Twitter feed to the keyboard jihadist editing Rumiyah or hacking a website to the real-world operators attacking a nightclub or running down holiday celebrants with a delivery truck.

IS has successfully exploited the sociopolitical environment and young adults’ obsession with technology to establish a growing community of devotees in the ungoverned territory of cyberspace, ensuring its ability to continue to coordinate and inspire violence well into the future. IS has found its own salvation via the Internet, particularly since it has already passed the peak of its real-world power.

IS has also capitalized on the world’s evolving propensity to integrate online activities with real-world activities. Social media has had an incredible multiplying effect on radical messaging, and IS has had great success publishing online, which has resonated particularly well with disenfranchised Muslims and youths, inspiring some to act on inspiration and guidance received online. IS has exploited their search for meaningful identity by promising to restore their dignity so that they may find personal fulfillment and purpose.

The virtual world is in some ways more compelling than the real world, because storylines can be artfully crafted for maximum appeal, while omitting anything that may be perceived as negative. A promise is much easier to make online, as is the vision of fulfilling aspirations. The IS has created virtual messaging that is wildly at odds with the reality of life as an IS fighter on the ground. Cyberspace has enabled IS to turn tactical defeats on the battlefield into glorious martyrdom operations that highlight the bravery and commitment of its fighters. The loss of territory and the deaths of key leaders have served to feed propaganda efforts that are used to prove the resiliency of the caliphate.

Since all that is required to be a virtual planner is an Internet connection and good encryption, they can operate from anywhere, although being geographically dispersed carries heightened risk of detection in some nations. The virtual planner model has revolutionized jihadist external operations. IS has taken advantage of recent advances in online communications and encryption so that the group’s top operatives can directly guide lone attackers, playing a central role in the conceptualization, target selection, timing, and execution of future attacks. Virtual planners offer operatives the same services once provided by strictly physical networks. They seamlessly execute the group’s guiding strategy and maximize the impact and propaganda value of attacks waged in its name, while avoiding many of the risks typically associated with physically training operatives, such as being tailed or getting caught returning to a home country.

Integrated into the group’s geographical command structure, virtual planners function much like theater commanders but in the cyber realm. IS virtual planners are also assigned areas of responsibility according to their nationality and linguistic skills, and are tasked with actively recruiting and handling attackers from these areas.

The advancement of Internet-based communication and the explosion of social media have enabled the planner to reach a larger audience than ever before. By building an “intimate” relationship with a potential attacker, the virtual planner provides encouragement and validation, addressing the individual’s doubts and hesitations while generating confidence and a strong desire to carry out an attack. Virtual planners can replicate the same social pressures that exist with in-person cells. Individuals can simply wander into searchable online networks rather than identify with and be socialized by covert in-person networks. Unlike with physical networks, the virtual planner model does not risk the capture or punishment of the network’s key operatives.

Individuals inspired by IS can directly reach out to virtual planners for guidance and assistance in carrying out attacks. In addition to recruitment and operational guidance, virtual planners can bring disparate individuals and cells together to form larger attack networks. IS virtual planners allow the group to effectively seize ownership over what would previously have been considered lone-wolf attacks. Virtual planners transform these individuals into ambassadors for the IS global brand at relatively low cost. Virtual planners help maximize the psychological and reputational impact of violence committed in the IS name, further enticing other potential devotees to join its cause.

The success of the virtual-planner model underscores the ongoing process of organizational learning by jihadist groups. But the model also has disadvantages, such as the inability to provide in-person training or be optimally nimble during an attack to modify plans as circumstances change. Cells directed by virtual planners are also at greater risk of being detected by Signals Intelligence, despite advances in end-to-end encryption. Nonetheless, the virtual planner approach is a low-cost, high-reward strategy with enormous destructive potential, especially as IS and other terrorist groups continue to refine the model.

Adaptations to jihadists’ modes of operation have continually outpaced states’ ability to effectively counter them, and will likely continue to do so. Virtual jihad has not only gained prominence and credibility as an alternative to traditional conceptions of jihad but has also progressively outpaced physical jihad. Although physical jihad continues to appeal to a great many actors, virtual jihad has supplanted traditional notions of jihad for a new generation of adherents who are either unwilling or unable to engage in physical violence themselves. The rise of the virtual jihadist has assumed an important (perhaps irreplaceable) role in rejuvenating the concept of jihad and facilitating the dissemination of its “counterculture” narrative to new audiences for many years to come.
 

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