The birth of Bangladesh was the very antithesis of one religion, one nation principle. Against the quasi theological state of Pakistan, Bangladesh defined itself as a secular multicultural republic. The state, having no truck with religion, was to protect and enhance secular and liberal principles, and respect the right to dissent and democracy. It was an experiment lauded by the world community. Unfortunately, what we are witnessing today may be the unwinding of that experiment. It appears that Bangladesh is moving slowly but surely towards a polity which will be defined by Islamism. 

The recent upsurge in anti-government demonstrations by the Hefazat e Islam, a conglomeration of religious interests, is a pointer that if not handled sternly, Bangladesh might go the Pakistan way which will have implications for the whole of South Asia. The current crisis has been precipitated by the decision of the Sheikh Hasina government to install a statue of Shiekh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh. Arguing that sculpture is against Islam, Hefazat has vowed to tear down any such statue thus setting the stage for another confrontation with the government. The Islamist argument always has been that any representation which might lead to ‘idolatry’ must be prohibited in an ‘Islamic’ nation. The argument is simply ridiculous: there is a difference between idols and statues, the deference shown to both is fundamentally and qualitatively different.

In fact, rather than statues, the threat of idol worship comes from the cult like status which many sovereigns of Muslim nations enjoy. But then, questioning the ‘divine right’ of one family to rule in perpetuity might amount to sedition and hence not just people of the Arab world, but even the Bangladeshi Mullahs will never raise such issues. It is extremely hard to believe that these Mullahs are themselves convinced of the veracity of their argument against installing Mujib’s statue. The problem to understand then is not the absurdity of such claims but what lies behind them. And it is becoming clear that the Islamists in that country want to imagine the state in their own image; in other words it is a power struggle to re-make Bangladesh into an Islamist republic.

One of the important reasons why these Islamists feel so emboldened is because the Hasina government has been soft on them. In 2017, the Hefazat tasted victory when they successfully rallied to pressurise the government to remove the statue of ‘lady justice’ which was installed in front of the apex court. Sheikh Hasina in fact supported the Islamists by publically criticising the installation of the statue. If the idea was that she would gather the support of these Islamists, then surely she did but at what cost? If an officially secular state capitulates to such ridiculous demands, then perhaps it is time to look at how the government itself is undermining the secular system which it claims to uphold.

Similarly, the government was silent and even at times supportive of the Islamists when there was a spate of killing of secular bloggers in the country. Senior ministers put the blame for such terrorist acts on the bloggers themselves, arguing that these bloggers had provoked ordinary Muslims and that they should have been sensitive to their religious feelings. Again, the government was bending over backwards to appease the hardliners. At times, the government was even seen to be actively on the side of Islamist killers by being extremely slow in prosecuting such cases. The government needs to understand that by accommodating the feelings of such hardliners, it is digging its own grave. No matter how popular Sheikh Hasina may be with the Islamists, the latter will not stop until they make fundamental changes to the constitution of that country. Hasina must realise that she will not be able to ‘contain’ the Islamist Ulama through such mollycoddling; they will only be emboldened to make further more hardline demands. Only a principled opposition to the ideology of the Islamists can make sure that these Islamists remain on the periphery.

The Islamist network in Bangladesh is grounded within independent/community (qawmi) madrasas. There are many large madrasas housing thousands of students who act as captive foot soldiers to implement the agenda of their bosses. According to one estimate, these community madrasas together house about 4 million students. The Sheikh Hasina government, again, in order to appease this section, made the certificate of these madrasas equivalent to certificates given by government schools and colleges. This resulted in ‘mainstreaming’ of madrasa education in Bangladesh but at the same time also led to rising aspirations of madrasa graduates. Although their certificates had become recognised and they could apply for government and other jobs, the teaching within their madrasas hardly equipped them to enter the professional job market. So while the aspirations had risen, the harsh reality outside led to rising levels of frustration within these madrasa students. It is not surprising therefore that this section is the first to hit the streets whenever a call is made by the Islamist Ulama. Moreover, this section is now convinced that their interests can only be fulfilled by an overtly Islamic regime and therefore it is in their interest to campaign for the abolishment of the existing secular system of governance.

Lastly, in its quest for absolute power, the Sheikh Hasina government has decimated the opposition. Leading members of the opposition have been jailed on trumped up charges. Even the civil society in Bangladesh is facing the heat. All this has ensured that the Hasina government has no rival in the foreseeable future. This vacant opposition space has now been filled by the Islamists. Since there is no other opposition, even people who are not Islamist have no other option but to support such Islamist parties. A sagacious move by the Hasina government would have been to keep alive the secular opposition space but in her quest for absolute power, she has made sure that the whole polity of Bangladesh has moved decisively to the right.

Sheikh Hasina has managed good press for herself so far. She is portrayed as someone who is fighting the Islamists but it appears that she has in many ways paved the way for such an Islamist scourge to emerge in the first place.
 

‘This article was first published in New Age Islam and may be read here’.

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Mozambique’s military responded swiftly following deadly attacks by Islamist gunmen on three police stations recently. Reuters/Juda Ngwenya

They told local people they would not hurt them, that their fight was with the state and the police. They explained that they rejected state health and education and refused to pay taxes. The local population calls these men “Al-Shabaabs”.
Mozambique’s government’s response was swift. It fought back with forces from other districts and special forces from the provincial capital. The battle lasted several hours and left 16 dead, including two policemen and a community leader.
The attack came as a shock to a country already grappling with major economic and political problems. The incident is the first confirmed Islamist armed attack in Mozambique.

Information is still sparse and confused. But for now, we can say with some degree of certainty that what happened on 5 October 2017 was not a Somali Al-Shabaab attack nor an externally driven international Jihadi plot. Nor was it a state conspiracy as some had suggested.

Rather, the attack appears to have been carried out by a group of local young Muslims who formed a sect in 2014 in Mocimboa da Praia which is known as “Al-Shabaab”. The group controls two mosques in the town and have told their followers to stop sending their children to secular institutions such as state schools and hospitals. It wants Sharia law applied in their area.

The fact that this first Islamist attack was carried out by Mozambicans makes the event no less shocking, particularly in a country proud of its sound and relaxed inter-religious relations. Until we get more information on the group and what triggered it to attack the state, it’s worth setting the incident within a historical context.
 

Islam in Mozambique

Islam has a very old presence in Mozambique, particularly on the coast and in the Northern parts of the country. Various Sultanates and Sheikdom existed before Portugal occupied the territory in the late 19th Century .

The Portuguese colonialists openly and officially favoured Catholicism, at a time repressing Islam and other religions. But Islam gained converts and nonetheless grew. By the time of independence in 1975 Muslims officially accounted for 13% of the population. The 1997 census gave the figure of 17.8%. Both figures are contested by Muslims who believe them to be higher.

After independence the Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo) adopted Marxist-Leninism. It attacked all faiths, but Islam was particularly affected. It was a faith most state leaders didn’t understand. This was evident in incidents such as President Samora Machel keeping his shoes when he walked into the main mosque in the country. Another example was the government insisting on pigsties being built in Muslim areas in the name of “development”. Memories such as these are still raw and were raised yet again after the Mocimboa da Praia attack.

After Frelimo abandoned Marxism-Leninism and shifted to multiparty democracy, the party began courting all religions to gain electoral support. But tensions still arose from time to time. One involved the government taking steps to officially recognise Islamic holidays. This sparked a crisis in parliament in 1996 and the Frelimo governing party backtracked, adopting a more secular approach from then on.

The incident served to remind Muslims that they still felt marginalised.

Islam is overwhelmingly Sufi in Mozambique, with a majority of Muslims belonging to different Turuq (brotherhoods). Sufism represents the more mystical side of Islam – opposed by scripturalist Muslims, such as the Wahhabi, who accuse them of deviating from the Koran.

The return of African graduates from Saudi Arabia in the 1970s gave political clout to the reformist and scripturalist movements in Mozambique. They gained control of some mosques and, in collaboration with the Portuguese, expanded their presence.

Today the main national organisation is the reformist Islamic Council which was created after independence by Wahhabi elements and grew in the 1980s and 1990s in partnership with the authorities.

Splinter organisations appeared in the late 1990s and 2000s, particularly in Northern Mozambique. As reformism gained firmer ground in the north, tensions and conflict increased. Controversies emerged in relation to sufi practices, alcohol, education and dress code. There was, however, never any violence against the state.
 

Powder keg

Although no international terror group has been linked to Mocimba da Praia, the incident is very serious. Cabo Delgado is a Muslim-majority province where discoveries of giant oil and gas reserves have brought international conglomerates and their private security, making the area a potential powder-keg.

On top of this, the area is desperately poor. Northern areas of Mozambique have gained little from the economic boom of the 2000s. Mocimboa da Praia is a case in point: little development has been seen even as expectations exploded following the discovery of massive gas and oil reserves in the province. Billions of dollars have been invested in offshore drilling, with little benefit to local communities.

The government must devise a careful and well-thought response to this new Islamist threat. Downplaying the affair as “banditry” and dealing only with the sect when it’s clear that there are broader religious and social dynamics at play risks seeing the problem reemerge elsewhere.

In turn, going for an all-out repression to eradicate the “Islamist threat” could radicalise other Muslims and root the problem deeper and more widely – think only of Boko Haram in West Africa in 2009.

So far state officials have been careful and moderate in their statements. But practice on the ground needs to follow the same line and some changes in social and religious policy will need to follow.
 

Eric Morier-Genoud, Lecturer in African history, Queen’s University Belfast

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

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Data on violent incidents in the US reveal that focus on Islamist extremism since 9/11 may be misguided

A woman holds a flag as she looks out over the National Sept. 11 Memorial and Museum. REUTERS/Lucas Jackson

On a Tuesday morning in September 2001, the American experience with terrorism was fundamentally altered. Two thousand, nine hundred and ninety-six people were murdered in New York, Virginia and Pennsylvania. Thousands more, including many first responders, lost their lives to health complications from working at or being near Ground Zero.

The 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by Islamist extremists, resulting in nearly 18 times more deaths than America’s second most devastating terrorist attack – the Oklahoma City bombing. More than any other terrorist event in U.S. history, 9/11 drives Americans’ perspectives on who and what ideologies are associated with violent extremism.

But focusing solely on Islamist extremism when investigating, researching and developing counterterrorism policies goes against what the numbers tell us. Far-right extremism also poses a significant threat to the lives and well-being of Americans. This risk is often ignored or underestimated because of the devastating impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

We have spent more than 10 years collecting and analyzing empirical data that show us how these ideologies vary in important ways that can inform policy decisions. Our conclusion is that a “one size fits all” approach to countering violent extremism may not be effective.

By the numbers

Historically, the U.S. has been home to adherents of many types of extremist ideologies. The two current most prominent threats are motivated by Islamist extremism and far-right extremism.

To help assess these threats, the Department of Homeland Security and recently the Department of Justice have funded the Extremist Crime Database to collect data on crimes committed by ideologically motivated extremists in the United States. The results of our analyses are published in peer-reviewed journals and on the website for the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism & Responses to Terrorism.

The ECDB includes data on ideologically motivated homicides committed by both Islamist extremists and far-right extremists going back more than 25 years.

Between 1990 and 2014, the ECDB has identified 38 homicide events motivated by Islamist extremism that killed 62 people. When you include 9/11, those numbers jump dramatically to 39 homicide events and 3,058 killed.

The database also identified 177 homicide events motivated by far-right extremism, with 245 killed. And when you include the Oklahoma City bombing, it rises to 178 homicide events and 413 killed.

Although our data for 2015 through 2017 are still being verified, we counted five homicide events perpetrated by Islamist extremists that resulted in the murders of 74 people. This includes the Pulse nightclub massacre in Orlando, which killed 49 people. In the same time period, there were eight homicide events committed by far-right extremists that killed 27 people.

These data reveal that far-right extremists tend to be more active in committing homicides, yet Islamist extremists tend to be more deadly.

Our research has also identified violent Islamist extremist plots against 272 targets that were either foiled or failed between 2001 and 2014. We are in the process of compiling similar data on far-right plots. Although data collection is only about 50 percent complete, we have already identified 213 far-right targets from the same time period.

The locations of violent extremist activity also differ by ideology. Our data show that between 1990 and 2014, most Islamist extremist attacks occurred in the South (56.5 percent), and most far-right extremist attacks occurred in the West (34.7 percent). Both forms of violence were least likely to occur in the Midwest, with only three incidents committed by Islamist extremists (4.8 percent) and 33 events committed by far-right extremists (13.5 percent).

Targets of violence also vary across the two ideologies. For example, 63 percent of the Islamist extremism victims were targeted for no apparent reason. They just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, often visiting symbolic locations or crowded venues such as the World Trade Center or military installations.

In contrast, 53 percent of victims killed by far-right extremists were targeted for their actual or perceived race or ethnicity. Far-right extremists, such as neo-Nazis, skinheads and white supremacists, often target religious, racial and ethnic, and sexual orientation and gender identity minorities.

Motives and methods

There are also differences in violent extremists across demographics, motives and methods. For instance, data show that guns were the weapon of choice in approximately 73 percent of Islamist extremist homicides and in only 63 percent of far-right extremist homicides. We attribute these differences to far-right extremists using more personal forms of violence, such as beating or stabbing victims to death.

We have also found that suicide missions are not unique to Islamist extremists.

From 1990 to 2014, we identified three suicide missions in which at least one person was killed connected to Islamist extremism, including the 9/11 attacks as one event. In contrast, there were 15 suicide missions committed by far-right extremists.

Our analyses found that compared to Islamist extremists, far-right extremists were significantly more likely to be economically deprived, have served in the military and have a higher level of commitment to their ideology. Far-right extremists were also significantly more likely to be less educated, single, young and to have participated in training by a group associated with their extremist ideology.

Threat to law enforcement and military

Terrorists associated with Islamist and far-right extremist ideologies do not only attack civilians. They also pose a deadly threat to law enforcement and military personnel. During the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 72 law enforcement officers and 55 military personnel were killed by members of Al-Qaida. On April 19, 1995, 13 law enforcement officers and four military personnel were killed when the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building was bombed by an anti-government far-right extremist in Oklahoma City.

Outside of these two events, Islamist extremists are responsible for the murders of 18 military personnel in three incidents, and seven law enforcement officers were killed in five incidents between 1990 and 2015. Far-right extremists have murdered 57 law enforcement officers in 46 incidents, but have never directly targeted military personnel.

Far-right extremists, who typically harbor anti-government sentiments, have a higher likelihood of escalating routine law enforcement contacts into fatal encounters. These homicides pose unique challenges to local law enforcement officers who are disproportionately targeted by the far right.

Moving forward

The events of 9/11 will continue to skew both our real and perceived risks of violent extremism in the United States. To focus solely on Islamist extremism is to ignore the murders perpetrated by the extreme far right and their place in a constantly changing threat environment.

Some have even warned that there is potential for collaboration between these extremist movements. Our own survey research suggests this is a concern of law enforcement.

Focusing on national counterterrorism efforts against both Islamist and far-right extremism acknowledges that there are differences between these two violent movements.

Focusing solely on one, while ignoring the other, will increase the risk of domestic terrorism and future acts of violence.

Both ideologies continue to pose real, unique threats to all Americans. Evidence shows far-right violent extremism poses a particular threat to law enforcement and racial, ethnic, religious and other minorities. Islamist violent extremism is a specific danger to military members, law enforcement, certain minorities and society at large. It remains imperative to support policies, programs and research aimed at countering all forms of violent extremism.

(This story is republished from The Conversation. The original story may be read here).

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Every theocratic state needs religious boosters to survive as a totalitarian state. It can be seen regularly happening in Pakistan. It came into being on August 14, 1947 as an Islamic State but the first formal dictator General Ayub Khan (1958-69) realised that Pakistan needed a booster dose of Islamism so many of the democratic rights of women and minorities, both religious and linguistic, were curtailed.
 
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the worst dictator (1978-88) declared that Pakistan, already an Islamic state, would be governed under 'Nizam-e-Mustafa' (Rule of the Prophet). Though fond of 'nautch' he introduced high octane Islamic laws making life in Pakistan a living hell for women and traditional minorities like Christians, Hindus, Shias and Ahmedyas.
 
Interestingly, the dreaded Blasphemy Laws followed by Zia were introduced by a so called democratically elected ruler, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-77). Bhutto introduced the Hudood Laws that, in the eyes of the law and state, turned women and minorities into sub-human beings. Democratically elected ruler Benazir Bhutto (1988–90 and 1993–96) also adhered to Islamism and continued giving booster dozes of Islam to the Pakistani state. In a framework of an Islamic theocratic state they all played their pre-destined role.

This process is still on as a natural corollary of the formation of a theocratic state in Pakistan. The latest booster dose of Islamism is in the form of a demand by an official religious agency that articulates that Muslim males should be allowed to thrash their wives.

This outrageous demand has appeared in a document titled, ironically as the 'Women Protection Bill'. According to a recent press report, "The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) has proposed its own Women Protection Bill, recommending ‘a light beating’ for the wife if she defies her husband.

The council has proposed that a husband should be allowed to ‘lightly’ beat his wife if she defies his commands and refuses to dress up as per his desires, turns down the demand of intercourse without any religious excuse or does not take bath after intercourse or menstrual periods. It further suggests that beating is also permissible if a woman does not observe Hijab, interacts with strangers, speaks loud enough that she can easily be heard by strangers and provides monetary support to the people without taking consent of her spouse".[i]

You are grossly mistaken if you believe that it is happening in Pakistan, a theocratic state, alone. Organisations wedded to the Hindutva worldview,  working zealously to convert India into a Hindu theocratic state have been supporting bashing of Hindu women, albeit in a more subtle and organised manner.

The largest organization in the world to circulate literature on the Hindu way of life has these popular title both in English and Hindi namely 'How to lead a Household Life' and 'Grahsth Mein Kaise Rahen' by Swami Ramsukhdas. This book is in a question-answer format and is a kind of Guide Book for to imbibe and practice the Hindu way of life.

A question is posed: “What should the wife do if her husband beats her and troubles her?”[ii] Swami Ramsukhdas offers the following sagely advice to the battered wife and her parents: "The wife should think that she is paying her debt of her previous life and thus her sins are being destroyed and she is becoming pure. When her parents come to know this, they can take her to their own house because they have not given their daughter to face this sort of bad behaviour."[iii]

And if her parents do not take her to their house, learned Swamiji’s pious advice is: "Under such circumstances…she should reap the fruit of her past actions. She should patiently bear the beatings of her husband with patience. By bearing them she will be free from her sins and it is possible that her husband may start loving her."[iv]
 
This book came out in 1990 and so far has had 50 editions both in Hindi and English with 1.2 million copies circulated. Interestingly, it is the most popular title with non-resident Indians (NRIs). The publishers of this book has more than 10 other titles on Women and these books are sold from hundreds of outlets including 110 railway stations where the Geeta Press has been provided stalls free of charge by the central government. The allotments were first allowed by Kamlapati Tripathi in 1970s when he was railway minister for many years in Indira Gandhi cabinet. Such books are also available at RSS run book stalls.
 
The Hindutva fraternity, functioning within the largest democracy in the world, is thus, far ahead in propagating wife beating in comparison to the Islamists in Pakistan.
 
Islamists and practitioners of Hindutva may appear to be indulging all kinds of rhetoric against each other but fact is that they together remain committed to a rare commonality of interests as far the status and treatment of their own women are concerned. Both seem to have studied, and propagate an anti-woman worldview. And this, as far as Indian is concerned, within an egalitarian polity that ‘allows’ such demeaning ‘Guides’ for women.
 
(The writer is an academician and can be followed on @shamsforjustice)

References:
[i]Wife=Beating:This 'women Protection Bill' also contains many other brazenly sadist demands against women.
[ii] Ramsukhdass, Swami, How to Lead a Household Life, Gita Press, Gorakhpur, 2001, p. 43.
[iii]Ibid.
[iv]Ibid.

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Brussels remains on high alert as raids continue.       Image: Christophe Petit Tesson/EPA

To understand the terrorist attacks we must examine the wider circumstances. These include the hypothesis that many of the terrorists – including the Algerian Muhammad Belkaid killed in a Brussels raid earlier in March – have been involved in the conflict in Syria and Iraq, and as a result have become radicalised. But as the investigation continues, questions will be asked about where the radicalisation of those involved took place: in Syria or Iraq, or in the back streets of the Molenbeek quarter of Brussels.

It is important, however, to note that while the terrorists appear to be Muslims, this does not equate to a relationship between the attacks and Islam. It is like equating the 1980s IRA attacks on the UK mainland to Christianity (despite the sectarian nature of that conflict, it was a political struggle). Let’s not forget that the residents of Molenbeek publicly mourned the Paris attacks.

The Syria connection

The conflict in Syria and Iraq has undoubtedly contributed to the spread of Islamist terrorism both in the Middle East and wider world. The foreign participants in this conflict have gained experienced in a violent landscape where the ostensibly noble idea of a classical style of defensive jihad in support of the Syrian people against Bashar Al-Assad, has morphed into nihilistic Islamist terrorism.

This in turn has radicalised many individuals, who on their return home, have difficulty readjusting. They return with some additional “street credibility” and may subsequently become both potential terrorists or trainers and ideologues. One man wanted by police in connection with the Brussels attack, Najim Laachraoui, is believed to have travelled to Syria in 2013.

A key point here to understand is that many individuals, both Arabs and Westerners, who go to Syria to join Islamic State are not necessarily radicalised already (in the sense of holding extreme political or religious beliefs), but that fighting and socialisation among Islamist fighters in Syria can radicalise them.

Complex routes to radicalisation

A recently published trove of Islamic State documents gave an insight into the many individuals who go to Syria and don’t join Islamic State immediately, but join other (perhaps more moderate) groups initially. To support the point that many of those travelling to Syria are not necessarily radical, a recent report was published of US citizens who went to Syria to fight against (not alongside) Islamic State. Reading their narratives confirms that they too were not considered radical.

The notion of radicalisation is complex and contested. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at Kings College London argues that radicalisation is a combination of grievances, ideology, and socialisation. Given that, and with the backdrop to the Syrian conflict, these factors appear to change over time.

Those who may have had initial grievances against the Assad regime in Syria, may later embrace a more extreme ideology, perhaps due to their socialisation with more extreme fighters in Syria. This transformation from fighting a classical jihad (against Syrian combatants) to one of terrorism (against civilians and non-combatants) is a much understudied phenomenon.

In this context, classical jihad is a fight to defend fellow Muslims against those who are persecuting them. The same logic was applied during the 1980s Afghan jihad, against the Soviets who were persecuting fellow Muslims in Afghanistan. This classical jihad had the full support of the United States as noted in a recent book about the war.

Syrian troops in al-Jbail Mountain, eastern Syria in March. SANA/EPA

The attacks in Brussels were largely, but regrettably, to be expected. One report noted that “one in nine foreign fighters returned to perpetrate attacks in the West”. With this in mind, and aware that at least 553 Belgians (many from the group Sharia4Belgium) have been active in Syria or Iraq, such attacks should not come as a surprise.

Islamic State, through its news agency Amaq, admitted responsibility for the Brussels attacks, perpetrated by “soldiers of the caliphate”. So the attacks in Brussels must be seen in the light of the geo-political events playing out in Syria and Iraq. They are not born out of a sectarian issue of Muslim versus Christian; but stem from groups and individuals who have been radicalised, beyond the point of involvement in defending their fellow Muslims through classical jihad, to one of Islamist terrorism.

This article was first published on The Conversation.

(Author is PhD candidate, Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St Andrews)

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