Businessman Alamgir Hossain from the capital’s Kazipara handed over his two sons to police after he became suspicious that they had been indoctrinated in religious extremism.

The man was hoping that the police would help with the rehabilitation of his sons. However, police produced the two boys in court on April 11, 16 days after their detainment on March 25, although they are legally required to bring detainees before court within 24 hours.

The frustrated father is now saying that law enforcement agencies were too busy collecting information from his sons instead of helping them rehabilitate to a normal life.

“Our finding is that about 82% of the arrested militants were radicalised by online writings and conversations. They were misled by militant outfits when they were out trying to sate their curiosity about their own religion:” Dhaka police

On January 14, authorities of Mymensingh Ishwarganj Girls High School and Women College found leaflets containing anti-state speeches and false misguiding information about Islam in the hands of students. They later saw a person clad in burka distributing the leaflets on their CCTV footage.

Since the Holey Artisan and Sholakia attacks in 2016, law enforcement has cracked down on radical militants. Almost 50 militants have been killed in confrontations with law enforcement and the army, and more than 100 militants have been nabbed.

The government, however, appears to be giving far less priority to protecting young boys and girls from getting easily drawn to violent radical ideologies.
Most of steps to prevent radical ideologies from spreading among the public have gone unnoticed or been ineffective.
 

The government has taken many initiatives to fight radicalisation, key among them is engaging imams of mosques to preach against extremism. However, experts say massive educational reform and social initiative is required. Photo Credit: Dhaka Tribune

Bangladesh police’s Counter-Terrorism Focal Point and police headquarters assistant inspector general Md Moniruzzaman said: “Our finding is that about 82% of the arrested militants were radicalised by online writings and conversations. They were misled by militant outfits when they were out trying to sate their curiosity about their own religion.”

Experts are blaming a lack of coordination amongst the concerned ministries, lack of initiatives from different national and regional socio-cultural organisations and lack of unity amongst the country’s political parties.

Dhaka University’s History Professor Dr Muntassir Mamoon said: “Psychological change among the people is necessary to combat extremism.

“The government took many initiatives to counter radicalisation and militancy, which were praiseworthy and partially successful.  But this is not enough. Nationwide socio-cultural movement and effective changes in the education system is necessary.”
 

A radical change in the country’s education system is must, the academic said.

“We need to synchronise the syllabi of Qawmi and Alia madrasas with mainstream education. Besides, social values and cultural movements must be strengthened in order to get rid of the problem permanently,” he said.

Ali Riaz, a professor of politics at Illinois State University, told the Dhaka Tribune: “Bangladesh has to dissolve the conditions favourable to radicalisation, like limitations to practice democratic rights, hindrance to expressing opinions, extremist speeches in politics, political imbalance and violence.
 

“The native socio-political crisis when mixed with the global trend of militancy and extremism creates a hazardous situation for the whole country,” he said.
Home Ministry sources said there is no budget for nationwide anti-militancy campaigns.

A Home Ministry official seeking anonymity said people still think that the responsibility of de-radicalisation lies with the government, so they are not taking up any initiatives themselves.

Social scientist Dr Anupam Sen said: “People are not involved with cultural activities that much anymore. The cultural field has been captured by small groups. This is a cause behind radicalisation among youths.”

Islamic Foundation Director General Shamim Afzal Khan, however, claimed the foundation was almost successful with its anti-militancy campaign.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina last week assured that militants and extremists wanting to get back to normal life would be given support so that they can reintegrate into society.

This story, first published on Dhaka Tribune, is being republished with permission.
 

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The post Bangladeshi Islamists rejoice at PM Hasina’s capitulation to agitation over ‘Lady Justice’ sculpture on Supreme Court premises appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Image: Star/ Focus Bangla

Hundreds of people ransacked temples and vandalized homes of the Hindu minority in the Brahmanbairs district of eastern Bangladesh. Over 100 Hindu homes and 17 temples were vandalised and looted since October 30 in Nasirnagar upazila, Bangladesh. According to media reports, this violence was unleashed by an angry mob over an alleged Facebook post ‘insulting the Ka’aba’—the house of Allah. 

Hindus made up 13.5 per cent of the total population in Bangladesh in the 1970s. Regrettably, the population of the religious minority has been steadily shrinking. From an earlier 13.5 per cent, they are reduced to an estimated 8.5 per cent now. The recent brutal attack on an already frightened religious minority in Bangladesh shows the miserable failure of the government to combat the growing Islamist communalism in the country. The Bangladeshi journalist Julfikar Ali Manik has rightly noted that “attacks on Hindus are not unusual in Bangladesh, but it is rare to see multiple crowds targeting temples in an organized way as they did on Sunday and Monday”.

As the country’s human rights commission has initiated an inquiry into the massacre, scores of human rights activists have taken out protests. At a rally recently held in front of National Press Club in Dhaka, Syed Abu Zafar Ahmed, general secretary, Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) strongly stated: “The government has failed to protect Hindus and other minorities for which, radicalised and communal groups succeeded attacking them for several times”, as reported in Dhaka Tribune.

Certainly, the attack is not justifiable by any stretch of imagination.  However, it’s important to discern the fanatics’ argument to better fathom the extremist minds. They buttress that it was tenable to vandalise Hindu temples after they saw on Facebook an edited photo of a Hindu deity inside the Ka’aba. It was something they took as a punishable offense against the holiest site of Islam — Makkah (Mecca).

Makkah is, indeed, the most sacred place in Islam. Millions of Muslims from across the world gather in Makkah to perform the annual Islamic pilgrimage of Hajj. Though Makkah consists of Najd, Taif, Jadda among other historic cities, however, when we say “Makkah”, we generally refer to the Ka’aba.  Ka’ba is also the Qibla — the the direction that Muslims face when they offer the five-time prayers (Salah or Namaz). Given this religious significance and sanctity any insult intended against the holiest Islamic site is indeed untenable.

One wonders where these extremist Islamists were when Makkah was recently attacked by a ballistic missile. Let alone the soft-core Islamists, even the hardcore Islamists of Bangladesh kept silent over the recent ballistic missile attack at Makkah. Wasn’t it an utterly shameful and offensive act? Why did they overlook the fact that it was no less a denigration of the holiest site in Islam?

A similar silence was also maintained when another holy site of Islam, Medina was under terror attack only a few months ago. No influential Muslim leader questioned as to how some Pakistani terrorists backed by the Saudi militants carried out the attack on Medina, which is under the utmost custody of the Saudi Kingdom.

But the accused Hindu fisherman, even after he has denied posting on Facebook any content offensive to Makkah, is seen as an ‘obstinate enemy of Islam’. Even after he has been arrested by the Bangladeshi police, the country’s religious zealots wantonly attacked the innocent members of the Hindu religious minority. Clearly, this is a brazen violation of law and order in the country. What the Bangladeshi radical Islamists have done in their self-styled defense of Makkah, is out-an-out religious extremism.

More regrettably, we have heard no strong opposition of this sick-mindedness from Muslim leaders and politicians in India. No protest against the fresh attacks on Bangladeshi Hindu minority. What does this ‘deafening silence’ of the Indian Muslim religio-politicians reveal?

It is noteworthy that majority of the Hindu community in India shows an avowed support to the Muslim minority in all cases where they are seen as ‘victims’. Be it the cow vigilantes lynching Akhlaq Ahmad or Najeeb Ahmad missing from JNU, Muslims in India have a huge support from non-Muslims, particularly secular and progressive Hindu members of the Indian society. Only two days ago, around 500 students from JNU, Delhi University and other central universities came out protesting for Najeeb Ahmad.

Close to 300 students took part in the sit-in, 'Light A Ray Of Hope For Najeeb', to express their solidarity with Ahmed and his grieving family. Over 250 of them have even been taken to the police station. So an avid support of non-Muslims towards their Muslim brethren in India is clearly seen in every incident of significance.

But when similar situation arises in Muslim countries in an attack against the religious minorities, one wonders why we Muslims show no spirited support of the victims, and no vehement opposition to the religious fanatics. One finds a note of introspection on part of us Muslims completely missing in such situations. It’s time we muster courage of conviction to speak for the rights of religious minorities in the Muslim world.

In fact, the violent attacks on the Hindu religious minority in Bangladesh should have evoked strong protest among us. But it is quite distressing to note that the attacks on Christians and Shias in Pakistan and on Hindus in Bangladesh have gone unchallenged by the Indian Muslims.  Only a few processions were taken out by the progressive Muslim activists, students and youths without any strong participation of the leading Muslim organisations.

In 2013, when similar attacks on Shias and Hindus occurred in Pakistan and Bangladesh, a group of Muslim youths held a candle light vigil and peace march registering their protest. They raised slogans against the government of Pakistan and Bangladesh holding placards which said “Stop Genocide of Hindus”.

A student of Jamia Millia Islamia had courage of conviction to say: “Muslims in India are quite concerned about what is happening in Pakistan and Bangladesh. We condemn the attacks in the strongest possible terms and demand that the governments of the two countries bring the perpetrators to book and ensure that the minorities remain safe and secured.”

The reason for the fresh vicious attacks on Hindu minority in Bangladesh, as the radical Islamists claim, was the local fisherman’s Facebook post which allegedly ‘denigrated the Ka’aba — the holist Islamic place of worship. Though the fisherman denied sharing the post and the police immediately arrested him for ‘hurting religious sentiment’, the religious goons were going haywire brazenly violating law and order in the country. While a few Muslims stopped at holding protests against the posting, the extremist herd in Bangladesh went berserk in its religious zeal, attacking the innocent members of the minority community. The unruly mob of religious fanatics pulled down over a dozen temples looting more than a hundred houses in Brahmanbaria.

One might ask how Indian Muslims would react if someone in India indulged in an offensive remark against Islam or Muslims. Obviously, they could only hold a protest demonstration demanding penal action, as they did in the recent case of Kamlesh Tiwari, who was accused of circulating pamphlets against Islam and the Muslims.

Tiwari has been in a Lucknow jail since his arrest last December under the National Security Act (NSA) — a tough 1980 law that makes securing bail difficult for an accused. His arrest occurred after students of Islamic seminary Darul Uloom Deoband and other members of the Muslim community staged a protest. Though a few fanatic Islamist clerics under Maulana Anwarul Haq Sadiq of Bijnor offered 51 lakh rupees to behead Tiwari for ‘denigrating Islam’ and thus take the law in hand, no Indian Muslim got carried away to indulge in such an unlawful act.

But what is happening in neighbouring Muslim countries is completely distressing.  Not long ago, Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab was assassinated for advocating reforms in Pakistan's blasphemy laws. He was killed by his own commando Malik Mumtaz Qadri, who believed Taseer had committed blasphemy.

Of late, the ‘Ahle Sunnat Wal Jama’at’, one of the largest Islamic movements in Bangladesh whose members in Brahmanbarhia organised a rally protesting against ‘the anti-Islamic post’ has denied being involved in the hate attacks on the religious minority. The leaders of the Ahle Sunnat have rightly stated that “the attacks were aimed to disrupt the communal harmony”. Mosaheb Uddin Bakhtiar, member secretary of the Islamic movement says that there was no instance of extremist violence perpetrated by the Ahle Sunnat — an apex body of Sunni Muslims in Bangladesh. “We observed a peaceful shutdown on April 20 this year. No one can say Ahle- Sunnat unleashed violence”, he said briefing the media.

It is gratifying that, in the wake of this anti-Hindu terror attack, the Ahle Sunnat has planned an anti-militancy rally in Dhaka slated for November 12. It might heal the broken hearts of the Hindu victims in the country. But it will be of little help if the Bangladeshi Muslims merely denounce the attackers and don’t combat the Islamist communalism deeply-entrenched in the country. It’s time mainstream Muslims in Bangladesh curb the very ideological stimulus which has caused the rising scale of violence against the religious minorities, particularly Hindus, for decades.

(A regular New Age Islam columnist, Ghulam Rasool Dehlvi is a scholar of Comparative Religion, Classical Arabic and Islamic sciences, cultural analyst and researcher in Media and Communication Studies).

(This article was first published on New Age Islam).

The post Why are Indian Muslims Silent Over Atrocities against Hindus in Neighbouring Bangladesh? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Photo credit: AFP

Among the gravest threats facing humankind today is extremism resulting from erroneous interpretations of religious teachings. Almost every religion has some teachings or the other that if not understood and practiced in the right manner can have disastrous effects, at both the individual as well as collective level. For instance, many religions underscore the need to protect society from anti-social elements, call for eradicating injustice, advocate establishing justice, and sanction self-defence in exceptional circumstances.

All of these things are part of our basic human duties. But if ignorance and immorality leads some people to develop distorted and deviant perspectives about these issues, it can easily lead to violent conflict in society. If this happens, religious teachings that were meant for promoting goodness and human welfare come to be used as a means to foment violence and destruction.

In this regard, Islam is faced with a particular predicament—of being viewed through a distorted lens by both those who claim to follow it as well as others. That it is misunderstood by others is not as surprising as the fact that it is misunderstood by many of those who claim to be its adherents, who are themselves destroying the religious and cultural bases of the tradition that they say they follow. These people are projecting their own religious teachings as a grave threat to the world.

The source of this distorted understanding of Islam is the intellectual crisis that Muslims have fallen prey to over the last three or four centuries. Several factors are responsible for this crisis, and unless these are properly understood, no meaningful efforts can be made to help Muslims come out of the morass in which they find themselves and to turn Muslim  thought back in the right direction. 

In part, the intellectual crisis of present-day Muslims can be traced to the suppression of the movement of Islamic rationalism by the traditionalist, orthodox Ulema in the early centuries of Islam. In the conflict between reason (Aql) and text (Nass), the suppression of reason played a major role in the ensuing intellectual stagnation of Muslims.

In part, the intellectual crisis of present-day Muslims can be traced to the suppression of the movement of Islamic rationalism by the traditionalist, orthodox Ulema in the early centuries of Islam. In the conflict between reason (Aql) and text (Nass), the suppression of reason played a major role in the ensuing intellectual stagnation of Muslims.

A second factor for this intellectual crisis of Muslims was the supposed closing of the ‘doors’ of Ijtihad’, creative reflection on and application of Islamic teachings in new contexts, in the 4th century AH following the establishment of the various schools of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). Who closed these ‘doors’ and when is a separate issue, but the fact is that, for all practical purposes, meaningful Ijtihad did come an end and its ‘doors’ remain closed till this very day.

A third factor for the present-day intellectual crisis of Muslims is the inability of Muslim leaders to understand the social political challenges that have emerged as a result of various socio-cultural processes. This, and a desperate clinging to the past, meant that Muslims were unable to relate intellectually with the present. Related to this is the fact that in seeking to preserve their intellectual heritage in the face of modernity, they uncritically continued to hold fast on to even those aspects of that heritage that were not a part of Islam as such, but, rather, reflected the influence of particular historical and socio-cultural contexts in which that heritage emerged.
Because of all of these inter-related factors, Muslim thought has strayed far off from the straight path.

The greatest need of the ‘Muslim world’ today is the reconstruction of Islamic thought so that Muslims can appropriately relate to contemporary socio-political demands. The poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938) attempted to do precisely this through his monumental work, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (1930), but the book failed to have any noticeable impact on the traditional ulema class, even though they counted themselves among Iqbal’s greatest admirers. While they were all praise for his poetry, they rebutted this serious academic work of his that raised many questions about traditional Muslim religious thought.

With regard to the renewal and reconstruction of Islamic thought, one dimension that needs particular attention is Muslim political theory. This urgently needs to be re-looked at. Aspects of this political theory that have now become irrelevant, and, more than this, have turned into a threat to the world of today, must be completely renounced so that the younger generation of Muslims can be protected from falling prey to deviant thinking and thus going astray.

Controversial and completely un-Islamic notions such as the global political hegemony of Islam, offensive jihad, considering other people’s lack of faith in Islam as a sufficient cause to wage war against them, and regarding war, not peace, to be the basis of relations with people of other faiths regrettably remain deeply entrenched in some Muslim quarters despite the fact that they can in no way be proven from the Quran and the practice of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him).

These notions fuel conflictual relations with people of other faiths. Islamic scholars must clarify that these notions have actually no Islamic legitimacy at all, contrary to what radical extremists claim. The enormous confusion in Islamic circles about these issues has resulted, on the one hand, in great misunderstandings about Islam among non-Muslims, and, on the other hand, has facilitated the emergence and rapid spread of extremism and radicalism among a section of Muslims.

The major share of the blame for the enormous misunderstandings about Islam that abound today, particularly with regard to the issues mentioned above, lies with the traditionalist Ulema, and, more than them, the Islamists or votaries of a politics-centric interpretation of Islam, who dream of imposing and enforcing their particular interpretation or version of the Shariah and establishing global what they regard as Islamic political dominance—or, in other words, their own rule.

The traditionalist ulema are mired in stagnation, while the Islamists are a victim of literalism. These two classes seek to establish the political theology that emerged in the Middle Ages, when Muslims enjoyed political dominance in large parts of the world, word for word, without making any changes in it. The only difference between the two is that the former gives stress to ‘patience’ and ‘waiting’ as a means to realise its dream of establishing this political ideology, while the latter is driven by a frenzied zeal to revive the past political glory of Muslims at any cost and without any delay. Because of this, the image of Islam is being terribly stained and in such a way as has never happened before. All across the world, there is a rapid escalation of hate for Muslims, and, moreover, Muslims themselves are killing each other.

While much has been written on various other aspects of Muslim jurisprudence, very little work has been done on an issue of immense contemporary import—Islamic political jurisprudence. Because this issue has not received the attention that it deserves, there is a huge vacuum in Islamic political theology, which is being taken advantage of by radical Islamists, who falsely claim to speak for Islam.

 In this regard, it is truly lamentable that the mindset of traditional ulema is such that they are not interested in taking up the task of addressing this vacuum, although this work of rethinking Islamic political theory is something that they would be more effective in doing because of the great influence that they have on general Muslim thinking. On the other hand, there are relatively few modernist Islamic scholars who can combine both traditional wisdom and modern perspectives and fill this enormous gap. One hopes that this issue will receive the attention that it so sorely deserves.

Today’s world is a closely interlinked ‘global village’. A saying of the Prophet Muhammad: “All God’s creatures are His family’’ reflects this reality, and we all, Muslims and everyone else, have to learn to live together in harmony, like members of one large, well-knit family. It is for each one of us to try to unite this family, through love, not to divide it, through hate. There is a very urgent need today for interfaith dialogue on a vast scale in order to promote mutual understanding, which is simply indispensable for peaceful coexistence at every level.

In this way, the external nearness between religious communities across the world that has come about through new communications technologies can evolve into an authentic, inner nearness. Today, this is the most urgent task for those who have true love for Islam to undertake and another major responsibility for Islamic scholars, besides other Muslims.

A graduate of the Dar ul-Ulum Deoband, Waris Mazhari did a PhD from the Department of Islamic Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, where he is currently teaching.

The post Muslim Paralysis: Trapped Between Out-of-date Ulema and Literalist Islamists appeared first on SabrangIndia.

What does the power struggle between President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and powerful Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen mean for Turks who want democracy?

Fethullah Gulen (Left) and Recep Tayyip Erdogan     Image: AP/Getty Images

Turkey is in crisis. Its President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has declared a three-month state of emergency. His purge following the failed coup is just the tip of the iceberg, with much worse to follow. The aftershocks of Turkey’s failed coup on 15 July are unprecedented. The symbol of Turkish parliamentary democracy, the Grand National Assembly, was bombed by members of the country’s own security forces; police and military forces exchanged gunfire and coup plotters attacked civilians on the streets of Istanbul and Ankara. The human toll is high: there have been around 232 deaths, over 1,541 injuries, according to official figures, and more than 60,000 state officials jailed or dismissed, with numbers increasing ever day.Turkey’s international image as a strong member of NATO and a bastion of stability between Europe and the Middle East, has been damaged. Tensions in US-Turkey relations have increased since Ankara demanded the extradition of Pennsylvania-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen, who is blamed by Erdogan for the coup attempt.

Turkey’s international image as a strong member of NATO and a bastion of stability between Europe and the Middle East, has been damaged.

On 15 and 16 July, people on the streets, as well as all party leaders —including AKP’s opponents  sided with ‘democracy’. Or rather, with Erdogan. Once Erdogan was assured that the government had taken control, he quickly announced that this was “a coup attempt by a small faction in the military, the parallels (Gülenists).” Since 2010, Erdogan has accused the Gülen movement of running a ‘parallel state’ with the aim of overthrowing the AKP government. Erdogan said that this is “a gift from God to us because this will be a reason to cleanse our army”. 

During his tenure in power, many argued that taking the army out of Turkish politics was one of his biggest achievements. However, Erdogan had in fact successfully co-opted high-ranking army officers. In the post-coup cleansing, Erdogan’s purge has extended beyond the army, including high-ranking officers of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), to the police, the judiciary, the National Intelligence Agency (MIT), the Ministry of Education and universities.

There is little doubt that Erdogan’s divisive and increasingly authoritarian policies pose a serious threat to Turkish democracy and secularism. The crux of the matter is Erdogan’s increasing personal power since his ascendance to the presidency in 2014. Prior to winning Turkey’s first presidential elections, Erdogan similarly blamed the Gülen cemaati (community) for creating a "shadowy state" within the Turkish state and engineering a "Gulen-Israel-axis" in order to overthrow him. This time the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “this was more than a treacherous plot: it was a terrorist campaign”, the illegal “Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organisation” staged it, and the “terrorists will be punished in accordance with the law”. The key to contextualising these allegations lies within the history of Erdogan’s relations with the Gülen movement, known as Hizmet (service) in Turkey.

Who is Fethullah Gülen?

Fethullah Gülen’s rise in Turkish politics began in the 1970s. Born to a pious family, Gülen became an imam and a spiritual leader who emphasised the importance of education to provide a moral compass for young people. His influence grew continuously within the country. He opened private schools, private tutoring centers and dormitories called ‘houses of light’. The origins of the Gülen movement were founded by the alumni of these schools, who built up a network of pious young businessmen and Muslim charity foundations. Following the 1980 military coup, the generals acting as the ‘guardians of secularism’ became highly suspicious of Gülen’s network and accused him of plotting to install an Islamic state. Gülen went into hiding for six years.

In the 1990s, the Gülen movement found a new purpose under the rule of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal. Opening Gülen movement schools in Turkic republics supported Ankara and Washington’s neo-liberal visions for the post-Cold war era. The first one was opened in Azerbaijan in 1991, they then spread to other post-Soviet Turkic republics. In 1999, a leaked video featuring clips from Gülen’s sermons was a turning point: Gülen was accused of infiltrating the Turkish military, the police and the judiciary in an attempt to undermine the secular foundations of the Republic. Gülen was again a wanted man. He has been living in exile ever since.

In post-9/11 international politics, the role of Islam gained new momentum which has benefited the Gülen movement. Gülen’s promotion of a humanist and moderate Islam was welcomed by Washington. This was also a turning point in Turkish politics, which has oscillated between secular state and Muslim society. The devout half of Turkish society found their voice in the AKP’s populist discourses in 2002. Its new leader, Erdogan, gained popularity as a result of his being victimised in the name of secularism: Erdogan was removed from his position as mayor of Istanbul and jailed in 1998 for reciting a poem, which included the lines: “the mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers”.

Although Gülen and Erdogan never met in person before Erdogan became prime minister in 2003, they were both pious Muslims who opposed both secularism and the army’s role in politics. It was the Turkish military’s threat to the AKP which turned Gülen into a key ally of Erdogan for a decade. Gülen’s followers provided crucial support for the AKP, which subsequently secured them three election victories. In return, Erdogan offered protection to the Gülen community’s opaque businesses and pious activities.

The movement operates a global network of business, education, media and charitable organisations. Hizmet runs schools in over 150 countries, including more than 100 chartered schools in the US, and has grown into what is possibly the world’s largest Muslim network with millions of followers.

The power struggle

The power struggle to control the state has turned into an open war: Gülen is now public enemy number one and his movement is officially identified as a terrorist group

Gülen is arguably Turkey’s second most powerful man. Once Hizmet grew and the cemaat members started to be employed by state institutions in Turkey, tensions between Erdogan and Glen began to increase. A key turning point was a series of investigations carried out between 2007 and 2013 known as Ergenekon trials. Ergenekon, an ultranationalist terrorist organisation, was charged with plotting a coup against the AKP government. It was later claimed that Glenists orchestrated the trials which damaged trust between Erdogan and Glen. Thereafter, the power struggle between two factions began for absolute control of the state.

When the AKP won the 2011 parliamentary elections with a majority, Erdogan was strong enough to break his alliance with the Gülen movement. The final break came in late 2013 when Erdogan decided to close down Gülen’s prep-schools in Turkey and began to pressure other heads of states to do the same for Gülen's international schools in their countries.

In response to Erdogan’s offensive, the Glenists allegedly launched a high-level corruption probe in which businessmen close to Erdogan, party officials and three ministers’ sons were arrested. In a leaked conversation with his son, the prime minister talked about having millions of dollars stashed away in shoeboxes. Erdogan later blamed Gülen for launching a “dirty conspiracy” and Hizmet’s direct involvement in the corruption investigations. While Gülen denied all of these accusations, the AKP government has intensified the purging of state officials in the judiciary, the police and party officials considered close to the Gülen cemaati

The power struggle to control the state has turned into an open war: Gülen is now public enemy number one and his movement is officially identified as a terrorist group. In November 2015, 122 Glenists were indicted, including Glen himself. He is accused of tampering with an investigation and managing an armed terrorist organisation. On 19 July 2016, Ankara asked Washington for his extradition, while Gülen gave interviews to the international media, rejecting allegations that he was the mastermind. According to Gülen, the failed coup was staged by Erdogan himself.

There is no doubt that Gülen is a controversial figure. To his followers, he is a liberal Islamic modernist who preaches “interfaith and intercultural dialogue”. As stated on its website, the Gülen movement claims to be “a worldwide civic initiative rooted in the spiritual and humanistic tradition of Islam.” It regards Islam as broadly compatible with modernity, science and democracy. To his critics, Gülen is a threat to the secular character of the Turkish state and is plotting to install an Islamic dictatorship. The rivalry between Erdogan and Gülen is more about personal power than different interpretations of political Islam. If Ankara’s demand for his extradition is successful, Gülen might face the death penalty, the reintroduction of which is highly possible in Erdogan’s ‘new Turkey’.

In the long term, a failed coup does not mean that democracy has won

In the long term, a failed coup does not mean that democracy has won. Paradoxically, this attempt has helped President Erdogan’s quest for more power and greater authoritarian control over Turkish politics. He is perceived to be the defender of ‘civilian rule’, while simultaneously clamping down on civil liberties. It is likely that his approval ratings will rise during the next referendum planned for later this year. He will leverage this popularity into votes for constitutional change to replace Turkey’s parliamentary democracy with an executive presidency. Such constitutional changes would grant him absolute power, which is his ultimate goal under the cover of his conservative Islamism. The power struggle between Erdogan and Gülen is harmful to Turkish people who opted for democracy. Whoever was behind the failed coup did Turkey’s democracy a double disservice. 

Ayla Gol is a Reader and Director of Graduate School at the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University. She is the author of Turkey Facing East: Islam, Modernity and Foreign Policy.

This story was first published on openDemocracy.

The post Its Islamists vs Islamists in Turkey: Erdogan vs Gülen appeared first on SabrangIndia.

 
The attitude of Indian Islamist organisations and scholars towards secularism is ridden with hypocrisy and double standards

It is sad but true that there is a large degree of hypocrisy and double standards on the part of Indian Islamist organizations and scholars when in their attitude and approach towards secular democratic India. 

Over the course of the last five-odd years, ever since the crisis that has erupted all across the Muslim world, in Muslim-majority and Muslim minority contexts, I have been troubled by a simple question. Do Indian Islamists accept the Indian secular state and the values and ethos of secularism only because Muslims are in a minority? If Indian Muslims were in a majority, would India have had a secular or an Islamic state? My assessment is that the latter would be true and without doubt we would have been reduced to another Pakistan. 

The Islamists start by saying since I am asking a hypothetical question, it requires no answer. I then request them to give me a hypothetical reply. I request a simple yes or no which they try and avoid. But the honest ones do say ‘yes’, if India were a Muslim majority country, it would have been an Islamic state, as they claim that essentially secularism is shirk, a sin. 

A few of the moderate elements go on to state that Indian secularism does find the right balance between religion and modernity and is therefore acceptable as the way ahead. 

But with the rising tide of political Islam, symbolised by the crisis raging all the way from West Asia to North Africa, with the crisis gripping certain nations of South Asia, an Islamic Caliphate is very much a subject of conversation.

The saving grace here is that the Indian Muslims masses are committed to the idea and the ethos of a ‘living secularism’. The very Idea of India for them is a unique experiment in the annals of human history, unparalleled at many levels.

Indian secularism is founded on the idea, an ethos of “mutual acceptance and respect” and not mere “tolerance”, which a very weak expression indeed. All those who still tom-tom the idea of a theocratic state – Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Jewish – need to understand that modern democracies and nations have no place for any theocracy. This is so because theocracies are inherently against equal citizenship rights, against equal rights for people of all religions, against the very concept of ‘sarva dharma samabhava’, that is, mutual respect and acceptance of all faiths, religions and cultures. It’s as simple as that.

In an Islamic state only Muslims have the right and freedom to practise, preach and proselytize, convert, whilst all other religions only have only the right to practice, that too with restrictions. Forget the right to preach and convert; Dhimmis are simply not allowed to do so. Islamists who hold such notions are the very same ones who demand equal rights in India or in the western countries wherein they dwell

Theocracies cannot lay the foundation for modern nations and democracies, or even regional unions and confederations. Nations need to be built around a vision where each citizen is equal, where every religious, gender, cultural, ethnic, sect, linguistic, class, tribal diversity and identity finds itself mirrored in the Constitution in equalitarian and legal terms, and not only that of the majority faith or sect. This has and will only create a weak society, a divided nation, regions, leading to hatreds, divisions and chaos which ruling elites and foreign imperial powers will take advantage of. Thus every individual, every section of society needs to be made an equal stake-holder without any exception.

This principle also applies at the regional and global levels, even as humanity integrates and evolves. In these nations and societies, all religions are accorded due respect and constitutional space, protecting and safeguarding the rights of diverse groups and communities.

I am opposed to the idea of a theocratic state just as I am opposed to a Communist state, as the latter too has proved to be as intolerant of other ideologies and religions, as well as multi-party democracies. 

In an Islamic state as propagated by the Islamists –

1) Muslims have more rights than the Dhimmis (non-Muslims), who are ‘protected citizens’ but not equal citizens.

2) In an Islamic state only Muslims have the right and freedom to practise, preach and proselytize, convert, whilst all other religions only have only the right to practice, that too with restrictions. Forget the right to preach and convert; Dhimmis are simply not allowed to do so. Islamists who hold such notions are the very same ones who demand equal rights in India or in the western countries wherein they dwell.

3) Islamists are also committed to the concept of ‘murtad’ (apostate) that a Muslim who leaves the fold of Islam and converts to another faith deserves to be killed. Where then is the concept of ‘freedom of conscience’, which they demand for themselves in secular lands? 

4) Only a Muslim can become a prime minister or president in an Islamic state. Others cannot even think of rising to the highest office in the land, as that is prohibited by the Constitution of such countries. Thus out of the window goes the concept of equal rights. This is very different from the Indian ethos where we have had a Sikh as our PM for 10 years, four Muslims have been elevated to the President’s post and a Muslim may even dream of some day sitting in the PM’s chair.

In short, in a modern, secular democratic State, all citizens are equal whereas in a ‘theocraZy’, those from the majority are more equal than others. 

(The writer is an activist and an expert on West Asian Affairs).
 

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Decolonizing Gender in the Arab World  
My research has sought to critically engage with two core assumptions underpinning the formulation of such a paradox. The first assumption is the reduction of women’s activism to the act of resisting patriarchy. This assumption is embedded within the concept of the private/public divide, whereby feminists argue that women are relegated to the private sphere, whilst men dominate the public sphere. This division becomes problematic when we look at evidence from the Arab world, where women’s participation has been encouraged as a means and marker of modernization. Since the end of the nineteenth century, nationalist discourse across the Middle East constructed the figure of a so-called new woman, who was educated and publicly visible. In this context, middle class and elite women began to enter public life, primarily by founding charitable associations but later also creating women’s unions that called for greater rights for women within marriage and widened women’s access to education. These women were not merely ‘resisting patriarchy’ but rather saw themselves as contributing to the struggle against ‘backwardness’ and for the modernization of the nation. In particular, women’s visibility became a key marker of identity for the emerging middle classes and an embodiment of the notion of ‘middle class modernity’ [2].

The second assumption underpinning the question of women’s rights in the Arab world is embedded within a long-standing Orientalist epistemology that sees women’s condition as a marker of the Arab world’s backwardness. On this basis, a popular answer amongst Western commentators to why women’s activism has not resulted in progress in women’s rights has come to be ‘because of the resilience of Arab patriarchy.’ This answer is problematic because of the way it reduces the causes of women’s subordination to Arab cultural values and beliefs, implying that the ‘West’ sets the civilisational standard for women’s rights. Moreover, arguments about the deficient nature of Arab culture with regards to women completely erase structures of power based particularly on class and nationality and ignore the role of global political economy and geopolitics in the reproduction of these intersecting hierarchies. Therefore, to formulate the title of this article as ‘How the West Undermined Women’s Rights in the Arab World’ is not to promise an exposé of Western government covert operations but rather to problematise, from the start, the way that we commonly think about women’s rights and women’s activism in the Arab world. In particular, I wish to highlight the geopolitical dimensions in the construction of gender norms and the resistance to them, as well as to extend our understanding of women’s rights beyond laws and public policies to include the ways in which women publicly subvert and resignify gender norms through their public participation.

The Rise of Radical Movements after 1967
This article focuses on the period from 1967 until the 1980s, in which the Arab world saw a rise of radical and revolutionary movements, challenging the political and geopolitical status quo, and their subsequent defeat by Western allies in the region (in particular, the Egyptian, Jordanian, Saudi Arabian and Israeli regimes). As we commemorate the fifth anniversary of the Arab uprisings, it is important to reflect on the political turmoil and contentious politics unleashed after 1967, which reveal some interesting parallels to the period from 2011 until 2013. 

The massive defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war brought into question the legitimacy of the pan-Arab project and led to a new era in Arab politics. Much has been written on the military and political dimensions of the 1967 war (amongst others, Louis and Shlaim)[3] as well as on the intellectual soul searching that followed the massive defeat.[4] However, there has been almost no attention paid to the gendered implications of the defeat. This is significant not only because it marginalizes the particular experiences of women and indeed men as gendered subjects and citizens. It is also significant because the 1967 defeat created a new opportunity for women to transgress the state feminist gender norms that had been integral to post-independence state building.

In Egypt, the profound shock of the 1967 defeat unleashed new oppositional movements, at the center of which was the student movement. It was initially sparked by outrage at the lenient prison sentences handed down to the army generals responsible for Egypt’s defeat in the war. However, the demands of the students went much further, including calls for greater political freedoms as well as the removal of intelligence and police from university campuses.[5] In January 1972, thousands of students participated in demonstrations, leading to a sit-in in Tahrir Square. The students were forcibly dispersed the following day and some were arrested. However, radical students continued to raise their national and political demands, in addition to protesting against the arrest of their colleagues.

Within these leftist and nationalist movements, issues of women’s rights and liberation were subordinated to the national and political goals of resisting imperialism and authoritarianism, fighting for social justice, and liberating Palestine. Whilst movement leaders believed that women should be mobilised to participate in the public sphere as a means of modernizing Arab societies, they ignored gender inequality within the private sphere.[6]

Yet these movements successfully mobilized young women into political activism on an unprecedented level. The post-1967 political turmoil provided opportunities for young women to transgress dominant gender norms. Egyptian human rights activist Aida Seif al-Dawla recalls being at university during the height of the Egyptian student movement:
“I remember I did things then, which now I am thinking about, I would never do them again […] You just walked into a lecture room and [would say]… “What the hell are you doing sitting in the lecture room? You should join the movement!” […] and then you walk out, and it’s so embarrassing to think about….”

The West is [not] an agent of progress and women’s rights in the Arab world. Rather, as a result of their geopolitical interests, they have supported regimes that have clamped down on revolutionary and radical popular movements and suppressed women’s embodiments of radical femininities. Over the long term, the demise of radical, secular movements has led to a decoupling of secular women’s rights agendas from local popular projects, paving the way for their co-option and instrumentalisation by authoritarian regimes and international actors and rendering secular women’s rights activists vulnerable to accusations of representing foreign agendas. Women activists face similar dangers today in the context of an ongoing counter-revolution across the Arab world. 

Another activist was Hala Shukrallah, who was born in Cairo in 1954, but had spent a large part of her youth in Canada, where her father was an ambassador for the Arab League. She returned to Egypt in 1971 and was propelled into activism by the arrest of her brothers, who were active in the student movement. Despite her young age, she became one of the leaders of the movement of the families of the arrested. She recalls a meeting with the speaker of the parliament, who knew her father very well:  
“so he started speaking very personally with me, “Oh Hala, I have known you since you were a child,” So I told him, “Please, be very professional.” And he was very upset about it. I of course was very rude. But anyway, that was natural for the time”. 

The memories of many of the women I interviewed suggest a social-political environment in flux in the period after the 1967 defeat. Diverse social and political movements had emerged to challenge the political, geopolitical and social status quo. Whilst ideologically, these movements had problematic attitudes to gender equality, nevertheless, they provided a terrain upon which young, middle class women could subvert gendered hierarchies and transgress dominant norms of gendered respectability, by participating in street demonstrations, joining political groups, challenging authority, and disobeying parents. Some were even arrested. In this way, women aligned their performances of radical new gender constructs with resistance to the socio-political and geopolitical status quo.

The Counter-Revolution
However, this post-1967 revolutionary wave in the Arab countries was eventually defeated by Western allies in the region. In particular, US support for Egypt amounted to billions of dollars in aid after President Anwar al-Sadat signed the peace treaty with Israel in 1979.[7] The counter-revolution not only targeted radical political forces but also women and gender.

President Sadat first attempted to undermine radical political movements by allowing Islamists to operate openly on university campuses, in contrast to the rule of his predecessor Gamal Abdel-Nasser, under whom Islamists had been imprisoned and even executed.[8] Women’s bodies and gender norms were central to this counter-revolution. Aida Seif al-Dawla recalls that the Islamists took over the student union in 1975 and began to advertise Islamic dress at reduced cost: “And it was during that time […] [that] I got to know a couple of young women, both of them were veiled and we got on well and so […] they started saying, ‘why don’t you put [on] the veil’.” 

Aida also remembers the conflicts between Islamists and other students:
“Yeah, so those final years in university, there were the Islamists on the one hand and the Nasserists on the other hand. And the confrontations were violent, […] students got beaten up. Of course, we as women, we did not get beaten up. I didn’t at least. But we received a lot of abuse. […] you know calling us ‘bitches’ and ‘whores’ and that ‘we are after husbands’ and that’s why we are involved in politics and stuff like that. So I was happy to graduate.”

Sadat’s support for Islamist students and his broader rapprochement with political Islamists was not only a way to counter the influence of Nasserist and leftist political groups but also to signal a clear break from Nasser’s secular modernizing regime, central to which had been state feminism. Sadat undermined some of the gains for middle class women through the introduction of infitah or economic reforms privileging the private sector. The relative decline in public sector wages as a consequence of infitah disproportionately impacted women, for whom the public sector was the employer of first choice. For the first time, and in a marked departure from the Nasserist era, there were public debates questioning the desirability of women working, and the government “offered numerous incentives [to women] to take a leave of absence without pay to raise their children and/or to work on a part-time basis”.[9] Such attitudes reflected growing social conservatism, which was being encouraged by Islamists.

Popular resistance to infitah culminated in the 1977 uprising, called the ‘bread riots’ in Western media, or the ‘bread uprising’ by Egyptians. The protests were triggered by the government’s announcement of the removal of subsidies on several basic commodities, including sugar, bread and rice, as well as reductions in state salaries, which led to a doubling of prices over night. On 17 January, workers walked out of their factories, and were later joined by thousands of students, civil servants, and other Egyptians, who marched on downtown Cairo. Protests spread throughout the country.
All in all, 160 demonstrators were killed and eight hundred injured by security forces.[10]. Thousands of leftists were rounded up and imprisoned, accused of attempting to overthrow the regime.[11] Many were released without charge, but not before having spent up to 6 months in administrative detention.[12] Human rights activist Magda Adli, then a student of medicine at Al-Azhar University, was one of about twenty individuals arrested for her involvement in the uprising and spent more than a year in prison. 

Within these leftist and nationalist movements, issues of women’s rights and liberation were subordinated to the national and political goals of resisting imperialism and authoritarianism, fighting for social justice, and liberating Palestine. Whilst movement leaders believed that women should be mobilised to participate in the public sphere as a means of modernizing Arab societies, they ignored gender inequality within the private sphere.

“I was arrested at university and I was charged with attempts to overthrow the regime and joining a secret organization and all the rest of the list of accusations by the state security that is still used until now. I spent fourteen or fifteen months in jail. […] So, that was a year lost from university […] And, I was sentenced to three years in jail, along with other people too, around twenty people were sentenced, […]  but I didn't do the rest of the time… I was under surveillance by the state security all the time even when I was doing my exams… and every new case that state security had against political activists or socialists or whomever, I was wanted for interrogation, […] So, I was playing cat and mouse with the state security all the time, so they couldn't catch me although I was charged with three cases after that, until I graduated.”  

The wide scale clampdown on activists after 1977 heralded the end of the leftist student movement as a force within Egyptian politics. Many of the underground Marxist organizations began to break up. Similar to what we have seen in Egypt since the summer of 2013, many activists became disillusioned and withdrew from public activism. Many took time out to read, pursue careers or doctoral studies abroad, reflecting upon and revising their previous political-ideological beliefs. Women who attended university in the 1980s remarked to me that there was a near absence of political activism on Egyptian campuses beyond Islamist student groups.

Decoupling of Women’s Rights Agendas and Activism from Popular Struggles
A central part of the counter-revolution was the restoration of the gender status quo ante, in which women were expected to comply with gendered hierarchies and notions of female respectability. However, this did not end women’s public involvement. Perhaps paradoxically, women’s independent organizations and initiatives began to flourish in the aftermath of the counter-revolution. The ‘New Woman’ study group, which later became the New Woman Foundation, was started by former members of the student movement in order to understand women’s specific subordination. Nawal El-Saadawi established the Arab Women’s Solidarity Association, raising the issue of violence against women. In 1985, a group of women activists and lawyers created a coalition against the repeal of the relatively progressive 1979 amendments to the personal status law, amongst other initiatives in the 1980s (see Al-Ali for further details).[13] 

The re-emergence of women’s independent associations in Egypt, for the first time since the 1950s, gave space to women to articulate a new gender discourse that escaped the problematic subordination of women’s issues within revolutionary and radical ideologies. However, in a context where popular forces were defeated and political opposition groups, with the exception of the Islamists, were weak, it also led to the isolation of women’s rights agendas within domestic and regional politics. This isolation was exacerbated by the increasing ‘NGOisation’ of the women’s movements after 1990[14], which did not support the mobilisation of wider constituencies. Moreover, women’s rights demands became delegitimised by the fact that the Egyptian regime selectively instrumentalised women’s rights and attempted to co-opt women’s organizations, through the National Council for Women for example. This was part of projecting a ‘modern’ image abroad and securitising women’s rights within the US-led alliance against ‘terrorism’. [15]

It is therefore unsurprising that when popular movements began to emerge after 2000, initially sparked by the Second Palestinian Intifada, women’s rights issues were not on the agenda. Women were highly visible in these movements, yet, unlike the revolutionary movements after 1967, there was almost no attempt to include ‘the woman question’ within these movements’ opposition to US imperialism, neo-liberalism and authoritarianism.

Repopularising and Depopularising Women’s Rights after 2011
It was only between 2011 and 2013 that women were able to re-insert the ‘woman question’ back into popular movements. In response to threats to women’s rights and increasing violence against women activists, under the rule of SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood, mass-based women’s organizing emerged outside of the established women’s NGOs. Egyptian women activists were at the forefront of struggles for social justice and democracy in post-Mubarak Egypt, whilst also raising gender-specific demands with regards to women’s participation and bodily integrity. Indeed, they successfully integrated the transformation of gender norms into demands for broader socio-political transformations (see various chapters in El Said, Meari and Pratt).[16]

However, the achievements of women’s independent, mass activism have been undermined by the political polarisation and increasing authoritarianism seen since the ouster of Muslim Brotherhood president, Mohammed Morsi in July 2013. Whilst the post-July 2013 regime has moved to extend women’s rights through the constitution and anti-sexual harassment law of 2014, it has also severely restricted freedom of association and expression. In this way, a new patriarchal bargain is crucial to the counter-revolution, in which the regime protects women’s rights, and in return, women must abandon their freedom to organize and define their own agenda. As I wrote last year, activists are facing a huge challenge in their simultaneous attempts to maintain their dynamic paradigm for gender justice, to resist state cooptation and top-down impositions, and to embed revolutionary gender constructs from the grassroots-upwards.

Conclusion
In this article I aimed to problematise two assumptions about women’s activism and women’s rights in the Arab world. First, I have attempted to expand our concept of women’s agency beyond resistance to patriarchy and to demonstrate the ways in which the subversion and re-signification of gender norms were also part of a counter-hegemonic movement against the post-1967 socio-political and geopolitical order. In other words, women’s participation in radical movements embodied socio-political transformation, including the transformation of gender norms. In this respect, we see parallels in the emergence of mass-based women’s activism as part of revolutionary struggles after 2011.

Second, I have aimed to problematise the notion that the West is an agent of progress and women’s rights in the Arab world. Rather, as a result of their geopolitical interests, they have supported regimes that have clamped down on revolutionary and radical popular movements and suppressed women’s embodiments of radical femininities. Over the long term, the demise of radical, secular movements has led to a decoupling of secular women’s rights agendas from local popular projects, paving the way for their co-option and instrumentalisation by authoritarian regimes and international actors and rendering secular women’s rights activists vulnerable to accusations of representing foreign agendas. Women activists face similar dangers today in the context of an ongoing counter-revolution across the Arab world. 

[This article is a condensed version of a lecture of the same name given at LSE Middle East Centre on 20 January 2016. The longer lecture also discusses Lebanon and Jordan. A podcast of the lecture can be heard here.The lecture is based on some of the material from a forthcoming book on women’s activism in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. A digital archive of all the interviews conducted for this research will be made publicly available alongside the publication of the book].

(This article has been reproduced with permission from Jadaliyya ezine). 
 

References
[1] Abu-Lughod, Lila (1998) Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[2] Watenpaugh, Keith David (2006) Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colonialism and the Arab Middle Class, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[3] Louis, Wm. Roger and Avi Shlaim, eds. (2012). The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[4] Ajami, Fouad (1981) The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[5] Abdalla, Ahmed (1985) The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt 1923-1973, London: Saqi Books, pp. 151-153.
[6] Hasso, Frances S. (2000) Modernity and Gender in Arab Accounts of the 1948 and 1967 Defeats, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 32: 4, pp. 491-510.
[7] Brownlee, Jason (2012) Democracy Prevention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[8] Abdalla, Ahmed (1985) The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt 1923-1973, London: Saqi Books. Ayubi, Nazih (1991) Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World, London: Routledge. Gerges, Fawaz (2012) The Transformation of Arab Politics: Disentangling Myth from Reality, in Louis, Wm. Roger and Avi Shlaim, eds. The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 285-314.
[9] Hatem, Mervat (1992) Economic and Political Liberation in Egypt and the Demise of State Feminism, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 24:2, pp. 231-251.
[10] Kandil, Hazem (2012) Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen: Egypt’s Road to Revolt, London: Verso Books, p. 169
[11] Hirst, David (1977) Egyptians Riot over Price Rises, The Guardian, January 19, p. 1. Stevens, Janet (1978) Political Repression in Egypt, Middle East Research and Information Project Report, no. 66, pp. 18-21.
[12] Stevens, Janet (1978) Political Repression in Egypt, Middle East Research and Information Project Report, no. 66, pp. 18-21.
[13] Al-Ali, Nadje Sadig (2000) Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women’s Movement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[14] Jad, Islah (2004) The NGO-ization of the Arab Women’s Movements, IDS Bulletin, 35:4, pp. 34-42.
[15] Pratt, Nicola (2012) The Gender Logics of Resistance to the ‘War on Terror’: constructing sex–gender difference through the erasure of patriarchy in the Middle East, Third World Quarterly, 33:10, pp. 1821-1836.
[16] El Said, Maha, Lena Meari and Nicola Pratt, eds. Rethinking Gender in Revolutions and Resistance: Lessons from the Arab World, London: Zed.
 

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And whilst we mourn the dead, let us not forget the many other civilians who whilst going about their daily lives have been slaughtered by Islamism – a global killing machine.

This month alone, the dead comprise 7 Hazara, including a 9 year old girl, beheaded by ISIS and 19 year old Rokhshana, stoned to death by the Taliban in Afghanistan; a mass grave of Yazidi women uncovered after ISIS was routed from Sinjar (see photo on left); roadside bombings in Baghdad and Sadr City, which killed 41 people; twin explosions in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed at least 43 people; a downed Russian airliner killing all 224 on board; at least 4 killed in suicide attack in Sinai, Egypt; a secular publisher killed and 3 others wounded in Bangladesh; at least 32 people, including four children, killed in a suicide attack in Pakistan; 30 people killed and dozens injured in twin suicide bomb attacks in Nigeria’s Borno State…

Countless others have also been killed – not by “jihadis” but legally by Islamic states via Sharia laws: 100 have been executed in Saudi Arabia during a 6 month period with 700 executions in Iran during the same time-frame. The current President Rouhani, who planned to visit France, has overseen the execution of 2000 civilians during two years in office… Many more languish in prison – people like Raif Badawi and Atena Faraghdani – or face male guardianship rules, compulsory veiling, gender segregation, even bans on laughing out loud or music…
U2 lead singer Bono says the Paris massacres, especially the attack on the music concert, is Islamic State’s first “direct hit against music” but music has been the target of Islamists for decades. In Mali, for example, Islamists have banned music in the north of that country. In Iran, women cannot sing solo in front of men…

The Islamists target music, art, love, and always civilians.

French President Hollande says the Paris attacks are an act of war. True, but this war has been raging for decades. People in many countries across the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia have lost a generation and been fighting this movement at great risk to their lives. This “war” is one of the main reasons for the mass migration.

Despite the devastation, there is hope. Just this week, women came out to oppose Rokhshana’s stoning, tens of thousands came out against the ISIS beheadings in Afghanistan and peshmarga liberated Sinjar from ISIS, lowering ISIS’ flag and raising the Kurdish flag.

True, but this war has been raging for decades. People in many countries across the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia have lost a generation and been fighting this movement at great risk to their lives. This “war” is one of the main reasons for the mass migration.

Protests in defence of the people of Paris are part and parcel of this global protest movement against Islamism’s inhumanity and brutality. Our success will lie in recognising the global resistance against Islamism and seeing how it is intrinsically linked to our own.

It will also lie in our ability to target Islamists and not just jihadis. We cannot win against ISIS whilst wining and dining heads of Islamic states like Rouhani and the Saudi regime or appeasing, funding or even arming “moderate” and “soft” Islamists, which are part of the problem.

We also won’t be able to win if we place collective blame on migrants or Muslims. Many “Muslims” (or those presumed to be Muslims) are the first victims and on the frontlines of resistance. Also, many migrants are fleeing Islamists or dictators like Asad in Iraq, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan…
Those who kill indiscriminately in Paris or in Raqqa include the European-born. This is not an “anti-imperialist” movement to be excused and justified nor is this about “identity.” It’s about politics – regressive, fascist politics that needs no justification to kill and slaughter. Where Islamism begins, rights, freedoms, democratic politics and freethought ends.

To push back this movement, we must oppose it all – not just jihadis – and not just in Europe. Keeping the people of Europe safe is intrinsically linked to keeping people the world over safe. In this we have many allies amongst the people of Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Iraq to Algeria, who have been standing up to and resisting Islamism for decades.

Today we mourn but we also resolve to continue the fightback on behalf of people everywhere.

Onwards towards a global, human resistance to Islamism.

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