‘Laal Salaam, Jai Bhim’, ‘Jai Bhim, Lal Salaam’: This is a slogan that rents the air amongst the protestors in Hyderabad Central and Jawaharlal Nehru Universities. As we know, the students and the teachers of these universities have been putting up a stiff united resistance against vicious attacks unleashed by the Sangh Parivar and its government. This resistance has thrown up many questions about the future course of action and the possibilities for alliances between Dalit groups and Left and other democratic struggles. This article is written with the perspective of exploring the ways in which such an alliance can be built in the context of a concrete political and material reality.

Ambedkar and the Marxists

Broadly speaking, the ideological and strategic difference between class and caste based political mobilisations can be summarised in the emphasis of Dalit politics on the question of representation. Since their inception the Ambedkarites have used the tool of Representation to press for social reform. It has been assumed that ‘only a Dalit’ can represent the interests of another ‘Dalit’ and all the others who advocate for Dalit rights are largely ‘Brahmanical’ social reformers. In fact, Ambedkar himself put Gandhiji in this category as he argued that the source of discrimination was Hinduism, and Gandhiji, far from opposing it, just wanted to reform it to make it “tolerable”.[1] 

But this was not a viable project since the social structures associated with Hinduism needed to be opposed in totality and this could only be done if Hindu religion was rejected by all Dalits. Instead Ambedkar advocated the path of Buddhism. In his book ‘Buddha and Marx’ he writes that the best way of achieving the goal of Communism was through the Rule of Righteousness and not the Rule of Law. Ambedkar in fact argues for the moral superiority of Buddhism as a pathway to Communism.

As Ambedkar writes in his critique of Lenin’s conception of revolution: “The Russians are proud of their Communism. But they forget that the wonder of all wonders is that the Buddha established Communism so far as the Sangh was concerned without dictatorship. It may be that it was a communism on a very small scale but it was communism, without dictatorship a miracle which Lenin failed to do”. [2]

This Buddhist version of communism is characterised by austerity and the redistribution of wealth through a change of heart. Once again Ambedkar writes with regard to the question of private property that the rules imposed by Buddha were far more stringent than those of the Communists.In the context of this overall framework, Ambedkar in fact lays down his own theory of caste when he argues that caste is in fact enclosed class, and all classes are turning themselves into castes through practices of endogamy and excommunication. The occupational and economic difference forms a basis and sustains itself through such enclosures.[3]

Hence Ambedkarites consider ‘caste’ as the primary contradiction of Indian society, and it is on this basis that the Satyashodhak Communist Party was formed. Advocating a dialectic between caste and class, Sharad Patil, the founder of the party, gives primacy to caste contradiction and subsumes within it the issue of class struggle.[4]Ambedkar himself wrote to this effect that: “Class-consciousness, class struggle and class wars are supposed to be ideologies, which came into vogue from the writings of Karl Marx. This is a complete mistake. India is the land, which has experienced class-consciousness, class struggle. Indeed, India is the land where there has been fought a class war between Brahmans and Kshatriyas (sic) which lasted for several generations and which was fought so hard and with such virulence that it turned out to be a war of extermination.”[5] 

While it is true that representation of Dalits in the political sphere broadens the social basis of the democratic structure, it does not necessarily alter or improve the material conditions of the Dalits.

Class struggle and class war are interpreted in terms of the conflicts between castes. In this sense caste and class are conflated with each other and it is believed that class differences may be erased but caste will prevail. For Ambedkar and the Ambedkarites, the representation within institutions of power would be the first step towards empowering themselves to bring about social transformation through the annihilation of caste.  This became the focus of most of Ambedkarite politics whose programme was quite different from that of the Justice Party, which also asked for the annihilation of caste but added land reforms and minimum wages to their programme.[6]

Such politics has also been continuously challenged by the emergence of the new Dalit organisations like the Panther Republicans in the 1970s and 1980s, especially after the emergence of a strong OBC political lobby.[7]In contrast, from a communist perspective, the question of class unity was central to the mobilisation of the Dalits, and it was soon realised in communist practice that no major movement could be launched without an anti-caste component. A good example of this is the preparatory phase before the Telangana movement where the caste question and discrimination with agricultural work became one of the major ways of building a movement of agricultural workers. In this phase the aim was to create a democratic consciousness within the Dalit agricultural worker and also a democratic anti-discrimination consciousness amongst the non-Dalit worker. Hence the project of ‘class struggle’ was firmly linked to the opposition and oppression of the Dalits. The communist led anti slavery movements were firmly embedded in this perspective.[8] 

The relationship between the politics of representation and class formation has been a severely under-analysed theme in both Dalit studies as well as Marxist analysis.

But despite these examples the persistence of caste has been seen as a challenge to Marxist theory within the country. It has been argued that prominent ideologues have seldom taken note of caste in their political discourse. This understanding is however a misrepresentation of the theory and practice of democratic Dalit politics in India.  Since the early days of its inception the communist movement has been forced to recognise the existence of caste and interpret it in its own material context.

One of the earliest theorists to do so was D.D. Kosambi who argued that the transition from ‘tribe’ to ‘caste’ was a hegemonic process to deprive the oppressed people from their legitimate rights. As Kosambi writes, “Caste is class at a primitive level of production, a religious method of forming social consciousness in such a manner that the primary producer is deprived of his surplus with the minimum coercion.[9]  This classical statement shows that Kosambi used the method of the Marxist anthropologists to show how religious and ethnic ideologies became the legitimating force of oppressive relations. Religious and caste consciousness are thus both tools of hegemony, and as E.M.S Namboodripad was to write later, the movements for reservation and lower caste upsurge (especially in the context of Kerala) could be seen as a form of a democratic upsurge. However the class unity between the oppressed people of the upper castes and the Dalits was essential if any further movement was to be made on the question of opposing both social and economic oppression.[10] 

This understanding has been further strengthened by the later analysis that argued for a sympathetic look at the opening up of democratic spaces by lower caste resistance.[11] Hence the ‘Dalit’ is interpreted as a ‘political identity’ which has come up against the oppression of ruling class politics, which is characterised by affirmative action without social transformation. The limit of such politics is seen in the emerging scenario and inequity within the scheduled castes.

Class Formation and Inequities amongst the ‘Scheduled Castes

The relationship between the politics of representation and class formation has been a severely under-analysed theme in both Dalit studies as well as Marxist analysis. This lack of focus is largely because the co-evolution of the Dalit political identity and working class formation have not been understood as simultaneous developments which structure all kinds of Dalit and working class resistance.

In post-Independent India, this phenomenon is largely true because while affirmative action has created a strong Dalit leadership, its representation in the public sphere has not in fact solved the problem of growing disparities within the social groups. The analysis below looks at the question of class formation in selected states which have historically been important for both Dalit and left politics. It analyses the trends in Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh (important centres of Ambedkarite politics), Tamil Nadu (which has pioneering movements in radical Dalit politics like Panthers) and West Bengal and Kerala (important centres of left politics). Through such an analysis in an all India context, an attempt is made to correlate the problem of disparities within the Dalits with the trends in Dalit and left movements.

Inequalities due to Access to Land

According to recently available data (2013) the disparities amongst the Scheduled Castes is highest than amongst any other social group in India.[12] The pattern of land holdings as it has emerged in 2013 shows that 54.9 percent of the Scheduled Castes have only homestead lands and out of this 4.4 percent do not even own homesteads. About 84.1 percent of the Scheduled Castes own less than 0.2 hectares of land other than the homestead lands. Of these 21.2 percent have no access to any land apart from their hutments. The rest of the 62.9 percent are virtually (or in effect) landless as they largely depend on labour for their livelihood.[13] Thus the first disparity that exists within the ‘Dalits’ is between those who possess land for purposes other than homesteads (which is about 7.2 percent with land over one hectare), and those who are landless and virtually landless.

This pattern is reflected at the state level also where the rising landlessness amongst the Dalits has created a differentiation between land losers and those who possess some cultivable land. The data for selected states (chosen on the basis of states with important and significant history of Dalit politics) show the following:

Decadal  Change in Ownership of Cultivated Land in Selected States, 1999-2011 

Source: Calculated from NSSO data from different years.
 
The table shows that land deprivation is one of the main problems faced by the Dalits in almost all states. It is interesting to note that at the All India level there is a growing landlessness amongst the Dalits with access to all other categories of land showing a decline. Though the percentage growth in landlessness is the lowest in Gujarat the rise in middle and large land holdings indicates that a consolidation of land holdings amongst the Dalits is taking place in the state.

States with strong Ambedkarite politics like Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra have increasing landlessness in terms of ownership of land holdings and more than 80 percent of the Dalits are landless in these two states. States with strong left politics like Kerala and West Bengal also show a rise in landlessness in terms of ownership of land, but the land disparities are the lowest in these states. In Tamil Nadu, another state with radical Dalit politics, 91.1 percent Dalits are landless. This proportion is much higher than Bengal and Kerala.

But disparities in land do not tell the entire story about land based inequalities. The landless Dalits still depend on agriculture through lease agreements. Since evictions are not permissible under the land laws, recorded leased-in rights in land reform states are instrumental in creating secure agricultural employment. The available NSSO data (2013) shows that in states like Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh with strong Ambedkarite politics but no land reforms, the lease-in tenancy arrangements are varied over two cropping seasons.

For example in Uttar Pradesh the average size of leased-in land varies from 0.277 hectares to 0 0.321 hectares over two seasons, and seasonal landlessness (i.e. Dalits with no access to cultivable land in one season) varies by about 4 per cent, whereas in Maharashtra the average size of leased-in land varies from 0.13 to 0.5 hectares and seasonal landlessness varies by 3 percent. Even in a state like Tamil Nadu with radical Dalit Panther politics, the size of lands leased-in remains relatively small, however seasonal landlessness varies by 6 percent.

In West Bengal and Kerala, the states with strong left politics, the size of land holdings leased-in by Dalits remains stable and so does the tenure of land holdings.[14] This is largely because these are land reform states and here leased-in rights are recorded, permanent and inheritable. Hence states with strong class based mobilisations give greater land based livelihood security to Dalits than states whose Dalit politics is largely based on question of representation.

Inequalities Arising from Income

Income inequality, measured through data on expenditure is another aspect of inequality which reveals how the character of the proletarianisation of Dalits has impacted the disparities within this social group. It is particularly interesting to note the disparity index within social groups across time. Using the available NSSO data, a recent study shows the following results:

Economic Disparity Ratio by Social Group

Source: Extracted from Ashish Singh, Kaushalendra Kumar and Abhishek Singh, ‘Exclusion within Excluded: The Economic Divide within Scheduled Castes and Tribes Economic and Political Weekly Volume 50 Number 42, October 17, 2015, Tables 4and 5.
 
The table above shows that the disparities amongst all social groups are increasing in the post- economic reforms period. It is also evident that the period of the late 1980s is also the time when the inequalities amongst the Dalits reduced. This reduction in inequities could be attributed to some of the measures undertaken by the state under pressure from the emergence of a new wave of Dalit, Adivasi and left politics that emerged from the late 1970s onwards.

As the figures from Kerala and West Bengal show, the disparities amongst Dalits seem to have reduced as a result of the land reforms project. This is in stark contrast to the disparities within ‘Others’ which seem to have increased in the same period. But this process seems to have reversed in the post-reforms period, when the inequities within ‘Others’ has decreased and those within vulnerable social groups, especially the SCs, has increased. This trend is especially true of the states with Left dominated politics and not for regions with strong Dalit identity politics.In the states dominated by Ambedkarite Dalit politics like Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh, the increasing disparities within the Dalits have grown at a very high rate. This is also true of Tamil Nadu where the Panthers attempted to raise the class question within Dalit politics. Coincidentally the rate of growth of Dalit disparity is lower in those areas where class based mobilisations are stronger than Dalit identity movements.

Political Implications of the Concrete Reality

These trends raise the fundamental question of whether the strengthening of class based mobilisation is important to address the basic problems of Dalits and what type of democratised Dalit political identities should be shaped to combat non-transformative ruling class ‘Dalit politics’. One of the assumptions of ‘Dalit activists’ is that Dalit representation in all forms is inherently transformative. Thus the very presence of ‘Dalits’ will lead to the transformations of the lives of people belonging to the most vulnerable and historically discriminated group.

This assumption lies behind the fundamental question asked by several progressive activists and scholars: how many Dalits are in the leadership of the communist party?  However, such a question also begs a counter question: has Dalit politics in fact led to the transformation in Dalit lives?

This questioning and counter questioning raises important issues on the relationship between representational politics and social transformation. History has shown that whenever and wherever the communists worked and organised the Dalits, the Dalits accepted and supported them as ‘natural allies’ irrespective of the social origins or caste of their leaders.

Simultaneously, the very organising of Dalits on their everyday issues often yielded a democratic Dalit leadership. The political identity of this leadership was however not based on an ‘exclusivist’ position (that only a Dalit can work amongst Dalits) but on the belief that the annihilation of caste was an important component of building a classless society or even a People’s Democracy.

These trends raise the fundamental question of whether the strengthening of class based mobilisation is important to address the basic problems of Dalits and what type of democratised Dalit political identities should be shaped to combat non-transformative ruling class ‘Dalit politics’.

Such a political position has the potential for developing a ‘working class Dalit politics’ whose import and thrust is quite different from ruling class or class insensitive Dalit politics. The challenge of building such politics is however twofold. First the problem of combating the discrimination of Dalit workers by non-Dalit workers has to be squarely addressed by working class politics. To an extent, this may need the transformation of the political practice of present day communist activists themselves, who may believe in an anti-caste ideology but are unable to put it into political practice in their own neighbourhoods.

Second, the acknowledgement of class contradictions within the Dalits needs to be translated into the mobilisation of the most vulnerable within the Dalits. In other words a transformed working class consciousness can form the basis of a democratic Dalit politics. But such a challenge can only be met if class based politics is strengthened and expanded amongst the Dalits and Dalit dominated regions.As far as the potential of non-class Dalit politics is concerned, it may be noted that our discussion of the concrete material conditions has shown that Ambedkarite politics has a limited counter hegemonic potential. While it is true that representation of Dalits in the political sphere broadens the social basis of the democratic structure, it does not necessarily alter or improve the material conditions of the Dalits.

A glance at the political sphere in fact shows that the beneficiaries of representation in the political sphere possess a ruling class consciousness and therefore fail to have a vision for social transformation which will form the basis of the annihilation of caste. However, at present, non-class based Dalit political movements are crucial political allies in stopping the rightwing Sangh Parivar from spreading its tentacles within historically vulnerable social groups and the working classes. This emerging potent combination of the left-Dalits in Indian universities (for example the support for Ambedkar study circle by the Students Federation of India in IIT Madras and Hyderabad) has threatened the hegemony of the Modi led rightwing developmental discourse.

In this sense ‘Jai Bhim, Lal Salaam’ may be a slogan that is relevant and necessary in the context of an immediate political reality. But the project of social transformation needs to go both beyond just this slogan. Ambedkarites need to firmly address the class dimension of the Dalit question if they are to in fact bring about the fundamental social transformation they seek.At the same time the slogan of ‘Lal Salaam Jai Bhim’ by communist activists is an important recognition by democratic working class politics of the challenges it faces in bringing about fundamental social transformations under contemporary Hindutva led capitalism.

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Chauhan’s entry into the campus and assumption of his post as chaiman happened despite a long struggle, a struggle which got support from a cross-section of people including mainstream and independent filmmakers, students from across the country, academicians, intellectuals, activists and artists. The protest of the students of FTII was against the partisan appointment of Gajendra Chauahan and others in the FTII society, the apex body which runs the institute.

While we were getting ready to protest, we were shocked to see the coronation like arrangements being made by the administration to welcome Gajendra Chauahan. In the past, the occasion of chairman joining the institute has never been a grand affair. But this time, the administration felt more like a unit of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) welcoming the ‘chief’.

In a government institute which is supposed to be secular in its affairs. Gajendra Chauhan was anointed with a tilak and aarti at the gate. On public money, the Institute had hired around 20 dhol pathaks (traditional dhol players). It seemed that the institute had taken direct inspiration from the recently released Bajirao Mastani: Chauhan was treated like the Peshava, the king who emerged victorious from the battle !

As worrying as the mode of welcome was the enthusiastic support Chauhan received from the FTII staff and the silence of many of the teachers to these developments. It is not as if all of them are avid supporters of the ideology behind the current regime but a combination of pragmatism and fear of the ‘repercussions’ were enough to keep everybody quiet and welcome Gajendra Chauhan.  As ‘well wishers’,  they kept advising us, as they had done during the 139 day-long strike that his proximity with the powers that be can deliver great ‘results’ for the Institute and we must utilize that. Indeed for many, it was ‘practical’ to go along with his entry rather than oppose it now that the strike of the students had ended.

In such atmosphere, one could not help but recall the famous slogan from the France of 1968, ‘Be realistic, demand the impossible’. In a world, guided by practical concerns it has become important to be ideal and fight for the impossible. To shed light on the dangerous (possible things) happening around us and to underline the importance of the ‘impossible.’

As we came out on the street to protest Gajendra Chauhan’s entry and that of others into the campus, we knew there would be all sorts of ‘arrangements’ made to stop us. But the levels of bandobast and the severity of police action shocked us. We had just started to shout slogans when police without warning started beating and pushing us. Several of us were thrown down on the concrete thoroughfare. One student was isolated, surrounded and brutally beaten. Women students were mishandled by male policemen. And our constant question, ‘why’ ?’ was answered with more blows from the lathi.

After detaining 30 students and blocking the entry of rest to their own campus, the coronation ceremony began. It had all the trappings of a religious ceremony. Then the meeting of the FTII society formally began. At the meeting, there was no mention of the students, the prime stakeholders who were sitting in jail. Persons of note, including Rajkumar Hirani, famed for his creative, cinematic propagation of the word Gandhigiri participated. At this meeting, the violent police behaviour with students moments before, just outside, did not figure. For Hirani and other members, obviously, more than any kind of giri, it was the 300 crores which the film had drawn from the ‘market’ that was important; and to keep making such crores, opportune silence was a pre-requisite when the critical moment came.

One of the first tasks of the FTII society on January 7, 2016, was to choose Governing council (GC) members. The members of this body, the GC, meets more regularly and is the sole body which takes and validates all academic and administrative decisions of the institute. In its very first task, the outcome of this meeting confirmed our worst fears.

The FTII society chose Narendra Pathak as one of the members of GC.  Narendra Pathak is a man who in the long run is perhaps more dangerous to the Institute than even Gajendra Chauan. He has no relation at all with the field of cinema or other artistic fields. He is presently, the principal of  SK Somaiya Vinay Mandir, High school and Junior college. He was chosen in the society under the category of ‘ a person of eminence’.

What makes him the person of eminence is not his teaching skills. More qualified persons from the field of teaching are available. His ‘actions’ as the ex-president of ABVP Maharashtra are a critical aspect in his bio-data that makes him the man of choice, for the present regime. During his tenure as president ABVP, he had ‘successfully’ stopped film screenings at various places in Pune.

The screening of Red Ant Dream and Jashn E Azadi was cancelled at Symbiosis Institute of Media after the threat from ABVP.  Another private college refused to screen Final Solutions, a film by Rakesh Sharma on Gujrat pogram terming it as 'controversial' after ABVP threatened to vandalise the space.

ABVP also threatened colleges who invited ‘anti-nationals’ like Binayak Sen and stopped Seminars which had words like Kashmir, communal violence and Hindutva. An entire session on Kashmir in a seminar organised by liberal arts department of Symbiosis University was cancelled due to the ABVP threat. He could do so even though his party was not in power either at the centre or in Maharashtra. He could successfully threaten organisers of such events and undemocratically threaten and stop these events from taking place.

When members of his organization beat up students of the FTII for screening Anand Patwardhan’sJai Bhim Comrade, it was Narendra Pathak who conveniently dubbed them ‘Naxalites’ and ‘anti-national’. After being nominated to the GC of the Society of a Film School, his first reaction to the media was that it is time for a new thought process to start at FTII and if students don’t behave they will be taught a lesson in ‘nationalism’ by him and other members of the ABVP. An obviously violent threat!

During the last five years, we have actively tried to show all kind of films at FTII and we have resisted the ABVP’s plan to vandalise or threaten us on campus, by mobilising the students and holding protests. In the city of Pune, the FTII was the last bastion so to speak, an Institute which did not pay heed to the diktats and sermons of the ABVP read the RSS.

Hence, clearly the regime has thought closely and carefully, by grabbing this opportunity to put it in a powerful position and place, a person against whom students of the FTII had protested within the Institute. An implicit message was being conveyed to students: fall in line like in all other Institutes or else….. This process reached completion and culmination on  January 7, 2016 when Pathak was appointed to the GC without any opposition from other members.

As the day progressed and we were detained at the police station without food, the second important agenda came up at the meeting: ‘Security’. The latest buzz word to punish and kill all kinds of dissent. For an institute which had seen a successful 139-day students’ strike, it surely was the ‘lack of security and discipline’ that ‘allowed’ the protests. This had to be corrected.

In its 55 years of history, FTII has surprisingly remained a very liberal campus, independent of what’s happening around the country. There are no hostel timings for the students and they can enter and exit the Institute at any time. Not just that, there are no restrictions on entry of male students to the hostel of female students and vice versa. For those who think this is too much freedom, it must be emphasised that no great catastrophe has happened till now. However, now, post January 7, 2016, the authorities have decreed that t it should not remain that island of autonomy and creativity and ‘a new thought process’ should start.

So elaborate security arrangements have been proposed which have included restrictions on entry and exit from campus between 11pm to 5 am; the refusal of entry if students were found with objectionable items, which include alchohol; and ‘other steps’ depending on the judgment made by the persons in authority; no entry of ex-students without the permission of either the Director or the Registrar and many more such restricting ‘decrees.’ In the words of the Director ‘it was important to discipline the students’.

We had just started to shout slogans when police without warning started beating and pushing us. Several of us were thrown down on the concrete thoroughfare. One student was isolated, surrounded and brutally beaten. Women students were mishandled by male policemen. And our constant question, ‘why’ ?’ was answered with more blows from the lathi.

Thankfully, due to the intervention of one GC member and the new chairman, Gajendra Chauhan’s first appearance reticence, the proposals were not passed. These would wait for another GC meeting, after the media attention has been subdued. We got that day what we  had imagined. In its very first meeting, the GC had made us realise that the protest must go on else a bleak future awaits us.

The FTII now resembled a microcosm of the whole nation and not the island look that it wore before the present regime assumed power. This was a change.

We witnessed, first hand, again that fascism and saffronisation are not rhetorical and vague terms but the actual, lived political reality of today.

We learned, and experienced, first hand, what happens when a government who is headed by a man who prides himself on being ruthless stops listening to valid feedback from the people.

We learned and experienced, first hand, how the state machinery can and is used most violently to crush acts of protest and dissent.

Most importantly, we also experienced how it is the silent majority that gives rise (and legitimacy) to such regimes.  A majority which believes in being pragmatic, frustrated by the present and in constant anticipation of a bright future which they feel the ruler will give to them on platter; a pessimists’ look towards protest and democracy in general; viewing discipline and tough authority as the answer to all ills. 

Most of the staff of the FTII behaved exactly like that. They were or are not the loyal soldiers of Hindutva but became or have become a part of its project unconsciously. 

This is what was truly scary about when the Modi government came to power. The happenings at FTII have brought close home the reality.

 By the night of January 7, Gajendra Chauhan was gone and we were released from police detention. The ‘well wishers’ were back in action, just as they were during the strike. They were again spewing the same old advice: how protest, politics, police and court were not the things or place(s) for students. That how a ‘bright future’ awaits us and we should concentrate on ‘making it big’. In the imagined idea of an ideal middle class Indian the ‘dirty’ business of politics should be left to ‘dirty’ people – workers, farmers, Dalits and Muslims. Not us, the light bearers of a developing India. If we don’t leave this ‘protest business’ alone, the dirt will come back to haunt us and getting a visa to the dreamland called America will be a huge problem. So we must use our common sense and behave.

But there were glimmers of hope. Students are still not ‘tired’ and the ‘common sense’ was and is in short supply. Already plans are being made about the future course of protest. 

I met a first year student late into the night that day; he was recalling the advise given to him by his teacher ‘ to concentrate on his career’. His answer was, ‘Without learning what will I do with a career?’ I asked him that what had kept him going in the last 200 days. (Since his was a one year course and traditionally in a short course students are much more concerned about moving out and getting a job). His reply was humbling. He said that if it was just one Gajendra Chauhan, he perhaps would not have protested. But he saw what was happening at FTII as just one small part of what this Government is unleashing on society.  He also confessed to me, his first ‘big mistake’, as he called it: Only 18 months back he had voted for Mr. Modi and he was feeling guilty for doing so.

These are mature statements coming from a ‘fresh’ batch of students who had previously voted for Modi but could see the danger of the implication(s) of this regime for society. They are willing to fight it out not just within FTII but outside as well. That, in a nutshell, are the real gains of the FTII movement. And that is why we are ‘being realistic and demanding the impossible’.

(The writer is a recent graduate of the Film and Television Institute of India, Pune with a PG Diploma in Editing, 2009 and also former General Secretary of FTII Students' Association)

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