A UN report has found that Washington Post columnist and Saudi regime critic Jamal Kashoggi was murdered by Saudi official and Saudi Arabia “seriously curtailed and undermined” Turkey’s ability to investigate the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, a UN expert has said.
 
The UN human rights investigator leading the international inquiry into the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi said evidence showed he was a victim of “a brutal and premeditated killing, planned and perpetrated by officials of the state of Saudi Arabia,” Al Jazeera reported.
 
Special Rapporteur Agnes Callamard said on Thursday her three-member team had access to part of “chilling and gruesome audio material” of the murder obtained by Turkish intelligence agencies while they visited Turkey between 28 January and 3 February.
 
A preliminary report says it was 13 days before Turkey was allowed into the consulate where the journalist was killed.
 
Khashoggi was last seen alive entering the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on 2 October. The 59-year-old was a prominent critic of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. US intelligence agencies believe Prince Mohammed ordered the assassination.
 
On Wednesday, the Wall Street Journal reported that Riyadh was trying to contest an element of a CIA assessment that concluded MBS likely ordered the killing. Riyadh denied his involvement, alleging “rogue” Saudi elements acted on their own accord, the Al Jazeera report said.
 
Saudi Deputy Public Prosecutor Shalaan bin Rajih Shalaan said investigators had concluded an intelligence officer ordered Khashoggi’s murder, applying a lethal injection inside the consulate, BBC reported.

The officer had been tasked with persuading the dissident journalist to return to the Gulf kingdom, he added. Khashoggi’s body was dismembered inside the building and the body parts were then handed over to a local “collaborator” outside the grounds, according to Shalaan.
 
Callamard plans to present a final report to the UN Human Rights Council in June.
 

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Washington: Netflix has dropped an episode from the comedy show Patriot Act with Hasan Minhaj that was critical of the murder of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi and Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s alleged role in the killing after a complaint by the kingdom’s rulers, Financial Times reported.
 
“Netflix confirmed that it had removed the episode in Saudi Arabia last week, after the country’s Communications and Information Technology Commission made a request to take it down because it allegedly violated the kingdom’s anti-cybercrime law,” Financial Times reported.
 
“Saudi Arabia has become an influential player in the technology and entertainment sectors through big investments by its sovereign wealth fund, which directly owns stakes in companies such as Uber and many other groups indirectly through its backing of Japan’s SoftBank Vision Fund,” Minhaj said. Later in the removed episode, he criticised Silicon Valley for ‘swimming in Saudi cash’ and urged tech companies to stop taking investment from the kingdom.
 
In a statement to Financial Times, Netflix said, “We strongly support artistic freedom worldwide and only removed this episode in Saudi Arabia after we had received a valid legal request — and to comply with local law.” The episode is still available on the official Netflix channel on YouTube.
 
It added that the Saudi telecoms regulator cited a cyber-crime law that states that “production, preparation, transmission, or storage of material impinging on public order, religious values, public morals, and privacy, through the information network or computers” is a crime punishable by up to five years in prison and a fine not exceeding SR3m ($800,000).
 
The American comedian Hasan Minhaj was critical of the Saudi heir in an episode of the standup show Patriot Act. He delivered a monologue mocking the Saudi royalty’s cover-up stories with regards to Kashoggi’s murder in the country’s consulate in Turkey, deep financial and political ties between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, the country’s involvement in Yemen and crackdowns on women’s rights advocates.
 
“Now would be a good time to reassess our relationship with Saudi Arabia. And I mean that as a Muslim and as an American,” says Minhaj in the episode titled “Saudi Arabia.”
 
“We access God through Saudi Arabia, a country I feel does not represent our values,” he says, explaining how problematic it is to pray facing Mecca, the birthplace of the Prophet Muhammad, in Saudi Arabia.
 
The episode was only dropped from Netflix in Saudi Arabia and is still available in other parts of the world. It can be seen in Saudi Arabia on YouTube.
 
It was interesting to note that the audience went completely silent when Minhaj observed that the crown prince MBS was a close second to Obama when it came to bombings.

 
Karen Attiah, Khashoggi’s editor at the Washington Post, said that it was outrageous that Netflix had caved to pressure from Saudi Arabia.

 
“Hasan Minhaj of Patriot Act has been a strong, honest and (funny) voice challenging Saudi Arabia + Mohammed bin Salman in the wake of #khashoggi’s murder,” she tweeted. “He brought awareness about Yemen. Quite outrageous that Netflix has pulled one of his episodes critical of Saudi Arabia.

 
The NGO Reporters Without Borders in October ranked Saudi Arabia 169th out of 180 countries for press freedom, adding that “it will very probably fall even lower in the 2019 index because of the gravity of the violence and abuses of all kinds against journalists”.

In an interview with The Atlantic about his show, Minhaj said he and his family discussed the potential repercussions of his criticism of the Saudi government, and that he now has fears about his own safety.
 
“There was a lot of discussion in my family about not doing it. I’ve just come to personal and spiritual terms with what the repercussions are,” he said.
 

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Parallel lawsuits filed by dissident Omar Abdulaziz, Amnesty International,and others accuse the spyware company of illegally helping governments of Saudia Arabia, Mexico and the UAE

A symbolic funeral prayer for the murdered Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul in November 2018 Reuters

A Saudi dissident has filed a lawsuit against Israeli software company NSO Group, accusing them of helping the royal court to spy on his smartphone about his communications with murdered journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

The lawsuit has put immense pressure on the company and the Israeli government, as Israel issues the company’s sales of spyware to foreign governments. The spyware is known as Pegasus, reports the New York Times.

The suit also drew new attention Israel’s alliance with Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf States. 

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have never recognized the Israeli state but they all are on the same side when it comes to opposing Iran. After the uprising of the Arab Spring, Israel and Arab monarchies are on common ground in defending the established Arab order.

Montreal-based Saudi dissident Omar Abdulaziz filed the lawsuit in Israel, which follows parallel suits by journalists, activists and others accusing that the NSO Group illegally helped the governments of Mexico and the UAEto spy on their smartphones even there were no criminal records against the individuals, with no posed threat of violence as well.

Israeli lawyer Alaa Mahajn filed the lawsuit with cooperation from Mazen Masri, a lecturer at the City University of London.

The lawyers intend to argue that the resulting exposure of the collaboration between Abdulaziz and Khashoggi “contributed in a significant manner to the decision to murder Khashoggi.”

Abdulazizis a 27 year old Saudi asylum seeker in Canada living in Montreal. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings, he became popular among Saudis for his online videos and social media speech criticizing the rulers of Saudi Arabia and their authoritarianism.

Over the last two months, Abdulaziz has gained international attention because of his friendship with Khashoggi.

In the lawsuit, Abdulaziz claimed that before the murder of Khashoggi, the royal court had access to Khashoggi’s communications about opposition projects with Abdulaziz because of the spyware.

Amnesty International has also accused the company of helping Saudi Arabia spy on a member of the organization’s staff. Amnesty willtake legal action after the Israeli Defence Ministry rejected a request to revoke NSO Group’s license to export its spyware.

“By continuing to approve of NSO Group, the Ministry of Defence is practically admitting to knowingly cooperating with NSO Group, as their software is used to commit human rights abuses,” said Molly Malekar, the programs director of Amnesty International’s Israeli office.

In a statement on Sunday, the NSO Group said its products were “licensed for the sole use of providing governments and law enforcement agencies the ability to lawfully fight terrorism and crime.”

Contracts for use of its software “are only provided after a full vetting and licensing by the Israeli government,” the company said, adding: “We do not tolerate misuse of our products. If there is suspicion of misuse, we investigate it and take the appropriate actions, including suspending or terminating a contract.”

In August, Abdulaziz was notified by a research group named Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto, that studies online surveillance, that his phone was hacked. They later concluded that the Saudi government was behind the hacking.

Saudi security forces also carried out a raid with search dogs in Abdulaziz’s family home in Jeddah.His brothers were arrested and put in prison, where they were tortured.

Courtesy: Dhaka Tribune

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This tells us about the nature of the state of Saudi Arabia itself: the state is personified and embodied in the person of Muhammad bin Salman, even though he is not yet the King. Anything critical of his policies is immediately perceived as a personal affront. Those who are trying to convince the world that it was not MBS but someone else who gave the order are only fooling themselves. No amount of spin is going to save the crown prince from the widely shared belief that the orders came from him and him alone.

The killing of Jamal Khashoggi is a landmark moment in the sense that it will always remind us that values that were held to be sacred like human rights, free speech etc. is no longer sacred anymore. If we see the issue closely, no one is talking about these issues anymore. Rather, there are only positions of self-interest. Trump has made it amply clear that this murder is not going to affect the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States. He went as far as to cast aspersions on his own CIA report which indicted MBS. The reasons are very clear indeed. Saudi Arabia is one of the largest importer of US’ arms and the American establishment will not see its business interests getting jeopardised simply because a journalist was brutally murdered.

But that’s not all. There is a larger game plan with regards to Middle East and Saudi Arabia is going to play to an important part in this re-configuration of geo-strategy for the US. It is now becoming amply clear that the US is inching towards a war with Iran. Saudi Arabia, considered the key to the hearts and minds of the Sunni world, will be a key ally in this changing configuration. The recent Saudi closeness towards Israel is part of the same deal: both together with the assistance of the US, hope to decimate Iran’s ambition to become a major player in the region.
It is no secret that due to the disastrous US policy in the Middle East, Iran has become the major power in the region. Not just Lebanon and Syria, but Iran is now able to influence decisions in Yemen, Iraq and Afghanistan too. Russia and China are already chipping away at the hegemonic might of the US. In fact, it was the combined effort of Russia and Iran which saw to it that despite horrendous atrocities, Bashar al Asad was able to survive the US led coalition which was baying for his blood.

Ever since the Iranian revolution which overthrew the despotic Shah regime, Iran has been an eyesore for the United States. More importantly now, it has emerged much more powerful because of the Iraq war. But Iran is not just an irritant for the US. Muslim world politics has largely been an exercise for hegemony of the Muslim world between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The kingdom detests the republic perhaps more vehemently than the US. And that’s why one of the first acts of MBS when he became the crown prince was to blame Iran even for the medieval horrors of his own country. The US wants to destroy Iran and in this effort, the Saudis are more than willing to play their part, even to the extent of warming up to their ideological enemy the Jews. This is precisely the reason why Trump wants to save MBS: so that the geo-strategic and business architecture of the Middle East so painstakingly put together by Jared Kushner is not disturbed.

But if US is clear about its game plan and handles the situation accordingly, Turkey, on whose soil the murder took place, is no different. Right since the very beginning, Turkey knew the whole story of killing of Jamal Khashoggi. But its piecemeal information sharing and even then falling short of naming MBS on whose order the killing took place, only meant that it was also using the incident to play politics. Erdogan used the incident to pin down Saudi Arabia while at the same time entered into some kind of a financial negotiation with that country. No matter what happened in the negotiations, Erdogan’s sole point was to prove that the Saudis were morally bankrupt and therefore had no business being the leaders of the Sunni world. That mantle should rightfully rest on the head of Erdogan himself.

For some years now, Turkey has been trying to revive the aura of the Ottoman Caliphate and the glorious past of the Muslims. From cultivating deep friendships with Muslim world to rescuing a tiny country like Qatar from the arrogant gaze of Saudi Arabia to offering liberal scholarships to students from the world, Turkey is slowly but surely cultivating an image of itself through which it wants to wrest the title of the leader of the Muslim world from Saudi Arabia. It will not be a surprise if one day, Erdogan declares himself to the caliph of the Muslim world. Jamal Khashoggi incident gave him another opportunity to showcase to the Muslim world that they are in need of a new leader and that they should look towards him and not towards the criminal state of Saudis.

The criminal act of the Saudi state should have led to a larger debate about the absence of an atmosphere of liberal critique in much of the Arab and Muslim world. But then the tragedy is that most Muslim leaders themselves are so knee deep in this malice that they can only use the incident to earn some political points for themselves.

Arshad Alam is a columnist with NewAgeIslam.com

Courtesy: New Age Islam
 

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Man wearing a mask depicting Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman protests the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, during a candlelight vigil outside Saudi Arabia’s consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, Thursday October 25, 2018. Picture by Depo Photos/ABACAPRESS.COM. All rights reserved.

The Saudi reaction to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi seems, repeatedly, to defy reality. The monarchy initially rejected all responsibility. When evidence leaked by Turkish investigators became overwhelming, they changed the story to suggest a surprise physical altercation was followed by accidental death. They then acknowledged that Saudi operatives were behind the killing, but claimed it had been a rogue operation. All three versions are widely seen to lack credibility. Is this just a case of bad PR?

Part of the answer is that Muhammad bin Salman, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, seems to have been genuinely surprised at the vehement reaction to the murder. Being caught off guard, however, is not the only probable reason for Riyadh’s doubling down.

Once the regime denied responsibility for the crime, repeating the official story – however incredible – became a loyalty test for Saudi citizens. This is the argument put forward by Laleh Khalili, a professor in Middle Eastern politics at SOAS in London. She suggested that it is Riyadh’s way of practicing politics of “as if”. This is an idea that the scholar Lisa Wedeen first developed in the context of Syria and the personality cult that once surrounded Hafiz al-Assad, president Bashar al-Assad’s father.

After seizing power in 1970, Hafiz al-Assad forced Syrians to parrot increasingly absurd claims. As a result, he was not only unceasingly said to be the beloved father of the nation, but also the nation’s “premier” pharmacist, lawyer, or doctor. The purpose of these absurd claims was not to achieve ideological legitimacy by offering a plausible interpretation of reality. It was, Wedeen argued, to demonstrate the power of the regime by forcing people to repeat a party line that was patently untrue. A similar dynamic seems to be at play in Riyadh.

A recent English-language comment piece in the Saudi Gazette was symptomatic. It appeared on 18 October, when Riyadh was still vehemently asserting its innocence. The article asserted that the disappearance of Jamal Khashoggi was “nothing but a comedy act” that was “orchestrated by haters and ill-wishers in Qatar” – Saudi Arabia’s Gulf rival. Doha’s malicious ruse would soon be exposed and Saudi Arabia would triumph. There was also “a group that is playing a dangerous role in the dark” – an oblique reference to Saudis who were doubting the official version “by spreading rumors and circulating fake news among Saudis in an effort to make them doubt their government”.

The comment piece clearly set out what was expected of Saudi subjects. Anyone who publicly doubted the official version of events was a “parasite” to be targeted in an “in-house cleaning”. Meanwhile the Saudi regime reportedly unleashed a troll army to stifle dissent on social media and target online activists. The Saudi Gazette article has to be understood as a warning to the population: play along with the politics of “as if” or face the consequences.

A second example of Riyadh’s brazen manoeuvring was a photo-op of the king and his son the crown prince offering their condolences to Khashoggi’s son on 24 October. In the photos the young Khashoggi appears stone faced, and he reportedly left the country soon after the photos were publicised.

As Elizabeth Tsurkov at the Forum for Regional Thinking pointed out, the meeting echoed a similar encounter 30 years ago between Hafiz al-Assad and the Lebanese Druze leader Walid Joumblatt, in the context of the Lebanese civil war. This meeting took place a few weeks after Joumblatt’s father had been assassinated, likely on the order of Hafiz al-Assad. It was a performance designed for public consumption. It was to show the son’s fealty to the ruler. This is why the son had to shake the Syrian dictator’s hand, acting “as if” Assad really was just another concerned foreign dignitary.

Muhammad bin Salman has courted foreign investors to end the country’s oil dependence and brought social reforms to the conservative kingdom. He lifted the ban on women driving and on modern entertainment options such as cinemas and music concerts. This softening of the monarchy’s image masked a brutal crackdown on dissent. In 2017, bin Salman imprisoned dozens of tycoons so as to discipline Saudi economic elites. His security services filled the country’s prisons by persecuting Shia activists, influential clerics, and women’s rights activists. Controlling public discourse through the politics “as if” is part of the repertoire of the new Saudi authoritarianism.

Muhammad bin Salman is not defying reality, he is forcing Saudis to defy it as proof of their loyalty. Seen this way, the alternative reality that Riyadh constructs is not so much a sign that it is losing control, but that the crown prince is tightening the reins.

Hannes Baumann is a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow in the Department of Politics at the University of Liverpool and author of “Citizen Hariri: Lebanon’s Neoliberal Reconstruction”.

Courtesy: https://www.opendemocracy.net/
 

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The result was clear enough: the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi went into the Saudi embassy on October 2 and never came out alive.  (Even an attempt of the gathered crew of death to procure a Khashoggi double was noted.)

For aspiring authoritarians, the Saudi state is a model instructor.  First came blanket denial to the disappearance: the Saudi authorities had no idea where the journalist had gone after October 2.  On October 18, Riyadh officially acknowledged Khashoggi’s death.  By October 21, Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir had come to the conclusion that this had, in fact, been murder, and a mistake. “This was an operation where individuals ended up exceeding the authorities and responsibilities they had”.

Then, an improbable story of a fist fight developed through the media channels. (When one has to kill, it is best to regard the enemy as inappropriately behaved when they dare fight back.)  In the presence of 15 Saudi operatives, this was all richly incredulous – but the Kingdom does specialise in baffling and improbable cruelties.

It was clear that distancing was fundamental, hence the cultivation of the “rogue” theory, with Saudi operatives taking a merry trip off the beaten path.  Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was happy to pour water on the suggestion. “We have strong evidence in our hands that shows the murder wasn’t accidental but was instead the outcome of a planned operation.”  It had been executed “in a ferocious manner”.

The Turkish president has, however, danced around the issue of ultimate state sanctioned responsibility.  Neither King Salman, nor Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, have been publicly outed in any statements as either showing awareness of the killing or ordering it.  Prince MBS and his father are happy to keep it that way, severing their links with the killing as assuredly as the killers had severed the journalist’s fingers.  This is evidenced by the Crown Prince’s own labelling of the act as a “heinous crime that cannot be justified”.

The Saudi Public Prosecutor has also decided to move the case from one of accidental killing (fist fights will do that sort of thing) to one of planned murder.  A bit of cosmetic housecleaning has been taking place (another authoritarian lesson: look busy, seem engaged with heavy concern): 18 people have been arrested and two advisers sacked by the Saudi state.  The Crown Prince, according to the official Saudi Press Agency, has chaired the first meeting of a committee established to reform the country’s intelligence services.

This authoritarian blueprint also implies a staying power in the face of other states who see Saudi Arabia as cash cow and security partner.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has a rich appetite for foreign arms, a point not missed on the weapons makers of the globe.  Some attrition is bound to take place: certain countries, keen to keep their human rights credentials bright and in place, will temporarily suspend arms sales.  Others will simply claim disapproval but continue leaving signatures on the relevant contracts of sale.

Some ceremonial condemnations have been registered.  Members of the European Parliament voted upon a non-binding resolution on Thursday to “impose an EU-wide arms embargo on Saudi Arabia.”  Germany, temporarily concerned, has suspended arms sales to the House of Saud, with Chancellor Angela Merkel deeming the Khashoggi killing “monstrous”.   Canada’s Justin Trudeau briefly pondered what to do with a lucrative defence contract with Riyadh worth $12 billion, only to then step back.

The Canadian prime minister did acknowledge that the killing of Khashoggi “is something that is extremely preoccupying to Canadians, to Canada and to many of our allies around the world” but has not made good any threats.  His predecessor has become the ideal alibi.  “The contract signed by the previous government, by Stephen Harper, makes it very difficult to suspend or leave that contract.”  Cancellation would lead to penalties which, in turn, would affect the Canadian tax payer.  How fortunate for Trudeau.

France, the United Kingdom and the United States remain the three biggest suppliers of military hardware to the kingdom, a triumvirate of competitors that complicates any effective embargo.  Which state, after all, wants to surrender market share?  It’s a matter of prestige, if nothing else.  President Donald Trump’s reaction is already clear: a suitably adjusted lid will be deployed to keep things in check till matters blow over; in the meantime, nothing will jeopardise a $110 billion arms deal.  Business with a theocracy can be patriotic.

The French angle has been reserved and coldly non-committal.  “Weapons exports to Saudi Arabia are examined in this context,” claimed foreign ministry deputy spokesman Olivier Gauvin, meaning that his country’s arms control policy was made on a case-by-case basis.  For France, keeping Riyadh in stiff opposition to Tehran’s regional ambitions has been a matter of importance in its Middle Eastern policy for decades, a point reiterated by President Emmanuel Macron in April.  And the Kingdom pays French arms exporters well: between 2008 and 2017, Saudi Arabia proved the second biggest purchaser of French arms (some 11 billion euros), with 2017 being a bumper year with licenses coming to 14.7 billion euros.  Riyadh can expect little change there.

Britain’s Theresa May, in the tradition of elastic British diplomacy (condemnation meets inertia), has insisted that her government already has the appropriately stringent rules on arms exports, another way of shunning any European resolution that might perch on human rights.  Such strictness evidently does not preclude the eager oil sheiks of Riyadh, though Britain’s foreign secretary Jeremy Hunt did suggest the Khashoggi killing, should it “turn out to be true” would be “fundamentally incompatible with our values and we will act accordingly.”  Such actions are bound to be symbolic – much money has been received by the British arms industry, with earnings of £4.6 billion coming from sales to the Kingdom since the Saudi-led war on Yemen began in 2015.  Sowing death, even if through the good agency of a theocratic power, is lucrative.
The fate of Khashoggi, cruel and ghastly, seems a piddle of insignificance in that light.  “Brexit,” urged Philippe Lamberts, MEP and leader of the Group of the Greens, “must not be an excuse for the UK to abdicate on its moral responsibilities.” That abdication, on the part of Britain and its arms competitors, took place sometime ago.

Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne.  Email: bkampmark@gmail.com

Courtesy: https://countercurrents.org/
 

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Robert Mahoney of the Committee to Protect Journalists on Oct. 18 appealed to the U.N. to investigate the disappearance of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. REUTERS/Shannon Stapleton

However, in the Middle East, my area of expertise, I believe this Trump policy shift opens the door to exactly the sort of flagrant attacks on individual freedom and safety that likely recently claimed Khashoggi.

Most criticism of Trump’s foreign policy has focused on two other major departures from decades of past American practice.

First, Trump has rejected the cornerstones of the post-WWII international order largely built by the U.S.: deep alliances among Western democracies and global free trade. Second, Trump has shown an affinity for authoritarian rulers, including Russia’s Vladimir Putin, which has undermined American interests.

Yet, the Trump administration’s abandonment of support for democracy and civil rights hurts the interests of both Middle Easterners and Americans.
 

Did the US walk the walk?

In the past, U.S. leaders and officials within the government have shown interest in political rights and government accountability in other countries. Such talk has nonetheless often taken a back seat to considerations of geopolitical power or resources.

Perhaps the lack of attention to current U.S. disregard for democracy and rights in the Middle East has to do with Washington’s inconsistency and perceived hypocrisy in the region.

U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, right, greets Iranian Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Washington in 1951. Two years later, the U.S. orchestrated a coup to oust democratically elected Mossadegh. AP

Even before the U.S. became a superpower after World War II, Western countries like England and France trumpeted democratic values while engaging in colonial control of the Middle East. This left a legacy of local suspicion regarding the sincerity of Western leaders’ stated political values.

The U.S.’s own track record in the region of allying with repressive governments, mounting coups (as in Iran in 1953) and overthrowing leaders by force (as in Iraq in 2003) are among examples where the U.S. practiced a politics other than what it preached.

At best, the U.S. has embraced democratization and human rights as one of many goals in the Middle East. More cynically, democratic talk could be seen as a cover for more imperialistic policies in the region during and after the Cold War.

Yet these days even the pretense is gone that U.S. policy in the Middle East – or elsewhere – should advance political freedom.

When asked about why he refuses to criticize repressive rulers like Putin or Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Trump’s response is to question whether “our country’s so innocent.” Denying that the U.S. is distinguishable from countries that penalize dissent, the current American leader disavows the very project of advancing democratic values abroad.
 

Pretense matters

Let me be clear that I am not suggesting that Middle Easterners should be, or are, dependent on foreign countries or activists for greater political rights. If so, why does an end to Washington’s inconsistent support for democratic politics and rights in the Middle East matter?
There are several reasons.

First, U.S. support for democratic values abroad – however variable – helps empower non-government organizations that consistently focus on rights in places like the Middle East.

That means Human Rights Watch, the World Justice Project and local movements these groups help can improve human rights and legal accountability in part because they have allies in Washington’s broader political culture.

Second, advocates for democratic rights exist within the U.S. government, and enjoy influence, even if their superiors are less constant in their support for democracy abroad.

So, groups within the State Department, and government organizations like USAID or the United States Institute for Peace, work to improve citizen capacity and rights in places like the Middle East. In more rights-oriented presidencies, such groups can affect broader government policy.

Even in administrations less focused on human rights, the rhetoric of support for democracy can be politically useful or persuasive. President George W. Bush partly justified American military overthrow of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 2003 with the argument that a more democratic Iraqi government might help transform the broader Middle East.

Third, the lack of U.S. predictability around political rights in the Middle East can actually deter governments dependent on good relations with Washington from repressing their citizens. That’s because they can’t be entirely sure about political consequences. Tacit approval by the U.S. of human rights abuses could turn overnight into condemnation.

Donald Trump greets Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi in 2017 in Saudi Arabia. Sisi has been accused of increasing repression in his country. The White House

For example, Egypt’s pre-2011 authoritarian leader Hosni Mubarak was known for political oppression. But he could not undermine democratic and human rights activists in his country altogether. He knew that, in a U.S. that provided billions of foreign aid to Egypt, at least some policymakers scrutinized his coercive practices.
 

Lack of pretense matters

Is it actually significant that the White House ignores political rights and freedom?

In the Middle East, the difference is large and palpable.

For one thing, increased deference to authoritarian leaders in the Middle East by the world’s most powerful democracy has allowed for the pursuit of deadly warfare and attacks on civilians. This is apparent in the actions of Syrian leader Hafez el-Assad, who has not hesitated to use chemical and other extreme weapons on his population.

Meanwhile, the Saudi government uses U.S.-supplied weapons to wage war in Yemen. The White House has not responded to the devastating civilian casualties.

More broadly, and as the Khashoggi affair highlights, the U.S.’s current lack of interest in political rights emboldens Middle Eastern governments to crack down on dissent and the dissenters, in flagrant and shocking ways.

Egypt under President Sisi is more repressive politically than it was prior to 2011 under Mubarak. Prince Salman of Saudi Arabia may be committed to increasing Saudi prestige and the selective enhancement of less puritanical social mores. Yet he also has shown little tolerance for political opposition.

When the Canadian foreign ministry tweeted critically about Saudi political arrests, the Saudis countered by expelling the Canadian ambassador and suspending trade, flights and Saudi student exchanges with Canada.

Such a strong reaction is hard to imagine in the days when at least pockets of the U.S. government showed concern about human rights in the Middle East. In this instance, the Trump Administration refused to support support Canada, its democratic neighbor. Similarly, Trump’s response to Khashoggi’s disappearance so far is to highlight the importance of Saudi-U.S. ties, particularly in the realm of weapons sales.

The upshot is that Middle Easterners have grounds to believe that Washington cares little for their basic well-being, their hopes for more responsive political systems and, in Syria and Yemen, their very lives.

The volcano of popular resentment against authoritarianism that erupted most notably in 2011, known as the Arab Uprisings, may have been capped temporarily. It has not quieted.

People in the Trump administration purport to care a great deal about potential violence from Middle Easterners. This is why it is puzzling that they side strongly with unelected leaders willing to use intimidation and violence to quell dissent.

It is tempting to argue that the inconsistency of U.S. efforts to further democratic values means that these efforts don’t matter.

At least in the Middle East, racked by ongoing war, the rising influence of autocrats, and increases in flagrant attacks on critical speech like Khashoggi’s death, I fear that the Trump administration’s abandonment of such efforts will in fact fuel more misery and anti-Americanism.

This is an updated version of an article originally published on August 24, 2018.
 

David Mednicoff, Chair, Department of Judaic and Near Eastern Studies, University of Massachusetts Amherst

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Things between Saudi Crown Prince Salman and Turkish President Erdogan have become rather tense. AP Photo/Burhan Ozbilici

Articles based on anonymous accounts from Turkish officials report that Turkey has video and audio proof that Saudi Arabian agents detained, murdered and dismembered Khashoggi, a sharp critic of his government who lived in Washington, D.C. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan raised the stakes even further when he said that a search of the Saudi consulate showed evidence of toxic materials that were painted over.

The affair is just the latest to drive a wedge between the two key Middle Eastern powers – countries that have in the past shared close ties to each other and to the United States.

How did their friendship turn frosty?

I’ve been studying and writing about the region for decades. And like with many other relationships in the Middle East, it’s complicated – and that’s why the current crisis could lead to a surprising twist.
 

Early days

Although diplomatic relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were established in 1932, neither country showed much interest in the other until the late 1960s.

Turkey’s secular ruling elite was more keen to have strategic and economic ties with the West than to the Arab world. Turkey joined the NATO alliance in 1951 – two years after its formation – and maintained good relations with Israel from the start, much to the disappointment of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries.

This began to change in the ‘60s and ’70s when Turkey made two moves that led to stronger relations with Saudi Arabia and resulted in increased trade. In 1969, it joined the nascent Organization of Islamic States, based in Saudi Arabia and intended to be a “collective voice of the Muslim world.” And in 1975, Turkey initiated diplomatic relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization, which sought to end the occupation of Palestinian territories in Israel.

Relations continued to improve in the 1980s but deteriorated in the ’90s when the kingdom took Syria’s side in several disputes with neighbor Turkey.

These ups and downs in Saudi-Turkish relations were partly a result of Turkey’s political instability, including several military coups in the ’80s and ’90s. Relations tended to improve when Islamist or civilian parties – which felt close cultural and religious links with Turkey’s Muslim neighbors – were in power but worsened after the military deposed them.

King Abdullah shake hands with Erdogan during the first visit of a Saudi monarch to Turkey since 1966. AP Photo/Umit Bektas

Warmer ties

Relations between the two countries found a firmer footing after the Justice and Development Party – commonly known as the AKP – gained power in Turkey in 2002 and continued to improve throughout the decade.

In contrast to the secular governments that had ruled Turkey since 1923, the AKP and its leader Erdogan put a high priority on building stronger relationships with its Arab and Muslim neighbors.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the resulting change in the balance of power in the region brought Turkey and Saudi Arabia even closer together. Both were concerned about Iraq falling into the hands of their common rival, Iran, whose military and political influence increased as a result of the invasion. They also wanted to contain Iran’s influence in Syria and Lebanon.

As a result of these closer ties, in August 2006 the late King Abdullah became the first Saudi leader to visit Turkey since 1966 and made another trip the following year. In return, then-Prime Minister Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia four times from 2009 to 2011.
The high-level diplomatic contacts fostered growing business and investment. Turkish exports of textiles, metals and other products to Saudi Arabia soared from US$397 million in 2000 to $3.6 billion in 2012. And Saudi businessmen who felt unwelcome in the U.S. and Europe after 9/11 saw Turkey as an attractive destination.
 

A springtime chill in the air

Relations took a sharp turn in the 2011, starting with the Arab spring uprisings that led to the overthrow of governments in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

As an advocate of political Islam, Erdogan welcomed the revolutions and the new governments they yielded. The Saudi government, on the other hand, saw the revolts as destabilizing.

This disagreement came to a peak when Mohammad Morsi, who was closely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, won that Egypt’s first post-Hosni Mubarak election in 2012. Erdogan supported Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power, which was opposed by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States like the United Arab Emirates. These countries had a long history of hostility towards Muslim Brotherhood activities throughout the Arab world and were concerned that these victories would energize the movement in their own countries.

The rift between Turkey and Saudi Arabia intensified after a military coup ousted Morsi in 2013. Erdogan strongly condemned it and gave the Muslim Brotherhood refuge in Turkey, while Saudi Arabia offered billions in financial aid to cement Egypt’s new military rulers.

Relations took another hit in 2014 when Saudi Arabia actively undermined Turkey’s bid to become a nonpermanent member of the United Nations’ Security Council.

More recently, Saudi Arabia and Turkey found themselves on opposite sides over the Qatar crisis in June 2017. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt severed all ties with Qatar – and tried to enforce an economic blockade – over the latter’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups. They were also upset with Qatar’s refusal to terminate its ties with Iran.

Turkey reacted by expanding its engagement with Qatar, offering economic aid and sending more troops to its small military base in that country. Indeed, Turkish food shipments to Qatar played a crucial role in its ability to withstand the blockade.

Jamal Khashoggi, missing since Oct. 2, is believe to have been killed. Flickr/The Project on Middle East Democracy, CC BY

Interpreting Turkey’s response to Khashoggi

So what does this all mean for the current crisis?

Western media have mostly portrayed Turkey’s handling of the latest incident involving Khashoggi’s disappearance as an indication of deteriorating Saudi-Turkey relations.

That might not, however, be the case. The Turkish government is trying to balance multiple conflicting goals in the way it handles this crisis.

On the one hand, it is trying to show a full commitment to discovering what happened and has put enormous pressure on Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman by leaking details of his government’s involvement. But I believe it is also mindful of preventing a further escalation of tensions with Saudi Arabia, which remains a major investor in Turkey.

Meanwhile, Turkey is struggling with a severe financial and external debt crisis at the moment and is desperately trying to attract foreign capital. A withdrawal of Saudi investment or tourists could worsen the crisis.

Erdogan’s initial hesitation in pointing the finger – leaving it to “anonymous officials” – and his call for a joint investigation gave Saudi leadership time to come up with a response strategy, which appears to be blaming “rogue killers.”

In this he seems to share President Donald Trump’s interest in giving Saudi Arabia a face-saving way out of the crisis. The U.S. and the Trump administration also have a lot on the line in their relationship with the Saudi government.

Interestingly, one result of this ordeal, which has plunged Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the West into chaos, may be more cooperation and better ties between the U.S. and Turkey, which now have a great deal of leverage over the kingdom.

Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in Economics of the Middle East, Brandeis University
 

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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