In spite of being one of India’s wealthiest state, Karnataka continues to perform poorly on key public health indicators compared to some of the other southern states (see Table 1 below) primarily because of structural and policy failures. However, it is no accident that the state continuous to be promoted as a ‘model’ for healthcare reforms, largely due to its aggressive adoption of privatisation, public–private partnerships (PPPs), contracting out critical health care services and insurance-based healthcare. The state has been quick to uptake the mandates of the

Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) -economic reform packages pushed onto India by International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.

Table 1: Comparison of mortality indicators for Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu 

Table 2: Health coverage indicators for Karnataka (NFHS-5) 

What should a Public Health law look like?

When there is a failure of voluntary compliance to public health policies, laws may be required. However, laws in themselves may be inadequate unless there is a political and moral mandate by governments to protect populations from threats to health and even to healthcare systems themselves. Public health laws should:

• Set clear rules of behaviour for individuals, public bodies, and private actors
• Define powers, limitations, and duties
• Protect fundamental rights
• Apply universally and predictably under the rule of law
• Must be transparent, publicly debated, and widely
• Embed principles of autonomy, privacy, transparency, accountability, and least
• Include Collective Rights to Social Determinants of Health such as safe drinking water, sanitation, nutrition and housing at the very least.
• Explicitly provide right to universal, free health care services that includes free diagnostics, free treatment and free drugs for ALL citizens for ALL health conditions without any conditions or exceptions.
• Prevent any role of private/ corporate entities in planning, regulating, monitoring or provisioning of public health care services
• Explicitly list violations of citizens’ health, health care and patient rights with clear redressal and enforcement mechanisms with proportionate penalties.

• Regulate unnecessary tests, procedures, referrals, bribes, negligence, and staff
• Clarify responsibility for service delivery
• Prevent sabotage by regulated
• Apply Siracusa principles to limit state power during emergencies
• Cap the costs of drugs and treatment in private/ corporate entities and enforce evidence based, standardised government protocols for treatment of diseases of public health importance.

How Karnataka government perceives health rights

A government draft Karnataka Right to Health and Emergency Medical Services Bill 2025 has been circulating, without any due process of public consultation and mostly borrowed from the Rajasthan Right to Health Act (2022). Some activists in Karnataka have been clamoring for a replication of the Rajasthan Right to Health Act without investing too much thought into whether this is what Karnataka requires.

This critique by Karnataka Janaarogya Chaluvali (KJC) illustrates that the draft Bill for Karnataka neither protects the public health system not citizens’ health care rights. Instead, it seems to legitimise large scale privatisation with a predominant focus on empanelling hospitals for emergency medical care and outsourcing ambulance services to any entity that ‘volunteers’ to do so.

The Preamble of the draft Bill invokes Articles 47 and 21 of the Constitution claiming to commit to providing “protection and fulfilment of rights and equity in health and well-being”, “free accessible health care for all residents of the State with the progressive reduction in out of pocket expenditure in seeking, accessing or receiving health care’ and “to provide for the people of Karnataka rights to health including emergency Health services with participation of stake holders and people for realization of people’s right to health services”.

In the case of Pt. Parmanand Katara vs Union of India & Ors on August 28, 1989, the Supreme Court has quoted the Constitutional mandate of the state to preserve life and obliging every doctor (government and medical institutions) to protect life. The Indian Medical Council Act (1860) and Indian Medical Council/Code of medical ethics also state the importance of immediate medical aid in all cases. No law or State action can intervene to avoid or delay these paramount obligations of the medical profession and all standards of care and quality must be upheld while doing so. Doctorscannot put the life of a patient at stake while waiting for fees to be paid. The Karnataka Private Medical Establishments (KPME) Act further reaffirms this mandate. Indeed, there can be no Right

to health without the intrinsic right to emergency healthcare1, so it is unclear why this has to be specified separately as the Karnataka Right to Health and Emergency Medical Services Bill 2025.

Vague definitions and commitments defeat the purpose of a law

The Karnataka draft bill and the Rajasthan Right to Health Act have failed to use standardised globally accepted definitions related to public health and therefore leave wide room for (mis)interpretation, going against the very principle of a good law. Defining public health as “the health of the population, as a whole especially as monitored, regulated, and promoted by the Government” is not only inadequate but also mischievous because it leaves out the crucial term “provisioned” absolving the state from being primary provider.

“health care”, taken verbatim from the watered down Rajasthan Health Act is defined as “testing, treatment, care, procedures and any other service or intervention towards a preventative, promotive, therapeutic, diagnostic, nursing, rehabilitative, palliative, convalescent, research and/or other health related purpose or combinations thereof, including reproductive health care and emergency medical treatment, in any system of medicines, and also included any of these as a result of participation in a medical research program”. Including health research into the definition of healthcare has many implications. Similarly the term “government funded healthcare services” legalises handing over funds to NGOs and private entities further absolving the government from its own Constitutional responsibilities.

The draft further reduces public health to a scheme (Karnataka Scheme of Public Health) with the planned State Health Authority (SHA) being expected to ensure availability, not of comprehensive health care or health, but only “medical services” free of cost, not to all, but only to “eligible patients”. Public health rights must include social determinants of health such as water, sanitation, nutrition, housing etc and include not just related to curative care services.

The SHA is expected to oversee medical, clinical, and social audits; hear all appeals against decision of District /city Health Authority; empanel private medical establishments and outsource ambulance services. It is not clear why a regulatory body should be carrying out executive functions like empanelment of private, placing the Suvarna Arogya Suraksha Trust (SAST) Executive Director as member-secretary of the SHA. SAST is an autonomous body with representatives of empanelled private hospitals on its Board and conflict of interest. Typically, the Director of Health and Family Welfare should be the member secretary of state level regulatory bodies.

Further, the corresponding District /city Health Authority includes the IMA as member. It is not clear what a member of the IMA is doing in a district level regulatory body which also hears people’s grievances. IMA members also have their own hospitals in the district. How can a legislation allow such a conflict of interest?

Grievance redressal

An aggrieved person should first approach the concerned person within the health care institution. If their complaint does not get resolved or if the person is not satisfied with the action taken by the health care institution, then she may approach the District Health Authority. Finally, an appeal can be made to the SHA and the latter should look into the matter and resolve it. There don’t seem to be any serious consequences of violating the provisions of the Bill apart from “a fine up-to rupees ten thousand for the first contravention, and up-to rupees twenty-five thousand for the subsequent contraventions”. Thus, human life is reduced to a few thousand rupees on the pretext of grievance redressal!

Finance

As per Chapter 6 and 8 of the draft Bill, the SHA will receive INR 100 crores as token fund from the state government to be used as corpus fund. The SHA as well as the District/ City authority can to raise its own funds not only through government bodies but also receive “donations” from any “individuals or body”. Isn’t it obvious that if individuals or groups donate funds then they will have a stake in the functioning of this regulatory body? These bodies can also borrow money from the open market for carrying out its activities. So the government will set up a regulatory body which the government itself will be unable to fund? How is the government expected to have any kind of control over this regulatory body? Further, the accounts of these agencies will be accounted by auditors appointed by themselves. While audited accounts have to be placed before the state legislature, it does not mention if it will be audited by the CAG. These provisions make the government’s intent highly suspect and does not infuse any confidence that the government has citizens’ interest in mind.

No real commitment to Right to Health or Emergency services

In this draft Bill, the government primarily commits to a Right to Information, a right to free OPD services and IPD consultations at public health institutions “accordantly to their level of health care as may be prescribed by rules made under this Act” and “emergency treatment and care for accidental emergency, emergency due to snake bite/animal bite and any other emergency decided by State Health Authority under prescribed emergency circumstances, without prepayment of requisite fee or charges including prompt and necessary emergency medical treatment and critical care, emergency obstetric treatment and care, by any public health institution, health care establishment and empanelled health care centres, qualified to provide such care or treatment accordantly to their level of health care, promptly as prescribed or as per guidelines and in a case of medico-legal nature of case, no health care provider or health care establishment shall delay treatment merely on the grounds of receiving police clearance or a police report”

Further it states that “Provided that after proper emergency care, stabilisation and transfer of patient, if patient does not pay requisite charges, healthcare provider shall be entitled to receive requisite fee and charges or proper reimbursement from State Government in prescribed manner as the case may be”. The statement ‘if the patient does not pay’ implies that payment by the patient is the first option and only if that does not happen, there will be reimbursement by the State.

The clause in the Act that emergency medical services means “any reasonable measure to render first-aid, advise or assistance to an injured person of an accident or incident of crime or any other emergency” is alarming. A private entity no matter how well equipped is now (by definition) allowed to wash its hands off by simply providing first aid, advice or assistance. This is no more than what anyone on the street can do if trained in basic first aid. It absolves private medical professionals and institutions from any kind of moral or ethical obligation to a patient in an emergency.

The bill says that to “stabilise” means the “rendering of any immediate emergency care of the injured person as may be necessary to assure within reasonable medical probability, that no material deterioration of

the condition of such injured person is likely to result from or occurred during the transfer of such injured person from one hospital to another, where such appropriate facilities are available to render the requisite treatment” goes against the Supreme court directive in the case of Pt. Parmanand Katara vs Union Of India & Ors on 28 August, 1989 where preserving life by the health professional and the State is over reaching. Terms like ‘as maybe necessary to assure within reasonable medical probability’ will not hold up in a court of law and will allow negligence to be absolved. Further emergencies happen to anyone in the state – visitor or resident. The language of “eligible individual and eligible households” being brought into emergency services is concerning. Are people now expected to carry identification documents or money for healthcare emergencies everywhere they go?

Other Provisions in the Bill

Karnataka Bill has two chapters dedicated to Empanelled Hospitals (Chapter 9) and Requirements of Ambulances (Chapter 10). Chapter 9 is about empanelling private hospitals for “providing or directing the life support system or limited life support system and pre-hospital care system to provide Health care facility and treatment under Government Funded Scheme”. It is not clear what the terms “directing life support”, “life- support system”, “limited life support system” and “pre-hospital care” even mean. With funds from the government, empanelled hospitals will set up emergency departments in their respective facilities without clearly stating what their commitments and accountability mechanisms will be using government funds. District/ City Authority are expected to ensure availability of ambulances, ensure easy access to medical emergency services as also handing over ambulance services to “persons voluntarily registered”.

Conclusion

With the spate of new privatisation friendly healthcare policies, the state has moved further and further away from its core commitments. If the government of Karnataka is seriously invested in the health care, it needs to commit to sustained direct investment into government health care facilities at all levels (primary, secondary, tertiary and super-specialty); strengthened district and government medical colleges as the final referral point; a permanent and well-supported health workforce; strict regulation of private providers; transparent data reporting; and, accessible and enforceable grievance redressal mechanisms. Instead the government breezes over all of these in its draft Bill and instead undermine citizens’ health rights, public accountability, and the core principles of public health.

In the Karnataka State Integrated Health Policy in 2004 and later again in 2017, the state had committed to quality healthcare with a focus on equity, accountability, community participation to improve health and well-being of ALL the people of Karnataka and reducing health disparities.

The vision foregrounded the social determinants of health and Constitutional mandates thus foregrounding health within which healthcare is situated.

Any law that legalises privatisation (public private partnerships, health insurance, contracting) will only further drain public resources will leaving patients at the mercy of market vagaries.

Unless there is a core commitment by the government to revisit these mandates, a law can only be toothless and an ineffective band aid for optics. It is time that the citizens of the state play a more informed role in demanding for our health rights.

The Draft Bill may be read here.

Related:

Labour rights, health of workers hit in the name of “reform”: PUCL Maharashtra

Why health and sex education for young is crucial: Supreme Court

ASHA workers, Anganwadi workers and sanitation workers overlooked in India’s healthcare protection reforms

The post Healthcare in Karnataka: Is a Health Bill the Need of the Hour? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

At the heart of the controversy is the Special Intensive Revision –SIR — a revised method of updating electoral rolls first deployed in Bihar, suddenly since June 2025. In a sharply worded joint statement, activists allege that SIR is not an administrative exercise but a tool that has disenfranchised lakhs of legitimate voters, fundamentally altering electoral outcomes. Political Economist and husband of Finance Minister Nirmala Sitaraman, Mr Parkala Prabhakar said speaking to TNIE said, `The SIR process “bears no resemblance” to the voter-roll revision system introduced in 2003. This statement by these NGOs from across the nation points out that additions and deletions were made to the voter list with “focused intent,” possibly manipulation engineered to benefit ruling-party candidates.” In a rare show of solidarity with state-level grievances, the groups declared, “We stand with the People of Bihar in rejecting the election results.”

Earlier in August 2025, the Vote for Democracy had released its preliminary analysis of discrepancies in the Bihar SIR. This may be viewed below.

This time, these groups have also directed criticism at Opposition parties, accusing them of participating in elections conducted under the SIR framework even as they protested against it. The statement argues that by doing so, Opposition parties have inadvertently lent credibility to what the groups call a “fraudulently elected government.” It further notes that despite large-scale mobilisation during movements such as the Voter Adhikar Yatra, the Opposition has failed to build durable alliances with grassroots civil society networks. The Election Commission has come under its most severe civil society criticism in recent years. The statement accuses the Commission of: firstly, “disregarding its constitutional mandate,” secondly, becoming “an assaulter, not a protector, of electoral integrity,” and thirdly of “losing its legitimacy under its current leadership.”

The signatories pledged to push for a non-partisan and transparent Commission, indicating that an organised campaign may be in the works. Civil society groups have warned that the SIR process is now slated for rollout in 12 more states, raising fears of further large-scale voter disenfranchisement. Their slogan — “No rightful voter left behind” — is emerging as a rallying point for activists preparing for legal, political and public mobilisation.

The statement has drawn support from a broad cross-section of society, including retired judges, senior civil servants, economists, farmers’ organisations, teachers’ groups, technologists, Jesuit institutions, artists and student networks. Prominent signatories include: Justice B. Sudershan Reddy (Retd., Supreme Court), Devasahayam M.G. (Retd. IAS), Dr Parakala Prabhakar, Political Economist, Tushar Gandhi, Activist, Meena Gupta (Retd. IAS), Thomas Franco, Voters Rights Movement, Justice Shankar K.G.,K. Ramachandra Murthy, Former Editor, Their combined presence signals an emerging nationwide civil society front preparing to challenge the SIR’s expansion. Senior IAS retired MG Devasahayam speaking to TNIE said, “How can we call this Bihar election fair by any stretch of imagination.”

As the ECI fends off unprecedented scrutiny, the Opposition faces questions about its strategy, and civil society groups mount coordinated pressure campaigns, India appears headed for a high-stakes confrontation over electoral integrity. The statement ends with a stark warning — and a pledge:

Related:

Vote for Democracy: Statistical, legal and procedural irregularities dot Bihar’s controversial SIR process

Vote for Democracy: Statistical, legal and procedural irregularities dot Bihar’s controversial SIR process

The post Civil society warns, Election Commission is “Undermining Democracy” appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The conspiracy unveiled

Initial investigation began after the school’s headmaster, Suleman Gorinaik, filed a complaint with the Saundatti police station when several students complained of nausea and a foul smell in the drinking water. Prompt medical attention helped avert a major tragedy, and all affected students recovered quickly, according to Superintendent of Police Bheemashankar S. Guled, as per the TNM report.

As the investigation progressed, police discovered that the school’s water tank had been intentionally poisoned with pesticides. Surveillance, forensic evidence, and witness accounts led to the arrest of three individuals on August 2:

• Sagar Patil, taluk president of the Hindutva outfit Sri Ram Sene in Saundatti,
• Krishna Madar, a local resident coerced into participation, and
• Magangouda Patil, an accomplice who assisted in procuring the poison.

According to SP Guled, the entire plot was masterminded by Sagar Patil, who allegedly sought to have Headmaster Gorinaik transferred or suspended from his post, motivated purely by communal animosity. Gorinaik, a respected educator who had served the school for 13 years, was well-liked by the local community, a fact that did not sit well with certain hard-line elements, according to the report of TOI.

A child manipulated

According to the Indian Express, police investigations revealed that Krishna Madar, acting under Patil’s direction, had purchased three types of pesticides, mixed them, and transferred the toxic concoction into a soft drink bottle. He then handed this bottle to a minor student, luring the child with Rs 500, chocolates, and condiments, and instructed him to empty the contents into the school’s drinking water tank. The minor, unaware of the gravity of the act, complied.

The police have confirmed that the soft drink bottle was recovered from the crime scene, and forensic analysis detected traces of insecticide inside. The minor child will now serve as a prosecution witness under legal protection, given his vulnerable status, as per TNM.

Blackmail and coercion

One of the most disturbing elements of the investigation is the role of blackmail in furthering the conspiracy. Police have stated that Sagar Patil coerced Krishna Madar into participating by threatening to reveal his inter-faith romantic relationship. According to the Belagavi SP, Patil weaponised communal shame and social stigma around inter-faith relationships to push Madar into executing a dangerous plot that endangered the lives of children, as per The Hindu.

Arrests and legal action

All three conspirators, Sagar Patil, Krishna Madar, and Magangouda Patil, have been arrested and remanded to judicial custody. Belagavi police have invoked stringent provisions under criminal law to charge the accused with criminal conspiracy, attempt to cause grievous hurt, poisoning, and endangering life, among others.

The minor student, whose role was manipulated, will not face charges and is being treated as a victim in the broader scheme, as per media reports.

Chief Minister’s strong condemnation

Karnataka Chief Minister Siddaramaiah took to social media to strongly condemn the incident, describing it as a “heinous” and “unforgivable” act rooted in religious bigotry. “The headmaster of the government school in Hulikatti village, Savadatti taluk, Belagavi district, belongs to the Muslim community. With the malicious intent of having him transferred elsewhere, Sagar Patil, the taluk president of Shriram Sena, along with two others, has been arrested for poisoning the drinking water of school children. In this incident that occurred 15 days ago, several children fell ill, but fortunately, no lives were lost,” he stated in a post on X dated August 3.

“Religious fundamentalism and communal hatred can lead to heinous acts, and this incident, which could have resulted in the massacre of innocent children, is a testament to that. In the land of the Sharanas, who proclaimed, “Compassion is the root of religion,” how could such cruelty and hatred arise? Even at this moment, I cannot believe it,” the CM wrote, expressing disbelief that such hatred could manifest in Karnataka, “the land of the Sharanas” — a reference to the state’s egalitarian cultural heritage.

Taking aim at the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Siddaramaiah further questioned whether senior BJP figures — including Sri Ram Sene chief Pramod Mutalik, BJP State President B.Y. Vijayendra, and Leader of Opposition R. Ashoka — would take moral responsibility for the acts perpetrated by those aligned with Hindutva ideologies. “Leaders who always support such socially destructive acts should now come forward and atone for their sins,” he declared.

A call to action against hate

The CM also highlighted the formation of a special task force to counter hate speech and prevent communal riots. “To curb hate speeches and communal riots, we have formed a special task force, and we are taking all possible legal measures against such elements. For all our efforts to bear fruit, the public must also raise their voices against such forces, resist them, and file complaints,” Siddaramaiah stated, urging citizens to report such conspiracies, resist communal forces, and stand up against sectarianism.

He concluded by praising the local police, especially the Belagavi team, for swiftly uncovering the conspiracy. “Congratulations to the police personnel who foiled the evil plot to massacre children. I have full confidence that the judicial system will deliver appropriate punishment to the culprits who committed such a heinous act”.

The complete post may be read here: 

ಬೆಳಗಾವಿ ಜಿಲ್ಲೆಯ ಸವದತ್ತಿ ತಾಲೂಕಿನ ಹೂಲಿಕಟ್ಟಿ ಗ್ರಾಮದ ಸರ್ಕಾರಿ ಶಾಲೆಯ ಮುಖ್ಯೋಪಾಧ್ಯಾಯರು ಮುಸ್ಲಿಂ ಸಮುದಾಯಕ್ಕೆ ಸೇರಿದವರು, ಅವರನ್ನು ತಮ್ಮ ಊರಿನಿಂದ ಬೇರೆಡೆಗೆ ವರ್ಗಾವಣೆ ಮಾಡಿಸಬೇಕೆಂಬ ದುರುದ್ದೇಶದಿಂದ ಶಾಲಾಮಕ್ಕಳ ಕುಡಿಯುವ ನೀರಿಗೆ ವಿಷ ಹಾಕಿದ ಶ್ರೀರಾಮ ಸೇನೆಯ ತಾಲೂಕು ಅಧ್ಯಕ್ಷ ಸಾಗರ ಪಾಟೀಲ ಸೇರಿದಂತೆ ಒಟ್ಟು ಮೂವರನ್ನು…

— Siddaramaiah (@siddaramaiah) August 3, 2025

SP Guled had noted that the police solved the case using a combination of scientific evidence, interrogation of students, and surveillance records.

Conclusion

The poisoning plot in Belagavi is a stark reminder of how hate-driven ideology can metastasize into lethal violence, even targeting children. The police’s timely intervention prevented what could have been a mass poisoning. But the incident raises larger questions about the rise of communal vigilantism, the weaponisation of school spaces, and the moral decay that accompanies unchecked religious extremism.

Related:

“Sambhal: Anatomy of an Engineered Crisis”- How a peaceful Muslim-majority town was turned into a site of manufactured communal conflict

Bengal arrests expose communal plot by members of Santani Ekta Manch, Punjab sees similar incident

Anatomy of Nagpur Riots: A communal bio politics that thrives on the graded inequalities of religion, gender and caste(s)

‘High-Handed, violation of the SC orders’: Bombay HC pulls up Nagpur Civic Body for demolishing homes of accused in communal violence

The post Communal Conspiracy in Karnataka School: Sri Ram Sene leader orchestrates poisoning to target Muslim headmaster appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Far from protecting the public, this Bill—if enacted—would allow the government to arrest, prosecute, and imprison users for social media posts deemed false, disrespectful, anti-feminist, or culturally inappropriate, without clear definitions, independent oversight, or constitutional safeguards.

A bill rooted in executive power, not due process nor public dialogue

The Bill’s legislative process betrays its undemocratic spirit. Though the Congress government had promised action against fake news in its 2023 manifesto, no draft was publicly released, no white paper issued, and no consultation held with journalists, civil society, or digital rights experts took place before the introduction of such a proposed law.

Instead, as reported by the Deccan Herald on June 20, 2025, details emerged through a leak, revealing shocking provisions: up to 7 years’ imprisonment, ₹10 lakh fines, non-bailable offences, and a new Authority chaired by the Information Minister to regulate speech on social media (Deccan Herald, 20 June 2025). The News Minute corroborated that the draft criminalises “anti-feminist” content and “disrespect of Sanatan symbols”.

This clandestine process stands in stark contrast to international best practices, where media regulation is subject to extensive parliamentary debate, judicial scrutiny, and civil society participation.

Analysis of the Bill

I. Vague, overbroad, and unconstitutional definitions

 A. Misinformation and Fake News: Undefined danger zones

The Bill defines “misinformation” (Section 2(k)) as a knowingly or recklessly false or inaccurate statement of fact, excluding satire or opinion—unless a “reasonable man” might mistake it for truth. This subjective test invites arbitrary enforcement.

The term “fake news” (Section 2(i)) covers misquotations, distorted videos, and fabrications, but offers no harm threshold or proof requirement. While the harm these phenomena cause is real, the Bill fails to set clear thresholds for harm or intention. Even minor inaccuracies or parodic edits could potentially attract criminal liability, creating a chilling effect on journalism, activism, and online discourse.

This echoes the unconstitutional vagueness that led the Supreme Court to strike down Section 66A of the IT Act in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), where terms like “offensive” and “menacing” were ruled too vague to be the basis for arrest and prosecution.

The Karnataka Bill repeats the same error, criminalising falsehood without requiring intent to deceive, incite, or defame, contrary to both domestic precedent and global free speech norms.

B. Unconstitutional grounds for speech restriction

Section 3 criminalises misinformation that is “public health, public safety, public tranquillity or the conduct of free and fair elections.” These terms, especially public tranquillity, health, or fair elections, are not defined in the Bill, nor are they part of the constitutionally permissible grounds under Article 19(2) for restricting speech. Even “public tranquillity” is broader and vaguer than “public order”, the actual constitutional category.

In S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989), the Court warned that mere discomfort or offense cannot justify censorship, by providing that anticipated danger should not be remote, conjectural or far-fetched. However, the Karnataka Bill violates this standard.

II. Criminalising Falsehood: Disproportionate and draconian 

A. Harsh jail terms for speech offences

The Bill introduces harsh criminal penalties:

• Section 3(2): 2–5 years’ imprisonment for misinformation.
• Section 7: Up to 7 years’ jail and ₹10 lakh fine for “fake news” posted on social media.
• Section 12: All offences are non-bailable and cognisable.

This is a stunning escalation from existing laws; these are staggering penalties for speech-based offences, harsher than for some forms of assault or property crime. Even defamation, under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023, carries a maximum 2-year sentence. Thus, under the new Bill, an inaccurate tweet or edited meme can trigger a multi-year jail term.

B. Bail denied, presumption of innocence reversed

The offences are made cognisable and non-bailable (Section 12). This means police can arrest without a warrant and courts can deny bail unless the accused proves innocence at the pre-trial stage—effectively reversing the presumption of innocence. Additionally, Section 12 makes it nearly impossible to secure bail. If the Special Public Prosecutor opposes release, the Court must find the accused “not guilty” at the pre-trial stage to grant bail, reversing the presumption of innocence, and creating a perverse system where accusation is equal to incarceration.

This turns pre-trial procedure into punishment, especially in a country where cases can drag on for years. Such disproportionate penalties violate the doctrine of proportionality; a central tenet of Article 19(2) jurisprudence affirmed in Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) and Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020). A democratic state cannot punish false speech, absent incitement, with the same severity as grave bodily crimes.

III. Politicised censorship through a minister-led “authority” 

A. Executive-only regulator with no safeguards

The core of the Bill is the creation of a Fake News on Social-Media Regulatory Authority (Section 5), chaired by the Minister for Kannada and Culture and comprised mainly of government nominees and industry reps, with no independent experts, civil society members, or judicial oversight. This political body is empowered to decide what constitutes truth, ban content, and recommend prosecution.

Notably absent: journalists, academics, fact-checkers, lawyers, civil society, or independent experts.

This Authority is empowered (Section 6) to:

• Ban content it deems “fake” or “anti-feminist”,
• Block posts that “disrespect Sanatan symbols and beliefs”,
• Permit only “authentic research” on “science, history, religion, philosophy, and literature”.

Nowhere does the Bill define these ideological or cultural categories. As courts have long held, laws restricting speech must be viewpoint-neutral. But here, the Authority becomes a cultural gatekeeper, with the power to censor satire, dissent, and critique based on subjective moral and political filters.

B. Echoes of the Kunal Kamra case

This mirrors the controversial Union Government’s “Fact Checking Unit” (FCU) challenged in Kunal Kamra v. Union of India, where the Bombay High Court had held that empowering an executive body to define truth undermines Article 19(1)(a) and violates principles of neutrality and procedural fairness, and stated that the government cannot be the judge of its own cause when the disputed speech criticises it.

IV. Sanatan Symbols and Anti-Feminism: Ideology masquerading as law

Section 6(b)–(e) mandates banning content that:

• Is “anti-feminist”,
• “Insults female dignity”,
• “Disrespects Sanatan symbols and beliefs”,
• “Promotes superstition”.

These phrases are neither defined nor legally established. For instance, what qualifies as anti-feminist? A critique of gender roles in mythology? A conservative view on family structure?

Similarly, “Sanatan symbols” is a term laden with majoritarian political weight, which is increasingly being invoked to assert Hindu nationalist identity, not just traditional values. By criminalising “disrespect” of such vague and religiously charged symbols, the Bill directly shields majoritarian ideology from critique, violating the secular and pluralist framework of the Constitution.

V. Lack of due process, oversight, and appeal 

A. No notice, no hearing, no remedy

The Bill does not require the Authority to notify or hear the accused before blocking content. There is no requirement for transparency, publishing reasons, or independent appeal. Section 13 empowers Special Courts to issue Correction or Disabling Directions to publishers and platforms based on FIRs. But neither the Authority nor the Court is required to:

• Issue a notice to the accused content creator,
• Hold a hearing before takedown,
• Publish orders or provide reasoned justification.

Only after the order is issued can an aggrieved person approach the same court for variation or cancellation (Section 13(3)), with a final appeal to the High Court under tight timelines (Section 13(4)). Even the appeals mechanism is narrow: only final orders can be appealed to the High Court within 60 days, placing heavy procedural burdens on social media users and journalists to challenge wrongful censorship.

The authority essentially operates in secrecy, and the Special Court’s role is post-facto and limited. This violates every principle of natural justice and prior notice, cornerstones of procedural fairness affirmed repeatedly by Indian courts.

VI. Threat to platforms and safe harbour protections

Section 15 extends liability to companies, intermediaries, and publishers. Their officers may face prosecution unless they can prove they lacked knowledge or took due diligence steps—creating reverse burden of proof.

This undermines the safe harbour principle under Section 79 of the IT Act, where intermediaries are not liable for user-generated content if they act on lawful takedown notices. Here, the spectre of criminal liability will force platforms to over-censor content—resulting in private censorship of public speech. Satirical posts, dissent, or unpopular political views may be purged in fear of triggering the law, thereby silencing democratic debate.

VII. “Good Faith” as a shield for abuse

Section 20 of the Karnataka Fake News Bill provides blanket immunity to the State Government, local authorities, and any government officer for “anything done in good faith” under the Act or its rules and orders. On the face of it, such a clause is standard in many laws. But in the context of this vague, punitive, and executive-driven framework, it becomes a shield for arbitrary and unconstitutional action, with zero accountability.

VIII. What the global standard looks like

Unlike Karnataka’s criminalised model, democratic countries pursue platform accountability and structural transparency, not punitive censorship:

• EU’s Digital Services Act (2024): No criminalisation of misinformation. Platforms must assess and mitigate risks, adjust algorithms, and comply with independent Trusted Flaggers.
• France’s Anti-Disinformation Law (2018): Limited to election periods; takedown orders must come from courts, not executive bodies.

By contrast, the Karnataka Bill places criminal liability on individuals, includes ideological filters, and offers unchecked power to executive actors. No major democracy allows a Minister to declare content fake and imprison users. The Karnataka Bill is dangerously out of step.

Conclusion: Scrap this bill, start over

India does face a disinformation crisis. But the response must not be to turn the state into an arbiter of truth with the power to imprison dissenters. Karnataka’s Misinformation and Fake News Bill, 2025 is not a regulatory framework. It is a blueprint for censorship, criminalisation of dissent, and ideological control of speech. It violates:

• Article 19(1)(a): Free speech and expression
• Article 14: Equality before law
• Article 21: Due process and personal liberty

The Karnataka Misinformation and Fake News (Prohibition) Bill, 2025, as it stands, is an overbroad, punitive, and ideologically skewed instrument that undermines both democracy and digital rights. If enacted, it will severely chill journalism, satire, dissent, research, and digital activism. The right to speak will survive in name, but be rationed in practice.

The complete bill may be accessed below.

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The post Weaponising Truth: A critical analysis of the Karnataka Misinformation and Fake News (Prohibition) Bill, 2025 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The struggle reached a new inflection point on July 4, 2025, when representatives of the Anti-Land Acquisition Struggle Committee and allied platforms met with Chief Minister Siddaramaiah, who sought 10 more days to find a “legal pathway” to undo the final land acquisition notification issued in April 2025. 

The next meeting, slated for July 15, is widely viewed as a deadline for the state government to keep its word or brace for a massive escalation of protests across Karnataka.

The land at the heart of the storm

The land in question is not barren. The Deccan Herald report provides that the said land is fertile, multi-cropped, and irrigated, producing grains, vegetables, fruits, flowers, silk, and milk for nearby Bengaluru’s food markets. According to the report of The Hindu, for farmers like Jagadish of Polanahalli, who lost 2 acres in an earlier phase, this land is not just property—it is memory, meaning, and sustenance. Today, he works as a farm labourer on what used to be his own farm. “Now they want to take the remaining 1.5 acres. I would rather die than lose this again,” he said while speaking to The Hindu.

This sentiment is echoed throughout the 13 villages. Over 95% of families have rejected the acquisition, citing not only the emotional and economic cost but also the legal violations involved in their open letter to CM, sent on June 24, 2025). According to the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, consent from 70–80% of landowners is mandatory for such acquisitions. Surveys indicate that more than 80% of affected farmers have not consented, as per Deccan Herald.

According to the report of New Indian Express, farmers also allege that of the 1,282 acres acquired in an earlier phase, much of the land has either remained unused or been diverted to private builders and educational institutions like Brigade Builders (73 acres), Chanakya University (116 acres), and IFFCO Nano Urea (13 acres).

Broken promises and state betrayals

In September 2022, then-Leader of Opposition Siddaramaiah stood with these very farmers at Freedom Park, beside a symbolic peepal sapling, and promised to cancel the land acquisition if the Congress came to power. As per the report of Deccan Herald, that plant was brought back to Channarayapatna and rooted in village soil—a living reminder of that assurance.

But in April 2025, the Congress-led government issued the final notification, effectively greenlighting the acquisition. The backlash was swift. On June 25, thousands marched in a ‘Devanahalli Chalo’ rally. The police responded with brutality—beating, detaining, and harassing protesters. Shockingly, the crackdown occurred on the 50th anniversary of the Emergency.

The Indian Express’ report highlighted the plight of 1omen like Yangtamma, who spent ₹8–9 lakh to plant pomegranates on her 5.5-acre farm, now fear their life’s work will be bulldozed. “The government calls this development. I call it destruction,” she said, while speaking to media. 

“This Land is Our Life”: The protesters speak

At the heart of the movement is a moral and existential cry: “This land is our life. Without it, we are nothing.”

Raghu M, who grows sandalwood on 10 acres, says his parents’ samadhi lies on that land. “If it is taken, I will die by suicide next to it,” he told Indian Express. Gopinath A.S., another protester, explained how he was denied a borewell NOC because of the acquisition plan. “If we lose this land, we’ll end up as gatekeepers and gardeners in those factories. We know nothing else,” he added, as per the IE report.

Jagadish, who lost land in 2018, received ₹80 lakh, two years late, after paying 25% in bribes. Now he cannot afford a plot in his own village, the report of The Hindu highlights. 

Despite being offered exclusion from acquisition, farmers from three spared villages continue to protest in solidarity. “Until all 13 villages are dropped, we fight together,” said Lakshmamma from Nallapanahalli told Indian Express.

Legal violations and socio-economic threats

Experts and activists have pointed that the acquisition violates the Karnataka SC/ST Land Transfer Prohibition Act, 1978, since over 160 SC/ST families, many of them land grantees, stand to be rendered landless as per the Deccan Herald. Of 800 affected families, 387 will lose their only landholding.

Food security is also at stake. Farmers warn that Devanahalli supplies vegetables, dairy, and flowers to Bengaluru. Already, milk output in Mattabaralu has halved following earlier land losses, as reported by The Hindu.

Solidarity: A growing people’s alliance

This movement now receives a wide web of solidarity. On July 1, the Karnataka Muslim Muttahida Mahaz (KMMM) marched to Freedom Park. Convenor Masood Abdul Qadir declared the struggle “legitimate and morally binding,” reminding the Congress to uphold its promises to farmers, Dalits, and minorities, as per Clarion India.

Top Muslim clerics and scholars joined hands with farmer leaders from across Karnataka, forming an unprecedented inter-community front for land justice. “This is not just about soil. It’s about dignity,” said Muhammad Yusuf Kani of Jamaat-e-Islami Hind to Clarion India.

Meanwhile, over 30 public intellectuals, including Ramachandra Guha, Madhura Swaminathan, and T.N. Prakash Kammarad, issued an open letter to Bengaluru’s corporate and tech leaders, demanding they speak out, according to The Hindu report. The letter also cited CAG Audit Report No. 8 of 2017, which had flagged irregularities in KIADB land dealings.

Countdown to July 15: Decision or conflagration?

The Struggle Committee, following the July 4 meeting, agreed to wait until July 15 for a final response. But the warning is clear: if the government fails to cancel the notification, the agitation will intensify across the state, possibly with Samyukta Kisan Morcha’s national support, their Joint Statement provided.

On July 9, the farmers’ demand will be included in the nationwide workers’ strike, linking agrarian justice with labour rights.

In the meantime, awareness campaigns, village meetings, and signboards reading “Our Land, Our Right” will be installed across Channarayapatna hobli, according to the said join statement released by them.

Beyond Devanahalli: A national reckoning

The Devanahalli struggle forces us to ask: Who benefits from development? And who pays its price?

“This movement is different,” said activist Mallige, while speaking with Deccan Herald, adding that “It speaks not of land prices but of land preservation, one that holds farming as dignity and future”.

In its endurance, its unity, and its moral clarity, the Devanahalli movement has become a mirror to India’s growth model- one that too often replaces food security with concrete and memory with profit.

The farmers are clear: “We are not giving up. This land is not for sale. This land is life.”

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The post Development or dispossession? 1,188 days of defiance against forced land acquisition in Devanahalli, Karnataka appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This action comes in the wake of two recent murders that sparked communal tensions in the coastal region. The externment measures are intended to restrict these individuals from entering designated areas for a specified period, thereby aiming to maintain public order and prevent further unrest.

The individuals in question are linked to multiple police station jurisdictions, including Bantwal, Vittal, Puttur Town and Rural, Kadaba, Sullia, Uppinangady, Punjalkatte, and Belthangady. The proceedings are being carried out under Section 55 of the Karnataka Police Act, which empowers the police to initiate preventive action against those deemed a threat to public peace and safety.

In the wake of recent communal killings in Dakshina Kannada, the police have barred 36 individuals, who belong to both communities and have troubled pasts, from entering the district under Section 55 of the Karnataka Police Act. This action is aimed at curbing unrest and… pic.twitter.com/Cxf7tKz2UU

— Ashish (@KP_Aashish) June 3, 2025

The list includes people from various parts of the district. They have been charged with assault, intimidation, extortion, and gang-related activities. The list comprises individuals aged between 22 and 54 from different parts of the district, all of whom have been booked for offences such as assault, intimidation, extortion, and involvement in gang-related activities.

Taking strict action to ensure peace in the region: Police

Arun K, Superintendent of Police, Dakshina Kannada, said, “We are taking strict action to ensure peace in the region. Externment is a preventive measure aimed at breaking the nexus of habitual offenders who pose a recurring threat to society” reported the Indian Express reported.

The police are in the process of serving notices, and hearings will be held in accordance with legal procedure before the orders are finalised, he said.

BJP Minister alleged Hindu leaders are being unfairly targeted under political pressure

Despite the list including individuals from both Hindu and Muslim communities, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has expressed concerns over what it alleges to be selective targeting. Union Minister of State for Labour and Employment, and Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises, Shobha Karandlaje, has written to the Chairman of the Police Complaints Authority, Justice N.K. Sudhindra Rao, claiming that Hindu leaders are being unfairly singled out under political pressure.

The minister its letter asserted that the action appears biased and urged the authority to review the externment proceedings to ensure they are free from political influence and carried out in a fair and transparent manner.

Shocking reports from Dakshina Kannada reveal targeted harassment of pro-Hindu citizens by police allegedly acting under political pressure from the Congress-led govt. Midnight raids, illegal surveillance & blatant abuse of power are being used as tools of political vendetta.… pic.twitter.com/eKJm3wk85V

— Shobha Karandlaje (@ShobhaBJP) June 3, 2025

She alleged that, “acting under political pressure from the Congress-led State Government, have been systematically targeting and harassing individuals associated with pro-Hindu organisations, social workers, traders, and even ordinary law-abiding civilians.”

Calling the situation “particularly alarming,” Karandlaje alleged that police officers have been visiting individuals’ homes late at night, photographing their residences, and recording GPS coordinates “without any legal warrants or just cause.”

She further added that these actions violate fundamental constitutional rights, including the right to privacy, the right to life under Article 21, and the right to equality under Article 14.

“This pattern of intimidation began shortly after the recent change in police leadership in Mangaluru,” she said, referencing the Karnataka government’s decision to transfer the Police Commissioner of Mangaluru city, along with the Superintendents of Police (SPs) of Dakshina Kannada and Udupi districts, in the wake of recent communal incidents.

Police initiated legal proceedings to extern BJP leader Arun Kumar Puthila

Additionally, in Dakshina Kannada district, police have initiated legal steps to extern BJP leader and Puthila Parivara head Arun Kumar Puthila, citing concerns about his impact on law and order in the region. Earlier, a formal notice had been served, requiring him to appear for a hearing on June 6. If he fails to do so, officials may proceed with an ex parte order, as per a report in the Hindustan Times.

The action is also being taken under Section 55 of the Karnataka Police Act. An official familiar with the matter said there are plans to relocate Puthila to the jurisdiction of Shahabad police station in Kalaburagi district. The notice, issued by the Puttur assistant commissioner, mentions that Puthila can be represented either in person or through a legal representative. The move reportedly stems from his past record of delivering inflammatory speeches, as reported

FIR registered against senior RSS leader Prabhakar Bhat for delivering provocative speech

As part of ongoing preventive measures, Dakshina Kannada police registered an FIR on June 2 against senior RSS leader Kalladka Prabhakar Bhat, accusing him of delivering a provocative speech during a condolence meeting held on May 12 for Suhas Shetty—a Hindutva activist and rowdy-sheeter who was recently killed on May 1 on a busy street in Mangaluru. Shetty was a prominent pro-right-wing youth leader associated with Bajrang Dal in Karnataka’s coastal belt.

According to The News Minute, the FIR details several of Prabhakar Bhat’s remarks. He reportedly said, “We don’t accept the killing of cows. So many of our youngsters have risen against that. They’re not rowdies; they’re patriots. They protect dharma (religion).”

The Hindu reports that the event took place at Madwa Palace Convention Hall in Kavalapadur village, under the jurisdiction of the Bantwal Rural Police Station. Authorities claim Bhat’s remarks were inflammatory and could spark communal unrest. The case has been filed under relevant section 353(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).

Interim relief for RSS leader after Hate Speech FIR

Just hours after the FIR for alleged hate speech was registered, RSS leader Prabhakar Bhat approached the Karnataka High Court, seeking to quash the case and halt further proceedings. In response, Justice S.R. Krishna Kumar granted interim relief, directing the police not to take any coercive action against him. The court also instructed Bhat to cooperate with the investigation and required the police to obtain judicial permission before filing a chargesheet.

Siddaramaiah government is anti-Hindu: BJP State President

Karnataka BJP President B.Y. Vijayendra launched a sharp attack on the Congress-led state government, accusing it of misusing the police force to target Hindu leaders for political gain. He alleged the administration was appeasing the Muslim community for electoral benefits while ignoring “anti-social elements.”

“In the coastal region, Hindu leaders and BJP workers are being deliberately harassed to intimidate Hindu activists,” Vijayendra said, claiming the state was silencing pro-Hindu voices and shielding others. He also criticised the swift transfer of senior police officers in Mangaluru following the murder of a Muslim truck driver, calling it a politically driven move.

“There’s a clear conspiracy to slap false cases on Hindu leaders and put them behind bars,” he added, denouncing FIRs and externment orders as “shameful attempts to stifle free speech.” He demanded the immediate withdrawal of all charges. “The FIR against more than 15 leaders of Hindu organisations, including Kalladka Prabhakar Bhat, must be cancelled, and the deportation order revoked. If not, the government alone will be responsible for the consequences,” he warned.

Commenting on the murder of right-wing leader Suhas Shetty, Vijayendra reiterated his stance, calling the Congress government “anti-Hindu” and alleging repeated attacks on Hindu activists. He said BJP leaders had appealed to Governor Thaawar Chand Gehlot for a central probe, and the Ministry of Home Affairs had since handed the case to the National Investigation Agency (NIA).

“BJP workers met the Governor and we demanded an investigation by the NIA, which the state government did not accept, but the Centre fortunately agreed to…” he stated in a report in the ANI.

BJP warns of agitation over alleged ‘targeting Hindu leaders’ in Dakshina Kannada

The BJP has warned of a protest against the Congress-led Karnataka government, accusing it of targeting Hindu leaders in Dakshina Kannada. This comes after an FIR was filed against RSS leader Kalladka Prabhakar Bhat for alleged hate speech and an externment notice was issued to BJP leader Arun Kumar Puttila, as per the Hindu reports.

Dakshina Kannada MP Capt. Brijesh Chowta criticised the Siddaramaiah government for misusing state machinery to harass and divide Hindu voices, claiming it was a cover-up for its administrative failures. He said he had spoken to the state police chief and would meet top police officials in Mangaluru on Tuesday along with other party leaders.

Former Minister and Karkala MLA V. Sunil Kumar accused the government of trying to enforce a “police raj” in Dakshina Kannada and Udupi, as reported

However, on June 3, BJP Dakshina Kannada district president Satish Kumpala also accused the Congress-led Karnataka government of misusing the police force to “mentally harass and demoralise Sangh Parivar activists by filing baseless cases against them” as per the report in the Hindu.

Speaking to the media after meeting City Police Commissioner Sudheer Kumar Reddy and Dakshina Kannada SP K. Arun—along with BJP MLAs and party leaders—Kumpala said the delegation had conveyed its strong displeasure over what they described as the police treating individuals associated with Hindu organisations as criminals.

Whether Hindu or Muslim, action will be taken only if someone breaks the law: Karnataka Home Minister

Responding to allegations of selective action, Karnataka Home Minister G. Parameshwara stated, “Whether Hindu or Muslim, action will be taken only if someone breaks the law. No one will be spared if they do something wrong.”

In a post on X, Parameshwara emphasised the government’s commitment to restoring peace and social harmony in the state, particularly in light of recent communal disturbances in Dakshina Kannada, Udupi, Uttara Kannada, and Shivamogga districts.

“We had promised to make Karnataka a garden of peace, and the people placed their trust in us,” he wrote. “Now, more than ever, there is a need to foster an environment of peace and unity.”

ಕರ್ನಾಟಕವನ್ನು ಸರ್ವಜನಾಂಗದ ಶಾಂತಿಯ ತೋಟವಾಗಿಸುವ ವಾಗ್ದಾನವನ್ನು ನಾಡಿನ ಜನತೆಗೆ ನಾವು ಚುನಾವಣಾ ಪೂರ್ವದಲ್ಲೇ ನೀಡಿದ್ದೆವು, ಅದರಂತೆ ಜನತೆ ನಮ್ಮ ಮೇಲೆ ವಿಶ್ವಾಸವಿಟ್ಟು ಬಹುಮತದ ಸರ್ಕಾರ ರಚನೆಗೆ ಅವಕಾಶ ನೀಡಿದ್ದಾರೆ.

ರಾಜ್ಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಶಾಂತಿ, ಸೌಹಾರ್ದತೆ ಮತ್ತು‌ ಸಾಮರಸ್ಯದ ವಾತಾವರಣವನ್ನು ನಿರ್ಮಾಣ ಮಾಡುವ ಅಗತ್ಯ ಎಂದಿಗಿಂತಲೂ ಈಗ… pic.twitter.com/JYtHiSZr8F

— DIPR Karnataka (@KarnatakaVarthe) May 30, 2025

He added that the government has taken serious note of incidents involving communal miscreants and has formed a special task force to address them. The force—carved out of the existing Naxal Suppression Unit—includes 248 personnel, led by a DGP and supported by officers across various ranks.

“Strict action will be taken against anyone who incites communal hatred, regardless of their religion or affiliation. The law will take its course,” he said.

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The post Karnataka Police’s massive crackdown on habitual hate offenders in Dakshina Kannada region appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A striking feature of the year’s events is the prevalence of moral policing, predominantly by Hindu vigilantes, accounting for 10 incidents, with three others involving unidentified groups. Religious conversion allegations also sparked tensions, though such incidents were limited to one case involving Hindu fundamentalists. The contentious issue of cattle vigilantism saw two reported cases, both allegedly carried out by Hindu vigilante groups.

Hate speech and hate crimes, both online and offline, emerged as a significant concern, with 27 incidents being reported. These included inflammatory remarks by Hindu fundamentalists in 15 cases, and 10 instances of hate speech proliferating via social media platforms. While Muslim fundamentalists were linked to two online hate incidents, the overwhelming majority of such activity was attributed to Hindu fundamentalist groups.

Attacks on places of worship were relatively rare in the coastal district of Karnataka but nonetheless symbolic of the communal fault lines, with one reported incident allegedly involving Hindu fundamentalists. Additionally, four other communal clashes or acts of violence were noted, including three attributed to Hindu fundamentalists and one to Muslim fundamentalists, with an unidentified group implicated in another.

These statistics offer a window into the persistent communal tensions in Karnataka’s coastal districts, underscoring the urgent need for proactive measures to foster harmony and curb the growing influence of vigilante groups. This report seeks to chronicle these incidents, not only to document the events of 2024 but also to highlight the socio-political conditions enabling such divisive activities. Through this report and this analysis, the aim is to contribute to ongoing efforts towards promoting peace and unity in this troubled region.

A comparison of the statistics of the current year with the previous year may be viewed here:

Incidents of moral policing

The report highlights a series of incidents in coastal Karnataka where moral policing and vigilantism were directed primarily against interfaith relationships. In Dharmasthala, an interfaith couple was harassed by locals and taken to the police station, though they were ultimately found to have committed no offence. Similarly, in Mangalore’s Kadri Park, three teenagers attacked a nursing student and his friend, recording and harassing them before being apprehended by the police.

In Puttur, a minor girl attending a local event was reportedly harassed by a youth of another faith, sparking a protest outside the police station by Hindutva activists demanding the youth be handed over. Meanwhile, at Panambur Beach in Mangalore, a woman meeting a friend was accosted by members of a Hindutva group who scolded the duo and filmed the incident.

Other incidents include the assault of a man and his mother in Kadaba for assisting a distressed woman, the repeated framing of consensual interfaith relationships as “love jihad,” and the targeting of couples travelling together, often leading to police involvement after interference by vigilante groups. These incidents underscore the region’s heightened communal tensions and the frequent intrusion of vigilante groups into personal matters.

Meanwhile, the right-wing Hindutva group Sri Ram Sena launched a controversial helpline to address so-called “love jihad” cases, aimed at interfaith relationships, particularly those involving Muslim men and Hindu women. The group claims that Hindu women are lured into relationships by Muslim men who allegedly aim to convert them. This initiative reflects a growing concern among certain segments of society about interfaith unions, and it has already stirred discussions regarding the involvement of law enforcement and whether such actions contribute to rising communal tensions.

In Sullia on January 12, 2024, a young man named Jostin Babu was beaten by a group of youths at a local temple fair after being seen talking to senior girl students from his college. This incident led to a complaint being filed at the Sullia police station. In a separate incident in Puttur on August 20, 2024, a minor girl was stabbed by a youth after she rejected his romantic advances. The assailant, with a history of conflicts, allegedly attacked her with a sharp object, leading to communal tensions as both individuals belonged to different communities. The girl was treated in hospital, and an investigation was launched under the POCSO Act.

Further investigation into the Puttur incident later revealed that the story may have been fabricated. CCTV footage contradicted the girl’s account, leading the police to question the authenticity of the claim. Some students also questioned the involvement of the accused boy, with certain groups offering support to his family, claiming the incident was being framed to stir communal unrest. A student organisation from the same college even demanded the suspension of the girl involved for making a false accusation.

These incidents highlight a complex intersection of personal conflicts, communal sensitivities, and societal divisions. Each case underscores the escalating tensions that are often fuelled by accusations and allegations involving different communities, further polarising the social fabric of India.

Patterns emerging from the incidents

1. Targeting of interfaith relationships: A clear pattern emerges of vigilantism directed against interfaith couples, particularly when one partner is a Muslim. Many of these incidents involve accusations of “love jihad,” with consensual relationships often being misconstrued as coercive or predatory. Such relationships are consistently framed as a threat to communal harmony, leading to harassment, public humiliation, and police involvement.
2. Role of Hindutva organisations: Many incidents are driven or escalated by the involvement of Hindutva groups such as the Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad. These organisations frequently gather crowds, stage protests, and exert pressure on law enforcement agencies to act against individuals from minority communities. Their presence and actions often serve to heighten communal tensions.
3. Public and police complicity: There is evidence of public participation in these incidents, where bystanders either inform vigilante groups or directly intervene to question or detain interfaith couples. Police involvement often follows, with authorities typically taking the couples into custody, questioning them, and sometimes returning women to their families. This reflects an implicit validation of the moral policing actions.
4. Violation of individual privacy and rights: The incidents regularly involve breaches of privacy, with photos and videos of couples being taken and shared without consent. Individuals are subjected to public scrutiny and moral judgment, often in violation of their rights as consenting adults. Women, in particular, face heightened surveillance and are frequently returned to their families, disregarding their autonomy.
5. Escalation into communal narratives: What begins as a personal or interpersonal conflict often escalates into communal narratives. Small disputes or interactions are leveraged by vigilante groups to propagate divisive rhetoric, further polarising communities. The term “love jihad” is repeatedly used to stoke fear and mistrust, even in cases where no evidence supports the claim.
6. Police action under pressure: Law enforcement appears to act under pressure from vigilante groups in several cases, treating consensual adult relationships as criminal matters. The swift involvement of the police, often in response to demands from Hindutva groups, reflects the growing influence of these organisations in dictating public and legal responses.

Incidents of religious conversions

In Puttur, seven families from Panja and Pallodi in Kadaba taluk, who had converted to Christianity over 20 years ago, were reconverted to Hinduism in a ceremony organised by the Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP). These families, primarily from Scheduled Castes, had converted to Christianity with promises of better living conditions, but over time, they remained in poverty as the church stopped providing support. The VHP and Bajrang Dal worked with them for two years, encouraging them to revert to Hinduism by offering material support and religious education. The reconversion ceremony, held at the Sri Panchalingeshwara Temple, involved traditional Hindu rituals and included clothes, groceries, and household items for the families.

This incident highlights how extremist Hindu groups use both religious and material incentives to coerce vulnerable individuals into changing their religious identity, often framing it as a return to their “ancestral” faith. This raises concerns about religious coercion, as such movements exploit socio-economic struggles to further their ideological goals, undermining personal freedom and religious choice.

Patterns emerging from the incidents

Several patterns emerge from these incidents involving religious vigilantes and the use of religion for coercive purposes:

1. Exploitation of vulnerable communities: Many of the victims in these incidents, including those in both the Hindu vigilante and unidentified segments, belong to marginalised or economically disadvantaged communities. The reconversion ceremonies, for example, targeted Scheduled Caste individuals who had initially converted to Christianity due to promises of material support. This highlights a troubling trend where extremists exploit socio-economic vulnerabilities to gain religious or political allegiance.
2. Religious polarisation: The incidents often involve a clear division between religious communities, which is exacerbated by the actions of vigilante groups. Whether it’s the spread of false accusations in Puttur or the targeting of interfaith relationships under the guise of ‘love jihad’, these incidents feed into the narrative of a growing religious divide. The aggressive defence of religious identities seems to be used to further polarise communities, leading to communal tensions.
3. Use of religion as a political tool: Both the reconversion incident and the ‘love jihad’ helpline reflect the increasing use of religious identity as a political tool. The reconversion was framed as a return to the “ancestral” faith, positioning Hinduism as the authentic faith, and indirectly promoting a narrative that portrays conversions to other religions as unnatural or coercive. Similarly, the ‘love jihad’ helpline seeks to control and manipulate interfaith relationships by framing them as religious violations, thereby politicising personal choices.
4. Coercive religious practices: The reconversion ceremony and vigilante actions such as the harassment of interfaith couples reveal how extremist groups use religious rituals and social pressure to force individuals into conformity. The promise of material benefits, such as housing and financial support, alongside the pressure to convert, showcases the coercive nature of these practices.
5. Media and social media amplification: Many of these incidents have been magnified by social media, where misinformation or unverified claims spread quickly. In the case of the stabbing incident in Puttur, for instance, the communal angle was immediately highlighted by social media users, leading to public outcry and protests. The viral spread of images and accusations often exacerbates communal tensions and fuels public sentiment.
6. State inaction or complicity: Another pattern is the state’s apparent inaction or indirect support of such vigilante activities. While some incidents, such as the stabbing in Puttur, prompt police investigation, the involvement of right-wing groups like the Sri Ram Sena in orchestrating campaigns like the ‘love jihad’ helpline is indicative of the potential complicity of the state in religiously motivated activities. This highlights the need for stronger legal frameworks to curb the influence of extremist groups in shaping societal norms.

Incidents of cattle vigilantism

The cattle vigilantism incidents in coastal Karnataka illustrate an increasing trend of religiously motivated actions by groups such as Bajrang Dal, who take it upon themselves to enforce laws regarding cattle transport. On February 25, 2024, in Sullia, Bajrang Dal activists intercepted a vehicle they suspected was involved in the illegal transport of cattle. They informed the local police, who arrested the driver, Bibin Paulose, and seized the cattle. This was one of the first of a series of such incidents throughout the year.

In Puttur on March 25, 2024, a similar event unfolded when Bajrang Dal activists received information about cattle being transported late at night. They attempted to stop a Swift car, but the driver lost control and crashed into a ditch. The activists managed to alert the police, who took control of the vehicle and the cattle, though the driver managed to escape. This action was part of a wider network of vigilantism, where community members work with local authorities to apprehend suspected violators.

On April 10, 2024, Bajrang Dal’s involvement was again evident when activists tipped off the police about cattle being transported to an illegal slaughterhouse in Mulky. The police managed to intercept the vehicle, arrest the driver, Jaya, and seize two cows, though the prime accused, Ashraf, escaped. This raised concerns about the increasing role of religiously motivated groups in law enforcement.

The most violent incident occurred on May 22, 2024 in Mudubidri, where a group of vigilantes attacked three men who were transporting cattle from Kallamundkur. The attackers, believed to be part of Bajrang Dal, not only assaulted the victims but also caused significant damage to their vehicle, even stabbing one of the men, Muhammed Zian, in the back. The police, after receiving the complaint, filed charges against the attackers and the victims, further highlighting the complex dynamics of these incidents.

On October 16, 2024, in Puttur, Bajrang Dal activists followed an auto-rickshaw carrying a calf and reported it to the police. The calf was rescued, and the authorities arrested the driver and two women involved in the incident. These incidents often blur the line between legal and extrajudicial actions, as vigilantes act outside the law to enforce their interpretations of cow protection.

Furthermore, such vigilantism is not limited to Muslims alone. For example, on June 27, 2024 in Vittal, Bajrang Dal activists intercepted a vehicle carrying a bull and handed over the driver and cattle to the police. Even non-Muslim individuals were caught up in the system, with Hindu activists implicated in cattle transport cases, such as the seizure of cows in Belthangady on October 4, 2024, where two BJP activists were arrested alongside two Muslims. In another case from October 19, 2024 in Belthangady, authorities discovered cattle being transported without the necessary permits, and the individuals involved had attempted to disguise their identities with slogans like “Tatvamasi” and “Jai Sri Ram.”

These incidents demonstrate an increasing pattern of violence, intimidation, and religiously charged actions by vigilante groups, suggesting that the protection of cows has become intertwined with communal agendas, often undermining the rule of law and creating tensions between communities.

Patterns emerging from the incidents

Several patterns emerge from the series of cattle vigilantism incidents in coastal Karnataka:

1. Religious motivation and community vigilantism: The majority of these incidents involve groups like Bajrang Dal, which is strongly associated with Hindutva ideology. The activists often justify their actions as a form of religious protectionism, particularly regarding cow slaughter. While the law prohibits the illegal slaughter of cattle, these groups have taken on a quasi-policing role, acting outside the formal legal framework.
2. Escalating violence: Many of the incidents involve increasing levels of violence. While early incidents such as the one in Sullia (February 2024) involved non-violent interventions, later incidents became more aggressive, culminating in attacks on individuals. For example, the assault in Mudubidri on 22nd May 2024 resulted in a stabbing, underscoring the dangerous escalation of these confrontations. Vigilantes are no longer just reporting suspected violations but are actively engaging in violence, which raises concerns about law and order in these regions.
3. Involvement of local authorities: Police are often involved, but the level of coordination between vigilantes and local authorities varies. In some cases, like in Puttur (March 2024) and Mulky (April 2024), the police responded quickly, arresting suspects and seizing cattle. However, in other cases, vigilante groups seem to operate with tacit approval or assistance from local police, which raises questions about the effectiveness of law enforcement and the role of communal politics in policing.
4. Targeting of specific communities: Although non-Muslims are also involved in some cases, such as the incident in Vittal (June 2024), the majority of the incidents disproportionately target Muslims, both in terms of the suspects and the accusations of illegal cattle transport. This points to a pattern of communal polarisation, where Muslims are seen as the primary violators of these laws in the eyes of the vigilant groups.
5. Increasing vigilante acts across the region: The number of incidents appears to be rising, suggesting a coordinated campaign by religious groups to assert control over cattle transport and slaughter. As more reports surface, it is evident that these vigilante groups are operating with growing regularity and confidence, emboldened by the support or inaction of local authorities and the state government.
6. Use of religion to justify illegal actions: In several cases, vigilante groups have invoked religious slogans, such as “Jai Sri Ram,” as part of their actions, often to mask their identity or to assert the religious nature of their activities. This points to a deliberate attempt to politicise cow protection and use it as a vehicle for wider religious and communal agendas.
7. Legal grey areas and extrajudicial actions: The actions of these groups often fall into legal grey areas. While they claim to be enforcing the law, they do so without legal authority, leading to questions about the rule of law in these situations. The vigilantism and resultant violence often complicate the investigation and prosecution of actual legal violations, as both perpetrators and victims are subjected to multiple charges, further muddying the legal landscape.
8. Impact on minority communities: These incidents contribute to an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, particularly for Muslim communities, who are frequently accused of violating cattle transport laws. The frequent attacks and assaults on Muslims involved in these incidents exacerbate religious tensions, perpetuating a cycle of mistrust and hostility between different community groups.

Incidents of hate speech/crime

The incidents of hate speech and communal tension in Mangalore highlight a concerning trend of escalating religious intolerance and political exploitation of such issues. On February 12, 2024, Mangalore City North MLA Y. Bharat Shetty made a statement urging parents to avoid sending their children to Christian missionary schools, citing alleged anti-Hindu sentiments, such as derogatory remarks made by a teacher at St. Gerosa School. This sparked widespread controversy, with Shetty’s comments further inflaming communal tensions, leading to protests outside the school by right-wing activists. The protests, led by Shetty, fellow MLA D. Vedavyasa Kamath, and other right-wing leaders, promoted religious intolerance and vilified the Christian community, accusing them of plotting against Hindu sentiments. The police filed a case against these leaders for inciting communal hatred, demonstrating a clear attempt to manipulate religious grievances for political gains.

Another incident, on March 10, 2024, saw Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) leader Sharan Pumpwell urging the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to raid madrassas and mosques for clues related to a Bengaluru café blast, based purely on the religion of the suspect, without any concrete evidence. This call for indiscriminate raids reflects a dangerous pattern of associating criminality with religion and exacerbating communal fear and hatred. Pumpwell’s rhetoric feeds into a larger narrative of demonising Muslim institutions and communities, often without due cause or regard for the rule of law.

Furthermore, the May 2024 incident involving a group of Muslims offering Friday prayers on a public road in Kankanady became another flashpoint for communal rhetoric. Right-wing groups, including the VHP, condemned the act and threatened counter-actions such as Hanuman Chalisa recitations on the same public roads. These groups framed the act as a deliberate attempt to provoke Hindu sentiments, despite the fact that the group offering prayers claimed no such intent. The police, however, initiated legal action against the group, while the VHP leader Pumpwell was accused of threatening social harmony and creating fear within the community by promoting vigilante actions. The mosque committee later assured that such incidents would not occur again, emphasising the need to respect public space and prevent future controversies.

In June 2024, communal tensions erupted in Mangalore when BJP MLA Harish Poonja falsely accused mosques of hiding weapons, sparking protests from Muslim leaders. This incident highlighted the growing political use of inflammatory rhetoric to stoke religious discord.

In July, a social media post by Dr. Upadhya, inciting violence against Muslims, went viral, illustrating how hate speech on digital platforms can spread quickly and fuel division. Similarly, in August, the Sullia police investigated an incident where individuals threatened students at a mosque over their attire, reflecting how even personal choices are increasingly politicised in a climate of rising intolerance.

Later in August, a gang-rape case became politically charged when BJP leaders tried to frame it within the “Love Jihad” narrative, further polarising the issue. This incident underscored the risks of politicising crimes, which distracts from justice and fuels communal division.

In September, inflammatory incidents continued, including the arrest of Satish Devadiga for promoting hatred through a derogatory banner, and a letter from a religious organisation demanding Muslims stop distributing food during a Hindu festival. These events demonstrated the persistent role of symbolism and rhetoric in inflaming communal tensions.

In October, Arun Ullal’s video urging Hindus to avoid Muslim-run schools sparked backlash, showing the extent to which hate speech had permeated educational institutions. Similarly, in November, incidents like derogatory messages at a bus stop and calls for Hindu-only vendors at temple events demonstrated the continued use of public spaces for spreading religious division.

These events reflect a growing trend of communal polarisation in Mangalore, where politicians, social media, and local activists increasingly exploit religious sentiments to fuel conflict. These incidents depict a pattern where political and religious leaders manipulate real or fabricated grievances to stoke communal tensions. The rhetoric used by individuals like Shetty, Kamath, and Pumpwell is often inflammatory, framing religious practices and educational institutions as battlegrounds for ideological warfare. The subsequent protests and legal actions against the Muslim community further escalate these divisions, creating an environment where peaceful coexistence is undermined by political calculations. The role of law enforcement is also concerning, as it often appears reactive or complicit, failing to address the communal rhetoric and violence perpetuated by such figures. The overall narrative is one of increasing intolerance, with politicians and right-wing groups using hate speech as a tool to consolidate power and deepen religious divides.

Patterns emerging from the incidents

Several key patterns emerge from the series of incidents in Mangalore, pointing to a larger trend of communal polarisation and political exploitation. These patterns not only highlight the rising religious intolerance but also underscore the role of politics, social media, and public spaces in amplifying hate and division.

1. Political exploitation of religious sentiments: A clear pattern of politicians using religious issues for political gains emerges throughout the incidents. Figures like Y. Bharat Shetty and Sharan Pumpwell frame religious issues as central to political discourse, amplifying grievances in ways that stoke communal tensions. Shetty’s comments on Christian missionary schools and Pumpwell’s calls for raids on Muslim institutions reflect how political figures exploit religious issues to consolidate their base, creating fear and division within society. This tactic often results in increased polarisation, where the political agenda supersedes the need for social harmony.
2. Demonisation of religious minorities: Another recurring pattern is the consistent demonisation of Muslim institutions and communities. Incidents such as Pumpwell’s call for NIA raids based on the religion of a suspect, Harish Poonja’s false accusations about mosques hiding weapons, and the framing of personal choices (like attire and religious practices) as threats, feed into a narrative that associates criminality and divisiveness with Muslims. This leads to a climate of suspicion and fear where the Muslim community is increasingly viewed with hostility, regardless of the facts. The framing of incidents such as the “Love Jihad” case as part of a larger conspiracy is another example of how religious minorities are vilified.
3. Weaponisation of social media and public spaces: social media and public spaces are increasingly being used as tools for spreading hate and amplifying divisive narratives. Dr. Upadhya’s viral post and the inflammatory videos, such as Arun Ullal’s call to avoid Muslim-run schools, show how quickly hate speech can spread, influencing public opinion and escalating communal tensions. Similarly, public spaces, like the Kankanady road incident or the derogatory banner in September, are increasingly becoming sites of ideological battles, where symbols and actions are used to provoke and exacerbate divisions.
4. Incitement to violence and vigilantism: Several incidents demonstrate a pattern of incitement to violence and calls for vigilante actions. The threats made against students at a mosque in Sullia, the Hanuman Chalisa recitation counter-threat, and the public demonstrations and protests often escalate into direct confrontations. This not only creates a volatile atmosphere but also encourages vigilantism, where groups take justice into their own hands, bypassing legal processes and further contributing to the erosion of law and order.
5. Selective law enforcement and impunity: A troubling pattern in these incidents is the reactive or selective nature of law enforcement. While there are occasional legal actions taken, such as the police case against political leaders like Shetty for inciting communal hatred or investigations into hate speech, there is a perception that enforcement is uneven. Many incidents involving right-wing leaders or activists, particularly those stirring religious hatred, often go unpunished or are handled leniently, fostering a sense of impunity. This selective enforcement undermines trust in the rule of law and fuels the perception of bias.
6. Polarisation of educational and social spaces: Education and social practices increasingly become sites of ideological conflict, with religious identity becoming a point of contention. Arun Ullal’s video against Muslim-run schools and the arrest of Satish Devadiga for promoting hatred through symbols are examples of how educational institutions and social gatherings are politicised, turning them into battlegrounds for ideological warfare. These incidents reflect a growing trend of divisiveness in public life, where even seemingly mundane spaces are appropriated for religious and political purposes.

Incidents of hate speech on social media

The incidents in Mangaluru and surrounding areas between February and December 2024 illustrate a growing trend of communal tensions exacerbated by social media. These incidents reveal how both individuals and groups exploit online platforms to spread provocative and often false content, which stokes religious and political divides.

In February, BJP MLA Harish Poonja stirred controversy by suggesting that taxes paid by Hindus should only benefit Hindus, an inflammatory statement that sparked public backlash and accusations of anti-Constitutional rhetoric. This was followed by a complaint in which a former Mangaluru Corporator accused unknown individuals of spreading fake news about a teacher at St. Gerosa School, further contributing to the growing religious discord. Meanwhile, a pattern of misrepresentation and religious malignment continued into April when false claims about a temple official’s religious identity were circulated online, aiming to stir communal sentiment. These acts of misinformation often exploit people’s beliefs and can quickly escalate tensions, as seen in the case involving a provocative video shared by BJP workers outside a mosque in Bantwal in June.

Social media platforms, such as WhatsApp, Facebook, and Instagram, played a crucial role in spreading such content. A viral video showing BJP workers celebrating an election victory with provocative slogans in front of a mosque in Bantwal raised significant concerns, particularly as it highlighted inconsistent law enforcement responses, which further polarised communities. Similarly, derogatory posts about religious figures and symbols, such as those in September, led to multiple police cases and arrests, underscoring the divisive potential of online hate speech.

The role of inflammatory voice messages and posts did not remain confined to one community. In June, a Muslim man was accused of posting communally provocative content, leading to a police investigation, mirroring the actions of those spreading hate from the other side. Additionally, in September, the contentious issue of a planned Eid procession led to further clashes, as social media posts from both sides’ escalated tensions. This exchange of provocative content highlights how social media platforms have become battlefields for ideological warfare, often spilling over into real-life conflicts.

The Hindu Janajagruti Vedike (HJV) in September also lodged a complaint about the defamation of Hindu gods on a Facebook page, once again demonstrating how online platforms are manipulated to spread vulgar and defamatory material. These incidents underline the vulnerability of social media to being used as a tool for incitement and the dangers of unchecked, inflammatory online discourse in fuelling communal divides.

Overall, the incidents reflect the growing role of social media in communal polarisation, with both religious communities increasingly using these platforms to spread misinformation, provoke reactions, and undermine social harmony. The inconsistency in law enforcement, particularly in dealing with inflammatory content, further exacerbates the situation, leading to a cycle of retaliation and escalating tensions across communities.

Patterns emerging from the incidents

The incidents in Mangalore and surrounding areas reveal several patterns related to communal tensions and the role of social media in exacerbating these divisions:

1. Exploitation of religious sentiments: A key pattern is the deliberate manipulation of religious sentiments by political and community leaders for personal or political gain. Statements by public figures, such as BJP MLA Harish Poonja’s call to restrict tax benefits to Hindus and inflammatory rhetoric surrounding school incidents, are often designed to create divisions and fuel animosity between communities.
2. Social media as a catalyst: Social media platforms like WhatsApp, Facebook, and Instagram have become central to spreading hate speech, misinformation, and provocative content. From fake voice messages about teachers to derogatory posts about religious figures and institutions, these platforms amplify the reach of harmful narratives, making it easier to ignite communal tensions on a large scale. The speed and anonymity provided by social media make it a particularly potent tool for incitement.
3. Religious polarisation and counter-accusations: A recurring theme is the polarisation of communities, with both Hindus and Muslims being accused of provoking one another through inflammatory posts and messages. For example, complaints about provocative content circulated by both Hindu and Muslim individuals highlight how both sides are contributing to the deepening religious divide. The back-and-forth nature of these accusations intensifies the conflict and creates a cycle of hostility.
4. Law enforcement inconsistencies: There is a noticeable inconsistency in how law enforcement responds to incidents based on the religious affiliation of the parties involved. The police often seem to take action only when the incident involves certain communities, or when it garners significant public attention, leading to accusations of bias. For instance, the lack of action against BJP workers celebrating an election victory in front of a mosque sparked public debate about unequal policing.
5. Provocative actions and public symbolism: Public spaces, including roads and mosques, have become arenas for ideological battles, with symbolic acts like offering prayers on the streets or chanting religious slogans outside religious buildings used to provoke reactions. These actions, often framed as threats or deliberate provocations, escalate tensions and fuel conflict between religious groups.
6. The role of fake news and misrepresentation: The spread of fake news is a critical factor in inflaming tensions. Instances where fake voice messages or false claims are made about religious figures or communities demonstrate how misinformation can be weaponised to damage inter-community relations. This often involves the spread of exaggerated or fabricated allegations that target religious or community identities, further deepening mistrust.

Incidents of desecration of religious places

On September 15, 2024, a stone-pelting incident targeted the Majidulla Hudajumma Mosque in Katipalla, Mangalore, during the Eid Milad celebrations. Six individuals, identified as Bharat Shetty, Chennappa Shivananad Chalavadi, Nitin Hadap, Sujit Shetty, Anappa, and Preetham Shetty, were arrested in connection with the attack, which is believed to have been orchestrated to inflame communal tensions. The attackers arrived on two bikes and threw stones at the mosque, damaging its glass windows, which was seen as an attempt to provoke violence between Hindu and Muslim communities in the area.

The police, under the guidance of senior officials including the police commissioner and deputy commissioners, swiftly formed a special team to investigate the case. The suspects were arrested within hours, highlighting the police’s prompt response in apprehending those responsible. However, the fact that some of the arrested individuals had numerous prior criminal cases raises concerns about the lack of deterrence for repeat offenders and the systemic issues that allow such individuals to continue committing violent acts.

This attack follows a disturbing trend of using religious sites and symbols to incite violence, a tactic that has been increasingly weaponised in Mangalore’s political and social landscape. The fact that the arrested individuals were largely from local areas further points to the deepening communal divide within the community, where local residents may be mobilised to engage in violent acts under the influence of right-wing groups. This raises questions about the role of local political forces in fostering an environment where attacks on places of worship are not just tolerated but may be tacitly encouraged for political gain.

Despite the arrests, the broader context of rising communal tensions in Mangalore, marked by earlier incidents of hate speech and protests, suggests that these actions are part of a larger, coordinated effort to stoke division.

Patterns emerging from the incidents

Several concerning patterns emerge from the stone-pelting incident at the Majidulla Hudajumma Mosque, as well as the broader communal tensions in Mangalore. These include:

1. Targeting religious spaces: Attacks on religious places, particularly mosques, appear to be a growing method of inciting communal violence. The mosque attack in Katipalla is part of a wider trend of using religious sites as symbols of contention, which serves to inflame tensions between religious communities. The destruction of religious symbols is often used as a tool to provoke responses, creating cycles of violence.
2. Repeat offenders in communal violence: The arrested individuals in this case had multiple prior criminal records, which underscores a troubling pattern where repeat offenders are involved in communal violence. The presence of individuals with established criminal backgrounds reflects the failure of local law enforcement to prevent these individuals from continuing to contribute to escalating tensions. This raises questions about how effectively the law deals with offenders, particularly those with a history of communal violence.
3. Political mobilisation of religious sentiments: The involvement of local figures with affiliations to right-wing groups or political parties, as seen in the case of Bharat Shetty and his associates, illustrates the instrumentalisation of religion for political gain. Inflammatory actions, such as the stone-pelting incident, are often linked to larger political strategies that seek to consolidate power by exacerbating religious divides. This pattern highlights the danger of politicians exploiting religious sentiments to further their own agendas, irrespective of the damage it causes to social harmony.
4. Media and social media amplification: The rise of social media as a platform for spreading communal rhetoric and mobilising people for violent actions is evident in Mangalore. The use of social media to spread hateful narratives or to glorify violent actions contributes to the amplification of communal discord. This is not just limited to traditional media but includes more covert digital spaces that serve as echo chambers for extremist views.
5. Uneven law enforcement: While there was a swift police response in this instance, there is a broader concern about the inconsistency in how law enforcement handles communal incidents. This can be seen in the reaction to similar incidents where legal action may be slow or even absent, depending on the religious or political affiliations of the individuals involved. The arrest and punishment of offenders in some cases, versus leniency or a lack of action in others, shows a concerning pattern of selective enforcement.
6. Escalation of religious intolerance: The attack on the mosque follows a series of incidents, including hate speech, political rhetoric, and symbolic actions (like protests), that reflect an increasing normalisation of religious intolerance. These incidents suggest that the region is witnessing a shift towards more overt communalism, where religious identities are increasingly used to divide communities and foster hostility.

Other communal incidents

The incidents detailed in the report reflect a deeply troubling escalation of communal tensions, particularly in Mangalore and surrounding areas, where religious groups, both Hindutva and Muslim fundamentalists, appear to be engaging in provocative actions that exacerbate existing divides. In the case of the teacher’s suspension in Mangalore, a series of protests erupted after allegations were made that she had insulted Hinduism, Lord Ram, and Prime Minister Modi during a class on “Work is Worship.” The situation was further inflamed by the active involvement of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and other right-wing groups, who demanded punitive action against the teacher. This incident, where a teacher with years of experience was suspended following a complaint by a parent and the subsequent protests, exposes a disturbing pattern of right-wing organisations pressuring educational institutions to conform to their ideological standards. This pressure to silence dissent not only stifles academic freedom but also undermines the broader principles of secularism and freedom of expression enshrined in the Constitution. Political leaders such as MLAs further fuelled the controversy, adding political weight to the protests, which escalated tensions. The actions of these groups, demanding swift action in the name of protecting religious sentiments, reflect an increasing intolerance for any form of critique, even in academic spaces, and raise significant concerns about the erosion of intellectual freedom and pluralism in society.

On the other hand, the incidents allegedly involving Muslim fundamentalists demonstrate a reactive form of communal violence that perpetuates cycles of aggression. In one instance, following the celebration of Prime Minister Modi’s swearing-in ceremony by BJP workers, provocative slogans were allegedly shouted near a mosque in Boliyar. These inflammatory slogans, including “you people belong to Pakistan,” stoked animosity and provoked a violent response from a group of Muslim youths, who followed the BJP workers and, in an altercation, stabbed two individuals. While the stabbing was condemned as an act of violence, the incident itself is indicative of the underlying communal tensions that have been festering for years. The violent reaction was likely fuelled by the provocative nature of the slogans, which targeted Muslims directly, creating a volatile situation that ultimately resulted in physical confrontation. This incident underscores a broader pattern where religious communities retaliate against perceived insults or provocations, further deepening the divide between the groups. The police response to these incidents, though swift in some cases, seems more reactive than preventative. The deployment of police forces and the formation of peace committees after the violence suggests an attempt to manage the fallout, but the failure to prevent these incidents from escalating in the first place raises questions about the effectiveness of law enforcement in addressing the root causes of communal strife.

Another concerning pattern emerges from the involvement of political figures in many of these incidents. In both the teacher suspension and the Boliyar stabbing case, local MLAs and political activists from both sides of the communal divide seem to have played a role in escalating the situation, either by leading protests or making statements that inflame the public sentiment. The active participation of these political figures suggests that communal violence is being increasingly politicised, with both sides leveraging religious issues for electoral gains. This politicisation of communal conflicts only exacerbates existing divisions and makes it more difficult to de-escalate tensions, as religious issues become intertwined with political agendas. Furthermore, the selective nature of law enforcement in many of these incidents is troubling. While the police appear to act swiftly when right-wing groups are involved, there is often a delay or lack of action when incidents involve Muslim groups, further fueling perceptions of bias and uneven justice. The police’s failure to prevent the inflammatory actions of both Hindu and Muslim groups, including the provocative slogans and public demonstrations, points to a systemic failure in maintaining law and order and fostering communal harmony.

Moreover, the widespread use of social media in these incidents plays a critical role in amplifying communal tensions. In the Mangalore teacher case, a voice message alleging derogatory remarks against Hinduism went viral, and in the case of the BJP workers, social media posts highlighting provocative slogans added fuel to the fire. These viral messages often spread misinformation, creating echo chambers where religious groups are further polarised. The role of social media in the rapid dissemination of potentially harmful content highlights the need for more effective regulation and monitoring to prevent its misuse for communal ends.

Overall, these incidents exemplify a dangerous trend where both Hindutva and Muslim fundamentalist groups are using inflammatory rhetoric and actions to provoke and retaliate against each other, often with the involvement of political figures who exacerbate the situation. This cycle of provocation and retaliation not only perpetuates violence but also erodes trust in the rule of law, as the police are seen as either unable or unwilling to effectively prevent communal flare-ups. Furthermore, the growing politicisation of communal violence, selective law enforcement, and the unchecked spread of hate speech on social media are contributing to a volatile and divisive atmosphere. These patterns of communal violence, driven by ideological and political motivations, pose a significant threat to social harmony, national unity, and the secular fabric of Indian society.

Patterns emerging from the incidents

A clear pattern emerges from these incidents, highlighting the cyclical nature of communal violence in India, where both Hindutva and Muslim fundamentalist groups engage in provocative actions that deepen societal divides. Key elements of this pattern include:

1. Provocative actions and retaliation: Incidents often begin with provocative actions or inflammatory rhetoric. In the Mangalore teacher case, a statement perceived as offensive to Hindu sentiments led to widespread protests and demands for punitive action. Similarly, the Boliyar stabbing incident was sparked by provocative slogans targeting Muslims, which were followed by violent retaliation from Muslim youths. These provocations often trigger a cycle of retaliation, with each side responding to perceived insults or affronts to their religious identity. This cycle perpetuates violence and escalates tensions, reinforcing communal divisions.
2. Involvement of political leaders: Political figures from both sides of the communal divide play an active role in escalating these incidents, either by leading protests, making incendiary statements, or aligning with religious groups to gain political leverage. The teacher suspension case saw the involvement of local MLAs from the right-wing, while political figures from both communities often take sides in the aftermath of violence. This politicisation of communal conflicts fuels polarisation and makes it harder to de-escalate tensions.
3. Selective law enforcement: A key feature of these incidents is the perceived bias in law enforcement. While police forces may act swiftly when right-wing groups are involved, delays or lack of action occur when incidents involve Muslim groups. This selective enforcement contributes to the perception of uneven justice, which further exacerbates communal tensions and erodes trust in the authorities.
4. Role of social media in amplifying divides: social media plays a central role in spreading provocative content and misinformation. Viral messages, videos, and posts often escalate minor incidents into larger communal flashpoints. In the case of the Mangalore teacher, a viral voice message was enough to spark protests, while the Boliyar incident was amplified by social media posts highlighting provocative slogans. The rapid spread of such content creates echo chambers that reinforce communal identities and fuel hatred.
5. Failure to address root causes: The pattern reveals a systemic failure to address the root causes of communal tensions. While police and political leaders may act after violence erupts, there is little focus on preventative measures or addressing the underlying issues driving communal animosity. Educational institutions, law enforcement, and political leaders seem to focus on damage control rather than on fostering understanding and promoting peaceful coexistence.
6. Escalation through ritualised violence: Violence becomes a repetitive and ritualised response to perceived slights, with each side acting in a manner that mirrors or retaliates against the other. This creates a dangerous feedback loop where the focus shifts from addressing the core issues of intolerance to outdoing each other in acts of violence.

Report for 2022 can be accessed here.

The complete report may be read below:

A comparative table may be viewed here:

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The protesters strongly objected to the celebration of the accused, stating, “The act of honouring those accused of murder is tantamount to endorsing the crime itself.” They urged Karnataka’s Home Minister to take legal action against the individuals involved in organising the felicitation and ensure that those responsible for the murder face swift justice. In their memorandum to the Home Minister, they emphasised the urgency of prosecuting the accused, condemning the glorification of criminals.

The protest also drew parallels to similar incidents, such as the honouring of individuals convicted in the Bilkis Bano case, raising concerns about a growing trend of celebrating those who commit violent acts. 

Kavita Lankesh and others decry glorification of accused:

Kavita Lankesh, sister of Gauri Lankesh, expressed shock and anguish over the recent events, describing the glorification of her sister’s alleged killers as deeply “disturbing.” Speaking to The Quint, she expressed frustration over the delays in the judicial process, which have allowed the accused to secure bail. “Our family has suffered enough, and now we must witness those responsible for Gauri’s death being honored,” she had said. Kavita revealed plans to meet with Karnataka Chief Minister Siddaramaiah to demand the formation of a special or fast-track court to handle her sister’s case.

She added that the investigation into Gauri’s murder had initially progressed under Siddaramaiah’s previous tenure as chief minister, with 100 people assigned to the case. However, delays in prosecution, combined with the recent release of the accused, have left her questioning the effectiveness of the legal system. “If there is no follow-up, what is the purpose of the investigation? The case is being jeopardised, and justice delayed is justice denied,” she stressed.

Reflecting on the slow progress of justice, Kavitha pointed out that while everyone accused in the case has been granted bail, her primary concern is the delay in the legal proceedings. Although she does not oppose the bail as part of the ongoing trial, she firmly believes that the extensive delay is jeopardising the case and allowing the accused to walk free. For her, this protracted legal process is undermining the significance of the investigation.

Determined to expedite the trial, Kavitha Lankesh revealed her plans to meet Chief Minister Siddaramaiah personally, urging him to take decisive steps to prevent further delays. She intends to request the establishment of a special or fast-track court to handle Gauri’s case, ensuring that justice is served swiftly and that the accused do not escape due process.

Kavitha Lankesh expressed profound anguish and disbelief over the recent felicitation of her sister’s alleged killers, Parashuram Waghmore and Manohar Edave, by right-wing Hindutva groups in Karnataka. She described the glorification of these individuals as “disturbing and shocking,” not only to her family but also to society at large. She emphasised that honouring her sister’s alleged killers is not just an insult to her family, but also to the legacy of Gauri Lankesh and the progressive values she stood for.

Kavitha also expressed her shock at how Karnataka, a state that has long stood for progressive values and human dignity, is now witnessing the glorification of individuals accused of heinous crimes. She drew parallels between this incident and others across India where rapists and murderers have been similarly honoured, such as those involved in the Bilkis Bano case in Gujarat. For her, the fact that this is happening in Karnataka is particularly distressing and serves as a blot on the state’s reputation.

In her statement, Kavitha Lankesh made it clear that the public celebration of individuals accused of murder is not just a personal affront but a societal danger. She urged the state government, particularly the Home Minister of Karnataka, to take strict legal action against those who organised the felicitation, accusing them of instigating violence and supporting murderers.
 

Protesters denounce broader trend of felicitating criminals

Members of the Veerashaiva Lingayat Coordination Committee and other progressive thinkers also staged a separate protest in Bengaluru on October 18, condemning the public support given to those accused in the murders of both Gauri Lankesh and scholar M M Kalburgi. The protestors also highlighted broader concerns over a growing trend of glorifying criminals, citing instances in states like Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh where convicted rapists and murderers have been celebrated. Members of ‘Eddelu Karnataka,’ a civil society group, submitted a memorandum to the Karnataka Home Minister condemning the recent events. The group emphasised that such actions tarnish the state’s long-standing reputation for upholding human values and called for legal action against those promoting violence.

In particular, they urged the government to expedite the trial of Gauri Lankesh’s murder and punish the guilty. They condemned the “felicitating of killers” as a blot on Karnataka’s social fabric, asserting that it goes against the state’s ethos of peace and justice. Prominent figures, former minister B T Lalitha Naik, former MLC Mohan Kondajji, activists K S Vimala, K R Subhash, and members of the Dalit Sangharsh Samiti, were among the protestors.

Shrikant Pangarkar’s controversial political appointment sparks outrage

In a related development, Shrikant Pangarkar, another accused in the Gauri Lankesh murder case, joined the Shiv Sena faction led by Maharashtra Chief Minister Eknath Shinde on October 19, 2024. His appointment ahead of the Maharashtra assembly elections sparked outrage, with opposition leaders condemning the move as a stain on the state’s governance.

However, on October 20, CM Eknath Shinde had to stay the appointment of Shrikant Pangarkar. This decision came amid criticism from opposition parties slamming Pangarkar’s re-entry into the party. A statement from the Shiv Sena on Sunday clarified that if Pangarkar had been appointed to any party post in the district, the decision has now been stayed.

Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee President Nana Patole sharply criticised the ruling coalition, stating, “The inclusion of Pangarkar, an accused in Gauri Lankesh’s murder, is a disgrace and tarnishes the state’s image.” Congress spokesperson Shama Mohamed and NCP MP Supriya Sule also expressed their dismay, with Sule stating, “The government has sanctified a criminal, signaling a breakdown of law and order in Maharashtra.”

गद्दारांना आरोपींची साथ!

पत्रकार गौरी लंकेश यांच्या हत्येमध्ये संशयित असलेले श्रीकांत पांगारकरने विधानसभा निवडणुकीच्या पार्श्वभूमीवर एकनाथ शिंदे यांच्या शिवसेना गटात केलेला प्रवेश म्हणजे ‘उंदराला मांजर साक्ष’ असा प्रकार आहे.

श्रीकांत पांगारकरने तीन संशयित हिंदुत्ववादी…

— Nana Patole (@NANA_PATOLE) October 20, 2024

Shrikant Pangarkar, accused in the Gauri Lankesh murder case, has joined the Eknath Shinde-led Shiv Sena, which is running the Maharashtra government in alliance with BJP and under PM @narendramodi Ji.

Why do all corrupts, murderers, and rapists seem to find BJP and its…

— Dr. Shama Mohamed (@drshamamohd) October 20, 2024

अतिशय धक्कादायक ! गुन्हेगारांना सामाजीक प्रतिष्ठा प्राप्त करुन देण्यात खुद्द मावळते मुख्यमंत्री आणि त्यांचा पक्ष आघाडीवर आहे. या राज्यात कायदा आणि सुव्यवस्थेचे तीन तेरा का वाजले याच्या काही कारणांपैकी हे एक प्रमुख कारण…! प्रख्यात पत्रकार गौरी लंकेश यांच्या मारेकऱ्याला खोके…

— Supriya Sule (@supriya_sule) October 20, 2024

According to India Today, Shrikant was part of the undivided Shiv Sena until 2006. In 2011, after the Shiv Sena reportedly denied him a ticket to contest elections, he joined the Hindu Janajagruti Samit, where he met co-conspirators in Gauri’s murder. Pangarkar had previously been arrested by the Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) in 2018 for possessing arms and explosives. He was linked to a right-wing extremist network responsible for planning attacks on cultural events and individuals deemed enemies of Hindutva ideology. 

According to the chargesheet filed in the Kavitha Lankesh murder case, Shrikant Pangarkar briefed all the accused on the precautions they were to undertake before, during, and after the murder. He also gave them legal training and told them what to do in case they got caught. Bharat Kurane bought Ganesh Miskin and Parashuram Waghmore the clothes they would use for the murder.

Although his appointment to the Shiv Sena was stayed amid public backlash, the episode has further fuelled criticism of the ruling government for allegedly providing a safe haven for extremists and criminals.

This recent sequence of events has intensified calls for greater accountability and justice, not only for Gauri Lankesh but also for all victims of politically motivated violence.

Related:

Murderers or Martyrs? The dangerous glorification of murdered Gauri Lankesh’s accused by Hindutva groups

Murder of Gauri Lankesh a hate crime against humanity, condemn release on bail of 8 accused: ALIFA Open letter

Gauri Lankesh assassination: 6 years down, no closure for family and friends, justice elusive

The Hasdeo Arand crisis: Tribal protesters face brutal state crackdown while standing against felling of trees

The post Protest in Karnataka as activists condemns felicitation of Gauri Lankesh murder accused by right-wing groups appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Only one state has an act for gig workers—Rajasthan—as of now, and if this draft becomes law, Karnataka would be the second state to enact a law for gig workers’ welfare. Notably, the Indian National Congress (INC) was the ruling party in Rajasthan, as it is now in Karnataka when the act was passed in the legislative assembly. Telangana, another state in which a gig worker draft law has been on the cards, is also a Congress-ruled state. However, Telangana’s law is not publicly accessible yet, and information on it was reported by sections of the media.

A few common threads

Generally, all state governments, as of now, seem to be following a set structure in terms of the welfare of gig workers.

One, in the definitions, they define:  

i) Aggregators to include major players like Swiggy, Zomato, etc., and smaller players like, say, Shoffer—a luxury electric car ride-hailing service based out of Bangalore.  

ii) Gig workers to include the delivery or ride partners or other such people registered on these platforms for work.

Two, they constitute a board to oversee the welfare of workers and ensure the implementation of the act.

Three, they establish a welfare fund to which the aggregators will be made to pay a certain amount per transaction per worker or some other mechanism.

Four, they outline the rights of the workers and the responsibilities of the aggregators, along with stating the penalties for violations.

While all these elements are present in the Karnataka Gig Worker law draft, it is important to understand the changing contours of employment relations in the gig economy year by year, along with the growing trend of gig work, when drafting the provisions of the law. For example, food delivery workers wear uniforms of the brand they are working with, as mandated, thus providing free marketing to the brand as they ride through the city. This is not factored into the pay given to them, and in fact, the uniforms are supposed to be bought from the brand by the workers themselves. These types of disguised employment conditions are not considered by the government while it defines the relationship between aggregators and workers.

In this context, this article will discuss the Karnataka Gig Worker law, its similarities and differences with the Rajasthan Gig Workers law, and the potential for improvement in the legislation on Gig Worker Welfare.

Draft Karnataka-based Gig Workers (Social Security and Welfare) Bill, 2024

The draft bill defines an aggregator as a digital intermediary for a buyer of goods or user of services to connect with the seller or the service provider, and includes any entity that coordinates with one or more aggregators to provide the services. Essentially, a food delivery app like Swiggy, or an app that facilitates the hiring of electricians or beauticians like Urban Company, comes under the definition.

Section 2(e) of the Act defines gig workers as a person who performs work or participates in a work arrangement that results in payment based on terms and conditions laid down in such a contract. This includes all piece-rate work, and whose work is sourced through a platform, in the services listed in Schedule-I.

The Schedule includes the following services:

1.   Ride Sharing Services  
2.   Food and Grocery Delivery Services  
3.   Logistics Services  
4.   E-Marketplace for wholesale/retail sale of goods and/or services—B2B/B2C  
5.   Professional Service Providers  
6.   Healthcare  
7.   Travel and Hospitality  
8.   Content and Media Services

The draft bill has provisions for the rights of the gig worker in Section 6, granting them the right to register with the Gig Workers Welfare Board—established under Section 3—and the right to access general and specific social security schemes, as well as the right to access a grievance redressal mechanism (Section 7). This Grievance Redressal Mechanism involves either a complaint to the state government-appointed officer or a petition through a web portal whose link should be provided on the aggregator’s website.

The draft also outlines several responsibilities for aggregators:

1. Aggregators must provide a database of workers to the board and update it (Section 10).  
2. Aggregators must register themselves (Section 11).  

3. Aggregators must ensure that the contract is fair, easily understandable in a language comprehensible to the worker and listed in the 8th Schedule of the Indian Constitution. Any change in the contract should occur with prior notice, and termination of the contract by the worker on account of the change should not affect the entitlements they were supposed to receive. 

4. Aggregators must communicate to the gig worker the parameters of allocation, distribution, assessment, and grounds for denial of work, as well as the parameters of the rating system and categorization of the workers on the quality of service, log-in time, etc. if such categorization is done by the employer (Section 14).

5. Aggregators cannot terminate the gig worker without prior notice of 14 days, and the contract must have an exhaustive list of grounds for termination or deactivation from the platform (Section 15).

6. Aggregators must pay workers weekly without delay (Section 16).

7. Aggregators must ensure reasonably safe and healthy working conditions, as practicable as possible (Section 17).  

8. Aggregators must ensure that a grievance link is available on their website and constitute an internal dispute resolution committee if they have more than 50 workers. These disputes include failure to adhere to the responsibilities mentioned above (Section 24). 

9. Aggregators must appoint a human point of contact for queries, with workers having the option to communicate in Kannada, English, or any 8th Schedule language known to them.

The draft also proposes the establishment of a welfare fund, to be funded by the aggregators at a percentage of the pay of platform-based gig workers per transaction or based on annual state-specific turnover, as may be notified by the government. For this purpose, the draft proposes a Central Transaction Information Management System where all transactions are mapped and monitored by the Board to ensure that payments made to workers and deducted fees are recorded and accounted for. Penalties range from Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 1, 00,000 and are compoundable unless the offense has been committed on more than three occasions.

It was also reported in the media that the government and aggregators agreed on levying a cess per transaction rather than based on state-specific turnover.

Similarities and differences with the Rajasthan Act

Both laws establish a board, give similar powers to the gig worker welfare board, and establish Central Monitoring Systems. In essence, both laws grant the same rights to workers, impose the same responsibilities on aggregators, and establish welfare funds.

However, the difference lies in the details of these broad structures. For example, the Rajasthan Act explicitly recognises the right of workers to participate in all decisions taken for their welfare through representation on the board. In constituting the board, the Rajasthan Act mandates that one-third of the members shall be women. The Karnataka draft misses these provisions and does not have as many members on the board. The Rajasthan law includes 12 board members, including the in-charge minister, while the Karnataka draft includes 10 members, with five being ex-officio members from various departments.

The Karnataka Act also emphasises transparency and the need for communication in languages understandable by the worker. By making it mandatory for the aggregator to provide details of the rating system or categorization of gig workers based on the quality of service rendered, log-in time, or other criteria, the draft attempts to lift the veil under which aggregators have operated until now.

Other key differences can be found in the welfare fee and penalty sections. The draft Karnataka law chooses an either-or approach, where the welfare fee could either be a percentage of each transaction or a percentage of the state-specific annual turnover. The Rajasthan Act does not mention turnover. In terms of penalties, Rajasthan’s law imposes penalties ranging from Rs. 5 lakh to Rs. 50 lakh. The Rajasthan Act also has provisions for interest payable on delayed payment of the welfare fee.

Potential for development

There is much room for development in the Karnataka draft law. While the fundamental question of defining the relationship between the gig worker and aggregator has not been answered, the draft leaves many concerns in the areas it chooses to operate in.

For example, it does not consider women in the gig workforce, nor does it enact specific provisions to protect their interests, such as maternity-specific provisions where women do not have to lose their categorization within the platform if they take a maternity break.

The bill has already been reportedly opposed by various companies due to concerns about compliance, with claims that it will hurt the ease of doing business in the state. While these concerns are expected, the sheer volume of compliance measures businesses must adhere to under the act raises doubts about its effective implementation. Meanwhile, Kerala’s Minister for Labour, V. Sivankutty, stated in August that the government intend to introduce the Kerala State Platform-Based Gig Workers (Registration and Welfare) Bill, 2024 in the assembly session this October.

In this paradigm, where the government seems to have decided not to accord the status of a worker to the gig worker and the status of an employee to the aggregator, the least it could have done is to provide for the increased bargaining power of the worker. This could have been achieved through the official recognition of unions in the gig economy, allowing bargaining to be done with unions or federations of such unions.

Conclusion

Despite the improvements in the Karnataka draft law, the fundamental question and demand remain unheeded. With the control aggregators usually exert on gig workers, the demand has been that gig workers be recognized as employees. With the BJP in Rajasthan not giving importance to the previously enacted gig worker law, and Congress governments consistently defining the relationship between gig workers and aggregators as independent individuals rather than employees, the future possibilities look narrower. 

Such a law should not be a choice between no protection at all and meagre protection for gig workers.

(The writer is a researcher with the organisation)

Related:

Rajasthan’s Gig Worker Law, a step towards industrial democracy

Karnataka Budget 2023-24: CM announces Rs. 4 lakh life & accident insurance policy for gig workers

Report Highlights Poor Working Conditions for Gig Workers; Uber, Ola, Amazon Score Zero

Report Highlights Poor Working Conditions for Gig Workers; Uber, Ola, Amazon Score Zero

India’s Gig Workers: Overworked And Underpaid

The post Karnataka’s draft law for welfare of gig workers, an insufficient tokenism? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Hence, as compared to other regions of Karnataka, the old Mysore region did not respond enthusiastically to the Sanghi agenda for these historical reasons. Thus, the BJP has not done well in this region so far.

But over the past thirty years, especially in the Modi era, the changes taking place in the socio-economic and political culture of Old Mysuru and Mandya district in particular, have begun to change this balance that has been shaped over a period.

Besides, the agrarian crisis, migration, unemployment, the crisis of livelihood leading to insecurity and identity crisis, personal and social anxieties generated by the neoliberal economy over the last three decades, coupled with the Brahminisation of the upper strata of the dominant castes, namely Vokkaligas and the Sanskritisation of the Nathapanthic Vokkaliga monasteries, the inertia and slow inaction of the progressive movements, and the zeal, resources and destructive zeal of the right-wing forces have brought about many fundamental changes in the politics of Mandya region which have become glaringly visible in the past few years.

Some Examples:

During the 2018 assembly elections, the upper strata of the dominant Vokkaliga caste declared their priorities as “Kumaraswamy for the state, Narendra Modi for the country,” the mobilisation of the dominant castes to defeat AHINDA (the acronym for Minorities (Alpasankhyata), Backwards (Hindulida) and Dalits) politics of Siddharamiah lead Congress. For the last 10 years, the Sanghis have kept Tipu’s capital Srirangapatna in a constant state of planned communal tension, with the BJP candidate who lost in that constituency in the 2023 elections getting four times more votes than the previous election.

They have tried unsuccessfully to change Tipu history during elections by fielding Uri Gowda and Nanje Gowda (the mythical characters created by the Sanghis to propagate their vicious narrative that these two Vokkaliga heroes assassinated Tipu and that he did not die a martyr in the battle field), the JD (S), which lost badly in the 2023 elections, not only aligned with the BJP in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, but also ideologically aligned with the Sanghi fascist Muslim-hating Brahmanical Hindutva.

The inauguration of the regional office of the RSS at Pandavapura, which was the main centre of the farmers’ union (Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha), the hoisting of the saffron flag at Keregodu and the manufactured communal tension in the area, which has been otherwise in the sphere of influence of the progressive movements like Dalit Sangharsha Samiti (DSS) and the farmers’ unions, soon after the elections, etc. are examples of the social and political changes that demonstrate that the Mandya-Mysuru region is increasingly turning towards Hindutva.

The communal violence in Nagamangala is a continuation of this phenomenon and not an exception. No matter from where the instant spark or stone fell to provoke communal riots on the day of Ganesh Utsav this year, the rest of the script was already planned as decided by the Sanghis. This is because this is part of the well-planned strategy of the Sangh Parivar to achieve its organisational and political hold over society.

In fact, thirty years ago in the coastal regions of the state—where polarisation has reached its peak today, there also existed communal co-existence like the Mandya-Mysuru of today. The Coastal Lab has provided the Sanghis a blueprint to root their politics of hate in society. They are now implementing the same experiment in Mandya in a phased manner, employing a strategic approach.

It is, therefore, imperative to understand the history of the growth of the Sanghis and its political arm, the BJP (Bharatiya Jana Sangh before 1980), and the strategies adopted by them at various levels, and move forward to build the political and grassroots organisations needed to defeat them.

The path treaded by the BJP and its growth in Karnataka

The Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the original form of the BJP in Karnataka, has been contesting elections in Karnataka since 1952. In the first two decades, the Jana Sangh, which contested in tens of constituencies in Hubli, Bidar, Bangalore, Kolar and coastal regions, had garnered an average 2-5 % of votes placing itself at a distant second or third place in some constituencies. In the 1967 elections, it won four seats in the Legislative Assembly for the first time. For comparison, except for the 1957 elections (in which the Jana Sangh got 1.34 per cent of the votes and the undivided CPI got 1.92 per cent of the votes) the left parties have never got more votes than the BJP in any of the elections until now.

In any case, after Emergency, the Jan Sangh, emerged as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) following the demise of the Janata Era in 1980. In 1983 it won 18 seats with a vote share of 7.83 percent. Its vote share fell in the 1985 election. But since the 1989 elections when the BJP won four seats with four per cent of the vote, continued to expand its vote base over the following decades as part of a several stages of Hindutva expansion projects across the state and country.

For example, in 1994, BJP got 17 percent of the vote and 40 seats. In 1999, 20.69 percent of the vote and 44 seats in 2004, 28.33 per cent of the vote and 79 seats, becoming the single largest party. In the year 2008, it received 33.86 percent of the vote and 110 seats. In 2013, though it splintered into three factions, the BJP’s total vote share remained the same if you include the vote share of the factions since all of them returned to the fold of BJP, subsequently.

In the 2018 assembly elections BJP secured 36.2 per cent of the vote and 104 seats. In 2023, although it got 36 percent of the votes, the number of seats fell to 66. However, in 2024 Lok Sabha elections it gained 46 percent votes and 17 out of 28 parliamentary seats well beyond the expectations of all pundits.

Therefore it can be concluded, in general that after 1989, the Sangh Parivar and the BJP have grown in Karnataka and the country in three stages, without major setbacks to their political and ideological agenda.

The first stage -hidden agendas, high dramas

In the first phase, in the new territories it enters, this combine will project itself as a cultured, honest, god-fearing, anti-corruption, patriotic party to enhance its image and influence. In this regard, it strengthens its image by bringing into its fold the elite of other parties and the elite of society, film actors, retired army officers-bureaucrats etc. And, also lures those castes and communities ignored by the mainstream party, i.e., the Congress, with party positions and other allurements.

In 1989, when the Congress made Bangarappa the chief minister after removing the Lingayat leader Veerendra Patil from the chief minister’s post, the BJP realised that the dissatisfaction of the Lingayats with the Congress was at its peak and immediately made Yeddyurappa, the Lingayat leader of the party, as the president of the BJP and thereby captured the support of Lingayat Mutts.

At the same time, LG Havanur, who was known as the harbinger of social justice in the state, economist Venkatagiri Gowda and other renowned people joined the BJP. At that time, they were only promoting pro-people, pro-farmer issues on the face of it while the combine was secretly carrying out its Hindutva campaign through other organs of the Sangh Parivar.

That’s the first phase.

In this first phase, it behaves such that its communal agendas go unnoticed in the region. Those who join the BJP are also at first joining only on the basis of caste, personal prestige etc. But while all parties do the same, the BJP is different because of its RSS structure and approach system and ideological agenda.

The second stage is consensual Hindutvaisation

Once the Lingayats migrated to the BJP for anti-Congress reasons in a significant way, the Sangh Parivar’s affiliate organisations began to organise the community on a number of issues, keeping in constant touch with the Lingayat mutts and its social elites and also the masses. For example, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) unifies all Lingayat-Veerashaiva seers as Hindus and brings them on a single platform for ‘Hindu protection’. Gradually, the anti-Brahminism among the Lingayats is vanquished and converted into Hindutva. The “Vachan Darshana’, the Sanghi  interpretation of 12^th century verses of the founders of Lingayatism, brought out by the Sanghis recently is a continuation of this project. Although the entrepreneurs and upper classes of the community have built up empires in the educational and other service sectors and are dependent on the support and cooperation of the state, these sections within the community have become Brahmanised, forgetting the Kayaka culture and pursuing their coveted business interests.

It is as a result of all this that it becomes an acceptable spokesperson for the Hindutva agenda.

This is the second stage.

The same trend is now prevalent in South Karnataka, especially among Vokkaligas. The erstwhile senior seer of the Adi Chunchanagiri Mutt, worshipped by the Vokkaligas, was made the vice-president of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. Their mutts are not only Sanskritising and Brahmanising, but also socially and culturally complementing Hindutva, without taking a politically overt stand. While the Adi Chunchanagiri Mutt took a clear stand on the Uregowda-Nanjegowda issue as senior Vokkaliga leaders of the Congress and the JD (S) were influential, the Mutt and the Vokkaliga community continue to have a soft spot for Modi on Hindutva. During the course of the text revision initiated by the VHP to undo secular texts and introduce Hindutva lessons, Lingayat mutts talked about only Basavanna, Vokkaliga mutts talked about Kuvempu, a great writer incidentally hailing from the community and after it was revised with minimal changes, there was silence. Moreover, none of them condemned the BJP’s removal of the text about Tipu Sultan. Neither did they stand in opposition when the name of a popular train bearing the name Tipu Express was changed by the then BJP government.

This is another example of the second phase of Hindutvaisation. It is not a coincidence that the Vokkaligas in South Karnataka voted for the BJP more than ever in the last elections. After the official alliance of BJP-JD (S) for the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the Hindutva mobilisation of the Vokkaliga community has gained momentum. It is also fuelled by the latent intolerance and suspicion towards Dalits and Muslims harboured by Vokkaligas

The third stage is militant Hindutva

The third phase is the phenomenon we are seeing in the coastal region and in Uttar Pradesh. At this juncture, the victims of Hindutva’s politics of hate are blinded to the extent that any amount of corruption, injustice, problems of life and the startling cruelty that shakes humanity are unable to wake them up.

The relative reduction of votes for the BJP in the coastal belt in 2023 and 2024 is rather a sign of dissatisfaction that the BJP is not as militant Hindutva as they would like it to be not the sign of coastal belt getting secular. The BJP’s vote share is also steadily increasing as it is moving smoothly from phase one to phase two and phase two to phase three.

And except for the usual sporadic protests by democrats and resistance by Dalits and Muslims to communalism there is no effective opposition to communalism in Karnataka.

Sanghi politics in Karnataka is in the second phase in Kittur and Central Karnataka and is speedily moving towards third phase. The coastal region is already in the third phase.
The Bengaluru, Kalyana Karnataka and South Karnataka where Mandya district and Nagamanagla is situated is moving towards the second phase with great speed.

The incidents in Srirangapatna, Keregodu, and now Nagamangala are examples of that.

In the first stage, it expands its base by using caste, prestige, defection. Soon the second phase begins. So even though ostensibly communal polarisation is not as visible in south Karnataka as in the coastal belt, it should not be forgotten that it is the first step in the same process. Therefore, the increase in the vote share of the BJP in all the constituencies of South Karnataka, even where the BJP has lost its deposits, and the visible characteristics of the second phase of Hinduisation in all these places, should be a cause for concern among the democrats and not a consolation.

At least the occurrences of planned communal riots in the Mandya region should shatter that false sense of relief.

Sanghi fascism is not invincible – but there is no alternative to people’s organisation

This does not however mean the BJP is unbeatable.

However, the last year-and-a-half of Congress rule has made it clear that the party’s politics, ideology, and organisation – even in the Rahul Gandhi era – have no intention of defeating or countering the Sangh’s Hindutva. It is, thus, a historical fact that it is the Congress’s compromising, soft Hindutva politics that has contributed to the growth of Sanghi politics.

Fascism is not just a cultural phenomenon as many liberals of Karnataka make it out to be. Even though Fascism as an ideology can be found in the society and the polity for a long time, it finds its social base and grows feeding on the growing social and economic crisis in society, fuelled by the failure of existing forces to resolve it.

The corporate crony, neo-liberal economic policies, Brahminical social policies, which the Congress and the BJP have all unanimously implemented, are exacerbating the crises and anxieties of the majority of the people and opening the highway to the fascists and fascism The growth of fascists cannot be stopped unless these are radically transformed into pro-people and socialistic policies. In the meanwhile its speed can only be controlled occasionally and temporarily but unless a formidable, credible ideological, political and organisational alternative is provided, fascism thrives.

Thus, Hindutva fascism can be defeated only through a popular democratic movement rooted in the oppressed people who can change both the capitalist and Brahminical system.

But unfortunately, the Left parties, which had previously built such movements, are now gasping. Today, the BJP is getting ten times more votes than the Left parties in their own strongholds.

On the other hand, no mass movement in Karnataka is today left with the capacity to mobilise people in great numbers to challenge both the government and Sangh fascism. Not only during the BJP government, but also during the present Congress government, protests have been reduced to tokenisms. The blockade at Freedom Park (a designated place in the Bangalore city for the protests) needs to be broken, people’s power resoundingly displayed as resistance power to jolt the government. This is not meant as a criticism of anybody but is meant as a collective self-criticism.

Therefore, until the time that we are able to build a strong mass movement and eradicate Hindutva from the minds of the people, until we are able to build true democratic aspirations among all peoples, neither will Hindutva be defeated nor the BJP could be unseated in the country.

The recent Nagamangala communal riots also sends out the same warning for those who can see and hear.

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Nationwide surge in Anti-Muslim violence: September 15-17 sees unprecedented attacks and discrimination

Tensions escalate in Himachal and Uttarakhand, multiple protest and rallies against mosques

Eviction tragedy in Assam: Two killed during eviction drive as police firing sparks allegations of government bias

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