A striking feature of the year’s events is the prevalence of moral policing, predominantly by Hindu vigilantes, accounting for 10 incidents, with three others involving unidentified groups. Religious conversion allegations also sparked tensions, though such incidents were limited to one case involving Hindu fundamentalists. The contentious issue of cattle vigilantism saw two reported cases, both allegedly carried out by Hindu vigilante groups.

Hate speech and hate crimes, both online and offline, emerged as a significant concern, with 27 incidents being reported. These included inflammatory remarks by Hindu fundamentalists in 15 cases, and 10 instances of hate speech proliferating via social media platforms. While Muslim fundamentalists were linked to two online hate incidents, the overwhelming majority of such activity was attributed to Hindu fundamentalist groups.

Attacks on places of worship were relatively rare in the coastal district of Karnataka but nonetheless symbolic of the communal fault lines, with one reported incident allegedly involving Hindu fundamentalists. Additionally, four other communal clashes or acts of violence were noted, including three attributed to Hindu fundamentalists and one to Muslim fundamentalists, with an unidentified group implicated in another.

These statistics offer a window into the persistent communal tensions in Karnataka’s coastal districts, underscoring the urgent need for proactive measures to foster harmony and curb the growing influence of vigilante groups. This report seeks to chronicle these incidents, not only to document the events of 2024 but also to highlight the socio-political conditions enabling such divisive activities. Through this report and this analysis, the aim is to contribute to ongoing efforts towards promoting peace and unity in this troubled region.

A comparison of the statistics of the current year with the previous year may be viewed here:

Incidents of moral policing

The report highlights a series of incidents in coastal Karnataka where moral policing and vigilantism were directed primarily against interfaith relationships. In Dharmasthala, an interfaith couple was harassed by locals and taken to the police station, though they were ultimately found to have committed no offence. Similarly, in Mangalore’s Kadri Park, three teenagers attacked a nursing student and his friend, recording and harassing them before being apprehended by the police.

In Puttur, a minor girl attending a local event was reportedly harassed by a youth of another faith, sparking a protest outside the police station by Hindutva activists demanding the youth be handed over. Meanwhile, at Panambur Beach in Mangalore, a woman meeting a friend was accosted by members of a Hindutva group who scolded the duo and filmed the incident.

Other incidents include the assault of a man and his mother in Kadaba for assisting a distressed woman, the repeated framing of consensual interfaith relationships as “love jihad,” and the targeting of couples travelling together, often leading to police involvement after interference by vigilante groups. These incidents underscore the region’s heightened communal tensions and the frequent intrusion of vigilante groups into personal matters.

Meanwhile, the right-wing Hindutva group Sri Ram Sena launched a controversial helpline to address so-called “love jihad” cases, aimed at interfaith relationships, particularly those involving Muslim men and Hindu women. The group claims that Hindu women are lured into relationships by Muslim men who allegedly aim to convert them. This initiative reflects a growing concern among certain segments of society about interfaith unions, and it has already stirred discussions regarding the involvement of law enforcement and whether such actions contribute to rising communal tensions.

In Sullia on January 12, 2024, a young man named Jostin Babu was beaten by a group of youths at a local temple fair after being seen talking to senior girl students from his college. This incident led to a complaint being filed at the Sullia police station. In a separate incident in Puttur on August 20, 2024, a minor girl was stabbed by a youth after she rejected his romantic advances. The assailant, with a history of conflicts, allegedly attacked her with a sharp object, leading to communal tensions as both individuals belonged to different communities. The girl was treated in hospital, and an investigation was launched under the POCSO Act.

Further investigation into the Puttur incident later revealed that the story may have been fabricated. CCTV footage contradicted the girl’s account, leading the police to question the authenticity of the claim. Some students also questioned the involvement of the accused boy, with certain groups offering support to his family, claiming the incident was being framed to stir communal unrest. A student organisation from the same college even demanded the suspension of the girl involved for making a false accusation.

These incidents highlight a complex intersection of personal conflicts, communal sensitivities, and societal divisions. Each case underscores the escalating tensions that are often fuelled by accusations and allegations involving different communities, further polarising the social fabric of India.

Patterns emerging from the incidents

1. Targeting of interfaith relationships: A clear pattern emerges of vigilantism directed against interfaith couples, particularly when one partner is a Muslim. Many of these incidents involve accusations of “love jihad,” with consensual relationships often being misconstrued as coercive or predatory. Such relationships are consistently framed as a threat to communal harmony, leading to harassment, public humiliation, and police involvement.
2. Role of Hindutva organisations: Many incidents are driven or escalated by the involvement of Hindutva groups such as the Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad. These organisations frequently gather crowds, stage protests, and exert pressure on law enforcement agencies to act against individuals from minority communities. Their presence and actions often serve to heighten communal tensions.
3. Public and police complicity: There is evidence of public participation in these incidents, where bystanders either inform vigilante groups or directly intervene to question or detain interfaith couples. Police involvement often follows, with authorities typically taking the couples into custody, questioning them, and sometimes returning women to their families. This reflects an implicit validation of the moral policing actions.
4. Violation of individual privacy and rights: The incidents regularly involve breaches of privacy, with photos and videos of couples being taken and shared without consent. Individuals are subjected to public scrutiny and moral judgment, often in violation of their rights as consenting adults. Women, in particular, face heightened surveillance and are frequently returned to their families, disregarding their autonomy.
5. Escalation into communal narratives: What begins as a personal or interpersonal conflict often escalates into communal narratives. Small disputes or interactions are leveraged by vigilante groups to propagate divisive rhetoric, further polarising communities. The term “love jihad” is repeatedly used to stoke fear and mistrust, even in cases where no evidence supports the claim.
6. Police action under pressure: Law enforcement appears to act under pressure from vigilante groups in several cases, treating consensual adult relationships as criminal matters. The swift involvement of the police, often in response to demands from Hindutva groups, reflects the growing influence of these organisations in dictating public and legal responses.

Incidents of religious conversions

In Puttur, seven families from Panja and Pallodi in Kadaba taluk, who had converted to Christianity over 20 years ago, were reconverted to Hinduism in a ceremony organised by the Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP). These families, primarily from Scheduled Castes, had converted to Christianity with promises of better living conditions, but over time, they remained in poverty as the church stopped providing support. The VHP and Bajrang Dal worked with them for two years, encouraging them to revert to Hinduism by offering material support and religious education. The reconversion ceremony, held at the Sri Panchalingeshwara Temple, involved traditional Hindu rituals and included clothes, groceries, and household items for the families.

This incident highlights how extremist Hindu groups use both religious and material incentives to coerce vulnerable individuals into changing their religious identity, often framing it as a return to their “ancestral” faith. This raises concerns about religious coercion, as such movements exploit socio-economic struggles to further their ideological goals, undermining personal freedom and religious choice.

Patterns emerging from the incidents

Several patterns emerge from these incidents involving religious vigilantes and the use of religion for coercive purposes:

1. Exploitation of vulnerable communities: Many of the victims in these incidents, including those in both the Hindu vigilante and unidentified segments, belong to marginalised or economically disadvantaged communities. The reconversion ceremonies, for example, targeted Scheduled Caste individuals who had initially converted to Christianity due to promises of material support. This highlights a troubling trend where extremists exploit socio-economic vulnerabilities to gain religious or political allegiance.
2. Religious polarisation: The incidents often involve a clear division between religious communities, which is exacerbated by the actions of vigilante groups. Whether it’s the spread of false accusations in Puttur or the targeting of interfaith relationships under the guise of ‘love jihad’, these incidents feed into the narrative of a growing religious divide. The aggressive defence of religious identities seems to be used to further polarise communities, leading to communal tensions.
3. Use of religion as a political tool: Both the reconversion incident and the ‘love jihad’ helpline reflect the increasing use of religious identity as a political tool. The reconversion was framed as a return to the “ancestral” faith, positioning Hinduism as the authentic faith, and indirectly promoting a narrative that portrays conversions to other religions as unnatural or coercive. Similarly, the ‘love jihad’ helpline seeks to control and manipulate interfaith relationships by framing them as religious violations, thereby politicising personal choices.
4. Coercive religious practices: The reconversion ceremony and vigilante actions such as the harassment of interfaith couples reveal how extremist groups use religious rituals and social pressure to force individuals into conformity. The promise of material benefits, such as housing and financial support, alongside the pressure to convert, showcases the coercive nature of these practices.
5. Media and social media amplification: Many of these incidents have been magnified by social media, where misinformation or unverified claims spread quickly. In the case of the stabbing incident in Puttur, for instance, the communal angle was immediately highlighted by social media users, leading to public outcry and protests. The viral spread of images and accusations often exacerbates communal tensions and fuels public sentiment.
6. State inaction or complicity: Another pattern is the state’s apparent inaction or indirect support of such vigilante activities. While some incidents, such as the stabbing in Puttur, prompt police investigation, the involvement of right-wing groups like the Sri Ram Sena in orchestrating campaigns like the ‘love jihad’ helpline is indicative of the potential complicity of the state in religiously motivated activities. This highlights the need for stronger legal frameworks to curb the influence of extremist groups in shaping societal norms.

Incidents of cattle vigilantism

The cattle vigilantism incidents in coastal Karnataka illustrate an increasing trend of religiously motivated actions by groups such as Bajrang Dal, who take it upon themselves to enforce laws regarding cattle transport. On February 25, 2024, in Sullia, Bajrang Dal activists intercepted a vehicle they suspected was involved in the illegal transport of cattle. They informed the local police, who arrested the driver, Bibin Paulose, and seized the cattle. This was one of the first of a series of such incidents throughout the year.

In Puttur on March 25, 2024, a similar event unfolded when Bajrang Dal activists received information about cattle being transported late at night. They attempted to stop a Swift car, but the driver lost control and crashed into a ditch. The activists managed to alert the police, who took control of the vehicle and the cattle, though the driver managed to escape. This action was part of a wider network of vigilantism, where community members work with local authorities to apprehend suspected violators.

On April 10, 2024, Bajrang Dal’s involvement was again evident when activists tipped off the police about cattle being transported to an illegal slaughterhouse in Mulky. The police managed to intercept the vehicle, arrest the driver, Jaya, and seize two cows, though the prime accused, Ashraf, escaped. This raised concerns about the increasing role of religiously motivated groups in law enforcement.

The most violent incident occurred on May 22, 2024 in Mudubidri, where a group of vigilantes attacked three men who were transporting cattle from Kallamundkur. The attackers, believed to be part of Bajrang Dal, not only assaulted the victims but also caused significant damage to their vehicle, even stabbing one of the men, Muhammed Zian, in the back. The police, after receiving the complaint, filed charges against the attackers and the victims, further highlighting the complex dynamics of these incidents.

On October 16, 2024, in Puttur, Bajrang Dal activists followed an auto-rickshaw carrying a calf and reported it to the police. The calf was rescued, and the authorities arrested the driver and two women involved in the incident. These incidents often blur the line between legal and extrajudicial actions, as vigilantes act outside the law to enforce their interpretations of cow protection.

Furthermore, such vigilantism is not limited to Muslims alone. For example, on June 27, 2024 in Vittal, Bajrang Dal activists intercepted a vehicle carrying a bull and handed over the driver and cattle to the police. Even non-Muslim individuals were caught up in the system, with Hindu activists implicated in cattle transport cases, such as the seizure of cows in Belthangady on October 4, 2024, where two BJP activists were arrested alongside two Muslims. In another case from October 19, 2024 in Belthangady, authorities discovered cattle being transported without the necessary permits, and the individuals involved had attempted to disguise their identities with slogans like “Tatvamasi” and “Jai Sri Ram.”

These incidents demonstrate an increasing pattern of violence, intimidation, and religiously charged actions by vigilante groups, suggesting that the protection of cows has become intertwined with communal agendas, often undermining the rule of law and creating tensions between communities.

Patterns emerging from the incidents

Several patterns emerge from the series of cattle vigilantism incidents in coastal Karnataka:

1. Religious motivation and community vigilantism: The majority of these incidents involve groups like Bajrang Dal, which is strongly associated with Hindutva ideology. The activists often justify their actions as a form of religious protectionism, particularly regarding cow slaughter. While the law prohibits the illegal slaughter of cattle, these groups have taken on a quasi-policing role, acting outside the formal legal framework.
2. Escalating violence: Many of the incidents involve increasing levels of violence. While early incidents such as the one in Sullia (February 2024) involved non-violent interventions, later incidents became more aggressive, culminating in attacks on individuals. For example, the assault in Mudubidri on 22nd May 2024 resulted in a stabbing, underscoring the dangerous escalation of these confrontations. Vigilantes are no longer just reporting suspected violations but are actively engaging in violence, which raises concerns about law and order in these regions.
3. Involvement of local authorities: Police are often involved, but the level of coordination between vigilantes and local authorities varies. In some cases, like in Puttur (March 2024) and Mulky (April 2024), the police responded quickly, arresting suspects and seizing cattle. However, in other cases, vigilante groups seem to operate with tacit approval or assistance from local police, which raises questions about the effectiveness of law enforcement and the role of communal politics in policing.
4. Targeting of specific communities: Although non-Muslims are also involved in some cases, such as the incident in Vittal (June 2024), the majority of the incidents disproportionately target Muslims, both in terms of the suspects and the accusations of illegal cattle transport. This points to a pattern of communal polarisation, where Muslims are seen as the primary violators of these laws in the eyes of the vigilant groups.
5. Increasing vigilante acts across the region: The number of incidents appears to be rising, suggesting a coordinated campaign by religious groups to assert control over cattle transport and slaughter. As more reports surface, it is evident that these vigilante groups are operating with growing regularity and confidence, emboldened by the support or inaction of local authorities and the state government.
6. Use of religion to justify illegal actions: In several cases, vigilante groups have invoked religious slogans, such as “Jai Sri Ram,” as part of their actions, often to mask their identity or to assert the religious nature of their activities. This points to a deliberate attempt to politicise cow protection and use it as a vehicle for wider religious and communal agendas.
7. Legal grey areas and extrajudicial actions: The actions of these groups often fall into legal grey areas. While they claim to be enforcing the law, they do so without legal authority, leading to questions about the rule of law in these situations. The vigilantism and resultant violence often complicate the investigation and prosecution of actual legal violations, as both perpetrators and victims are subjected to multiple charges, further muddying the legal landscape.
8. Impact on minority communities: These incidents contribute to an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, particularly for Muslim communities, who are frequently accused of violating cattle transport laws. The frequent attacks and assaults on Muslims involved in these incidents exacerbate religious tensions, perpetuating a cycle of mistrust and hostility between different community groups.

Incidents of hate speech/crime

The incidents of hate speech and communal tension in Mangalore highlight a concerning trend of escalating religious intolerance and political exploitation of such issues. On February 12, 2024, Mangalore City North MLA Y. Bharat Shetty made a statement urging parents to avoid sending their children to Christian missionary schools, citing alleged anti-Hindu sentiments, such as derogatory remarks made by a teacher at St. Gerosa School. This sparked widespread controversy, with Shetty’s comments further inflaming communal tensions, leading to protests outside the school by right-wing activists. The protests, led by Shetty, fellow MLA D. Vedavyasa Kamath, and other right-wing leaders, promoted religious intolerance and vilified the Christian community, accusing them of plotting against Hindu sentiments. The police filed a case against these leaders for inciting communal hatred, demonstrating a clear attempt to manipulate religious grievances for political gains.

Another incident, on March 10, 2024, saw Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) leader Sharan Pumpwell urging the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to raid madrassas and mosques for clues related to a Bengaluru café blast, based purely on the religion of the suspect, without any concrete evidence. This call for indiscriminate raids reflects a dangerous pattern of associating criminality with religion and exacerbating communal fear and hatred. Pumpwell’s rhetoric feeds into a larger narrative of demonising Muslim institutions and communities, often without due cause or regard for the rule of law.

Furthermore, the May 2024 incident involving a group of Muslims offering Friday prayers on a public road in Kankanady became another flashpoint for communal rhetoric. Right-wing groups, including the VHP, condemned the act and threatened counter-actions such as Hanuman Chalisa recitations on the same public roads. These groups framed the act as a deliberate attempt to provoke Hindu sentiments, despite the fact that the group offering prayers claimed no such intent. The police, however, initiated legal action against the group, while the VHP leader Pumpwell was accused of threatening social harmony and creating fear within the community by promoting vigilante actions. The mosque committee later assured that such incidents would not occur again, emphasising the need to respect public space and prevent future controversies.

In June 2024, communal tensions erupted in Mangalore when BJP MLA Harish Poonja falsely accused mosques of hiding weapons, sparking protests from Muslim leaders. This incident highlighted the growing political use of inflammatory rhetoric to stoke religious discord.

In July, a social media post by Dr. Upadhya, inciting violence against Muslims, went viral, illustrating how hate speech on digital platforms can spread quickly and fuel division. Similarly, in August, the Sullia police investigated an incident where individuals threatened students at a mosque over their attire, reflecting how even personal choices are increasingly politicised in a climate of rising intolerance.

Later in August, a gang-rape case became politically charged when BJP leaders tried to frame it within the “Love Jihad” narrative, further polarising the issue. This incident underscored the risks of politicising crimes, which distracts from justice and fuels communal division.

In September, inflammatory incidents continued, including the arrest of Satish Devadiga for promoting hatred through a derogatory banner, and a letter from a religious organisation demanding Muslims stop distributing food during a Hindu festival. These events demonstrated the persistent role of symbolism and rhetoric in inflaming communal tensions.

In October, Arun Ullal’s video urging Hindus to avoid Muslim-run schools sparked backlash, showing the extent to which hate speech had permeated educational institutions. Similarly, in November, incidents like derogatory messages at a bus stop and calls for Hindu-only vendors at temple events demonstrated the continued use of public spaces for spreading religious division.

These events reflect a growing trend of communal polarisation in Mangalore, where politicians, social media, and local activists increasingly exploit religious sentiments to fuel conflict. These incidents depict a pattern where political and religious leaders manipulate real or fabricated grievances to stoke communal tensions. The rhetoric used by individuals like Shetty, Kamath, and Pumpwell is often inflammatory, framing religious practices and educational institutions as battlegrounds for ideological warfare. The subsequent protests and legal actions against the Muslim community further escalate these divisions, creating an environment where peaceful coexistence is undermined by political calculations. The role of law enforcement is also concerning, as it often appears reactive or complicit, failing to address the communal rhetoric and violence perpetuated by such figures. The overall narrative is one of increasing intolerance, with politicians and right-wing groups using hate speech as a tool to consolidate power and deepen religious divides.

Patterns emerging from the incidents

Several key patterns emerge from the series of incidents in Mangalore, pointing to a larger trend of communal polarisation and political exploitation. These patterns not only highlight the rising religious intolerance but also underscore the role of politics, social media, and public spaces in amplifying hate and division.

1. Political exploitation of religious sentiments: A clear pattern of politicians using religious issues for political gains emerges throughout the incidents. Figures like Y. Bharat Shetty and Sharan Pumpwell frame religious issues as central to political discourse, amplifying grievances in ways that stoke communal tensions. Shetty’s comments on Christian missionary schools and Pumpwell’s calls for raids on Muslim institutions reflect how political figures exploit religious issues to consolidate their base, creating fear and division within society. This tactic often results in increased polarisation, where the political agenda supersedes the need for social harmony.
2. Demonisation of religious minorities: Another recurring pattern is the consistent demonisation of Muslim institutions and communities. Incidents such as Pumpwell’s call for NIA raids based on the religion of a suspect, Harish Poonja’s false accusations about mosques hiding weapons, and the framing of personal choices (like attire and religious practices) as threats, feed into a narrative that associates criminality and divisiveness with Muslims. This leads to a climate of suspicion and fear where the Muslim community is increasingly viewed with hostility, regardless of the facts. The framing of incidents such as the “Love Jihad” case as part of a larger conspiracy is another example of how religious minorities are vilified.
3. Weaponisation of social media and public spaces: social media and public spaces are increasingly being used as tools for spreading hate and amplifying divisive narratives. Dr. Upadhya’s viral post and the inflammatory videos, such as Arun Ullal’s call to avoid Muslim-run schools, show how quickly hate speech can spread, influencing public opinion and escalating communal tensions. Similarly, public spaces, like the Kankanady road incident or the derogatory banner in September, are increasingly becoming sites of ideological battles, where symbols and actions are used to provoke and exacerbate divisions.
4. Incitement to violence and vigilantism: Several incidents demonstrate a pattern of incitement to violence and calls for vigilante actions. The threats made against students at a mosque in Sullia, the Hanuman Chalisa recitation counter-threat, and the public demonstrations and protests often escalate into direct confrontations. This not only creates a volatile atmosphere but also encourages vigilantism, where groups take justice into their own hands, bypassing legal processes and further contributing to the erosion of law and order.
5. Selective law enforcement and impunity: A troubling pattern in these incidents is the reactive or selective nature of law enforcement. While there are occasional legal actions taken, such as the police case against political leaders like Shetty for inciting communal hatred or investigations into hate speech, there is a perception that enforcement is uneven. Many incidents involving right-wing leaders or activists, particularly those stirring religious hatred, often go unpunished or are handled leniently, fostering a sense of impunity. This selective enforcement undermines trust in the rule of law and fuels the perception of bias.
6. Polarisation of educational and social spaces: Education and social practices increasingly become sites of ideological conflict, with religious identity becoming a point of contention. Arun Ullal’s video against Muslim-run schools and the arrest of Satish Devadiga for promoting hatred through symbols are examples of how educational institutions and social gatherings are politicised, turning them into battlegrounds for ideological warfare. These incidents reflect a growing trend of divisiveness in public life, where even seemingly mundane spaces are appropriated for religious and political purposes.

Incidents of hate speech on social media

The incidents in Mangaluru and surrounding areas between February and December 2024 illustrate a growing trend of communal tensions exacerbated by social media. These incidents reveal how both individuals and groups exploit online platforms to spread provocative and often false content, which stokes religious and political divides.

In February, BJP MLA Harish Poonja stirred controversy by suggesting that taxes paid by Hindus should only benefit Hindus, an inflammatory statement that sparked public backlash and accusations of anti-Constitutional rhetoric. This was followed by a complaint in which a former Mangaluru Corporator accused unknown individuals of spreading fake news about a teacher at St. Gerosa School, further contributing to the growing religious discord. Meanwhile, a pattern of misrepresentation and religious malignment continued into April when false claims about a temple official’s religious identity were circulated online, aiming to stir communal sentiment. These acts of misinformation often exploit people’s beliefs and can quickly escalate tensions, as seen in the case involving a provocative video shared by BJP workers outside a mosque in Bantwal in June.

Social media platforms, such as WhatsApp, Facebook, and Instagram, played a crucial role in spreading such content. A viral video showing BJP workers celebrating an election victory with provocative slogans in front of a mosque in Bantwal raised significant concerns, particularly as it highlighted inconsistent law enforcement responses, which further polarised communities. Similarly, derogatory posts about religious figures and symbols, such as those in September, led to multiple police cases and arrests, underscoring the divisive potential of online hate speech.

The role of inflammatory voice messages and posts did not remain confined to one community. In June, a Muslim man was accused of posting communally provocative content, leading to a police investigation, mirroring the actions of those spreading hate from the other side. Additionally, in September, the contentious issue of a planned Eid procession led to further clashes, as social media posts from both sides’ escalated tensions. This exchange of provocative content highlights how social media platforms have become battlefields for ideological warfare, often spilling over into real-life conflicts.

The Hindu Janajagruti Vedike (HJV) in September also lodged a complaint about the defamation of Hindu gods on a Facebook page, once again demonstrating how online platforms are manipulated to spread vulgar and defamatory material. These incidents underline the vulnerability of social media to being used as a tool for incitement and the dangers of unchecked, inflammatory online discourse in fuelling communal divides.

Overall, the incidents reflect the growing role of social media in communal polarisation, with both religious communities increasingly using these platforms to spread misinformation, provoke reactions, and undermine social harmony. The inconsistency in law enforcement, particularly in dealing with inflammatory content, further exacerbates the situation, leading to a cycle of retaliation and escalating tensions across communities.

Patterns emerging from the incidents

The incidents in Mangalore and surrounding areas reveal several patterns related to communal tensions and the role of social media in exacerbating these divisions:

1. Exploitation of religious sentiments: A key pattern is the deliberate manipulation of religious sentiments by political and community leaders for personal or political gain. Statements by public figures, such as BJP MLA Harish Poonja’s call to restrict tax benefits to Hindus and inflammatory rhetoric surrounding school incidents, are often designed to create divisions and fuel animosity between communities.
2. Social media as a catalyst: Social media platforms like WhatsApp, Facebook, and Instagram have become central to spreading hate speech, misinformation, and provocative content. From fake voice messages about teachers to derogatory posts about religious figures and institutions, these platforms amplify the reach of harmful narratives, making it easier to ignite communal tensions on a large scale. The speed and anonymity provided by social media make it a particularly potent tool for incitement.
3. Religious polarisation and counter-accusations: A recurring theme is the polarisation of communities, with both Hindus and Muslims being accused of provoking one another through inflammatory posts and messages. For example, complaints about provocative content circulated by both Hindu and Muslim individuals highlight how both sides are contributing to the deepening religious divide. The back-and-forth nature of these accusations intensifies the conflict and creates a cycle of hostility.
4. Law enforcement inconsistencies: There is a noticeable inconsistency in how law enforcement responds to incidents based on the religious affiliation of the parties involved. The police often seem to take action only when the incident involves certain communities, or when it garners significant public attention, leading to accusations of bias. For instance, the lack of action against BJP workers celebrating an election victory in front of a mosque sparked public debate about unequal policing.
5. Provocative actions and public symbolism: Public spaces, including roads and mosques, have become arenas for ideological battles, with symbolic acts like offering prayers on the streets or chanting religious slogans outside religious buildings used to provoke reactions. These actions, often framed as threats or deliberate provocations, escalate tensions and fuel conflict between religious groups.
6. The role of fake news and misrepresentation: The spread of fake news is a critical factor in inflaming tensions. Instances where fake voice messages or false claims are made about religious figures or communities demonstrate how misinformation can be weaponised to damage inter-community relations. This often involves the spread of exaggerated or fabricated allegations that target religious or community identities, further deepening mistrust.

Incidents of desecration of religious places

On September 15, 2024, a stone-pelting incident targeted the Majidulla Hudajumma Mosque in Katipalla, Mangalore, during the Eid Milad celebrations. Six individuals, identified as Bharat Shetty, Chennappa Shivananad Chalavadi, Nitin Hadap, Sujit Shetty, Anappa, and Preetham Shetty, were arrested in connection with the attack, which is believed to have been orchestrated to inflame communal tensions. The attackers arrived on two bikes and threw stones at the mosque, damaging its glass windows, which was seen as an attempt to provoke violence between Hindu and Muslim communities in the area.

The police, under the guidance of senior officials including the police commissioner and deputy commissioners, swiftly formed a special team to investigate the case. The suspects were arrested within hours, highlighting the police’s prompt response in apprehending those responsible. However, the fact that some of the arrested individuals had numerous prior criminal cases raises concerns about the lack of deterrence for repeat offenders and the systemic issues that allow such individuals to continue committing violent acts.

This attack follows a disturbing trend of using religious sites and symbols to incite violence, a tactic that has been increasingly weaponised in Mangalore’s political and social landscape. The fact that the arrested individuals were largely from local areas further points to the deepening communal divide within the community, where local residents may be mobilised to engage in violent acts under the influence of right-wing groups. This raises questions about the role of local political forces in fostering an environment where attacks on places of worship are not just tolerated but may be tacitly encouraged for political gain.

Despite the arrests, the broader context of rising communal tensions in Mangalore, marked by earlier incidents of hate speech and protests, suggests that these actions are part of a larger, coordinated effort to stoke division.

Patterns emerging from the incidents

Several concerning patterns emerge from the stone-pelting incident at the Majidulla Hudajumma Mosque, as well as the broader communal tensions in Mangalore. These include:

1. Targeting religious spaces: Attacks on religious places, particularly mosques, appear to be a growing method of inciting communal violence. The mosque attack in Katipalla is part of a wider trend of using religious sites as symbols of contention, which serves to inflame tensions between religious communities. The destruction of religious symbols is often used as a tool to provoke responses, creating cycles of violence.
2. Repeat offenders in communal violence: The arrested individuals in this case had multiple prior criminal records, which underscores a troubling pattern where repeat offenders are involved in communal violence. The presence of individuals with established criminal backgrounds reflects the failure of local law enforcement to prevent these individuals from continuing to contribute to escalating tensions. This raises questions about how effectively the law deals with offenders, particularly those with a history of communal violence.
3. Political mobilisation of religious sentiments: The involvement of local figures with affiliations to right-wing groups or political parties, as seen in the case of Bharat Shetty and his associates, illustrates the instrumentalisation of religion for political gain. Inflammatory actions, such as the stone-pelting incident, are often linked to larger political strategies that seek to consolidate power by exacerbating religious divides. This pattern highlights the danger of politicians exploiting religious sentiments to further their own agendas, irrespective of the damage it causes to social harmony.
4. Media and social media amplification: The rise of social media as a platform for spreading communal rhetoric and mobilising people for violent actions is evident in Mangalore. The use of social media to spread hateful narratives or to glorify violent actions contributes to the amplification of communal discord. This is not just limited to traditional media but includes more covert digital spaces that serve as echo chambers for extremist views.
5. Uneven law enforcement: While there was a swift police response in this instance, there is a broader concern about the inconsistency in how law enforcement handles communal incidents. This can be seen in the reaction to similar incidents where legal action may be slow or even absent, depending on the religious or political affiliations of the individuals involved. The arrest and punishment of offenders in some cases, versus leniency or a lack of action in others, shows a concerning pattern of selective enforcement.
6. Escalation of religious intolerance: The attack on the mosque follows a series of incidents, including hate speech, political rhetoric, and symbolic actions (like protests), that reflect an increasing normalisation of religious intolerance. These incidents suggest that the region is witnessing a shift towards more overt communalism, where religious identities are increasingly used to divide communities and foster hostility.

Other communal incidents

The incidents detailed in the report reflect a deeply troubling escalation of communal tensions, particularly in Mangalore and surrounding areas, where religious groups, both Hindutva and Muslim fundamentalists, appear to be engaging in provocative actions that exacerbate existing divides. In the case of the teacher’s suspension in Mangalore, a series of protests erupted after allegations were made that she had insulted Hinduism, Lord Ram, and Prime Minister Modi during a class on “Work is Worship.” The situation was further inflamed by the active involvement of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and other right-wing groups, who demanded punitive action against the teacher. This incident, where a teacher with years of experience was suspended following a complaint by a parent and the subsequent protests, exposes a disturbing pattern of right-wing organisations pressuring educational institutions to conform to their ideological standards. This pressure to silence dissent not only stifles academic freedom but also undermines the broader principles of secularism and freedom of expression enshrined in the Constitution. Political leaders such as MLAs further fuelled the controversy, adding political weight to the protests, which escalated tensions. The actions of these groups, demanding swift action in the name of protecting religious sentiments, reflect an increasing intolerance for any form of critique, even in academic spaces, and raise significant concerns about the erosion of intellectual freedom and pluralism in society.

On the other hand, the incidents allegedly involving Muslim fundamentalists demonstrate a reactive form of communal violence that perpetuates cycles of aggression. In one instance, following the celebration of Prime Minister Modi’s swearing-in ceremony by BJP workers, provocative slogans were allegedly shouted near a mosque in Boliyar. These inflammatory slogans, including “you people belong to Pakistan,” stoked animosity and provoked a violent response from a group of Muslim youths, who followed the BJP workers and, in an altercation, stabbed two individuals. While the stabbing was condemned as an act of violence, the incident itself is indicative of the underlying communal tensions that have been festering for years. The violent reaction was likely fuelled by the provocative nature of the slogans, which targeted Muslims directly, creating a volatile situation that ultimately resulted in physical confrontation. This incident underscores a broader pattern where religious communities retaliate against perceived insults or provocations, further deepening the divide between the groups. The police response to these incidents, though swift in some cases, seems more reactive than preventative. The deployment of police forces and the formation of peace committees after the violence suggests an attempt to manage the fallout, but the failure to prevent these incidents from escalating in the first place raises questions about the effectiveness of law enforcement in addressing the root causes of communal strife.

Another concerning pattern emerges from the involvement of political figures in many of these incidents. In both the teacher suspension and the Boliyar stabbing case, local MLAs and political activists from both sides of the communal divide seem to have played a role in escalating the situation, either by leading protests or making statements that inflame the public sentiment. The active participation of these political figures suggests that communal violence is being increasingly politicised, with both sides leveraging religious issues for electoral gains. This politicisation of communal conflicts only exacerbates existing divisions and makes it more difficult to de-escalate tensions, as religious issues become intertwined with political agendas. Furthermore, the selective nature of law enforcement in many of these incidents is troubling. While the police appear to act swiftly when right-wing groups are involved, there is often a delay or lack of action when incidents involve Muslim groups, further fueling perceptions of bias and uneven justice. The police’s failure to prevent the inflammatory actions of both Hindu and Muslim groups, including the provocative slogans and public demonstrations, points to a systemic failure in maintaining law and order and fostering communal harmony.

Moreover, the widespread use of social media in these incidents plays a critical role in amplifying communal tensions. In the Mangalore teacher case, a voice message alleging derogatory remarks against Hinduism went viral, and in the case of the BJP workers, social media posts highlighting provocative slogans added fuel to the fire. These viral messages often spread misinformation, creating echo chambers where religious groups are further polarised. The role of social media in the rapid dissemination of potentially harmful content highlights the need for more effective regulation and monitoring to prevent its misuse for communal ends.

Overall, these incidents exemplify a dangerous trend where both Hindutva and Muslim fundamentalist groups are using inflammatory rhetoric and actions to provoke and retaliate against each other, often with the involvement of political figures who exacerbate the situation. This cycle of provocation and retaliation not only perpetuates violence but also erodes trust in the rule of law, as the police are seen as either unable or unwilling to effectively prevent communal flare-ups. Furthermore, the growing politicisation of communal violence, selective law enforcement, and the unchecked spread of hate speech on social media are contributing to a volatile and divisive atmosphere. These patterns of communal violence, driven by ideological and political motivations, pose a significant threat to social harmony, national unity, and the secular fabric of Indian society.

Patterns emerging from the incidents

A clear pattern emerges from these incidents, highlighting the cyclical nature of communal violence in India, where both Hindutva and Muslim fundamentalist groups engage in provocative actions that deepen societal divides. Key elements of this pattern include:

1. Provocative actions and retaliation: Incidents often begin with provocative actions or inflammatory rhetoric. In the Mangalore teacher case, a statement perceived as offensive to Hindu sentiments led to widespread protests and demands for punitive action. Similarly, the Boliyar stabbing incident was sparked by provocative slogans targeting Muslims, which were followed by violent retaliation from Muslim youths. These provocations often trigger a cycle of retaliation, with each side responding to perceived insults or affronts to their religious identity. This cycle perpetuates violence and escalates tensions, reinforcing communal divisions.
2. Involvement of political leaders: Political figures from both sides of the communal divide play an active role in escalating these incidents, either by leading protests, making incendiary statements, or aligning with religious groups to gain political leverage. The teacher suspension case saw the involvement of local MLAs from the right-wing, while political figures from both communities often take sides in the aftermath of violence. This politicisation of communal conflicts fuels polarisation and makes it harder to de-escalate tensions.
3. Selective law enforcement: A key feature of these incidents is the perceived bias in law enforcement. While police forces may act swiftly when right-wing groups are involved, delays or lack of action occur when incidents involve Muslim groups. This selective enforcement contributes to the perception of uneven justice, which further exacerbates communal tensions and erodes trust in the authorities.
4. Role of social media in amplifying divides: social media plays a central role in spreading provocative content and misinformation. Viral messages, videos, and posts often escalate minor incidents into larger communal flashpoints. In the case of the Mangalore teacher, a viral voice message was enough to spark protests, while the Boliyar incident was amplified by social media posts highlighting provocative slogans. The rapid spread of such content creates echo chambers that reinforce communal identities and fuel hatred.
5. Failure to address root causes: The pattern reveals a systemic failure to address the root causes of communal tensions. While police and political leaders may act after violence erupts, there is little focus on preventative measures or addressing the underlying issues driving communal animosity. Educational institutions, law enforcement, and political leaders seem to focus on damage control rather than on fostering understanding and promoting peaceful coexistence.
6. Escalation through ritualised violence: Violence becomes a repetitive and ritualised response to perceived slights, with each side acting in a manner that mirrors or retaliates against the other. This creates a dangerous feedback loop where the focus shifts from addressing the core issues of intolerance to outdoing each other in acts of violence.

Report for 2022 can be accessed here.

The complete report may be read below:

A comparative table may be viewed here:

Related:

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Development project threatens the livelihood of port village in Karnataka

Karnataka: Hindutva groups call for economic boycott of Muslim vendors at Siddheshwar Temple

Hindu Janagaruti Samiti (HJS) & Karnataka links

The post Shadows on Karnataka’s Coast: Report provides the communal flashpoints that defined the region in 2024 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The protesters strongly objected to the celebration of the accused, stating, “The act of honouring those accused of murder is tantamount to endorsing the crime itself.” They urged Karnataka’s Home Minister to take legal action against the individuals involved in organising the felicitation and ensure that those responsible for the murder face swift justice. In their memorandum to the Home Minister, they emphasised the urgency of prosecuting the accused, condemning the glorification of criminals.

The protest also drew parallels to similar incidents, such as the honouring of individuals convicted in the Bilkis Bano case, raising concerns about a growing trend of celebrating those who commit violent acts. 

Kavita Lankesh and others decry glorification of accused:

Kavita Lankesh, sister of Gauri Lankesh, expressed shock and anguish over the recent events, describing the glorification of her sister’s alleged killers as deeply “disturbing.” Speaking to The Quint, she expressed frustration over the delays in the judicial process, which have allowed the accused to secure bail. “Our family has suffered enough, and now we must witness those responsible for Gauri’s death being honored,” she had said. Kavita revealed plans to meet with Karnataka Chief Minister Siddaramaiah to demand the formation of a special or fast-track court to handle her sister’s case.

She added that the investigation into Gauri’s murder had initially progressed under Siddaramaiah’s previous tenure as chief minister, with 100 people assigned to the case. However, delays in prosecution, combined with the recent release of the accused, have left her questioning the effectiveness of the legal system. “If there is no follow-up, what is the purpose of the investigation? The case is being jeopardised, and justice delayed is justice denied,” she stressed.

Reflecting on the slow progress of justice, Kavitha pointed out that while everyone accused in the case has been granted bail, her primary concern is the delay in the legal proceedings. Although she does not oppose the bail as part of the ongoing trial, she firmly believes that the extensive delay is jeopardising the case and allowing the accused to walk free. For her, this protracted legal process is undermining the significance of the investigation.

Determined to expedite the trial, Kavitha Lankesh revealed her plans to meet Chief Minister Siddaramaiah personally, urging him to take decisive steps to prevent further delays. She intends to request the establishment of a special or fast-track court to handle Gauri’s case, ensuring that justice is served swiftly and that the accused do not escape due process.

Kavitha Lankesh expressed profound anguish and disbelief over the recent felicitation of her sister’s alleged killers, Parashuram Waghmore and Manohar Edave, by right-wing Hindutva groups in Karnataka. She described the glorification of these individuals as “disturbing and shocking,” not only to her family but also to society at large. She emphasised that honouring her sister’s alleged killers is not just an insult to her family, but also to the legacy of Gauri Lankesh and the progressive values she stood for.

Kavitha also expressed her shock at how Karnataka, a state that has long stood for progressive values and human dignity, is now witnessing the glorification of individuals accused of heinous crimes. She drew parallels between this incident and others across India where rapists and murderers have been similarly honoured, such as those involved in the Bilkis Bano case in Gujarat. For her, the fact that this is happening in Karnataka is particularly distressing and serves as a blot on the state’s reputation.

In her statement, Kavitha Lankesh made it clear that the public celebration of individuals accused of murder is not just a personal affront but a societal danger. She urged the state government, particularly the Home Minister of Karnataka, to take strict legal action against those who organised the felicitation, accusing them of instigating violence and supporting murderers.
 

Protesters denounce broader trend of felicitating criminals

Members of the Veerashaiva Lingayat Coordination Committee and other progressive thinkers also staged a separate protest in Bengaluru on October 18, condemning the public support given to those accused in the murders of both Gauri Lankesh and scholar M M Kalburgi. The protestors also highlighted broader concerns over a growing trend of glorifying criminals, citing instances in states like Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh where convicted rapists and murderers have been celebrated. Members of ‘Eddelu Karnataka,’ a civil society group, submitted a memorandum to the Karnataka Home Minister condemning the recent events. The group emphasised that such actions tarnish the state’s long-standing reputation for upholding human values and called for legal action against those promoting violence.

In particular, they urged the government to expedite the trial of Gauri Lankesh’s murder and punish the guilty. They condemned the “felicitating of killers” as a blot on Karnataka’s social fabric, asserting that it goes against the state’s ethos of peace and justice. Prominent figures, former minister B T Lalitha Naik, former MLC Mohan Kondajji, activists K S Vimala, K R Subhash, and members of the Dalit Sangharsh Samiti, were among the protestors.

Shrikant Pangarkar’s controversial political appointment sparks outrage

In a related development, Shrikant Pangarkar, another accused in the Gauri Lankesh murder case, joined the Shiv Sena faction led by Maharashtra Chief Minister Eknath Shinde on October 19, 2024. His appointment ahead of the Maharashtra assembly elections sparked outrage, with opposition leaders condemning the move as a stain on the state’s governance.

However, on October 20, CM Eknath Shinde had to stay the appointment of Shrikant Pangarkar. This decision came amid criticism from opposition parties slamming Pangarkar’s re-entry into the party. A statement from the Shiv Sena on Sunday clarified that if Pangarkar had been appointed to any party post in the district, the decision has now been stayed.

Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee President Nana Patole sharply criticised the ruling coalition, stating, “The inclusion of Pangarkar, an accused in Gauri Lankesh’s murder, is a disgrace and tarnishes the state’s image.” Congress spokesperson Shama Mohamed and NCP MP Supriya Sule also expressed their dismay, with Sule stating, “The government has sanctified a criminal, signaling a breakdown of law and order in Maharashtra.”

गद्दारांना आरोपींची साथ!

पत्रकार गौरी लंकेश यांच्या हत्येमध्ये संशयित असलेले श्रीकांत पांगारकरने विधानसभा निवडणुकीच्या पार्श्वभूमीवर एकनाथ शिंदे यांच्या शिवसेना गटात केलेला प्रवेश म्हणजे ‘उंदराला मांजर साक्ष’ असा प्रकार आहे.

श्रीकांत पांगारकरने तीन संशयित हिंदुत्ववादी…

— Nana Patole (@NANA_PATOLE) October 20, 2024

Shrikant Pangarkar, accused in the Gauri Lankesh murder case, has joined the Eknath Shinde-led Shiv Sena, which is running the Maharashtra government in alliance with BJP and under PM @narendramodi Ji.

Why do all corrupts, murderers, and rapists seem to find BJP and its…

— Dr. Shama Mohamed (@drshamamohd) October 20, 2024

अतिशय धक्कादायक ! गुन्हेगारांना सामाजीक प्रतिष्ठा प्राप्त करुन देण्यात खुद्द मावळते मुख्यमंत्री आणि त्यांचा पक्ष आघाडीवर आहे. या राज्यात कायदा आणि सुव्यवस्थेचे तीन तेरा का वाजले याच्या काही कारणांपैकी हे एक प्रमुख कारण…! प्रख्यात पत्रकार गौरी लंकेश यांच्या मारेकऱ्याला खोके…

— Supriya Sule (@supriya_sule) October 20, 2024

According to India Today, Shrikant was part of the undivided Shiv Sena until 2006. In 2011, after the Shiv Sena reportedly denied him a ticket to contest elections, he joined the Hindu Janajagruti Samit, where he met co-conspirators in Gauri’s murder. Pangarkar had previously been arrested by the Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) in 2018 for possessing arms and explosives. He was linked to a right-wing extremist network responsible for planning attacks on cultural events and individuals deemed enemies of Hindutva ideology. 

According to the chargesheet filed in the Kavitha Lankesh murder case, Shrikant Pangarkar briefed all the accused on the precautions they were to undertake before, during, and after the murder. He also gave them legal training and told them what to do in case they got caught. Bharat Kurane bought Ganesh Miskin and Parashuram Waghmore the clothes they would use for the murder.

Although his appointment to the Shiv Sena was stayed amid public backlash, the episode has further fuelled criticism of the ruling government for allegedly providing a safe haven for extremists and criminals.

This recent sequence of events has intensified calls for greater accountability and justice, not only for Gauri Lankesh but also for all victims of politically motivated violence.

Related:

Murderers or Martyrs? The dangerous glorification of murdered Gauri Lankesh’s accused by Hindutva groups

Murder of Gauri Lankesh a hate crime against humanity, condemn release on bail of 8 accused: ALIFA Open letter

Gauri Lankesh assassination: 6 years down, no closure for family and friends, justice elusive

The Hasdeo Arand crisis: Tribal protesters face brutal state crackdown while standing against felling of trees

The post Protest in Karnataka as activists condemns felicitation of Gauri Lankesh murder accused by right-wing groups appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Only one state has an act for gig workers—Rajasthan—as of now, and if this draft becomes law, Karnataka would be the second state to enact a law for gig workers’ welfare. Notably, the Indian National Congress (INC) was the ruling party in Rajasthan, as it is now in Karnataka when the act was passed in the legislative assembly. Telangana, another state in which a gig worker draft law has been on the cards, is also a Congress-ruled state. However, Telangana’s law is not publicly accessible yet, and information on it was reported by sections of the media.

A few common threads

Generally, all state governments, as of now, seem to be following a set structure in terms of the welfare of gig workers.

One, in the definitions, they define:  

i) Aggregators to include major players like Swiggy, Zomato, etc., and smaller players like, say, Shoffer—a luxury electric car ride-hailing service based out of Bangalore.  

ii) Gig workers to include the delivery or ride partners or other such people registered on these platforms for work.

Two, they constitute a board to oversee the welfare of workers and ensure the implementation of the act.

Three, they establish a welfare fund to which the aggregators will be made to pay a certain amount per transaction per worker or some other mechanism.

Four, they outline the rights of the workers and the responsibilities of the aggregators, along with stating the penalties for violations.

While all these elements are present in the Karnataka Gig Worker law draft, it is important to understand the changing contours of employment relations in the gig economy year by year, along with the growing trend of gig work, when drafting the provisions of the law. For example, food delivery workers wear uniforms of the brand they are working with, as mandated, thus providing free marketing to the brand as they ride through the city. This is not factored into the pay given to them, and in fact, the uniforms are supposed to be bought from the brand by the workers themselves. These types of disguised employment conditions are not considered by the government while it defines the relationship between aggregators and workers.

In this context, this article will discuss the Karnataka Gig Worker law, its similarities and differences with the Rajasthan Gig Workers law, and the potential for improvement in the legislation on Gig Worker Welfare.

Draft Karnataka-based Gig Workers (Social Security and Welfare) Bill, 2024

The draft bill defines an aggregator as a digital intermediary for a buyer of goods or user of services to connect with the seller or the service provider, and includes any entity that coordinates with one or more aggregators to provide the services. Essentially, a food delivery app like Swiggy, or an app that facilitates the hiring of electricians or beauticians like Urban Company, comes under the definition.

Section 2(e) of the Act defines gig workers as a person who performs work or participates in a work arrangement that results in payment based on terms and conditions laid down in such a contract. This includes all piece-rate work, and whose work is sourced through a platform, in the services listed in Schedule-I.

The Schedule includes the following services:

1.   Ride Sharing Services  
2.   Food and Grocery Delivery Services  
3.   Logistics Services  
4.   E-Marketplace for wholesale/retail sale of goods and/or services—B2B/B2C  
5.   Professional Service Providers  
6.   Healthcare  
7.   Travel and Hospitality  
8.   Content and Media Services

The draft bill has provisions for the rights of the gig worker in Section 6, granting them the right to register with the Gig Workers Welfare Board—established under Section 3—and the right to access general and specific social security schemes, as well as the right to access a grievance redressal mechanism (Section 7). This Grievance Redressal Mechanism involves either a complaint to the state government-appointed officer or a petition through a web portal whose link should be provided on the aggregator’s website.

The draft also outlines several responsibilities for aggregators:

1. Aggregators must provide a database of workers to the board and update it (Section 10).  
2. Aggregators must register themselves (Section 11).  

3. Aggregators must ensure that the contract is fair, easily understandable in a language comprehensible to the worker and listed in the 8th Schedule of the Indian Constitution. Any change in the contract should occur with prior notice, and termination of the contract by the worker on account of the change should not affect the entitlements they were supposed to receive. 

4. Aggregators must communicate to the gig worker the parameters of allocation, distribution, assessment, and grounds for denial of work, as well as the parameters of the rating system and categorization of the workers on the quality of service, log-in time, etc. if such categorization is done by the employer (Section 14).

5. Aggregators cannot terminate the gig worker without prior notice of 14 days, and the contract must have an exhaustive list of grounds for termination or deactivation from the platform (Section 15).

6. Aggregators must pay workers weekly without delay (Section 16).

7. Aggregators must ensure reasonably safe and healthy working conditions, as practicable as possible (Section 17).  

8. Aggregators must ensure that a grievance link is available on their website and constitute an internal dispute resolution committee if they have more than 50 workers. These disputes include failure to adhere to the responsibilities mentioned above (Section 24). 

9. Aggregators must appoint a human point of contact for queries, with workers having the option to communicate in Kannada, English, or any 8th Schedule language known to them.

The draft also proposes the establishment of a welfare fund, to be funded by the aggregators at a percentage of the pay of platform-based gig workers per transaction or based on annual state-specific turnover, as may be notified by the government. For this purpose, the draft proposes a Central Transaction Information Management System where all transactions are mapped and monitored by the Board to ensure that payments made to workers and deducted fees are recorded and accounted for. Penalties range from Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 1, 00,000 and are compoundable unless the offense has been committed on more than three occasions.

It was also reported in the media that the government and aggregators agreed on levying a cess per transaction rather than based on state-specific turnover.

Similarities and differences with the Rajasthan Act

Both laws establish a board, give similar powers to the gig worker welfare board, and establish Central Monitoring Systems. In essence, both laws grant the same rights to workers, impose the same responsibilities on aggregators, and establish welfare funds.

However, the difference lies in the details of these broad structures. For example, the Rajasthan Act explicitly recognises the right of workers to participate in all decisions taken for their welfare through representation on the board. In constituting the board, the Rajasthan Act mandates that one-third of the members shall be women. The Karnataka draft misses these provisions and does not have as many members on the board. The Rajasthan law includes 12 board members, including the in-charge minister, while the Karnataka draft includes 10 members, with five being ex-officio members from various departments.

The Karnataka Act also emphasises transparency and the need for communication in languages understandable by the worker. By making it mandatory for the aggregator to provide details of the rating system or categorization of gig workers based on the quality of service rendered, log-in time, or other criteria, the draft attempts to lift the veil under which aggregators have operated until now.

Other key differences can be found in the welfare fee and penalty sections. The draft Karnataka law chooses an either-or approach, where the welfare fee could either be a percentage of each transaction or a percentage of the state-specific annual turnover. The Rajasthan Act does not mention turnover. In terms of penalties, Rajasthan’s law imposes penalties ranging from Rs. 5 lakh to Rs. 50 lakh. The Rajasthan Act also has provisions for interest payable on delayed payment of the welfare fee.

Potential for development

There is much room for development in the Karnataka draft law. While the fundamental question of defining the relationship between the gig worker and aggregator has not been answered, the draft leaves many concerns in the areas it chooses to operate in.

For example, it does not consider women in the gig workforce, nor does it enact specific provisions to protect their interests, such as maternity-specific provisions where women do not have to lose their categorization within the platform if they take a maternity break.

The bill has already been reportedly opposed by various companies due to concerns about compliance, with claims that it will hurt the ease of doing business in the state. While these concerns are expected, the sheer volume of compliance measures businesses must adhere to under the act raises doubts about its effective implementation. Meanwhile, Kerala’s Minister for Labour, V. Sivankutty, stated in August that the government intend to introduce the Kerala State Platform-Based Gig Workers (Registration and Welfare) Bill, 2024 in the assembly session this October.

In this paradigm, where the government seems to have decided not to accord the status of a worker to the gig worker and the status of an employee to the aggregator, the least it could have done is to provide for the increased bargaining power of the worker. This could have been achieved through the official recognition of unions in the gig economy, allowing bargaining to be done with unions or federations of such unions.

Conclusion

Despite the improvements in the Karnataka draft law, the fundamental question and demand remain unheeded. With the control aggregators usually exert on gig workers, the demand has been that gig workers be recognized as employees. With the BJP in Rajasthan not giving importance to the previously enacted gig worker law, and Congress governments consistently defining the relationship between gig workers and aggregators as independent individuals rather than employees, the future possibilities look narrower. 

Such a law should not be a choice between no protection at all and meagre protection for gig workers.

(The writer is a researcher with the organisation)

Related:

Rajasthan’s Gig Worker Law, a step towards industrial democracy

Karnataka Budget 2023-24: CM announces Rs. 4 lakh life & accident insurance policy for gig workers

Report Highlights Poor Working Conditions for Gig Workers; Uber, Ola, Amazon Score Zero

Report Highlights Poor Working Conditions for Gig Workers; Uber, Ola, Amazon Score Zero

India’s Gig Workers: Overworked And Underpaid

The post Karnataka’s draft law for welfare of gig workers, an insufficient tokenism? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Hence, as compared to other regions of Karnataka, the old Mysore region did not respond enthusiastically to the Sanghi agenda for these historical reasons. Thus, the BJP has not done well in this region so far.

But over the past thirty years, especially in the Modi era, the changes taking place in the socio-economic and political culture of Old Mysuru and Mandya district in particular, have begun to change this balance that has been shaped over a period.

Besides, the agrarian crisis, migration, unemployment, the crisis of livelihood leading to insecurity and identity crisis, personal and social anxieties generated by the neoliberal economy over the last three decades, coupled with the Brahminisation of the upper strata of the dominant castes, namely Vokkaligas and the Sanskritisation of the Nathapanthic Vokkaliga monasteries, the inertia and slow inaction of the progressive movements, and the zeal, resources and destructive zeal of the right-wing forces have brought about many fundamental changes in the politics of Mandya region which have become glaringly visible in the past few years.

Some Examples:

During the 2018 assembly elections, the upper strata of the dominant Vokkaliga caste declared their priorities as “Kumaraswamy for the state, Narendra Modi for the country,” the mobilisation of the dominant castes to defeat AHINDA (the acronym for Minorities (Alpasankhyata), Backwards (Hindulida) and Dalits) politics of Siddharamiah lead Congress. For the last 10 years, the Sanghis have kept Tipu’s capital Srirangapatna in a constant state of planned communal tension, with the BJP candidate who lost in that constituency in the 2023 elections getting four times more votes than the previous election.

They have tried unsuccessfully to change Tipu history during elections by fielding Uri Gowda and Nanje Gowda (the mythical characters created by the Sanghis to propagate their vicious narrative that these two Vokkaliga heroes assassinated Tipu and that he did not die a martyr in the battle field), the JD (S), which lost badly in the 2023 elections, not only aligned with the BJP in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, but also ideologically aligned with the Sanghi fascist Muslim-hating Brahmanical Hindutva.

The inauguration of the regional office of the RSS at Pandavapura, which was the main centre of the farmers’ union (Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha), the hoisting of the saffron flag at Keregodu and the manufactured communal tension in the area, which has been otherwise in the sphere of influence of the progressive movements like Dalit Sangharsha Samiti (DSS) and the farmers’ unions, soon after the elections, etc. are examples of the social and political changes that demonstrate that the Mandya-Mysuru region is increasingly turning towards Hindutva.

The communal violence in Nagamangala is a continuation of this phenomenon and not an exception. No matter from where the instant spark or stone fell to provoke communal riots on the day of Ganesh Utsav this year, the rest of the script was already planned as decided by the Sanghis. This is because this is part of the well-planned strategy of the Sangh Parivar to achieve its organisational and political hold over society.

In fact, thirty years ago in the coastal regions of the state—where polarisation has reached its peak today, there also existed communal co-existence like the Mandya-Mysuru of today. The Coastal Lab has provided the Sanghis a blueprint to root their politics of hate in society. They are now implementing the same experiment in Mandya in a phased manner, employing a strategic approach.

It is, therefore, imperative to understand the history of the growth of the Sanghis and its political arm, the BJP (Bharatiya Jana Sangh before 1980), and the strategies adopted by them at various levels, and move forward to build the political and grassroots organisations needed to defeat them.

The path treaded by the BJP and its growth in Karnataka

The Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the original form of the BJP in Karnataka, has been contesting elections in Karnataka since 1952. In the first two decades, the Jana Sangh, which contested in tens of constituencies in Hubli, Bidar, Bangalore, Kolar and coastal regions, had garnered an average 2-5 % of votes placing itself at a distant second or third place in some constituencies. In the 1967 elections, it won four seats in the Legislative Assembly for the first time. For comparison, except for the 1957 elections (in which the Jana Sangh got 1.34 per cent of the votes and the undivided CPI got 1.92 per cent of the votes) the left parties have never got more votes than the BJP in any of the elections until now.

In any case, after Emergency, the Jan Sangh, emerged as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) following the demise of the Janata Era in 1980. In 1983 it won 18 seats with a vote share of 7.83 percent. Its vote share fell in the 1985 election. But since the 1989 elections when the BJP won four seats with four per cent of the vote, continued to expand its vote base over the following decades as part of a several stages of Hindutva expansion projects across the state and country.

For example, in 1994, BJP got 17 percent of the vote and 40 seats. In 1999, 20.69 percent of the vote and 44 seats in 2004, 28.33 per cent of the vote and 79 seats, becoming the single largest party. In the year 2008, it received 33.86 percent of the vote and 110 seats. In 2013, though it splintered into three factions, the BJP’s total vote share remained the same if you include the vote share of the factions since all of them returned to the fold of BJP, subsequently.

In the 2018 assembly elections BJP secured 36.2 per cent of the vote and 104 seats. In 2023, although it got 36 percent of the votes, the number of seats fell to 66. However, in 2024 Lok Sabha elections it gained 46 percent votes and 17 out of 28 parliamentary seats well beyond the expectations of all pundits.

Therefore it can be concluded, in general that after 1989, the Sangh Parivar and the BJP have grown in Karnataka and the country in three stages, without major setbacks to their political and ideological agenda.

The first stage -hidden agendas, high dramas

In the first phase, in the new territories it enters, this combine will project itself as a cultured, honest, god-fearing, anti-corruption, patriotic party to enhance its image and influence. In this regard, it strengthens its image by bringing into its fold the elite of other parties and the elite of society, film actors, retired army officers-bureaucrats etc. And, also lures those castes and communities ignored by the mainstream party, i.e., the Congress, with party positions and other allurements.

In 1989, when the Congress made Bangarappa the chief minister after removing the Lingayat leader Veerendra Patil from the chief minister’s post, the BJP realised that the dissatisfaction of the Lingayats with the Congress was at its peak and immediately made Yeddyurappa, the Lingayat leader of the party, as the president of the BJP and thereby captured the support of Lingayat Mutts.

At the same time, LG Havanur, who was known as the harbinger of social justice in the state, economist Venkatagiri Gowda and other renowned people joined the BJP. At that time, they were only promoting pro-people, pro-farmer issues on the face of it while the combine was secretly carrying out its Hindutva campaign through other organs of the Sangh Parivar.

That’s the first phase.

In this first phase, it behaves such that its communal agendas go unnoticed in the region. Those who join the BJP are also at first joining only on the basis of caste, personal prestige etc. But while all parties do the same, the BJP is different because of its RSS structure and approach system and ideological agenda.

The second stage is consensual Hindutvaisation

Once the Lingayats migrated to the BJP for anti-Congress reasons in a significant way, the Sangh Parivar’s affiliate organisations began to organise the community on a number of issues, keeping in constant touch with the Lingayat mutts and its social elites and also the masses. For example, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) unifies all Lingayat-Veerashaiva seers as Hindus and brings them on a single platform for ‘Hindu protection’. Gradually, the anti-Brahminism among the Lingayats is vanquished and converted into Hindutva. The “Vachan Darshana’, the Sanghi  interpretation of 12^th century verses of the founders of Lingayatism, brought out by the Sanghis recently is a continuation of this project. Although the entrepreneurs and upper classes of the community have built up empires in the educational and other service sectors and are dependent on the support and cooperation of the state, these sections within the community have become Brahmanised, forgetting the Kayaka culture and pursuing their coveted business interests.

It is as a result of all this that it becomes an acceptable spokesperson for the Hindutva agenda.

This is the second stage.

The same trend is now prevalent in South Karnataka, especially among Vokkaligas. The erstwhile senior seer of the Adi Chunchanagiri Mutt, worshipped by the Vokkaligas, was made the vice-president of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. Their mutts are not only Sanskritising and Brahmanising, but also socially and culturally complementing Hindutva, without taking a politically overt stand. While the Adi Chunchanagiri Mutt took a clear stand on the Uregowda-Nanjegowda issue as senior Vokkaliga leaders of the Congress and the JD (S) were influential, the Mutt and the Vokkaliga community continue to have a soft spot for Modi on Hindutva. During the course of the text revision initiated by the VHP to undo secular texts and introduce Hindutva lessons, Lingayat mutts talked about only Basavanna, Vokkaliga mutts talked about Kuvempu, a great writer incidentally hailing from the community and after it was revised with minimal changes, there was silence. Moreover, none of them condemned the BJP’s removal of the text about Tipu Sultan. Neither did they stand in opposition when the name of a popular train bearing the name Tipu Express was changed by the then BJP government.

This is another example of the second phase of Hindutvaisation. It is not a coincidence that the Vokkaligas in South Karnataka voted for the BJP more than ever in the last elections. After the official alliance of BJP-JD (S) for the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the Hindutva mobilisation of the Vokkaliga community has gained momentum. It is also fuelled by the latent intolerance and suspicion towards Dalits and Muslims harboured by Vokkaligas

The third stage is militant Hindutva

The third phase is the phenomenon we are seeing in the coastal region and in Uttar Pradesh. At this juncture, the victims of Hindutva’s politics of hate are blinded to the extent that any amount of corruption, injustice, problems of life and the startling cruelty that shakes humanity are unable to wake them up.

The relative reduction of votes for the BJP in the coastal belt in 2023 and 2024 is rather a sign of dissatisfaction that the BJP is not as militant Hindutva as they would like it to be not the sign of coastal belt getting secular. The BJP’s vote share is also steadily increasing as it is moving smoothly from phase one to phase two and phase two to phase three.

And except for the usual sporadic protests by democrats and resistance by Dalits and Muslims to communalism there is no effective opposition to communalism in Karnataka.

Sanghi politics in Karnataka is in the second phase in Kittur and Central Karnataka and is speedily moving towards third phase. The coastal region is already in the third phase.
The Bengaluru, Kalyana Karnataka and South Karnataka where Mandya district and Nagamanagla is situated is moving towards the second phase with great speed.

The incidents in Srirangapatna, Keregodu, and now Nagamangala are examples of that.

In the first stage, it expands its base by using caste, prestige, defection. Soon the second phase begins. So even though ostensibly communal polarisation is not as visible in south Karnataka as in the coastal belt, it should not be forgotten that it is the first step in the same process. Therefore, the increase in the vote share of the BJP in all the constituencies of South Karnataka, even where the BJP has lost its deposits, and the visible characteristics of the second phase of Hinduisation in all these places, should be a cause for concern among the democrats and not a consolation.

At least the occurrences of planned communal riots in the Mandya region should shatter that false sense of relief.

Sanghi fascism is not invincible – but there is no alternative to people’s organisation

This does not however mean the BJP is unbeatable.

However, the last year-and-a-half of Congress rule has made it clear that the party’s politics, ideology, and organisation – even in the Rahul Gandhi era – have no intention of defeating or countering the Sangh’s Hindutva. It is, thus, a historical fact that it is the Congress’s compromising, soft Hindutva politics that has contributed to the growth of Sanghi politics.

Fascism is not just a cultural phenomenon as many liberals of Karnataka make it out to be. Even though Fascism as an ideology can be found in the society and the polity for a long time, it finds its social base and grows feeding on the growing social and economic crisis in society, fuelled by the failure of existing forces to resolve it.

The corporate crony, neo-liberal economic policies, Brahminical social policies, which the Congress and the BJP have all unanimously implemented, are exacerbating the crises and anxieties of the majority of the people and opening the highway to the fascists and fascism The growth of fascists cannot be stopped unless these are radically transformed into pro-people and socialistic policies. In the meanwhile its speed can only be controlled occasionally and temporarily but unless a formidable, credible ideological, political and organisational alternative is provided, fascism thrives.

Thus, Hindutva fascism can be defeated only through a popular democratic movement rooted in the oppressed people who can change both the capitalist and Brahminical system.

But unfortunately, the Left parties, which had previously built such movements, are now gasping. Today, the BJP is getting ten times more votes than the Left parties in their own strongholds.

On the other hand, no mass movement in Karnataka is today left with the capacity to mobilise people in great numbers to challenge both the government and Sangh fascism. Not only during the BJP government, but also during the present Congress government, protests have been reduced to tokenisms. The blockade at Freedom Park (a designated place in the Bangalore city for the protests) needs to be broken, people’s power resoundingly displayed as resistance power to jolt the government. This is not meant as a criticism of anybody but is meant as a collective self-criticism.

Therefore, until the time that we are able to build a strong mass movement and eradicate Hindutva from the minds of the people, until we are able to build true democratic aspirations among all peoples, neither will Hindutva be defeated nor the BJP could be unseated in the country.

The recent Nagamangala communal riots also sends out the same warning for those who can see and hear.

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The post Is Mandya becoming the new right wing capital of Karnataka? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As per the poll predictions of Eedina, the Indian National Congress party, which is also governing the state after winning the assembly elections, will continue to maintain its lead in Karnataka over others in the Lok Sabha elections. As per the predictions, Congress party will be winning 15 seats will the Bharatiya Janata Party-led NDA will be able to win 13 seats in the state. It is also essential to note that as per the predictions of Eedina which were released prior to the beginning of the election, it had been alleged that Congress party might be able to secure anywhere between 13 to 18 seats, with a vote share of 46.4%.

If the predictions of the Eedina hold true, the BJP-JD(S) alliance will be able to secure 10 to 13 seats, with a vote share of 44.27%. It is also essential to note that the poll predictions of Eedina for the state assembly elections, which had predicted a win for the Congress Party, had held to be accurate.

Eedina has also released their predictions for the following states:

For the state of Telangana, Eedina has predicted that Congress will be able to win a total of 10 seats while BJP will win 4 to 5 seats and BRS to win 2-3 seats.

For Tamil Nadu, a state where BJP has been trying to making their significant entry, Eedina has projected the NDA to be able to win 1 seat while the INDIA alliance has been predicted to bag 38 seats.

For the state of Kerala, which is another state that has consistently opposed the saffron party and their politics based on communalism, INDIA is forecasted to win 19 seats and NDA only 1 seat.

The complete video can be viewed here:

#Breaking #ExitPoll #LokSabaElections2024

The most accurate Eedina survey about Karnataka, Telangana, Tamil Nadu, Kerala came out

In-fact Eedina throws a challenge to all exit polls and to Axis My India’s Pradeep Gupta specifically keeping Karnataka in context.

According… pic.twitter.com/vTPZpjdBGr

— Swati Dixit ಸ್ವಾತಿ (@vibewidyou) June 3, 2024

 Eedina’s challenge to the exit polls:

In addition to releasing their poll findings, Eedina had also sternly denounced the exit polls that had been released by mainstream media houses, some of which are surveys like India Today – Axis My India, News24 – Today’s Chanakya, and Republic-Matrize, and had rather demanded for them to discuss their methodology in collecting the data on which their findings are based upon.

As per a video uploaded on YouTube, Eedina‘s research team members Dr Vasu and Bharath, raised concerns behind the surveys upon which the mainstream media are basing their findings and releasing the exit polls. The concerns raised by the team of Eedina was based upon their own recent surveys in Karnataka, through which the team has alleged that the sampling methodologies adopted as well as the outcomes of these exit polls do not align with Karnataka’s demographics and voter preferences. The aforementioned realisation then prompted for the Eedina team to challenge the exit poll results. It is essential to note that most of the surveys released by the mainstream media has shown BJP winning the Lok Sabha elections of 2024 in the state of Karnataka quite comfortably.

Additionally, Eedina has also raised a call for increasing transparency in the exit polls by promoting the agencies to release their sample size, sampling methodology, or the demographic breakdown of their samples. As per Eedina, following the practice of full disclosure will then enable the people to realise the sampling biases that might have crawled in during the surveys. Some of the concerns highlighted by Eedina were under-sampling of women and the less educated voters.

As per Eedina, by ensuring and promoting transparency, the accuracy of these exit polls can then be checked and the public, which could have been misled or influence by biased exit polls, can then re-evaluate their perception.

The complete video can be viewed here:

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Hasty exit poll conducted during the seventh phase of voting in Bengal

The post Eedina predicts 15 seats for Congress in Karnataka in contradiction to the mainstream surveys; challenges other exit pollsters on their accuracy appeared first on SabrangIndia.

 The grandson of JDS chief and former Prime Minister HD Deve Gowda, reportedly left for Germany after voting took place in his constituency on April 26. His father HD Revanna, who is a MLA for the Holenarasipur constituency, has also been accused in the case of sexual harassment after a former house cook of their filed a complaint. 

Almost 30,000 explicit videos were allegedly made and shot by the MP which were also circulated widely in Revanna’s constituency Hassan in Karnataka.  Several of these videos, as per Hindustan Times, also recorded incidents of sexual assault. As India’s Lok Sabha elections continue, the incident has now received international media attention. Outrage has peaked on social media as this regime’s record of insensitivity on gender crimes reached a peak with this incident.

The news of the alleged crime has sent shockwaves across the nation. News reports have even reported that a 47 year old domestic worker employed by the family as a cook was sexually assaulted, and has written in her complaint at the Holenarasipur police station that the employees would always be scared of the father and son, “When I joined, six other maids would say they were scared of Prajwal. The male employees, too, would ask us to be wary of H D Revanna and his son Prajwal.” She has also claimed that her daughter too was assaulted. For reporting the assault, she has stated that her and her family’s life is under threat right now. 

Furthermore, what is shocking is that it is also reported that BJP Leader Amit Shah knew of these allegations because Karnataka BJP leader Devaraje Gowda has claimed that he wrote to the senior BJP leader that the party should not associate with the Revanna family in December 2023.   Police has thus far lodged a case against Revanna and his father on charges of sexual harassment and criminal intimidation. The Karnataka Women’s Commission has also taken note of the incident and the of commission, chief Nagalakshmi Chaudhary has written to the police chief to take action against the culprits. The commission also reportedly recommended the state government to take action after which the SIT (Special Investigation Team) has reportedly formed to investigate the case.  

The letter to Amit Shah being circulated on social media may be read here:

How did Prajwal Revanna escape to Germany?

Prajwal Revanna is part of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) after last September when the Janata Dal (Secular) allied with the BJP. It was also reported by India Today that in June 2023, Revanna had sought a gag order against media houses to not publish sexually explicit videos of him. As of now, Revanna has reportedly left the country to Frankfurt, Germany immediately a day after voting took place in his constituency on April 27. This raises the question: how did Revanna manage to travel abroad, did he receive special assistance?

Meanwhile, in what seems to be a confirmation, Prajwal’s father H D Revanna has said that the videos are 4-5 years old, of which a ‘conspiracy’ is being made, “I know what kind of conspiracy is going on. I am not someone who’ll get scared and run away. They have released something that was 4-5 years old. Expelling him from the party is left to the party high command.” He also denied claims that Prajwal left the country due to the allegations, and said that he did not know of any FIR as he already had plans to go abroad.  

Revanna himself has so far denied allegations  and has filed a complaint claiming that the videos being circulated are doctored. But both BJP and JD(S) have distanced themselves from Revanna. JD(S) leader H D Kumaraswamy has stated that he would like to wait for all the facts to come out before taking a judgement on Prajwal, who is also his nephew. Kumaraswamy also claimed that he had nothing to do with his nephew’s swift departure from the country the minute the allegations went public. Interestingly, Kumaraswamy has also claimed that this is a “family issue”, “It’s an issue of the Revanna family, we have nothing to do with it, they are four living separately.”

He also stated, “It is not related to me. SIT probe has been ordered, officials have been put to work. If he has gone to a foreign country, getting him back is their responsibility. What should I say, if I’m asked. They (SIT) will get him, don’t worry.” 

Amit Shah, India’s union home minister has asked what the Congress was doing for many years when the incidents took place, “BJP’s stand is clear that we stand with the ‘Matr Shakti’ of the country. I want to ask Congress, whose government is there? The government is of the Congress Party. Why have they not taken any action till now? We do not have to take action on this as this is a law and order issue of the state, the state government has to take action on it. We are in favour of the investigation and our partner JD(S) has also announced to take action against it. Today there is a meeting of their core committee and steps will be taken.”

#WATCH | On ‘obscene videos’ case involving JD(S) MP Prajwal Revanna, Union HM Amit Shah says, “BJP’s stand is clear that we stand with the ‘Matr Shakti’ of the country. I want to ask Congress, whose government is there? The government is of Congress Party. Why they have not… pic.twitter.com/bAZYw7i1oi

— ANI (@ANI) April 30, 2024

Meanwhile, the All India Mahila Congress president Alka Lamba has called on CM Siddaramaiah to write to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) to call on Germany to extradite Prajwal, “We need to see if the MEA will act or keep quiet.” Lamba has also claimed that when Amit Shah recently visited Mysore in March or February, senior party leaders such BJP MLA Preetham Gowda, ex-MLA A T Ramaswamy and district leaders asked the party not to let Prajwal contest. However, the candidate at Hassan was once against Prajwal. 

According to India Today, the senior leader of the JD(S) H D Kumaraswamy also said that he was confident “their” candidate would win from Hassan, “ As far as the election is concerned, we have first-hand information that our candidate will win. Everybody is saying that.”

What does this mean for the hundreds of women who suffered the assaults? Will the JD(S) will actually take any action against Revanna and suspend the accused from the party and ensure that justice is meted out to the victims legally? Or will he also be forgotten, deliberately and become another Brij Bhushan?

This is not the first time a leader associated with the NDA or the BJP has been accused of heinous sexual assault related crimes. BJP MP from Kaiserganj, Brij Bhushan Singh is also somebody who has been accused of grave sexual crimes, including assaulting minors. Wrestlers protested for justice to be brought against him for almost a year however, their protests were to no avail and the courts are yet to frame charges against him either. Similarly, Kuldeep Singh Sengar who was finally convicted in 2019 for raping a 17 year old girl in 2018 was also from BJP. He is also suspected of killing her father and criminal intimidation. There was a huge public outcry against Sengar, who reportedly also tried to kill the victim and her family multiple times during the case. He was suspended by the party, who shared the news with the public in 2019 after there was mounting pressure on the party to share its stance. 

Similarly, recently The Wire reported that a BJP MLA was yet to be disqualified from the Uttar Pradesh assembly despite being served a sentence of 25 years for rape.  The MLA Ramdalur Gond was convicted in December 2023 for a case of raping of a minor that took place in 2014, yet was still continuing to serve his term as MLA.

Ankita Tiwari assaulted and murdered in Uttarakhand

The most recent and one of the most harrowing cases is from Uttarakhand, where the young and bright 19 year old Ankita Bhandari was murdered in 2022. The resort where she worked was reportedly owned by Pulkit Arya, the son of a senior RSS and former BJP leader Vinod Arya.

 The murder ignited widespread outrage, leading to protests across the state. The parents of the victim also led the protests for days, hoping to find justice for their daughter. However, what is worse is that the case saw great obstruction of justice, where Ankita’s parents were shuffled from one police station to another when they tried to file an FIR. Pulkit Arya had reportedly already informed the police about Ankita being missing earlier. What is even more alarming is that MLA of the area, Renu Bisht from the BJP bulldozed the resort after Ankita’s death.  A JCB driver told the courts that he was not just called once but twice to demolish the resort. The second time he reached, Bisht was present at the resort, giving instructions. Pulkit Arya and his two associates have reportedly confessed to the police during interrogation. 

The parents, as recently as April 2024, continue to ask for justice, including action against BJP MLA Renu Bisht for allegedly destroying evidence and also against SDM Pramod Kumar. The family has also demanded action against BJP Secretary  Ajay Kumar, who is said to be the VIP for whom Pulkit Arya reportedly tried to force Ankita to provide “special services” in exchange for money.  

Uttar Pradesh: Rapes and murders

Before that in Uttar Pradesh, first the Unnao gang rapes and killings of Dalit women and then Hathras are blots on BJP’s record. February 17, 2021 a horrific news of three Dalit girls tied up in a field and allegedly poisoned was reported from Unnao district, Uttar Pradesh. While two were found dead, one is battling for her life. The doctor has reportedly said that the girl’s survival rate is low because there seems to be considerable brain damage.

Unnao is also infamous for its 2017 gang rape of a 17-year-old minor which led to the conviction and life imprisonment of the former BJP member Kuldeep Singh Sengar, who was also held responsible for the (judicial) custodial death of the survivor’s father. Her relatives met with similar fate and died in a mysterious car accident.

A 19-year-old Dalit woman in Hathras, (2020) named four upper caste ‘Thakur’ men in her dying declaration after she was raped and strangled to death. The barbarism continued when the Uttar Pradesh Police first, delayed immediate medical attention and eventually denied that she had been raped.

In August, 2020, Lakhimpur Kheri in Uttar Pradesh reported the rape and murder of a 13-year-old girl who was strangled and left to perish in a sugarcane field. This was followed by a 17-year-old Dalit girl who was raped and killed while returning home after filling a scholarship form at a cyber cafe. Days later, in September, a three-year-old child was raped and murdered in the fields due to family enmity with another family in the same district, which acquired a lot of media attention.  

It seems Prajwal Revanna is another name in the list of harrowing incidents and crimes associated with the party. With this list of past examples, it is crucial to see what the NDA and the respective parties will do with Prajwal Revanna and his candidature. 

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Outrageous! BJP Mahila Morcha leader says Hindu men should gangrape Muslim women to protect India

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Is BJP-Ghaziabad police nexus trying to cover up minor’s rape incident?

The post NDA candidate Prajwal Revanna accused of sexually exploiting and videotaping thousands of women appeared first on SabrangIndia.

When I was a student in high school and Pre-University College, I was a member RSS for a few years. Perhaps because I was influenced by their ideas of “Hindu Unity” which espoused equality – but only superficially. I will share with you a couple of examples from my time there. There was a kind Brahmin boy named Mohan in the RSS. His whole family was like RSS. If I had a meal at this house or at the RSS office, he would wash my plates himself. For someone who had been experiencing discrimination in a divided society like ours, an act like this may appear like consolation. However, within RSS discourse, there was an intolerant attitude towards inter-caste, interreligious marriage. When Muslims and Christians were relatively lenient about this, why were they uptight about this? Especially when you claim all Hindus as One? Even though I was nowhere close to marriageable age, I was bothered by it. Anyway, let’s keep that aside.

When we see these two instances together, one can clearly see that even though Mohan’s situation may appear to be progressing, the status quo of casteism is deeply entrenched within RSS thought process. To be clearer, look at the history of the central leadership of the RSS. It has always been led by a Brahmin. To be precise, a Brahmin belonging to a particular subcaste. RSS is trying to replicate the same across the country. BJP has joined hands with RSS. In short, this is the Ashwamedha Yag for the victory of Brahminism.

There is an incident that continues to haunt me today. Often, many prominent leaders of RSS used to visit us. Once, a heavy man who looked like a pehlwan came. He gathered 6-7 kids around him and started talking about history, mythology, patriotism etc. In between, as if remembering something he whispered: “My life’s desire was to spill the blood of a Muslim as a sacrifice to this land, which was decimated by them. One day I did get that opportunity. I saw a destitute man walking towards me in a desolate street. I stabbed him and killed him in a single stroke. I felt my life had become worthwhile.”

The atmosphere was hypnotic. Suddenly, I felt disassociated from my own body. As if I was looking at myself from afar as a third person. I thought to myself: He doesn’t look like a murderer. Maybe he is lying. But why would he lie about something like this? Is this to sow the seeds of hatred against Muslims? To encourage us to kill them?

I never found an answer to these questions. I still haven’t. Maybe this is the teaching method of organisations with ulterior motives?

Thankfully, I failed PUC and was back home. Our village used to receive a single Prajavani newspaper. One day, I came across the news of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia’s death. It had been covered prominently in the newspaper. There were many special features about him. I came under his spell. On the day of Dr. Lohia’s demise, I declared myself a Socialist. At the same time, I also gained friends in the guise of Su. Ramakantham and Srikrishna Alanahalli. Today I am what I am because of all these incidents and meetings.

2. Your short but significant oeuvre of three books of fiction deals immensely with the intricate Dalit life experiences. In ‘ Kusumabale’ the novel in which an untouchable young man, Channa, who was murdered following an affair with Kusuma, an upper caste girl reflects the pervasive Indian reality of honour killing by upper caste people. ‘ Kusumabale’ was written in 1988. How do you reflect on the scenario from 1988 to 2024? Is there a palpable change in the life of Dalits in India? 

You should ask this question to my readers and not to me. Every writer and artist who belongs to a particular time tries to express all that he has sensed and witnessed while fighting for his life in the flood of life that comes at you from all directions.

Take Madara Dhoolaiah as an example. He is a 12th Century Vachana poet. He is a cobbler. When mending footwear, God manifests on the tip of the sewing awl and smiles at him. Madara Dhoolaiah responds: “Why are you grinning at me? There are many who worship you and chant in your name. Go to them. Don’t disrupt my work”. This is a summary of one of his vachanas. Now, if you ask me what is the difference between the 12th century and the 21st century, what do I even say? Isn’t that vachana, the present? An artwork should be seen- not for its depiction of the time period or the sequence of events – but for its sensibilities.

3.  Were the murders of Gauri Lankesh, NM Kalburgi, Dabholkar a sign of the radicalisation of Hindus? If yes, how do you analyse this? 

The murders of Dabholkar, Kalburgi, Gauri and Pansare are not murders committed by human beings. Rather, they are ideological murders. Committed by someone at the behest of someone else by transforming human beings into weapons, by misusing their devotion to God and the nation. When the man who killed Gauri was asked for his reason behind the killer, he said,” I am a man of God. One day, someone I see as a Guru, showed me the news of a woman named Gauri insulting my Gods. I felt an anti-God like her shouldn’t be alive.”

That ideological Guru reads the news to his devotees. Shows them the photos of those who should be killed. That’s all. The Bhakt loses cool and things happen. I think this is what is happening. Dabholkar, Gauri, Kalburgi, and Pansare lost their lives like this. The one who killed was a sacrificial lamb for the conspiracy of someone else. The ideological guru who is the source of this has killed his own conscience and soul to orchestrate something as inhumane as murder. That’s why I said in the beginning, that these murders are not committed by human beings. This reminds me of actor Prakash Raj’s words: ‘We did not bury Gauri, but sowed’.

If we are to find the fountainhead of all this, it lies in the RSS’s realization of God. The second sarasanghachalak of RSS MS Golwalkar said, “The establishment of a society based on the Chaturvarna system – Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya, Shudra – is the realization of God. RSS and its puppet BJP government want to establish this gospel truth. The murders, hate, and intolerance are part of this attempt.

When you see all this, you realise that maybe these RSS people are not actual devotees of Rama, Krishna, Shiva, Shakti, etc. I feel it’s their plan to capture the minds of those who believe in them and then establish the Gods of the Chaturvarna society.

4.  What are the strategies through which the RSS and the BJP appropriates the marginalized groups such as tribal population, women, Dalits and minorities? Since the Sangh is keen on appropriating these segments what will be the impact that these segments will experience over time? 

RSS and BJP change colours as per their needs and requirements. They turn Adivasis into Vanvasis and then conceal the truth that they are our ancestors to deprive them of their rights. They chant women empowerment only to ensure that they sit at home. Calling Dalits as one of their own, they snatch the opportunities given to them. They use them and discard them. They never become partners with equal footing. This applies to middle castes (former shudras) too. Aren’t they unemployed too? They don’t seem to even glance at the unemployment issue that’s heating up every day. They are not demanding their rights. They are succumbing to the elaborate deceptions of BJP. They are once again marching as the Shudra servants of the Chaturvarna system to the tune of sloganeering.

At the same time, the think tank of RSS is portraying the Christian and Muslim minorities as terrorists. It is sowing the seeds of hatred by propagating the false narrative that they are the reason for all our misfortune and misery. This hatred is their capital. This hatred is their energy tonic. The day when the hate is replaced by love, tolerance and coexistence, is when these men of the past will vanish. That’s when we come face to face with the present. Once we realise this, we will also know the work that needs to be done.

RSS and BJP have already caused enough damage as it is. It has reached the summit and now is on a descent. Everyone has woken up from a deep slumber. Naturally, this is manifesting as resistance. A lot of resistance.

5.  Do you think the apparent use of the Hindu religion and its symbols by the Sangh Parivar needs to be countered vociferously to displace their political constituency? Whether the practice of conventional politics in using caste and religious elements for electioneering by opposition parties help displace Sangh’s political constituency based on religion? 

Chaturvarna Hindutva’s RSS is a petty organisation which has appropriated vastly diverse Hinduism, its symbols and values while acting as if it is the representative of all Hindus, fooling everyone in the process. It uses this to further its own political ambitions. They are experts at deceitful politics. Many in their ranks are experts at deviousness. They are well-trained. When others try to copy this, they are mocked. What we need to say is this: Let our Gods and religion remain within the confines of our homes. On public streets, they may end up becoming demons. We need to be cautious of this. Another caution: Constitution, Participative Democracy, Federalism, preserving the autonomy of autonomous institutions, safeguarding public resources, encouragement to agroforestry, implementation of Swaminathan report on support price, prioritising health and education, job creation, controlling inflation – these are the things we need to focus on.

6.  How do you perceive the 2024 general elections? What is the historical importance of the general elections according to you?

In early April, Union Minister Nitin Gadkari was asked what is his agenda for the elections. In his reply he said “Personally, I don’t have any agenda. The agenda is set by the RSS. Our responsibility is to fulfil that.” It was understandable if he said his party BJP would set the agenda. But he said he is going to follow the agenda set by RSS! The gist of this is that BJP which is a puppet of RSS is unfit for democracy and unqualified to govern.

RSS is an organisation that is outside the purview of the constitution and is not accountable to us. Its main agenda is to build a society based on Chaturvana system. Chaturvarna system is their God. They need to destroy the Indian Constitution which is in the way to achieve their agenda. But the feet of RSS are reversed. These are the feet that only move towards the past. How can the BJP which is the puppet of RSS and is bound to its agenda, can ever become people’s representatives? The challenge in front of us is to stop BJP’s politics of the past which only makes the wheels of history move backwards.

7.  What is your experience of ‘Eddelu Karnataka’ in which you were also an active stakeholder?

I’m a member of the Bharat Jodo Abhiyaan. This is not a single organisation, but a wave. Hence, we work with numerous social-oriented organisations. In the 2023 Assembly elections, I joined hands with Dalita Sangharsha Samiti (DSS), Eddelu Karnataka, and Raita Sangha. Eddelu Karnataka did effective campaigning at the ground level. Samyuktha Horata – Karnataka and Janandolana’s grand alliance were active. Everyone has worked together. Along with them, the contributions of organisations that work for the oppressed communities and minority communities are immense. The list goes on.

All these organisations and more have been active in the upcoming 2024 Lok Sabha elections. Many new faces and organisations have joined forces. They are united in their goal: BJP, the puppet government of RSS which advocates for Chaturvarna Hindutva, should not come to power again; a democratic government adherent to the constitution should be elected.

Translated from Original Kannada by Amulya B

(A journalist with fifteen of years of experience Abhish K Bose was a staffer at The Times of India and The Deccan Chronicle – Asian Age. As a contributor, his interviews or articles have been published in Frontline magazine, The Wire, The Print, The Telegraph, The Federal, The News Minute, Scroll, The Kochi Post, Madhyamam Weekly, Andolana, Countercurrents.org and the Asian Lite international published out of Manchester. ) 

The post RSS & BJP have already caused enough damage: In conversation with path-breaking novelist Devanur Mahadevan appeared first on SabrangIndia.

On Tuesday, April 23, after a meeting with chief minister, Karnataka Siddaramaiah and deputy chief minister, DK Shivakumar, Thol Thirumavalavan announced the decision to join hands in the election campaigning in the state on the social media platform “X”.

“Today (23-04-2024) in Bengaluru we personally met Karnataka State Chief Minister Hon’ble Siddaramaiah and Deputy Chief Minister Hon’ble DK Shivakumar and expressed our support.  Also, we met some important leaders of the Congress Party in person and consulted about election campaigning in Karnataka.

As two-phase elections are going to be held in Karnataka state, and the campaigning for the first phase of the election will be completed by tomorrow evening. I will support the India

Alliance Party candidates in the second phase of campaigning and conduct election campaigning in some areas where Tamils are the majority.”

கர்நாடகா துணை முதல்வரும் காங்கிரஸ் கட்சியின் மாநிலத் தலைவருமான திரு. @DKShivakumar அவர்களைச் சந்தித்து நாடாளுமன்றத் தேர்தலில் காங்கிரசுக்கு விசிக ஆதரவைத் தெரிவித்தோம்.
கர்நாடகா விசிக தலைவர் சந்திரசேகர், மாநில செயலாளர்கள் இராஜ்குமார், எம்சி ஹள்ளி வேணு ஆகியோரும், கட்சியின் பிற… https://t.co/pmu3jdhWse

— Thol. Thirumavalavan (@thirumaofficial) April 23, 2024

All three seats go to the polls on Friday April 26. Karnataka with 28 seats is crucial for the INDIA alliance in the 18^th Lok Sabha Polls, Of the 28 seats, Udupi Chikmagalur, Hassan, Dakshina Kannada, Chitradurga, Tumkur, Mandya, Mysore, Chamarajanagar, Bangalore Rural, Bangalore North, Bangalore Central, Bangalore South, Chikkballapur and Kolar vote on Friday, April 26. Bengaluru Rural, Bengaluru South and Kolar are constituencies with a hearvy Tamil Dalit population. The rest of Karnataka’s seats vote in the next phase on May 7.

Announcing the formal decision to the media on Tuesday, the Karnataka state President of VCK, Chandrashekhar announced that the decision was being taken in the wider interests of the country, to Save the Constitution. He state that “VCK could not be the reason for the defeat of Congress and victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).” Chandrsahekhar himself from Bengaluru Rural, Rajkumar from Bengaluru South and Hallivennu from Kolar had been the declared candidates of the VCK prior to this significant decision.

Before arriving in Bengaluru from Chennai, on Saturday, April 20, Thol Thirumavalavan hinted at this decision. The Hindu reported that the Viduthalai Chiruthai Katchi (VCK) leader and MP Thol. Thirumavalavan hinted on April 18 itself that he would campaign for Congress candidates contesting in the Karnataka general election. Speaking to media persons in Chennai, he said the DMK front in Tamil Nadu was strong and the alliance partners maintained a cordial relationship. The VCK and the DMK worked together on many issues, including social justice and equality. Thirumavalavan also said in Chennai that the Congress would emerge victorious in Karnataka election slated for next month and announced his intention of addressing rallies in the state seeking votes for Congress candidates.

When queried by reporters on the deteriorating situation of “law and order” IN Karnataka, Chandrshekhar was categorical: the Siddaramaiah –led government that came to power in May 2023 had been successful in reaching its five guarantees to the people and this has had a huge impact especially among rural women and with no issue to raise this was a false flag raised by a discredited BJP, he said.

#WATCH | Bengaluru: On BJP's reported law and order situation remark in Karnataka, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK) president Thol. Thirumavalavan says, "There is no point for them against the Karnataka government, hence they are talking about law and order issue. The state… pic.twitter.com/ap9CjnrYI1

— ANI (@ANI) April 23, 2024

 Viduthalai Chiruthai Katchi (VCK)

The iconic Dalit Panthers of Iyyakam was formed in Madurai, Tamil Nadu under the leadership of Malalchami inspired by the Dalit Panthers Movement of India formed earlier in the 1970s in Maharashtra. Thirumavalavan become its leader in 1989, after the death of the founder. Through the 1990s the party expanded by highlighting issues of discrimination and caste-based violence. It was in 1999 that the VCK contested elections for the first time. VCK has been allotted different election symbols in every election. In 2014, Madras HC ordered the Election Commission of India to consider VCK’s request for ‘star” as their election symbol.

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Karnataka: While Congress lead increases, a neck to neck fight challenges party workers & organisation

EXCLUSIVE | Karnataka will have a neck to neck fight in LS polls, edge to Congress, INDIA: Eedina Survey

The post Karnataka: Thirumavalavan’s VCK, state unit, declares support for Congress in three crucial seats appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Eedina’s Final Pre-Poll Survey indicates voter preference tilting towards the Congress with serious challenges being its fragmented organisation. With ten days to go for the first phase of Lok Sabha elections in Karnataka, scheduled for April 26, while the state’s voter preference is leaning towards the Congress, there are serious challenges in the run up to the polls reveals a Final Phase Survey conducted by eedina.com. 

The survey estimates that the Congress as a whole will have more than 13-18 seats and the BJP-JD(S) alliance will go closer to 10-13 seats.

Twenty out of the state’s 28 seats is what the Congress could pull in here if the workers and organisation buckle down in reaching its attractive Manifesto (Nyay Patha) to all crucial constituencies in the state. If however, the party falters, the BJP could race to the finish at the last minute. On March 19, a survey by the Eedina group (Eedina.com) that had accurately predicted a comfortable victory for the Congress in the state elections of May 2023 had shown a 17:11 lead for INDIA (Congress) over NDA (BJP-JDS) with seven seats, indicating a neck to neck fight. While the Congress vote share has shown an increase in the past year and the BJP vote share and seats both a decline, 45% of those surveyed, however, still want Narendra Modi to have a third term. Karnataka sends 28 Members of Parliament (MPs) to the Lok Sabha.

If the overall trend of the voters which is towards the Congress continues like this, the grand old party could get more than 20 seats, and there is a possibility of surprising results in some constituencies. However, the rider even here is the fragmented Congress party organisation, which is still wanting in reaching the INC’s Nyaya Patha to the people

April 16, 2024 Survey

Now this Final Survey shows how, as campaign picked up the prospects of the grand old party have improved. The Congress’s vote share has increased by 2.64% in the last one month. The vote share of the BJP-JDS alliance increased by 1.92%. But the contradiction lies in the fact that 50% of the voters surveys also said that they were satisfied with the ten years of Narendra Modi government, 39% of the voters said that they were not satisfied and 11% of the voters said that they do not know.

In many constituencies, the battle between the Congress and the BJP-JDS alliance is close and so intense that the final picture of a definitive conclusion as to who will win. The survey data clearly points to such a situation.(Not only this, Congress is in a better position this time in the constituencies where the vote share was less than BJP by 13-14% in the previous elections)

According to the findings of the Final Pre-Poll Eedina Survey, the Congress will win 9 seats definitely and BJP-JDS will win 7 seats. The uncertainty lies in the remaining 12 constituencies, where there is fierce fight with the Congress is ahead in 5-7 seats. The survey estimates that the Congress as a whole will have more than 13-18 seats and the BJP-JD(S) alliance will go closer to 10-13 seats.

If however the leads of the Congress, which have been steadily increasing its vote share so far, continue in this fashion, the Congress party could win 18 seats, according to the survey data.

In every Lok Sabha election in Karnataka since 1996, the BJP’s vote share has been steadily increasing. But for the first time, this Survey finds that the BJP will experience a vote share drop for the first time in the last 28 years.

Eedina. Com is the only media house in Karnataka, which had given the most accurate pre-election survey during the 2023 Karnataka Assembly Elections. Eedina.com has conducted two surveys about who the voters are inclined towards in this Lok Sabha election and which party can get more seats this time.

In the first survey conducted before the announcement of the candidates, the Congress got 43.77% vote share, BJP-JDS 42.35% vote share. The first poll predicted the chances of Congress winning in 11 constituencies and BJP-JDS alliance capturing 10 constituencies. This Survey said that there is a fierce fight between the Congress and the BJP-Dal alliance in 7 constituencies, and in the fierce competition of these seven constituencies, the Congress has an upper hand in 6 constituencies and BJP in 1.

In what it terms as the Final Survey Report published on April 16 by Eedina.com, 42,674 voters were interviewed for this survey from March 28 to April 14, after the announcement of official candidates of all parties. According to this survey report, voters’ inclination towards Congress has increased. Congress vote share has increased by 2.64% within a month. BJP-JDS vote share increased by 1.92%.

Voters agree that inflation, unemployment and corruption have increased during the decade long Modi era However, the survey also found that Modi has maintained his ‘clean hands’ charisma despite the explosive Electoral Bonds Scam exposure. During the survey, voters answered questions about price hike, unemployment, corruption, tax injustice, election bond scam, Karnataka’s five guarantee, ten years of Modi rule.

Although it is true that inflation, unemployment and corruption have increased during the ten years of Modi’s rule, people appear not ready to put the responsibility on the head of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Even though they accept that BJP has indulged in corruption, a majority still say that Modi is not corrupt.

However Siddaramaiah is a more popular leader than Modi in Karnataka. 42.27% of voters said Jai for Siddhu, while 40.81% of voters said popular leader is Modi. Three quarter percent more people like Siddaramaiah than Modi. 

Who do you think is most responsible for this price hike?

A high 85% of the people surveyed said that there is a price hike (76.55% in the first survey). 44.17% people said that BJP is the reason for the price hike. 23.07% said it was due to Congress. 21% said that all parties are the cause and 8.71% said they don’t know.

Are you willing to vote for congress in favour of Guarantees?

In this April 2024 Survey, 52.28% of Karnataka voters surveyed, have expressed that they would vote for Congress in favour of Guarantee Schemes while 35.26% have said they will not vote for Guarantee Schemes. In first survey the people who are willing to vote in favour of Guarantee Schemes was at 56%.

Has unemployment increased or decreased in the last ten years? If more, who is responsible?

A large section of those surveyed felt that Unemployment is excessive. A significant 37.89% of the people surveyed said that BJP is the reason for the unemployment and 19.88% of the voters said that the cause was the Congress. Another 18.26% of those surveyed said that everyone is the cause and 11.29% of those surveyed said that they don’t know. A small 1.64% of those surveyed put unemployment at the door of the JDS. 11.03% said that there was less unemployment than before.

Has corruption increased or decreased in ten years? If more, who is responsible?

A significant 36.4% of the people who participated in the Survey said that BJP is the reason for the increase in Corruption while 21.45% said that it was because of the Congress, and 18.08% said that all parties were the cause. 11.16% of people said they don’t know. According to 11.36% of voters Corruption is less than before.

Do you think the central government has reduced the tax share of Karnataka state?

41.87% said that the actions of the Central Government were unfair, 27.34% did not agree and 30.8% said they do not know.

Are you satisfied with the Narendra Modi administration of these ten years of central BJP government? 

A significant 49.99% of people are satisfied, 38.64% are not satisfied, 11.36% don’t know.

On the question of awareness of Congress Guarantees at the National level 48.59% have expressed the view that they are unaware of the poll promise in the Mahalaskhmi scheme.

Despite being released on April 5, 2024, a good ten days back, the Congress Party’s “Nyaya Patra” election manifesto of 25 guarantees has not yet reached the people. The Congress vote share could to increase further if the declaration of 1 lakh rupees per family per year under Mahalakshmi Yojana and complete loan waiver of farmers reaches voters through a door to door campaign. Then, the Congress may garner more than 20 seats in the state and are set for a surprising result.

However the lacklustre and fragmented Congress Party organisation poses a serious challenge.

Survey Demographics

2023 

(The pre-election survey which was accurate about the seat distribution of the assembly elections held in the state last year)

The results of the pre-poll survey on Eedina.com (above), which were announced 20 days before the polling of the state assembly elections last year, and these were as accurate as any survey can get. 

Compared to this 2023 Survey, with only ten days are left for the first phase of the current Lok Sabha elections in Karnataka, the Survey suggests that even at this stage, the voters of the state have not made up their minds where there votes will go.

This indicates that the last lap of the election campaign which includes minute level ‘election management’ is crucial and will finally determine the ups and downs of the results.

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PM Narendra Modi’s frequent visits to Tamil Nadu, his “love” for Tamil culture exposed

The post Karnataka: While Congress lead increases, a neck to neck fight challenges party workers & organisation appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The survey shows an increase in the Congress vote share in the past year with a decline for the BJP vote share and even seats. Yet, 45% of those surveyed, however, still want Narendra Modi to have a third term.

Interestingly, six weeks before the scheduled polling in the state, the issues most acutely important by voters, according to this survey is the spiralling price rise/inflation (76.55% of respondents feel price of essential goods has increased) and acute unemployment (53.18% of respondents feel price employment opportunities have reduced). This is followed by voter realisation that corruption has increased (45.75% of respondents), the gap between rich and poor has widened (42.02% of respondents) and access to welfare schemes has gone down (37.63% of respondents). This is a scathing indictment of the ordinary voter on a decade of Modi’s rule.

Change in voter trends

BJP which enjoyed gradual rise in their vote share since 1996 shows a decline in their vote share this Lok Sabha election

2019 Lok Sabha Elections

• BJP 51.38%
• CONG 31.88%
• JDS 9.67%

However, interestingly, political perceptions of the voters surveyed throw up these findings:

Perception people have regarding Modi regime.

• 47.64% feel that position and fame of India has increased at global level.
• 56.14% feel that they would vote in favour of the Congress guarantee schemes
• For women respondents this increases to 59.28%.
• 39.67% respondents feel State Government Guarantee schemes are more helpful compared to 20.31% feeling central government schemes are more helpful. 26.31% feeling both centre and state schemes help them.
• 35.8% of respondents feel Narendra Modi’s work to be satisfactory and 33.06% feel Modi’s work is excellent.
• 45.19% of respondents also feel Modi should get the third term.

Eedina.com’s survey, the second since the group was launched was conducted with a systematic random sampling method with door to door, face to face surveys. In 2023, it was the only media house which predicted the election outcome 21 days prior to the Karnataka election date of May 10 2023.

This survey was conducted from February 15, to March 5, 2024h prior to the candidate announcement. With the sample size of 52,678 this is so far the largest pre-poll survey conducted in Karnataka for upcoming Lok Sabha election 2024.

Note: This is a Pre poll Survey before the announcements of the candidates. This trend may change keeping Candidature, Issues crop up and Mode of Campaign parties and civil society hold. 

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Watch | ‘Rich-Poor Issue, Not Just Caste, Is Driving Karnataka Election’: Yogendra Yadav

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