The loose drama at such events is often hard to detach from the firmly rooted substance.  Trump’s relationship with the accurate is tenuous and free flowing, so we have little to go on.  Ahead of the meeting, the White House was busy sending various signals designed to baffle and confuse friend and foe alike.  The president was keen to praise the “special relationship” with Kim, the sort of term reserved for gatherings such as those between the UK and US.

At the end of January, Stephen Biegun, designated special representative for North Korea in the US State Department, suggested that Pyongyang had made a commitment in pre-summit talks to eliminate uranium and plutonium enrichment facilities for a price.  His mood seemed to jar with the more bellicose stance taken by national security adviser and pro-bombing enthusiast John R. Bolton and fellow belligerent companion and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

In carefully chosen words, the representative noted how, “Chairman Kim qualified next steps on North Korea’s plutonium and uranium enrichment facilities upon the United States taking corresponding measures.”  Biegun was optimistic at the time, drawing upon themes of flexibility and novelty. “Neither leader is constrained by traditional expectations that might doom their teams to try the exact same approach as in the past, with no expectation of anything but the same failed outcome.”

The president’s preliminary chats over dinner with Kim prior to the formal summit did not give much away.  “Great meetings and dinner tonight in Vietnam with Kim Jong Un of North Korea,” he tweeted.  “Very good dialogue. Resuming tomorrow!”  Those aching for detail were left disappointed.  By breakfast the next day, things had cooled.  Cancellations of a working lunch followed.

The smoke has yet to clear, and may be hovering for some time yet.  But Trump was impressed by Kim’s offer to dismantle the enrichment facility at Yongbyon in its entirety (though it is clear that the totality of the DPRK’s capacity goes beyond it).  The discussion and proposed transaction list seemed somewhat threadbare; a total lift of sanctions for Yongbyon’s dismantling?  According to Trump, “Basically they wanted the sanctions lifted in their entirety, but we couldn’t do that.”

The response was not long in coming.  Ri Yong-ho, North Korea’s foreign minister, suggested another version, somewhat more nuanced, less absolute: that only some sanctions be lifted in exchange for the permanent and complete dismantling of the main facility, verified by US experts.  “Given the current level of trust between North Korea and the United States, this was the maximum step for denuclearization we could offer.”
Prior to the summit, there was a transfixed terror that Trump was going to give all earthly concessions, and a good number of goods on gold platter, to the North Korean leader.  A bemused Trump simply deemed it “false reporting” on his “intentions with respect to North Korea.”  Both parties would “try very hard to work something out on Denuclearization & then making North Korea an Economic Powerhouse.”

This was far from the case.  As Joel S. Wit and Jenny Town note with some accuracy,  “It’s ironic that while most pundits and the media kept up a steady drumbeat that he was going to give away the store, he did just the opposite, holding out for a better deal.”

The issues at stake here on the Korean Peninsula seem monumental, but when seen together, constitute the pieces of a jigsaw.  Any comprehensive talks will have to address these, and this summit was evidently not going to do that.  To only see one or two pieces in isolation (abductees, for instance, or the issue of exclusive, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation) is to ignore the numbers of steps in the entire affair.

Trust needs to be restored, a peace treaty neutering the war status of the Peninsula signed, undertakings against the use of force and hostile intent made with heft, and ultimately, an understanding that the parties at the negotiating table aren’t going to bump you off.  Pyongyang is being asked to relinquish its highest grade insurance in the face of a superpower which has shown more than an unhealthy tendency to inflict regime changes with catastrophic consequences.  Brinkmanship and theories of managed lunacy in the diplomatic realm will only get you to a point.

With Trump being advised by the likes of the gun slinging Bolton (known in North Korean circles as the paternal inspiration for Pyongyang’s nuclear program) and Kim ever mindful about the vulnerabilities of his regime, more walkouts are bound to happen.  As Jeffrey Lewis rightly noted, the old guard (Bolton and company) represent “the cold wind” and “pretty much the rest of the government bureaucracy.”  The warmth of reform in securing peace on the Korean Peninsula, spurred on by the fanning of South Korea’s Moon Jae-in and the likes of Biegun, act as counters.  This walkout, at least, means that each can live to talk another day, though it will keep their respective public relations teams busy.
As matters stand, there will be no resumption of North Korean ballistic and nuclear testing, and a promise for more negotiations.  The chatter will continue, and channels will remain open.  As for Trump itself, “This wasn’t a walkaway like you get up and walk out.  No, this was very friendly. We shook hands.”

Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne.  Email: bkampmark@gmail.com

Courtesy: Counter Currents
 

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Interview with Aijaz Ahmad
Interviewed by Prasanth R.

Newsclick speaks to Professor Aijaz Ahmad on the implications of the meeting between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, as well as the path ahead for the key players in the region.  

Courtesy: Newsclick.in

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The meeting between North Korea’s Kim Jong-un and South Korea’s Moon Jae-in is certainly one of the most dramatic and momentous events in the recent history of East Asia. Beyond the symbolism of cross-border handshakes and tree planting (not to mention a controversially decorated mango mousse that briefly ticked off Japan), the joint declaration that a peace treaty will be agreed this year and that the two countries share a goal of denuclearisation marks the most important development in inter-Korean relations since the Armistice that ended the Korean War in 1953.

The first real opportunity for this dialogue seemed to come when South Korea hosted the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang in February this year. But in practice, it’s unlikely that a conveniently located sporting event was the only catalyst for such a dramatic shift in North Korean foreign policy.

Among analysts of Korean affairs, a few theories are circulating. Some think that the Kim government made its overtures because it genuinely fears that economic sanctions could become an existential threat; others surmise that the regime’s programme of weapons testing has now provided it with sufficient reassurance that it could deter a serious attack. A third theory suggests that Donald Trump’s unpredictable approach to international relations gave the north a sense of urgency.

But whatever the precise stimulus or concatenation of circumstances, the north has turned out to be rather more diplomatically sophisticated than many observers thought. When Pyongyang first reached out to Seoulabout the possibility of a meeting via its emissaries to the Winter Olympics, it was unclear how such a historic summit could be organised in such a short space of time. Such events ordinarily take months of planning and negotiation over the finest of details, yet the two sides gave themselves just a matter of weeks in which to arrange it.

Kim Jong-un’s visit to Beijing – his first overseas trip as North Korea’s leader – proved to be pivotal. Kim left reassured of his most important ally’s support, and he eased Beijing’s growing fear of being sidelined in the process. This summit also provided the first example of Kim’s previously unappreciated diplomatic skills as he played the role of junior partner perfectly with Xi Jinping.
Still, for all the outpouring of emotion on all sides, a dose of realism is in order.

The long game

Despite the declaration of Kim and Moon that the complete denuclearisation of the peninsula is the goal, it’s not yet clear whether two sides take that phrase to mean the same thing. Whether or not Pyongyang is willing to accept a reduction in its capability of any level is unclear, but even if it engaged to the fullest extent in a denuclearisation deal, its weapons programme is ultimately irreversible: North Korea now knows how to produce these weapons, and it will still know how even if the ones it has are destroyed.

Another notable declaration at the summit was the two leaders’ undertaking to “actively pursue” meetings either with the US or with the US and China. This nods to an uncomfortable truth: any discussion about inter-Korean relations can never be purely bilateral. As historic as this summit was, the issues at the core of Korea’s division cannot be resolved without the direct involvement of the US and China.

China will not tolerate being marginalised by the US, and will do all it can to ensure that the next step is a four-way dialogue. Similarly, North Korea will need the support of its most significant economic partner if it is to rebuild its economy. Ultimately, China’s interests are best served by peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas rather than reunification, which would deprive it of a buffer state between its border and that of a US military ally. It is likely that Xi will continue to support Kim and provide assistance in economic development rather than encourage a formal dissolution of the border with the south.

Similarly, regardless of the wishes of those south of the border, concrete progress with the north cannot be achieved without the US’s contribution. As things stand, the south needs Washington’s security guarantees, and the north’s various priorities all revolve around safeguarding itself against hypothetical US military action.

So, as momentous as the Kim-Moon meeting was, the two men alone do not hold the key to their countries’ futures. But despite this stark geopolitical reality, it would be wrong not to acknowledge the magnitude of this tremendous step forward. That the two Koreas are talking again is progress in itself – and that it seems likely they will keep talking and building trust is the very best anyone could have hoped for from this unprecedented meeting.

This article was first published on theconversation.com.
 

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The nuclear stand-off between Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the US continues, with the US sending its aircraft carrier strike force Carl Vinson and USS Michigan, an Ohio class nuclear submarine, off the Korean peninsula. Trump has held out the threat that if China does not intervene, the US will “solve the problem” of a nuclear DPRK “by itself”. The Korean peninsula and nearby countries including Japan, are now in imminent danger of another US military misadventure that can spin rapidly out of control, leading even to a nuclear exchange.

While the world now admits that the Bush administration lied about the Iraq WMD's, no serious questioning has ever been done on Bush's claims that DPRK violated the 1994 Agreement. DPRK is held responsible for breaking of the 1994 Agreed Framework though it is the US that walked out of it. If we read the mainstream western media, DPRK leaders are “unstable”, “volatile”, “irrational” and the root of the problem of a nuclear DPRK today. 

Neither has any serious consideration been paid to why DPRK has built a nuclear deterrence, dismissing its need for security as irrational. The world has forgotten that the US brutally bombed and napalmed DPRK during the 1950-53 Korean War, leading to the loss of 20% to 30% of its population. During the McArthur Congressional hearings, Gen. O'Donnell testified , “…I would say that the entire, almost the entire Korean Peninsula is just a terrible mess. Everything is destroyed. There is nothing standing worthy of the name…” (Vol. 4, p. 3075). While the world might have forgotten this carnage, for the Korean people, this memory remains still fresh.

The US has also never forgiven the DPRK and the Peoples Republic of China for the defeat that they inflicted on the US in Korea. At periodic intervals, the US ratchets up war hysteria over DPRK and conducts aggressive war games near its borders in the demilitarised zone around the 38th parallel. In violation of the 1953 Armistice, it introduced nuclear weapons in 1957 in Korea. The US also maintains a nuclear arsenal with sea and submarine forces, and has held nuclear weapons in Okinawa under secret agreements with Japan, though Japan has a constitutional bar against nuclear weapons on its soil. There are currently around 50,000 U.S. troops stationed in 23 military bases in Japan, and around 28,000 in 15 military bases in South Korea.

DPRK also looked at what has happened in the world after the fall of Soviet Union. The US and NATO forces bombed and invaded Serbia, Iraq and Libya. Would it have done so if they had nuclear weapons?

The DPRK started a nuclear and a missile program in the 1980's, and by early 1990's, was in position to create fissile material from its 5-MW reactor in Yongbyon. It felt that a nuclear capability would provide a bargaining counter with the US for longterm peace in the peninsula, and avoid costly conventional military build-up that it might otherwise need.

In early 90's, the US intelligence agencies claimed that DPRK had a stock of plutonium from the Yongbyon reactor and its plutonium reprocessing plant. Estimates varied from a few grams to a few kgs of fissile grade plutonium, sufficient for one or two bombs. DPRK had also started plans for two Light Water Reactors of 50-MW and 200-MW capacity for producing electricity. This were to be commissioned by early 2000. Once all these facilities were in place, DPRK would have had the capability of producing up to 20-25 bombs a year, and therefore a credible nuclear arsenal.

Simultaneously, it was also developing missile capability, by upgrading the Soviet era missiles in its stock, and creating the next generation of missiles.

The 1994 Framework Agreement was negotiated between the US and DPRK in this context. Its key features was dismantling the existing Yongbyon reactor, stopping the construction and eventual dismantling of the 50-MW and 200-MW reactors, and put all its spent fuel from which fissile plutonium could be extracted under IAEA safeguards. In lieu of this, the US agreed to provide two 1000-MW Light Water Reactors and supply fuel oil for producing electricity till these two reactors were built.

Unlike what we read in the western media, DPRK did carry out its part of the bargain. It dismantled its reactors and put its spent fuel rods under IAEA safeguards. Joel Wit, a former State Department official and very much a part of the 1994 Agreement, writes (Foreign Policy: April 27, 2016 ), “Pyongyang’s development of a plutonium production program, ongoing since the 1960s at a cost of tens, maybe hundreds, of billions of dollars… became a pile of unsalvageable junk.”

What the mainstream media neglects to mention is that the US never held up its side of the bargain. By 2002, instead of the two 1,000 MW reactors being finished as agreed, only some civil works had started. The fuel oil shipments, supposed to continue as long as the reactors were being built, saw only sporadic supplies.

The Bush administration, when it come to office in 2002, had identified DPRK as a part of the axis of evil, along with Iraq and Libya, and wanted to blow up the 1994 Agreement. The AQ Khan link to DPRK and its importing centrifuges from Pakistan for a uranium enrichment program was the excuse. As John Bolton, the US Ambassador to the UN puts it, “It was the hammer I had been looking for to shatter the Agreed Framework. ” The US walked out of its commitment of the 1994 Agreement, laid down conditions that DPRK had to “surrender your nuclear and missile program or else.” DPRK chose “or else”.

Did DPRK conduct a clandestine uranium enrichment program forbidden under the 1994 Agreement? While the US argued that any uranium enrichment program was against the “spirit” of the agreement, they never addressed the question under what clause was producing Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel barred in the 1994 Agreement.

Did DPRK have a legitimate reason to start a uranium enrichment program? Much of the discussions that apply to DPRK is also common to the Iran issue. The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) allows for peaceful use of nuclear energy including a fuel cycle. If DPRK did not want to be dependent on the US for nuclear fuel, it would need an indigenous fuel program. Therefore, uranium enrichment for fuel was a legitimate need of its civilian nuclear energy program. Of course, the same centrifuges can also produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) required for a weapons program. That is why it is a dual use technology.

The US had the option of accepting, as it has now done for Iran, that DPRK has the right to a nuclear fuel cycle. It had also the option to negotiate capping of DPRK's missile program, give guarantees against aggression, and stop the highly provocative military exercises it carries out each year. Instead, it walked out of a functioning Framework Agreement, which had effectively dismantled DPRK's plutonium program. DPRK then walked out of NPT, took back the 8,000 kg spent fuel roads it had handed over to IAEA, and within a few years conducted nuclear tests. Its missiles can now reach Japan and the US military bases in Okinawa and Guam, and in another 3-4 years, even reach the US mainland.

The US under Trump believes that more sabre rattling – this time with aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines – will cow DPRK down and make them surrender. The US and Bush Junior's policy of browbeating DPRK did not work in 2002. Why would the US and Trump's threats be more credible today after DPRK has built a nuclear arsenal?

Or does Trump believe what Bolton wrote recently: the only way to end North Korea's nuclear program is to “end North Korea ”. Something that Senator Lindsay Graham is also advocating. Take out North Korea in a preemptive strike even if it means “sacrificing” South Korea and Japan, and damage to China. Do China, South Korea and Japan have an opinion regarding such a suggestion? Is this what Trump is contemplating when he says that the US “will solve the problem by itself”?

Courtesy: Newsclick.in

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