(Photo: Joan Campderrós-i-Canas / Flickr)
 

Democracy can be messy. In the northeast corner of Spain this week, democracy was downright chaotic.

Catalans went to the polls on Sunday to vote in a referendum on whether to stay in Spain or go their separate way. The Spanish authorities, however, declared the vote illegitimate and sent in the national police to disrupt the referendum.

In many locales, as the police swept into the polling station to seize the ballots, the Catalans merely hid all the voting paraphernalia. When the police left, the Catalans set up again to register voter preferences, and lines reformed outside.

Such Keystone Kops scenarios would have been amusing if not for the outright violence of the Spanish police, which beat voters with batons and fired rubber bullets into crowds. In The Independent, Hannah Strange and James Badcock write:
 

Video footage showed officers from Spain’s national police — 4,000 of whom had been brought in by the government to help quash the ballot — fighting with elderly voters, some of whom were left bleeding, and dragging young women away from polling stations by their hair.
 

The Spanish government has been monumentally stupid. Its case for unity is much stronger than Catalan leader Carles Puigdemont’s case for independence. The Spanish constitution of 1978 speaks of the country’s “indissoluble unity,” while also according Catalonia considerable autonomy. “The Catalan government claims the right to self-determination,” The Economist points out. “But international law recognizes this only in cases of colonialism, foreign invasion, or gross discrimination and abuse of human rights.” None of those conditions applies to Catalonia.

Sure, the relatively wealthy Catalans are aggrieved that a portion of their economic success is redistributed elsewhere in Spain. But that’s a fundamental element of the modern state. New Yorkers subsidize New Mexicans, London subsidizes Leeds, Germans subsidize Greeks. Catalans can certainly challenge the terms of the economic arrangement — after all, the poorer Basque region doesn’t share much of its tax revenues with Madrid — but neither Spanish law nor international law allows them to gather up all their marbles and go home.

Meanwhile, the very process by which Puigdemont rammed through the referendum doesn’t reflect well on his democratic credentials. Writes Yascha Mounk in Slate:
 

The government rushed the necessary legislation for the referendum through the Catalan Parliament without giving deputies adequate time to discuss it. It passed the legislation in a late-night session even though the opposition was absent. It vowed to secede from Spain even if a majority of the population stayed away from the polls. And, taking a page from Trump’s playbook, it has been smearing everybody from opponents of secession to judges doing their jobs as enemies of the people.

With only a 42 percent turnout for the referendum, the Catalan authorities have no authoritative mandate for a declaration of independence. Many people who opposed secession simply refused to vote. On the other hand, the Spanish government’s reaction may well have pushed more people into the independence camp. On Monday, thousands of protesters poured into the streets of Barcelona to protest the Spanish government’s actions and assert their popular sovereignty. On Tuesday, unions called a general strike for the same purpose.

Ultimately the Catalan crisis boils down to consent — whether the Catalans continue to agree to be part of the larger Spanish nation. In an 1882 essay on nations and nationalism, the French philologist Ernest Renan famously wrote that the nation is a “daily referendum.” He meant that the nation is a matter not of inviolate borders or ancient history. Renan continued:
 

A nation is therefore a great solidarity constituted by the feeling of sacrifices made and those that one is still disposed to make. It presupposes a past but is reiterated in the present by a tangible fact: consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life.

If a majority of Catalans no longer consent to be part of the larger Spanish nation, then the specifics of the Spanish constitution are largely irrelevant. The people will force a change. Given that the younger generation favors independence, demography is on the side of the secessionists. The more polarized the situation becomes in Spain, the less room there will be for the sensible middle option of greater autonomy for Catalonia.

In the past, secessionist movements represented not a challenge to the nation-state system, but its ultimate expression. After all, rebellious provinces or peoples want nothing more than to become nation-states themselves. If every nation deserves a state, then how can the international community deny the Slovaks, the Slovenes, and the East Timorese? Secessionist movements were simply the continuation of a process interrupted by historical anomalies like the Soviet, Yugoslav, or Czechoslovak federations, or the often arbitrary border delineations of colonial administrators.

But the Catalan case suggests a different kind of future. In this future, economics, geopolitics, and technology all point toward what I’ve called in my latest book: the splinterlands.

Catalonia and the EU
The architects of the European Union imagined that their new entity would solve the challenge of endless division on the continent.

Europe has always been a patchwork of different peoples, all striving for sovereignty over their own territory. People of varying histories, cultures, languages, and religions have been mixed together in a way that has defied any easy drawing of borders. Order has usually come over the centuries by force of arms. In the last century, two world wars were fought to upend those orders, and a third war beckoned.

The EU was supposed to change all that by pointing toward something beyond the nation-state.

Not only did the EU weaken the powers of the state by appealing to the benefits of something larger — economies of scale, a unified foreign policy voice, greater individual freedoms to travel and work — it also appealed to a “Europe of regions.” According to this project, regions could deal directly with Brussels, bypassing their national governments, and also cooperate horizontally with one another: Provence with Basque country, Bavaria with Lombardy, and so on. Secession would be rendered moot, for Catalans could get what they wanted if not from Spain then from Brussels or other European entities.

Alas, it was not to be. Writes Anwen Elias back in 2008, “Regionalist or autonomist parties who saw in the EU an opportunity for organizing political authority on a post-sovereigntist basis were also forced to recognize that, in practice, Europe was still dominated by sovereign states and sovereignty-based understandings of politics.” Even in Europe, the nation-state held onto its privileged position. Attempts to revive the “Europe of regions” to accommodate pressures from below, particularly after the last Catalan referendum in 2014, came up hard against the growing Euroskeptical movements, the continued problems in the Eurozone, and ultimately Brexit.

The problem of consent, in other words, has infected the EU as well. Many citizens of wealthier European countries don’t want to subsidize the citizens of less-well-off countries. Europe-firsters have been unenthusiastic about the influx of immigrants that the EU as a whole embraced. Though others threatened to do so, the British have been the first to withdraw their consent entirely.

If the Catalans withdraw from Spain, they are also withdrawing from the EU, which would amount to a second defection in so many years. The decision could prove even more costly for Catalonia than Brexit is proving for the UK, since it doesn’t have an economy the size of England’s, hasn’t preserved a separate financial system (and currency), and doesn’t have the same international profile (for instance, Catalonia is not a member of the World Trade Organization).

Of course, would-be countries are often prepared to take an economic hit for the sake of independence.

But the Catalans have perhaps not factored in just how big a hit they’re going to take, naively thinking that the small bump up in revenues not turned over to Madrid will make the difference. They’re also disgusted, and rightly so, with the economic austerity measures that the EU has imposed on Spain. But little Catalonia will have even less power to resist these forces after independence.

Now that the “Europe of regions” has faded into irrelevance, Europe faces more fracture points. As a result of the Brexit vote, Scotland is once again reconsidering its commitment to the United Kingdom, though public opinion polls suggest that a second referendum on independence would fail by a narrow margin just like the first. In Belgium, the largest political force is a nationalist party, the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), which supports Flemish independence. Of course, the Flemish are the majority in Belgium, and Flanders is doing much better economically these days than Wallonia, but Belgian unity remains a fragile thing. Other regions of Europe are also restive — Basque country, northern Italy, Corsica.

Although the Catalan vote isn’t likely to unravel the tapestry of Europe quite yet, other forces are at work in Europe — and not just Europe.
 

Kurdishstruggle / Flickr
 

Kurdistan, Finally?
Kurds have wanted their own states for centuries. They’ve attempted to carve out autonomous regions in Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Last week, the Kurdish territory in Iraq held a non-binding referendum on independence, which garnered overwhelming support.
Surrounding states all took measures against the would-be new state of Kurdistan. Iran declared a fuel embargo, as did Turkey. Both countries moved troops to their borders for joint military exercises with Iraq. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called the referendum “illegitimate.”

Baghdad, too, rejected the non-binding vote. But unlike Madrid, the Iraqi authorities did not attempt to stop the vote from happening. Iraq banned flights to Kurdistan airports and imposed sanctions on Kurdish banks. But it didn’t send in troops. The Kurdish government has announced new elections for November 1, and Baghdad seems to be waiting to see what the Kurds’ next move will be. Neither side wants war.

As in Catalonia, the referendum wasn’t simply a transparent bid for independence. Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani used the vote as a way to boost his own popularity and that of his party, as well as to make a stronger bid for Kirkuk, a disputed oil-rich area that Baghdad also claims. Regardless of Barzani’s motives, however, independence is clearly popular in Kurdistan.

Indeed, it’s hard to imagine the Kurds dialing back their ambitions in Iraq. They’ve been running a de facto state of sorts for years. They thought, not unreasonably, that they could trade their extraordinary efforts against the Islamic State for a shot at real, de jure sovereignty. They’ve even embraced a rather ruthless realpolitik to their ethnic brethren across the borders. Kurdistan has maintained strong ties toward Turkey — despite President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s crackdown on Turkey’s own Kurdish population — and have been cool toward the de facto Kurdish state of Rojava in northern Syria.

But there’s still a huge difference between de facto and de jure. Just as Catalonia can be the string that unravels the European tapestry, Kurdistan can be the string that unravels the Middle East tapestry. Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq all fiercely defend the unitary nature of their states, and the Kurds represent a strong threat to that structure.

Moreover, the region is as much of a patchwork as Europe. Yemen and Libya have already effectively fallen apart. Palestinians have been thwarted for decades from having their own state. Turkmen, Shia (in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain), and others might lobby as well for a piece of their own pie.

But what if they get their slice just when the pie has become stale and inedible?

Slouching toward Splinterlands
What’s happening in Europe and the Middle East is part of a larger pattern.

The global market has been eroding the power of the nation-state for several decades, as transnational corporations flit around the world to get the best tax deals and the cheapest labor, international trade deals remove key points of leverage that national governments once had over various economic actors, and global financial authorities impose conditions on all but the largest economies that governments must meet or face default.

The global market has delegitimized states. No wonder, then, that subnational units are taking advantage of this weakness.

Technology has amplified this trend. Communications advances make this global market possible, and the transfer in microseconds of huge amounts of capital in and out of nation-states renders national economic policy increasingly illusory. The Internet and social media have broken the monopoly on national media, providing civic movements (along with global disrupters like the United States and Russia) the means to challenge the once authoritative narratives of the nation-state. What happened in the Arab Spring to authoritarian governments is now happening to democratic governments as well (witness the Brexit vote and Donald Trump’s victory).

Finally, in the world of geopolitics, the overarching reasons for ideological unity are gone. The West no longer faces a “Communist threat,” while the East no longer huddles together against the “Yankee threat.” Sure, there’s the Islamic State and its ilk to worry about. But all nation-states see these non-state actors as a threat. The “war on terrorism” hasn’t forced states to give up a portion of their sovereignty for the cause — only citizens to give up a portion of their civil liberties.

In the 1950s and 1960s, utopians dreamed of a world government even as dystopians feared a global Big Brother. Today, when the international community can’t even come together to stop climate change, the prospect of world federalism seems impossibly quaint. A much grimmer reality presents itself in places like Libya and Somalia and Yemen: failed states and the war of all against all.

Today the world faces a crisis of the intermediate structure. The EU is under siege. The power of nation-states is eroding. If this trend continues, with the world continuing to splinter, the only entities left with any global power will be corporations and religious organizations, a world where frightened people pray to Facebook and the gods of Google that the fierce winds of nationalism and the rising waters of climate change and the random fire of lone gunmen will stay away for one more day.
 

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Although it was never quite clear what the September 25 referendum was intended to achieve, one thing’s for sure: while the Iraqi government, neighbouring states, regional powers and the international community were all against it from the off, the people of Iraqi Kurdistan have voted on self-determination and given a very clear mandate for independence.

It only takes a short stay in Iraqi Kurdistan to conclude that a separation from the rest of Iraq seems inevitable, thanks to both the long-held Kurdish desire for a homeland and the different trajectories that Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq have followed now for more than a quarter of a century.

Barring diplomatic, economic, or even military action by Iraq or other states, the next step envisioned by Kurdistan’s president, Masoud Barzani, is to enter into negotiations with the Iraqi federal government over Kurdistan’s future status. Since the federal government would have to relinquish its sovereign claim over Kurdistan in order for it to become a state, Kurdistan’s path to independence travels through, and is dependent upon, Baghdad.

But just because separation is inevitable doesn’t mean achieving it will be easy. An independent Kurdistan will present problems for other states with secessionist movements and will immediately confront severe challenges of its own.
 

Feeling the pinch

The most pressing problem that an independent Kurdistan would face is how to fund itself. Much of Kurdistan’s domestic economy is dependent on Turkey, which has threatened to cut off the flow of goods and stop exporting oil because of the referendum. Iraqi Kurdistan also currently receives approximately 13-17% of the national Iraqi budget. This funding has been a source of continued dispute, but is vital to Kurdistan maintaining its government and services. Advocates for independence make much of the potential financial windfall from oil production, but with oil prices low and political turmoil running high, the Kurdistan market is less and less attractive for international investors
.
In fact, since 2014, Kurdistan has been struggling with a long-term financial crisis. The costs of war with the so-called Islamic State (IS), an influx of refugees and a decline in oil revenues have combined to undermine the government’s budget. Since 2015 government salaries have gone unpaid or been cut. These would be onerous problems indeed for a new independent state to confront.

Raising the roof. EPA/Gailan Haji

This year’s referendum was a vote for the people of Iraqi Kurdistan as well as four Kurdish controlled regions within Iraq: Kirkuk, Makhmour, Sinjar and Khanaqin. Although these regions are currently controlled from Erbil, they are also claimed by Baghdad.

The perilous state of finances in Kurdistan mean Kirkuk in particular is vital. A multi-ethnic city, Kirkuk sits next to one of the largest oil fields in Iraq, and contestation over who it belongs to has long been a concern. Kurdistan has controlled it since 2014, but the decline of the IS threat in Iraq would allow Baghdad to commit military resources to reclaiming the city and its oil fields.
One issue that any negotiation between Baghdad and Erbil would have to resolve is the status of these oil resources. A peaceful resolution to this land and resource dispute would do much to allow Kurdistan to split from Iraq in an amicable fashion. But looking at a map of north and central Iraq, Kirkuk is only one of many potential flashpoints in the disputed territories that ring the borders of Kurdistan from Mosul to Tuz Khurmatu.
 

Marching up the hill

Even among Iraqi Kurds, the referendum in Kurdistan was not universally supported. Some parties argued that the timing of the referendum was wrong; others raised concerns that President Barzani was using the referendum to safeguard his own political future. It was not clear until the day of the referendum whether the polls would open in Kirkuk or not.

Further, Kurdistan is not just populated by Kurds – and many (including Iran and Turkey) are concerned for the status and future of Arabs, Turkmen, and other minority groups. Incorporating non-Kurds into a territory so closely associated with Kurdish identity and longstanding calls of Kurdish nationalism will be an obstacle that a Kurdistan outside of Iraq will have to address if it wishes to remain stable.

Something’s in the air in Erbil. EPA/Gailan Haji

Beyond that, though, the heightened sense of Kurdish nationalism amongst the Kurds themselves may have been necessary for mobilisation of society behind a yes vote, but it will also have to be carefully navigated by the Kurdistan government. In the run-up to the referendum, Barzani made clear and strong statements that Kurdistan would not stay within Iraq and that it would not be controlled by outside powers. But what happens if the promises of independent statehood cannot be realised?

The negotiations between Erbil and Baghdad carry no guarantees. If they want to avoid crisis, Barzani and his fellow leaders will need to engage in long-term and very careful politics with both Baghdad and Kurdistan’s population – if they’re mobilised and marched to the top of the hill, it could be dangerous to try to march them back down.

As things stand, all involved must confront two difficult facts. First, it is not easy or straightforward to become a new sovereign state and, second, any resolution to the question of Iraqi Kurdistan is still a long way off. The independence referendum has presented an optimistic future, but there are plenty of obstacles in the way.
 

Rebecca Richards, Lecturer in International Relations, Keele University and Robert Smith, Lecturer in International Relations, Coventry University

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

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[In early 2016 Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, proclaimed that a referendum on Kurdish independence would be conducted before this year’s US presidential elections. More recently its prime minister, Nechirvan Barzani, has pledged the referendum will be held after the campaign to oust the Islamic State (IS) movement from Mosul is concluded. To get a better understanding of the dynamics and context of a potential initiative to declare Kurdish statehood in Iraq, and as part of a series of Quick Thoughts with International Crisis Group Middle East analysts, Jadaliyya interviewed Joost Hiltermann, the organization’s Middle East and North Africa Program Director.]

Jadaliyya (J): The Kurds of Iraq appear to be emerging as significant beneficiaries from the campaign against the Islamic State (IS) movement, particularly in terms of the expansion of territory under their rule to the contested city of Kirkuk. Once the dust settles over the Mosul campaign, do you think this will strengthen the Kurdish Regional Government’s (KRG) hand vis-à-vis the Iraqi central government, or rather set the stage for intensified hostility between Erbil and Baghdad?

Joost Hiltermann (JH): Future relations between the Iraqi central government and the KRG will depend on how the battle for Mosul, and for Nineveh Governorate more broadly, plays itself out. For now, military cooperation between the Iraqi military and Masoud Barzani’s Peshmerga is good, but this is only because they have concluded a mutually beneficial deal: the Peshmerga are permitting the Iraqi army to move through areas the KRG controls east of Mosul, and in exchange Baghdad is not challenging control over these areas by Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which is the dominant force in the KRG.

Yet these areas, known as the Nineveh Plains and which extend north and northwest of Mosul, are disputed areas whose status is yet to be determined on the basis of steps outlined in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution. So for sure, the KDP’s de facto control over these areas will strengthen the KRG’s bargaining power over the central government in any post-Mosul negotiations over the terms of the Baghdad-Erbil relationship.

The area is also rich in oil; ExxonMobil has a contract with the KRG to develop a couple of blocks there, as do other companies, despite the fact that these areas formally fall under Baghdad’s remit. If the effort to defeat IS in Mosul proceeds according to plan, then this de facto military deal may lead to a political accord. But much could still go wrong with the military operations currently underway, and this could affect the Baghdad-Erbil relationship in ways that are at present impossible to predict.

J: Some have characterized the growing talk of an independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan as little more than a way for the KRG leadership to "escape forwards" as it comes under increasing domestic criticism for failures related to its rule. Is it nevertheless the case that the KRG leadership will be left with no option but to make good on its vow?

JH: The vow to conduct an independence referendum before the end of this year was made by KRG President Masoud Barzani, but it is not unanimously supported by Kurds, even if many do favor an independent Kurdistan. This is because many saw Barzani’s move as a political ploy to cloak the reality that his tenure as president has expired – twice, in fact, if one takes into account his 2009 electoral mandate as well as the two-year extension granted him in 2013 by the Kurdish regional parliament. When your governing legitimacy is at risk, appeals to nationalist sentiment can bring some relief. How much relief is the question. We are nearing the end of 2016, and there has been no referendum. How long can you continue to fool the people, especially when their salaries have been both cut and delayed, public services have dwindled, and corruption is rife, including at the highest levels of government? Yet, behind the scenes, the KDP has initiated discussions with the coalition of Shia parties in Baghdad about the eventuality of Kurdish independence. We’ll have to see where that goes; again, much will depend on how the battle for Mosul unfolds, and what happens in its immediate aftermath.

J: What are the current attitudes of Turkey, Iran and the US to Kurdish independence? Do you think these will have a determining effect?

JH: There seems to be quite a bit of sympathy for Kurdish independence inside the Beltway, but Turkey and Iran are not going to recognize an independent Kurdish state. For them Kurdish statehood constitutes a red line – for obvious reasons. And they hold more weight in the neighborhood than does the US. Turkey needs the KDP to fight the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and also benefits from a very close economic relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan, including through transshipment of oil and gas. But Ankara has a potential chokehold on a landlocked Iraqi Kurdistan’s lifeline. As for Iran, it too wants to benefit economically, and maintains close ties with Barzani’s rivals in Suleimaniya, Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the pro-reform Movement for Change (Gorran), which have an unhappy relationship with each other. Iran can easily aggravate intra-Kurdish divisions to thwart any move toward statehood.

J: What do you see as the most likely and best options respectively for the future dispensation of Iraqi Kurdistan? 

JH: The best option is also the most likely one, and it has already been outlined in the Iraqi Constitution: a federal arrangement with Baghdad that allows the Kurdish region to develop and flourish (if it can diminish the impact of the “oil curse” and get rid of the scourge of corruption). The problem is that the central government in Baghdad is divided and weak, and so Kurdish leaders are finding it difficult to resist the temptation to retain control of territory taken from IS that was never Kurdish or majority-Kurdish. This complicates negotiations over the terms of the federal relationship and potentially sets the stage for the next round of conflict. I don’t expect this to take the form of open warfare between Baghdad and Erbil, but rather anticipate a series of conflicts between local forces loosely aligned with either side. Given the stakes, these conflicts will be particularly pronounced in the disputed territories.

Courtsey: Jadaliyya.com
 

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