Kurds | SabrangIndia News Related to Human Rights Thu, 28 Sep 2017 08:05:36 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.2.2 https://sabrangindia.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Favicon_0.png Kurds | SabrangIndia 32 32 `Kurdistan: after vote for independence, what’s next? https://sabrangindia.in/kurdistan-after-vote-independence-whats-next/ Thu, 28 Sep 2017 08:05:36 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2017/09/28/kurdistan-after-vote-independence-whats-next/ After much anticipation and under threat of retaliation, the people of Iraqi Kurdistan turned out in high numbers to return what appears to be an overwhelming vote in favour of independence from Iraq. Advocates for independence covered a broad spectrum, from those using the vote as a way to negotiate a better future within Iraq […]

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After much anticipation and under threat of retaliation, the people of Iraqi Kurdistan turned out in high numbers to return what appears to be an overwhelming vote in favour of independence from Iraq. Advocates for independence covered a broad spectrum, from those using the vote as a way to negotiate a better future within Iraq to those demanding a new sovereign state.

Kurdis`ta`n

Although it was never quite clear what the September 25 referendum was intended to achieve, one thing’s for sure: while the Iraqi government, neighbouring states, regional powers and the international community were all against it from the off, the people of Iraqi Kurdistan have voted on self-determination and given a very clear mandate for independence.

It only takes a short stay in Iraqi Kurdistan to conclude that a separation from the rest of Iraq seems inevitable, thanks to both the long-held Kurdish desire for a homeland and the different trajectories that Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq have followed now for more than a quarter of a century.

Barring diplomatic, economic, or even military action by Iraq or other states, the next step envisioned by Kurdistan’s president, Masoud Barzani, is to enter into negotiations with the Iraqi federal government over Kurdistan’s future status. Since the federal government would have to relinquish its sovereign claim over Kurdistan in order for it to become a state, Kurdistan’s path to independence travels through, and is dependent upon, Baghdad.

But just because separation is inevitable doesn’t mean achieving it will be easy. An independent Kurdistan will present problems for other states with secessionist movements and will immediately confront severe challenges of its own.
 

Feeling the pinch

The most pressing problem that an independent Kurdistan would face is how to fund itself. Much of Kurdistan’s domestic economy is dependent on Turkey, which has threatened to cut off the flow of goods and stop exporting oil because of the referendum. Iraqi Kurdistan also currently receives approximately 13-17% of the national Iraqi budget. This funding has been a source of continued dispute, but is vital to Kurdistan maintaining its government and services. Advocates for independence make much of the potential financial windfall from oil production, but with oil prices low and political turmoil running high, the Kurdistan market is less and less attractive for international investors
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In fact, since 2014, Kurdistan has been struggling with a long-term financial crisis. The costs of war with the so-called Islamic State (IS), an influx of refugees and a decline in oil revenues have combined to undermine the government’s budget. Since 2015 government salaries have gone unpaid or been cut. These would be onerous problems indeed for a new independent state to confront.


Raising the roof. EPA/Gailan Haji

This year’s referendum was a vote for the people of Iraqi Kurdistan as well as four Kurdish controlled regions within Iraq: Kirkuk, Makhmour, Sinjar and Khanaqin. Although these regions are currently controlled from Erbil, they are also claimed by Baghdad.

The perilous state of finances in Kurdistan mean Kirkuk in particular is vital. A multi-ethnic city, Kirkuk sits next to one of the largest oil fields in Iraq, and contestation over who it belongs to has long been a concern. Kurdistan has controlled it since 2014, but the decline of the IS threat in Iraq would allow Baghdad to commit military resources to reclaiming the city and its oil fields.
One issue that any negotiation between Baghdad and Erbil would have to resolve is the status of these oil resources. A peaceful resolution to this land and resource dispute would do much to allow Kurdistan to split from Iraq in an amicable fashion. But looking at a map of north and central Iraq, Kirkuk is only one of many potential flashpoints in the disputed territories that ring the borders of Kurdistan from Mosul to Tuz Khurmatu.
 

Marching up the hill

Even among Iraqi Kurds, the referendum in Kurdistan was not universally supported. Some parties argued that the timing of the referendum was wrong; others raised concerns that President Barzani was using the referendum to safeguard his own political future. It was not clear until the day of the referendum whether the polls would open in Kirkuk or not.

Further, Kurdistan is not just populated by Kurds – and many (including Iran and Turkey) are concerned for the status and future of Arabs, Turkmen, and other minority groups. Incorporating non-Kurds into a territory so closely associated with Kurdish identity and longstanding calls of Kurdish nationalism will be an obstacle that a Kurdistan outside of Iraq will have to address if it wishes to remain stable.


Something’s in the air in Erbil. EPA/Gailan Haji

Beyond that, though, the heightened sense of Kurdish nationalism amongst the Kurds themselves may have been necessary for mobilisation of society behind a yes vote, but it will also have to be carefully navigated by the Kurdistan government. In the run-up to the referendum, Barzani made clear and strong statements that Kurdistan would not stay within Iraq and that it would not be controlled by outside powers. But what happens if the promises of independent statehood cannot be realised?

The negotiations between Erbil and Baghdad carry no guarantees. If they want to avoid crisis, Barzani and his fellow leaders will need to engage in long-term and very careful politics with both Baghdad and Kurdistan’s population – if they’re mobilised and marched to the top of the hill, it could be dangerous to try to march them back down.

As things stand, all involved must confront two difficult facts. First, it is not easy or straightforward to become a new sovereign state and, second, any resolution to the question of Iraqi Kurdistan is still a long way off. The independence referendum has presented an optimistic future, but there are plenty of obstacles in the way.
 

Rebecca Richards, Lecturer in International Relations, Keele University and Robert Smith, Lecturer in International Relations, Coventry University

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

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Serious rights violations in southeast Turkey: UN Report https://sabrangindia.in/serious-rights-violations-southeast-turkey-un-report/ Sun, 12 Mar 2017 06:10:37 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2017/03/12/serious-rights-violations-southeast-turkey-un-report/ UN report details massive destruction and serious rights violations since July 2015 in southeast Turkey   GENEVA – The UN Human Rights Office on Friday published a report detailing allegations of massive destruction, killings and numerous other serious human rights violations committed between July 2015 and December 2016 in southeast Turkey, during Government security operations […]

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UN report details massive destruction and serious rights violations since July 2015 in southeast Turkey


 

GENEVA – The UN Human Rights Office on Friday published a report detailing allegations of massive destruction, killings and numerous other serious human rights violations committed between July 2015 and December 2016 in southeast Turkey, during Government security operations that have affected more than 30 towns and neighbourhoods and displaced between 355,000 and half a million people, mostly of Kurdish origin.

The report describes the extent of the destruction in the town of Nusaybin, in Mardin Province, where 1,786 buildings appear to have been destroyed or damaged, and the Sur district of Diyarbakir, where the local government estimates that 70 percent of the buildings in the eastern part of the district were systematically destroyed by shelling. The destruction apparently continued even after the security operations ended, reaching a peak during the month of August 2016. Before-and-after satellite images from Nusaybin and Sur show entire neighbourhoods razed to the ground.

The UN Human Rights Office is “particularly alarmed about the results of satellite imagery analysis, which indicate an enormous scale of destruction of the housing stock by heavy weaponry,” the report states.

Heavy damage is also reported from a number of other towns, including Cizre, in ªirnak Province, where witnesses and family members of victims “painted an apocalyptic picture of the wholesale destruction of neighbourhoods” where, in early 2016, up to 189 men, women and children were trapped for weeks in basements without water, food, medical attention and power before being killed by fire, induced by shelling.

“The subsequent demolition of the buildings destroyed evidence and has therefore largely prevented the basic identification and tracing of mortal remains,” the report continues. “Moreover, instead of opening an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the reported excessive use of force, recourse to heavy weapons and the resulting deaths, the local authorities accused the people killed of participating in terrorist organizations and took repressive measures affecting members of their families.”

The report describes how one woman’s family “was invited by the public prosecutor to collect her remains, which consisted of three small pieces of charred flesh, identified by means of a DNA match. The family did not receive an explanation as to how she was killed nor a forensic report. The victim’s sister, who called for accountability of those responsible for her death and attempted to pursue a legal process, was charged with terrorist offences.”

The report also cited information received from the Government of Turkey indicating that the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which the Government considers a terrorist organization, “had conducted a number of violent attacks that caused deaths and injuries among Turkish security forces and other individuals. The PKK has also been involved, according to the Government, in kidnappings, including of children; digging trenches and placing roadblocks in cities and towns; and preventing medical services from delivering emergency health services.”

The UN Human Rights Office says it has been seeking access to the affected parts of southeast Turkey for almost a year, to independently investigate allegations of serious human rights violations. In the absence of meaningful access, the report – the first in a series – was produced through remote monitoring, using both public and confidential sources, satellite imagery and interviews to gather information about the conduct and impact of the security operations in the southeast of the country.

The report also documents accounts of torture, enforced disappearances, incitement to hatred, prevention of access to emergency medical care, food, water and livelihoods, and violence against women, as well as expressing concern “about the post-security operation policies of expropriation,” citing a number of examples including the Council of Ministers’ March 2016 decision, which reportedly resulted in the expropriation of up to 100 per cent of all land plots in Sur.

Measures taken under the state of emergency following the attempted coup of July 2016, including the dismissal of more than 100,000 people from public or private sector jobs during the reporting period, have also deeply affected the human rights situation in the southeast. Some 10,000 teachers were reportedly dismissed on suspicion of having links with the PKK, without due process. The use of counter-terrorism legislation to remove democratically elected officials of Kurdish origin, the severe harassment of independent journalists, the closure of independent and Kurdish language media and citizen’s associations and the mass suspension of judges and prosecutors have also severely weakened checks and balances and human rights protections.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein acknowledged the complex challenges Turkey has faced in addressing the attempted coup of July 2016 and in responding to a series of terror attacks. However, he said the apparent significant deterioration of the human rights situation in the country is cause for alarm and would only serve to deepen tensions and foster instability.

“I am particularly concerned by reports that no credible investigation has been conducted into hundreds of alleged unlawful killings, including women and children over a period of 13 months between late July 2015 and the end of August of 2016. It appears that not a single suspect was apprehended and not a single individual was prosecuted,” High Commissioner Zeid said.

“The Government of Turkey has failed to grant us access, but has contested the veracity of the very serious allegations made in this report. But the gravity of the allegations, the scale of the destruction and the displacement of more than 355,000 people mean that an independent investigation is both urgent and essential.”

The full report can be accessed here.

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Kurdish Women’s Battle Against State & Patriarchy: Co-Mayor of Diyarbakir https://sabrangindia.in/kurdish-womens-battle-against-state-patriarchy-co-mayor-diyarbakir/ Fri, 16 Sep 2016 06:05:12 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2016/09/16/kurdish-womens-battle-against-state-patriarchy-co-mayor-diyarbakir/ After this military coup, the government may use this as an excuse to strengthen their sexist, militarist and anti-democratic policies further. We face this danger now. Read the first female co-mayor of Diyarbakir speak Gültan Kişanak. Authors' own photo. All rights reserved. The authors write: The prominence of Kurdish women in Rojava (western Kurdistan/northern Syria) […]

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After this military coup, the government may use this as an excuse to strengthen their sexist, militarist and anti-democratic policies further. We face this danger now. Read the first female co-mayor of Diyarbakir speak

Gültan Kişanak. Authors' own photo. All rights reserved.

The authors write:

The prominence of Kurdish women in Rojava (western Kurdistan/northern Syria) inspired us initially to understand the historical role of women in the Kurdish political movement. We were also interested in the role of Kurdish women in challenging traditional patriarchal society and rules. As part of this wider project, we wanted to hear the thoughts of Gültan Kışanak, the female co-mayor of Diyarbakır, the largest Kurdish city in southeastern Turkey.

She has been a long-term activist in the Kurdish women’s movement in addition to being a former MP for the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). Ms Kişanak was imprisoned as a student after the military coup in 1980, and as a woman’s rights activist and Kurdish politician has witnessed the violent aftermath of previous coups as well as the radically changing political landscape over the past decades.

Given the recent developments in Turkey, we were also eager to enquire about the recent failed coup, particularly in relation to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, prospects for peace and gendered implications of recent developments.
 

Nadje Al-Ali (NA) and Latif Tas (LT): Based on your own experiences, could you tell us about the history of women’s roles within the Kurdish political movement?  

Gültan Kişanak (GK): Since the beginning of the Kurdish political movement in Turkey, women have taken active and important roles. However, we should accept that in the 1970s and 1980s women’s rights were sacrificed for the sake of general political and national aims. The slogan was to first have a revolution and then make some improvements in women’s rights and gender equality. This idea was not only part of Kurdish independence movements, but it was also followed by Turkish and other leftist and democratic groups who wanted to change the regime of their countries.

A few select women were given some positions to further wider political aims but they were also forced to postpone any initiatives focusing on their own rights for the sake of the national and political revolution. Key roles for women were not taken by women themselves, but ‘given’ by a male-dominated political leadership. After any success or political achievement, women were easily forgotten and forced back into the home to continue in their ‘traditional’ roles. Sadly, this has been the destiny of women in almost all countries and many contexts throughout history. So we started to prioritize changes in democratic rights. This has become more important for us than the creation of an independent state.
 

NA,LT: Was this trend also evident within Kurdish political ideology?

GK: In the beginning, the Kurdish movement was also influenced by this tradition. Our main aim was to promote national aims and a revolution. The movement had to show a strong and tough ‘male’ face if we were going to have any success with these political aims. Most of our male friends and comrades came from this old, patriarchal tradition. Patriarchal structures, even including many progressive leftist movements, did not want to change their position and include any real focus on women and their rights. But after a while, we, in the Kurdish political movement, began to strongly and continuously question – and we still question – this perspective.

Especially in the 1980s and 1990s, the issue of women's rights became important internationally, and we benefited from this trend. We started not just questioning the position of the state and the regime but also challenged the role of patriarchal structures. We started believing and supporting the idea that if there was going to be a real, sustainable and positive change than this should include women’s rights from the beginning and at all levels. Without real democratization and inclusion of all minority rights, especially women’s rights, any new model will not be much better or substantially different from the old one.

So we started to prioritize changes in democratic rights. This has become more important for us than the creation of an independent state. Within this new environment, women began to assume important roles and created their own separate branches, not just following what the general political movement says, but also creating alternative policies, which the party must follow. This change is not just limited to the political elements within the movement, but also includes societal changes. It has influenced all levels of the Kurdish movement. These changes were not easy and the rights were not just given by men: Kurdish women have fought at all levels and achieved these changes despite barriers within patriarchal society and despite the resistance of some of our male comrades.
 

NA,LT: Give us more details about the kind of changes Kurdish women have achieved and what kind of positions and roles they have gained?

GK: When society needs to make sacrifices in difficult times, like conflict and war, male-dominated societies may establish some new roles for women, including for women to sacrifice their lives. But after all these difficult times, the same people suddenly forget their promises to women. Similar to today, the 1990s were especially difficult for the Kurdish movement. The state was oppressive and applied considerable pressure. Women experienced those difficulties and paid a huge price. Women organized and led many demonstrations against state brutality in villages and towns. Many of our female and male friends were arrested, tortured and killed. They had to defend themselves during their trials. They read and researched about their rights. Women not only learnt about Kurdish rights and freedoms, but as women who were simultaneously oppressed by the state and by society, they recognized their rights, their equality with men, and their freedom. We have gained confidence and trust in ourselves. We did not simply follow established policies but also took part in creating new policies.

This was an important element of the enlightenment of Kurdish women. We have gained confidence and trust in ourselves. We did not simply follow established policies but also took part in creating new policies. We came onto the streets with new innovative slogans. We challenged not just the state's perspective but also the established rules of society. The male-dominated political establishment usually does not make women’s issues their main argument. However, day-by-day, women’s participation and active demanding of their rights while coming out onto streets has been increasing. When women come onto the streets for a demonstration, some of them bring along their children. Others leave their husband at home, to look after the children.


Gultan Kisanek photos. All rights reserved.
 

NA,LT: How do you assess the role of the Kurdish political leadership in addressing these changes?

GK: Women have fought a lot for their rights. But especially for the initial movement and involvement you need a strong leadership. We are lucky that we had – and still have – this. Of course the changes and evolution of the role of women within the Kurdish movement and Kurdish society would not be easy without the full support of the Kurdish leader, Abdullah Öcalan, who has been imprisoned by Turkey since 1999, more than 17 years. Since the 1990s, Öcalan advised women's organizations to create separate branches to promote rights and equality within the wider movement and society. He repeatedly said that if women do not create their own free and autonomous branches, dominant and traditional men would try to destroy women after any achievements. These separate branches should not be just created within society or locally, but also within political parties and guerrilla movements. He also advised men to abandon the traditionalist perspective, the primitive ideology of men and masculinity. He believes that most societal problems are the creation of dominant masculine men. This is the reason why people make decisions for others without their agreement. This is the reason that many wars and conflicts are so often about power and ego. If we are going to change society, Öcalan and many of us believe that we should first eliminate patriarchal masculinity and the ego born from this masculinity. 
 

NA,LT: We have interviewed many different Kurdish women, including peace activists, mothers of martyrs, politicians, mayors, guerrillas, students, lawyers, community members and house wives. Different women experience historical developments and struggles differently. You have a very important role and hold a very important position as the co-mayor of Diyarbakir/Amed. What kind of difficulties and problems have you faced as a woman and a co-mayor?

GK: My own life story has followed the development of the Kurdish women's movement. In the 1980s, I was imprisoned in Diyarbakir prison. This had notoriously brutal conditions, with torture and killings. To be Kurdish, to be a woman and to be leftist created triple difficulties for me. I was kept in a dog kennel for six months because I refused to say ‘I am not a Kurd but a Turk’. Our older women friends, our mothers’ age were tortured because they could not speak Turkish. I still have signs of torture from those days on my body. If we are going to change society, Öcalan and many of us believe that we should first eliminate patriarchal masculinity and the ego born from this masculinity.
This prison was a place for me to question everything about humanity. It was a place for me to recognize the importance of gender. It was a place for friendship and to create strong bonds with other women. After my life in prison, I became a university student. Together with many other Kurdish women, I took part in the women's struggle, both while I was in prison and also during my time in university. This destroyed any fears I had. In fact, the heavy burden and difficulties developed my self-confidence. If I think back to those days, when I was a 19-year-old university student, it is difficult now to imagine how I managed all those difficult challenges whilst almost continually being under attack for my Kurdish identity, for my mother tongue and most importantly for being a woman.

It was not an easy period in my life and in the lives of many other Kurdish women. The difficult conditions forced us to make choices: to surrender and accept the state’s idea of a unitary identity and to assimilate  – or to resist against all oppression. Under those difficult conditions, we questioned the role of state and society, and the established role and identity of women. But we also thought about human rights, the importance of diverse identities, and our own Kurdish identity and practices. We decided to work against all oppression since they fed on each other. Without that historical development and those experiences, I would not have my current advantages, and my strong role. The women who jump into politics, without the kind of experiences we all had, may well face some difficulty in the beginning. We fought with masculine politics at every stage of our movement. 
 

NA,LT: How did your political experiences develop after your university days?

GK: In the 1990s, when conditions were very difficult and there was no sign of freedom – just like it is now – I worked for newspapers where Kurdish and women’s rights were the main issue. These were alternatives to the mainstream newspapers. The conditions for journalists, especially for Kurdish journalists were harsh – just like today. Some of our journalist friends were killed while they were doing their work. I worked as a journalist for 13 years and published sections focusing on women’s issue within the newspaper. But we also thought about human rights, the importance of diverse identities… We decided to work against all oppression since they fed on each other.

During the hard time of the 1990s, many autonomous women's organizations were established. I took different roles within these, and worked to support their activities. In 1996, the Kurdish political movement created a separate women's branch. This developed into a system of political representation. In 1999 for the first time three Kurdish women were elected as local mayors. This number more than tripled in 2004 and we had 14 women mayors. Most importantly, we started co-chairing in 2004, although at the time this was not legal. But the women were all pressured by their male co-chairs. They were perceived as assistants. After 2007, women became more visible and powerful. The 2007 elections were revolutionary for both Kurdish and Turkish women. 8 out of 26 Kurdish MPs were women. Women became more confident as co-chairs and men had to accept them as equals. Other political parties were embarrassed and started to introduce a co-chair system as well. But it was not simply a matter of a quota and co-chairing, but the actual style and work of parliament changed. Women did not ask for permission any more to speak on important subjects such as the defence budget. All these steps have helped Kurdish women to develop their own independent branches. The aim was to put new brick on top of the existing ones and so to move forward women's issues. We are becoming stronger with every passing day.
 

NA,LT: What do you consider as your main challenges in the past?

GK: It might be difficult to believe but when I look back at my own experience and story, the hardest time for me as a woman was not in prison. It was not my time at university or when I was working as a journalist. But it was the struggle we had to fight in order to get a women’s quota for MPs. During the time before the 2007 general election when we made our first important moves towards a quota, our male friends were happy about our hard work. We were organizing meetings and demonstrations, and were facing the police on a daily basis as we worked hard in our political and gender struggles. In the 2007 general election, the Kurdish political party did not run as a party, because of the ten-per cent threshold, but put forward independent candidates, and the Kurdish women's movement wanted to achieve a women's quota even it was for independent candidates. We wanted an equal number of male and female MPs. The 40 per cent quota for women had been one of our party policies since 2002, but its implementation had been postponed to the next election. We did not want any further postponement. We wanted the policy to be put into practice. Our attempts created a big discussion within the Kurdish political movement. There were several barriers from the established political traditions and from dominant men. There were two main questions: first how many women should be put into electable positions; and secondly who was going to decide about these women candidates?


Gültan Kışanak's photos. All rights reserved.
 

NA,LT: A woman’s quota was already part of your party policy. Why did many men in the Kurdish political movement object?

GK: We started co-chairing in 2004… But the women were all pressured by their male co-chairs. They were perceived as assistants. Yes, it was there and for that reason – theoretically at least – they could not be against our demands. We had already had this as a party policy for almost 5 years. However, some men created different excuses, such as society was not ready yet. Other argued that women should be happy with a smaller quota, and once society becomes ready we will put the 40 per cent into practice. In other words, we were supposed to wait years or even decades for society to become ready. They knew that a good number of women were going to be elected and also that it was going to affect some men’s chances to become MPs. We were ready to do political demonstrations in every part of the country, to communicate with people in the cities, but also to go to villages, to talk to old and young members of our society, to convince them about our role in representing them. We did not want to fail for lack of trying. However, many of our male friends continued to offer just a few positions to women. Even though we started co-chairing in 2004, until 2007 they did not really include women co-chairs in any meaningful way. They even called our female co-chairs Yenge (sister-in-law), as a way of showing they were not equals but assistants. We wanted to change this symbolic representation and instead make it full and meaningful.

Most men and even some women following the old traditions did not want to recognize that the Kurdish women’s movement was not fragile any more. It was strong enough to take what it deserved. Yes, we had Leyla Zana as an example of an MP in 1991, but her role and power did not come from women's organisations or representation. She was the wife of a famous Kurdish politician, Mehdi Zana, a former mayor of Diyarbakir, who also went to prison in the 1980s for his political views. When Leyla Zana was first elected, her social status and her being the wife of somebody famous was the main reason for her to be elected. Of course, later she has become a very important Kurdish figure and politician in her own right. As an elected MP, Zana had to face prison, along with several other Kurdish MPs, and she stayed there for almost a decade, just like her husband and many other Kurdish politicians. We were strongly against accepting a few symbolic women. We wanted to exist and make decisions at all levels.

In 2007, men in the Kurdish political movement accepted the number of women to be elected, but they came out with a new offer: to put a few famous women or the wives of famous men onto the list. According to our male friends, that would have been easier for society to accept. But we said no. Because the number itself was not going to be meaningful as long as the proper acknowledgment of women was not recognized by men and society. We were strongly against accepting a few symbolic women. We wanted to exist and make decisions at all levels. We also decided that the female candidates should not be decided on by men or in joint meetings. Women's organizations should decide on their own candidates. After long and harsh arguments, we won this battle as well. We created a women's election committee in parallel to the previous general election committee and the women's branches decided on their own candidates. In the end, 8 out of 26 women MPs were elected in 2007. Almost all our women candidates had more votes than their male colleagues. The women found it much easier to make connections with different social groups. Their messages were much clearer. Society was ready; even if the previous male dominated power holders were not.


Gültan Kışanak's photos. All rights reserved.
 

NA,LT: Many commentators see the involvement and power of Kurdish women as a simple change in policy and practice. But your experience illustrates that it is an on-going struggle that has been difficult on many levels.

GK: It looks simple now, but it was certainly not easy to put this simple action into practice. Almost all our women candidates had more votes than their male colleagues. The women found it much easier to make connections with different social groups. The discussions before, and the results of the 2007 election marked a radical revolution for Kurdish and Turkish women rights and position in Turkey. First, the idea of women not being able to succeed was destroyed. Second, the well-known male stereotype of society not being able to accept women was challenged as well. Society actually welcomed women. Third, the general tradition of electing only well-known, famous women or wives of famous men was challenged. Women were elected with their own identity, from a mix of economic, social, ethnic and religious backgrounds. Before the 2007 election, people in our society still called women who had been elected as mayors ‘Mr. President’ (Baskan Bey). When a mayor visited somewhere most people were expecting to see a man. They asked ‘where is Mr. President’, and found it difficult to see a woman in power. When a woman mayor was elected, people would speculate that the city was run by men behind the scenes. The outcome of the 2007 election destroyed all these ideas and women mayors or MPs can now be accepted with power without any shadows behind her. Our system of co-chairs at all levels has become more visible, strong and stable since the 2007 election.
 

NA,LT: Do you feel that you have achieved gender-based equality within the Kurdish political movement and in Kurdish society?

GK: It is not easy to make deep societal changes in a short time, but it is happening. Now many Turkish and Kurdish people may not know the names of male Kurdish MPs, or politicians, but they usually know the names of Kurdish female politicians. 2007 was a big test for us. But the real test of success is continuity and the normalization of gender equality and representation in politics for the next generations. We have worked very hard, sometimes more than our male friends, to make this happen. The future generations, the young members of women's organizations, have important responsibilities for the continuation of equality and to change the established male-dominated tradition of power. We should also know and accept that there are many women who have played passive or even active roles in the continuation of patriarchal society. We should also know and accept that there are many women who have played passive or even active roles in the continuation of patriarchal society. There are many women who have become masculinized and act like men in our society. They are a barrier we need to deal with and change. If our progressive women’s organizations ever relax with the power they have gained, then that power could easily be taken away again by male dominated power holders. Equality of power must be institutionalized and become one of the most important societal norms if our advances are to continue.
 

NA,LT: How have these changes translated into Turkish politics and affected the work of other parties? 

GK: Our new gender role and practices have pushed changes in the Turkish political parties and the legal system. I would like to share a few examples, beginning in the Turkish parliament, where our Kurdish umbrella party at the time (DTP – Democratic Society Party) secured a female deputy leader in 2007. This was a ‘first’ for any political party in Turkey. This position allowed the leader, Fatma Kurtulan, to organize all party politics, and to speak in the name of the party. Other political parties joined in. The CHP (Republican People’s Party), which claims to be a leftist party, was embarrassed by this initiative and they also elected a woman deputy leader. And then the Erdoğan-led AKP (Justice and Development Party) also followed with these changes. It has almost now become a rule for political parties in Turkey to elect one male and one female deputy leader.

The second radical change was that for the first time in the Turkish parliament, women started to talk about important issues, including defence, foreign relations, economic and energy investments and the state budget. I was the first woman who was elected to the commission of state budget planning and became the only woman working with 44 men. Previously, women were almost always limited to a few issues, like family matters and some social problems. All other topics, especially those connected with defence budgets and policies, were left to men to deal with. We challenged this conservative approach and our female MPs started to make proposals regarding almost all issues.
This was another shock for the other political parties. They could not understand and accept that women should also take part on defence budget issues. They did not want women to have any involvement with important state matters. They wanted women just to speak about women's issues, children and family matters. We destroyed this very bad, men-oriented political tradition.

The third important change is that with our party co-chair leadership system and practice we pushed for the Turkish legal system to be changed. Now it is legal in Turkey, other political parties can use the same system. However, until now, no other political parties except the Public’s Democratic Party (HDP), the Kurdish dominated party, have adopted this practice in parliament.
 

NA,LT: These very important changes have challenged many traditions in the Turkish political system. Do you think these positive changes will continue and perhaps further close the gender gap in practice? 

GK: Of course the long history of inequality has created huge gaps and it is not possible to close these in 10 or 20 years. After 2007 we did not stop. In the 2011 election, more women gained power, and in the 2014 local election and the 2015 general election we have reached almost equal levels of representation in the Kurdish political party, as well as at the levels of city, town and village representation. This is not something we were given. We have had to fight for every single advance. As a party, we hold mayoral power in 102 different cities and towns in Turkey and in all of these, the mayors rule according to the co-chair system, with one man and one woman. We have had to fight for this. Our male friends started with the idea that they could understand equality at the level of the political party, but not for mayors. They thought it was a position where men can do better and make decisions more quickly. After a long battle we have won this argument as well. As you see at all levels we have to fight to have any meaningful equality. Now co-mayors make decisions together and equally. One is not more important than the other. We try to create full and permanent equality.

This is not just about numbers of individuals but also about the equality of input from different genders. We are now working on making the co-chair system at the mayoral level legal: it is practiced de facto by us but is not yet legal. But we made similar changes around political leadership and I believe we will do it at mayoral level too. As a party and as a community, we have increased trust in women's roles and positions.

This is not something we were given. We have had to fight for every single advance. For that reason I want to believe that these rights and the fight for equality is not going to be taken away from women. But we cannot relax and must keep on working even harder than we have already done.


Gültan Kışanak's photos. All rights reserved.

 From your experiences we can see the creation of any permanent equality is not an easy process. The outcome of our research in the Middle East but also other contexts around the globe indicate that in many places successful women forget their gendered identity after a while. Especially women leaders often buy into and project masculinist identities. As co-mayor of Diyarbakir what are the advantages or disadvantages of working as a woman? How much, and in what ways can you represent your gender identity? : NA,LT

GK: To be mayor of Diyarbakir is a very important and honourable position. Many of our male friends say that I can do it, because I have this great experience unlike other women. They do not want to see me as a result of the success of the Kurdish women's movement. However, this can be sometimes a problem, especially if you come from a strong political background, like me. To have the experience of my political background and having been an MP for two terms, as well as having been the co-chair of the party in the past might all look like an advantage. But in practice, all this does not help women’s rights in general. Many of our male friends say that I can do it, because I have this great experience unlike other women. They do not want to see me as a result of the success of the Kurdish women's movement. Instead they want to believe and see that Gültan is an exception. I try to explain and fight against this very wrong assumption. There is the strong power of the Kurdish women's movement behind my individual success. Without this movement, I would not be here. We, within the Kurdish women's movement, now try to make those still adhering to the patriarchal tradition understand that every woman can be as successful as every man, at least if they are given equal support, chances and trust. My story is not just my story; it is the story of the success of Kurdish women.

Another danger we should be aware of is that those in the male dominated tradition do not want to see a successful woman as a woman any more. They de-genderise successful women. They try to kill our gender identity, to see us as men, even expecting us to act like men. They believe that every successful woman has male hormones. We must not tolerate this. They do not mind if I as a Gültan, co-mayor of Diyarbakir, enter male areas, such as mosques or teashops. But they don’t want me as a woman. They say: ‘ you are welcome, because you are our President, but we don’t want other women here.’ According to them, if somebody is mayor, they have reached the level of men. When I remind them that I am also a woman they still hesitate to accept this idea. As you can see, there are still many barriers. One ends and another one starts.
 

NA,LT: If we look at work places and traditionally male dominated public spaces more broadly, what level of change have you witnessed over the last years? 

GK: There were not any women deputy mayors previously in Diyarbakir. All four deputies were men. After several months of battles we managed to get a position for women. There were 19 different departments below the mayor of Diyarbakir and women were managing just two of them. Now we have increased this to six, but the aim is to have equal numbers. The problem was not that we did not have qualified women for these positions before, in fact we had much better qualified women than men ready to work. But these positions were seen as positions for men.

Many women also accepted these traditions until recently. As part of Diyarbakir municipality, we have established a special department named Department of Women Policies. There are no similar examples of this in Turkey in any other local areas. This new department will have three main foci: 1. to deal with and reduce violence against women; 2. to increase women’s education, including making them aware of their rights; 3. to help women gain new skills and become more economically independent. This women’s department has the right and a sufficiently senior position to observe all investment programs and to evaluate to what extent these programs include the gender dimension or not.

Our aim is to confront all male-occupied spaces and make women more independent socially, economically, and legally. Our previous mayor, Mr. Osman Baydemir, also tried to challenge this male dominated ideology. During his time, 20 women were hired for fire-fighter positions and 15 for bus driver positions. These are very important changes. The aim of these policies was to break down traditional barriers. But their male colleagues and the established male ideology made life very difficult for these female fire fighters and bus drivers. Many of them wanted to return to office work. Our male friends defended their actions and claimed that ‘fire-fighter and bus drivers are heavy jobs, requiring 24 hour work, including night shifts. How can women do this? We cannot create separate bathrooms and sleeping rooms for them. It will be too expensive and too complicated. Society is not ready’. Our answer is that if doctors, nurses can do their job with separate living conditions, something should be done for fire-fighters and bus drivers too. As you can see many of our male friends are not against women's equality in theory, but when it comes to practice and practicalities, they create many obstacles.

Resistance is not simply coming from society, but it is coming from some of our male friends within our political movement. There is still a long way to go. We should not sacrifice our gendered identity and should not tolerate when they come to us with sexist offers. We also have to remember the obstacles society and we face all the time. It's not just about equality in leadership or gaining some specific numbers in more powerful position. New traditions of equality in the workplace and in society need to be generalized and normalized. If this does not happen then just having women in symbolic positions, like the one I have now, will not be enough for any real, meaningful and permanent equality and freedom.
 

NA,LT:  How do you evaluate the latest situation in Diyarbakir and in the region in general?  

GK: As you already know, we have been going through a very difficult time with war and atrocities recently, following a more hopeful time starting with the peace letter of Mr. Abdullah Õcalan during the Newroz celebrations in 2013. We were hoping for true negotiations, reconciliation and democratization in Turkey. However, due to many reasons and developments, the ruling AKP government decided not to pursue a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue and waged another war on Kurds on all fronts, including our city Diyarbakir, other neighbouring cities and towns as well as Rojava. We have lost thousands of people, many of whom are innocent civilians, young children and women. Our cities and towns have almost been invaded and many districts were completely destroyed with all houses demolished, and the infrastructure destroyed. As if all this was not enough, we, as co-mayors are also facing judicial injustices. 22 of our co-mayors were arrested and 31 others were dismissed from office without any concrete legal grounds. Among them, 17 are female co-mayors. Despite all the difficulties and obstacles, we are trying to continue our municipal services on the one hand and show solidarity with the people affected by the clashes on the other hand. I hope the western world breaks its silence and puts more pressure on Turkey and the ruling AKP so that the government will shift towards negotiation for a peaceful solution.

I cannot say that international bodies, organizations and the media have been sensitive and attentive enough to the problems we are facing. However, as we know from past experiences, international campaigns and solidarity work is crucial in stopping atrocities and clashes. I hope the western world breaks its silence and puts more pressure on Turkey and the ruling AKP so that the government will shift towards negotiation for a peaceful solution of the problems.
 

NA,LT: How did the more recent wave of crack down and clashes influence your work and struggle for greater gender-based equality and justice?

GK: I think Kurdish women are having a more difficult time now than at any other time in the last three decades. The state’s military operations in the Kurdish regions during the last year was no longer limited to rural areas. They have destroyed all city life and put a huge burden on people’s shoulders, especially on women. The Turkish Human Rights Organisation has published a report about what has happened between 16 August 2015 and 18 March 2016 in 7 cities and 22 towns in the Kurdish regions. According to this report, a total of 1 million and 642 thousand people were affected by the state’s operations and curfews. 320 people have lost their lives (72 children and 62 women). Tens of thousands of houses were destroyed. At least 250 thousand people are homeless now, because of the destruction of their houses. Women and children have been especially affected by this damage. Most of them have been living in uncivilized conditions in tents without water and electricity for months. They cannot find enough food and clean water to keep them alive. They don’t have access to any health system. Although women have tried to protect themselves and their children from illnesses, the rates of premature birth, neonatal deaths, stillbirth, and child deaths have all increased. Children are traumatised and most have lost their normal lives and trust. I think Kurdish women are having a more difficult time now than at any other time in the last three decades.

During the military operations, the death of 62 women illustrates how women have been used as easy targets by the state. In Silopi, the 57 year old Taybet Inan was killed by state forces but her body was left on the street for 7 days, because snipers targeted anyone who tried to remove her body. This shows how the state uses women’s bodies as part of its politics and sees women and their actions as dangerous. It is an important proof that the masculine state hates women. 

In the Kurdish women’s movement, we have tried to help our people. We continue our education programmes and close connections with women. We are organizing to help people with their daily needs. We try to limit the effects of trauma among women and children. Despite the relentless war by the state against our people, women have not surrendered. They continue to resist in many ways. Many of our friends and political activists have been killed, including Asya Yuksel (the spokesperson for the Cizre Women’s Council), Seve Demir (the Women’s Rights representative for Silopi), Fatma Uyar and Pakize Nayır. These women did not leave their towns, cities, but continued to help their people despite knowing their lives were in danger. 

Because of the war conditions and other urgent priorities, we are focusing less on violence against women within families. We are not ignoring this important issue, but most of our workers have to deal with other problems at the moment. This provides important evidence of yet another way that war and conflict increases violence against women, especially within families and on the street. I hope the war conditions will not continue – this would put women’s rights in further danger and even put us back to the old days. I hope this difficult time will end soon and will even help us to move the Kurdish women’s movement one more step further on, as we managed in the 1980s and 1990s.
 

NA,LT: Did you expect the latest military coup? How is the failed coup and its aftermath affecting Kurdish women and people in general?

GK: As I mentioned at the beginning of our interview, myself and many other Kurds have directly suffered as a result of previous military coups in Turkey. I was taken to the infamous Diyarbakir prison following the military coup (12 September 1980). I know very well the bad effects of a military coup. There has always been the possibility of a military coup in Turkey. For that reason, the recent military coup was no surprise to me. I am very angry that no proper measures were taken to stop this coup. As a mayor of Diyarbakir, I have responsibilities for my people. I worry that this will affect our city and our people negatively. This is what always happened during and after the previous military coups. If I go back to that evening, on 15 July 2016, we first tried to work out if there were any street clashes and conflict happening in our city. The leader of the HDP, Mr Selahattin Demirtaş, was in Diyarbakir that evening. I visited him and talked to him about the coup and its possible results. The HDP made a strong official statement straight away and made their position very clear: they were totally against any military coup. The HDP made a strong official statement straight away and made their position very clear: they were totally against any military coup. We anxiously followed all developments that evening and afterwards, just like many other Kurdish people and HDP members.

Looking at the results: we can see that the high ranking military generals and personnel who carried out a very brutal war against Kurdish people were directly involved in this military coup. This shows that the war in Kurdistan and the level of democracy in Turkey are directly connected with one another. Sadly we can see that these generals, who have carried out crimes against Kurds and violated all human rights in Kurdistan, are not blamed for this reason. They are only blamed for a coup attempt, carried out against democracy. But we should know that the war in Kurdistan and the coup mentality are interconnected. If the crimes and war in the country continue, especially what we have witnessed against Kurds in the last two years, there will be always a strong possibility that entrenched military ideologues will continue to attempt coups, as they try to control power. War in Kurdistan increases the military mentality and opens a way for anti-democratic actions in the country. With no shame, the generals who organised the coup, are claiming the significant role they played in the war against Kurds as part of their defense. They try to justify themselves by proclaiming what big Turkish nationalists they are. I am quite sure that the war against Kurds in the last two years, which was led by the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government, was planned and carried out by these military generals and police chiefs. We understand exactly how well these generals and police chiefs understand democracy. However, even after the coup, the AKP government has not shown any clear sign that they are going to stop the war against Kurds. If the AKP is really keen on democracy and is a true champion of democratic values, they could learn lessons from the latest military coup and adopt democratic solutions to the Kurdish issue. We do not yet know what kind of strategy will now be followed by Erdoğan, the Turkish president, concerning the Kurdish issue. After the coup Erdoğan and the AKP have started a dialogue with most of the opposition political parties. However, since the HDP and Kurds are not included in this dialogue, this has created suspicions that a democratic solution may not be the priority for the Erdoğan and his government. War in Kurdistan increases the military mentality and opens a way for anti-democratic actions in the country.

When I look at the reaction of the Kurdish people after the coup, I can say that especially Kurdish women and other leftist women’s organizations in Turkey have organized demonstrations and rallies with the slogan: ‘No to Coup, Yes to Radical Democracy’. In these demonstrations, tens of thousands of women have taken a strong stance against any military coup. But they have also made it clear and demonstrated that they are against authoritarian, sexist and militarist rules and structures. As I have said throughout this interview, women’s movements have always been critical of the divisive, unequal and sexist slogans and policies of the government. After this military coup, the government may use this as an excuse to strengthen their sexist, militarist and anti-democratic policies further. We face this danger now. Women’s movements are aware of this danger and for that reason keep advocating for societal and gender equality at all levels. We see this as the main starting point for all democratic values and practices. Without this we cannot talk about democracy: it can only be paying lip service while hiding their true agenda. Crucially, to be against the coup does not mean we have to agree with the government’s policies. We are continuing our work and struggle with a clear understanding of the connections between government policies, practices and military coups.

About the authors
Gültan Kışanak has been the first female co-mayor of Diyarbakir, the largest Kurdish majority city in southeastern Turkey. Previously, she was an MP of the Peace and Democracy party  (BDP) and has a long history of women's rights activism. She also worked as a journalist for several years. 

Nadje Al-Ali teaches at the Centre for Gender Studies, SOAS University of London. She is specialised in women and gender issues with reference to the Middle East; particularly Iraq and Egypt, and more recently Turkey and Kurdish issues. 

Latif Tas is research associate in the School of Law at SOAS University of London and has most recently been awarded a Global Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellowship. He has been writing on legal pluralism, Kurdish issues and diaspora mobiilization, and, jointly with Prof Al-Ali, has been working on the gendered implications of conflict and peace in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. He is author of Legal Pluralism in Action: Dispute Resolution and the Kurdish Peace Committee (Ashgate 2014). 

This article was first published on Open Democracy

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Turkey: Crushing the dissenting voice https://sabrangindia.in/turkey-crushing-dissenting-voice/ Sat, 06 Feb 2016 09:24:51 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2016/02/06/turkey-crushing-dissenting-voice/ Umit Bektas/Reuters USA and EU blind to Turkish government’s brutal clampdown in Kurdish regions While the EU and the US have turned a blind eye to the Turkish government’s brutal clampdown in Kurdish regions, Turkish academics who have spoken out about the regime’s increasingly dictatorial policies have faced punishment and even imprisonment. A petition published […]

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Umit Bektas/Reuters

USA and EU blind to Turkish government’s brutal clampdown in Kurdish regions

While the EU and the US have turned a blind eye to the Turkish government’s brutal clampdown in Kurdish regions, Turkish academics who have spoken out about the regime’s increasingly dictatorial policies have faced punishment and even imprisonment.

A petition published in early January by the Academicians for Peace initiative, criticising the Turkish state’s political and military attacks against the Kurdish people, raised a red flag with its signatories stating: “We will not be a party to this crime.” They wrote:“The Turkish state has effectively condemned its citizens in Sur, Silvan, Nusaybin, Cizre, Silopi, and many other towns and neighborhoods in the Kurdish provinces to hunger through its use of curfews that have been ongoing for weeks. It has attacked these settlements with heavy weapons and equipment that would only be mobilized in wartime. As a result, the right to life, liberty, and security, and in particular the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment protected by the constitution and international conventions have been violated”.
 

In response, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan immediately demanded that all institutions in Turkey take action: “Everyone who benefits from this state but is now an enemy of the state must be punished without further delay.”

Academics targeted

Following this, Turkish federal prosecutors have investigated 1,128 of the signatories with 33 academics from three Turkish universities in Bolu, Kocaeli and Bursa being detained because of their alleged propaganda for a terrorist organisation and insulting the Turkish nation, state, government and institutions.

Turkey’s top higher education body, the Higher Education Board (YÖK), has called for university administrators to impose disciplinary sanctions against the academics. Subsequently, 109 academics from 42 Turkish universities were subjected to dismissal, discharge, suspension, termination and forced resignation.

A government-backed counter-petition, Academics Against Terror, has also been organised. The Grey Wolves, also known as Idealist Hearts, a formal youth organisation of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in the Turkish parliament, has even marked the office doors of signatories and left written threats.
Despite this, immediately after the government’s response, the number of academics participating in the campaign increased from 1,128 to 4,491. There has also been a public reaction against the government’s tactics.

Within just two weeks, independent petition campaigns organised by a variety of civic and professional organisations have collected more than 60,000 signatories, and supporting statements have been released by 65 organisations that have millions of members across the country.

The original petition has also created much-needed international solidarity with more than 60 international institutions, organisations, leading academics and politicians issuing messages of support and ten international petition campaigns being organised worldwide.

The recent clampdown on academics characterises the scope of the new “counterterrorism” strategy of the Turkish state. This “new” doctrine is again promoting a military solution to the Kurdish question by concentrating state violence against the Kurds and supporters of Kurdish rights.

Political plotting

After a period of fragile negotiations with the hope of ending the decades-long conflict, the new doctrine has emerged since the June 2015 Turkish general elections, when Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) failed to win a majority in parliament for a single-party government.

The government introduced the strategy after the June elections in an attempt to win back the votes of Turkish nationalists in the MHP, a long standing ultra-nationalist political party, and the “borrowed votes” of Turkish dissidents who temporarily collaborated with the HDP, a pro-Kurdish and pro-minority political party.

The Turkish state has effectively condemned its citizens in Sur, Silvan, Nusaybin, Cizre, Silopi, and many other towns and neighborhoods in the Kurdish provinces to hunger through its use of curfews that have been ongoing for weeks. It has attacked these settlements with heavy weapons and equipment that would only be mobilized in wartime.

The Turkish state is also using the Syrian refugee crisis and military intervention against the so-called Islamic State to gain international support from the EU and the US.
In line with the “new” doctrine, the ongoing ceasefire agreement and peace negotiations between the Turkish state and the PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) were officially suspended in July, with a state of emergency and curfew declared in Kurdish territories by the AKP government.

According to a report in Turkish by the Human Rights Association in Turkey, between June and November, 602 people (including 41 children) were killed, 1,300 people were injured, 1,004 people were jailed and 5,713 people were taken into custody during the military operations in Kurdish towns. There were also 134 people killed and 564 injured in two suicide bombings in Suruç and Ankara.

This campaign seemed to pay off for the AKP, with a significant increase in support within the six-month period. The AKP won 49.50% in a second parliamentary election called on November 1 2015, returning their single party majority.

Entrenching positions

It seems that Turkey’s “new” anti-Kurdish doctrine is a strategic, precautionary manoeuvre to maintain the popularity of Erdoğan’s regime. The government is aiming to avoid potential resistance, such as that experienced in the Gezi Park uprising in 2013, which unified a wide range of dissidents including leftists, Turkish nationalists, capitalists from the upper classes and religious groups.
Through its anti-Kurd strategy, the government is simultaneously deepening localised political and social tensions in Kurdish regions and reunifying right-wing nationalist civil society and political organisations under the flag of Turkish chauvinism.

In this light, the petition by Academicians for Peace is not only a revolt against the government’s Kurdish policy, but also a very effective swipe at the crucial point of the “new” strategy. It draws academics, students, intellectuals and other urban professionals together throughout the country, sending a wake-up call to the international public that Erdoğan’s new political and military strategy cannot be tolerated.

This article originally appeared on The Conversation

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Statement of Concern by Professors of Turkish Studies and Ottoman History Regarding Diminishing Academic Freedoms in Turkey https://sabrangindia.in/statement-concern-professors-turkish-studies-and-ottoman-history-regarding-diminishing/ Sun, 24 Jan 2016 08:49:39 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2016/01/24/statement-concern-professors-turkish-studies-and-ottoman-history-regarding-diminishing/ Photo credit: New York Times [On 10 January 2016, 1128 academics from Turkey and 356 from abroad signed a petition calling the Republic of Turkey to end ongoing violence and curfews affecting 1.5 million predominantly Kurdish citizens of Turkey. At a press conference the next day, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan denounced the letter as "treachery." […]

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Photo credit: New York Times

[On 10 January 2016, 1128 academics from Turkey and 356 from abroad signed a petition calling the Republic of Turkey to end ongoing violence and curfews affecting 1.5 million predominantly Kurdish citizens of Turkey. At a press conference the next day, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan denounced the letter as "treachery." By the end of the week, the government had launched 109 criminal investigations into academics based in Turkey. According to reports, the government arrested 33 academics who were later released.
The following statement was issued by a group of scholars of Turkish Studies and Ottoman History on 20 January 2016 in regards to concerns over academic freedoms and freedom of expression in Turkey.]

Statement for Academic Freedom In Turkey

Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey.

We, the undersigned professors of Turkish Studies and Ottoman History working at various universities throughout the world, from the USA to Asia, declare that we are profoundly concerned about the diminishing academic freedoms in Turkey.  On 10 January 2016, 1128 academics from Turkey and 356 from abroad signed a petition calling the Republic of Turkey to end ongoing violence and curfews affecting 1.5 million predominantly Kurdish citizens of Turkey in seven cities in the eastern provinces and to return to negotiations with the Kurdish movement.

We consider this petition within the framework of freedom of expression and consider the criminalization of our fellow academics unacceptable. We are deeply worried about the campaigns by the political authorities accusing our colleagues of “treason” and “supporting terrorism” as well as investigations by the prosecutors and Turkish Higher Education Council (YÖK) against them. We, thereby, invite the Turkish political authorities, judiciary and YÖK to abide by the universal standards of academic freedom and freedom of expression.

We also remind the Turkish authorities that Turkey is a signatory of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Based on these conventions and, and more importantly, the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, the state is required to protect freedom of thought, expression, association, and assembly. Thereby, we ask the authorities of the Republic of Turkey to respect academic freedom and freedom of expression.

References
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/01/turkish-academics-pay-price-speaking-out-kurds

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/15/turkey-rounds-up-academics-who-signed-petition-denouncing-attacks-on-kurds

Signature list as of January 20, 2016

Prof. Dr. Daron Acemoglu – Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics, MIT, USA
Dr. Can Açıksöz – University of Arizona, USA
Dr. Iris Agmon – Ben Gurion University, Israel
Dr. Gabor J Agoston – Georgetown University, USA
Prof. Dr. Samim Akgonul – University of Strasbourg, France
Prof. Dr. Jun Akiba – Chiba University, Japan
Dr. Yigit Akin – Tulane University, USA
Dr. Karabekir Akkoyunlu – University of Graz, Austria
Prof. Dr. Virginia Aksan – McMaster University, Canada
Dr. Ayca Alemdaroglu – Associate Director of Keyman Modern Turkish Studies Program, Northwestern University, USA
Dr. Ece Algan – Director, Center for Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, California State University at San Bernardino, USA
Prof. Dr. Guillermo Algaze – University of California, San Diego, USA
Prof. Walter Andrews – University of Washington, USA
Dr. Sedef Arat-Koc – Ryerson University, Canada
Dr. Febe Armanios – Middlebury College, USA
Dr. Tuna Artun – Rutgers University, USA
Dr. Senem Aslan – Bates College, USA
Dr. Nurcan Atalan – Skidmore College, USA
Dr. Sabri Ateş – Southern Methodist University, USA
Dr. Marc Aymes – CNRS, France
Dr. Kathryn Babayan – University of Michigan, USA
Prof. Dr. Marc Baer – London School of Economics, UK
Dr. Ulas Bagci – University of Central Florida, USA
Dr. Onur Bakiner – Seattle University, USA
Prof. Asli Bali – University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Prof. Dr. Karl K. Barbir – Siena College, USA
Dr. Sami Bargaoui – University of La Manouba, Tunisia
Dr. Betul Basaran – St. Mary’s College, USA
Prof. Dr. Shahzad Bashir – Stanford University, USA
Dr. Birol Başkan – Georgetown University, USA
Dr. Sahar Bazzaz – College of the Holy Cross, USA
Prof. Dr. Joel Beinin – Donald J. McLaclan Professor of History, Stanford University, USA
Dr. Ceren Belge – Concordia University, Canada
Prof. Faruk Bilici – Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales, France
Dr. Patricia Blessing – Society of Architectural Historians, USA
Dr. Grigor Boykov – CRSA, University of Sofia, Bulgaria
Prof. Dr. Hamit Bozarslan – EHESS, France
Prof. Dr. Sibel Bozdogan – Harvard University, USA
Dr. Marcy Brink-Danan – The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
Prof. Dr. Petra de Bruijn – Leiden University, Netherlands
Prof. Dr. Palmira Brummett – Brown University, USA
Dr. Guy Burak – New York University, USA
Dr. Rebecca Bryant – London School of Economics, UK
Dr. Michelle Campos – University of Florida, USA
Dr. Lale Can – City University of New York, USA
Dr. Giancarlo Casale – University of Minnesota, USA
Dr. Sinem Casale – University of Minnesota, USA
Prof. Dr. Ekrem Causevic – University of Zagreb
Dr. Erdem Çıpa – University of Michigan, USA
Dr. Natalie Clayer – CNRS-EHESS, France
Prof. Dr. Juan Cole – University of Michigan, USA
Prof. Dr. Howard Crane – Ohio State University, USA
Dr. Robert Crews – Stanford University, USA
Dr. Ferenc Csirkés – Tübingen University, Germany
Prof. Dr. Jocelyne Dakhlia – EHESS, France
Dr. Rosito D’Amora – University del Salento, Italy
Emeritus Prof. Robert Dankoff – University of Chicago, USA
Prof. Dr. Linda T. Darling – University of Arizona, USA
Dr. Yorgos Dedes – School of Oriental and African Studies, UK
Emerita Professor Dr. Carol Delaney – Stanford University, USA
Prof. Dr. Devin DeWeese – Indiana University, USA
Emeritus Professor Dr. Arif Dirlik – University of Oregon, USA
Prof. Dr. Beshara Doumani – Joukowsky Family Distinguished Professor of Modern Middle East History, Brown University, USA
Dr. Markus Dressler – University of Bayreuth, Germany Dr. Vera Eccarius-Kelly — Siena College, USA
Dr. Howard Eissenstat – St. Lawrence University, USA
Dr. Lerna Ekmecioglu – McMillan-Stewart Associate Professor of History, MIT, USA
Dr. Evrim Emir-Sayers – San Francisco State University, USA
Dr. Bogac Ergene – University of Vermont, USA
Prof. Carl Ernst – Kenan Distinguished Professor of Religious Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA
Dr. Sinem Eryilmaz, CSIC, Madrid, Spain
Dr. Tolga Esmer – Central European University, Hungary
Dr. Kristin Fabbe – Harvard University, USA
Prof. Dr. Khaled Fahmy – Harvard University, USA and American University in Cairo, Egypt
Dr. Heather Ferguson – Claremont McKenna College, USA
Dr. Emine Fetvaci – Boston University, USA
Emeritus Professor Dr. Carter Findley – Humanities Distinguished Professor in History, Ohio State University, USA
Prof. Dr. Cornell Fleischer – Kanuni Suleyman Professor of Ottoman and Modern Turkish Studies, University of Chicago, USA
Dr. Benoit Fliche – CNRS, France
Prof. Dr. Ben Fortna – University of Arizona, USA
Dr. Elizabeth Frierson – University of Cincinnati, USA
Prof. Nancy Gallagher – University of California, Santa Barbara, USA
Dr. Pascale Ghazaleh – The American University in Cairo, Egypt
Prof. Dr. Fatma Muge Gocek – University of Michigan, USA
Dr. Banu Gokariksel – University of North Carolina, USA
Emeritus Professor Dr. Peter B. Golden – Rutgers University, USA
Dr. Rachel Goshgarian – Lafayette College, USA
Prof. Dr. Rossitsa Gradeva – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and American University in Bulgaria 
Prof. Dr. Molly Greene – Princeton University, USA
Prof. Dr. Alexander H. de Groot – Leiden University, Netherlands
Dr. Mehmet Gurses – Florida Atlantic University, USA
Dr. Gottfried Hagen – University of Michigan, USA
Prof. Dr. Shirine Hamadeh – Rice University, USA
Prof. Dr. Jane Hathaway – Ohio State University, USA
Dr. Beatrice Hendrich – University of Cologne, Germany
Dr. David Henig – University of Kent, USA
Prof. Dr. Bernard Heyberger – Directeur d’études, EHESS, France
Prof. Dr. Colin Heywood – University of London, UK
Prof. Dr. Elizabeth Hurd – Northwestern University, USA
Dr. Asli Igsiz – New York University, USA
Prof. Dr. Colin Imber – University of Manchester, UK
Dr. Katharina Ivanyi – Columbia University, USA
Dr. Ralph Jaeckel – University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Prof. Dr. Cemal Kafadar – Vehbi Koç Professor of Turkish Studies, Harvard University, USA
Dr. Efthymia Kanner – University of Athens, Greece 
Dr. Burcu Karahan, Stanford University, USA
Dr. Ayfer Karakaya-Stump – The College of William and Mary, USA
Prof. Dr. Ahmet T. Karamustafa – Maryland University, USA
Prof. Dr. Hakan Karateke – University of Chicago, USA
Prof. Dr. Resat Kasaba – Stanley D. Golub Professor of International Studies, University of Washington, USA
Dr. Dimitris Kastritsis, St. Andrews University, UK
Dr. Zeynep Kaya – London School of Economics, UK
Dr. Hasan Kayali – University of California, San Diego, USA
Dr. Michael Kemper – University of Amsterdam, Netherlands
Dr. Zeynep Kezer – Newcastle University, UK
Prof. Dr. Dina Khoury – Elliot School of International Affairs and George Washington University, USA
Dr. Ilham Khuri-Makdisi – Northeastern University, USA
Prof. Dr. Hans-Lukas Kieser – University of New Castle, Australia
Dr. Ramazan Kilinc – University of Nebraska, USA
Dr. Mariya Kiprovska – CRSA, University of Sofia, Bulgaria
Dr. İpek Kocaomer Yosmaoğlu – Northwestern University, USA
Prof. Dr. Markus Koller – Ruhr University, Bochum, Germany
Prof. Dariusz Kolodiejczyk – University of Warsaw and the Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland; Honorary Member of Turkish Historical Society (TTK)
Dr. Elias Kolovos – University of Crete, Greece
Dr. Zeynep Korkman – University of Arizona, USA
Prof. Dr. Yavuz Kose – University of Hamburg, Germany
Dr. Tijana Krstic – Central European University, Hungary
Dr. Harun Kucuk – University of Pennsylvania, USA
Dr. Paul Kubicek – Oakland University, USA 
Prof. Dr. Timur Kuran, Professor of Economics and Political Science and Gorter Family Professor of Islamic Studies, Duke University, USA
Dr. Vjeran Kursar – University of Zagreb, Croatia
Dr. Ahmet Kuru – San Diego State University, USA
Prof. Dr. Selim Sirri Kuru – University of Washington, USA
Dr. Paul Levin – Stockholm University, Sweden
Prof. Dr. Mark Levine – University of California, Irvine, USA
Dr. Darina Martykánová – Universidad Autonóma de Madrid, Spain
Prof. Dr. Mark Mazower, Columbia University, USA
Dr. Morgan Y. Liu – Ohio State University, USA
Prof. Dr. Beatrice F. Manz – Professor of History, Tufts University, USA
Professor Lenore G. Martin – Emmanuel College and Harvard University, USA
Dr. Elise Massicard – Sciences-Po CERI, France
Dr. Adam Mestyan – Society of Fellows, Harvard University, USA
Prof. Dr. Laurent Mignon – Oxford University, UK
Dr. Alan Mikhail – Yale University, USA
Dr. Amy Mills – University of South Carolina, USA
Dr. Mostafa Minawi – Cornell University, USA
Prof. Dr. Timothy Mitchell – William B. Ransford Professor, Columbia University, USA
Dr. Yael Navaro – University of Cambridge, UK
Prof. Dr. Gülru Necipoğlu – Agha Khan Professor of Islamic Art, Harvard University, USA
Prof. Dr. Christoph K. Neumann – Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich, Germany
Dr. Vanessa Ogle – University of Pennsylvania, USA
Prof. Dr. Bernard O’Kane – American University in Cairo, Egypt
Dr. Kerem Oktem – University of Graz, Austria
Prof. Dr. Ozlem Onaran – Greenwich University, UK
Prof. Dr. Victor Ostapchuk – University of Toronto, Canada
Dr. M'hamed Oualdi – Princeton University, USA
Prof. Dr. Umut Ozkirimli – Lund University, Sweden
Dr. Hakan Ozoglu – University of Central Florida, USA
Dr. Esra Ozyurek – Chair for Contemporary Turkish Studies, London School of Economics, UK
Dr. Tatjana Paic-Vukic – The Oriental Collection of the Archives of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Croatia
Prof. Dr. Leslie Peirce – New York University, USA
Dr. Karen Pinto, Boise State University, USA
Dr. Oyku Potuoglu-Cook – University of California, Riverside, USA
Prof. Dr. Scott Redford, SOAS, UK
Dr. Andras Riedlmayer – Harvard University Libraries, USA
Prof. Dr. Aron Rodrigue – Charles Michael Professor in Jewish History and Culture, Stanford University, USA
Prof. Dr. Dani Rodrik – Harvard University, USA
Prof. Dr. Eugene Rogan – Director of the Middle East Center, Oxford University, UK
Dr. E. Natalie Rothman – University of Toronto, Canada
Dr. David Romano – Missouri State University, USA
Dr. Avi Rubin – Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel
Prof. Dr. Khaled El-Rouayheb – James Richard Jewett Professor of Arabic and of Islamic Intellectual History, Harvard University, USA.
Dr. Kim Rygial – Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada
Dr. Hanan Sabea – American University in Cairo, Cairo
Dr. Dana Sajdi – Boston College, USA
Dr. Adam Sabra – University of California, Santa Barbara, USA
Dr. İbrahim Kaya Şahin – Indiana University Bloomington, USA
Dr. Christa Salamandra – City University of New York, USA
Dr. Ariel Salzmann – Queen's University, Canada
Dr. Safa Saracoglu – Bloomsbury University, USA
Dr. Marinos Sariyannis – Institute for Mediterranean Studies/FORTH, Greece
Dr. Hakan Seckinelgin, London School of Economics, UK
Dr. David Selim Sayers – San Francisco State University, USA
Dr. Jan Schmidt – Leiden University, Netherlands
Dr. Kent Schull – SUNY, Binghamton, USA
Dr. Anna Secor – University of Kentucky, USA
Dr. Günter Seufert – German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Germany
Dr. Prakash Shahah – Queen Mary, University of London, UK
Prof. Dr. Elizabeth Shakman-Hurd – Northwestern University, USA
Prof. Dr. Wendy Shaw – Freie University, Germany.
Prof. Dr. Kim Shively – Kutztown University, USA
Prof. Dr. Kemal Silay – Indiana University, USA
Dr. Brian Silverstein – University of Arizona, USA
Prof. Dr. Amy Singer – Tel Aviv University, Israel
Prof. Dr. Radhika Singha – Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
Dr. Mark L. Stein – Muhlenberg College, USA
Dr. Gerrit Steunebrink – Radboud University, Netherlands
Prof. Dr. Martin Strohmeier – University of Cyprus, Cyprus
Prof. Dr. Martin Stokes – King’s College, UK
Dr. Emmanuel Szurek – EHESS, France
Emeritus Professor Richard Tapper – University of London, UK
Dr. Eren Tasar – University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, USA
Dr. Deniz Tat – Leiden University, Netherlands
Dr. Baki Tezcan – University of California, Davis, USA
Dr. Gunes Murat Tezcur – Jalal Talabany Chair for Kurdish Political Studies, University of Central Florida, USA
Dr. Nicholas Trépanier – University of Mississipi, USA
Dr. Cihan Tugal – University of California, Berkeley, USA
Prof. Dr. Berna Turam – Northeastern University, USA
Dr. Zeynep Turkyilmaz – Dartmouth College, USA
Prof. Dr. Masayuki Ueno, Osaka City University, Japan
Dr. Ebru Ustundag – Brock University, Canada
Prof. Dr. Nicolas Vatin – Collège de France, France
Dr. Ali Yaycioglu – Stanford University, USA
Dr. Eunjeong Yi – Seoul National University, Korea
Dr. Kadir Yildirim – Rice University, USA
Dr. Zeynep Yurekli – Oxford University, UK
Prof. Dr. Sabra J. Webber – Ohio State University, USA
Prof. Dr. Jenny White – Boston University, USA
Dr. Charles L. Wilkins – Wake Forest University, USA
Dr. Carole Woodall – University of Colorado, USA
Dr. Sara Nur Yildiz – St. Andrews University, UK
Prof. Dr. Gokce Yurdakul – Georg Simmel Professor of Comparative Studies on Diversity and Social Conflicts, Humboldt University, Germany
Dr. Konstantina Zanou – Columbia University, USA
Prof. Dr. Fariba Zarinebaf – Chair, Middle East and Islamic Studies Program, University of California, Riverside, USA
Prof. Dr. Dror Zeevi – The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
Prof. Dr. Madeline Zilfi – University of Maryland, College Park
Prof. Dr. Erik-Jan Zürcher – Leiden University, Netherlands

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