The consistent tension between the state’s power to investigate crime and the individual’s fundamental right to liberty forms a fundamental pillar of criminal jurisprudence in any constitutional democracy. Within this dynamic, the judiciary serves as the final arbiter, tasked with balancing the imperatives of law enforcement with the sacrosanct principles of personal freedom. The Supreme Court of India’s decision in Jugraj Singh v. State of Punjab stands as an illustration of this tradition.[1] A bench comprising of Justices Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhuyan, in its judgement stated that merely because nothing incriminating could be discovered would not mean that there is non-co-operation on the part of accused. While the case itself presents a common factual scenario—an individual implicated solely on the disclosure statement of a co-accused and the subsequent opposition to bail on grounds of non-cooperation—the Court’s treatment of these issues offers an important reaffirmation of established constitutional safeguards.

This article argues that the judgment in Jugraj is a crucial restatement of liberal bail jurisprudence, reiterating the foundational principles through a three-pronged analytical approach. First, it shows the inherent weakness of a co-accused’s confession as a basis for criminal implication, thereby demanding a higher threshold of prima facie evidence from the prosecution at the bail stage. Second, it narrowly and correctly defines the scope of “cooperation with the investigation,” aligning it with the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. Third, by scrutinising the investigative agency’s own diligence, the judgment implicitly critiques prosecutorial overreach and investigative inertia, reinforcing the judiciary’s role as a check on the executive’s power to curtail liberty.

The significance of Jugraj lies not in the creation of new legal doctrine. It is in its function as a necessary course correction. In an era where even politicians in power are being targeted on the pretext of not cooperating with the investigation by agencies like the ED, the Supreme Court’s decision serves as an important reminder to lower courts and law enforcement agencies. It shows that the foundational principles of liberty, articulated decades ago in landmark cases such as Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, remain undiluted and must be rigorously applied against any procedural practice that seeks to undermine them. This article will deconstruct the Jugraj judgment by analysing its factual and legal underpinnings, situating it within the broader jurisprudential context of evidence law and anticipatory bail, and exploring its implications for the rights of the accused and the obligations of the state.

The Judgment in Focus: Factual Matrix and Ruling in Jugraj v. State of Punjab

The case of Jugraj Singh presented a set of circumstances that are frequently encountered in trial courts across the country, making the apex court’s intervention particularly instructive.

Facts

The appellant, Jugraj Singh, sought anticipatory bail in connection with a case registered at Police Station Sadar Patti, District Tarn Taran. His implication in the case was not based on any direct evidence or recovery of incriminating material from his person or premises. Instead, the entire basis for his arraignment was a disclosure statement made by a co-accused, Rashpal Singh, from whom a recovery had been affected. This singular fact formed the crux of the appellant’s plea for pre-arrest bail.

Compounding the matter was a crucial detail that the Supreme Court found particularly relevant: the appellant had been “similarly implicated” in a prior case, also on the basis of a co-accused’s disclosure statement, and had been granted the protection of anticipatory bail in that instance. Despite this history and the nature of the evidence, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh rejected his anticipatory bail application on April 3, 2025, prompting the appeal to the Supreme Court. Recognising the tenuous nature of the implication, the Supreme Court, on June 23, 2025, granted the appellant interim protection from arrest. This protection was made conditional upon a standard and vital requirement which states that he joins the investigation as and when called upon to do so by the Investigating Officer.

Arguments advanced by the Parties

The arguments before the Supreme Court centred on whether this interim protection granted on June 23, 2025, should be made absolute. The appellant’s case was straightforward, resting on fundamental principles of criminal law. He argued that his implication was false and malicious, stemming solely from the inadmissible statement of a co-accused. He emphasised that nothing incriminating had been recovered from him and pointed to the past instance of similar implication as evidence of a pattern of harassment. Implicitly, he contended that he had complied with the interim order by joining the investigation.

The State of Punjab, in its counter-affidavit, did not dispute the foundational premise. It conceded that Jugraj Singh’s implication was indeed based on the confessional statement of the co-accused. However, to oppose bail, the State levelled the allegation of non-cooperation. The sole basis for this serious charge was the appellant’s statement during questioning that he had thrown his mobile phone into a river.

The Supreme Court’s reasoning deconstructed

The Court first addressed and defined the concept of cooperation, holding that “Merely because nothing incriminating could be discovered would not mean that there is non-co-operation on the part of accused”. This observation delinks the outcome of an interrogation from the process of cooperation itself. The absence of a discovery cannot be retrospectively used to label the accused as non-cooperative.

Second, the court noted a glaring omission in the State’s counter-affidavit i.e., there was no mention of any independent effort made by the police to verify the appellant’s claim or to pursue alternative leads. The Court pointedly observed that the State had not stated “that any effort was made to trace out the mobile number of the appellant and collect the call detail records or that any raid was carried to find out whether he is in possession of any incriminating material”.

This is instructively significant. It establishes a direct relationship between the quality of the foundational evidence and the credibility of the prosecution’s subsequent procedural objections. The prosecution’s case rested exclusively on a co-accused’s statement, a form of evidence legally recognized as weak. Faced with this fragile foundation, the State’s only recourse to deny bail was the allegation of non-cooperation. The Court perceived this as an attempt to secure custody to compensate for the lack of substantive evidence. It was insufficient for the State to merely allege it; the State had to first demonstrate that it had exhausted its own investigative avenues. This implies a judicial principle: the weaker the prima facie case against an accused, the less weight a court will give to generic and unsubstantiated allegations of non-cooperation used to deny bail.

Ultimately, considering the nature of the evidence, the precedent of the appellant receiving similar protection, and the lack of substance in the non-cooperation claim, the Supreme Court made the interim bail order absolute, subject to standard conditions.

Foundation of implication: Deconstructing evidentiary value of a co-accused’s statement

The Supreme Court’s decision in Jugraj was heavily influenced by the evidentiary quality of the material used to implicate the appellant. A look into the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, reveals why a case built solely on the statement of a co-accused is considered fundamentally weak.

Legislative framework

The Indian Evidence Act treats confessions made to police with extreme caution, born from the recognition of the power imbalance between the accused and the state.

• Sections 25 and 26: Section 25 states that no confession made to a police-officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. Section 26 states that no confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. These sections create an absolute bar on proving confessions made to a police officer or by a person in police custody, unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. This is a safeguard against coercion.
• Section 27: This Section creates a narrow exception wherein when a fact is discovered as a consequence of information from an accused in custody, “so much of such information.as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” The discovery lends credibility to the information. In Jugraj, the State made no claim that any fact was discovered based on information from the appellant.
• Section 30: This is the most pertinent provision. It states that when multiple persons are tried jointly, a confession by one affecting himself and others can be “taken into consideration” against the others. However, jurisprudence is clear: such a statement is not substantive evidence. It is not given under oath, nor is it subject to cross-examination. As established in the landmark case of Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the confession of a co-accused is a matter of the highest caution and can only be used to lend assurance to other evidence.[2] It cannot be the sole basis for conviction. The rationale is that an accused person has a powerful incentive to implicate others to exculpate themselves or to receive a lighter sentence.

Connecting legislative framework to Jugraj

The implication of Jugraj Singh rested exclusively on Rashpal Singh’s disclosure statement. There was no independent corroboration, no recovery, and no other material linking him to the offence. This reliance on the weakest form of evidence, legally insufficient to sustain a conviction, made the State’s opposition to anticipatory bail untenable. The decision provides u and affirms a vital principle for bail jurisprudence: the court must examine the prima facie quality and admissibility of the evidence.

Shield of Liberty: anticipatory bail, the enduring legacy of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia

The legal instrument through which Jugraj Singh sought freedom was anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). His case is rooted in the jurisprudential history of this provision, benchmarked by Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab.[3]

Jurisprudential evolution of section 438 CrPC

Introduced in 1973 based on the 41st Law Commission Report, anticipatory bail was designed to protect individuals from harassment and wrongful incarceration through malicious accusations. It is a pre-arrest legal remedy, giving substance to the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The Sibbia doctrine: Magna Carta of Anticipatory Bail

The scope of Section 438 was settled by a five-judge Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab (1980). The Supreme Court emphatically rejected the restrictive approach taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which had sought to impose rigid conditions, such as limiting it to “exceptional cases” and importing the restrictions of regular bail under Section 437.

The key principles laid down in Sibbia are:

• Liberal Interpretation: The provision must be interpreted liberally in favour of personal freedom.
• No Inflexible Rules: The Court refused to lay down a “straitjacket formula.” The decision must be based on the specific facts of each case.
• Wide Discretion: The discretion vested in the higher courts is wide and should not be fettered by self-imposed, restrictive conditions.
• Reasonable Apprehension: The “reason to believe” an arrest is imminent must be based on reasonable grounds, not vague fears.

Modern Application and Jugraj

The pro-liberty ethos of Sibbia has been consistently reaffirmed, notably in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra (2010)[4] and the Constitution Bench decision in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2020), which held that anticipatory bail is not by default time-bound.[5]

The judgment in Jugraj is a textbook application of the Sibbia doctrine. The Court faced a classic scenario Section 438 was designed to address: an individual facing arrest based on weak, potentially inadmissible evidence. By looking past the State’s procedural objections to the substantive merits, the Court exercised its wide discretion to protect the appellant’s liberty. The decision fulfils the very purpose for which Section 438 was enacted, acting as a vital shield for individual freedom.

Defining the Line: “Cooperation with Investigation” versus the Right against Self-Incrimination

The State’s primary argument against Jugraj Singh was his alleged “non-cooperation.” The Supreme Court’s handling of this issue firmly situates the concept of cooperation within the framework of the fundamental right against self-incrimination.

The Constitutional Bedrock: Article 20(3)

Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India provides that “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” This right ensures that the burden of proving guilt lies squarely on the prosecution, which must gather evidence through its own independent efforts, not by coercing the accused. It represents a fundamental departure from an inquisitorial system of justice, where the accused can be questioned to extract truth, to an accusatorial system, where the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

Judicial Interpretation of “Cooperation”

Cooperation involves an accused person adhering to the legal process: joining the investigation when summoned and making oneself available for questioning. Crucially, it does not mean admitting guilt or making a confession. The right to remain silent is a vital facet of the right against self-incrimination, and its exercise cannot be construed as non-cooperation.

Applying the Standard to Jugraj

The appellant had complied with the core requirement of the interim bail order: he joined the investigation. The State’s entire allegation of non-cooperation hinged on his statement about his mobile phone. Demanding that the appellant produce his phone, which could contain evidence against him, would be a textbook violation of Article 20(3).

Instead of focusing on the veracity of the appellant’s statement, the Court shifted the focus to the investigative agency’s own responsibilities. Its pointed observation about the State’s failure to trace the phone number or collect Call Detail Records (CDRs) is critical. This judicial manoeuvre implicitly redefines “non-cooperation.” It is not merely the accused’s silence but the prosecution’s failure to investigate. By highlighting what the police did not do, the Court reframed the issue. The State’s argument was, “The accused is not cooperating because he won’t give us the evidence.” The Court did not consider this because the State is supposed to find the evidence and not imply on the basis of someone’s acts or omissions.

It is important to distinguish this from genuine non-cooperation, such as absconding, tampering with evidence, or intimidating witnesses, which would warrant denial of bail. The appellant had done none of these; his refusal to self-incriminate was the exercise of a fundamental right.

Synthesis and Concluding Analysis

The judgment in Jugraj v. State of Punjab is a synthesis of three fundamental pillars of Indian criminal law: the rules of evidence, the principles of anticipatory bail, and the constitutional right against self-incrimination. The case began with a weak evidentiary foundation, necessitating the protective remedy of anticipatory bail. The State’s attempt to defeat this claim rested on an allegation of non-cooperation that was constitutionally impermissible. The Supreme Court, by seeing through this procedural gambit, wove these three threads together, affirming that liberty cannot be curtailed on weak evidence, and the shield of pre-arrest bail cannot be pierced by a flawed interpretation of cooperation.

Its value lies in its clear-headed application and forceful restatement of foundational principles. In a legal system where the process can often become the punishment, the judgment provides a much-needed reinforcement of the delicate balance between effective crime detection and the protection of constitutional rights.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

[1] 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 837

[2] MANU/SC/0031/1952

[3] MANU/SC/0215/1980

[4] MANU/SC/1021/2010

[5][5] MANU/SC/0100/2020

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A Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and K.V. Viswanathan anchored its decision in two principles: first, that Section 43D (5) cannot be triggered without a prima facie link to a proscribed organisation; and second, that statutory restrictions on bail do not prevent a Constitutional Court from granting bail to protect the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21.

This analysis dissects Union of India v. Saleem Khan (2025) by situating the Karnataka High Court’s reasoning within the modern bail jurisprudence under the UAPA. We trace the jurisprudence from the restrictive standard laid down in NIA v. Watali (2019), to the liberty-affirming exception carved out by Union v. K.A. Najeeb (2021), to the inclusion of a mens rea element in Thwaha Fasal. Finally, we reflect on what the Saleem Khan judgment reveals about the fragile promise of a speedy trial under the shadow of a terrorising ‘anti-terror’ law.

The Case before the Supreme Court

The case began in 2020, with an FIR registered at the Suddaguntepalaya Police Station in Bengaluru filed against 17 individuals for offenses under the UAPA, IPC, and Arms Act. The investigation was subsequently handed over to the National Investigation Agency (NIA), and re-registered as RC No. 4/2020/NIA/DLI – the ‘Karnataka Al-Hind ISIS module’ case. Saleem Khan was named as Accused No. 11 and Mohammed Zaid was named Accused No. 20. The prosecution claimed that Saleem Khan had connections with Al-Hind and the chargesheet accused him of attending “jihadi meetings.”

Khan and Zaid filed for regular bail, claiming that they had been “falsely roped in” without any link to a criminal conspiracy or terrorist organization. They cited their prolonged pre-trial detention, the lack of prima facie evidence on record, and the devastating impact of their detention on their families since they were the sole breadwinners. The Special NIA court rejected their applications invoking Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, finding that the accusations against them were prima facie true.

On appeal, the Karnataka High Court partly reversed the decision by granting bail to Khan while upholding the denial of bail to Zaid. This led to two separate appeals before the Supreme Court: one filed by the Union of India challenging the grant of bail to Khan, and another filed by Zaid challenging the rejection of his bail plea.

Submissions

At the High Court, the accused argued that there were no direct recoveries tying them to terrorist acts. The evidence was largely documentary and circumstantial, not substantive:

1. No association with Banned Group: The prosecution had not established that they belonged to a terrorist group, as “Al-Hind” is not a banned organization under Schedule I of the UAPA.
2. Vague Allegations: No dates or locations for the alleged “conspiracy meetings” and “jihadi meetings” were specified in the chargesheet.
3. Lack of Evidence for Terrorist Activity: The recovery of items like tents and knives, and the attendance of pistol training, do not constitute proof of a terrorist act.
4. Weak Witness Testimony: Witness statements about the seized materials did not directly link the accused to any terrorist activities.

The prosecution countered that both accused persons were directly involved in conspiracy meetings with other key members of the Al-Hind group, arguing that:

1. Saleem Khan was a close associate of the primary accused in the Karnataka Al-Hind ISIS module case since 2015. He played a significant role as a recruiter and organizer for the Al-Hind group.
2. Mohammed Zaid’s had a prior criminal history in another NIA case, and had attended several conspiracy meetings across multiple locations.
3. The evidence of participation in “jihadi” and martial arts training demonstrates preparation for militant activities.

Statutory analysis: Who is a ‘member’ of a terrorist organisation?

The UAPA charges pressed against Saleem Khan were Section 18 (conspiracy to commit a terrorist act), Section 18A (organising training camps), Section 20 (membership of a terrorist gang or organisation) and Section 39 (providing support to a terrorist organisation). The evidence on record for these offences were allegations of “association” with an organisation and “attendance” at group meetings. Even to an ordinary citizen, this should seem troublingly vague: what does it mean, in law, to be a “member” of a terrorist organisation?

Section 20 provides that “any person who is a member of a terrorist gang or organisation, which is involved in terrorist acts, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to life.” However, nowhere does the Act explain what counts as “membership,” or how this is different from an “association” (Section 38) or “support” (Section 39) which carry a maximum sentence of 10 years.

In Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam (2011), the Supreme Court had attempted to read in a measure of fairness into this provision. It held that “mere membership” of a banned organisation would not make a person criminally liable unless accompanied by an “overt act” of violence or public disorder. This modest safeguard, however, was short-lived. A 2023 review bench reversed the decision, restoring liability for “passive membership.”

Unlike companies with registers or shareholder lists, terror groups are amorphous and decentralised. The determination of “membership” therefore depends not on records, but on the perceptions and inferences of the NIA. This is a dangerous discretion to afford to an investigator when the consequence is mandatory life imprisonment. However, it is the inevitable consequence of a law which sanctifies arbitrariness, allowing life and liberty to turn on the whims of a government officer.

The Supreme Court’s ruling

While these statutory ambiguities expose the fragility of the UAPA’s scheme, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Saleem Khan turned on narrower grounds. Since the appeals before the Court were for the grant/refusal of bail, the Bench confined itself to reviewing the High Court’s order, which it ultimately found “fully justified and reasonable.”

In Saleem Khan’s case, the Court’s decision to uphold bail was anchored by the key fact that Al-Hind is not a designated terrorist organization as defined by Section 2(m) (Schedule I) of the UAPA and therefore attending meetings of the organisation would not amount to any prima facie offence. The Court further noted the 5½ year delay in the trial’s commencement, with Khan having been on bail for 3½ years, holding that it would not be “just and proper” to interfere with the order at this stage.

For Mohammed Zaid, the Court upheld the denial of bail, finding that his alleged direct involvement with a banned terrorist organization under the UAPA, his role in operating the dark web, and his prior involvement in another UAPA case justified his continued detention (the Court recorded that he had been granted bail in the second case). The Bench, therefore, signalled that ‘passive association’ without a proscribed link (Khan) cannot be equated to ‘active participation’ tied to a banned outfit (Zaid) – exemplifying how judicial reasoning under UAPA depends on crafting limits on a statute designed to operate through vagueness.

Bail under UAPA: The Inverted Logic of Section 43D(5)

The Supreme Court’s limited engagement meant that the real weight of reasoning lay with the Karnataka High Court, which grappled with the meaning of Section 43D(5) and its inverted standard for bail.

Section 43D(5) states that if the Court, after perusing the case diary and the chargesheet, finds reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true, then the accused cannot be released on bail. Notably, at this stage, the defence can neither submit exculpatory evidence nor cross-examine the prosecution’s case.

When judicial discretion is replaced by a prosecutorial veto, how, then, is a Court to grant bail? What counts as “reasonable grounds”? And what does it mean for a Court to believe that an accusation is “prima facie true”?

Watali and Najeeb: Jurisprudence of Suspicion or Liberty?

The Supreme Court’s judgment in NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) is the starting point for the modern jurisprudence on bail under the UAPA. The judgment placed extraordinary weight on the accusatory narrative, holding that at the bail stage, courts must not conduct a “detailed analysis of evidence” or reject prosecution material as inadmissible. The evidence collated by the investigating agency is to be presumed true. This interpretation cements a “jurisprudence of suspicion,” making bail under the UAPA nearly unattainable.

Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) carved out an exception to Watali’s strict faith in prosecutorial evidence. The Supreme Court observed that Section 43D(5) is not the sole standard, but “merely another possible ground” to deny bail. It ruled that the straitjacket of Section 43D(5) cannot justify keeping an accused in custody indefinitely; when trial delays cross the threshold of reasonableness, Article 21 demands release on bail.

Since Watali entrenched a near-insurmountable standard for bail by presuming the prosecution’s material to be true, subsequent courts have negotiated with its rigidity by relying on Najeeb’s deference to a speedy trial to carve out space for liberty.

Thwaha Fasal: Intention as the Threshold

Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India (2021) adopted the liberty-approach, building on Najeeb to hold that there must be an element of “mens rea” discernible from the facts and circumstances to constitute an offence of membership or support of a terrorist organisation.

The case began when a Sub-Inspector in Kozhikode assessed that three students were “standing in suspicious circumstances” in front of a laboratory. Seeing a police vehicle, one of them ran away while the other two were intercepted. The officer searched their bags and uncovered ‘radical literature’ – books like ‘Caste issues in India,’ notes written by Rosa Luxemburg to Lenin, protest posters and pamphlets, et cetera. They were arrested and charged with UAPA Sections 20 (punishment for being a member to a terrorist gang or organization); 38 (offences relating to membership of a terrorist organization); and section 39 (offences relating to support given to a terrorist organization) with the investigators alleging that they were members of the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist). Of the two, Thwaha Fasal was denied bail by the High Court leading to his appeal before the Supreme Court.

The Bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka granted bail, ruling that “mere association” or “mere support” is insufficient for offences under the above sections: what must be shown is an intention to further the activities of a terrorist organisation, discernible from overt acts (echoing the distinction between active and passive membership drawn in Arup Bhuyan). The Court adhered to the standard set by Watali of not conducting a “mini-trial” at the bail stage, but emphasised Section 43D(5) cannot override constitutional guarantees, as held by Najeeb. Thus, where the material fails to disclose intent or where prolonged pre-trial detention violates Article 21, bail becomes a constitutional imperative.

The Saleem Khan Case at the Karnataka High Court

The articulation of the essential ingredients constituting “membership” directly fortified the Karnataka High Court’s analysis in Saleem Khan. The Court affirmed that it was not to weigh the merits of the evidence but to consider the chargesheet material as it stands. At the same time, it stressed the need to “strike a balance” between Section 43D and the rights of the accused. To guide this assessment, the Court identified the following circumstances as relevant to deciding whether there exist “reasonable grounds” to believe that the accusations are prima facie true:

1. Whether the accused is associated with any prohibited organisation under the Act
2. Whether the accused was convicted of offences involving terrorist activities (or though acquitted on technical grounds, was held associated with terrorist activities)
3. Whether explosives of the category used in the crime were recovered from the accused
4. Whether any eyewitness or mechanical device (CCTV) indicates the accused’s presence at or around the scene
5. Whether the accused was arrested soon after the occurrence based on available clues

Applying these factors, the Court observed that Al-Hind was not a proscribed organisation; no explosive material had been recovered; no eyewitness or CCTV evidence placed him at the scene; nor had he been convicted of any terrorism-related offences. Therefore, it concluded that there were no reasonable grounds for believing the accusation against Saleem Khan to be prima facie true

Fragile Promises, Carceral Realities

The judgment in Saleem Khan reinforces the principle articulated in Najeeb: that the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 cannot be eclipsed by statutory bail restrictions under Section 43D (5). The Court was categorical that no accused can be allowed to “languish in jail without being given a fair and speedy trial.” Noting that Khan’s co-accused, Mohd. Zaid, had already spent 5½ years in custody without a trial, it directed the trial court “expedite the trial” and conclude it “within a period of two years,” while also requiring the prosecution to ensure full cooperation in leading evidence and completing the proceedings within the stipulated time.

But the promise of a “speedy trial” is not enough. In practice, even the process of securing a bail hearing is long and arduous. Although lapse of time is, in principle, an objective factor under Article 21, many lower courts treat it as operative only once the undertrial has served more than half the maximum sentence. This perverse inversion normalises prolonged incarceration and reflects the deeply carceral mentality embedded in our justice system. Under an overbroad anti-terror law, the senseless violence of a ‘terrorist’ and the democratic dissent of a revolutionary are two sides of the same coin: both are held hostage to the state’s conspiracies and routinely warehoused as undertrials on the mere strength of an accusation.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this legal resource has been worked on by Raaz)

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In a long overdue decision, the Delhi social welfare minister Rajendra Pal Gautam on Monday, August 21,  announced a blanket ban on manual cleaning of sewers and warned that anyone found violating the rule will be booked under culpable homicide.He also said that a committee had been formed to find out the best possible ways or machines to clean the gutters, within 15 days. This directions came after Lieutenant Governor Anil Baijal on Monday called a high-level meeting over deaths during sewer cleaning, which was attended by Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal, Delhi PWD minister Satyendar Jain and Gautam, along with officials of the departments concerned. The real question will be how strictly the Delhi government now implements the ban.

“It was decided in the meeting that no person will be allowed to go inside the gutter for sewer cleaning under any circumstances. There will be a complete ban on it. We will also put up hoardings in this regard,” Gautam told reporters.

“It is very unfortunate and shameful that people are losing their lives while cleaning sewers manually in the country’s capital,” the minister said, adding there were “standing instructions” that sewer drains should not be cleaned manually, but people were not adhering to the norms. “From noow on, if any contractor or the engineer is found getting the sewer lines or tanks cleaned manually, he will be booked under culpable homicide instead of negligence,” Gautam told the media. Earlier he said also he had issued instructions for putting up hoardings discouraging manual cleaning of sewers but that was not followed properly and another incident happened.

One more man had died while cleaning a sewer tank in Lok Nayak Jai Prakash (LNJP) Hospital of the Delhi Government on Sunday, while three others were injured. It is the 10th such death in Delhi in just over a month.

There is more. The minister also said that a committee comprising CEO-Delhi Jal Board, Chairman-New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) and Commissioner-South Delhi Municipal Corporation had been formed to find out the best practices adopted or the best machines being used in other countries across the world to clean sewer lines.

“They will submit their report in 15 days which will be tabled before the Lieutenant Governor in the next meeting,” he said. He added that on several occasions, it was found that people privately hired labourers to clean sewer tanks at their houses or at shopping malls and mishaps occurred. “I have asked the authorities concerned to make a proper list of such people who manually clean sewer. I have also ask the Jal Board to display a contact number on the hoardings, so that people can call on that number and ask for help if any sewer line or tank is to be cleaned instead of directly hiring the labourers,” Gautam said.

On August 12 , two brothers died of suffocation while cleaning a septic pit at a mall in Shahdara in east Delhi. On August 6, three persons died after inhaling toxic gases while cleaning a sewer in Lajpat Nagar in south Delhi. On July 15, four persons had died after inhaling poisonous gases as they entered a water harvesting tank in Ghitorni in south Delhi.

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Evangelical atheism: why the ‘secular fundamentalists’ have got it all wrong

An atmosphere of moral panic surrounds religion. Viewed not so long ago as a relic of superstition whose role in society was steadily declining, it is now demonised as the cause of many of the world’s worst evils. As a result, there has been an explosion in the literature of proselytising atheism.

The abrupt shift in the perception of religion is only partly explained by terrorism. The 9/11 hijackers saw themselves as martyrs in a religious tradition and western opinion has accepted their self-image. And there are some who view the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as a danger comparable with the worst that were faced by liberal societies in the 20th century.

For Dawkins and Hitchens, Daniel Dennett and Martin Amis, Michel Onfray, Philip Pullman and others, religion in general is a poison that has fuelled violence and oppression throughout history, right up to the present day. The urgency with which they produce their anti-religious polemics suggests that a change has occurred as significant as the rise of terrorism: the tide of secularisation has turned. These writers come from a generation schooled to think of religion as a throwback to an earlier stage of human development, which is bound to dwindle away as knowledge continues to increase. In the 19th century, when the scientific and industrial revolutions were changing society very quickly, this may not have been an unreasonable assumption. Dawkins, Hitchens and the rest may still believe that over the long run the advance of science will drive religion to the margins of human life but this is now an article of faith rather than a theory based on evidence.

It is true that religion has declined sharply in a number of countries (Ireland is a recent example) and has not shaped everyday life for most people in Britain for many years. Much of Europe is clearly post-Christian. However, there is nothing that suggests the move away from religion is irreversible or that it is potentially universal. The United States is no more secular today than it was 150 years ago when De Tocqueville was amazed and baffled by its all-pervading religiosity. The secular era was in any case partly illusory. The mass political movements of the 20th century were vehicles for myths inherited from religion and it is no accident that religion is reviving now that these movements have collapsed. The current hostility to religion is a reaction against this turnabout. Secularisation is in retreat and the result is the appearance of an evangelical type of atheism not seen since Victorian times.

Zealous atheism renews some of the worst features of Christianity and Islam. Just as much as these religions, it is a project of universal conversion. Evangelical atheists never doubt that human life can be transformed if everyone accepts their view of things and they are certain that one way of living – their own, suitably embellished – is right for everybody. To be sure, atheism need not be a missionary creed of this kind. It is entirely reasonable to have no religious beliefs and yet be friendly to religion. It is a funny sort of humanism that condemns an impulse that is peculiarly human. Yet that is what evangelical atheists do when they demonise religion.

A curious feature of this kind of atheism is that some of its most fervent missionaries are philosophers. Daniel Dennett’s Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon claims to sketch a general theory of religion. In fact, it is mostly a polemic against American Christianity. This parochial focus is reflected in Dennett’s view of religion which for him means the belief that some kind of supernatural agency (whose approval believers seek) is needed to explain the way things are in the world. For Dennett, religions are efforts at doing something science does better – they are rudimentary or abortive theories, or else nonsense. "The proposition that god exists," he writes severely, "is not even a theory". But religions do not consist of propositions struggling to become theories.

The incomprehensibility of the divine is at the heart of eastern Christianity while in orthodox Judaism, practice tends to have priority over doctrine. Buddhism has always recognised that in spiritual matters, truth is ineffable, as do Sufi traditions in Islam. Hinduism has never defined itself by anything as simplistic as a creed. It is only some western Christian traditions, under the influence of Greek philosophy, which have tried to turn religion into an explanatory theory.

The notion that religion is a primitive version of science was popularised in the late 19th century in JG Frazer’s survey of the myths of primitive peoples, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion. For Frazer, religion and magical thinking were closely linked. Rooted in fear and ignorance, they were vestiges of human infancy that would disappear with the advance of knowledge.

Dennett’s atheism is not much more than a revamped version of Frazer’s positivism. The positivists believed that with the development of transport and communication – in their day, canals and the telegraph – irrational thinking would wither way along with the religions of the past. Despite the history of the past century, Dennett believes much the same. In a piece entitled ‘The Evaporation of the Powerful Mystique of Religion’, he predicts that: "In about 25 years almost all religions will have evolved into very different phenomena, so much so that in most quarters, religion will no longer command the awe that it does today." He is confident that this will come about, he tells us, mainly because of "the worldwide spread of information technology (not just the Internet but cellphones and portable radios and television)". The philosopher has evidently not reflected on the ubiquity of mobile phones among the Taliban or the emergence of a virtual al-Qaeda on the web.

The growth of knowledge is a fact only postmodern relativists deny. Science is the best tool we have for forming reliable beliefs about the world but it does not differ from religion by revealing a bare truth that religions veil in dreams. Both science and religion are systems of symbols that serve human needs – in the case of science, for prediction and control. Religions have served many purposes but at bottom they answer to a need for meaning that is met by myth rather than explanation. A great deal of modern thought consists of secular myths – hollowed-out religious narratives translated into pseudoscience. Dennett’s notion that new communications technologies will fundamentally alter the way human beings think is just such a myth.

In The God Delusion, Dawkins attempts to explain the appeal of religion in terms of the theory of memes, vaguely defined conceptual units that compete with one another in a parody of natural selection. He recognises that because humans have a universal tendency to religious belief, it must have had some evolutionary advantage but today, he argues, it is perpetuated mainly through bad education. From a Darwinian standpoint, the crucial role Dawkins gives to education is puzzling. Human biology has not changed greatly over recorded history and if religion is hardwired in the species, it is difficult to see how a different kind of education could alter this. Yet Dawkins seems convinced that if it were not inculcated in schools and families, religion would die out. This is a view that has more in common with a certain type of fundamentalist theology than with Darwinian theory and I cannot help being reminded of the evangelical Christian who assured me that children reared in a chaste environment would grow up without illicit sexual impulses.

Dawkins’s "memetic theory of religion" is a classic example of the nonsense that is spawned when Darwinian thinking is applied outside its proper sphere. Along with Dennett, who also holds to a version of the theory, Dawkins maintains that religious ideas survive because they would be able to survive in any "meme pool" or else because they are part of a "memeplex" that includes similar memes, such as the idea that if you die as a martyr, you will enjoy 72 virgins. Unfortunately, the theory of memes is science only in the sense that intelligent design is science. Strictly speaking, it is not even a theory. Talk of memes is just the latest in a succession of ill-judged Darwinian metaphors.

Dawkins compares religion to a virus: religious ideas are memes that infect vulnerable minds, especially those of children. Biological metaphors may have their uses – the minds of evangelical atheists seem particularly prone to infection by religious memes, for example. At the same time, analogies of this kind are fraught with peril. Dawkins makes much of the oppression perpetrated by religion, which is real enough. He gives less attention to the fact that some of the worst atrocities of modern times were committed by regimes that claimed scientific sanction for their crimes. Nazi "scientific racism" and Soviet "dialectical materialism" reduced the unfathomable complexity of human lives to the deadly simplicity of a scientific formula. In each case, the science was bogus but it was accepted as genuine at the time, and not only in the regimes in question. Science is as liable to be used for inhumane purposes as any other human institution. Indeed, given the enormous authority science enjoys, the risk of it being used in this way is greater.

Contemporary opponents of religion display a marked lack of interest in the historical record of atheist regimes. In The End of Faith: Religion, Terror and the Future of Reason, the American writer Sam Harris argues that religion has been the chief source of violence and oppression in history. He recognises that secular despots such as Stalin and Mao inflicted terror on a grand scale but maintains the oppression they practised had nothing to do with their ideology of "scientific atheism" – what was wrong with their regimes was that they were tyrannies.

But might there not be a connection between the attempt to eradicate religion and the loss of freedom? It is unlikely that Mao, who launched his assault on the people and culture of Tibet with the slogan "Religion is poison", would have agreed that his atheist world view had no bearing on his policies. It is true he was worshipped as a semi-divine figure – as Stalin was in the Soviet Union. But in developing these cults, communist Russia and China were not backsliding from atheism. They were demonstrating what happens when atheism becomes a political project. The invariable result is an ersatz religion that can only be maintained by tyrannical means.

Something like this occurred in Nazi Germany. Dawkins dismisses any suggestion that the crimes of the Nazis could be linked with atheism. "What matters is not whether Hitler and Stalin were atheists but whether atheism systematically influences people to do bad things. There is not the smallest evidence that it does." This is simple-minded reasoning. Always a tremendous booster of science, Hitler was much impressed by vulgarised Darwinism and by theories of eugenics that had developed from Enlightenment philosophies of materialism. He used Christian anti-Semitic demonology in his persecution of Jews and the churches collaborated with him to a horrifying degree. But it was the Nazi belief in race as a scientific category that opened the way to a crime without parallel in history. Hitler’s world view was that of many semi-literate people in inter-war Europe, a hotchpotch of counterfeit science and animus towards religion. There can be no reasonable doubt that this was a type of atheism or that it helped make Nazi crimes possible.

Nowadays most atheists are avowed liberals. What they want – so they will tell you – is not an atheist regime but a secular state in which religion has no role. They clearly believe that in a state of this kind, religion will tend to decline. But America’s secular Constitution has not ensured a secular politics. Christian fundamentalism is more powerful in the United States than in any other country while it has very little influence in Britain, which has an established church. Contemporary critics of religion go much further than demanding disestablishment. It is clear that they want to eliminate all traces of religion from public institutions. Awkwardly, many of the concepts such critics deploy – including the idea of religion itself – have been shaped by monotheism. Lying behind secular fundamentalism is a conception of history that derives from religion.

AC Grayling provides an example of the persistence of religious categories in secular thinking in his Towards the Light: The Story of the Struggles For Liberty and Rights That Made the Modern West. As the title indicates, Grayling’s book is a type of sermon. Its aim is to reaffirm what he calls "a Whig view of the history of the modern West", the core of which is that "the West displays progress".

The Whigs were pious Christians who believed divine providence arranged history to culminate in English institutions and Grayling too believes history is "moving in the right direction". No doubt there have been setbacks – he mentions Nazism and communism in passing, devoting a few sentences to them. But these disasters were peripheral. They do not reflect on the central tradition of the modern West, which has always been devoted to liberty and which – Grayling asserts – is inherently antagonistic to religion: "The history of liberty is another chapter – and perhaps the most important of all – in the great quarrel between religion and secularism." The possibility that radical versions of secular thinking may have contributed to the development of Nazism and communism is not mentioned. More even than the 18th century Whigs, who were shaken by the French Terror, Grayling has no doubt as to the direction of history.

But the belief that history is a directional process is as faith-based as anything in the Christian catechism. Secular thinkers such as Grayling reject the idea of providence but they continue to think humankind is moving towards a universal goal – a civilisation based on science that will eventually encompass the entire species. In pre-Christian Europe, human life was understood as a series of cycles; history was seen as tragic or comic rather than redemptive. With the arrival of Christianity, it came to be believed that history had a predetermined goal which was human salvation. Though they suppress their religious content, secular humanists continue to cling to similar beliefs. One does not want to deny anyone the consolations of a faith but it is obvious that the idea of progress in history is a myth created by the need for meaning.

The problem with the secular narrative is not that it assumes progress is inevitable (in many versions, it does not). It is the belief that the sort of advance that has been achieved in science can be reproduced in ethics and politics. In fact, while scientific knowledge increases cumulatively, nothing of the kind happens in society. Slavery was abolished in much of the world during the 19th century but it returned on a vast scale in Nazism and communism and still exists today. Torture was prohibited in international conventions after the second world war, only to be adopted as an instrument of policy by the world’s pre-eminent liberal regime at the beginning of the 21st century. Wealth has increased but it has been repeatedly destroyed in wars and revolutions. People live longer and kill one another in larger numbers. Knowledge grows but human beings remain much the same.

Belief in progress is a relic of the Christian view of history as a universal narrative and an intellectually rigorous atheism would start by questioning it. This is what Nietzsche did when he developed his critique of Christianity in the late 19th century but almost none of today’s secular missionaries have followed his example. One need not be a great fan of Nietzsche to wonder why this is so. The reason no doubt is that he did not assume any connection between atheism and liberal values – on the contrary, he viewed liberal values as an offspring of Christianity and condemned them partly for that reason. In contrast, evangelical atheists have positioned themselves as defenders of liberal freedoms – rarely inquiring where these freedoms have come from and never allowing that religion may have had a part in creating them.

Among contemporary anti-religious polemicists, only the French writer Michel Onfray has taken Nietzsche as his point of departure. In some ways, Onfray’s In Defence of Atheism is superior to anything English-speaking writers have published on the subject. Refreshingly, Onfray recognises that evangelical atheism is an unwitting imitation of traditional religion: "Many militants of the secular cause look astonishingly like clergy. Worse: like caricatures of clergy." More clearly than his Anglo-Saxon counterparts, Onfray understands the formative influence of religion on secular thinking. Yet he seems not to notice that the liberal values he takes for granted were partly shaped by Christianity and Judaism.

The key liberal theorists of toleration are John Locke, who defended religious freedom in explicitly Christian terms, and Benedict Spinoza, a Jewish rationalist who was also a mystic. Yet Onfray has nothing but contempt for the traditions from which these thinkers emerged – particularly Jewish monotheism: "We do not possess an official certificate of birth for worship of one god. But the family line is clear: the Jews invented it to endure the coherence, cohesion and existence of their small, threatened people." Here Onfray passes over an important distinction. It may be true that Jews first developed monotheism but Judaism has never been a missionary faith. In seeking universal conversion, evangelical atheism belongs with Christianity and Islam.

In today’s anxiety about religion, it has been forgotten that most of the faith-based violence of the past century was secular in nature. To some extent this is also true of the current wave of terrorism. Islamism is a patchwork of movements, not all violently jihadist and some strongly opposed to al-Qaeda, most of them partly fundamentalist and aiming to recover the lost purity of Islamic traditions while at the same time taking some of their guiding ideas from radical secular ideology. There is a deal of fashionable talk of Islamofascism, and Islamist parties have some features in common with interwar fascist movements, including anti-Semitism. But Islamists owe as much, if not more, to the far left and it would be more accurate to describe many of them as Islamo-Leninists. Islamist techniques of terror also have a pedigree in secular revolutionary movements. The executions of hostages in Iraq are copied in exact theatrical detail from European "revolutionary tribunals" in the 1970s, such as that staged by the Red Brigades when they murdered the former Italian prime minister Aldo Moro in 1978.

The influence of secular revolutionary movements on terrorism extends well beyond Islamists. In God Is Not Great, Christopher Hitchens notes that long before Hizbollah and al-Qaeda, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka pioneered what he rightly calls "the disgusting tactic of suicide murder". He omits to mention that the Tigers are Marxist-Leninists who, while recruiting mainly from the island’s Hindu population, reject religion in all its varieties. Tiger suicide bombers do not go to certain death in the belief that they will be rewarded in any post-mortem paradise. Nor did the suicide bombers who drove American and French forces out of Lebanon in the 1980s, most of whom belonged to organisations of the left such as the Lebanese Communist Party. These secular terrorists believed they were expediting a historical process from which will come a world better than any that has ever existed. It is a view of things more remote from human realities and more reliably lethal in its consequences than most religious myths.

It is not necessary to believe in any narrative of progress to think liberal societies are worth resolutely defending. No one can doubt that they are superior to the tyranny imposed by the Taliban on Afghanistan, for example. The issue is one of proportion. Ridden with conflicts and lacking the industrial base of communism and Nazism, Islamism is nowhere near a danger of the magnitude of those that were faced down in the 20th century. A greater menace is posed by North Korea which far surpasses any Islamist regime in its record of repression and clearly does possess some kind of nuclear capability. Evangelical atheists rarely mention it. Hitchens is an exception but when he describes his visit to the country, it is only to conclude that the regime embodies "a debased yet refined form of Confucianism and ancestor worship". As in Russia and China, the noble humanist philosophy of Marxist-Leninism is innocent of any responsibility.

Writing of the Trotskyite-Luxemburgist sect to which he once belonged, Hitchens confesses sadly: "There are days when I miss my old convictions as if they were an amputated limb." He need not worry. His record on Iraq shows he has not lost the will to believe. The effect of the American-led invasion has been to deliver most of the country outside the Kurdish zone into the hands of an Islamist elective theocracy in which women, gays and religious minorities are more oppressed than at any time in Iraq’s history. The idea that Iraq could become a secular democracy – which Hitchens ardently promoted – was possible only as an act of faith.

Some neocons – such as Tony Blair, who went on to teach religion and politics at Yale – combine their belligerent progressivism with religious belief though of a kind Augustine and Pascal might find hard to recognise. Most are secular utopians who justify pre-emptive war and excuse torture as leading to a radiant future in which democracy will be adopted universally. Even on the high ground of the West, messianic politics has not lost its dangerous appeal.

Religion has not gone away. Repressing it is like repressing sex, a self-defeating enterprise. In the 20th century, when it commanded powerful states and mass movements, it helped engender totalitarianism. Today the result is a climate of hysteria. Not everything in religion is precious or deserving of reverence. There is an inheritance of anthropocentrism, the ugly fantasy that the earth exists to serve humans, which most secular humanists share. There is the claim of religious authorities, also made by atheist regimes, to decide how people can express their sexuality, control their fertility and end their lives, which should be rejected categorically. Nobody should be allowed to curtail freedom in these ways and no religion has the right to break the peace.

The attempt to eradicate religion however only leads to it reappearing in grotesque and degraded forms. A credulous belief in world revolution, universal democracy or the occult powers of mobile phones is more offensive to reason than the mysteries of religion and less likely to survive in years to come. Victorian poet Matthew Arnold wrote of believers being left bereft as the tide of faith ebbs away. Today secular faith is ebbing and it is the apostles of unbelief who are left stranded on the beach.

This article, an edited extract from Gray’s Anatomy: Selected Writings, Penguin, 2009, was published on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation website on January 9, 2012. www.abc.net.au

Archived from Communalism Combat, June 2012.Year 18, No.166 – Cover Story

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Defending atheists: The most stigmatised community in America

Amid western atheist tells of sitting in her lunchroom at work and listening as conversation opened up around her about religious differences. Her co-workers included several kinds of Protestants, a Catholic, even a Jew. Sensing they were in risky territory, they worked to find common ground. "At least there aren’t any atheists around here," one woman said in a warm, inclusive tone.

What’s a girl to do in a situation like that? Should she out herself or just keep quiet? In his seminal book, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, sociologist Erving Goffman posed the perennial quandary of stigmatised persons: "To display or not display; to tell or not to tell; to let on or not to let on; to lie or not to lie; and in each case, to whom, how, when and where" (p. 42).

Disclosure feels risky because it is. In 2008 Atheist Nexus gathered "coming out" stories from over 8,000 visitors who described themselves as atheist, humanist, freethinker, agnostic, sceptic and so forth. Some of the tales are painful to read. One woman said: "I’ve had people literally, physically back away from me upon hearing I am atheist. My children were told to run away from our evil home." A man’s confession of lost faith almost cost his marriage: "My wife told me that I’m caught in Satan’s grip and confessed that after I de-converted, she considered leaving me. I believe the only reason she didn’t is because she’s financially dependent on me." Elsewhere a young woman tells of losing 34 Facebook friends when she announced her lack of belief.

The consequences of anti-atheist stigma are public as well as private. Most self-described atheists are acutely aware of survey results showing that US atheists are less electable than reviled minorities, including Muslims and gays. Six states (in the US) still have laws on the books that ban non-believers from holding public office. A Florida minister whose de-conversion recently made national news said that job interviews were cancelled when prospective employers found out.

In the minds of many believers, atheism is linked with immorality and despite mounds of evidence to the contrary, religious leaders reinforce this stereotype. I once attended a Palm Sunday service at a popular Calvinist megachurch in Seattle. The minister was determined that his congregation should believe the resurrection of Christ to be a physical, historical event. He said: "If the resurrection didn’t literally happen, there is no reason for us to be here. If the resurrection didn’t literally happen, there are parties to be had. There are women to be had. There are guns to shoot. There are people to shoot." I found myself thinking: if the only thing that stands between you and debauchery, lechery and violence is a belief in the literal resurrection of Jesus, I’m really glad you believe that. But what are you saying about the rest of us?!

Anti-atheist stereotypes work to bond believers together in part because many Americans think that they have never met an atheist. A stigmatised minority can be the nameless, faceless "other" that people love to hate as long as members remain nameless and faceless. But as the gay rights movement has shown, things get more complicated – and attitudes start changing – when we realise we are talking about our friends, beloved family members and co-workers. Coming out has been such a powerful change agent for gays that atheists (along with other faceless groups like Mormons and women who have had abortions) are explicitly taking a page from the gay rights movement and launching visibility campaigns.

That is easier than it sounds. Among atheist and humanist leaders, passionate disagreements have erupted about what kind of visibility will actually help advance acceptance and rights for those who eschew supernaturalism. 

As a social cause rather than just a life stance, atheism was catapulted forward by 9/11 and the ascendancy of the religious right. Cognitive scientist Sam Harris says that he began writing The End of Faith the morning after seeing the trade towers bombed with jet fuel and airline passengers. Biologist Richard Dawkins, who had previously hosted a gracious series of televised interviews exploring faith and non-faith, shifted tone and became a patriarch of antitheistic activism. Journalist Christopher Hitchens wrote his scathing indictment, God Is Not Great. Doubters started coming out of the closet. I myself began publicly challenging evangelical Christian teachings when George Bush pointed to heaven to indicate where he had sought advice before invading Iraq.

It takes energy and guts to buck taboos and norms as strong as those surrounding religion and so the first out the door were antitheists who felt so strongly that they were willing to throw themselves into the fray, do or die. The "New Atheists" attracted a preponderance of young males who largely fit godless stereotypes: some defiant, some nerdy, many hyper-intellectual. All were, for one reason or another, either impervious to rules protecting faith from criticism or willing to pay a price for breaking those rules. 

Some of these firebrands can be counted among today’s leaders and many have kept an edge that is honed by the seemingly relentless assaults on science and civil rights perpetrated by Christian and Muslim fundamentalists. They remain fiercely defiant, unapologetic about their scorn for religion, willing to use shock tactics if that’s what it takes to break what they see as a terminal religious stranglehold on society. Several years back, a group called the Rational Response Squad promoted a "blasphemy challenge" urging people to videotape themselves denying the holy spirit because one Bible writer calls such blasphemy an unforgivable sin. In 2010 a Seattle cartoonist launched "Everybody Draw Muhammad Day" after learning about death threats against Trey Parker and Matt Stone for depicting Muhammad in (the animated TV series) South Park. This winter, American Atheists provoked quite an outcry with a billboard that quoted a Bible verse: "Slaves Submit to Your Masters – Colossians 3:22". 

The organisers of these irreverent events see them as advancing values that they cherish deeply – perhaps one could say values they hold sacred: freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of conscience and freedom from cruelty grounded in dogma or superstition. And yet criticism of such in-your-face attacks on religion has often come from people who share their goals. As the atheist visibility movement has expanded, quieter, more diplomatic leaders have emerged. Many of them insist that aggressive confrontation does more harm than good – that atheists need to be changing stereotypes, not reinforcing them and that there is such a thing as bad publicity.

Biologist PZ Myers and Harvard Humanist chaplain Greg Epstein have staked out two very different positions in the naughty-or-nice controversy. Myers writes a popular blog, Pharyngula, which evolved from a primary focus on biology and politics to include broad-based uncensored anti-religious news and commentary. Myers doesn’t suffer fools lightly and makes no bones about letting people know that he finds most religion not only destructive but also stupid. Epstein, by contrast, seeks to build ethical and spiritual community that builds bridges between faith and non-faith. His Humanist Community Project encourages humanists to develop the traditional virtues of religion: communities built around shared values and social service. Where Myers might rail against "faith in faith", Epstein’s colleagues find common ground with open, inclusive religious groups like the Interfaith Youth Core.

The consequences of anti-atheist stigma are public as well as private. Survey results show that US atheists are less electable than reviled minorities, including Muslims and gays. Six states in the US still have laws on the books that ban non-believers from holding public office

Blogger Greta Christina has said that atheists should "let firebrands be firebrands and diplomats be diplomats". She argues that both confrontational and collaborative tactics made the gay rights movement stronger and will do the same for non-theism. But what kind of confrontation? Ugly partisanship can backfire. For example, Fred Phelps and Sean Harris give homophobia such a vile face that they trigger disgust, pushing people in the opposite direction. Some atheist activism may do the same.

Even reasonable confrontation tactics can backfire – especially in the hands of a hostile journalist. Cathy Lynn Grossman of USA Today attended the April Reason Rally in DC, a gathering she described as "hell-bent on damning religion and mocking beliefs". There she found plenty which, when taken out of context, could be used to reinforce stereotypes. Her article headlined with a quote from Richard Dawkins encouraging non-believers to "show contempt" for baseless dogmas. It was accompanied by a picture of Jen McCreight (of the Secular Student Alliance) cheerfully carrying a sign that read: "Obama isn’t trying to destroy religion… I am". Other speakers were depicted as ornery, offensive and more than a little scary. 

Ad campaigns by non-theist organisations reflect a struggle to find messages that connect with either teetering believers or closeted sceptics while avoiding backlash. In 2009 a London publicity campaign went viral internationally with bus ads proclaiming: "There’s probably no God. Now stop worrying and enjoy your life". A variety of billboard campaigns have followed, some more provocative than others: "Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence"; "You Know It’s a Myth. Solstice is the Reason for the Season"; "In the Beginning Man Created God"; "We are all Atheists about Most Gods; Some of Us Just Go One God Further"; "Don’t Believe in God? Join the Club". All have drawn protests or vandalism from indignant theists.

It may be almost impossible to avoid causing offence while challenging the religious status quo. Non-theist organisations have traditionally ignored communities of colour but African Americans for Humanism recently launched an outreach campaign with the tag line: "Doubts about religion? You’re one of many". Billboards and posters show faces of familiar black leaders as well as ordinary group members. Coalition of Reason organiser, Alix Jules of Dallas says that even this understated approach is plenty controversial for two reasons: Almost 90 per cent of African Americans express certainty about the existence of god and honouring religion is seen as a matter of loyalty.

In Halifax, Nova Scotia, Humanist Canada wanted to run a bus campaign that said, simply: "You Can Be Good Without God". But the public bus agency refused the ads because they "could be too controversial and upsetting to people". One reader commented: "I think we should make atheist ads as innocent and non-confrontational as possible. Not because we should avoid controversy but because we will get the controversy no matter what we put up and the kinder and gentler our message, the more obvious the hypocrisy of our critics. I’m hard put to think of one more innocent than this one, though."

Humanist blogger and speaker James Croft, a doctoral student of educational philosophy at Harvard, insists that it can be done: "There are ways of conveying our values that are both strong and civil, which avoid insults and (except in certain cases) ridicule without giving one inch of ground on the battlefield of our core values. All the evidence shows that this hybrid approach is more effective than simply seeking to be likeable or relying on confrontation alone."

In their effort to find the balance that Croft calls "strong and civil", the Freedom From Religion Foundation has moved towards more personal messages, ones that offer a glimpse into a godless individual (or family) rather than some form of universal claim. Since 2007, they have purchased billboard space for messages, including "Imagine No Religion", "Beware of Dogma" and "Praise Darwin: Evolve Beyond Belief". But their latest campaign, "Out of the Closet", puts real names and faces together with simple statements of values or disbelief: "Atheists work to make this life heavenly," says Dr Stephen Uhl of Tucson on one sign. "Compassion is my religion," says Olivia Chen, a Columbus student who appears on another. A recent campaign in Clarksville, Tennessee, merely shows a young woman identified as Grace beside the words: "This is what an atheist looks like".

Atheist visibility is more than ad campaigns. In 2009 psychologist Dale McGowan, editor of Parenting Beyond Belief, launched the Foundation Beyond Belief, a tool that lets the non-religious visibly contribute to non-profits working on education, health, human rights and the environment. Last year the foundation added a donation category called "Challenge the Gap" that builds bridges by contributing to the work of religious groups with shared values. Hemant Mehta of the Friendly Atheist hosts news and commentary of interest to young non-believers – absent the edge that characterises an earlier generation of blogs. He brings more humour than anger when he talks with secular student groups about outreach. Small local groups are doing their part. Seattle Atheists dress as pirates and carry a Flying Spaghetti Monster in summer parades. But they also participate in food drives and blood drives. They hand out water during an annual marathon. The aim is not only to make themselves more visible but to show that they too are compassionate members of the community of humankind.

As non-believers gain recognition as normal and ethical members of society, I think we will find that confrontation diminishes and bridge building grows. It is not only that both are necessary but that one paves the way for the other. The Stonewall riots and San Francisco drag scene laid the foundation for Feather Boa Fathers and It Gets Better and pride parades that include local businesses and church banners. Early feminists who stayed defiant even when beaten and jailed made way for the apple-pie tactics of MomsRising which has stencilled messages on onesies and delivered cookies to congressmen to get their equal pay message across. In the words of Ecclesiastes, "To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven." The questions are in each case, to whom, how, when and where.

Greta Christina has estimated that atheist visibility is about 35 years behind the gay rights movement. That sounds close. We will have caught up when a majority of Americans know they know a non-theist – and that friends, family members and fellow citizens really can be good without god.

This article was published in the online magazine AlterNet on May 4, 2012. www.alternet.org

Archived from Communalism Combat, June 2012. Year 18, No.166 – Cover Story
 

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An empirical study on the New Atheist movement and its consequences

In 1963 the sociologist Erving Goffman published a book that has become part of the canon in social psychology, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, in which he defined stigma as "an attribute that is deeply discrediting". Those who are stigmatised are "reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one". Further, "sometimes it [stigma] is also called a failing, a shortcoming, a handicap" and that in extreme cases, a stigmatised person is "bad, dangerous or weak".¹ Then there is the issue of "coming out": "To display or not display; to tell or not to tell; to let on or not to let on; to lie or not to lie; and in each case, to whom, how, when and where."²

That atheists are stigmatised in the United States was dramatically illustrated by the University of Minnesota researchers Penny Edgell and Joseph Gerteis in their frequently cited 2006 article ‘Atheists As "Other": Moral Boundaries and Cultural Membership in American Society’, in which they present data indicating that atheists are much more stigmatised than other historically marginalised groups: "Atheists are at the top of the list of groups that Americans find problematic in both public and private life and the gap between acceptance of atheists and acceptance of other racial and religious minorities is large and persistent. It is striking that the rejection of atheists is so much more common than rejection of other stigmatised groups."3

Margaret Downey began collecting discrimination narratives through the Anti-Discrimination Support Network (ADSN) she founded in 1993.⁴ Downey has collected hundreds of detailed stories of atheists losing their jobs, facing abusive family situations, being subjected to organised campaigns and even death threats. More recent work by the staff at the Military Association of Atheists and Freethinkers documents the hostile environment for atheists in the military.

The "New Atheists" are not so new

There has been a "freethinking" movement in the United States for a very long time, even predating the outspoken 19th century orator Robert Ingersoll. Indeed atheists have had many champions over the centuries, from the European thinkers Thomas Aquinas, David Hume and Immanuel Kant and more recently in the United States, Madalyn O’Hair, Michael Shermer and Carl Sagan. The so-called "New Atheists" – Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens (d. 2011) – are but the latest in what is now a more widely publicised movement.

Media attention on atheists in the United States has been on the increase in the last half decade and includes highly publicised debates between believers and non-believers, bus advertisement campaigns, numerous editorials and documentaries. An impressive rise in Internet-based social networking sites specifically for atheists has occurred, most notably Atheist Nexus which in just over the first 14 months attracted well over 15,000 members worldwide and had 1,00,000 unique visitors every month.

Despite all of this attention, there remains in the public mind a very monolithic and negative image of atheists and there seems to be no end in sight to this particular dimension of the culture wars. Ray Comfort, in the ‘Introduction’ to his special 150th Anniversary Edition of The Origin of Species, writes: "It’s rare to find an atheist who doesn’t embrace Darwinism with open arms. Many believe that with creation adequately explained by evolution, there is no need for a god and no moral responsibility."⁵ This stereotype about non-believers is pervasive and distressingly common among Christians, especially in the American South. The sad fact is that Comfort is but one voice among many working to perpetuate the marginalisation and even demonisation of atheists. That non-believers are decidedly not a homogeneous set of amoral individuals may be obvious to those who are close to this topic but much work remains to more completely address the negative stereotypes.

Recent efforts to describe and more thoroughly understand the non-religious segment of the population in the United States have yielded rich and instructive data. In his 2009 article ‘Profiles of the Godless’, Luke Galen provides a useful survey of this growing body of literature as to the characteristics of atheists: the surveys consistently report that atheists are predominantly male, highly educated and overwhelmingly liberal. My research reported here is intended to expand on this data set so that we may better understand the stigma in order to attenuate it.⁶

Methodology

The survey "Coming Out as an Atheist" was live on the Atheist Nexus website (atheistnexus.org) for four months, from September to December 2008. During the time the survey was up news of its existence spread throughout the Internet on various atheist-oriented websites, blogs and listservs (most notably when it was mentioned by PZ Myers on the Pharyngula site http://scienceblogs.com/pharyngula). Although the vast majority of the questions were in a forced-choice format, one question was open-ended and over half of the respondents took the time to describe a situation where they had felt some stigma associated with being an atheist.

All forms of data collection present unique challenges and problems, including the use of the Internet. Nevertheless, the data obtained in this study do provide insight into the lives of the self-identified atheists who completed the survey. These are individuals who: a) have access to the Internet, and b) feel comfortable enough in their atheism to seek out communities online where they could speak with similar individuals. Although findings from this study may not be generalised to all atheists, research by Nadine Koch and Jolly Emrey suggests that Internet research conducted on marginalised populations may have more generalising power than previously thought.⁷ For example, they found that demographics for gay/lesbian samples obtained from Internet communities mirrored gay/lesbian population demographics. Furthermore, demographics of those participating in the survey were nearly identical to those who chose not to participate. And the psychologist Sam Gosling and his colleagues, after an extensive study on Internet-based research programmes, concluded: "Evidence so far suggests that Internet-based findings are consistent with findings based on traditional methods."⁸ Research supports the possibility that there is a strong social desirability bias – people are more honest when they don’t have to interact with the real person – in telephone surveys and that more valid results may indeed be yielded by online surveys.⁹

Results

The population represented in this survey of 8,200 respondents looked very similar to other survey populations of atheists¹⁰: many more males (74 per cent) than females, highly educated (62 per cent with college or graduate degrees), overwhelmingly white and very liberal (42 per cent). Though most (71 per cent or 5,398) of the respondents were from the US, the survey was completed by significant numbers from around the world (29 per cent or 2,218) and thus allows some suggestive comparisons.

Respondents were offered nine options: Atheist, Agnostic, Humanist, Bright, Freethinker, Sceptic, Naturalist, Non-believer and Other, in answer to the question: "Which word below do you most often use to identify yourself?". The overwhelming majority – 71 per cent – responded with "atheist". This result remained roughly steady when controlling for gender, age and geographic location. Interestingly, there was no close second place in terms of the preferred label, with none of the remaining options attracting much over five per cent of the responses. Of note is that in answer to the question: "How comfortable do you feel being labelled an atheist?", people from the United States were far less comfortable being labelled an atheist (54 per cent) as compared to those in, for example, western Europe (73 per cent).

The remaining 29 per cent however are spread over scores of different terms. Many respondents indicated that what they call themselves depends on the social context. Although many had very serious and thoughtful alternatives such as: "rationalist", "critical atheist", "antitheist", "teleologist", "non-theistic Reconstructionist Jew" or "Gnostic atheist", others had more whimsical responses such as "Pastafarian" and "Anti-Christer." One that perhaps captures the essence of this entire semantic struggle answered "midway between atheist and agnostic, waiting for atheist to lose its social stigma". Herein lies the crux of the problem. The stigma.

The stigma associated with being an atheist

In response to the question: "Which best describes your realisation that you are an atheist?", 19 per cent of those from the US indicated: "I have always known" compared to 33 per cent from the UK and 39 per cent in western Europe. For most atheists (56 per cent), this realisation was a gradual process over months or years.

In answer to the question: "How often did you attend religious services when you were growing up?", the data indicates that 64 per cent of those from the United States attended a house of worship at least a few times per month. Religious service attendance was much lower for those in other nations, with only 33 per cent of western Europeans indicating they went to services that often. Results for other nations include Canada 52 per cent, UK 43 per cent and Australia 45 per cent. While only 15 per cent of those from the US indicated they never went to religious services, the numbers are higher for other nations: Canada 21 per cent, UK 29 per cent, western Europe 27 per cent and Australia 15 per cent.

In response to the question: "Do you feel any stigma related to your atheism?", the data indicate a dramatic difference between the US and other western nations. While only 16 per cent of those from the US indicated they felt no social stigma related to their atheism, the numbers were much higher in other nations: Canada 38 per cent, UK 68 per cent, western Europe 68 per cent and Australia 56 per cent. On the other end of the response scale, the numbers tell the same story: 18 per cent of those from the US indicated they felt a strong social stigma related to being an atheist compared to only 5.8 per cent in Canada, two per cent in the UK, one per cent in western Europe and three per cent in Australia.

The survey’s most visceral responses addressed the assumption that atheists have no morals. Indeed the stories tell of atheists not just being seen as amoral but decidedly immoral. One woman from the Bible belt wrote: “Many times I’ve been told: ‘What stops you from going out and killing people?’!!”

In response to the question: "In general, how stigmatised do you feel atheists are in your culture?", the contrast between the responses from those in the US were dramatically different from those in other nations. The choice "not stigmatised at all" generated only two per cent of those from the US compared to 14 per cent from Canada, 46 per cent from the UK, 52 per cent from western Europe and 33 per cent from Australia. On the other end of the scale, 55 per cent of the US respondents indicated that atheists were "very stigmatised" compared to only 17 per cent from Canada, four per cent from the UK, three per cent from western Europe and four per cent from Australia. One of the most consistent patterns related to stigma was within the US. On every question, the four regions used for comparison – Bible belt, Midwest, West and North-east – the percentages for each response remained in the exact same order through all measures.

Social repercussions of being identified as an atheist

Three questions in the survey asked the respondent to predict the repercussions should they be identified as an atheist. These questions were all phrased as follows: "Do you feel that there would be any social repercussions if people in your [workplace/family/local community] found out that you were an atheist?" The results indicate significant differences between the US and other nations in all three scenarios.

While 57 per cent of those respondents from the US felt there would be at least minor repercussions in the workplace, only 12 per cent of those from western Europe felt that way. The other nations are as follows: Canada 35 per cent, UK 15 per cent and Australia 24 per cent.

While 61 per cent of those respondents from the US felt there would be at least minor repercussions in the family, only 20 per cent of those from western Europe felt that way. The other nations are as follows: Canada 46 per cent, UK 22 per cent and Australia 27 per cent.

While 68 per cent of those respondents from the US felt there would be at least minor repercussions in the local community, only 18 per cent of those from the UK felt that way. The other nations are as follows: Canada 48 per cent, western Europe 22 per cent and Australia 31 per cent.

When examining this data set broken down by region within the US, the pattern mentioned above again manifests itself. In all three scenarios, it is the Bible belt and the Midwest where the repercussions proved to be the most severe. It is with the family where there is the most fear of repercussions, with both the Bible belt and the Midwest in double digits predicting major repercussions. That females comprised only 25 per cent of the respondents to this survey certainly raises some important questions beyond the scope of the present article. There has been little research on how the stigma of being an atheist varies by gender. The present data suggest that being an atheist is more difficult socially for females than for males. In the present data, females differed somewhat from males: they were slightly younger on average and significantly more liberal, with 53 per cent reporting themselves as "very liberal" compared to 38 per cent of the males.

In response to the question: "Do you feel any social stigma related to your atheism?", 78 per cent of the females reported at least slight stigma as compared to 69 per cent of the males, indicating that the stigma is moderately greater for a female. Restated, while 20 per cent of the females said they felt no social stigma, 30 per cent of the males put themselves in that category.

While 46 per cent of the females believed there would be no social repercussions if people at their workplace found out they were atheists, 55 per cent of the males felt the same, indicating that more females than males feared at least some workplace repercussions.

The data with respect to social repercussions if family found out they were atheist are very similar to those found regarding the workplace: 41 per cent of the females felt there would be none while 50 per cent of the males reported the same.

Though the national and regional differences regarding perceived stigma are interesting, I think there is a greater need for deeper research into its gendered nature.

"And God Bless America!"

Atheists are marginalised and made to feel uncomfortable when a major political official ends her/his speech with "and may God bless America" or when grandmother asks "who is going to say grace?" before a holiday meal.

In two survey questions: "Which best describes how you feel in more intimate social situations where religion is invoked (for example, a pre-meal prayer with family or friends)?" and "Which best describes how you feel in public gatherings where religion is invoked (for example, when a speaker refers to god or says a prayer)?", the results were dramatic. Respondents indicated overwhelmingly that they felt at least a slight discomfort in both situations: 79 per cent of all respondents were uncomfortable in intimate social situations and 82 per cent felt discomfort with regard to public settings.

The vast majority (86 per cent) of the females reported feeling at least slight discomfort while a slightly smaller – but possibly statistically significant – percentage of the males felt the same way (76 per cent). Fifteen per cent of the females reported feeling no discomfort while 24 per cent of the males reported feeling no discomfort.

The stories of stigma

Nearly 4,200 respondents offered written responses to the prompt: "Please provide an example of a social situation where you experienced stigmatisation because you are an atheist". These narratives provide perhaps the richest information yielded from the data and clear patterns emerge, clarifying and deepening the sketch provided by the quantitative numbers from the forced-choice questions. Perhaps the most visceral responses addressed the assumption perpetuated by Ray Comfort and others, namely that atheists have no morals. Indeed the stories tell of atheists not just being seen as amoral but decidedly immoral.

One woman from the Bible belt wrote: "Many times I’ve been told: ‘What stops you from going out and killing people?’!!" A middle-aged female noted: "My six-year-old son was cornered in first grade by three other six-year-olds who screamed at him: ‘You will believe in Jesus!! You will believe in Jesus!!’ Not so good."

A young male confessed: "My wife told me that I’m caught in Satan’s grip and confessed that after I de-converted, she considered leaving me. I believe the only reason she didn’t is because she’s financially dependent on me." Another described: "I’ve had people literally, physically back away from me upon hearing I am atheist. My children were told to run away from our evil home."

Conclusion

Many more examples could be cited from the data but the tone and pattern are clear. The stigma associated with being an atheist, especially in the American Bible belt, is real, pervasive and oppressive. It is affecting the lives and livelihoods of many. But just how many? A recent survey by Trinity College in Connecticut found that 15 per cent of Americans claim they adhere to no religion, making them the fastest growing group of believers – or rather, non-believers – in the US. The Trinity College American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS) also found that the number of people who self-identify as "non-religious" is growing in every state. Data from the Pew Forum US Religious Landscape Survey appears to support the ARIS data.

According to several estimates, there are many more non-believers in the US other than historically marginalised groups. Yet this highly stigmatised group has no protection from discrimination and there are still laws on the books in six states prohibiting non-believers from holding public office, including my own home state, North Carolina.

Is a future where atheists in the US are not stigmatised possible? Work done to minimise or eliminate stigma by other historically marginalised groups such as homosexuals, HIV-positive individuals and others with physical challenges such as epilepsy has had mixed success. The social movement referred to by some as the "New Atheism" is focused among other things on the de-stigmatisation of atheism. It is hoped that research data such as presented here will contribute to useful dialogue on this problem.

Archived from Communalism Combat, June 2012. Year 18, No.166 – Cover Story
 This article was published in Skepticmagazine in January 2010. http://www.skeptic.com/magazine/archives/15.4/

References

1 Goffman, Erving, 1959, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, p. 5.

2 Ibid, p. 42.

3 Edgell, Penny and Gerteis, Joseph, 2006, ‘Atheists As "Other": Moral Boundaries and Cultural Membership in American Society’, American Sociological Review, 71, p. 230.

4 Downey, Margaret, 2004, ‘Discrimination Against Atheists: The Facts’, Free Inquiry, June 1, pp. 41-43.

5 Comfort, Ray, 2009, ‘Special Introduction’ to the 150th Anniversary Edition of The Origin of Species, Alachua, Fl, Bridge-Logos, p. 39.

6 Galen, Luke, 2009, ‘Profiles of the Godless: Results from a survey of the non-religious’, Free Inquiry, Aug/Sept 2009, pp. 41-45.

7 Koch, Nadine and Emrey, Jolly, 2001, ‘The Internet and Opinion Measurement: Surveying Marginalised Populations’, Social Science Quarterly, 82, pp. 131-138.

8 Gosling, Samuel, et al, 2004, ‘Should We Trust Web-Based Studies?’, American Psychologist, 59, pp. 93-104.

9 Presser, Stanley and Stinson, Linda, 1998, ‘Data Collection Mode and Social Desirability Bias in Self-Reported Religious Attendance’, American Sociological Review, 63, pp. 137-145.

10 Shermer, Michael, 2000, How We Believe: The Search for God in an Age of Science, New York, Henry Holt; Hunsberger, Bruce and Altemeyer, Bob, 2006, Atheists: A Groundbreaking Study of America’s Nonbelievers, Amherst, NY, Prometheus Books.

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The 2006 study conducted by the University of Minnesota found that atheists ranked lower than Muslims, recent immigrants, gays and lesbians and other minority groups in "sharing their vision of American society". Atheists are also the minority group most Americans are least willing to allow their children to marry. The results from two of the most important questions were:

This group does not at all agree with my vision of American society…

Atheist: 39.6 per cent; Muslim: 26.3 per cent; Homosexual: 22.6 per cent; Conservative Christian: 13.5 per cent; Recent Immigrant: 12.5 per cent; Hispanic: 7.6 per cent; Jew: 7.4 per cent; Asian American: 7.0 per cent; African American: 4.6 per cent; White American: 2.2 per cent

I would disapprove if my child wanted to marry a member of this group…

Atheist: 47.6 per cent; Muslim: 33.5 per cent; African American: 27.2 per cent; Asian American: 18.5 per cent; Hispanic: 18.5 per cent; Jew: 11.8 per cent; Conservative Christian: 6.9 per cent; White: 2.3 per cent

Lead researcher Penny Edgell said that she was surprised by this: "We thought that in the wake of 9/11, people would target Muslims. Frankly, we expected atheists to be a throwaway group." Nevertheless, the numbers are so extreme that she was led to conclude that they are "a glaring exception to the rule of increasing tolerance over the last 30 years". It’s not that bigotry and discrimination against Muslims is appropriate but at least it’s not hard to understand where such attitudes would come from.

Every group except atheists is being shown much greater tolerance and acceptance than 30 years ago. "Our analysis shows that attitudes about atheists have not followed the same historical pattern as that for previously marginalised religious groups. It is possible that the increasing tolerance for religious diversity may have heightened awareness of religion itself as the basis for solidarity in American life and sharpened the boundary between believers and non-believers in our collective imagination."

Some respondents associated atheism with illegal behaviour like drug use and prostitution: "that is, with immoral people who threaten respectable community from the lower end of the social hierarchy". Others saw atheists as "rampant materialists and cultural elitists" who "threaten common values from above – the ostentatiously wealthy who make a lifestyle out of consumption or the cultural elites who think they know better than everyone else".

Given the relatively low number of atheists in America, and the even lower number who are public about their atheism, Americans can’t have come to their beliefs about atheists through personal experience and hard evidence about what atheists are really like. Furthermore, dislike of atheists doesn’t correlate very highly with dislike of gays, immigrants or Muslims. This means that dislike of atheists isn’t simply part of a larger dislike of people who are "different".

Why are atheists being singled out for special hatred and distrust? "What matters for public acceptance of atheists – and figures strongly into private acceptance as well – are beliefs about the appropriate relationship between church and state and about religion’s role in underpinning society’s moral order, as measured by… whether society’s standards of right and wrong should be based on god’s laws." It is curious that atheists should be singled out for special hatred on the basis of church/state separation which religious theists, including Christians, are usually in the forefront of fighting to preserve. It is rare to find a case filed by or supported by atheists which is not also supported by theists and Christians. In fact, I can’t think of any offhand.

Although people may say that they consider atheists inferior because atheists don’t believe that civil law should be defined according to some group’s conception of what their god wants, I don’t think that’s the whole story. There are too many religious theists who also want civil law to be secular rather than religious. Instead, I think that a much better case can be made for the idea that atheists are being scapegoated the same way that Catholics and Jews once were: they are treated as social outsiders who create "moral and social disorder".

Atheists can’t both be lower-class drug users or prostitutes and upper-class elitists and materialists. Instead, atheists are being saddled with the "sins" of American society generally. They are "a symbolic figure" that represents religious theists’ "fears about… trends in American life". Some of those fears involve "lower-class" crimes like drug use; other fears involve "upper-class" crimes like greed and elitism. Atheists are thus a "symbolic representation of one who rejects the basis for moral solidarity and cultural membership in American society altogether".

That’s obviously not going to change, because as long as atheists remain atheists, they won’t be theists and they won’t be Christians. This means that they won’t agree that any gods, much less the Christian god, can serve as the basis for moral solidarity or cultural membership in American society. Of course, neither can adherents of many other religions who either don’t believe in gods or who don’t believe in the Christian god. As America becomes more religiously pluralist, America is going to have to change and find something else to serve as the basis for moral solidarity and cultural membership. Atheists should work to ensure that this is as secular as possible.

 This article was posted on the website About.com; http://atheism.about.com/

Archived from Communalism Combat, June 2012.Year 18, No.166 – Cover Story

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On research that has found that atheists are more compassionate and generous than highly religious people

Actually, this doesn’t surprise me. Back when I waited tables, the Sunday after-church crowd was the absolute worst of the week to wait on. They took forever, were super-picky, were terrible tippers and tended to be the most critical customers I had. It really killed me when, instead of leaving a tip, they’d leave a tract on the table. If you’re not familiar with these, they’re little booklets that some Christians pass out to try and save people. They justify substituting this for money because saving my soul is a far greater gift than a couple of dollars. Well, I’ve got news for you. The last time I tried to pay rent with a tract, my landlord wasn’t impressed. Second, that assumes an awful lot about me, my beliefs and my needs, doesn’t it?

I’m digressing but the point is, I identified with this article just by the title alone. It actually reminded me of a church sign that warrants a second look (see picture).

Another friend of mine, Paul, posted the following reflection about why this somewhat counter-intuitive phenomenon might be. He said: "When religious people do ‘good things’, they are often doing so in conditioned response to an ethereal reward/punishment set of beliefs. When non-believers do ‘good things’, it is because they want to do them." Tragic if true but I think Paul might be on to something. I should note that Paul is involved in ministry, like me, so he’s not throwing stones from a distance.

I also wonder if it has something to do with the comfort that comes with being part of the cultural majority. Yes, there are Christians who will claim we’re part of a persecuted minority but that’s simply ignorant. Christians have had the lion’s share of power in this country for a long, long time and it shows in our attitudes. We assume that what "we believe" is normal and that anything else is an aberration. The result of this is that anyone who doesn’t claim to be a Christian is made much more aware of it because of their difference.

It’s like what I’ve written before about the inherent privilege of being straight. Generally, straight people don’t think about being straight as much as gay people think about being gay namely because the "default" sexual orientation – aka, the majority identity – is that of straight people. The fact is, we don’t think about who we are and how we act nearly as much when we’re the ones in control.

Atheists, on the other hand, are fairly regularly persecuted (socially at least) for their lack of belief. They are made quite aware of their atheism either because of how they’re treated for it or because they have to keep silent about it for fear of being ridiculed. So perhaps with this tendency to be more self-conscious comes an equally more self-aware set of behaviours and attitudes. Put another way, if you’re part of a group that is stereotyped in a negative way, you might go out of your way to act differently, even at an unconscious level, to try and defy that stereotype.

I could be reaching here but I think there’s something here that is basic to contemporary human nature. So although I don’t think there’s anything inherently better or worse about an atheist brain or heart than a Christian one, I do expect that atheists may work a little harder to convince the rest of the culture around them that they’re decent, loving, caring people regardless of whether they believe in god.

Is this a case for atheism? An indictment of Christianity? Not really either, I think. If I’m right, it tells us more about the power of cultural norms, the potential negative (but relatively invisible) effects of majority consciousness and the responsibility of those with the privilege of being in the majority to go out of their way to act against the negative effects of such privilege.

All I know is that when someone tells me I defy many of the common expectations they have of Christians, I take that as a compliment. I wish it wasn’t the case but it is clear from the empty seats in many of our churches that we have done an awful lot of this to ourselves.

This article was posted on the author's website, on May 9, 2012.  http://christianpiatt.com

Archived from Communalism Combat, June 2012.Year 18, No.166 – Cover Story

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Crowds in support of Ambedkar

If the Ambedkar-conceived Constitution can be amended 97 times, can’t a textbook, which has to be treated as a work in progress, be amended?

When I was alerted to Shankar’s cartoon on April 10, it struck me like a whiplash. I am no teacher nor do I have children; textbooks are a distant memory. In the English medium textbooks I grew up on in Andhra Pradesh, caste, let alone Ambedkar, was rarely mentioned. Like most privileged Indians, I was to discover all this shamefully belatedly in life.

When a reporter called me for a "quote" on the cartoon row, I asked her if she even knew where Ambedkar was born. Silence. Our textbooks don’t tell students that Ambedkar, unlike Mahatma Gandhi, did not have to travel abroad to realise what it meant to be thrown out of a train; and that after having earned a PhD from Columbia University, he had to hide his identity to rent a room in an inn in Baroda and was kicked out when discovered. Dandi, yes – but neither teachers nor students are aware of the momentous, Ambedkar-led, civil rights struggle for water in Mahad in 1927. Most newspaper editors wouldn’t be able to name the four newspapers Ambedkar edited and published. Any small-town Dalit activist would know all this. Forget our MPs, the non-Dalit intellectual classes’ collective ignorance of Ambedkar seems pathological.

My concern over the cartoon in the NCERT Class XI political science textbook, Indian Constitution at Work, is how children and teachers in a classroom would read it in a society where caste prejudices and stereotypes are still rampant. Consider the general hostility towards Dalits and those from socially disadvantaged backgrounds entering elite English medium schools, as witnessed in the near racist opposition to the idea of including the poor (read "lower" castes) in rich people’s private schools through the Right to Education (RTE) Act. How would the largely non-Dalit teaching community (who handle NCERT textbooks in English) frame the cartoon? A year ago, the principal of Delhi’s elite Shri Ram School, Manika Sharma, was quoted in The Wall Street Journal as saying that she was "horrified" and "jolted" when the floor sweeper from her home enrolled her child in the school where Sharma is the principal. When saying, "I can’t sit across the table from someone who sweeps my floors," she was vocalising the fear of millions of well-off Indians who think the "outcastes" should only serve, stand and wait.

Now, how would Sharma or students trained by her read this cartoon? How would their reading potentially impact the self-confidence and self-worth of the 25 per cent – children of sweepers, shoemakers, drivers, dhobis and vegetable vendors – being coaxed into these elite bastions by the RTE Act? Suppose there was just the odd Dalit student in a classroom, what are the chances of her different reading of the Shankar cartoon getting a hearing from Sharma-type principals? She would likely be shouted down, just like voices from the Dalit movement are booed at by self-righteous upholders of "freedom of expression", a term as carelessly bandied as "merit" was to attack reservation.

A snail moves tardily and a rotund Ambedkar seems to be slowing it down further. Slowness is something "undeserving" "quota" students are routinely accused of. Ambedkar’s whip is limp while Nehru’s is taut – after all, the latter is the ramrod erect national patriarch. Ambedkar cuts a sorry figure. Yes, the chapter in question discusses Ambedkar’s crucial role several times yet stops short of mentioning how and why his favourite project, the Hindu Code Bill that gave women the rights to divorce and property, was scuttled both in the Constituent Assembly and later in Parliament. But can we expect one textbook to do everything?

Images and symbols tend to have a stronger impact than words. Almost every ‘conscientised’ Dalit has a picture of Ambedkar in his or her house, they are familiar with his trials and tribulations, and the more educated Dalits engage with his key works. Ambedkar is a rallying point, a symbol of hope, of possibilities of exit from the morass of caste. In contrast, finding a picture or work of Ambedkar in an average non-Dalit household would be as rare as finding beef cooked with asafoetida – unlike Dalits, the brahmanical classes have little to gain by embracing Ambedkar’s anti-caste ideas.

As recently as 2006, at the height of the media-fuelled anti-Mandal II mania, students at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences burnt Ambedkar’s books in the hostel corridor, made vulgar gestures, shot a video of this and circulated a CD among fellow students during their annual cultural festival. These arrogant and ignorant students would not long ago have been in Class XI or XII, taught by some Sharma.

Yes, political parties across party lines use this occasion to show a patently false love for Ambedkar and his iconic status but remain silent about the recent judgement in the 1996 Bathani Tola massacre of 21 Dalits, where all 23 accused were acquitted. But that shouldn’t rankle us much. We live in a country where justice for real crimes, like the 2006 Kherlanji carnage, is elusive, even structurally impossible; a country where it is easier to win retribution for the symbolic desecration of Ambedkar. And when Dalits are forced to take solace only in symbols, who is to be blamed?

What rankles is how liberal and even left intellectuals, who claim to be fellow-travellers of Dalits, have imposed moral pressure on Dalits and Dalit intellectuals to come out and stand in support of retaining the textbook in all its sanctity. Dalits have been portrayed both in big media and alternative media, such as the blog Kafila, as "emotional-devotional" fanatics who lose all "rationalism" – something non-Dalits gleefully point out Ambedkar stood for.

It is one thing for a news publication to feature such a cartoon and quite another for it to be reused in a textbook. What makes us think these cartoonists are beyond prejudices that the Dalit-free media they work for and the society they are part of are saturated with?

My friend and cartoonist at The Hindu, Surendra, had the tendency to show his "common man" seated, reading the newspaper or watching TV, and the woman of the house always serving tea or coffee, standing. He was unwittingly reinforcing gender stereotypes that RK Laxman and Shankar had perpetuated, stereotypes which, it could be argued, reflect reality. What if one such cartoon should find its way into textbooks? Should we not seek amends so that children are not fed stereotypes of gendered division of labour? It is one thing for a news publication to feature such a cartoon and quite another for it to be reused in a textbook. What makes us think these cartoonists are beyond prejudices that the Dalit-free media they work for and the society they are part of are saturated with?

This is just one part of the story. This debate has failed to engage with what the textbook actually sets out to do. On reading it, I realised it was radical in many ways. This is a textbook that uses the word Dalit several times unapologetically. This seems a first, given that as recently as 2008, the Haryana government ordered a ban on the use of the word Dalit interchangeably with scheduled caste in all official parlance.

Here is a passage from it that would have made Ambedkar proud: "As early as 1841, it was noticed that the Dalit people of northern India were not afraid to use the newly introduced legal system and bring suits against their landlords. So this new instrument of modern law was effectively adopted by the people to address questions of dignity and justice." In the last chapter, the textbook proffers another strong opinion: "Is it a coincidence that the central square of every other small town has a statue of Dr Ambedkar with a copy of the Indian Constitution? Far from being a mere symbolic tribute to him, this expresses the feeling among Dalits that the Constitution reflects many of their aspirations." But only Dalit aspirations?

In one scenario, the textbook makes students imagine that they receive a postcard from Hadibandhu, a "member of the Dalit community" in Puri district, Orissa. Men from this community refused to follow a custom that required them to wash the feet of the groom and guests of the "upper caste" during marriage ceremonies. In revenge, four women from this community are beaten up and another is paraded naked. The postcard writer says: "Our children are educated and they are not willing to do the customary job of washing the feet of upper-caste men, clear the leftovers after the marriage feast and wash the utensils." Then the critical pedagogical import is driven home: "Does this case involve violation of fundamental rights? What would you order the government to do in this case?"

The textbook also underscores the limitations of the first past the post (FPTP) electoral system. It says that though Muslims constitute 13.5 per cent of the population, the number of Muslim MPs in the Lok Sabha has usually been less than six per cent and that a similar situation prevails in most state assemblies. It explains proportional representation and sows doubt in the minds of the student readers: "The FPTP electoral system can mean that the dominant social groups and castes can win everywhere and the oppressed social groups may continue to remain unrepresented."

Who is to take credit for the radical language of this textbook? Of course, the Dalit movement and post-Mandal consolidation of OBC interests, which have created enough intellectual, social and political pressure to warrant these changes. The textbook ends with a "request for feedback" and asks readers to suggest "changes you would like to see in the next version of this book". We first need to acknowledge that neither the textbook nor Ambedkar is above criticism. An online petition called ‘In Defence of Critical Pedagogy’, signed by academic luminaries – mostly with upper-caste sounding surnames – seems to treat the textbook like a sacred text, as if it were the Bhagavad Gita that statues of Gandhi show him holding. If the Ambedkar-conceived Constitution can be amended 97 times in 62 years, can’t a textbook, which has to be treated as a work in progress, be amended?

Till such time, we can live with this textbook and celebrate its triumphs.

This article was published in The Indian Express on May 24, 2012; www.indianexpress.com

Archived from Communalism Combat, June 2012. Year 18, No.166 – Controversy.

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