Many analysts have presented critique of the abrogation of Article 370 and its impact on the political and social conditions but not much has been expressed about the causes of such hasty policy decisions. While the ‘ timing’ has been somewhat unexpected, there were many indicators that led to such a move. Hence, the decision is not very much surprising.

Hindutva organizations have been very critical of special status for Kashmir almost from the time of Independence. The political party representing these groups has openly expressed its intentions by incorporating the removal of special status in the manifesto.
 

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Modi supporters celebrate as votes are counted on May 23. STR/EPA

In early 2019, such a result had looked uncertain in the wake of state election defeats in Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan – part of the Hindi heartland that had helped Modi to victory in 2014. Opponents of the BJP dared to think that the Congress Party – the former “Grand Old Party of India” which had been reduced to only 44 seats in 2014 – was sufficiently revitalised to mount a credible challenge in 2019.

As the early months of 2019 dawned, scandals about the allocation of a defence contract as well as rising unemployment figures – and the suppression of these figures – made a bad start to the campaign. The Mood of the Nation survey conducted in December 2018 and January 2019 concluded that the National Democratic Alliance, the coalition the BJP heads, would not win a majority in the general elections.

Security

We will have to wait for results from post-election surveys to get detailed analysis of the segments of society that voted for the BJP, but several points are clear about Modi’s victory.

Modi benefited tremendously from the fallout from a suicide attack in Pulwama in Jammu and Kashmir that killed 40 Indian soldiers in February 2019. Although responsibility for the attack was claimed by a Pakistani terrorist group, it was carried out by a local Kashmiri. One reading of this could have been that Modi’s policies in the Kashmir valley, such as the increase in the use of pellet guns, blinding hundreds and killing at least 14, had led to the attack. But Modi swiftly turned it to his advantage.

Not only did he pursue an aggressive course of action with airstrikes against militants on Pakistani territory, he also successfully sold it as a huge success, despite some evidence that the fighters had missed their target. The national security narrative took centre stage in the 2019 election, something that the opposition parties were unable to counter.

Rahul Gandhi and his sister and party member Priyanka on the campaign trail. Prabhat Kumar Verma/EPA

Opposition failings

The second factor was the Congress campaign. The party’s leader, Rahul Gandhi, has come a long way since his debut in a national election in 2014. But the Congress campaign failed on two fronts. The first was the messaging: it was a mistake to try and attack Modi on allegations of corruption rather than focusing on the economic failures of his first term. Focusing on corruption only served to remind the electorate of the Congress party’s involvement in previous (very large) corruption scandals.

Yet, even had Congress focused solely on the economy, this may not have led to a very different result. The BJP swept the board in the 2017 Uttar Pradesh state elections, held only a few months after Modi’s disastrous demonetisation policy which saw the withdrawal of 86% of India’s currency. The second failure was the high-handedness with which Congress approached the formation of its own political alliances. The BJP was extremely accommodating of its alliance partners in states such as Bihar and Maharashtra, but Congress did not manage to agree a deal with its potential partners in Delhi and in Uttar Pradesh.

NaMo appeal

The third factor was the presidential nature of the campaign. Modi successfully portrayed the campaign as Modi v Rahul. Such a framing benefited Modi – a fantastic campaigner. He built on the national security narrative by framing himself as a Chowkidar, or watchman, who would protect India. This built on his reputation as someone who would make India great – something that played extremely well in the campaign.

Narenda Modi called himself Chokidar during the campaign, meaning watchman. Harish Tyagi/EPA

Modi’s profile in India is huge – he takes personal credit for all initiatives, and his picture appears multiple times in the same editions of the daily newspapers when government initiatives are flagged.

But curiously, for such an effective campaigner, he held his first press conference as prime minister in the final weeks of the 2019 campaign. And even then it was dominated by Shah – and Modi didn’t answer a single question.

The BJP has had extraordinary control of the political narrative during this election, aided by its extremely large war chest which has helped it penetrate even deeper into traditional and social media. While only a quarter of Indians use WhatsApp – still 300m people – the creation of promotional material specifically targeted at different segments of society has played a huge role in advancing a particular political narrative.

In addition, the Election Commission has been criticised for clearing BJP leaders of many alleged election code violations, and only belatedly banning the showing of a biopic about Modi on the eve of the elections. It also allowed the BJP’s TV channel, NaMo TV, to run without challenge throughout the campaign. It has now gone off air.

Concerns for minorities

The final point to make relates to the opinions of voters. The BJP ran a very polarising campaign. In 2014, 51% of those who responded to India’s National Election Studies said they believed that democracy meant that the will of the majority community should prevail – a steep rise from 2009. This demonstrates a move towards the right and an acceptance of Hindu majoritarianism in Indian politics – a position that questions whether religious minorities, particularly Muslims, should have special rights within India. This trend of Hindu majoritarianism is higher among the young – a growing demographic within India – who have grown up in an era in which the BJP has been a national player.
This does not bode well for religious minorities in the world’s largest democracy, 20% of whom are non-Hindu. Although Modi tweeted after the results that “together we will build a strong and inclusive India”, the attacks on Muslims, both political and actual during his first term cast doubt over the second part of this promise.

Courtesy: The Conversation

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Will Secular India Survive

The constitution ‘enacted, adopted and given to ourselves’ in November 1949 did not declare that India would be a secular state. Constituent assembly leaders like Nehru and Ambedkar were sure that by not proclaiming any ‘state religion’ and by enshrining in the constitution principles of citizen’s equality and non-discrimination on the ground of religion they had put India on a secular footing.

To make things clearer, they had added a few more provisions in the constitution – religious freedom allowed to individuals and communities subject to specified conditions, no compulsion to pay tax for promoting any particular religion, no religious instruction at all in educational institutions wholly maintained out of state funds, and no compulsory religious instruction or worship in other recognized and aided institutions.

Democracy being a game of numbers, to protect religious minorities from a highly probable hegemony of the predominant majority in respect of educational development they included in the constitution a fundamental right – notably, unlike other such rights, unqualified – to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.

The constitution-makers did not enshrine in the charter of governance produced by them any ‘non-establishment’ clause or a ‘wall of separation’ between religion and state, as under the US constitution. On the contrary they included in it a number of provisions essentially creating religion-state links — theological restrictions on entry into Hindu, Buddhist, Jain and Sikh religious institutions to be removed by law, cow and its progeny to be meticulously protected [due to the majority community’s reverence for the bovine as later acknowledged by the apex court], and the religious practice of wearing and carrying kirpans to be respected as a fundamental right of the Sikhs.

The party now ruling at the centre is translating into practice its own well known ideology. Communal vituperation by its partners in governance and atrocities by its followers in the society are being met with a calculated silence.

Within six years the constitution was amended to obligate the states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu to provide specified annuities for the maintenance of local dewasom temples. In the eyes of the constitution-makers these selective religious and community-specific provisions had no adverse effect on the secular character of the state. In 1976,  fully retaining all of these, the constitution was amended to add the word ‘secular’ to the description of India in the preamble. From a sovereign democratic republic the nation was upgraded to the status of a ‘sovereign socialist secular democratic republic.’.

It was thus restrictive secularism, not absolute or unqualified, that the founding fathers of the constitution had opted for. From the very beginning the Congress party pursued this hybrid concept without caring for its inherent limitations.  As a matter of its policies the community-specific religious provisions of the constitution gained an upper hand at the cost of diluting its mandatory principles of equality of, and equal protection of laws, for all citizens irrespective of religious persuasion.

The frequency of communal riots was not controlled with an iron hand. Educational rights of religious minorities were given the treatment of ‘constitution proposes government disposes.’ In mid-1960s the Congress government deprived the Aligarh Muslim University of its statutory autonomy and, on its action being challenged in the apex court, convinced the court  that the institution had not been established by the Muslims. The process of social reform was restricted by it to some chosen communities, on the pretext that others were yet not ready for change.

The party now ruling at the centre is translating into practice its own well known ideology. Communal vituperation by its partners in governance and atrocities by its followers in the society are being met with a calculated silence.

There are no foolproof safeguards against these in the constitution; and there are precedents in the policies and practices of the Congress party which ruled the country for long years since independence, claiming exclusive credit for winning freedom from British raj. Its criticism of the present government is an instance of pot calling the kettle black.
 
(The author is Professor of Law & Former Chair, National Minorities Commission)

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