To understand the factors behind this incident of violence, a fact-finding team comprising of Vikash Narain Rai, former Director, National Police Academy, Hyderabad and former DGP (Law and Order) Haryana, Dr. Sandhya Mhatre, Executive Council member of Centre for Study of Society and Secularism (CSSS) and Neha Dabhade, Executive Director of CSSS visited Nuh, Sohna and Gurugram from August 24 to 28, 2023.

The Mewat Landscape

Mewat district was renamed Nuh in 2016, because Mewat is a cultural region which spans the state of Haryana, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. The district comprises Nuh, Taoru, Nagina, Ferozepur Jhirka, Indri, Punhana and Pinangwan blocks, 431 villages and 297 panchayats.

Nuh district is one of the 22 districts in the Indian state of Haryana. It has an area of 1,507 square kilometres (582sq mi) and 10.9 million population. It is bound by Gurgaon district on the north, Rewari district on the west and Faridabad and Palwal districts on the east. It is predominantly populated by the Meos, who are agriculturalists, and Muslims.

The total population of Mewat district is 1,089,263 as per the census of 2011. Muslims constitute 79.20% of Mewat population. Hindu are a minority in Mewat district forming 20.37% of total population (Population Census 2011, n.d.). Nuh Town’s current population in 2023 is 22, 300 and 2636 houses. Hindus make up 49 % of the population and Muslims 51% in the town.

How did Nuh, formerly known as Mewat, fall from the fabled position of ‘bharat ke reed ki haddi’ to being battered by communal violence? To understand this, it is important to grasp and comprehend the dynamics of the communal riot that unfolded on July 31 with all its complexity.

Mewat is the region which is spread out over some parts of Rajasthan, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh. Mewat region comprises of Nuh in Haryana, Bharatpur and Alwar districts in Rajasthan and Mathura in Uttar Pradesh. Though there are state boundaries in the region which are political, socially, and culturally similar, there is fluidity in the region with people across state boundaries sharing similar traditions and culture.

Factors such as its economic underdevelopment, illiteracy and fissures in social and political landscape can help trace the roots of this violence in Nuh. The communal riot that unfolded in Nuh can’t be understood in isolation but as part of an ecosystem that exists and the changes that have place over the years.

Complex History of Mewat

The history of Meo Muslims in Mewat is a tapestry of religious diversity, cultural assimilation, and the challenges faced by a community at various points in time. The Meos have demonstrated resilience and adaptability in the face of adversity. The history of the Meo Muslims in the Mewat region is a fascinating tale of cultural and religious interactions that span centuries. From the unique beliefs of figures like Baba Laldas to the challenges faced during India’s partition in 1947, the Meo community’s journey is marked by a complex interplay of faiths, rulers, and societal changes.

One shining example of syncretic traditions of Mewat is Baba Laldas, originally named Lal Khan Meo, who was born into a Muslim family in 1540. What makes him particularly remarkable is his belief in Nirguna Bhakti, a formless devotion to Lord Ram, while still adhering to Islam. Scholars have highlighted that Baba Laldas preached cow-worship, vegetarianism, and the chanting of Lord Ram’s name, showcasing a unique fusion of Islamic and Hindu elements in his spiritual practice. Interestingly, the Meo Muslims in Mewat have not and did not identify themselves as completely Muslim. Over the centuries under the influence of Sufi saints, the Hindus converted into Islam but yet retained their Hindu identity in observance of festivals and social institutions like gotra etc. The contribution of Meos is also well documented in the revolt against the British in 1857 and subsequent freedom struggle and before that even against the Mughals.

For instance, Hasan Khan Mewati, went to war with the Central Asian invader Babur. The Muslims that this fact-finding team met lamented that though Mewat is called mini-Pakistan, the Meo Muslims are proud of their history which stands as a testimony to their fight against injustice- both against the Mughals and the British. Their bravery is legendry.

The region of Mewat is famous for its composite culture, communal harmony and the distinct identity of the Meo Muslims who inhabit the region. The Meo Muslims don’t identify themselves completely as either Hindus or Muslim.  There are many oral epics in this region where Muslim jogis have popularized epics like Gopichand, Bhartrihari and Pandun ka kada, indicating their affinity with Hindu religious traditions. Ethnographers like Crooke, Sherring and Russell refer to the strong Hindu components of their tradition: their folklore which attributes their celebration of their origin to Arjuna, Krishna and Rama; Hindu festivals like Holi and Dussehra; their marriage customs which combine the nikah with Hindu ceremonies; their mixed names such as Fateh Singh, and so on (Mayaram, 1988).

In the latter half of the 14th century, a new ruling class emerged in Mewat known as the Khanzadas (1390-1527). Despite their Muslim identity, the Khanzadas traced their lineage back to the Jadon Rajputs. They played a pivotal role in shaping the Meo community by encouraging a shift from pastoral lifestyles to settled agriculture. Additionally, they actively worked on Islamising the Meos, establishing mosques and appointing Qazis to administer Shariah law.

Close interaction with the Mughal administration resulted in the Meos adopting various Islamic practices, such as Nikah (marriage) and burial rites. Islamic festivals like Id-ul-fitr, Ramzan, Shab-e-barat, and the Urs of Sufi saint Khwaja Muinuddin Chishti gained popularity among the Meos. Moreover, Muslim names became more prevalent within the community.

As the Mughal empire weakened, the Hindu Jats began to exert their influence in Bharatpur, leading to conflicts with the Meos. In the early 1920s, the Meos faced a serious threat from the Arya Samaj’s Shuddhi movement, which aimed to reconvert them to Hinduism. In response, Meo leaders invited the Tablighi Jamaat to Mewat to strengthen their faith, leading to a ban on Hindu practices. However, a full Islamisation of the Meo community took several more decades.

During India’s partition in 1947, the princely states of Alwar and Bharatpur saw a violent pogrom directed against the Meos. The rulers of these states supported the Arya Samaj and Shuddhi movement, which sought to convert Muslims to Hinduism. This support led to the rise of organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Discriminatory taxation policies triggered a Meo revolt, culminating in a tragic incident in Govindgarh, Alwar, in January 1933, where the state army opened fire on a crowd, resulting in over 30 deaths.

Narayan Bhaskar Khare from the Hindu Mahasabha became the prime minister of Alwar in April 1947 and an advisor to the state of Bharatpur. He convinced India’s Home Minister Sardar Patel that a Meo revolt was brewing and that Meo areas might attempt to join Pakistan. This suspicion led to a large-scale flight of Meos from Bharatpur to Alwar on June 18, 1947, resulting in a massive loss of life. Historian Shail Mayaram estimated that a significant number of Meos sought refuge in Pakistan due to these events (Balachandran, 2023).

The people of Mewat proudly remember that Gandhi visited Ghasera village after partition when the frenzy of communalism had taken over people and the King of Alwar was spreading rumours against the Meo Muslims who revolted against him for high taxations. It was Gandhi who had stopped the Meo Muslims from Mewat from migrating to Pakistan. The Meos stayed back in India out of love for their country and became an integral part of the region.

Underdeveloped economy

Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy of Nuh. The communities in the region given the land condition and other factors have been pastoral communities. The biggest challenge to agriculture in Nuh is that it is mostly rain-fed and the irrigation facility is inadequate to supply water. Thus, 400 out of 435 villages in the district are facing a water crisis. Agriculture production measured in terms of crop yield per hectare in Mewat is comparatively low to the other districts of the state. In recent years, two canals are proposed in the region which are important for Nuh. However, this makes for a stark contrast between Nuh and other parts of Haryana and Nuh and the neighbouring Punjab – regions which are rich in agriculture having substantial irrigation facilities. This lack of the crucial irrigated water has starved the agriculture and in turn the economy of the district.

Animal Husbandry, particularly dairy is the secondary source of income for people of Mewat and those who live closer to the hilly ranges of Aravali also keep a few sheep and goats. The Meo Muslims in Nuh are traditionally pastoral and the community is heavily dependent on cattle for dairy business. Cattle becomes the centre of their livelihood. This also explains the rise of cow vigilantism in the region which will be dealt with later. It is noteworthy that given the high dependency of their livelihood on the cows and cattle in culmination with cultural factors, the Meo Muslims of Mewat don’t consume beef and venerate the cows.

Till a few years back, mining was an avenue for livelihood for the youth in Nuh. But after the ban on mining brought by the Supreme Court order, mining as a source of livelihood has closed. The Niti Aayog of India has ranked Nuh the lowest on development indicators like health and education in 2018. Ironically, Nuh borders Gurugram which is an IT hub but does not have university or college other than the Shaheed Hasan Mewati Medical College which came up in 2012.  Students aspiring to study in universities must go out of the district. The region in general has poor educational infrastructure leading to low literacy rates especially female literacy rate.

These restricted livelihood options along with low literacy rate have pushed the youth to take to cybercrime, giving it the notorious sobriquet of the new “jamtara” of India.  The youth of Nuh have taken to sextortion and cyber frauds on different platforms like OLX. It was reported by a section of media that the attack on the cyber police station in Nuh on July 31, can be attributed to the motive of the criminals in the cases related to cyber-crimes and sextortion to destroy evidence in the cases. It is alleged that the tensions on July 31, were used as a smokescreen to tamper and destroy evidence in the cyber police station.  While Nuh has been under the media limelight for the wrong reasons calling Nuh “ground zero for cybercrimes” etc. and has been at the receiving end of the police crackdown on cybercrimes, little attention or light has been shed on the deplorable economy and lack of livelihood options in the district pushing the youth to resort to such crimes. Some section of residents of Nuh believe that the police crackdown is also attributed to the Muslim majority population of the district and the action is targeted towards Muslims.

Political history of Mewat

Before the delimitation exercise for Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha constituencies in Haryana in 2007 and 2008, all Meo-dominated assembly constituencies formed part of the Faridabad parliamentary seat. The three assembly seats under the Nuh district are Nuh, Punhana and Ferozepur Jhirka. Currently, all the three seats are held by Congress MLAs, and all of them are Meo Muslims — Aftab Ahmed from Nuh, Mohammad Ilyas from Punhana, and Moman Khan from Ferozepur Jhirka assembly constituency. About 80% of Nuh population is made up of Muslims.  In the 2019 state elections, both Hathin and Sohna in Gurugram went to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with Praveen Dagar and Sanjay Singh representing the two constituencies respectively.

The political landscape of Nuh has always been dominated by a few political families. The families of Khurshid Ahmed and Tayyab Hussain have been prominent families elected multiple times. Khurshid Ahmed became a member of the legislative assembly (MLA) five times between 1962 and 1982 from Congress. He represented Nuh in 1962, 1968, and 1991 and Tauru in 1977 and 1987. His father, Kabir Ahmed, became an MLA in a by poll in 1975 and 1982, while his son Aftab Ahmed, the present MLA from Nuh, was elected to the assembly in 2009 and 2019.

Tayyab Hussain was MP 1971-1976 (Gurugram seat) and 1980-1986 (Faridabad seat) and MLA from Janata Party from the region. Zakir Hussain, his son, is a three-time MLA, and the administrator of the Haryana Waqf Board. He won the 1991 election as an Independent from Tauru (a part of Mewat before delimitation), in 2000, he won the seat on a Congress ticket while in 2014, he became MLA from Nuh as an Indian National Lok Dal (INLD) candidate.

Despite the popularity and steady support enjoyed by the political representatives, there is little development in terms of education or livelihood in the region. Lack of education in the Mewati youth has hindered leadership in them to emerge as a force to reckon with in the future. Additionally, delimitation exercise has rendered prospects of Meo Muslims getting elected from other neighbouring districts difficult. Ironically, according to Subhash Bansal, a BJP supporter, and a businessman from Sohna, in Sohna, the elected representatives have been from out of Sohna. The political parties haven’t given opportunities to the natives from Sohna in electoral politics. These factors have marginalised new Meo Muslims from the political landscape of the broader region.

Extortion, Lynching and Impunity post 2014

With the rise of BJP in 2014 at the centre, cow vigilantism has become a strong trend in the region. While the BJP hasn’t been able to make a dent in the electoral contest in Nuh, the narrative of Muslims from the region being cow smugglers and slaughtering cows has gained currency overall. While the term ‘cow vigilante’ is commonly used to refer to these anti-social elements, the term is misleading and accords some legitimacy to them. Cow protection is used merely as a pretext to extort money from those buying and selling and those who can pay are allowed to transport cattle by these extortion networks. The extortion network in the region has blatantly abducted Muslims under the pretext of cow slaughter. They are beaten or worse lynched to death. Extortion and threats have become common place. If the Muslims transporting cattle can pay they are allowed to pass but those who can’t pay are beaten up. While the façade the gau rakshaks have adopted is that of “protecting” the cow as holy to Hindus, however, there are increasing reports of how this is used a pretext to extort money from the Muslims wanting to buy or sell cattle. It has become a business for extortionists. So treacherous is transporting cattle in this region and the fear writ large that either the Muslims request their Hindu neighbours to transport the cattle for them or give up their livelihood completely in an economy heavily dependent on dairy industry. Like the two hundred cattle traders of Rojka Meo, a village in Mewat, Haryana, who are on the verge of giving up their traditional livelihood of sale and purchase of buffaloes.

The communal riots in Nuh that took place on July 31, 2023 are intricately linked with the systematic and blatant targeting of the Muslims in the region with no prospects of justice from the state. The residents have been aghast and resentful about how easily Muslim youth are kidnapped or abducted and murdered with the state doing little to ensure that the culprits are brought to justice. Worse, the state in some way is giving patronage to the extortion network who take it as a cue to blatantly to target the Muslims.

In 2015, the Haryana government implemented the Cow Promotion and Protection Act. To strengthen this law, a Cow Protection Taskforce was formed in 2021, which includes non-government persons. This Gau Raksha Dal tracks incidents of “cow smuggling” and “cow slaughter” in the area and informs the police. The so called gau rakshaks take the liberty to confiscate any cattle or even enter private property to take away cattle belonging to Muslims.

For instance, Haji Jamat Ali had kept his cattle for two and a half months in a farmer’s field in Bai Kheda village in Gurugram district, three to four kilometers away from his village, Khori Jamalpur. His children were present there to look after the cattle. Suddenly on June 30, some youths wearing saffron scarves around their necks came there shouting communal slogans and took away all the cattle tied in the field with them. They took away 56 cows belonging to Haji’s family whose primary source of livelihood is selling of milk (Jha, 2023). , Bittu Bajrangi, has been booked by police in this case for attacking and snatching milch cattle. This is not an isolated case. The question that resonates then in the region is “can’t a Muslim rear cow in Mewat?” In the face of such grave provocation, the Meo Muslims have demonstrated restraint and no communal incident has taken place in the past.

Cases of cow vigilantism

Pehlu Khan (55) was transporting cattle from Jaipur in a weekly fair to Nuh, his village. Khan, dairy farmer, was waylaid by a mob of extortion network in Alwar on April 1, 2017 and beaten up mercilessly. Khan died in the hospital. The extortion network accused him and his companions including his sons of being cattle smugglers. The then Rajasthan home minister Gulab Chand Kataria belonging to the BJP ‘justified’ the attack and said both parties were to be blamed for Pehlu Khan’s death. The police after pressure from the family of Khan and civil society arrested the accused. However, all six accused were acquitted in Alwar court. Additionally, Khan’s sons were also framed under the Rajasthan Bovine Animal (Prohibition of Slaughter and Regulation of Temporary Migration or Export) Act, 1995.

Then, again, 42-year-old Umar Mohammad from Ghatmika of Bharatpur district, Rajasthan was a dairy farmer. He was shot dead in November 2017 while transporting cows in a pickup with his two companions and his body was found on railway tracks near Govindgarh in Alwar. Four days after the assault, police said two ‘gau rakshaks’, Ramveer Gujjar and Bhagwan Singh, both in their thirties, arrested in connection with the case, had confessed to the assault as well as mutilating Umar’s body and dumping it on the railway track, about 15 km away, to make it look like an accident. The accused have been booked under sections 302, 307, 147 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

But the police –in their crime reports –have called both sides criminals. They claim that Umar and his two companions, Tahir and Javed, were habitual cattle smugglers and were using a stolen pickup to transport cows.

Akbar Khan alias Rakbar, a resident of Kolgaon village on Rajasthan-Haryana border, was lynched to death by extortion network in Alwar in Mewat when he was transporting cows for milking in July 2018. He was accused of cow smuggling. Khan’s post-mortem report revealed that he died of shock and injuries from a blunt weapon or object and he succumbed to multiple injuries following the brutal attack. Akbar had 12 injury marks on his body and he died of excessive internal bleeding. Khan’s friend and companion, Aslam, in a written statement to police, said around five men beat Akbar with sticks. According to the charge sheet, the three accused attacked Khan at Lalawandi village in Alwar district when he was transporting his two cows and their calves, eventually leading to his death (Tabeenah, 2018).

On May 16, 2021, Asif Khan, a resident of Khera Khalilpur village in Nuh district of Haryana was murdered by some residents from his own village. Asif was kidnaped when he went to Sohna to buy medicines to treat his typhoid. His family allege that he was beaten mercilessly. He was stabbed in his eyes and his bones broken. They stabbed him in the chest with an iron rod and shot him in the arm and leg. While the police attribute this to “old enmity”, the family insists that he was targeted because he was a Muslim and the perpetrators didn’t want Muslim families to live in the Hindu majority village. The arrested in the case were associated with the BJP (Saxena, 2021).

Waris, a 22-year-old from Nuh, died on January 28, 2023 when the extortion network attacked him while returning from Bhiwadi. Allegedly, Monu Manesar, infamous ‘cow vigilante’ belonging to Bajrang Dal and VHP had uploaded a video on his facebook which showed him and his associates attacking Waris. However, the police claim that Waris Khan died when his vehicle met with an accident. Khan’s family has alleged that he was either strangulated or his internal organs were injured since there are no marks of injury or wound on his body (The Scroll, 2023).

Nasir and Junaid who belonged to Ghatmeeka village in Rajasthan, were abducted from Bharatpur and killed by cow vigilantes after abducting them. Their charred bodies found near Loharu in Bhiwani on February 16, 2023. They were burnt alive in the car. Before the dead bodies of Nasir and Junaid were discovered, a video was posted by Monu Manesar, boasting of having the support of the Haryana police while posing with rifles and arms.

The common thread that runs in all these cases is the impunity with which the extortion networks have attacked Muslims in the Mewat region. The Muslims are mercilessly and blatantly beaten up and killed. These cold-blooded murders are boasted about by cow vigilante like Monu Manesar as badge of honor. This fearlessness of the extortion network and the patronage given to them by the police and the ruling political party has created resentment in ordinary Muslims. This outrage at the lack of justice in the face of naked show of power and claiming innocent lives, leaving behind destitute and devastated families, has not been heeded by the state. Recently, a memorandum was given to the President of India titled ‘Demand for a ban on Special Cow Protection Task Force and justice for families of Junaid and Nasir’ by the civil society. The helplessness and outrage of the Muslim community in the face of these murders can be attributed to the reaction of the Muslims to the video posted by Monu Manesar and Bittu Bajrangi and the subsequent attack by a section of the Muslim youth.

Immediate context of July violence

A couple of days before the procession on July 31, 2023 on a video Monu Manesar, a fugitive who was wanted in the murder of Junaid and Nasir, had urged his followers to be present in the Braj Mandal Jal Abhishek procession as he will be attending it. This inflamed tempers of a section of Muslims in the region. Similarly, on the morning of July 31, in a video Bittu Bajrangi challenged the Muslim community to welcome him with flowers and gave out his location. He said, “Apke jijaji aa rahe hai. Phoolonse Swagat ke liye khade rahe na”. This was seen as a challenge by the Muslim youth, which provoked a section of the youth. The Muslim youth prepared to attack Monu Manesar who continuously targeted the Muslim community members and running an extortion racket in the name of cow vigilantism. The Braj Mandal Jal Abhishek yatra was organised by the VHP and Bajrang Dal since 2021. So far barring vandalizing of a mazaar near the Nalhar Shiva temple last year, there was no history of violence during the yatra. The procession or yatra started from civil lines in Gurugram on the morning of July 31. The Yatra was to reach Ferozepur Jhirka via Nuh. After performing the Jal Abhishek at the Nalhar Shiv temple, the participants of the procession returned to Nuh city at around 2.30pm. Some participants were carrying arms- swords, lathis and guns when the procession entered Nuh. They raised anti- Muslim slogan – “Mulle Kate Jayenge, Ram Ram chillayenge” rented the air.

Thus, on July 31, around 2.00 pm near the Mewli road, when a white car in the procession was passing, a section of the Muslim youth suspected that the car was carrying Monu Manesar. According to activists in Nuh, the car reversed at high-speed knocking down a Muslim boy. That gave rise to the suspicion that the car had Monu Manesar. The Muslim youth chased the car and stopped it. They pulled out the man in the car who turned out to be Bittu Bajrangi and beat him up. But he escaped. This triggered communal riots in Nuh.

In response to the attack by the Muslim youth on the car, at around 2.30pm, stones were pelted on Hotel Rizq by Bajrang Dal members as seen in one of the videos. The members of the procession who were on the road started vandalizing and torched vehicles. Several vehicles were torched. In the pursuant violence, at some places, Muslim youth clashed with the members of the procession. Gun shots were heard near the Shiv temple in Nalhar. In the violence, six lives were lost- two of the home guards and four of civilians including the death of deputy Imam from a mosque in Gurugram.

Reaction of violence in Sohna and Gurugram

After the violence in Nuh, the members in the procession went to Sohna and targeted Muslim owned properties in Nut colony. Three mosques including the Shahi Juma Masjid in Sohna were attacked. The Shahi Juma Masjid was attacked on August 1, at 1.30pm. The violence spread to Gurugram too, where the mob attacked the Anjuman Jama Masjid in Sector 57, set it on fire and killed the deputy imam on the night of July 31, 2023. VHP threatened the Muslim migrant workers in sector 70 on August 1. Subsequently, over 120 Muslim families left for West Bengal and Bihar. In response to the violence, the Haryana administration has demolished over 750 properties in Nuh alone – all owned by Muslims. The team visited some sites of demolitions and interacted with the affected persons.

Muslims as criminals and extortionists or nationalists? Selective response of the state:

The police in the past couple of years have cracked down on the cyber-crimes in the region. The Muslim youth pushed towards crime due to various factors seen above has been arrested. While there is no debate that criminals committing crime must be brought to justice, the question which cannot be ignored either is that if the police are acting against criminals based on their religion? If the Muslims committing cyber-crimes are should be punished, then why shouldn’t the Hindu right wing group activists and extortionists using the pretext of cow protection not be punished? Isn’t extortion and beating up and murdering innocent citizens not a crime? The selective action of the state and the police have raised questions about equality before law and justice.

The police have been aware about the cases of lynching and extortion. The families of those murdered have been implicated in cases and justice denied to the families and the deceased in the cruelest way. There is little hope of justice.

In this atmosphere of hopelessness and resentment, when Bittu Bajrangi and Monu Manesar challenged the Muslims, there was a potential of tension and violence. The implications were written large and clear. The police still didn’t do much to pre-empt violence. They ignored the instigations by the Bajrangi and Manesar who are accused of violence in different cases. The response of the state ( or lack of it) is a big contributing factor to the violence that took place on July 31, 2023.

To be continued…

Related:

Lives lost in Nuh violence, a failure on the part of the Haryana police and government?

Nuh Clashes planned and coordinated, more such violence likely before 2024 Polls: Satyapal Malik

Communal violence erupts in Nuh, Mewat, five killed, provocations by VHP-Bajrang Dal continue

The post The slow but sure marginalisation of Nuh’s Meo Muslims: a report appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Rajasthan Muslim Forum: Call for action

Demanding justice for victims of anti-minority violence in Rajasthan

In Sept-October 2011 Communalism Combat had reproduced the preliminary report of a fact-finding team set up by the People’s Union for Civil Liberties to investigate the attacks on the Meo Muslim minority in Gopalgarh, Rajasthan, on September 13-14, 2011, where police brutality and mob violence claimed 10 lives and left several persons injured. Thereafter, in a report on the All India Democratic Women’s Association’s Convention against Communal Conflict in December 2011, CC had revisited the incident.

Distressed by the state government’s reluctance to punish the culprits, including police officers responsible for dereliction of duty, in the violence against innocent Muslims in Gopalgarh (Bharatpur) and elsewhere in Rajasthan, representatives of Rajasthan’s Muslim minority under the banner of the Rajasthan Muslim Forum (RMF) led delegations to the National Commission for Minorities and met ministers in the central government in June 2012 to submit a detailed representation in this regard. In what appears to be a clear instance of contrary messages being sent out by the United Progressive Alliance, a month before the RMF felt compelled to take such steps and meet senior functionaries of the UPA in Delhi, union minister Salman Khurshid and Congress general secretary Digvijay Singh had in a public meeting in Jaipur on May 6, 2012 urged the chief minister of Rajasthan, Ashok Gehlot, who was present on the dais, to give prompt and fair justice to the victims of the Gopalgarh violence and punish the guilty.

The press release issued by the RMF on June 26, 2012 tragically encapsulates the attitudes of the state (Congress) and central (UPA) governments towards the punishment of the perpetrators of communal violence in a state under their rule.

Summary of demands

The victims of the Gopalgarh violence of September 13-14, 2011 and concerned citizens and social workers appeal to the government of Rajasthan (GoR), the government of India (GoI) and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to give fair and prompt justice to the victims. Documentary evidences and the attitudes of officers show that the victims are not only not getting justice but have been made to suffer further injustice, discrimination and harassment due to delays and arbitrary procedures. Thus victims are made to fend for their own security and legal defence whereas the accused are given a clean chit due to faulty investigations and delays. Ten Muslims died due to police firing and burning and several were injured. Many houses and shops were looted and damaged while the police looked on.

None of the officers responsible for such flagrant dereliction of duty, including the district magistrate (DM) and superintendent of police (SP) of Bharatpur, have been punished. In fact, they have now been reinstated by the state thus demonstrating its desire to shelter them. This is one of the reasons why Rajasthan has witnessed increasing violence against Muslims, in the regions of Marwar, Mewar, Hadoti and Mewat, in recent months. No officer has so far been punished for these incidents of anti-Muslim violence.

The law of the land must apply equally to all, irrespective of class, status and religion.

The adverse roles of the CBI and the state
 

• Using subterfuge (e.g. calling victims for assessment of losses for compensation and then arresting them in Bharatpur), Muslim victims of violence have been treated as perpetrators; they have been arrested and are being harassed by the CBI and police. This is done with the desire to immobilise victims, to undermine their commitment to fight for justice and file first information reports (FIRs) against the accused and officers who conspired with perpetrators and/or committed gross dereliction of duty which resulted in deaths and massive loss of property.
• Ignoring the clear instructions in two government (GoR and GoI) notifications, the CBI took a biased approach while dealing with Muslim victims and guilty officers like the DM and SP; the FIRs filed by Muslim victims were ignored while those filed by the police were investigated and action was taken on them.
• The CBI is intimidating witnesses to the violence. It is asking Muslims only two specific questions (‘How many Muslims were in the masjid?’ and ‘Who instigated the violence?’) without allowing them to narrate the sequence of events which would reveal who cast the first stone. Why is the CBI not interested in a complete chain of circumstances when such an investigation would expose the preplanning and conspiracy behind the violence and bring in the calculated assault on the imam of the Jama Masjid and other Muslims on September 13, 2011 which occurred before passions were allowed to build up and violence erupted? The approach of the CBI is selective, to say the least, and reveals a biased approach in the investigation itself.
• Despite the assurances given to Muslims by the chief minister of Rajasthan, he has not taken strict action against the officers accused of dereliction of duty and others who indulged in arson, looting and killing i.e. those responsible for the loss of Muslim life and property.
• Although the DM and SP of Bharatpur were suspended from service in late September 2011, serious administrative loopholes in the orders passed have ensured that they and other officers could not be punished. The state government deliberately failed to issue show-cause notices to or file charge sheets against the two officers either before or during their suspension. Worse, the state government consciously chose not to intervene before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT); hence it was not heard before the CAT delivered its interim order. The government did not file a review application against the judgement delivered by the CAT nor has it to date appealed against the CAT judgement in the high court, explaining forcefully the reasons for the officers’ suspension.
• Soon after the DM and SP were suspended, representatives of the Indian Administrative Service and Indian Police Service associations in the state met the then chief secretary to protest against the suspension, claiming that this had demoralised their officers. Such belligerence reveals a disturbing mindset among the senior bureaucracy in the state – where firm action following criminal dereliction of duty is interpreted as a cause for loss of morale. In fact, the suspended officers had violated their constitutional duty and the code of conduct that enjoins IAS/IPS officers to uphold the fundamental rights to life and equality before the law.
•  There is a nexus between the various arms of the bureaucracy that is protecting guilty officers responsible for the carnage in Gopalgarh.
• Compensation for the loss of property has been calculated in accordance with the GoR (home department) rules of 2008; these amounts are miserably low and do not reflect the price index. Most victims have refused to accept the compensation offered. It has been a consistent finding that during communal violence and one-sided violence against Muslims, it is the Muslims who suffer the most in terms of loss of life and property. The corollary then is equally disturbing: while the compensation paid to Muslims for loss of life and property ought to be much higher, it is in fact unrealistically low. This shows a deep-seated prejudice against minorities. The rules were framed during the Congress regime in 2008 when Ashok Gehlot was chief minister. Such norms must be reviewed and upgraded realistically (as has been done in the case of victims of the 1984 Sikh massacre in Delhi or the 2002 Muslim massacre in Gujarat).
• The victim community’s requests for an appointment with the chief minister had not been successful.

Gopalgarh: Victims of mob and state

Background
 

• GoR notification F-19 (13) Home-5/2011, dated September 21, 2011, mentions five FIRS registered (thus far) at the Gopalgarh police station. However, the notification contains clear instructions that all FIRs in the case: "All cases registered at police station Gopalgarh, district Bharatpur, and attempts, abetments and conspiracies in relation to or in connection with the above-mentioned offences and any other offence or offences committed in course of the same transaction or arising out of the same facts" must be investigated.
• GoI notification F. No. 228/65/2011-AVD-II, dated October 11, 2011, refers to the GoR notification above and repeats verbatim GoI instructions which include all cases/FIRs for CBI investigation.  
• However, going against the explicit instructions in the GoR/GoI notifications, SS Kishore, additional superintendent of police, CBI, registered (and thereafter investigated) only five FIRs on October 11, 2011, deliberately excluding the 14 FIRs filed by victim Muslims against the DM, SP, local officers and Gujjars/Hindus, accusing them of conspiracy and of abetting the crimes committed against the victims on September 13-14, 2011. The CBI was quick to register a fresh case on October 11, 2011 but it did not take cognisance of the 14 FIRs that had also been registered at the police station before that date and which it deliberately ignored. This shows that the CBI had acted mala fides in its willingness to protect bureaucrats accused of gross dereliction of duty. This despite the fact that the divisional commissioner of Bharatpur had indicted these officers for dereliction of duty, stating that the investigation must be conducted by an inspector-general of police.
• The GoR notification mentions 20 FIRs, including the 14 FIRs filed by Muslims, and the same instructions (i.e. to investigate all cases/FIRs relating to the incident) were reiterated to the CBI in October 2011.
• About three and a half months later, on January 20, 2012, the GoI issued another notification which mentioned 18 FIRs, including the 14 FIRs filed by Muslims. There was no need to do this, as it was a mere repetition. This appears to have been done with deliberate purpose. It gave the CBI a handle to protect the DM and SP while maintaining that it (the CBI) could begin investigations into the 14 FIRs (which named the DM and SP among other accused) only after the (second) GoI notification of January 20, 2012. This time lag of over three months (October 11, 2011 to January 20, 2012) also allowed the CBI to file a charge sheet against those accused in the five FIRs first registered by it without delay. Since the DM and SP were not mentioned in these FIRs (at least two of which were filed by policemen), both officers could be given a clean chit; there was nothing to incriminate them. The damning accusations against these officers were contained in the 14 FIRs filed by victims which had been registered earlier but which the CBI had deliberately overlooked.

The CBI is determined to protect bureaucrats somehow. It has managed to give them a clean chit despite evidence of their complicity and incompetence. The government of Rajasthan has aided this

• Moreover, the CBI did not act promptly even after the GoI’s second notification had been issued on January 20, 2012. It only registered the cases on February 24, 2012 after a deliberate delay of one month. This amounts to a total delay of five months if the initial GoR/GoI notifications are taken into consideration. In contrast, the CBI acted on the GoI’s first notification (albeit selectively) the very same day i.e. October 11, 2011. It appears that for the CBI, the ‘accused’ named in the five FIRs that were first registered (which include Muslim victims who were attacked in the market and those whose property was looted) are  more serious offenders than the high-profile ‘accused’ (the DM, SP and other officials) named in the 14 FIRs filed by Muslim victims. This shows a clear bias towards the powerful accused and a communal bias against the victims. The conduct of the investigation, the CBI’s selective promptness and delays, served to protect the district administration, particularly the SP and DM, while the victim Muslims were further victimised. While the victim Muslims were in jail, or nursing their injured kinsmen in hospital, the accused were allowed to roam free.
• The 14 FIRs filed by Muslim victims in the incidents of September 13-14, 2011 were registered between September 25 and 27, 2011 after curfew was partially lifted and only after the victims, occupied with the treatment of the injured and the burial of their dead, could muster the courage to do so. There was thus a 12-day delay in the registration of these FIRs. This is not an insurmountable delay in law. Meanwhile, the policemen and Gujjars were at an advantage; they had nothing to fear and were able to file FIRs immediately. (The very fact that the entire police staff of the Gopalgarh police station was transferred to the Bharatpur police lines about a week after the incident points to their complicity in the violence.)
• If all 19 FIRs had been clubbed together for the CBI investigation as per the explicit instructions in the state and central government notifications, the dereliction of duty and collusive roles of the district administrators and others accused by the victims would have become clear, in particular the mala fide intent and conduct of the DM, the SP and other local officials.
• In sum, the CBI is determined to protect bureaucrats somehow. It has managed to give them a clean chit despite evidence of their complicity and incompetence.

The GoR has aided this. As mentioned earlier, it did not file charge sheets against or issue show-cause notices to the DM and SP before or during their suspension, allowing the CAT to give a verdict in their favour. Nor did the state put its views on the conduct of these officials before the tribunal. The GoR had enough evidence against these officers for dereliction of duty as a result of which precious lives were lost, property damaged/looted and communal and social harmony jeopardised or destroyed.

The officers’ failures and culpability were manifested in:

a) Their failure to take preventive measures on September 13, 2011 by arresting those named in the FIR filed by Abdul Gani for assaulting his family and the imam of the Jama Masjid (before the violence had escalated);

b) Their deliberate failure to impose prohibitory orders, or Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (powers to issue an order in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger), on the morning of September 14, 2011 when a crowd had assembled to protest against the assault on the imam; and

c) The DM and SP’s failure to resolve the graveyard land dispute by referring the same to the revenue department and Wakf Board expeditiously.

By their deliberate inaction, passions were allowed to build up.

Among the signatories to the representation are Quari Moinudin, Nazimudin Engineer, Mohd Saleem and Prof M. Hasan (all of the Rajasthan Muslim Forum) along with victims of the Gopalgarh violence, including Abdul Rashid, the imam of the Jama Masjid who was brutally assaulted on the evening of September 13, 2011, as well as several prominent members of the Muslim community across Rajasthan. Prof HC Bhartiya, Prof RC Bhandari, Prof HC Rara, Prof Surendra Singh Chaudhari, Prof NC Jain, Prof RP Bhatnagar and Prof  CH Hada (all formerly of the University of Rajasthan) and Prof SS Shukla, formerly of the Government College, Ajmer, are also key signatories.

Archived From Communalism Combat,  July 2012, Year 18, No- 167. Focus

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