• The ban on the niqab has often sparked fierce debate on religious freedoms
• The ban was introduced in 2015 by a previous head of Cairo University, two years after the 2013 military ouster of Mursi

CAIRO: A top Egyptian court has ruled in favor of banning female academic staff at Cairo University from wearing the Muslim face veil, known as the niqab, lawyer Ahmed Mahran said Monday.

The decision taken by the Supreme Administrative Court last week rejected appeals against a 2016 lower court verdict banning the niqab on grounds that it impeded interaction between students and teachers.
The ban on the niqab, which covers the entire face except for the eyes, has often sparked fierce debate on religious freedoms.

“The ruling is final and not subject to appeal,” said Mahran, who represented 80 women in challenging the 2016 ruling.

Most Muslim women in Egypt wear the headscarf, or hijab, which covers the hair but not the face. The niqab is largely worn by women of ultra-conservative backgrounds.

The ban was introduced in 2015 by a previous head of Cairo University, two years after the 2013 military ouster of Islamist president Muhammad Mursi.

Mahran said the decision was issued for “political reasons” at the time.

“But it never came into effect. I do not expect it to be applied now,” he added.

Cairo University is one of Egypt’s oldest higher education institutions.

Its current head, Mohamed Othman Elkhosht, quoted by local media, said his institution respected decisions taken by the judiciary but did not specify if the ban would be enforced.

Courtesy: https://www.arabnews.com/

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With no clear winner in September’s Israeli elections, both the incumbent prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and his only serious contender, Benny Gantz, will now set about trying to form a governing coalition. Both are tarnished by the result.

Benny Gantz: one seat ahead. Atef Safadi/EPA

Contrary to elections held in April when Netanyahu’s right-wing party, Likud, and Gantz’s centrist alliance, Kahol Lavan or “Blue and White”, were tied, this time Gantz is one seat ahead of Netanyahu, according to official results released after 90% of the vote had been counted.

But Gantz’s 32 seats – three fewer than in April – plus those of his two centrist-left alliance partners (the Democratic Union and Labor-Gesher) add up to only 43. This is far from the 61 seats necessary to form a government backed by a majority of 120 deputies in the Knesset, Israel’s parliament.

Yet, Netanyahu’s bloc that consists of the two ultra-orthodox parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism, and the parties of the far-right Yamina alliance, add up to only 55 seats. To further complicate matters, the two groups that aren’t fully affiliated with one of the blocs are not political allies: the Joint List of mostly Arab parties gained 13 seats, while the right-wing Yisrael Beiteinu – the party headed by Netanyahu’s former ally Avigdor Lieberman – won nine seats.

As there is no Likud politician in sight who would be capable of subverting Netanyahu to form a national unity government, for the time being both Gantz and Netanyahu remain in the race for the premiership.

So what does this stalemate mean for the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories and the Middle East region more widely?

The stakes for Palestinians

Palestinians who have lived under Israeli occupation in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 1967 have the most at stake. Whatever government is formed, it will not only rule Israeli citizens who were eligible to vote but also those Palestinians living in the occupied territories who weren’t – something I’ve argued implies that Israel is not a democracy.

In another sense, the elections have little significance for the Palestinians living under occupation. The idea of withdrawing the Israeli army from Palestinian territories and accepting a sovereign and viable state of Palestine is as alien to Gantz as it is to Netanyahu.

Whether Israeli governments in the late 20th century seriously considered the possibility of a two-state solution remains debatable. Yet, so far in the 21st century, the game played by Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation has not been about negotiating “peace” in the form of untroubled relations between Israel and a Palestinian state. Rather, it’s been about pretend-negotiating peace – and avoiding blame for, predictably, failed rounds of talks.

Contrary to Gantz, Netanyahu announced he would annex major parts of the West Bank including all Jewish settlements and most of the Jordan Valley. However, as the West Bank has been ruled and colonised by Israel for half a century, its annexation would be little more than a symbolic policy and wouldn’t fundamentally change the situation on the ground.

Bibi’s grip on power is slipping. Heidi Levine/EPA

In August, Gantz vowed to “pound Gaza” in the event of military confrontations. Under his premiership, Israel’s rule over the coastal strip might be implemented in an even more oppressive way than it has been so far this decade.

United against Iran

With regards to wider regional policies, Gantz is in line with Netanyahu and they share a strong stand against Iran. In February, referring to Iran, Gantz said: “On my watch, there will be no appeasement.”

Gantz has also endorsed Israel’s policy of containing Iran’s Lebanese ally Hezbollah inside Lebanon and in Syria. Since 2013, Israel has frequently launched air strikes against Iranian-backed militia posts in Syria, whose activities are crucial for the Bashar al-Assad regime’s relentless fight for survival.

Until recently, the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in Syria had not spilled beyond its borders. But by launching an attack with two drones in Beirut on August 25, Israel violated this tacit agreement. In the aftermath, despite some skirmishes and aggressive rhetoric, both Lebanon and Israel showed restraint. But similar incidents in future could lead to further escalation – something Netanyahu might welcome if he were hoping to make a mark early in another premiership.

Regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, US president Donald Trump’s so-called “deal of the century”, expected to be released shortly, probably won’t be more than the symbolic funeral of an idea – the two-state solution – that has been clinically dead for years. Much more intriguing is whether the plan might boost the ongoing normalisation of the Arab world’s relations with Israel and foster the tacit anti-Iranian alliance between Saudi Arabia and Israel in the making.

There is a lot at stake for Netanyahu now. Probably only a law granting Israel’s prime minister full immunity from prosecution could save Netanyahu from being indicted for corruption, and such a law will only pass if he manages to remain in power.

It remains to be seen in the coming days and weeks of coalition negotiations whether a tottering Netanyahu will win what is probably his last major political battle and stay in power against all the odds – and what role foreign policy towards the Middle East will play in his coalition-building strategy.

Courtesy: The Conversation

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At the time I became pregnant I had a good job with an international NGO in addition to my income as a freelance writer and translator, along with my husband’s salary. Yet three months before I gave birth, my contract was terminated. The U.S. funded project I was assigned to closed as a result of the Trump’s administration cut in aid to Gaza’s relief agencies.

Suddenly I found myself about to have a new baby without security for a decent future and life. When I thought of the coming year, I could not help but think of the UN report that warns my home in the Gaza Strip will be “uninhabitable” by 2020.

But I overcame some of my worries. When I hug my son I make a choice to be happy for him. I am thankful for the blessing of having him. Still, I can only stop my anxiety for a few days at a time. When the stress returns, I wonder how I will secure a future for my son? Will we be able to provide him all his needs–a good education, good healthcare, a clean and healthy environment, a safe place to live? All these questions kept popping up in my mind and so I reached out to other new parents. Some considered leaving Gaza.
 

My son’s first war

Sarah Algherbawi with her husband and son, Khalil. (Photo courtesy of the author)
 

Becoming a first-time mom may seem typical for a woman my age, but in Gaza nothing is typical anymore. When I decided to have a child I it was not a decision that I took lightly. I was afraid. I’m 27 and I’ve already witnessed three wars and I never want my child to experience what I’ve gone through. I live everyday in fear that a new war will take place.

Yet even with this fear, I never imagine that such a short time after giving birth my son would experience what war feels like. That is because I didn’t realistically think a war would break out when Khalil was only two weeks old when a short military escalation that took place between Israel and Hamas in mid-November. In the span of two days Israeli forces killed 15 Palestinians, and Hamas’ armed wing killed one Israeli officer. In this period Israeli soldiers bombed 150 sites in Gaza and 400 rockets were fired at Israel.

I was still recovering at my parents’ house from a caesarean delivery when the fire exchange started. It was November 11 and the first thing I did was ask my brother to move Khalil’s bed to the hallway, away from any windows in case the glass breaks in the event a building near the house is targeted.

In previous wars I was glued to my phone and laptop, writing and translating media reports. But this time I only hugged my child prayed to God to protect him from any harm. It was the first time I forgot about my own fear and only thought of him. With every incoming strike and outgoing rocket, I muffled out the sound by holding my hands over Khalil’s ears.
 

No stability

It’s not only the fear of war that dominates every parent in Gaza. We also lack stability. When I lost my job on July because of the punitive measures the Trump administration took against Palestinians I became like one-third of Gaza: unemployed.

My family’s ability to afford caring for our child is now in question, but it’s a question facing many parents around me.  

The World Bank reported in October,  “In Gaza, 54 percent of the labor force is unemployed, including 70 percent among youth,” where youth means anyone from age 15 to 29.

The potential to have a good job in Gaza seems impossible now; there’s no governmental recruitment programs because Gaza’s government already suffers from a deficit and doesn’t even pay full salaries to its employees. UNRWA is terminating employees left and right now that the Trump cuts to Palestinian refugees have hit Gaza. And, the Palestinian Authority, an employer in salary alone, is now scaling back the wages of its employees in Gaza as one of many punitive measures in the Hamas-Fatah power struggle.

I never thought of leaving Gaza before. I’m strongly committed to my family and friends here. But now, my husband and I are seriously considering leaving Gaza. We want to have a better and safer life for our child and we’ve lost trust in our politicians to do so.
 

Mahnoud Saqer and his wife Mayar in Gaza. (Photo courtesy of the author)
 

Huda and her three princesses

My colleagues another journalist couple, Huda Baroud and Mohammed Othman preceded us in taking this step. Huda works as a media editor for a local media website and Mohammed used to work in investigative journalist.

Two years ago, Othman emigrated from Gaza leaving behind his wife and three daughters as he searched for a better job and to establish some himself before the rest of the family would follow.

Until now, Mohammed is in Belgium separated from Baroud and his daughters because of paperwork holds. In the meantime Baroud is suffering here in Gaza playing the role of both mother and father. We recently talked about their divided family.

“Our children are the victims we brought into this life in Gaza. We need to do our best to protect them from wars, bad living and environmental conditions,” she told me.

Huda said she now perceives that women of Gaza have become weaker after having children. There are a myriad of safety issues to worry about as a parent and it takes a toll on our strength. “I think a thousand time before I take one of my daughters to a doctor; as medical mistakes killed people here many times,” Huda said.

“Besides, with every escalation with Israel I wish if I never had children,” she said, “Gaza is not a safe place for children to grow up in, this is why I welcomed my husband’s idea of travelling abroad to search for a better life for our daughters.”
About the latest escalation, Huda went on,

“I thought about many scenarios of how I’ll escape with my daughters if a bombardment took place near our house. I tried to explain to my daughters Lamia, 6, Alma, 4, and Tulien, 2, part of the nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is to understand violence impacts our lives. I wanted to make sure that if something bad happened they’re ready to face it.”

Huda tries to compensate for the absence of her husband by taking her daughters out from time to time, but the environmental pollution has made her picky and careful in her choices. She tells to me, “Going to the beach is totally forbidden because of the high pollution and wastewater.” Instead of the beach, “I brought a plastic pool for the girls to swim in inside the house.”

She’s also picky in regard to the type of food she feeds to her daughters, “I’m careful in choosing the source of vegetables and fruits the girls eat, I buy from one source that I’m sure they don’t use chemicals on plants.”

At the end of our conversation Huda told me, “I’m a journalist and I’m well aware of what’s happening here. Economic and environmental experts assured that the environmental reality of Gaza is very difficult and is about to collapse if no intervention takes place. This is why I’m always careful and picky with my daughters.”
 

Huda Baroud and Mohammed Othman’s three daughters. (Photo courtesy of the author)
 

A Crazy Step

Another couple I know, Mahmoud and Mayar Saqer, age 27 and 24, are experiencing the same emotional distress I’m having: the joy of becoming a parent along with the fear of being a parent in Gaza. The couple are about to have twins, yet instead of celebrating they are extremely worried because Mahmoud’s shoe store recently went out of business.  

They are preparing themselves now to emigrate from Gaza temporarily, at least until Mayar gives birth to the twins abroad.

Mahmoud, who supports ten other members of his family, said this: “Within months I’ll be a father of two and the only source of our income has now closed. I want to immigrate to a European country so that I can guarantee that my twins will get a foreign passport and security in their future, then I’ll return to Gaza.”

The couple plans to journey along smuggling routes of thousands of fleeing refugees. First go to Egypt, then they’ll travel to Turkey, and lastly travel across the sea to Greece.

“I know that this step is surrounded with a lot of risks, but the future of our children warrants taking this risk. I want to have a better life for them,” Mahmoud said

As Mahmoud spoke I thought Malak Abu Jazar, 9, from Gaza who drowned to death off the shores of Turkey when the boat that was smuggling her family and her to Greece sunk.  Mahmoud and Mayar followed the news when it broke a few weeks ago. It’s given Mayar reservations, but not enough to change her strategy. “Since I agreed to do this step, I have become very nervous,” she tells me, “I hope it goes well. The bad reality of Gaza pushed us to take this risk.”

Courtesy: https://mondoweiss.net/

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The “caterwaul” on Capitol Hill reflects years of determined effort by grassroots groups to end U.S. involvement in war on Yemen, fed by mounting international outrage at the last three years of war that have caused the deaths of an estimated 85,000 Yemeni children under age five.
How might we understand what it would mean in the United States for fourteen million people in our country to starve? You would have to combine the populations of New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, and imagine these cities empty of all but the painfully and slowly dying, to get a glimpse into the suffering in Yemen, where one of every two persons faces starvation.

Antiwar activists have persistently challenged elected representatives to acknowledge and end the horrible consequences of modern warfare in Yemen where entire neighborhoods have been bombed, displacing millions of people; daily aerial attacks have directly targeted Yemen’s infrastructure, preventing delivery of food, safe water, fuel, and funds. The war crushes people through aerial bombing and on-the-ground fighting as well as an insidious economic war.

Yemenis are strangled by import restrictions and blockades, causing non-payment of government salaries, inflation, job losses, and declining or disappearing incomes. Even when food is available, ordinary Yemenis cannot afford it.

Starvation is being used as a weapon of war—by Saudi Arabia, by the United Arab Emirates, and by the superpower patrons including the United States that arm and manipulate both countries.

During the thirteen years of economic sanctions against Iraq— those years between the Gulf War and the devastating U.S.-led “Shock and Awe” war that followed—I joined U.S. and U.K. activists traveling to Iraq in public defiance of the economic sanctions.

We aimed to resist U.S.- and U.K.-driven policies that weakened the Iraqi regime’s opposition more than they weakened Saddam Hussein. Ostensibly democratic leaders were ready to achieve their aims by brutally sacrificing children under age five. The children died first by the hundreds, then by the thousands and eventually by the hundreds of thousands. Sitting in a Baghdad pediatric ward, I heard a delegation member, a young nurse from the U.K., begin to absorb the cruelty inflicted on mothers and children.

“I think I understand,” murmured Martin Thomas, “It’s a death row for infants.” Children gasped their last breaths while their parents suffered a pile-up of anguish, wave after wave. We should remain haunted by those children’s short lives.

Iraq’s children died amid an eerie and menacing silence on the part of mainstream media and most elected U.S. officials. No caterwauling was heard on Capitol Hill. But, worldwide, people began to know that children were paying the price of abysmally failed policies, and millions of people opposed the 2003 Shock and Awe war.

Still the abusive and greedy policies continue. The U.S. and its allies built up permanent warfare states to secure consistent exploitation of resources outside their own territories.

During and after the Arab Spring, numerous Yemenis resisted dangerously unfair austerity measures that the Gulf Cooperation Council and the U.S. insisted they must accept. Professor Isa Blumi, who notes that generations of Yemeni fighters have refused to acquiesce to foreign invasion and intervention, presents evidence that Saudi Arabia and the UAE now orchestrate war on Yemen to advance their own financial interests.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, Blumi states that although Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman wants to author an IPO (International Public Offering), for the Saudi state oil company, Aramco, no major investors would likely participate. Investment firms know the Saudis pay cash for their imports, including billions of dollars’ worth of weaponry, because they are depleting resources within their own territory. This, in part, explains the desperate efforts to take over Yemen’s offshore oil reserves and other strategic assets.

Recent polls indicate that most Americans don’t favor U.S. war on Yemen. Surely, our security is not enhanced if the U.S. continues to structure its foreign policy on fear, prejudice, greed, and overwhelming military force. The movements that pressured the U.S. Senate to reject current U.S. foreign policy regarding Saudi Arabia and its war on Yemen will continue raising voices. Collectively, we’ll work toward raising the lament, pressuring the media and civil society to insist that slaughtering children will never solve problems.

Kathy Kelly is a peace activist and a co-coordinator of Voices for Creative Nonviolence http://vcnv.org/ . Kathy Kelly’s email is kathy@vcnv.org

This article first appeared on the website of The Progressive magazine.
 

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Not much is known about the human cost of such earnings which swell up the country’s forex reserves quietly. My recent RTI intervention and research of proceedings in Parliament has revealed that between 2012 and mid-2018 more than 24,570 Indian Workers died in these Gulf countries. This works out to an average of more than 10 deaths per day. For every US$ 1 Billion they remitted to India during the same period there were at least 117 deaths of Indian Workers in Gulf countries.
Please read further for the details of the RTI intervention and data analysis.
 

THE RTI INTERVENTION

In August 2018, I submitted a request for information under The Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) to the Union Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) through the Central Government’s RTI Online filing facility seeking the following information
“1) The year-wise list of the names, age, sex, and occupation of Indian workers who died in the countries of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Quwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates between 01 January, 2012 till date; and
2) The cause of death as mentioned in the death certificates of every deceased Indian worker referred to at para 1 above for the same period.”
The Central Public Information Officer (CPIO) promptly transferred the RTI application to the CPIOs of the Indian Embassies situated in the six Gulf countries (see page 3 of attachment 1). It appears that the MEA does not maintain data about the deaths of Indian
Workers unless queries are raised in Parliament.

The CPIO of the Embassy of Kuwait replied that most of the details regarding deaths of Indian Workers in that country was available online on their official website (attachment 2). Indeed, month-wise data is available on this website, but only 2014-onwards. The CPIOs of the Indian Embassies in Bahrain (attachment 3), Oman (attachment 4) and Qatar (attachment 5) provided year-wise data about deaths of Indian Workers in those countries. The Indian Embassy in Saudi Arabia provided year-wise data after I filed a first appeal against the CPIO’s initial rejection order (attachment 6).

Both the CPIO and the First Appellate Authority of the Indian Embassy in UAE refused to provide even this data citing Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act which exempts the disclosure of personal information which may cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of the individual or where the disclosure has no relationship to any public activity or interest (attachment 7). Despite showing the good practice of proactive information disclosure adopted by the Indian Embassy in Kuwait, the Embassy in UAE continues to refuse even basic data.

The other Indian Embassies have refused details regarding the deaths of Indian Workers sought in the RTI application by either citing Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act or by claiming that the information was held in multiple files in disaggregate form. They are striving to adopt the lowest common denominator instead of following the sterling example of the Indian Mission in Kuwait.

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA REGARDING THE DEATHS OF INDIAN WORKERS IN GULF COUNTRIES

In order to fill up the gaps in the data (between 2012-2013, which the Indian Embassy in Kuwait did not display) and the data which UAE refused to disclose, I researched the websites of the Lok Sabha (Lower House) and the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) in Parliament and found some data. A preliminary analysis of these collated datasets indicates the following trends (the data sets are in the form of tables in attachment 8 and graphs in attachment 9):

1) Available data indicates that at least 24,570 Indian workers died in the six Gulf countries between 2012 and mid-2018. This number could increase if the complete figures for Kuwait and UAE are made available publicly. This amounts to more than 10 deaths per day during this period (see Table 1 in the attachment 8 and graphs 1 and 2 in attachment 9);

2) At 10,416, the most number of deaths occurred in Saudi Arabia during this period while Bahrain accounted for the least number — 1,317 deaths (see Table 1 in attachment 8 and graph 1 in attachment 9);

3) The most number of deaths occurred in 2015 (4,702) whereas the smallest number was reported in 2012 (2,375). By July-August 2018, 1,656 deaths had already occurred (see Table 1 in attachment 8 and graph 1 in attachment 9).

4) Only the CPIO of the Indian Embassy in Qatar provided some information about the cause of deaths. While more than 80% of the deaths were attributed to natural causes, almost 14% of the deaths occurred in accidents. Almost 6% of these deaths were due to suicides (see Table 2 in attachment 8 and graph 3 in attachment 9).

COMPARING DATASETS OF DEATHS WITH DATASETS RELATING TO REMITTANCES

Most of the Indian diaspora is also a very important source of forex earnings for the country. The World Bank publishes estimates of remittances from every country sent to every other country on the globe in its annual Migration Reports. Although these figures are estimates only, they have received currency in official circles as the Central Government often reports from these figures when questions regarding remittances are raised in Parliament. However, while World Bank publishes data based on the calendar year, the Reserve Bank of India publishes weekly remittance data based on the financial year cycle (see Tables 3 and 4 in attachment 8). Nevertheless, country-wise data regarding remittances is not traceable on RBI’s website.

A comparative analysis of the data regarding remittances received from Indians working in Gulf countries with the datasets relating to death reveals the following preliminary results:
1) Indians working in Gulf countries accounted for more than half of the remittance that India received from all over the world between 2012-2017. While Indian received a total of US$ 410.33 billion in remittances from the world over, remittances from the Gulf countries accounted for US$ 209.07 Billion (see Tables 5 and 6 in attachment 8 and graph 8 in attachment 9);

2) According to World Bank estimates, UAE topped the list of Gulf countries from which remittances were received at US$ 72.30 Billion, followed by Saudi Arabia (US$ 62.60 billion); Kuwait (US$ 25.77 Billion); Qatar (US$ 22.57 billion); Oman (US$ 18.63 Billion) and Bahrain came last with US$ 7.19 Billion;

3) When compared with the dataset on deaths of Indian workers obtained through RTI and parliamentary records, there were more than 187 deaths for every US$ Billion received from Oman during 2012-17; more than 183 deaths for every US$ Billion received from Bahrain and 162 deaths for every US$ Billion received from Saudi Arabia. Qatar accounted for more than 74 deaths for every US$ Billion received while the lowest figure of 71 deaths for every US$ Billion received was from UAE (see Table 7 in attachment 8 and graph 6 in attachment 9);

4) Interestingly, while UAE was the source of the highest amount of remittances from Indian workers during 2012-2017 (US$ 72.3 Billion), it also had the lowest deaths per US$ Billion remitted to India (a little over 71 deaths). Conversely, Bahrain, which came at the bottom of the list in terms of total remittances during the same period (US$ 7.19 Billion only), stands at second place in terms of the number of deaths of Indian workers per US$ Billion remitted (a little over 183 deaths). In other words, every US$ Billion earned by Indian Workers remitted from Bahrain cost much more in terms of deaths than a similar amount remitted from UAE (see Table 7 in attachment 8 and graph 6 in attachment 9);

5) A comparison of the remittances data from Gulf countries with the remittances from the Indian diaspora in the advanced countries of the western world, namely, UK, USA and Canada shows some interesting trends. Indian workers in the UAE remitted US$ 72.3 Billion between 2012-2017 while remittances from Indians in the USA were only US$ 68.37 Billion during this period. Remittances from the UK at US$ 23 Billion and a mere US$ 17.3 Billion from Canada compare poorly with the remittances that Indian workers sent from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait during the same period (See Tables 5 and 6 in attachment 8 and graphs 4 and 7 in attachment 9). However, the Indian diaspora in the developed world seems to wield more political influence in India than the Indian worker community eking out a living in Gulf countries. This phenomenon also needs a deeper examination from researchers and academics;

6) Further, remittance from Nepal to India (US$ 17.37 Billion) was only slightly lower than the remittance from Canada to India (US$ 17.39 Billion) between 2012-2017. While remittances from Singapore amounted to only US$ 5.5 Billion during this period, remittances from Bangladesh to India stood at US$ 4.7 Billion. Remittances from Pakistan and Sri Lanka individually during the same period were higher than the remittance received from Indian workers in Bahrain. Interestingly, remittance data from Pakistan to India is available only for the years 2013-2014 (US$ 9.46 Billion) (see Table 6 in attachment 8 and Graph 7 in attachment 9). The World Bank Migration Reports indicate that similar data was not made available by the authorities in Pakistan for other years covered by this study. Similarly, the Central Government was not able to provide data about the number of persons of Indian origin or NRIs in Pakistan in its reply tabled in the Lok Sabha in April 2018 (see attachment 10);

7) It appears that blue collared workers are contributing more to India’s forex kitty than the white-collared workers in the developed countries. However, as a proportion of the total forex reserves at the end of the calendar year, the share of the remittances seems to be declining in recent years. In 2012, remittances from Gulf countries were equal to 12.57% of the forex reserves (excluding gold and Special Drawing Rights) declared by RBI for the week ending December 29. In 2017, the remittances were only 9.97% of the year-end forex reserves declared by RBI; and

8) According to data tabled in Parliament by the Central Government, 7.75 lakh Indian workers were issued emigration clearances (ECR) in 2014, enabling them to work in the six Gulf countries. This number has since fallen, year after year. 7.6 lakh workers were issued ECR clearances in 2015, 5.07 lakh workers issued ECR in 2016. During the first 10 months of 2018 only, 3.46 lakh ECRs were issued by the Central Government. The number of ECRs seems to have halved since 2014. In its reply to an Unstarred Question raised in the Lok Sabha, the Government also listed a slew of measures put in place to provide safeguards for Indian Workers in Gulf countries. However none of these measures include any mention of steps taken to study the phenomenon of deaths of Indian Workers in Gulf countries. (see Table 10 in attachment 8 and attachments 10 and 11).

The above comparison is not an attempt to label the remittances from the Gulf as blood money. Instead the purpose of this comparative analysis is to highlight the shockingly large number of deaths of Indian workers in Gulf countries. This phenomenon requires urgent examination. It is hoped that the Central Government will start this exercise by making more information about deaths of Indian Workers in these countries public. There is an urgent need to commission experts to study the cause of deaths — especially the large number of deaths labelled in Qatar as “natural deaths” and examine the conditions under which Indians work there and identify measures that will prevent avoidable deaths. 
Meanwhile, I will file an appeal with the Central Information Commission to examine the good practice of the Indian Embassy in Kuwait and direct the other Embassies to emulate their standard of proactive information disclosure regarding the deaths of Indian Workers abroad.

CHRI trail of enquiry:  1^st attachment | 2^nd attachment | 3^rd attachment | 4^th attachment | 5^th attachment | 6^th attachment | 7^th attachment | 8^th attachment | 9^th attachment | 10^th attachment | 11^th attachment | 12^th attachment

First published on http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org

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Robert Mahoney of the Committee to Protect Journalists on Oct. 18 appealed to the U.N. to investigate the disappearance of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. REUTERS/Shannon Stapleton

However, in the Middle East, my area of expertise, I believe this Trump policy shift opens the door to exactly the sort of flagrant attacks on individual freedom and safety that likely recently claimed Khashoggi.

Most criticism of Trump’s foreign policy has focused on two other major departures from decades of past American practice.

First, Trump has rejected the cornerstones of the post-WWII international order largely built by the U.S.: deep alliances among Western democracies and global free trade. Second, Trump has shown an affinity for authoritarian rulers, including Russia’s Vladimir Putin, which has undermined American interests.

Yet, the Trump administration’s abandonment of support for democracy and civil rights hurts the interests of both Middle Easterners and Americans.
 

Did the US walk the walk?

In the past, U.S. leaders and officials within the government have shown interest in political rights and government accountability in other countries. Such talk has nonetheless often taken a back seat to considerations of geopolitical power or resources.

Perhaps the lack of attention to current U.S. disregard for democracy and rights in the Middle East has to do with Washington’s inconsistency and perceived hypocrisy in the region.

U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, right, greets Iranian Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Washington in 1951. Two years later, the U.S. orchestrated a coup to oust democratically elected Mossadegh. AP

Even before the U.S. became a superpower after World War II, Western countries like England and France trumpeted democratic values while engaging in colonial control of the Middle East. This left a legacy of local suspicion regarding the sincerity of Western leaders’ stated political values.

The U.S.’s own track record in the region of allying with repressive governments, mounting coups (as in Iran in 1953) and overthrowing leaders by force (as in Iraq in 2003) are among examples where the U.S. practiced a politics other than what it preached.

At best, the U.S. has embraced democratization and human rights as one of many goals in the Middle East. More cynically, democratic talk could be seen as a cover for more imperialistic policies in the region during and after the Cold War.

Yet these days even the pretense is gone that U.S. policy in the Middle East – or elsewhere – should advance political freedom.

When asked about why he refuses to criticize repressive rulers like Putin or Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Trump’s response is to question whether “our country’s so innocent.” Denying that the U.S. is distinguishable from countries that penalize dissent, the current American leader disavows the very project of advancing democratic values abroad.
 

Pretense matters

Let me be clear that I am not suggesting that Middle Easterners should be, or are, dependent on foreign countries or activists for greater political rights. If so, why does an end to Washington’s inconsistent support for democratic politics and rights in the Middle East matter?
There are several reasons.

First, U.S. support for democratic values abroad – however variable – helps empower non-government organizations that consistently focus on rights in places like the Middle East.

That means Human Rights Watch, the World Justice Project and local movements these groups help can improve human rights and legal accountability in part because they have allies in Washington’s broader political culture.

Second, advocates for democratic rights exist within the U.S. government, and enjoy influence, even if their superiors are less constant in their support for democracy abroad.

So, groups within the State Department, and government organizations like USAID or the United States Institute for Peace, work to improve citizen capacity and rights in places like the Middle East. In more rights-oriented presidencies, such groups can affect broader government policy.

Even in administrations less focused on human rights, the rhetoric of support for democracy can be politically useful or persuasive. President George W. Bush partly justified American military overthrow of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 2003 with the argument that a more democratic Iraqi government might help transform the broader Middle East.

Third, the lack of U.S. predictability around political rights in the Middle East can actually deter governments dependent on good relations with Washington from repressing their citizens. That’s because they can’t be entirely sure about political consequences. Tacit approval by the U.S. of human rights abuses could turn overnight into condemnation.

Donald Trump greets Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi in 2017 in Saudi Arabia. Sisi has been accused of increasing repression in his country. The White House

For example, Egypt’s pre-2011 authoritarian leader Hosni Mubarak was known for political oppression. But he could not undermine democratic and human rights activists in his country altogether. He knew that, in a U.S. that provided billions of foreign aid to Egypt, at least some policymakers scrutinized his coercive practices.
 

Lack of pretense matters

Is it actually significant that the White House ignores political rights and freedom?

In the Middle East, the difference is large and palpable.

For one thing, increased deference to authoritarian leaders in the Middle East by the world’s most powerful democracy has allowed for the pursuit of deadly warfare and attacks on civilians. This is apparent in the actions of Syrian leader Hafez el-Assad, who has not hesitated to use chemical and other extreme weapons on his population.

Meanwhile, the Saudi government uses U.S.-supplied weapons to wage war in Yemen. The White House has not responded to the devastating civilian casualties.

More broadly, and as the Khashoggi affair highlights, the U.S.’s current lack of interest in political rights emboldens Middle Eastern governments to crack down on dissent and the dissenters, in flagrant and shocking ways.

Egypt under President Sisi is more repressive politically than it was prior to 2011 under Mubarak. Prince Salman of Saudi Arabia may be committed to increasing Saudi prestige and the selective enhancement of less puritanical social mores. Yet he also has shown little tolerance for political opposition.

When the Canadian foreign ministry tweeted critically about Saudi political arrests, the Saudis countered by expelling the Canadian ambassador and suspending trade, flights and Saudi student exchanges with Canada.

Such a strong reaction is hard to imagine in the days when at least pockets of the U.S. government showed concern about human rights in the Middle East. In this instance, the Trump Administration refused to support support Canada, its democratic neighbor. Similarly, Trump’s response to Khashoggi’s disappearance so far is to highlight the importance of Saudi-U.S. ties, particularly in the realm of weapons sales.

The upshot is that Middle Easterners have grounds to believe that Washington cares little for their basic well-being, their hopes for more responsive political systems and, in Syria and Yemen, their very lives.

The volcano of popular resentment against authoritarianism that erupted most notably in 2011, known as the Arab Uprisings, may have been capped temporarily. It has not quieted.

People in the Trump administration purport to care a great deal about potential violence from Middle Easterners. This is why it is puzzling that they side strongly with unelected leaders willing to use intimidation and violence to quell dissent.

It is tempting to argue that the inconsistency of U.S. efforts to further democratic values means that these efforts don’t matter.

At least in the Middle East, racked by ongoing war, the rising influence of autocrats, and increases in flagrant attacks on critical speech like Khashoggi’s death, I fear that the Trump administration’s abandonment of such efforts will in fact fuel more misery and anti-Americanism.

This is an updated version of an article originally published on August 24, 2018.
 

David Mednicoff, Chair, Department of Judaic and Near Eastern Studies, University of Massachusetts Amherst

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Things between Saudi Crown Prince Salman and Turkish President Erdogan have become rather tense. AP Photo/Burhan Ozbilici

Articles based on anonymous accounts from Turkish officials report that Turkey has video and audio proof that Saudi Arabian agents detained, murdered and dismembered Khashoggi, a sharp critic of his government who lived in Washington, D.C. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan raised the stakes even further when he said that a search of the Saudi consulate showed evidence of toxic materials that were painted over.

The affair is just the latest to drive a wedge between the two key Middle Eastern powers – countries that have in the past shared close ties to each other and to the United States.

How did their friendship turn frosty?

I’ve been studying and writing about the region for decades. And like with many other relationships in the Middle East, it’s complicated – and that’s why the current crisis could lead to a surprising twist.
 

Early days

Although diplomatic relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were established in 1932, neither country showed much interest in the other until the late 1960s.

Turkey’s secular ruling elite was more keen to have strategic and economic ties with the West than to the Arab world. Turkey joined the NATO alliance in 1951 – two years after its formation – and maintained good relations with Israel from the start, much to the disappointment of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries.

This began to change in the ‘60s and ’70s when Turkey made two moves that led to stronger relations with Saudi Arabia and resulted in increased trade. In 1969, it joined the nascent Organization of Islamic States, based in Saudi Arabia and intended to be a “collective voice of the Muslim world.” And in 1975, Turkey initiated diplomatic relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization, which sought to end the occupation of Palestinian territories in Israel.

Relations continued to improve in the 1980s but deteriorated in the ’90s when the kingdom took Syria’s side in several disputes with neighbor Turkey.

These ups and downs in Saudi-Turkish relations were partly a result of Turkey’s political instability, including several military coups in the ’80s and ’90s. Relations tended to improve when Islamist or civilian parties – which felt close cultural and religious links with Turkey’s Muslim neighbors – were in power but worsened after the military deposed them.

King Abdullah shake hands with Erdogan during the first visit of a Saudi monarch to Turkey since 1966. AP Photo/Umit Bektas

Warmer ties

Relations between the two countries found a firmer footing after the Justice and Development Party – commonly known as the AKP – gained power in Turkey in 2002 and continued to improve throughout the decade.

In contrast to the secular governments that had ruled Turkey since 1923, the AKP and its leader Erdogan put a high priority on building stronger relationships with its Arab and Muslim neighbors.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the resulting change in the balance of power in the region brought Turkey and Saudi Arabia even closer together. Both were concerned about Iraq falling into the hands of their common rival, Iran, whose military and political influence increased as a result of the invasion. They also wanted to contain Iran’s influence in Syria and Lebanon.

As a result of these closer ties, in August 2006 the late King Abdullah became the first Saudi leader to visit Turkey since 1966 and made another trip the following year. In return, then-Prime Minister Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia four times from 2009 to 2011.
The high-level diplomatic contacts fostered growing business and investment. Turkish exports of textiles, metals and other products to Saudi Arabia soared from US$397 million in 2000 to $3.6 billion in 2012. And Saudi businessmen who felt unwelcome in the U.S. and Europe after 9/11 saw Turkey as an attractive destination.
 

A springtime chill in the air

Relations took a sharp turn in the 2011, starting with the Arab spring uprisings that led to the overthrow of governments in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

As an advocate of political Islam, Erdogan welcomed the revolutions and the new governments they yielded. The Saudi government, on the other hand, saw the revolts as destabilizing.

This disagreement came to a peak when Mohammad Morsi, who was closely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, won that Egypt’s first post-Hosni Mubarak election in 2012. Erdogan supported Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power, which was opposed by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States like the United Arab Emirates. These countries had a long history of hostility towards Muslim Brotherhood activities throughout the Arab world and were concerned that these victories would energize the movement in their own countries.

The rift between Turkey and Saudi Arabia intensified after a military coup ousted Morsi in 2013. Erdogan strongly condemned it and gave the Muslim Brotherhood refuge in Turkey, while Saudi Arabia offered billions in financial aid to cement Egypt’s new military rulers.

Relations took another hit in 2014 when Saudi Arabia actively undermined Turkey’s bid to become a nonpermanent member of the United Nations’ Security Council.

More recently, Saudi Arabia and Turkey found themselves on opposite sides over the Qatar crisis in June 2017. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt severed all ties with Qatar – and tried to enforce an economic blockade – over the latter’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups. They were also upset with Qatar’s refusal to terminate its ties with Iran.

Turkey reacted by expanding its engagement with Qatar, offering economic aid and sending more troops to its small military base in that country. Indeed, Turkish food shipments to Qatar played a crucial role in its ability to withstand the blockade.

Jamal Khashoggi, missing since Oct. 2, is believe to have been killed. Flickr/The Project on Middle East Democracy, CC BY

Interpreting Turkey’s response to Khashoggi

So what does this all mean for the current crisis?

Western media have mostly portrayed Turkey’s handling of the latest incident involving Khashoggi’s disappearance as an indication of deteriorating Saudi-Turkey relations.

That might not, however, be the case. The Turkish government is trying to balance multiple conflicting goals in the way it handles this crisis.

On the one hand, it is trying to show a full commitment to discovering what happened and has put enormous pressure on Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman by leaking details of his government’s involvement. But I believe it is also mindful of preventing a further escalation of tensions with Saudi Arabia, which remains a major investor in Turkey.

Meanwhile, Turkey is struggling with a severe financial and external debt crisis at the moment and is desperately trying to attract foreign capital. A withdrawal of Saudi investment or tourists could worsen the crisis.

Erdogan’s initial hesitation in pointing the finger – leaving it to “anonymous officials” – and his call for a joint investigation gave Saudi leadership time to come up with a response strategy, which appears to be blaming “rogue killers.”

In this he seems to share President Donald Trump’s interest in giving Saudi Arabia a face-saving way out of the crisis. The U.S. and the Trump administration also have a lot on the line in their relationship with the Saudi government.

Interestingly, one result of this ordeal, which has plunged Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the West into chaos, may be more cooperation and better ties between the U.S. and Turkey, which now have a great deal of leverage over the kingdom.

Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in Economics of the Middle East, Brandeis University
 

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Many female Bangladeshi workers who returned from Saudi Arabia say they suffered from subhuman treatment at the hands of their employers and the Bangladesh Embassy in the country did not conduct proper monitoring Mehedi Hasan/Dhaka Tribune

More than 80 Bangladeshi women who used to work as domestic help in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) have returned to Bangladesh this week.   

The poverty stricken women, mostly from rural areas in Bangladesh, flew to Saudi Arabia with hopes and dreams of improving their standard of living. But why are they now returning? 

Shariful Hasan, head of Brac’s Migration Program, said those who returned had various reasons for doing so, but physical torture and sexual abuse were chief among them.

 “We have talked to a number of the returnees, and their main complaint was that they were tortured there (in Saudi Arabia). Many of them spoke of how they were sexually abused,” Shariful told the Dhaka Tribune. 

Sources said 66 women returned on Saturday and another 21 on Sunday, due to various problems with their employers in Saudi Arabia. 

In 2015, the governments of Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement on sending female workers to KSA as domestic help. 

After receiving assurances from the Saudi government on the protection of female workers, the Bangladesh government sent 20,952 female workers to Saudi Arabia in 2015, while 68,286 went to the country in 2016, and 83,354 went in 2017. From January to April this year, a further 30,102 female workers went to Saudi Arabia from Bangladesh.

However, around 5,000 female Bangladeshi workers have returned from Saudi Arabia since 2015, due to reasons varying from a failure to adapt to the foreign culture, to torture, sexual abuse, and irregularities in the payment of their wages, sources said.

Rokeya Begum, a 38 year-old mother from Noakhali district, went to Saudi Arabia in February this year and returned on Sunday. She used to work at the household of a wealthy family in Riyadh and her salary was fixed at Tk20,000 per month during recruitment. However, after working for three months, she was only paid Tk16,000 in wages. 

“I was tricked by the broker who arranged the recruitment. I was supposed to take care of an elderly woman at my employer’s residence, but they forced me to do all kinds of work, including cooking and washing. However, it was not a problem for me as I went there to earn money. My employer and his family treated me like a slave and did not pay me accordingly,” Rokeya told the Dhaka Tribune. 

“They did not even give me adequate food, clothing, and other daily essentials. One day, I quarreled with my employer over my wages and he got angry. Later, he whipped me, as did his family members,” Rokeya added. 

Hundreds of female Bangladeshi workers who have returned from Saudi Arabia have similar stories. Some even fell ill due to the severity of the torture they faced at the hands of their Saudi employers. Many of the returnees also said they had been raped by their employers as well as their   family members.

Mili Akhter, another returnee who arrived in Bangladesh on Sunday, said her employers in Saudi Arabia did not treat their domestic help like human beings.

 “They treated us very badly. As we do not understand their language, it is tough to communicate. When we did not understand what they said, they became angry and tortured us. There are so many sexual abuse cases concerning Bangladeshi domestic help,” Mili told the Dhaka Tribune. 

The returnees further said the Bangladesh Embassy in Saudi Arabia was indifferent to the condition of female Bangladeshi workers in the country and did not conduct proper monitoring.

However, Bangladesh government officials said most of the female Bangladeshi workers in Saudi Arabia were working without any problems and their condition was satisfactory. 

They added that those who return mostly do so after failing to cope with the new culture and environment.

Dr Namita Halder, secretary of the Bangladesh Ministry of Expatriates Welfare and Overseas Employment, said: “Some incidents of torture have taken place, but not all cases are the same. Around 80% of the female workers are working happily in Saudi Arabia while the rest of them have several reasons for coming back.” 

“One of the major reasons behind the returns is failure to cope with the environment and culture of the Middle East. They usually eat bread, their language is different, and the weather is very hot. Most of the time, our girls go there without considering the pros and cons,” she said. 

“After experiencing these difficulties, when they refuse to work, their employers become angry which results in unexpected incidents,” she added.

Courtesy: Dhaka Tribune
 

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A wall with the logo and slogans of the Islamic State that unknown people tried to erase. Mosul, Iraq, 9 May 2017. Picture by Jan Kuhlmann/DPA/PA Images. All rights reserved.

The Middle East and North Africa is a competitive, fragmented and highly penetrated regional system. However, it is a place that lacks a security system and is unique for its absence of a region-wide architecture. 

The Arab League – the region’s largest IGO – has been mobilized on numerous occasions, for a number of structural, political and ideological reasons but these efforts have failed. At the state level, the post-colonial state has failed to establish a fair model of governance. The region is dominated by authoritarian regimes and yet is also bereft of a hegemonic power able to impose its own will on the subsystem and therefore awash with rivalries. 

Thus, the region is characterized by inter-state rivalries and increasingly exposed to identity politics which is manifesting itself in inter-confessional and inter-communal conflicts. Consequently, signs of deep social trauma and crisis of identity and governance at both state and society levels are visible. 

Sub-communalization is taking place across the region, thus gradually eroding the hard won century-old national societies that independent states forcefully but carefully have put together. In addition, the region’s ‘contested’ states seem to be unravelling into smaller communities of sects, religious affiliations, tribal groups, and ethnicities. 

The MENA region is suffering from an imbalance in the forces pushing for change – the peaceful mass mobilizations and the violent nihilistic ones. This is a region, which is at once both post-modern and pre-modern. Both post- and pre-modern forces compete for power.

The regional system is vulnerable to the actions of these sub-state and non-state actors and many of its states are suffering at the hands of violent jihadi groups who have stepped into the vacuum created by the weakening of the iron grip of the central government in several Arab countries.

Modernity as the norm for much of the twentieth century – in terms of rationality as a driver of decisions, transparent institutions of governance, rule of law, reliable public services (education, health, etc.), accountable public servants, functioning state institutions, enhancement of opportunity – has been taking a back seat in driving change in the region.

Power is fluid, unevenly distributed, and does not necessarily manifest itself in terms of such traditional indicators as the size of population, territory, economy (GNP), or geography; nor does the size of military budgets, of the armed forces, or military hardware provide sufficient indicators of power and influence. Indeed, in the twenty-first century, it seems to be the smaller Arab states who are outperforming their larger counterparts; and non-state actors making waves.

Violent-Salafism seems to be one of the most challenging issues that face the region
The region is still lacking alternative political forces able to fulfill the expectations of the people and achieve development and security. Eventually, the Islamic radical groups, such as the Islamic State, seem to have become the substitute for the past political forces in doing this mission.
Thus, violent-Salafism seems to be one of the most challenging issues that face the region. Salafism in the Islamic tradition was a reformist movement. It emerged at the end of the Abbasid Caliphate in the eleventh century. All called for the return to the true Islam, where the law of the divine is represented in Quran and Hadith (the teachings of the Prophet Mohammad).

Violent-Salafism is a relatively contemporary phenomenon. It was arguably introduced in the writings of the Egyptian Sayyid Quṭb (October 1906 – 29 August 1966), who came at a time when leftist radical movements were rising in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. Sayyid Quṭb resented pan-Arab policies of the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and called for regime change. Qutb introduced what is known as Global Jihad and was later arrested for plotting against President Nasser and executed in late August 1966.

The Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union in the 1980s became the life blood of violent-Salafism in the region. Yet the milestone arguably is the Kuwait crisis in 1990-1991. The occupation of Kuwait divided the Arab world. Furthermore, American soldiers were not welcomed in the Holy Land by the Arab mujahidin of Afghanistan who established their group, al-Qaeda, just two years earlier, in 1988. As a result, the Kuwait crisis provided the opportunity for these jihadi groups to operate in the region. When House of Saud rejected Osama Bin Laden’s offer to defend the Holy Shrine, the latter vowed to attack the US and its allies.

The war on Iraq in 2003 brought about a new wave of global Jihad
The Algerian civil war (1991-2002) and the Bosnian war (1992-1995) had also their own share in the rise and the development of violent Salafism. However, the establishment of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan witnessed the birth of a new trend of global Jihad following Sayyid Quṭb’s school of global Jihad. While the Taliban, the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) and Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) had locally based agendas in Afghanistan, Algeria and France, al-Qaeda unleashed radicalism onto the international scene. Al-Qaeda began to attack the US and its allies in the world. The first attack was on the US army residence Gold Mohur hotel in of Aden in 1992, followed by the bombing of the World Trade Centre in 1993, and the bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar al-Salam in 1998. The most disastrous attacks were the attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington, DC.

The war on Iraq in 2003 brought about a new wave of global Jihad. The occupation of Baghdad was a major turning point for the pan-Arab and revolutionary forces in the region one that compares to the defeat of 1967 and the Israeli occupation of Beirut in 1982. 

The collapse of the Iraqi state provided the space where Jihadists can operate and attack the US and its allies in the region. Al-Zarqawi, an ex al-Qaeda member in Afghanistan, travelled to Iraqi Kurdistan in 2002 and established his network with the Jihadists there. In 2003, he and his followers began to attack the Americans and the Shiites. They called themselves Jamāʻat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Jihād (The Organization of Monotheism and Jihad, initially established in 1999 by al-Zarqawi in Afghanistan). In 2004, the group pledged allegiance to Osama Bin Laden and changed its name to Tanẓīm Qāʻidat al-Jihād fī Bilād al-Rāfidayn, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). 

The group played on sectarian tensions between the Shiite and the Sunni communities inside Iraq. It was calculating that if they attack the Shiite, which they did, they would retaliate by attacking the Sunnis, which they did. The Sunnis would then seek protection from al-Zarqawi and his followers, which they also did. This has been the group’s usual strategy since the days of al-Zarqawi’s leadership. By doing this, it would gain Sunni sympathy and it did so quite dramatically (see al-Zarqawi letter to Osama Bin Laden, 2004).

Al-Zarqawi was killed in an American air strike in June 2006. His death, though, did not decrease the group’s vision of statehood. The Egyptian militant Abu Hamza al-Muhajir took over the lead. Later he will pledge allegiance to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as the leader of what later became known as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), arguably to give the group an Iraqi flavor. Yet, as soon as the Sahawat were established by the Iraqi government and the US and composed of Sunni tribes that had cooperated with ISI, the Islamic State was driven out of the Sunni areas in 2006.
The civil war in Syria helped ISI to expand and flourish again. The armed conflict between al-Assad and the opposition, which started a few months after the peaceful protests in 2011 turned into what many Syrians now perceive as a sectarian war. The chaos attracted ISI. The group began to control areas in Syria between 2012 and 2013. As soon as it controlled Raqqa in 2013, it changed the name of the group to the Islamic State in Iraq and a-Sham (ISIS). And once Mosul fell under their control in the summer of 2014, the group began to call itself the Islamic State (IS).

Although IS has lost most of the territory it controlled in Syria and Iraq, it has not been defeated.
IS transformed the Islamic Jihad within a short space of time. What al-Qaeda could not do in years, IS did in months, in terms of political and military successes and in terms of recruitment. This was partly due to the use of technology and social media, but also to the adoption of offensive Jihad, or Jihad al-Shauka, rather than defensive Jihad, or Jihad al-Nikaya as in the case of al-Qaeda, thus attracting scores of young people worldwide. 

The difference between the two forms of Jihad is that defensive Jihad aims to deter impairment, offensive Jihad on the other hand, features the work of Machiavelli in terms of land-control, the ends justify the means, and most importantly, fighting the near enemy – essentially any local or regional group that opposes the jihadi group or refuses to pledge allegiance to it.

Although IS has lost most of the territory it controlled in Syria and Iraq, it has not been defeated. The group rose on the aches of the regional disorder and the failure of the state, and these fertile conditions have not changed. Furthermore, violent Salafism acts as a catalyst for the entrenchment of other sub-state actors, like the Shiite militias, Iran’s proxies in the region, mainly Hezbollah in Lebanon and recently operating in Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq. These Iranian-backed militias pose threats not only to the security of those countries they are operating in, but also to the stability of the entire region.

Leadership is still lacking and no solutions for the many regional problems are in sight. Meanwhile, with the lack or weakness of alternative forces able to fulfill the expectations of the people in the region, Islamic radical groups, such as the Islamic State, are appealing to the masses, and seem to have become the substitute for a failed regional order and failing domestic conditions. Thus, violent Salafism is a phenomenon that will continue to shape the politics of the region, irrespective of military offensives against its different adherers.

Anoush Ehteshami is professor of international relations and head of the school of government and international affairs at Durham University. His many book-length publications include Globalization and the Middle East: Old Games, New Rules (Routledge, 2007); (co-author) Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives (IB Tauris, 2007); (co-editor) The Middle East’s Relations with Asia and Russia (RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (co-editor) (Lynne Rienner, 2002); (co-author) Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Rand, 2001).
 

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