Minority Institutions | SabrangIndia News Related to Human Rights Sat, 16 Nov 2024 12:01:32 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.2.2 https://sabrangindia.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Favicon_0.png Minority Institutions | SabrangIndia 32 32 Supreme Court delivers a 4:3 Verdict on parameters to determine the minority status of institutions https://sabrangindia.in/supreme-court-delivers-a-43-verdict-on-parameters-to-determine-the-minority-status-of-institutions/ Sat, 16 Nov 2024 12:01:32 +0000 https://sabrangindia.in/?p=38803 A seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court recently pronounced a verdict in in case of AMU vs Naresh Agarwal, in a 4:3 majority—overruling the court’s previous judgement in Azeez Baasha vs. Union of India.[1] The Supreme Court, in 1967, had held in Azeez Basha that Aligarh Muslim University did not quality to be minority institution as it was neither established nor administered by the Muslim community.[2]

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The context

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan-an educationist from the 19th century who also was also the founder of the Aligarh movement-founded the Mohammeden Anglo Oriental College (MAO College) in 1877. There is a great deal of literature on how Syed Ahmed Khan was working for development of both Hindus and Muslims while serving as a judge, and how he found the Scientific Society with Hindu personalities to translate scientific works into Urdu and Hindi.[3] The same literature also marks a shift in how he later specifically focussed particularly on upliftment of Muslims through education. In this pursuit, he established a school in 1875 which later became the MAO College.

The MAO College eventually transformed into AMU in 1920 through an Act of the Central Legislature, expanding its academic reach and gaining university status.  The birth of independent India in 1947 brought forth a new era, marked by the adoption of the Constitution in 1950. This landmark document enshrined fundamental rights, including provisions for minority institutions, notably Article 30(1), which guaranteed religious and linguistic minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.  The enactment of the Constitution necessitated aligning existing laws with its principles.  Consequently, the AMU Act underwent amendments in 1951 and 1965. These amendments aimed to reconcile the university’s governance structure with the newly established constitutional provisions, particularly those related to secularism, equality, and the right to education for all citizens.

Changes to AMU Act after Independence

The 1951 Amendment Act was crucial in reshaping AMU’s governance to adhere to the principles of the Constitution, particularly those related to government aid and non-discrimination. The amendment addressed several key aspects, including the composition of the university’s governing body, “the Court,” and provisions for religious instruction. Prior to the amendment, the AMU Act mandated that all members of the Court be Muslims.  This provision was deemed incompatible with the secular and egalitarian ethos of the Indian Constitution, which prohibits discrimination based on religion.  The 1951 amendment removed this requirement, allowing for a more diverse and inclusive composition of the Court, thereby adhering to Article 14, which guarantees equality before the law.

Another significant aspect addressed by the 1951 amendment pertained to religious instruction. The original AMU Act mandated religious instruction for Muslim students, a provision that raised concerns about potential discrimination against students of other faiths. To rectify this and ensure compliance with Article 28(1), which prohibits religious instruction in educational institutions wholly maintained out of State funds, the amendment removed the mandatory religious instruction provision.  This change was crucial in aligning AMU with the principles of the. By removing the requirement for an all-Muslim Court and the mandatory religious instruction provision, the 1951 amendment sought to remove any impediments to AMU receiving government aid while upholding the principles of secularism and equality enshrined in the Constitution.

However, the 1965 Amendment Act, introduced amidst a period of campus unrest, significantly altered the power dynamics within the university, further intensifying debates about its minority character and the autonomy of minority institutions in general. This amendment effectively curtailed the authority of the Court, reducing it to an advisory body. The Executive Council, on the other hand, saw its powers considerably augmented. Additionally, the amendment introduced significant changes to the composition of the Court, shifting from an elected body to a primarily nominated one. These changes, perceived by many as a move towards greater government control over the university, sparked concerns about the erosion of minority institutions’ autonomy and sparked renewed legal challenges. The Supreme Court delivered its judgement on the validity of the amendments in Azeez Basha vs. Union of India.

Azeez Basha v. Union of India (1967) and subsequent developments.

In the 1967 case of Azeez Basha v. Union of India, the Supreme Court examined the question of whether Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) was a minority educational institution under Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution. The Court ultimately ruled that AMU was not a minority institution, a decision that has been contested ever since.

The petitioners in Azeez Basha had challenged amendments made to the AMU Act in 1951 and 1965, arguing that they violated the Muslim community’s right to administer an educational institution they had established. These amendments, as previously mentioned, changed the university’s governance structure and composition, including measures that reduced the power of the university’s Court, removed a requirement for Court members to be Muslim, and empowered the Executive Council.

The Court upheld the amendments, determining that the AMU was neither established nor administered by the Muslim minority at the time the Constitution came into force. The Court reasoned that because the central legislature enacted the AMU Act in 1920, the university was established by the government, not a religious minority. The Court determined that the words “establish and administer” in Article 30(1) must be read conjunctively, meaning the minority community must have both established and administered the institution to qualify for protection under this article.

Timeline: key developments after Azeez Basha

November 26, 1981: The two-judge bench in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya vs. District Inspector of Schools expressed doubts about the Azeez Basha judgment and referred the matter to a larger bench for reconsideration.[4] The case involved a different educational institution and was considering whether registration as a society under the Societies Registration Act changed an institution’s status as a minority institution. The judges questioned whether an institution established with any non-minority participation could be considered a minority institution and directed that a larger bench consider the matter. However, this reference was never conclusively addressed.

December 31, 1981: The AMU Act was amended with the intention of overturning the Azeez Basha judgment. This amendment redefined “University” in the AMU Act to mean “the educational institution of their choice established by the Muslims of India, which originated as the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh, and which was subsequently incorporated as the Aligarh Muslim University”. The amendment also emphasized the university’s role in promoting the educational and cultural advancement of Muslims. However, the legal validity of this amendment, and whether it could supersede the Supreme Court’s Azeez Basha judgment, became a point of contention in future litigation.

 2002: The Supreme Court, in TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka stated that the determination of whether a community is a minority is to be made at the state level.[5] The Court in TMA Pai framed a question similar to the one in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya, but ultimately determined that the question of indicia for treating an educational institution as a minority institution should be decided by a regular bench, not the eleven-judge bench hearing the case. However, this question remained unanswered.

2005: AMU, asserting its claim as a minority institution based on the 1981 amendment, reserved 50% of seats in postgraduate medical courses for Muslim candidates. This decision led to the case of Dr. Naresh Agarwal v. Union of India.[6] The petitioners in this case, citing Azeez Basha, contested the reservation policy and argued that AMU was not a minority institution. The Union and the University countered that the 1981 amendment had nullified Azeez Basha.

2005: The Allahabad High Court, relying on the reasoning in Azeez Basha, struck down AMU’s reservation policy.  The High Court determined that the 1981 amendment did not change the basis of the Azeez Basha decision, and so AMU remained a non-minority institution. The High Court reasoned that the Muslim community had willingly surrendered their right to administer AMU to the government. It also found the 1981 amendment impermissible because the amendment sought to overrule the Azeez Basha judgment without removing its legal basis.

2006: The Union government and AMU appealed the Allahabad High Court’s decision to the Supreme Court.

 February 12, 2019: A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, recognising that the correctness of Azeez Basha remained unresolved, referred the question of AMU’s minority status to a seven-judge bench. The bench determined that previous references, including the one in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya, had not provided a definitive answer to this question.  This referral also directed the seven-judge bench to consider the impact of the 2010 amendment to the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act (NCMEI Act) on AMU’s minority status. The 2010 amendment to the NCMEI Act expanded the definition of a minority institution to include universities, a change the three-judge bench felt necessitated further examination.

Arguments

The petitioners primarily argued that the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) should be recognized as a minority institution based on its historical connection with the Muslim community, and therefore entitled to protection under Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution. They challenged the long-standing precedent set by Azeez Basha, which had denied AMU minority status. The petitioners contended that the Azeez Basha judgment misinterpreted the scope of Article 30(1) and created a restrictive precedent that limited the ability of minority communities to establish and administer universities. They emphasized that a university could be considered “established” by a minority community even if it was formally incorporated through a legislative act, particularly when the community played a significant role in the institution’s conception, development, and ongoing character. The petitioners highlighted AMU’s historical origins, its contributions to Muslim education and culture, and the university’s strong ongoing connection with the Muslim community as evidence of its minority character.

The respondents argued that AMU’s establishment through the Aligarh Muslim University Act of 1920, enacted by the British Indian government, negated the claim that it was established by the Muslim minority community. They emphasized that the Act granted the government extensive control over the university, including the power to appoint key officials, regulate its functioning, and oversee its finances. This control, they contended, contradicted the autonomy and independence typically associated with a minority institution. The respondents also argued that the Muslim community, in its pursuit of a university, had willingly accepted a certain level of government control in exchange for recognition and support. This acceptance, they argued, amounted to a surrender of the right to establish an independent minority institution. This surrender predated the Indian Constitution, they noted, and therefore could not be reevaluated based on the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. The respondents further argued that AMU’s designation as an “institution of national importance” under Entry 63 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, combined with its integration into the regulatory framework established by the University Grants Commission (UGC) Act of 1956, demonstrated its national character and its alignment with the broader Indian higher education system.

Majority Judgement

Decoupling minority status from statutory incorporation, date of establishment, and administrative composition

The majority judgment authored by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and joined by Justices Sanjiv Khanna, J.B. Pardiwala, and Manoj Misra sought to clarify the criteria for determining the minority status of educational institutions in India. This 4:3 decision rejected a narrow interpretation of Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees religious and linguistic minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The majority opinion articulated a set of principles aimed at ensuring the protection of minority rights in the realm of education.

Firstly, the judgment refuted the long-held notion that statutory incorporation automatically precludes minority status. The court distinguished between “incorporation” and “establishment,” asserting that these concepts are distinct and should not be conflated. Therefore, the mere fact that the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) was created through an Act of Parliament (the AMU Act of 1920) does not inherently negate its potential minority status. The majority opinion emphasized that the critical inquiry should focus on who established the institution and the driving force behind its creation, the purpose of the creation and the way it was created. It is here the majority judgement makes the distinction. [Paragraph 94]

The majority stated that the indicia for treating an educational institution as a minority education institution constitutes the genesis of the idea or ‘brain’ behind the establishment as gauged from the correspondence, government resolutions.  This inquiry should lead back to a person from the minority community. Additionally, the purpose of the institution can be for the benefit of the minority community rather than being ‘solely for the benefit of the minority community.’ [Paragraph 72]

The implementation of the idea, according to the majority opinion of the Supreme Court, needs to be examined but state aid in the implementation would not adversely affect the minority status of the institution. The administrative structure also should reflect the minority character of the institution. [Paragraphs 133-138]

Secondly, the majority judgment debunked the idea that an institution’s date of establishment is determinative of its minority status. The court clarified that Article 30 does not restrict the right to establish and administer educational institutions to minorities only after the Constitution came into effect. This clarification ensures that the protection afforded to minority educational institutions under Article 30 extends to institutions established before the Constitution’s adoption, acknowledging the historical context of minority education in India.[Paragraph 119]

Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, the court held that administration by non-minority members does not, in itself, negate an institution’s minority status. Recognizing the evolving nature of educational institutions and their commitment to secular values, the majority acknowledged that a minority institution might not require minority members in its administration to maintain its essential character. The court highlighted that a minority institution might prioritize secular education, making the presence of minority members in administration unnecessary. This principle allows minority institutions to embrace inclusivity and diversity in their administrative structures without jeopardizing their minority status and the associated constitutional protections. The court also recognized that compelling a minority institution to surrender its minority character in exchange for recognition or affiliation would violate Article 30(1).[Paragraph 160]

Minority opinion

Justice Surya Kant’s dissenting opinion disagrees with the majority on two crucial points: how the case came before the court and what criteria should be used to determine the minority status of an institution.

First, Justice Surya Kant strongly criticizes the procedural route the case took. The issue of AMU’s minority status started with a two-judge bench that doubted the correctness of a previous five-judge bench ruling (the Azeez Basha case). This two-judge bench then referred the case directly to a seven-judge bench, bypassing the proper channels. Justice Surya Kant argues this is a fundamental error. He cited established legal principles and the Supreme Court’s own precedent in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v State of Maharashtra to emphasise that a smaller bench cannot overrule or refer the decisions of a larger bench without going through the Chief Justice of India.[7] This, he argued, undermines judicial order and predictability. [Paragraph 91]

Second, on the substantive issue of how to determine minority status, Justice Surya Kant disagreed with the majority’s view that an institution incorporated by a statute can still be considered a minority institution. He emphasizes that both the “establishment” and “administration” of an institution must reflect its minority character for it to receive protection under Article 30(1). This is a conjunctive reading of those two terms – both conditions must be met. [Paragraph 131]

.Justice Surya Kant, in his dissent, listed factors indicating a loss of minority administrative control over an institution: management unaccountable to the founders, external vetoes in staffing decisions, lack of guaranteed minority representation on governing bodies, and a shift from the institution’s original minority-focused goals. These suggest diminished influence of the minority community in administering the institution.[Paragraph 181]

Justice Dipankar Datta expressed caution against recent judicial trends that diverge from historical precedent and original constitutional interpretations. [Paragraph 133] He emphasised that judges are not infallible and should be guided by the framers’ intentions rather than rewriting history. He argued that the right to establish and administer minority institutions (under Article 30) is contingent upon the community’s intent and control. Regarding Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), he noted its founding circumstances, highlighting that it was publicly funded and controlled by the colonial government, with minimal Muslim community oversight—pointing to a limited claim to minority status in its administration. He was the lone judge withing the minority to go ahead and declare that AMU is not a minority educational institution.

Justice Satish Chandra Sharma opined that for a minority community to claim administrative rights under Article 30, they must have “established” the institution, meaning they must have independently and predominantly created it without substantial outside control. The institution’s purpose should primarily serve the minority’s interests, and they should hold decisive administrative power. The term “establish” refers strictly to the act of creation, and cases should evaluate whether the minority community directly contributed to its foundation and operation, according to him. [Paragraph 266]

Understanding the reasoning

El Clásico between purposive and literal interpretation

The majority took the route of purposive interpretation of the Constitutional provision by examining the purpose of Article 30(1) and how the article underscores the imperative to enable minorities to maintain their distinctive characteristics and fulfil their specific needs. Out of the majority judgement’s discussion, a principle emerges— that the special right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution is that the state must grant the minority institution sufficient autonomy to enable it to protect the essentials of its minority character. [Paragraph 65] Using this, the Court also went on to devise the tests which look at the origins and purpose of the institution in question, to answer whether it is a minority institution or not. The majority judgement also stated that it is inconsequential whether the word ‘establish’ in Article 30(1) actually means ‘to bring into existence’ or ‘to found’ the real determination becomes possible only when the veil of the statute is lifted. [Paragraph 110]

Justice Dipankar Dutta’s minority opinion stresses on the literal phrase in Article 30(1) and states that the framers of the Constitution were aware of the circumstances of the times and yet, they used the word ‘establish’ instead of ‘found’ —a broader word. [Paragraph 134] Later he stated that even if the verb ‘establish’ could be read as ‘to found’ which he found no warrant to so read, the Muslim community’s leaving the administration of AMU to be worked out according to the AMU Act shows the clear lack of intention on part of the community to administer it. [Paragraph 133]

These are classic conflicts in terms of interpretation. While the purposive interpretation looks at the origins of the law and the purpose it sought to achieve, the literal interpretation gives importance to the intent and wisdom of those who framed the law since they understood the circumstances better and yet used the wording. While literal interpretation is used to let the law be a stable instrument for order, purposive interpretation enables law to be instrument in social change.

Justice Satish Chandra Sharma’s minority ppinion and loose threads

An interesting line of reasoning emerges from the minority opinion of Justice Satish Chandra Sharma. First, he states that there was no right under Article 30 in 1920 for it to have been surrendered to the government by the minority community via the enactment of AMU Act. Essentially, he stated that the Constitution bestows the right on minorities and before 1950, the right did not exist. This reasoning recognises constitution as a document that effectuates change-something similar to what  Justice Vivian Bose had said in Virendra Singh vs State of UP in 1955 that “The Constitution  by  reason of the authority derived  from and conferred  by the people of India destroyed all vestiges  of arbitrary and despotic power in the territories of India and over its citizens and lands and prohibited just such acts of arbitrary power as the State in the present case was seeking to  uphold.”  The chance at progressive interpretation however gets lost when the opinion says that since there was no right to establish institutions for minorities, there is no question of relinquishing the right. Additionally, he went on to say that limited minority aspects/elements cannot make an institution a ‘minority institution.’ [Paragraph 204]

Justice Satish Chandra Sharma stated in his minority opinion that the court cannot be swayed by one side of the story or the other. He referred to the competing narratives by both appellants—saying that the university was established by Muslim people for the benefit of Muslim community with the help of state sanction, and by respondents—saying that the establishment of the university was largely a government affair with minority elements. He states as follows in Paragraph 204:

“If in a given case, there may be other factual factors pointing towards the contrary, highlighting that whatever the intention or the will of the minority community might have been at the said time, in exchange or during negotiations, if the resultant institution was effectively rendered an open governmental institution [with limited minority aspects], then Article 30 would be out of the picture.”

We do not get to see in his opinion how or why this conclusion can be drawn from the elaborate discussion he did on the facts leading up to the establishment of the university or why a significant effort by the minority community can be trumped by the mere fact that university gets incorporated by a legislative act.

The majority judgement tackles this line of reasoning by saying that In Article 30(1) by saying that, there is no distinction between universities and colleges regarding minority rights. Both serve the common purpose of educating students, and minorities are entitled to autonomy in administering these institutions to benefit their communities. The term “establish” refers to the act of founding an institution and is distinct from “incorporation.” A person or community could establish a teaching college that later became a university, and the right to establish is not limited by legal incorporation under the Act.

The bench however left the determination of the minority status of AMU itself and directed that a smaller bench would apply the criteria as laid out by the seven-judge bench.

(The author is part of the research team of the organisation)


[1] 2024 INSC 856

[2] 1968 AIR 662

[3] Kidwai, S., 2020. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan: Reason, Religion and Nation. Routledge India.

[4] W.P. (C) 54-57 of 1981

[5] Writ Petition (civil)  317 of 1993

[6] 2005(4)ESC2489

[7] (2005) 2 SCC 673


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NCPCR suggests extending RTE to all minority institutions https://sabrangindia.in/ncpcr-suggests-extending-rte-all-minority-institutions/ Wed, 11 Aug 2021 12:23:17 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2021/08/11/ncpcr-suggests-extending-rte-all-minority-institutions/ As per a countrywide assessment done by the body, 62.5 percent of students in minority schools belong to non-minority communities

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MinoritiesImage Courtesy:news.careers360.com

In a study undertaken by the National Commission of Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) titled Impact of Exemption under Article 15 (5) with regards to Article 21A of the Constitution of India on Education of Minority Communities, the child rights body has recommended to the government to bring all minority schools under the ambit of Right to Education (RTE) Act, 2009 and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan campaign.

At present, the minority schools don’t fall under RTE and are exempted under Article 15 (5) that empowers the government to form any policy for the upliftment of socially backward class, thus forming the basis of affirmative action in private unaided schools in India. Hence, NCPCR carried out an assessment across all minority schools to understand the impact of this exemption on children and their education.

The report states, “The aim of the study was to find out ways to create a pathway to ensure that children in minority schools are able to study in an inclusive environment conducive to their development by receiving both modern & foundational education, as guaranteed by their fundamental rights, along with religious & cultural education.”

Statistics

According to the report, across all communities in minority schools, 62.5 percent of the student population belong to the non-minority community, while only 37.5 percent belong to the minority community. Muslim community schools (20.29 percent) have the lowest percentages of non-minority population among their minority schools. The Christian community schools, on the other hand, have 74.01 percent of the student population belonging to the non-Christian communities.

The report further reveals that the Sikh community contributes 9.78 percent to the total religious minority population and contributes a share of 1.54 percent to the religious minority schools. The Buddhist community schools have 75.12 percent of the student population belonging to non-Buddhist communities and the Parsi schools have 76.92 percent of the students belonging to non-Parsi communities.

RTE

Unfortunately, the study shows that there are approximately 1.1 crore Muslim children who are out of school, and the number of madrasas identified is approximately 6,000 only. Mere 4 percent of Muslim children attend Madrasas. Across all communities, 8.76 percent of the total student population belong to the disadvantaged sections. The report reads, “Since minority schools are outside the purview of the RTE Act, there is no compulsion to admit students from disadvantaged backgrounds”.

Tamil Nadu. Odisha, Dadra and Nagar Haveli have no percentage of disadvantaged minority students receiving benefits. Andhra Pradesh has the highest percentage (19.37 percent), followed by Bihar at 12.27 percent of disadvantaged students who have received benefits like minority scholarships, fee waivers, free ships on books and/or uniforms. In total, only 4 percent of students from disadvantaged and marginalised sections all across the country receive such backing and benefits.

Unrecognised institutions

The NCPCR report also highlights the importance of mapping all unrecognised institutions (Madrasas, Vedic Pathshalas, Gumpas), to identify out-of-school children as there are a large number of children who remain unidentified. The report states, “There are a large number of children attending Schools/ Institutions that are not recognised. Children also attend such institutions that are unrecognized as these are unmapped and the number of such institutions is not known. Therefore, whether these institutions provide quality education and the information on the environment these institutions provide to children also remains unknown. Children attending all such institutions (unrecognised and/or unmapped schools) are to be treated as Out of School, even if they provide regular education.”

The report reveals that there are three kinds of madrasas in the country – recognised madrasas which are registered and impart both religious as well as secular education; unrecognised madrasas which have been found deficient for registration by state governments as secular education is not imparted or other factors like lack of infrastructure; and unmapped madrasas which have never applied for registration.

As mentioned above, 4 percent (15.3 lakh) of Muslim children attend madrasas, but this only takes into account the registered madrasas. The report adds that the syllabi of madrasas, that have evolved over centuries, are not uniform, and that “being left ignorant of the world around them, many students develop an inferiority complex, being alienated from the rest of society and unable to adjust with the environment”. It also mentions that madrasas do not have any teachers training programmes.

The survey also talks about disproportionate numbers after drawing a comparison of the population of a religious community in a state to the number of minority status schools of that particular community, which indicates that the “minority status schools are not in proportion to the religious minority population in a particular State.” For instance, the report explains that in West Bengal, 92.47 percent of the minority population is that of Muslims and 2.47 percent are Christians, but there are 114 Christian minority schools in the state and only 2 schools with Muslim minority status.

Suggestions to the government

The Child Rights Body has recommended the government to extend the provisions of RTE to minority educational institutions or make a law with similar effect to ensure RTE of children studying in these minority educational institutions. They have also suggested a greater role of the Minority Cell in NCERT/ SCERTS in giving the fundamental right to elementary education to all children, especially children of minority communities.

In the report, they have also appealed for introspection by management of schools with minority status and religious institutions on their role and contribution. Most importantly, they have suggested the government to undertake mapping of all unrecognised institutions to identify out of school children.

The report also suggests that minority schools are catering to less than 8 percent of the minority children population, despite a large presence of minority students in school-going age groups. Hence, “there is a need to lay down specific guidelines regarding the minimum percentage of students from the minority community to be admitted to the institution”, says the report.

The entire report may be read here: 

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Minority Institutions: Rights or Privilege? https://sabrangindia.in/minority-institutions-rights-or-privilege/ Tue, 12 Jan 2016 10:50:32 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2016/01/12/minority-institutions-rights-or-privilege/ ‘AMU is not a Minority Institution,’ says the Modi government to the SC   Showing its true colours on issues related to minority rights, the Central government dominated by the supremacist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh(RSS) has opposed the minority status of the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU). In a complete turnaround from the earlier Central government, under […]

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‘AMU is not a Minority Institution,’ says the Modi government to the SC

 
Showing its true colours on issues related to minority rights, the Central government dominated by the supremacist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh(RSS) has opposed the minority status of the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU). In a complete turnaround from the earlier Central government, under UPA I and II, that had challenged a judgement of the Allahabad high court reversing AMU's minority status, the Modi government has withdrawn its name as one of the petitioners challenging the 2005 Allahabad high court verdict.[1] The Supreme Court had stayed implementation of the high court judgement in 2006.

Making the submission in the Supreme Court, attorney general, Mukul Rohatgi said, “It is the stand of the Union of India that AMU is not a minority university. As the executive Government at the Centre, we can’t be seen as setting up a minority institution in a secular state.” He was referring to the Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920 that was subsequently amended by Parliament twice in 1951 and 1981. The stand came as a surprise to the three member bench consisting of Justices JS Khehar, MY Eqbal and C Nagappan who pointed out that this stand of the Centre was contrary to what was filed previously by the Centre before this court and the Allahabad HC. Justice Eqbal asked, “With the change in Government, can you change your stand?” The Bench has asked Rohatgi to file an affidavit in this regard and posted the case for hearing next on April 4, 2016.

Communalism Combat has been analysing and tracking the issue of the minority status of the AMU for the past decade. We bring you some of our archival issues that trace the background of establishment of this institution as also the erosions in certain principles that require rectification.

Advocate Mihir Desai author of a book on the subject [2] analysed for us the grave fallacies in the verdict of the Allahabad high court. Faizan Musatafa, then registrar of the AMU too argued how the judgement was bad in law. CC brought to its readers a critical dimension to the issue when we investigated and found that communal reservations at Aligarh Muslim University have struck at the very character and repute of the institution. Noted scholar Asghar Ali Engineer argued that while the Aligarh Muslim University is, without doubt, a minority institution, it must allow reservations for Backward Caste Muslims.

We bring to our readers the various dimensions of the issue that has a crucial bearing on minority rights within a democracy.

Links to 2005 Communalism Combat issues archived here

  1.  The Case of the Aligarh Muslim University, 2005 : Alas, Your Lordships!
  2.  Minority Institutions: Rights or Privilege?
  3. Wong in Law 
  4. No to Communal Reservations
  5. Flawed Judgement

 


[1] Modi govt opposes minority character of AMU in Supreme Court, http://muslimmirror.com/eng/modi-govt-opposes-minority-character-of-amu/
[2] Minority educational institutions and law, 1996, Mihir Desai, Akshar Prakashan

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Flawed judgement https://sabrangindia.in/flawed-judgement/ Mon, 31 Oct 2005 18:30:00 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2005/10/31/flawed-judgement/   Aligarh Muslim University is, without doubt, a minority institution but it must allow reservations for Backward Caste Muslims alone The Allahabad High Court in order to quash the 50 per cent quota for Muslims had to declare Aligarh Muslim University itself a non-minority institution since the reservation quota was based on its being a […]

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Aligarh Muslim University is, without doubt, a minority institution but it must allow reservations for Backward Caste Muslims alone

The Allahabad High Court in order to quash the 50 per cent quota for Muslims had to declare Aligarh Muslim University itself a non-minority institution since the reservation quota was based on its being a minority institution. However, the hon’ble court has based its judgement on the Supreme Court judgement in the case of Azeez Basha vs Union of India. In this case, the hon’ble judges of the Supreme Court concluded that Muslims are one homogenous community and in contrast the Hindus are not. Thus, according to this logic, Muslims constitute a majority community and Hindus several minority communities. So if Muslims are a minority according to this strange logic, they cannot enjoy a minority status as stipulated in Article 30 of the Constitution.

 

As to the second question, whether Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had established Aligarh Muslim University, it concluded that MAO College was transformed into a university through an Act of Parliament, which was representative of the whole country. As such, the judgement arrived at the conclusion that the Muslims are neither a minority community nor did they establish AMU and hence it is not a minority institution under the Indian Constitution.

The Allahabad High Court based its judgement on the Supreme Court judgement and quashed the 50 per cent quota as unconstitutional. If such perverse logic is applied, no justice will ever be done.

Historically, Muslims have been recognised as a minority community and apart from this, Muslims are not a homogenous community at all. They too are divided into various sects and follow different doctrines and practices. They are also divided into caste systems and do not intermarry. Certain beliefs are common but this is also true among Hindus. The Supreme Court judgement in the above case has negated the age-old consensus among all leaders of the freedom struggle and all negotiations based on the assumption that Muslims are a minority community.

Technically, it is true that AMU was established according to a parliamentary Act and is financed by the Government of India. But one cannot deny the fact that MAO College was established by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, who raised the entire infrastructure, including buildings, and this college fulfilled the needs of North Indian Muslims for close to 35 years. Moreover, it was on the insistence of Muslims themselves that the British government transformed it into a university.

Later, the Indian Parliament also amended the Aligarh Muslim University Act in 1981 and recognised the university as a Muslim institution, and it continued to be recognised as a minority institution. If one quashes its minority character by using such logic that Muslims are a majority community and Hindus are in the minority then one begins to doubt whether the judges have applied their minds properly or have become victims of certain myths being propagated by certain interests.

Also, it is well known that Muslims are very backward and in fact slipping even below the Scheduled Castes in all economic and educational indices. One should try to help Muslims through positive action rather than take away even legitimate rights. It is true that there is a controversy about reservations on a religious basis. Should the entire Muslim community be treated as one and reservations be given to the community as a whole or should this be done on the basis of caste? 

Indian Muslims, most of whom were converted from low castes, retained their caste identities though untouchability was not as severe among them as among Hindus. Many Muslim leaders and activists belonging to lower castes are now struggling for the benefits of reservations on a caste basis. Today in UP, Bihar, Maharashtra and other states there is a Backward Caste movement asking for Mandal Commission benefits. They maintain, and rightly so, that until now the ashraf (upper caste Muslims like Syeds, Shaikhs, Pathans etc.) have pocketed all the benefits in the name of Muslims and that this cannot be allowed perpetually.

Should reservations in various professional courses granted by the AMU executive committee and confirmed by the human resources ministry be given to Muslims as a whole or to Backward Caste Muslims only? This is the real question. It is true that Backward Caste Muslims have been left high and dry while all the benefits have gone to a small section of upper caste Muslims. Democracy and implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations has brought new awareness among these poor and OBC Muslims to fight for their rights.

The real debate should not be whether reservations ought to be given or not but about which sections of Muslims this benefit should reach. The Left, which has always been sympathetic towards the plight of the Muslim minority, should not ask for the scrapping of religion-based reservations in toto but should use its influence to get benefits for OBC Muslims.

It is true that an overwhelming majority of Muslims in India today belong to the OBC and Dalit categories. There are hardly 10 per cent of Muslims who belong to the ashraf categories…

Thus, in my opinion, the reservations granted in professional courses (at AMU) should be retained and their benefit be given to OBC Muslims… Like the lower caste among Hindus these lower caste Muslims have also suffered intensely. In this way, communal forces will also not be able to exploit these reservations for Muslims politically

Archived from Communalism Combat, November 2005 Year 12    No.112 -Cover Story 4

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Minority institutions https://sabrangindia.in/minority-institutions/ Mon, 31 Oct 2005 18:30:00 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2005/10/31/minority-institutions/   Rights or privilege? The recent Allahabad High Court judgement ruling that Aligarh Muslim University is not a minority institution has sparked a nationwide controversy The recent decision of the Allahabad High court effectively holding that the Aligarh Muslim University cannot claim minority status compounds the confusion created by the Supreme Court over the last 50 […]

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Rights or privilege?

The recent Allahabad High Court judgement ruling that Aligarh Muslim University is not a minority institution has sparked a nationwide controversy

The recent decision of the Allahabad High court effectively holding that the Aligarh Muslim University cannot claim minority status compounds the confusion created by the Supreme Court over the last 50 years in matters pertaining to rights of minority educational institutions.

But before we look at the Allahabad judgement and some of the other decisions of the Supreme Court it is necessary to contextualise the rights of minorities.

The yardstick for measuring the intrinsic strength of a secular democracy is how secure the minorities feel within the nation. No doubt, democracy is ultimately supposed to be the rule of the majority but at the same time there have to be inbuilt safeguards to ensure that a rule of the majority does not become tyranny by the majority. It is in this context that the rights of minorities acquire crucial significance.

Justice Jackson of the US Supreme Court rightly pointed out in the West Virginia State Board of Education case: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein".

Democracy is the rule of equality where all persons are treated as equal whether they belong to the majority or minority. It has been argued that the fact that the minorities are being treated as equals, and that too through a fundamental right, should satisfy and protect them. Where then is the need for special safeguards or separate fundamental rights? But as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of St Stephen’s College vs University of Delhi (1992): "The minorities do not stand to gain much from the General Bill of Rights or Fundamental Rights which are available only to individuals. The minorities require positive safeguards to preserve their minority interests which are also termed as group rights".

Similarly, in the St Xavier’s College case judgement of 1974, Justice Khanna observed: "The idea of giving some special rights to the minorities is not to have a kind of privileged or pampered section of the population but to give the minorities a sense of security and a feeling of confidence".

It has been internationally recognised that minorities need not just equal treatment but also special protection. It has been assumed, and rightly so, that the majority can look after and take care of itself in respect of protection of language, religion or culture.

In all functioning secular democracies, individuals and groups have the right to practice and propagate religion as a basic right. A secular state necessarily means the absence of any state religion. But this is a very restrictive definition. Secularism also means that the state shall protect those who do not follow the majority religion. It is thus crucial that sufficient protective measures exist for the religious minority groups to protect their religion.

There is a major difference between the Backward Castes and linguistic and religious minorities. The only way in which the Backward Castes can get out of their oppression in the long run is through a casteless society i.e. if they lose their caste status. The Backward Castes will benefit and in the ultimate analysis be rid of their oppression if they lose their caste identity and in that sense merge with the so-called mainstream. For the linguistic and religious minorities the issue is different. They want to retain their identity as separate linguistic or religious groups. As very rightly said, Jews do not want to be Catholics, Gujaratis do not want to be Maharashtrians and Muslims do not want to be Hindus. Looked at from this point of view, the stress laid time and again by the Supreme Court that all educational institutions should be melting pots for all communities is wide off the mark.

The Constituent Assembly recognised that religious and linguistic minorities have to be protected by allowing them to establish and administer educational institutions for conserving their script, language or religion and giving them adequate facilities so that they are not hampered in this. It is in this context that Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution have to be viewed.

The test of whether an educational institution is actually a minority institution or not should be whether it in fact protects or promotes a minority script, religion, language or culture. But over the last 50 years the Supreme Court has consistently negated this argument

"29(1) Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same.

"30(1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.

"(2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it was under the management of minority, whether based on religion or language."

It is very clear from Articles 29 and 30 and also from the discussion above that the purpose of granting protection to minority educational institutions is to ensure that the minorities, religious or linguistic, are able to protect their script, language, religion or culture. Thus, the test of whether an educational institution is actually a minority institution or not should be whether it in fact protects or promotes a minority script, religion, language or culture. But over the last 50 years the Supreme Court has consistently negated this argument.

The Supreme Court has throughout held that the only test to determine the minority status of an educational institution is whether it is established and administered by a minority and not whether it is running for the benefit of the minority. To put it simply, if five Maharashtrians get together and start a Marathi medium school in Mumbai it will not be treated as a minority institution. But if five Gujaratis get together and start a Marathi medium school in Mumbai it will be treated as a minority school. For example, in Mumbai there are colleges run by Sindhis which do not give preference to Sindhi students, do not necessarily prefer Sindhi teachers, do not offer Sindhi as even an optional subject but are granted minority status.

Because of this skewed interpretation by the Supreme Court, the only reason why most of the institutions claim minority status is to get certain benefits for the management and not for the script, language or culture of the minority that they represent. There are, broadly, three benefits available to a minority institution that are not available to other institutions:

(a) Minority educational institutions do not have to maintain reservation in employment or admissions for SCs, STs and OBCs as required to be done by other educational institutions.


While on the one hand, genuine minority institutions do not get adequate protection under Article 30, on the other hand fake minority institutions enjoy these rights and privileges. What is needed is a comprehensive overhaul of the Article 30 jurisprudence developed by the Supreme Court over the last 50 years 

(b) In terms of control over employees, minority educational institutions have much greater powers than other institutions. For instance, in the selection of teachers and principals the minority educational institution can have a selection committee which does not include the university representative. Similarly, while in ordinary schools the headmasters normally have to be appointed on the basis of seniority, minority managements can select a headmaster of their choice.

(c) In matters of admission of students, minority educational institutions can have reservation of up to 50 per cent for students of their community.

Unfortunately, it has been observed that most of the managements seek minority status only to avoid reservation for Backward Castes and for victimising employees.

It is in this context that Aligarh Muslim University seems to have been ‘done in’ by a curious interpretation of the Constitution first by the Supreme Court and now by the Allahabad High Court.

The case of Azeez Basha vs Union of India (AIR 1968 SC 663) was decided by a constitutional bench of the Supreme Court in 1967. The question was whether certain amendments to the Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920 affected the Muslim minority’s rights under Article 30(1). The court held that though the university came into existence because of the demands from the Muslim minority community and due to their efforts, it was in fact ‘established’ by a central legislation and hence could not be said to be ‘established’ by a minority.

This is and was an amazing decision. Having accepted and held that it was as a result of the efforts and aspirations of Muslims that the university was established, for the Supreme Court to turn around and hold that it was not a minority institution merely because it was formally brought into existence by an enactment is to make a mockery of minority rights. As the constitutional expert HM Seervai rightly pointed out, any university has two distinguishing features: firstly, it is incorporated by a sovereign and secondly, it is empowered to give its own degrees which are recognised by the sovereign. The only manner in which a community could establish such a university was by invoking the exercise of the sovereign power, which might take the form of either a Charter or an Act of the legislature. This, the Muslim community that had set up the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental (MAO) College, did. They brought the university into existence in the only manner in which such a university could have been brought into existence, namely, by invoking the exercise by the sovereign authority of the legislative power.

It was the Muslim community that had provided the lands, money and other necessaries for founding the university and in that sense ‘founded’ the university. By the logic of the Supreme Court, though a university is an educational institution it can never ever get the character of a minority educational institution.

The same error has been committed by the Allahabad High Court in its October 2005 judgement in the case of Dr. Naresh Agarwal vs Union of India where certain amendments to the Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920 were challenged. After the decision in the case of Azeez Basha, the Act was amended to incorporate specific provisions in the Act which categorically pointed to the fact that the university was established by Muslims. A further amendment stated that one of the objects for establishing the university was to ‘promote especially the educational and cultural advancement of the Muslims in India’. On the basis of this, a reservation for Muslim students in admissions was provided. This was challenged by some non-Muslim candidates.

It was argued that in view of the amendments of 1981 the basis of the Supreme Court decision in the Azeez Basha case had been removed and so Aligarh Muslim University could at least now be termed a minority educational institution. However, following the logic of the Supreme Court, the Allahabad High Court rejected this contention and effectively held that no university could ever be a minority institution.

In keeping with the past record of the courts, the decision is not at all surprising. While on the one hand, genuine minority institutions do not get adequate protection under Article 30, on the other hand fake minority institutions, which have been mushrooming only for the managements to derive personal benefits without having any impact on community rights, enjoy these rights and privileges.

What is needed is a comprehensive overhaul of the Article 30 jurisprudence developed by the Supreme Court over the last 50 years, which in my opinion has been totally wrong and not in consonance with the spirit of the Constitution. Minority status needs to be given only to those educational institutions which promote or protect the script, language, culture or religion of a minority grouping and the protection given to these institutions needs to be only to the extent that such protection furthers these goals. We cannot allow either the Backward Castes or employees to be sacrificed on the altar of such protection.

Archived from Communalism Combat, November 2005 Year 12  No.112, Cover Story 1
 

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Wrong in law https://sabrangindia.in/wrong-law/ Mon, 31 Oct 2005 18:30:00 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2005/10/31/wrong-law/ Aligarh Muslim University challenges the Allahabad High Court decision   Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) has minutely studied the judgement of the learned Allahabad High Court judge, Justice Arun Tandan dated October 4, 2005 and found it technically flawed, legally unsound and constitutionally untenable. The university, after consulting its lawyers, has challenged the judgement on the […]

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Aligarh Muslim University challenges the Allahabad High Court decision
 

Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) has minutely studied the judgement of the learned Allahabad High Court judge, Justice Arun Tandan dated October 4, 2005 and found it technically flawed, legally unsound and constitutionally untenable. The university, after consulting its lawyers, has challenged the judgement on the following grounds:
 

  • The finding of the learned judge that Article 30 of the Indian Constitution gives rights only to natural citizens and not to body corporates such as universities incorporated or juristic entities, which means that these entities cannot claim fundamental rights that are guaranteed by the Constitution for citizens alone. Aligarh Muslim University was established by an Act of Parliament and not by the Muslims of India and therefore is not a minority institution within the meaning of Article 30. It is for the first time in India’s judicial history that such a narrow interpretation has been applied to Article 30. As per this interpretation, there is no minority institution in the country that is entitled to protection under Article 30. The Supreme Court of India in a series of cases has held that Article 30 is to be liberally interpreted, as unlike the other fundamental rights it has not been subjected to any restriction within the text of the Article. Every minority institution is run by a society that is registered under the Societies Registration Act and therefore every minority institution is necessarily a juristic entity.  

  • It is a well established precedent that the legislature has the power to overturn a decision of the courts. It can remove the very basis on which the decision was based. It can also legislate retrospectively and nullify a decision that pre-dates legislative intervention. The legislative power of Parliament to enact a law on a given subject includes the power to re-enact, repeal, amend or change a statute within the appropriate category. The learned judge has endorsed the aforesaid rule yet fails to apply the same to the facts and circumstances of the case. In 1981, the Indian Parliament in its wisdom amended the Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920 and removed the basis on which the Supreme Court of India rendered its decision in the Azeez Basha vs The Union of India case in 1967. (In the Azeez Basha case, the Supreme Court held that AMU was established by a statute i.e. the 1920 Act as passed by the central legislature, and not by Muslims. Before 1920 and the legislation that gave AMU the status of a university, AMU was the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental (MAO) College.) The only question required to be considered by the hon’ble single judge concerned the legislative competence of Parliament to enact the amending Act of 1981 whereby Parliament removed the ambiguity and cured the defects as noticed in the Azeez Basha judgement.  

  •  On a reading of the complete Aligarh Muslim University Act of 1920 (as amended by the Aligarh Muslim University Amendment Act of 1981), it is clear that the purpose of the Act was to simply accept and assert the status of AMU as a minority institution while also giving it the status of a university. The enactment of an Act by the legislature thus merely changed the form and not the substance of MAO College.  

  • The legislative power of Parliament can also be invoked to fulfil fundamental rights or give effect to such rights. It was in the exercise of this power that Parliament passed the Act of 1981 so as to remove doubts about Aligarh Muslim University’s minority character from the minds of the Muslim community. The Act of 1981 specifically stated that Aligarh Muslim University was established by the Muslims of India and not by Parliament. Even the hon’ble Supreme Court recognised in the Azeez Basha judgement that if AMU was established by the Muslim minority, then the ‘minority would certainly have the right to administer it’. The judgement of the learned single judge is clearly erroneous as it completely overlooks this aspect of the Azeez Basha verdict. With the passage of the amendment Act of 1981, and the explicit words used therein, it is now acknowledged that Aligarh Muslim University was established by Muslims of India and in the light of the Azeez Basha judgement, the Muslim minority community has been awarded the right to administer it within the meaning of Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution. The Union of India in its February 25, 2005 letter also accepted that Aligarh Muslim University was established by Muslims of India and is being administered by them as per Article 30 of the Indian Constitution.  

  • The October judgement is completely silent on Section 5(2)(c) of the Act of 1981, which empowers the university to especially promote the educational and cultural advancement of the Muslims of India. A non-minority institution can never be given such a mandate by Parliament.  

  •  The distinction drawn by the learned judge between ‘University’ and ‘Deemed-to-be University’ is also erroneous. To say that a ‘Deemed-to-be University’ can be a minority institution and a ‘University’ cannot is unconstitutional and moreover, runs contrary to a decision by an 11-member bench of the Supreme Court of India.

(Faizun Mustafa is the registrar, Aligarh Muslim University.)

Archived from Communalism Combat, November 2005 Year 12 No.112,  Cover Story 2

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No to communal reservations https://sabrangindia.in/no-communal-reservations/ Mon, 31 Oct 2005 18:30:00 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2005/10/31/no-communal-reservations/ Aligarh Muslim University, 1946 Communal reservations at Aligarh Muslim University have struck at the very character and repute of the institution   Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) was a fairly small university when independence came. With the AMU (Amendment) Act, 1951, the Government of India took up the entire responsibility for its maintenance and provided it […]

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Aligarh Muslim University, 1946

Communal reservations at Aligarh Muslim University have struck at the very character and repute of the institution
 

Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) was a fairly small university when independence came. With the AMU (Amendment) Act, 1951, the Government of India took up the entire responsibility for its maintenance and provided it with a largely democratic and autonomous structure. The result of these steps was the beginning of a phase of expansion of the university with central government funds (afterwards routed through the University Grants Commission). The Chatterji Committee appointed to review the working of the university (1960) commended the Act of 1951 and agreed that a policy of admissions, where some preference may be given to internal students, should continue. The Act of 1951 forbade in its Article 8 the admission of students through any "test of religious belief" and the question of reservation for Muslims was not raised by anyone.

Unfortunately, a sudden enhancement of the internal quota to 75 per cent in 1963 and its proposed reduction in 1965 created a violent incident in the latter year. The Government of India took the opportunity to practically scuttle the Act of 1951 through an ordinance and in effect took over control of the university’s administration by its nominees. This action had the most disastrous consequences. As against government control, the issue of AMU’s autonomy as a minority institution was raised for the first time by many critics of the government’s ham-handed act. It was only after seven years that in 1972 certain amendments were made to restore some internal authority to AMU, but there yet remained in it far too many undemocratic provisions, reminiscent of the 1965 ordinance…

Finally, in 1981 Indira Gandhi’s government brought forth amendments to show that they were trying to underline the minority character of AMU… But that these provisions were intended to have no effect on the policy of admissions was shown by the reformulation, by the same amendment Act, of Section 8, in the following words: "The university shall be open to all persons (including the teachers and taught) of either sex and of whatever race, religion, creed or class". The only proviso to this was permission to provide religious instruction to "those who have consented to receive it". There is no proviso for any kind of denominational reservation…

The whole question was reopened by the BJP government in 2003-04. In his effort to bring admissions to all professional courses in the country under his control, Murli Manohar Joshi, the then human resource development (HRD) minister, sanctioned a 50 per cent Muslim quota for the Jamia Hamdard (a "Deemed University"), and as the AMU vice chancellor has confirmed, offered the same to AMU. It is not surprising that the VC of AMU has been citing the Hamdard Deemed University’s quota system as a precedent for AMU, although Hamdard is an institution managed by a private trust while AMU is administered according to a parliamentary Act and, being maintained by the government, is ‘part of the state’ in the eyes of the law…

The new admission policy, which reverses a tradition established since AMU’s foundation, stipulates that at the maximum only 25 per cent of the seats in the main professional and technical courses (medicine, engineering, management, etc.) would now be absolutely open to merit. A further 20 per cent will be reserved for internal students. For ‘Muslims of India’ who fail to enter AMU through these two channels, a 50 per cent quota would be provided. Finally, there will be a five per cent discretionary quota for admitting children of employees, alumni, government servants, SC/ST candidates, etc. In medicine, the percentages are 25 per cent general, 25 per cent internal and 50 per cent for Muslim candidates not getting through under the first two categories. There is thus to be practically no SC/ST quota at any level…

What the university authorities and the HRD ministry have entirely failed to recognise is the blow they have struck at the character and repute of AMU. The letter from the MHRD to allied parties quotes from the speech of late CPI leader Indrajit Gupta where he rightly said that a university does not become communal if it has a majority of Muslims – which for AMU has always been the case. But if a religious test is imposed – which Indrajit Gupta never contemplated, and which Section 8, as redrafted by the very Amendment Act of 1981, entirely bans – it can no longer be said that the admissions to AMU are not communally oriented…

Far from addressing this very important issue, the university authorities have, in order to justify their new admission policy, publicly run down the quality of education imparted at AMU both in its schools and in its university classes (Admission Review Committee’s Report, pp. 2-3)…

A university is an intellectual community. Until now it was the proud boast of AMU that once a student is admitted here there would be no discrimination between him and others on any sectarian grounds. Neither the university authorities nor the MHRD seem willing to consider the very disturbing fact that now on the AMU campus there would be two sets of students – one set disadvantaged by its religion, and having only half the chance than the other of getting admitted to a higher course. One cannot predict the tensions that such discrimination could breed on the campus.

Archived from Communalism Combat, November 2005  Year 12. No.112,  Cover Story 3

 

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