The support for this Bill from Hindutva forces is hardly surprising, given their well-documented hostility toward minorities. However, what is deeply unsettling is the complicity of several so-called secular parties. Their endorsement of the Bill exposes the emptiness of their professed commitment to minority rights and pluralism. Their secular rhetoric now stands exposed as little more than a deceptive smokescreen, carefully crafted to mask their communal politics.

With the passage of this Bill, the Muslim community is compelled to reassess its long-standing political trust in these so-called secular parties. It is now imperative for them to distinguish between genuine allies and those who betray them under the guise of friendship.

The Waqf Amendment Bill serves multiple objectives, none of which align with principles of justice or fairness. First, the Bill creates an avenue for widespread encroachment and plunder, effectively making it easier for government agencies and private entities to seize Waqf properties. Second, it significantly weakens the Waqf Tribunal, transferring excessive power into the hands of bureaucrats—an alarming violation of fundamental jurisprudential principles. Most shockingly, the government, which is itself a party to numerous disputes over Waqf land, has now positioned itself as the adjudicator in these very conflicts. This blatant conflict of interest constitutes a grave miscarriage of justice.

Third, the Bill may impose majoritarian supremacy. It sends an unambiguous message to the Muslim community: either submit to the will of the majority or risk further marginalization. Fourth, the Bill threatens to erode constitutional protections granted to minorities. It signals a broader trend—the gradual dismantling of constitutional safeguards for minority rights, including protections related to cultural identity and personal laws.

The judiciary, instead of acting as an independent arbiter and guardian of the Constitution, has increasingly succumbed to executive pressures. Rather than upholding constitutional principles, it has become a silent spectator—if not an outright enabler—of majoritarianism. The Babri Masjid-Ram Temple verdict stands as a glaring example of this judicial capitulation.

Fifth, the Bill may serve as a warning to all marginalized social groups. Its passage can be interpreted not merely as an assault on Muslims but as a broader threat to all minorities and weaker sections of society. It signals that their rights and properties are no longer as secure as they once were and may be seized under various pretexts to serve majoritarian agendas and profit-driven motives.

The Sachar Committee Report, commissioned by the Prime Minister, had provided crucial recommendations on how Waqf properties could be better managed for the welfare of the poor and marginalized. It emphasized that reclaiming encroached Waqf properties and improving their administration could generate substantial funds to support socio-economic upliftment. The report advocated for technological advancements, expert oversight, and even the establishment of a specialized UPSC cadre to manage Waqf assets. Yet, rather than implementing these progressive measures, the government has chosen a path that appears to facilitate the plundering of Waqf properties—going so far as to appoint non-Muslim members to oversee assets donated by believing Muslims for charitable purposes.

This betrayal by so-called secular parties has left the minority community in shock and despair. Since the Nehru era, Waqf properties have been systematically looted, but now this plunder appears to have been granted legal sanction. Other minority and marginalized communities must take heed—every common property could become a potential target for exploitation.

In these trying times, patience, wisdom, and strategic action are essential. Rash decisions driven by emotion will only deepen the crisis. Rather than allowing ourselves to be divided over petty issues, we must prioritize broader unity with other oppressed sections of society. This crucial moment also serves as a litmus test for genuine secular forces—where do they stand in this critical hour?

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar repeatedly warned that democracy cannot survive without safeguarding the rights of minorities—whether religious, caste-based, or Adivasi. Today, one can only imagine how Babasaheb, the chief architect of the Indian Constitution, would react to this assault on the very principles he enshrined. As someone born into the majority community, I hang my head in shame at this brazen display of majoritarianism.

But the bigger question remains: Will India continue down the path of majoritarian dominance, or will it reclaim its constitutional commitment to justice and equality? The future will depend on our actions. Remember, rights are not granted as charity—they are won through struggle. Similarly, the weakening of movements led by marginalized communities threatens to undo their hard-earned gains. Political processes are dynamic, and to prevent further setbacks, we must act now—peacefully and democratically.

(Dr. Abhay Kumar holds a PhD in Modern History from the Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. His forthcoming book explores Muslim Personal Law. Email: debatingissues@gmail.com)

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

The post The Waqf Amendment Bill: A majoritarian assault on minority rights appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Context

The Uttarakhand High Court has issued a 6–week notice to the State government and the Centre to file their responses to the petitions challenging the provisions of the Uttarakhand Uniform Civil Code (UCC). Further, in a move to provide temporary relief, the Uttarakhand High Court has asked the affected individuals to approach the court in cases of penal actions, as reported by LiveLaw.

On January 27, 2025, Uttarakhand became the first Indian state to implement a Uniform Civil Code (UCC). However, the law has come under the scrutiny of the Uttarakhand High Court as a result of various writ petitions filed challenging multiple provisions of the UCC. The law makes it mandatory for individuals in live–in relationships to register their relationship with the registrar within whose jurisdiction they reside. Further, the law deliberately targets the minority communities, such as Muslims, and prescribes procedures to be followed in religious matters which is completely contrary to the holy Quran.

For a more comprehensive understanding of the provisions challenged in the impugned UCC, the article published by CJP may be referred to.

Challenges to provisions governing live–in relationships

The mandatory registration of live–in relationships and the penal provisions for non–compliance of the same have been challenged before the High Court. The petitioners have contended that these provisions are against the Fundamental Right to privacy protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. While addressing these contentions, Solicitor General (SG) Tushar Mehta appearing for the Government mentioned that “Experience has shown that having lived in live–in relationships without any commitment – which results from marriage only – generally, the man deserts the woman, leaving her destitute and leaving the children born out of such relationships illegitimate.” He further argued that the law aims to regulate live–in relationships, not prohibit the same while stating that “On such a registration, the child born out of such a live–in relationship is considered under the UCC to be a legitimate child, and the deserted woman is given a right to approach the competent court seeking maintenance for herself and her child,” as reported by the Times of India.

While hearing the batch of petitions, Chief Justice of the Uttarakhand High Court G Narendar questioned as to what the problem is with regulating live–in relationships while orally remarking that “There is also a fallout of this. What happens if this relationship breaks up? What if there is a child out of this relationship? In respect of marriage, there is a presumption regarding paternity but in a live-in relationship, where is that presumption? In the garb of invasion of your privacy, can the self-respect of another person be sacrificed, that too when he is your child and there is no proof of marriage… or paternity,” as reported by the Indian Express.

This debate underscores the necessity of striking a balance between the fundamental right to privacy and protecting the rights of children born out of live–in relationships and providing recognition to them.

Targeting minorities

The law has come under heavy criticism for particularly targeting religious minority communities, such as Muslims. The petitioners have contended that the UCC significantly impacts the Muslim community as it prescribes procedures to be followed which are completely against the principles laid down in the Quran. The petitioners argued that “We have pleaded before the court that the law prescribed in the Quran and its verses is an essential religious practice for every Muslim. UCC prescribes the procedure for religious matters which is absolutely contrary to the verses of the Quran. We have pleaded that to remain a Muslim, a person has to follow the Quran and its Verses.” The petitioners have further stated that “following the verses of the Quran is a mandatory practice for a Muslim and by making a civil law, the state government cannot direct a Muslim person to do anything which is contrary to the verses of Quran,” as reported by the Hindustan Times.

The petitioners cited that by banning the mandatory practice of Iddat that is followed by a divorced Muslim woman, the UCC violates the religious practice of Muslims. The petitioners have further contended that these provisions of the impugned law violate Article 25 of the Constitution of India which protects the freedom of practice and profession of religion. It has also been argued by the petitioners that the UCC is violative of the Preamble of the Indian Constitution as the liberty of expression, belief, faith and worship have been guaranteed under the Preamble.

It should be noted here that while the basis for the Uttarakhand UCC is Article 44 (Uniform civil code for the citizens), which is only a directive principle and not binding and non–justiciable in nature, Articles 25 (Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion), 26 (Freedom to manage religious affairs) and 29 (Protection of interests of minorities) which guarantee freedom of religion have been blatantly ignored. The petitioners have contended that the impugned law strikes at the fundamental principle of Secularism that has been provided in the Constitution of India

The petition also stresses that the impugned law is not Uniform as it excludes the Scheduled Tribes from its purview. The petitioners have argued that the UCC creates “an arbitrary and artificial discrimination, impermissible in law, amongst citizens by not applying it to the Scheduled Tribes” and that such UCC “is not a Uniform Civil Code as directed under Article 44 of the Constitution of India, hence, deserves to be declared void.”

Restrictions on marriage

The list of “prohibited relationships” provided in the UCC has also been challenged by the Petitioners on the grounds that not only do the impugned provisions hinder the Muslims’ right to marry but also declares such marriage void and criminalizes the same. The petitioners have argued that the impugned legislation is “discriminatory in nature since it takes away the customs and usage of the Muslim community by providing for restrictions to marry in ‘degrees of prohibited relationship’ as defined in the UCC.” The petitioners further contended that such restrictions do not exist in the Muslim community and that marriage among relatives is permitted as per the Muslim law.

Conclusion

In conclusion, significant constitutional debates have been sparked by the Uttarakhand High Court’s assessment of the state’s proposed Uniform Civil Code (UCC). Privacy, religious freedom, and equal protection under the law are among the issues raised by the forced registration of live-in relationships, the purported targeting of religious minorities, and limitations on marital customs. The problem is further complicated by the Scheduled Tribes’ exclusion and the possibility of the UCC’s extraterritorial application. The High Court’s decision will be a turning point in determining how to strike a balance between individual laws, cultural autonomy, and the movement for a uniform civil framework, since Uttarakhand’s transition to a UCC is unprecedented in India.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this legal resource has been worked on by Yukta Adha)

Related:

The Uniform Civil Code (UCC) of Uttarakhand: Advancement in gender justice or violating individual liberties?

Destroying the basic standards of legislation- the Uttarakhand Model of UCC

Uttarakhand’s UCC seen through a Muslim women’s political perspective

The post Petitions against Uttarakhand UCC draw attention to Constitutional issues regarding personal autonomy and minority rights appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Context of the judgment: Balancing secularism and minority rights

The case revolved around the balance between the State’s interest in promoting secular education and the rights of religious minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The relevant provisions include:

• Articles 14, 15, and 16: Guaranteeing equality before the law and prohibiting discrimination based on religion.
• Articles 25 to 30: Addressing religious freedom and the rights of minorities.
  • Article 28: Prohibiting religious instruction in state-funded institutions.
  • Article 30: Protecting the right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions.
• Article 21-A: Guaranteeing the right to free and compulsory education for children aged 6 to 14.
• The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act): Implementing Article 21-A but specifically excluding Madarsas.
• The Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004 (Madarsa Act): Establishing a board to regulate Madarsa education including teacher qualification, building strength etc.

The case also considered the legislative powers of the State and Parliament, specifically:

• Article 246: Distributing legislative powers between the Union and States.
• Entry 25 of List III (Concurrent List): Empowering both Parliament and State legislatures to make laws on education.
• Entry 66 of List I (Union List): Granting Parliament exclusive power to legislate on coordinating and determining standards in higher education.
• The University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (UGC Act): Enacted by Parliament under Entry 66, regulating higher education and conferring degrees.

Facts of the case

The Madarsa Act, enacted in 2004, established the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education to regulate Madarsas in the state. This included prescribing curricula, conducting examinations, and setting standards for teachers and infrastructure. The Act was challenged before the Allahabad High Court in several writ petitions. One petitioner, an advocate, argued that the Act violated the principle of secularism by regulating religious instruction. He also challenged Section 1(5) of the RTE Act, which exempts Madarsas from its purview. The essence of these challenges was that if State is funding the Madarasas, then they ought not to have religious instruction; they ought to have a diverse board governing the UP Board of Madarsa Education—which instead has religious leaders—according to the petitioners to the HC. After the High Court declared the whole act to be unconstitutional and asked the state government to accommodate the children studying in Madarsas in state government schools, an appeal was in to the Supreme Court.

Arguments presented in challenge of the Act:

• Argued that the Madarsa Act, by regulating institutions that impart religious instruction, violated secularism, particularly Article 28.
• Contended that the Act deprived Madarsa students of a holistic, secular education and equal opportunities.
• Highlighted the overrepresentation of members focused on religious instruction on the Board.
• Raised concerns about the inadequacy of teacher qualifications under the Act.
• Argued that the Act encroached on Parliament’s exclusive power to regulate higher education under Entry 66 of List I, as it sought to regulate Fazil and Kamil (Higher education) degrees.

In Defence of the Act:

• Argued that the Act was a regulatory measure aimed at improving the quality of education in Madarsas, which included both religious and secular subjects.
• Emphasized the State’s positive obligation to ensure quality education for minorities under Articles 29 and 30.
• Contended that regulating Madarsas fell within the State’s legislative competence under Entry 25 of List III.
• Pointed out that the RTE Act specifically excludes Madarsas, implying no conflict with Article 21-A.

High Court’s judgement and reasoning

The Allahabad High Court declared the entire Madarsa Act unconstitutional, holding that it violated secularism and Articles 14, 21, and 21-A. The Court reasoned that the Act’s object of regulating institutions imparting “religious instruction and teachings” was inherently contrary to secularism. It also found the Act ultra vires Section 22 of the UGC Act, which restricts the power to confer degrees. The Court directed the State to accommodate Madarsa students in regular schools, effectively leading to the closure of Madarsas.

Supreme Court’s reasoning

The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s judgment, finding the Madarsa Act largely constitutional. The court noted that while the Equality code of Articles 14,15, 16 forms one facet of Secularism, Articles 29 & 30 form the other facet of Secularism. This formed the essence of the judgment. The Court’s reasoning centred on the following points:

• Secularism as a positive concept: The Court emphasized that secularism in the Indian context involves not just the separation of religion and state but also the State’s positive obligation to ensure equal opportunities for all religions. Regulating Madarsa education to improve its quality was viewed as furthering substantive equality for the minority community.
• Distinction between religious instruction and education: The Court differentiated between religious instruction, which focuses on specific tenets and rituals, and religious education, which provides broader knowledge about religions. It held that the Madarsa Act aimed to regulate education in Madarsas, which included both religious and secular subjects.
• Article 30 and State regulation: The Court recognized the right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions under Article 30 but also acknowledged the State’s interest in maintaining educational standards in these institutions. It held that the Madarsa Act’s regulatory provisions, relating to curriculum, teacher qualifications, and infrastructure, were reasonable measures to ensure quality education without infringing on the minority’s right to administration.
• Legislative competence: The Court affirmed the State legislature’s competence to enact the Madarsa Act under Entry 25 of List III. It rejected the argument that regulating institutions imparting religious instruction fell outside the scope of “education.” However, the Court found those provisions regulating Fazil and Kamil(higher education) degrees unconstitutional, as they conflicted with the UGC Act—which enables regulation of higher education degrees by the UGC— enacted by Parliament under the exclusive power of Entry 66 of List I.
• Severability: The Court applied the doctrine of severability to uphold the majority of the Madarsa Act. It held that the provisions regulating Fazil and Kamil degrees could be severed from the rest of the Act, which remained valid and enforceable.

On basic structure and it being the basis of a challenge

In Anjum Kadari, the Supreme Court clarified that laws cannot be invalidated solely for violating the “basic structure” doctrine, which limits Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution. Laws can only be struck down if they breach specific constitutional provisions or exceed legislative competence.

The Court highlighted that abstract concept like secularism or democracy, while part of the basic structure, are undefined and open to interpretation. Invalidating laws based on such broad principles could undermine legislative authority. It noted that even in cases like Madras Bar Association vs Union of India [(2014) 10 SCC 1 [109], the violation had to link to concrete constitutional provisions.

For example, to challenge a law based on secularism, a petitioner must show how it violates specific provisions like Articles 14, 15, or 25-30. In this case, the Court examined the Madarsa Act under Articles 28 and 30, rejecting the High Court’s view that it inherently violated secularism.

On Right to Education under Article 21A

The Supreme Court in Anjum Kadari addressed the apparent conflict between the Madarsa Act and Article 21A, which guarantees the right to free and compulsory education for children aged 6 to 14. The key point is that the RTE Act, which implements Article 21A, specifically exempts Madarsas from its purview (Section 1(5) of the RTE Act)1. This exemption itself implies that the legislature recognized the potential tension between the universal right to education and the specific rights of minorities under Article 302.

The Supreme Court in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust vs Union of India [(2014) 8 SCC 1] had previously held that applying the RTE Act to minority institutions, including Madarsas, could undermine their minority character and violate Article 302. Therefore, the Court in Anjum Kadari did not find the Madarsa Act’s regulation of Madarsas to be in conflict with Article 21A, as the RTE Act itself carves out an exception for such institutions.

Despite the parts related to higher education degrees in Madarsas, this judgement forms a positive part of the jurisprudence relating to minority rights in the country.

(Case Note: Anjum Kadari vs. Union of India)

 (The author is a legal researcher with the organisation)

[1] 2024 INSC 831

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Unshackling Education: High Court Unravels Madrasa Order in Jammu and Kashmir

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The post Upholding the Madarsa Education Act as constitutional, the SC however restricted the Board’s right to confer degrees appeared first on SabrangIndia.

On March 31, the Gujarat State Assembly passed the Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education (Amendment) Bill, 2021 making the appointment of teaching faculty and principal of minority educational institutions a centralised process. State government records suggest that there are 397 secondary and higher secondary schools run by religious and linguistic minority organisations in Gujarat. Further classification indicates that there are 300 religious minority including 173 Muslim, 89 Christian, 10 Parsi, 25 Jain, 2 Jew and 1 Sikh schools. Further, there are 97 linguistic minority schools including Hindi (71), Sindhi (13), Marathi (10), Tamil (1), Urdu (1) and Malayalam (1).

The Catholic Church of Gujarat and Father Teles Fernandes, secretary of Gujarat Education Board of Catholic Institutions have challenged this amendment before the Gujarat High Court while contending that they are losing their autonomy in staff recruitment completely. The division bench of Chief Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Biren Vaishnav issued notice to the state government on June 22 and has sought a response within 3 weeks.

The State’s Education Minister Bhupendrasinh Chudasama spelled out the statement of objects and reasons while introducing the bill and cited Supreme Court’s judgement in TMA Pai Foundation & Ors vs. State of Karnataka & Ors 2002 to justify the amendment while stating that academic standard cannot be lowered in any manner.

“Regulations can be framed governing service conditions for teaching and other staff of minority educational institutions where the aid is provided by the State without interfering with overall administrative control of management over the staff,” said Chudasama.

The amendment

A bare reading of just the amendment Act will not give a complete picture of how this has affected the minority educational institutions and in what way. The amendment substitutes Section 40A as follows:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, sub-section 1 of section 34, and clause (b) of sub-section 1 and sub-sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of section 36 shall not apply to any educational institutions established by a minority, whether based on religion or language”

Section 40A prior to the amendment as per the latest bill read as follows:

“Nothing contained in clause 26 of section 17, sections 34 and 35, and clause b of sub-section 1 and sub-sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of section 36 shall apply to any educational institutions established and administered by a minority, whether based on religion or language”

Once read with the sections referred herein from the Act, the intentions of the state legislature become amply clear. The amendment effectively makes clause 26 of section 17 as well as the rest of the sub-sections of section 34, and the entirety of section 35 applicable to minority institutions.

Section 17 of the Act spells out powers and duties of the Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Board and clause (26) which has now been made applicable to minority institutions empowers the Board to lay down qualifications, methods of selection and conditions of appointment, promotion and termination of employment and rules for conduct and discipline of the headmaster and the teaching and nonteaching staff of all secondary and higher secondary schools.

Prior to the amendment, the whole of section 34 was inapplicable to minority institutions but after the amendment, only sub-section 1 was made inapplicable while sub-section 2 has been now applied to minority institutions. Sub-section 1 mandates that schools must have 15% vacancy in teaching staff for persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Sub-section 2 of section 34 allows the Board to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service including conduct and discipline of persons appointed as headmaster, teachers and members of non-teaching staff of all schools including minority-run schools of secondary and higher secondary level.

Prior to the amendment, section 35 was not at all applicable to minority-run schools but the amendment has completely reversed the situation. This means that the minority-run schools will need to appoint selection committees; one for recruiting the teaching staff and a Special Committee for appointing the headmaster. The staff selection committee shall be constituted by two representatives from the school management, the headmaster of the school, one representative of the Board and two teachers (if total teachers are more than 6) else, one teacher.

The Special Committee shall comprise two representatives of the school management and two representatives of the Board. Any appointment made in contravention to these provisions shall be ineffective.

After having read the amendment into the context of the Act and the previous section which existed before the amendment, it has become clear that the appointment of teachers and headmaster of minority-run schools is no longer autonomous to those schools as was the case earlier. Representatives of the Education Board will now be a part of this process and will get involved in the selection process. Moreover, due to application of sub-section 2 of section 34, the Board is empowered to regulate the conduct and discipline of headmaster, teachers and members of non-teaching staff thus appointed.

The amendment, thus, mandates minority institutions to follow a centralised recruitment policy of the state government.

Challenged in court

The Catholic Church of Gujarat, Father Teles Fernandes, secretary of Gujarat Education Board of Catholic Institutions have challenged this amendment before the Gujarat High Court while contending that they are losing their autonomy in staff recruitment completely. Earlier they were required to acquire a No Objection Certificate from the state government for the recruitments. After the amendment, the recruitment process has been practically taken over by the state government. The posts will be advertised by the state government, a merit list will be prepared based on the qualifications and appointments will be made.

Father Vinayak Jadhav, spokesperson of Catholic Church of Gujarat, told the Indian Express, “The right of disciplinary action against any erring staff has been taken away. These were the rights given to minority institutions under minority rights enshrined under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India, which is to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. With this notification, the human right ensured to the minority, goes for a toss.”

Minority rights

The Article 30 of Indian Constitution provides minorities with the right to establish and administer educational institutions. While the word “minorities” has not been defined in the Constitution, it is a relative term used to refer to the smaller of the two numbers, sections or group called “majority”. Minority group just means a non-dominant group. The minority referred to in this Gujarat amendment is linguistic and religious minority.

Article 30 of the Constitution reads as follows:

(1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice

(1A) In making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property of an educational institution established and administered by a minority, referred to in clause ( 1 ), the State shall ensure that the amount fixed by or determined under such law for the acquisition of such property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that clause

(2) The state shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language

Article 30 confers two rights: right to establish the institution and right to administer it. The latter refers to management of affairs of the institution. In Md. Joynal Abedin v. West Bengal AIR 1990 Cal 193 the Calcutta High Court held that the management of affairs must be free of external control so that the founders or their nominees can manage the institution as they think fit in accordance with their ideas of how best the interest of the community in general and the institution in particular will be served.

In State of Kerala, Etc. v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial, Etc. [(1971) 1 SCR 734] held that an exception to the right under Article 30 was the power with the state to regulate education, educational standards and allied matters and that the minority institutions could not be allowed to fall below the standards of excellence expected of educational institutions or under guise of the exclusive right of management, allowed to decline to follow general pattern.

In TMA Pai Foundation & Ors vs. State of Karnataka & Ors 2002 (8) SCC 481, which has been cited by Education Minister Chudasama, the 11-judge bench of the apex court has held that unaided minority educational institutions have the right to administer albeit not an absolute one and the state could still impose regulations for ensuring educational standards. In All Saints High School v. Andhra Pradesh AIR 1980 SC 1042, the Supreme Court held “standard” of education to not be a part of “management”.  

In St. Xavier’s College v. state of Gujarat AIR 1974 SC 1389, the apex court had held that the regulation made by the state government cannot go to the length of annihilating the right guaranteed by Article 30 (1) and that the said regulation must be related to the interests if the institution as an educational institution and not merely in the interests of general public.

In Virendra Nath v. Delhi (1990) 2 SCC 307, the apex court held that while Article 30(1) is subject to the regulatory power of the State, the minority cannot be deprived of actual management of the institution due to such regulation.

However, the point of violation of rights under Article 30 (1) arises in cases of unaided minority institutions as reiterated by the Supreme Court in Sk. Md. Rafique v. Contai Rahamania High Madrasah (Civil Appeal No.5808 of 2017; decided on January 6, 2020). The Court held that Government-aided minority-run educational institutions do not have an absolute right to appoint teachers while upholding the validity of the West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008, that set up a commission to appoint teachers in government-aided madrasas in the state.

Thus, the new amendment to the the Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Act imposed on minority run institutions is evidently a violation of minority rights under the Constitution.

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The post Is the new amendment to Gujarat’s education law violating minority rights? appeared first on SabrangIndia.