On September 8, this year, we were just shocked to read the news emanating from Kerala. In the night of 7th September, two young activists of a radical Salafist outfit demolished the tomb of Sufi Sayyed Muhammed Turab of Nadukani, a remote village in the Malappuram district in Kerala. Now we have learnt that Anees, one of the two Salafi shrine-destroyers, has been arrested by the Kerala Police, while the other violence perpetrator, Shajahan is to be arrested soon, according to the Malayalam media outlet, Dool News It reports that these two young extremists are the active members of Mujahid Global, one of the Salafi outfits in Kerala. Tragically, the same Sufi tomb has faced three attempts of demolition by the very Salafist outfit throughout the year.

Times of India reports that the 37-year-old Aneesh the accused in connection with the demolition of the Swalih Makham Shareef Jaram is sympathizer of Mujahid Wisdom (Jinn) group, as the inspector of Edakkara police circle, P Abdul Basheer has stated. The centuries old jaram (tomb) of Muhammed Swalih situated on Vazhikkadavu-Gudallur state highway near the Tamil Nadu border was targeted three times on September 7, 19 and 29 by a section of Mujahids. It triggered a war of words between the Sunnis (Sufi followers) and Mujahids (Salafis). The same tomb had also been attacked in April 2009 by those following the Mujahid ideology. But no Muslim media outlet or the so-called Islamic political party in Kerala viewed it as a matter of concern. Therefore, it is about time Islam is discerned from the false Islamic schools of thought which are trying to further the ulterior foreign motives in India. Only moderate Muslims in India can win this war within Islam. At the moment, we must concern ourselves with the rise of overt religious fanaticism in Kerala.

Though the issue has attracted the national attention, it also raises a crucial question to the Keralite Muslim society: Why the Keralite Salafist activists systematically target the Sufi shrines, while they seem ‘peaceniks’ loudly talking about Islam as ‘religion of peace’? But when it comes to show peace and toleration within Islam itself, they find no room for other schools of thought! Literally, there is no diametric difference between the ISIS onslaught on tombs of the Prophet’s companions and the demolition of the Sufi tomb by the Salafis at Nadukani in Kerala. Worst of all, the deafening silence by the ‘popular’ Muslim fronts, Islamic media outlets and political parties particularly those formed in the name of Islam and Muslims in Kerala is appalling. This situation should have forced the Keralite Muslims to think of who they are and where their state is headed to. But execrably, the larger section of the community is still in denial.

Undeniably, the political Islamist outfits in Kerala pledging an allegiance to Ikhwan-ul-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) are antithetical to the south Indian history of Islamic pluralism. Islam emerged in India through two different groups— Muslim traders and Arab invaders. In sharp contrast to the other parts of India, Kerala witnessed Islam’s advent through completely peaceful means—trade and travel. While north India’s ‘first encounter’ with the Muslims through the Arab invaders has not gone down well in history, Kerala had the bliss of mystical Islam in the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) through his direct companions (Sahabis). As evidenced in historical records, Islam blossomed in south India with the Prophet’s noble companions reaching the coastal areas of Malabar for their trade.

But over the past few years Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological project has been massively funded and supported in south India’s Salafist circles particularly in Kerala and the Malabar coastline. This has systematically been pursued in a bid to indoctrinate the Keralite Muslims into the theocracy of the two political Islamist ideologues: (1) Syed Qutub, the Egyptian theologian and the leading member of the Ikhwan who conceptualised other insurgent Islamist outfits in Egypt and (2) Maulana Maudoodi whose writings politicized the Islamic doctrines and practices to an extent that he viewed every spiritual belief and act of Islam with a political outlook.

Hasan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 in Egypt. But it actually gained ideological momentum with the theoretical framework of Syed Qutub who propounded the doctrine of ‘Hakimiyyah’ (God’s sovereignty on earth). For instance, in his commentary on the Qur’an, ‘Fi Dilalil Qur’an (In the Shade of the Qur’an), he misinterpreted the 44th verse of Surah al-Maida to buttress his own argument that every modern, liberal and democratic form of governance is “infidelity”.

Such an exclusivist interpretation which turned Islam from being a faith of spiritual salvation into a religion of political dominion has created chaos in West Asia. But deplorably for Indian Muslims, it appears to be at play in India too—more so in south India now.

It was during the early 19th century when Kerala first witnessed the self-styled Islamist doctrine of Hakimiyah with the establishment of an Islamist outfit, ‘Muslim Aikya Sangham’ by Vakkam Abdul Qadar, popularly known as Maulvi Vakkom.

Maulvi Vakkom championed the pan-Islamism for the Muslims of Travancore, Cochin and Malabar regions. He was instrumental in creating an ‘Islamist renaissance’ in Kerala through the Arabic and Malayalam literature like The Muslim (1906), Al-Islam (1918) and Deepika (1931). Through these publications, he tried to preach the ‘puritanical’ Salafi Islam purging the Keralite Muslims of the local festivals like the Nerchas and Urus. For instance, Malik Deenar Urus was one of the major local festivals for the Keralite Muslims who celebrated Malik’s advent in South India. It was a mix of various socio-cultural rites such as the shrine visitation (ziyarat) flag hosting (pataka uyarthal) and Annadanam (Malabari tradition offering of food). But the Salafist proselytes have now deviated from the pluralistic postulates reflecting an ancient Muslim heritage in Kerala.

The advent of Islam in Kerala is attributed to the early Sufi saints—Tabi‘in—who reached the coastal areas of Malabar. Hazrat Malik bin Dinar, a mystically-inclined companion (Sahabi or Tabi’i) of the Prophet was the earliest Muslim preacher in South India. One of the first mosques in Kerala is known as Malik Dinar Masjid, which is located in Kasaragod with an adjacent graveyard and is embellished with the grave-stones known as Mizan-stones. This historic mosque built in the typical Keralaite architectural style is believed to have been established by Malik Ibn Deenar himself. According to a historical account, Malik and his trade associates landed in Kerala in 624 AD and erected the mosque in 642 A.D. (13th Rajab, 22 Hijrah). 

Remarkably, this foremost Muslim in Kerala greatly inspired the noted mystics of Islam in Arabia like Hasan al-Basri and Rabia al-Adawiya. In fact, he coined the Sufi term of ‘jihad bin-Nafs’—inner jihad against one’s baser instincts— in contrast to the offensive jihad. He also showed wide embrace for all faith traditions in India. Imbued with the spiritual ideals of Jesus Christ (pbuh), Malik bin Dinar memorized various chapters and commentaries of the Bible along with the Qur’an. Thus, he was an epitome of the peaceful coexistence with the Christians and other faith-based communities in the Indian subcontinent.

Now, let’s discern between Malik bin Dinar’s Islam which meted out a magnanimous treatment to the Christians and the self-styled Islamists chopping off a Christian professor’s hand in Kerala’s Idukki. Thus, ironically, the Salafist preachers of Islam in Kerala are catapulting the Keralite Islam from inclusivism to the brutal religious exclusivism. There is a continued wave of radicalisation in Kerala and the Malabar region, thanks to the extremist outfits which camouflage political Islam in the name of ‘fight for Muslim rights’.

The Kerala-based political Islamist outfit Popular Front of India (PFI) is a substantial case in point. PFI cannot be understood without grasping this broader ideological dynamic. It claims to be an NGO, but pledges an allegiance to the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan-ul-Muslimin). It has also alleged links with terror activities like chopping of a Christian professor’s hand in Kerala’s Idukki and running the ‘Islamic State Al-Hindi Module’. A case was busted in which PFI planned to target prominent people and places in South India by involving the outfit Islamic State Al-Hindi, as the NIA report on government table revealed.
(Source indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/nia-report-on-popular-front-of-indias-terror-links-on-government-table-4839296/

What we have learnt, so far, from various media outlets, is that PFI may soon be banned by the union government. A dossier of the Ministry of Home Affairs has claimed that the PFI is indulging in actions detrimental to the overall national security of India. Investigators have accused PFI of pursuing secret agenda inspired by radical Islam in India. But the question is: will merely banning the radical Islamist outfits serve the purpose? Has the government’s crackdown on the radical Salafist preacher, Zakir Naik and his outfit Islamic Research Foundation (IRF) brought any tangible developments on counter-extremism?

Merely mulling the crackdown on the radical institutions is pointless. India would do better if it strengthens the spiritual Muslim centres like Khanqahs and Sufi shrines situated in South India as quality education centres in order to rescue the young and impressionable Muslim minds from going astray.

Today, there are two major groups of Keralite Muslims diametrically different in thought and action: Sunni Muslims and Mujahid Muslims. While the Keralite Sunni Muslims are believed to be pluralistic, peaceful, and Sufi-oriented shrine-visitors, the ‘Mujahid Muslims’ in Kerala constitute the ‘puritanical’ Salafis often indulged in communal and sectarian clashes. Recently, they razed the tomb of a Sunni spiritual leader Muhammad Swalih at Vazhikkadavu on the Nilambur-Otty road on September 6. A piece of paper scuffled inside a bottle was recovered from the vicinity. The words written on it in Malayalam were: “I am going to the Arabian Sea”. In their protests, the Sunni-Sufi leaders came down heavily on the Salafis. K P Jamal Karulayi, district leader of the Sunni Yuvajana Sangham said: “Wahhabism should be thrown into the Arabian sea”.

Ghulam Rasool Dehlvi is a regular columnist with www.newageislam.com,  scholar of classical Arabic and Islamic Sciences, cultural analyst and researcher in Media and Communication Studies at Centre for Culture, Media & Governance, Jamia Millia Islamia.
 

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Kargil has quite naturally dominated the Indian media’s attention ever since intruders from Pakistan were discovered on its glaciated peaks. Every aspect of the situation has been analysed form every possible angle by experts from every discipline. But I have yet not come across any mention of the impact of the event on the minds of the Muslims in Ladakh, in Kashmir and Jammu, on Buddhist–Muslim relations in Kargil, and Muslim–Hindu relations in the other two regions which have important implications for the future of the state.

While writing in the present context, many experts have re–examined the lessons of earlier experiences of Indo–Pak wars, from diplomatic, strategic and other angles, viz., terms of cease fire agreements, territories gained or lost. But again, no one has made any mention of the relationship between external involvement and the local mood of the people, and the impact of war on them.

The present tilt of international opinion against Pakistan is being variously explained as the achievement of able diplomacy of the BJP government, realisation on the part of America of the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, which has become powerful in Pakistan, or the importance that India has acquired as a market and an investment avenue.

These explanations may be true to some extent. But the fact that is being completely ignored is that international opinion is also influenced by the merit of a case. The package is important but not more than the material it covers. Every nation watches its national interest but that concern must also include its influence and image among the rest of the nations.

That India did not get much international support against Pakistan during the decade–long insurgency in Kashmir was due to the fact that, inter alia, people of the Valley, rightly or wrongly, supported it. Kashmiri youth used to cross the LoC and get arms and training and return as militants for the cause of ‘Azadi’. The ruthless manner in which the insurgency was sought to be suppressed in the initial phase invited universal ondemnation.

In contrast, today it is essentially an operation of the Pakistan army with the support of specially recruited and specially indoctrinated Mujahids in an area where there is no freedom movement. Of course, India’s restraint in dealing with the situation has also paid diplomatic dividends. 

But why did Pakistan change its position as a champion of the rights of Kashmiris to that of an aggressor? The BJP blames the Congress Party for defeating its government, which tempted Pakistan to exploit the consequent political instability in the country. The Congress blames the naivete and gullibility of the Prime Minister who was mesmerised into complacency due to the euphoria created by his bus diplomacy.
More objective experts offer a number of strategic theories for the gamble that Pakistan played in Kargil, viz., it wanted to do a Siachen on India, or to open an alternative route of infiltration to the Kashmir valley.

In short, all debate on Kargil that dominates the national agenda is based on the presumption that the entire conflict between India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is based on the title over real estate. This approach errs in ignoring the fact that Pakistan’s behaviour is influenced by the political mood of the people and that it has political motives also. In other words, it means a ref usal to accept the vital fact thatpeople of the state also matter. 

If the way the situation was developing or drifting within the state in the recent period was watched  carefully, any observer could not have missed the writing on its political wall regarding what has happened in Kargil.
A further confirmation would have been available if turmoil across the LoC, too, had been noticed. For understanding Kargil, an understanding of the wider ethno-cultural milieu of which it is a part is necessary. But that requires much more rigorous homework which is beyond our tribe of Kashmir experts.

Let me recount some of the evidence that gave an indication of the shape of things to come. Pakistan was under a compulsion to convert the Kashmiri movement for Azadi into a Muslim movement for Pakistan.
For, Kashmiri nationalism was a double–edged weapon. India used it against Pakistan from 1947 to 1953 and from 1975 to the mid–eighties. The ideological gap between the Kashmir movement and Pakistan could be a political threat to the latter. Thus Pakistan wriggled out of its commitment to the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, the pioneer of militancy in Kashmir, for Azadi. Pakistan gradually reduced and then withdrew all support to it. Instead, it sponsored pro–Pakistan and Islamic fundamentalist groups of militants. The leadership of its  verground political wing, under the banner of All Parties Hurriyat Conference, too, shifted accordingly.

Meanwhile the J and K chief minister, Farooq Abdullah, shifted his allegiance from the Left–supported United Front to the BJP and issued a certificate of patriotism to the RSS. The effective political choice for the people of Kashmir was thus confined to a pro–RSS face of India and a pro-Pakistan Jamaat–led Hurriyat Conference. But to close their options, Jammu and Ladakh needed to be communalised. Hence the Muslim pockets within them became a target of the militants.

Their task was facilitated by the communal polarisation of Jammu between the National Conference and BJP, and of Ladakh between the former and the Ladakh Buddhist Association. The voting in the parliamentary election of 1998 was a neat reflection of this polarisation. It suited the National Conference rulers if the perennial regional discontent in Jammu and Ladakh was divided along communal lines.
Thus as a reaction to some voices for separate statehood of Jammu and Union Territory status for Ladakh, the National Conference started a campaign for separation of Muslim majority parts from their respective regions. In April 1999, the state government formally proposed re–demarcation of these regions on communal basis, of course for public discussion.

By this time, fresh initiatives came from America–based think tanks for the solution of the Kashmir problem on the basis of traditional official American thinking that the problem must be resolved “accordingly to the wishes of the people, Hindus, Muslims and Buddhists”. This simplistic thinking completely ignores the ethnic identities and their aspirations. 

Reflecting the same thinking, the US–based and influential Kashmir Study Group recommended that “the state be reconstituted through an internationally supervised ascertainment of the wishes of the people on either side of the Line of Control”. This portion be constituted “as a sovereign entity (but without an international personality)”. Two Indian representatives who had participated in the meeting which made
this recommendation later clarified that it meant the reconstituted state should be within Indian sovereignty. But obviously they did not object to reconstitution.

Pakistan came nearer to this position when its foreign minister proposed a district–wise plebiscite to determine the future of the state; thus limiting its claim to, besides the Kashmir Valley, to the Muslim majority districts of Rajouri, Poonch and Doda in Jammu region and the district of Kargil in Ladakh. After extending militant activity to the former area, Kargil appeared to be its natural target. It may merely have been more encouraged by internal developments and external proposals on the subject.

The Pakistan government had not properly taken into account the lack of response of the Muslims of Kargil, the formidable military challenge of the Indian armed forces and hostile international reaction to its action. But India’s decisive victory would depend on how far it can meet the political fall–out of Kargil. Can it help Kargil to feel a secure and proud part of a secular Ladakhi identity, which requires restoration of traditional friendly and cordial relations between Buddhists and Muslims? Can a part of the solidarity and sympathy that the whole nation is expressing for valiant soldiers and their families be extended to the patriotic people of Kargil and about 30,000 homeless, famished refugees?

Again, how would India meet the international pressure, which would turn on it after Kargil crisis is over, to solve the Kashmir problem with some semblance of popular satisfaction? Can India satisfy the urge for identity, democracy and good administration of the people of Kashmir and help them to have friendly relations with peoples of the other two regions of the state?

There are some lessons of Kargil for the nation as a whole, too. While it has generated sentiments of patriotism, sacrifice and fellow feeling, a few reactions exceed legitimate limits of patriotism and, in fact, undermine its moral and psychological basis. The government ban on PTV is, for instance, a reflection on the patriotism of an average citizen which is supposed to be so fragile that it cannot stand a hostile propaganda. If Pakistan can continue its confrontation with India in Kargil, and if India has fought earlier four wars without a ban on the foreign media, why should the present government presume that Indians have become less mature now.

What makes the ban silly is the fact that it is totally unimple-mentable in Kashmir and on the entire Indo–Pak border. Moreover, PTV’s non–news programmes, particularly its plays, are very popular in many parts of India. Why should even the entertainment offered by PTV be banned? Another display of misplaced patriotism is the plea by veteran cricketer Kapil Dev to snap all sports relations with Pakistan. It is true that Indo–Pak matches often arouse jingoist sentiments in both countries and, on this ground, a case could be made to suspend them till tempers cool down. But to argue a sort of sport boycott of Pakistan for its action in Kargil is a case of over–reaction. Does Kapil suspect that every sportsman and sportswoman or sports lover in Pakistan is involved in sponsoring intrusion in Kargil and is an enemy of India? In the past persons belonging to the fields of sports, culture, literature and music have in the worst of times, been messengers of peace and friendship
between the two neighbours. We have to draw a distinction between the people of Pakistan and their rulers. Among the former there has always been an India- friendly constituency which, in our own interest, we
should not let down.

There are some voices demanding of some eminent Muslims that they prove their patriotism, or advocating a ‘final solution’ to the centuries–old aggression upon India from Mohammad Bin Kasim to Mian Nawaz
(Bal Thackerey and the RSS weekly, Panchajanya, respectively. These are too absurd to be discussed; but if such views gather more support, that would pose a greater threat to the existence of a united and civil
India than the military, political, ideological and diplomatic threat ever posed by Pakistan.

Archived from Communalism Combat, July 1999, Year 6  No. 51, Cover Story 1

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