• Why did I use the term Islamist instead of Islamic?

My Response: The term Islamic is a broad, neutral adjective that refers to anything related to Islam—its religion, culture, civilization, and traditions. It applies to concepts like Islamic art (art influenced by Islamic culture) and Islamic law (Sharia, the ethical and legal framework derived from Islamic principles). This term does not carry any inherent political meaning.

Islamist, on the other hand, is a more specific term with political connotations. It refers to individuals, movements, or ideologies that seek to implement Islamic principles in governance and society, often advocating for a political order based on their interpretation of Islam. While some Islamists pursue their goals through democratic means, others adopt more radical or militant approaches. Importantly, Islamist does not equate to Islamic—not all Muslims are Islamists, and Islamism represents a distinct political ideology rather than the religion itself.

The choice of Islamist in my article was deliberate. It accurately reflects the political dimension of the subject being discussed, distinguishing it from the broader religious or cultural aspects of Islam. Precision in terminology is essential, especially when addressing political ideologies or movements within the Islamic world.

• Another criticism levelled at my work is that it merely presents others’ viewpoints without a clear, cohesive argument.

My Response: This critique misinterprets the article’s purpose. Far from lacking direction, my work deliberately highlights the diversity of perspectives on secularism and Islam—concepts that are inherently contested and open to multiple interpretations. The absence of a rigid, singular definition is not a flaw but a reflection of the discourse itself.

Contrary to the claim that my argument is unclear, I explicitly advocate for secularism as religious neutrality and Sarva Dharma Samabhava—equal respect for all religions. This framework stands in direct opposition to theocratic visions promoted by Islamist groups, which reject pluralism in favour of a monolithic religious order.

Rather than weakening my case, the inclusion of diverse perspectives strengthens it. By engaging with a spectrum of viewpoints, I demonstrate the complexity of the debate while reinforcing secularism as the most viable model for a pluralistic society like India. My article is not a passive compilation of opinions but a structured, purposeful defence of secularism—one that gains depth, not dilution, from the multiplicity of voices it engages.

• What we now call secular values—human rights, equality, compassion, and justice—are deeply rooted in religious morality. Modern secular societies did not emerge in isolation; rather, they evolved from centuries of religious teachings that laid the groundwork for these principles. Paradoxical as it may seem, secular values originate from religion itself, making secularism an inherent part of religious traditions rather than a departure from them.

My Response: I do agree. Secularism is not inherently anti-religious but can align with religious values by promoting neutrality, freedom, and equality. It ensures the state doesn’t favour any religion, protecting religious diversity and allowing all faiths to coexist peacefully. This aligns with religious principles like freedom of conscience (e.g., “no compulsion in religion” in Islam) and treating others with respect (e.g., “love thy neighbour” in Christianity). Secularism also fosters collaboration on shared goals like social justice, reflecting religious values of compassion and service. By separating religion from state power, it prevents extremism and respects moral autonomy, allowing individuals to practice their faith freely. In essence, secularism supports religious values by creating a fair, inclusive society where diverse beliefs thrive.

• The term “Islamism” originated in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Initially, it was used in European languages as a neutral synonym for Islam, much like “Christianism” for Christianity. Early Western writers, including Voltaire and Encyclopædia Britannica (first edition, 1771), used “Islamism” simply to refer to the religion of Islam.

My Response: Islamism and Islam are used interchangeably. Most Islamophobes adopts this method. This approach is wrong. This is equal to equating of Hindutva with Hinduism and Zionism with Judaism.

• Islam itself is however already an “-ism” – given this, why did European languages create “Islamism” instead of just using “Islam”?

My Response: The term “Islamism” was indeed coined in European languages to create a clear distinction between Islam as a religion and the political movements or ideologies that seek to implement Islamic principles in governance and society. While “Islam” refers to the faith, spirituality, and practices of Muslims, “Islamism” specifically denotes political ideologies that advocate for the implementation of Islamic law (Sharia) and the establishment of Islamic-based political systems. This distinction emerged in the late 20th century as a way to analyse the political dimensions of Islam separately from its spiritual and theological aspects, providing clarity in discussions about religion versus ideology.

However, the distinction between Islam and Islamism is not always clear-cut, and the term “Islamism” itself has been subject to debate. It can oversimplify the diversity of political movements within the Muslim world and may be used to stigmatize legitimate political expressions of Islamic identity.

The interpretation of Islamic values is a topic of ongoing debate, particularly between Islamists and those who prioritize Quranic values. Islamists often focus on implementing Sharia law, emphasizing legalistic interpretations over broader ethical values. In contrast, the Quran highlights values such as justice, mercy, compassion, and human dignity. One of the fundamental principles of the Quran is freedom of religion, as stated in verse 2:256, “There is no compulsion in religion.” However, some Islamist movements have been accused of imposing religious practices, undermining this principle.

The Quran also promotes fraternity and equality, envisioning the ummah (global Muslim community) as a brotherhood of equals. Nevertheless, some Islamist regimes have faced criticism for fostering sectarianism and discrimination. Individual self-determinism is another key value in the Quran, emphasizing personal responsibility and individual accountability. In contrast, Islamist ideologies often prioritize collective identity over individual freedoms. The Quran is clear in its advocacy for justice, fairness, and human rights, including those of women and minorities. However, some Islamist policies have been criticized for being discriminatory or unjust, particularly toward women and religious minorities. In addition, the Quran encourages coexistence and dialogue among diverse groups, promoting pluralism and diversity. Unfortunately, some Islamist movements reject pluralism, seeking to establish homogeneous Islamic states. The Quran promotes peace and reconciliation, yet some Islamist groups have been linked to violent extremism, contradicting these principles.

Finally, the Quran advocates for economic justice, prohibiting usury and mandating charity (zakat). While Islamist attempts to implement Islamic economic systems have had mixed success in achieving justice, the importance of economic fairness remains a core Islamic value.

• The term “Islamist” has developed a pejorative connotation, especially in modern political discourse. While Islamic governance has existed for centuries—without the need for a distinct label—”Islamism” emerged in Western discourse to specifically refer to political movements advocating for governance based on Islamic principles, with an implicit tone of disapproval.

My Response: You are right. The term “Islamist” has become a focal point in the broader issue of Islamophobia, reflecting and reinforcing deeply ingrained biases in Western discourse. Historically, the West’s engagement with the Islamic world—from colonialism to the Cold War and the post-9/11 era—has shaped a narrative that associates Islam with backwardness, violence, and authoritarianism. This narrative has been perpetuated through the pejorative use of “Islamist,” which is often applied indiscriminately to a wide range of Islamic political movements, from moderate reformers to extremist groups. By conflating these diverse movements under a single, stigmatized label, the term contributes to a perception that Islam itself is inherently incompatible with democracy or modernity. This framing not only delegitimizes legitimate political expressions of Islam but also fuels Islamophobia by portraying Muslims as a monolithic group prone to extremism. The lack of equivalent terms for religiously motivated movements in other faiths, such as “Christian democracy” or “Hindu nationalism,” underscores the double standard at play, further entrenching stereotypes and fostering fear and mistrust of Muslim communities.

• Your article is about “Why Quranic Principles Advocate Secular Democracy Over Theocracy” is not about “making a compelling case for secularism as the best model for a pluralistic society like India.” India is not even mentioned in the article and rightly so because what has India to do with Why Quranic Principles Advocate Secular Democracy Over Theocracy? You seem to have lost track of what the article is about.

My Response: My critique presents a theoretical and theological challenge to the imposition of Sharia within political Islam, examining its far-reaching implications for societal structures, governance frameworks, and individual liberties. At its core, my argument questions whether enforcing Sharia as state law aligns with fundamental principles of legal pluralism, human rights, and the separation of religion and state.

A critical analysis reveals that such enforcement poses significant risks, including marginalizing non-Muslim communities and silencing dissenting voices within Muslim societies. It also risks clashing with universal human rights standards, particularly in areas such as gender equality, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression.

From a theological perspective, my critique emphasizes that Sharia is not a monolithic entity, but rather a complex and dynamic system subject to diverse interpretations shaped by historical, cultural, and contextual factors. Rigid enforcement of Sharia within modern political systems disregards its inherent adaptability, distorting its original principles and fostering authoritarianism—where religious elites consolidate power, stifling intellectual and social progress.

Politically, my critique contests the exploitation of Sharia as a means of consolidating power and exerting control over populations, thereby exacerbating societal fractures and eroding social cohesion. A comprehensive review of historical precedents and comparative analyses demonstrates that imposing religious law often leads to the suppression of dissenting voices and the erosion of individual liberties.

Ultimately, my critique calls for a critical reassessment of Sharia’s role in modern governance. It advocates a framework that safeguards legal pluralism, human rights, and the separation of religion and state—fostering a more inclusive, tolerant, and equitable society.

• The (Iranian) regime is not corrupt; it is principled. It has prioritized principles over political compromises. It faces sanctions because it supports Palestine—ironically, as a Shia state, it is the only one backing Sunni Palestine. The suffering of its citizens is primarily due to sanctions and military spending for national defence. Iran remains the only Muslim state capable of standing up to the U.S. in conventional warfare, making it the last bastion that the U.S. and Israel seek to bring down.

My Response: While Iran adheres to a distinct ideological framework, its governance is driven by both principled and pragmatic considerations, with internal power struggles and instances of corruption undermining the system’s integrity. The significant economic influence wielded by the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and political elites has raised allegations of nepotism and financial malfeasance. Moreover, prioritizing principles over pragmatic political compromises is not inherently virtuous if it results in widespread hardship for citizens.

A balanced approach is essential—one that upholds fundamental principles while carefully considering their impact on human welfare. Iran’s troubling human rights record, as seen in the case of Mahsa Amini, highlights the urgent need for such scrutiny.

While sanctions and military expenditures contribute significantly to economic difficulties, internal economic mismanagement and political repression also play substantial roles. Many Iranians hold their government accountable for economic struggles, citing corruption, lack of transparency, and crackdowns on dissent. The government’s resource allocation, such as funding regional militias versus domestic welfare initiatives, is a contentious issue debated among Iranians themselves. Rather than being merely a victim of external pressures, the Iranian regime actively shapes its domestic and regional realities, with consequences both positive and negative.

• “The notion that Islam requires the integration of religion and state is a historical development, not a Quranic mandate.” “Fight until there is no more oppression and injustice and the Law of Allah prevails.” (Q.8:39)

My Response: This verse can be interpreted in another way. A humanistic interpretation of Q.8:39 would focus on the broader ethical and moral principles it conveys, emphasizing themes of justice, freedom, and the pursuit of a harmonious society. From this perspective, the verse could be understood as a call to resist oppression and work toward a world where human dignity, equality, and fairness are upheld. The “Law of Allah” could be interpreted symbolically as a universal moral order that aligns with humanistic values such as compassion, justice, and the common good. The emphasis on ceasing hostilities if the opposition stops (“if they desist”) could be seen as a call for reconciliation and peace, highlighting the importance of resolving conflicts through dialogue and mutual understanding rather than violence. This aligns with humanistic ideals of nonviolence and the belief in the potential for positive change in human behaviour. The reading would focus on the underlying message of striving for a just and equitable world, where all individuals are free from oppression and can live in dignity and peace. It would encourage reflection on how these principles can be applied in contemporary contexts to promote social justice and human flourishing.

• Q. 5:44 clearly affirms that governance must align with divine law.

My Response: Q.5:44 emphasizes the importance of divine guidance in governance and justice, reflecting the principle that laws should align with moral and ethical values rooted in faith. From a Quranic perspective, this verse can be understood as a call for governance that upholds justice, compassion, and the dignity of all human beings. Divine law, in this context, is not merely a rigid set of rules but a framework that seeks to promote the well-being of individuals and society. It emphasizes accountability, fairness, and the protection of human rights, which are universal values shared across cultures and faiths. I interpret divine law as a means to foster a just and equitable society where the welfare of people is prioritized. It encourages leaders to govern with wisdom, mercy, and a deep sense of responsibility toward all members of society, regardless of their faith or background. This aligns with the broader Islamic principle of Rahmah (mercy) and the concept of Maqasid al-Shariah (the higher objectives of Islamic law), which include the preservation of life, intellect, faith, lineage, and property. In essence, governance aligned with divine law, from an Islamic humanistic viewpoint, is one that serves humanity, promotes justice, and ensures the dignity and rights of all individuals are respected and protected. It is a call to integrate spiritual and ethical principles into leadership, ensuring that power is exercised with humility and a commitment to the common good.

• Islamic governance, in both theory and practice, incorporated consultation, judicial impartiality, and legal pluralism—values that align with modern democratic ideals.

My Response: My critique of contemporary political Islamists centres on their deviation from the historical and ethical principles of Islamic governance, rather than an attack on Islam itself. Many modern political Islamist movements have distorted these principles, centralizing power, side-lining diverse voices, and imposing rigid, exclusionary interpretations of Sharia. These movements often prioritize ideological purity over practical governance, using religion as a tool for political control rather than a means to promote justice and welfare. For example, the concept of hakimiyyah (sovereignty of God) has been weaponized to justify authoritarian rule, while the dynamic and adaptive spirit of early Islamic law, exemplified by ijtihad (independent reasoning), is often ignored. This rigidity leads to the suppression of dissent, the marginalization of women and minorities, and a failure to address pressing socio-economic challenges. Moreover, the politicization of religion by these groups undermines the spiritual and ethical dimensions of Islam, reducing it to a mechanism for power consolidation. By rejecting democratic principles as “Western impositions,” many political Islamists alienate broader populations, particularly the youth, who seek inclusive and pragmatic solutions to modern problems. My critique targets the authoritarian, exclusionary, and rigid practices of contemporary political Islamists, which diverge sharply from the pluralistic, consultative, and justice-oriented spirit of early Islamic governance. By reclaiming these historical principles, it is possible to envision a form of governance that is both authentically Islamic and aligned with the aspirations of modern societies for fairness, inclusivity, and good governance.

(V.A. Mohamad Ashrof is an independent Indian scholar specializing in Islamic humanism. With a deep commitment to advancing Quranic hermeneutics that prioritize human well-being, peace, and progress, his work aims to foster a just society, encourage critical thinking, and promote inclusive discourse and peaceful coexistence. He is dedicated to creating pathways for meaningful social change and intellectual growth through his scholarship. He can be reached at vamashrof@gmail.com)

Courtesy: New Age Islam

The post The inherent problem with political Islam appeared first on SabrangIndia.

General Debate, Item 3, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development

Delivered By Sultan Shahin, Founding Editor, New Age Islam

on behalf of Asian-Eurasian Human Rights Forum

Mr. President,
Even17 years after 9/11, terrorism in the name of Islam is nowhere near its end. The so-called Islamic State has been defeated in Iraq and Syria, but it is expanding its presence in Africa and South Asia. Many Taliban terrorists have joined ISIS now and are wreaking havoc in Afghanistan. In one of the deadliest attacks in Egypt’s modern history, ISIS terrorists targeted a Sufi mosque in November 2017, leaving 305 people dead and 128 injured in a town of only 800. The victims were primarily Sufi Muslims. Sufi shrines and its visitors have been targeted by Islamist terrorists around the world, killing thousands and damaging shrines, mosques and libraries, particularly in Pakistan, Libya, Mali and Iran.

Yet, all that one hears from Muslim leaders is rhetoric against Islamist terrorism. No concrete action has been taken to cleanse the Islamic theology of totalitarianism, xenophobia, intolerance and a historical urge to expand the land of Islam through offensive Jihad. One would think that at least Sufi Muslims, who have been for long a victim of Jihadism, an offshoot of neo-Khwarij Salafism, would introspect and look into their own theology and purify it from elements of political Islam.

This may sound strange to some. For, Sufism has been identified as the antidote to Jihadism. It is true that Sufi masters have emphasised pluralism and co-existence in both their sayings and conduct. Their service to humanity and treatment of humans from all caste and creed has been exemplary. No wonder one continues to find people belonging to all religions thronging their shrines. But we must also understand that Sufi scholars and theologians too have been votaries of political Islam.

The strangest thing that is happening now is that rather than cleansing their theology of traces of totalitarianism, large sections of Sufism-oriented Muslims are actually engaged in what can be called a Wahhabisation of Sufism. Enlightening Sufi books of mysticism, ethics and morality have been taken out of the courses of study from Sufi madrasas. The basic Sufi concept of Wahdatul Wujood (Unity of Being) is being replaced in Sufi madrasas with the concept of Wahdatul Shuhood (unity of perception or unity of appearances) invented by Sheikh Sirhindi to counter Ibn-e-Arabi’s ideas that have been described by his followers as Wahdatul Wujood. Some erstwhile Sufism-oriented Muslims are themselves adopting some of the hard-line outlook of Wahhabi-Salafi Muslims on issues of Ziarat-e-Qaboor (grave visitation) and gender segregation, etc.  Women are being barred from visiting shrines in the way they used to do before.

Mr. President,
I would like to appeal to Muslim governments represented in the Council to take the issue of terrorism in the name of Islam more seriously than they have so far and cleanse Islamic theology of totalitarian ideas that support offensive Jihad for world domination. The minds of Muslim students of madrasas should not be poisoned with ideas emanating from the doctrine of al-Wala-wal-Bara (having friendship only with Muslims and enmity with all others), or takfirism (calling other Muslims kafir).

There are ideas and instructions in Islamic scriptures that should not be considered applicable to us today. Instead what even earliest Sufi and Salafi theologians have said is that one so-called sword verse alone has abrogated 124 early verses of Quran preaching peace and pluralism. Any instructions given during a war should be considered void once the war is over. Muslim heads of government who rail against terrorism should first introspect and cleanse Islamic theology of elements of totalitarianism.

Mr. President,
Let me elaborate the issues raised here in some detail.

With its almost two billion followers, Islam has spread throughout the world. Born in the sandy desert of Arabia 1400 years ago, it has naturally acquired a local colour everywhere it has gone, while retaining its basic belief systems. Indeed, Islam itself has encouraged this process. The Holy Quran exhorts its followers to believe in all the prophets of God, by whatever names they may now be known, who preceded Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) and preached the message of God in the local languages of their times.

In Islamic traditions the number of such seers, who brought messages from God, is put at 1,24,000, though only 25 names could be mentioned in the Quran in the course of their examples being cited to illustrate various teachings. Thus, while expressing belief in the oneness of God and the prophethood of Mohammad, a Muslim simultaneously expresses belief in all the previous messengers of God as well. It is natural that the Muslims have not felt obliged to distance themselves totally from their previous beliefs and cultural practices even after conversion to Islam, to the extent these did not contravene their new Islamic beliefs.

As in Africa and Far East Asia, in South Asia, too, Islam naturally has its own indigenous flavour. And it finds its best expression in the Sufi way of life prevalent in the Indian sub-continent for centuries. Its vibrancy is evident in tens of thousands of people from different religious backgrounds thronging Sufi shrines across the length and breadth of South Asia, and especially at annual urs events. Sufi music programmes continue to be organised in some shrines either weekly or on some special occasions. Sufi music festivals, with the participation of musicians from different parts of the world, continue to attract an ever-expanding number of fans. From classical cultural events to productions of film industry, South Asia continues to celebrate Sufi art in a variety of ways and in a number of events with wide participation. Soul-stirring music, helping the seeker’s quest for the creative infinite, unique to the Indian sub-continent, continues to be produced, particularly in India an Pakistan.

But things have also been changing in the last decades. A determined effort has been made for bringing uniformity in Islamic thoughts and practices, a kind of the Saudi Arabisation of Islam, wiping out local cultural influences from everywhere in the world. Backed by a massive injection of petrodollars, since 1974, the global rise of Salafism has brought about new challenges to the Sufi way of life in the Indian sub-continent as well.  While on a superficial glance, the Sufi culture may still appear to thrive, even finding newer expressions in the film and music industries, there are deeper rumblings within. The continuing footfalls in a Sufi shrine should not lull us into losing sight of the grave challenges facing Sufism.

A serious propaganda campaign was unleashed globally over 4o years ago calling Sufism heresy. Sufism has been at the receiving end of criticism throughout Islamic history but what happened in the last decades was particularly virulent and backed not just by enormous riches but also state power.
Two of the most revered and influential 13th and 14th century Salafi scholars Abdu’r Rahman Ibn al- Jawzi and Taqī ad-Dīn Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya describe Sufism as “heretical” and “a Christianized version of Islam” respectively. These and similar views calling Sufism an innovation have been massively propagated around the world in the last decades.

The fact of the matter is that mystical tendencies have existed in Islam from its very inception, the very first Muslims Hazrat Abru Bakr (RA) and Hazrat Ali (RA) being considered the first mystic masters having been taught and trained by the Prophet (pbuh) himself into the secrets of mystical practices. It is important for us to remember in all discussions about Islam that the Prophet (pbuh) himself was first and foremost a mystic, or a Sufi, though this term came into use only later. He used to spend days and weeks in contemplation and meditation in the cave at Hira, as all mystics, Rishis, Munis and Sufis do. 
Islam had been brought to the Indian sub-continent by Sufi saints. Understandably, the overwhelming majority of Indian Muslims are or at least have been Sufism-oriented. But many Muslims around the country, particularly in the state of Kerala, now proudly proclaim being Salafi Muslims and call their mosques Salafi mosques. Some Muslims have even started calling themselves Taimi, thus describing themselves followers of Ibn-e-Taimiya, though they never described themselves as Wahhabi or follower of Mohammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab. While, mercifully, Sufi shrines and its visitors, are not yet coming under attack in India, as is happening in other parts of the sub-continent and the world, the pressure on Sufism is manifesting in various other ways. 

The leitmotif of the present age is terrorism practiced in the name of Islam. Terrorists call it Jihad. Their ideology has come to be known as Jihadism. Jihadism is considered an extremist offshoot of neo-Khwarij-Salafism-Wahhabism, as practised in Saudi Arabia. Sixteen of the nineteen terrorists involved in 9/11 terrorist attack on American institutions were Saudis and the rest Egyptian who had also gone through the Saudi religious education.

The world began to fear Islam. But it saw Sufism as an antidote to Islamist terrorism. While this brought a positive focus on Sufism, the attacks on Sufism also grew from both the Jihadist and Islamophobe camps.

The internet today contains tens of thousands of pages trying to prove that Sufism is not a pacifist, quietist version of Islam as it is supposed to be. Quotations have been dug up from writings of great Sufi theologians like Hazrat Abdul Qadir Jilani, Imam Ghazali. Ibn-e-Arabi, Sheikh Sirhindi, Shah Waliullah, etc in an effort to prove that they were all as much in support of offensive Jihad against the unbelievers and polytheists to establish Islam’s domination of the world as non-Sufi and traditional orthodox theologians. It would appear that there is a consensus in Islamic theology that the Muslims’ relationship with non-Muslims is that of perpetual war until all world comes under Muslim domination.

So where do Sufis stand on the issue of Offensive or Martial Jihad? From earliest times Sufis have given a textual as well as spiritual exegesis of Quranic exhortations. From earliest Sufi books like Kashf al-Asrar (the Unveiling of the Mysteries) composed by Rashid al-Din al-Maybudi (d. early twelfth century) or al-Qushayri’s Lata’if al-isharat to Hazrat Abdul Qadir Jilani (ra), Imam Abhu Hamid al-Ghazali (ra), India’s very own Mujaddid Alf-e-Saani Sheikh Ahmad Sarhandi (ra) or Shah Waliullah Muhaddis Dehlavi (ra), all of them seem to agree with traditional ulema on the necessity for offensive Jihad to help the word of God dominate the world. They say directly or indirectly that Jihad should go on as long as there is kufr and shirk in the world. The humiliations they describe that should be heaped on Jizya paying non-Muslims make a very difficult read for a person with a 21st century sensibility. For them offensive Jihad and spiritual
Jihad are two sides of the same coin, spiritual jihad being necessary as a preparation for martial Jihad. (Please see Appendix given below for some of these quotations.)

In his authoritative work “Jihad in pre-modern Sufi writing,” Harry S Neale discovers complementarity of spiritual and martial jihad even in early Sufi writings. He says: “Similar to what Ibn Kathir’s tafsir (book of Quranic exegesis) says over 200 years later (14th century), Maybudi’s (early 12th century) Kashf al-Asrar remarks that some religious scholars hold that verse 9:5 abrogates the 124 earlier verses regarding relations with non-Muslims. The fact that an early twelfth-century Sufi tafsir as well as a non-Sufi tafsir from the fourteenth century both discuss the abrogation of earlier Qur’anic verses dealing with the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims suggests that Qur’anic exegetes considered this opinion legitimate and well established.”

In his Wasaya (Admonitions), Ibn-e-Arabi says: “I counsel you to fear God and uphold the requirements of the outer aspects of the sharia and its statutes. The greater jihad is incumbent upon you, which is the jihad against the passions, and when you wage this jihad against your lower self the other jihad against the enemies will be [easy] for you, for if you should be killed [in the martial jihad] you will be among the living martyrs for whom God provides. The merit of the one who wages jihad (mujahid) in God’s path is like that of the devout one who fasts in God’s signs … strive to participate actively [in jihad] in God’s path … beware … if you do not take part in military campaigns and if you are not resolved to go forth [for this purpose] then you will be among the hypocrites ….” [ Ibn-e-Arabi’s Wasaya (Admonitions) as quoted by Harry S Neale in “Jihad in pre-modern Sufi writing”.]

Similarly, Hazrat Abdul Qadir Jilani (ra) also deals with he complementarity of martial and spiritual Jihad. He “emphasises adhering to the dictates of Islamic law as an essential aspect of the greater jihad, which contradicts the idea that Sufis are unconcerned with the fundamental outer aspects of Islam. … though Sufi writings have generally considered the spiritual jihad more difficult than the martial jihad, it does not mean that the spiritual jihad supersedes the martial jihad. Likewise, the terms “greater” and “lesser” do not refer to some hierarchy of importance; rather,  … they refer to the greater effort required to subdue the lower self,” says Harry S Neal in “Jihad in pre-modern Sufi writing”.

Growing Opposition To The Practice Of Ziyarat
Strangely, not to speak of Salafi-Wahhabis, even some erstwhile Sufism-oriented Barailvi Muftis in India vehemently oppose the practice of Ziyarat (visiting of Sufi shrines). They come up with outlandish arguments and weak evidences that do not stand up to scrutiny. The maximum they have managed to get to prove their point is some mansukh ahadith (abrogated Prophetic sayings) that forbade the earliest Muslims from visiting the graves. But they turn a blind eye to the nasikh ahadith that came later abolishing the earlier ahadith and allowing and favouring the practice of Ziyarat. In fact, the Prophet (pbuh) had prohibited the Ziyarat temporarily, and later he allowed and encouraged the people to do it regularly for its spiritual benefits.

The reason for the temporary prohibition was that the newly converted Muslims were writing indecent elegies and making offensive statements over the graves of their dead relatives who were predominantly non-Muslims. But later, when Muslims were trained into proper behaviour in graveyards, this prohibition was lifted and a general permission was given by the Prophet (pbuh) for the Muslims, both men and women, to go for Ziyarat and gain spiritual benefits from it. The Prophet (pbuh) addressed his companions and said:

“I had prohibited you from visiting graves. But from now on, you can go for Ziyarat because it will make you feel unattached towards this world and remind you of the hereafter.” (Muslim, Janaiz, 106; Adahi, 37; Abu Dawud janaiz, 77; Ashriba, 7; Tirmidhi, Janaiz, 7; Nasai, Janaiz, 100; Ibn Majah, Janaiz, 47; Ahmad b. Hanbal, I, 147, 452, III, 38, 63, 237, 250, V, 35, 355, 357).

The Prophet (pbuh) himself would go for Ziyarat-e-Qubur especially on the night of mid-Shaabaan (Laylat al-Bara’at). He used to visit the grave of his mother regularly and cry out of his love and remembrance of her, as the following tradition says:

“The Holy Prophet (pbuh) visited the grave of his mother and cried near her grave and also made others around him cry. Thereafter he said: I have taken permission from my Lord to visit the grave of my mother. You too should visit the graves because such a visit will remind you of death.” (Sahih Muslim, vol. 3, p. 65)
Despite this clear Islamic concept of grave-visiting enshrined in the Hadith, the zealot muftis even in Sufi-oriented institutions abhor the women visitors of Sufi shrines on the pretext of intermingling between men and women. They call this age-old traditional Islamic practice haram (forbidden).

The growing Salafi-Wahhabi influence on even the Sufi-oriented Barailvi-Eiteqadi clerics is becoming more and more apparent by the day. The puritanical Barailvi ulema, who call themselves ‘Reformist Sufis’ denounce the spiritually inclined Sufi-minded scholars and ulema for their liberal ideas, declaring them zindiqs (heretics), badmazhab (erroneous in faith) and gumrah (deviant), using exactly the same terms as Salafi ulema do. For instance, on the ground of his interfaith activities like celebration of Christmas and listening to Sufi Music, Pakistani Sufi scholar Dr. Tahirul Qadri has been declared “gumrah” and “badmazhab” by the chief Muftis of Barailvis in India, Mufti Akhtar Raza Khan and Mufti Ziaul Mustafa.

Such retrogressive pronouncements or fatwas of the Sufi-Barailvi maulvis are on the rise. For instance, the Mumbai-based Raza Academy demanded a ban on famous Iranian filmmaker Majid Majidi’s biopic, “Muhammad: The Messenger of God.” They have also issued a fatwa not only against the film, but the entire filmmaking crew, including prominent music composer AR Rahman, who has given music for the film.

Fatwas of Apostasy Emanating From Sufi Shrines
Raza Academy considers all those associated with the film as apostates and wants them to recite the Kalima or confession of faith again, so that they once again come back to the Muslim faith. The fatwa was issued by Mufti Mahmood Akhtar Qadri, a Barailvi cleric appointed as Imam in Haji Ali Dargah in Mumbai. He leads prayers in the mosque of Haji Ali Dargah in Mumbai and also runs a Darul Ifta and a madrasa in the city. Since he is also an acclaimed Mufti with his own Madrasa (Darul Ulum Amjadia) and Darul Ifta, he clearly misuses his position and influence at the shrine while issuing retrogressive fatwas. His fatwas played a major role in provoking the common Sunni Muslims who protested against Majidi’s movie and AR Rahman’s music in it.

Sufi Shrines Issuing Retrogressive Fatwas
Sufi shrines should have no role to play in issuing fatwas. But the imams appointed in the mosques attached to the shrines often hold positions in certain madrasas with their own Darul Ifta. What has a Sufi shrine got to do with a Darul Ifta? Why are imams of mosques associated with Sufi shrines issuing fatwas now?

Mercifully, and gratifyingly, the Sajjadahnashins of several Sufi shrines, most notably Ajmer Sharif and Hazrat Nizamuddin dargahs, took a different stand on music and portrayal of the Prophet (pbuh). They said that A R Rahman must be lauded for his outstanding response; like a true believer. In a written statement, Rahman had said, “I follow the middle path and am part traditionalist and part rationalist. I live in the Western and Eastern worlds and try to love all people for what they are, without judging them.”

Wahhabisation of Sufism
Another aspect of what can be called the Wahhabisation of Sufism is that Sufism-oriented Barailvi ulema and muftis have not only banned traditional practices such as women visitors’ entry to shrines on the excuse of their intermingling with men but also banned traditional cultural practices such as taking out of tazia (a replica of the tomb of Imam Husain, the martyred son of Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him) processions during Muharram, in which even Hindus used to and still participate in some places, out of deference for Muslim sentiments.

Sufi Literature Removed From Sufi Madrasas
But more worrisome than all this is that Sufi literature has been removed from many Indian Sufi madrasas.

Sufi shrines and khanqahs are running across the country seminaries (madrasas) of mystical learning, Sufi experience and enlightenment. The curriculums of those madrasas used to be so very broad and inclusive in their worldview until a few decades ago that students from all backgrounds were cordially welcomed. Devotional songs were composed there in different vernacular languages and Sufi music (sima) was considered a manifestation of complete submission to God. 

ï Beautiful Islamic discourses compiled by Sufis and mystics of India that were taught in madrasas a few decades ago, are no more part of their study materials. Not even Sufi-oriented madrasas of today teach books like Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi’s Masnawi, Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhs Hijweri’s Kashful Mahjub, Shaikh Sa’adi Sherazi’s Gulsitan & Bostan, Hazrat Nixzmuddin Aulia’s Fawaidul Fuwad, Sheikh Shahabudin Suhrawardi’s Awarif ul Ma’arif and historical documents of Islamic mysticism that preach universal values, communal harmony, love for all and hatred for none. Gone are the days when books on reason, wisdom, ethics and morality were part of Madrasa curriculum in India. Far from presenting the broader Islamic notion of Deen and Ummah, present-day madrasa curricula concern the students with the ideological reproduction of works of their own sect (Maslak) and school of law (Fiqhi Mazhab).
Let me be more specific. Some of the Sufi texts previously taught in madrasas were:

ï Kahsful Mahjub by Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhs Hijweri
ï Awariful Ma’arif by Sheikh Shahabudin Suhrawardi
ï Fawaidul Fu’aad by Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia
ï Masnawi of Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi
ï Gulistan & Bostan by Shaikh Sa’adi Sherazi
ï Several Books on Metaphysics by Mullah Sadra
ï Fususul Hikam (Shiakh Ibn ul Arabi)
ï Life and teachings of great Sufis like Khwaja Muinuddin Chishti (ra), Baba Fareed, Ameer Khusro etc.

Some of the Sufi madrasas that have removed these books are:
ï Madrasa Firangi Mahal (Lucknow)
ï Darul Uloom Misbahul Uloom (now known as Jamia Ashrafia) in Mubarak Pur, Azam Garh
ï Jamia Naeemia (Muradaba)
ï Madrasa Alia Qadria (Badaun)
ï Jamia Manzar-e-Islam (Bareilly)
ï Jamia Mazhar-e-Islam (Bareilly)
ï Darul Uloom Warisia (Lucknow)
ï Madrasa Ahsanul Madaris Qadeem (Kanpur)
ï Madrasa Alia, Fatehpuri Masjid, Delhi

These books served as the main stimulus for exhorting great moral and spiritual ideals. They contain basic concepts of Sufism such as Wahdatul Wujood (unity of existence), Sulh-e-Kul (peace with all), Ilmul Yaqeen (knowledge with firm faith), Zikr (incantation), Muraqaba (meditation), observance of Taqwa (God-consciousness), Taubah (repentance of sins), Ikhlas (sincerity), Tawakkul (contentment and trust in God), Sidq (truthfulness), Amanah (trustworthiness), Istiqamah (uprightness) and Shukr (thankfulness). It is only after mastering these higher spiritual disciplines that a student in those madrasas was given the degree of Alim or Fazil.

‘Love for all and hatred for none’ was the legacy of Sufis, as enshrined by the pioneer of Chishti Sufi order in India, Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti of Ajmer, popularly known as Gharib Nawaz (the benefactor of the poor). This legacy greatly impacted their attitude towards other faith traditions. As a matter of fact, Sufi literature helped the madrasa graduates to embrace universal values and essential messages of Islam such as brotherhood of mankind, pluralism, tolerance, religious harmony, moral excellence and service to humanity regardless of faith and creed.

But the Sufi madrasas have removed the portion of Sufi literature that was taught in Indian madrasas, as an integral part of Dars-e-Nizami, for long. No wonder, even the students of Sufi-oriented madrasas have now developed an attitude of intolerance in their character and views.

Essential Sufi Concepts Are Being Misrepresented
Not only has enlightening Sufi literature been removed but also the essential Sufi concepts are being misrepresented now. For instance, Sulh-e-Kul (peace with all), a Sufi term that essentially means: equal respect for all, is now misconstrued. According the Barailvi clerics, Sulh-e-Kul means reconciliation with other Islamic sects. So, anyone who befriends people of all Islamic sects and does not detest them, is a Sulh -e- Kulli and thus misguided in their view. However, this unfavourable development is also being criticised by some Sufi ideologues such as: Shaikh Abu Saeed Ihsanullah Safawi of Khanqah Aarifia, Allahabad and Syed Salman Chishti of Chishtiya Foundation of Ajmer Dargah.

The Barailvi clerics are opposed to these scholars as they are to Dr. Tahirul Qadri because of their openness to music (Sima), acceptance of all faith traditions and sects, and companionship with other religious groups such as Hindus and Sikhs.

Wahdatul Wujood Being Misrepresented As Wahdatul Shuhud
Even in terms of Sufism’s spiritual philosophy, Wahdatul Wujood, one notices even in casual discussions with Sufi-Barailvi scholars that it has been practically replaced by Wahdatul Shuhood, probably to make it acceptable in the pro-Salafi-Wahhabi milieu created by the spread of Petrodollar Islam. This process actually started with Mujaddid Alf-e-Saani Sheikh Ahmad Sarhandi in 16th-17th century and later consolidated with Shah Waliullah Dehlavi in 18th century. As defined in 12th-13th century by Sheikh Mohiyuddin Ibn-e-Arabi, an Andalusian Scholar, Sufi mystic, poet, and philosopher, called by many “the genuine saint,” Wahdatul Wujood stresses that “there is no true existence except the Ultimate Truth (God).” This is completely in line with Quranic teaching: “And what is the life of this world except the enjoyment of delusion.” (3:185)

Other ways of explaining Wahdatul Wujood are: “the only truth within the universe is God,” and, “all things exist within God only.” In still other words, the existence of God is the only truth (haq) and the idea of a separated created universe is falsehood (batil). Sheikh Sarhandi countered this with his concept of Wahdatul Shuhood, “unity of appearance,” or “unity of perceptions,” also called in English “Apparentism.” In his view “any experience of unity between God and the created world is purely subjective and occurs only in the mind of the believer; it has no objective counterpart in the real world.” Ibn-e-Arabi’s position, Sheikh Ahmad Sarhandi felt led to pantheism, which was contrary to tenets of Islam. He held that God and creation are not identical. In his view the creation is a shadow or reflection of Divine names and attributes. 

Then in an effort to reconcile the vastly different or even contrarian concepts of Wahdatul Wujood and Wahdatul Shuhood, Shah Waliullah dismissed the differences as mere “verbal controversies” and ascribed these to ambiguities of language. Then to further downplay the concept of Wahdatul Wujood, he called it merely a less advanced stage of Wahdatul Shuhood, though the fact is that Wahdatul Shuhood may be considered the first stage of the core of Islamic spiritualism, Wahdatul Wujood.

The result is that today Wahdatul Wujood is taught as if it were Wadhatul Shuhood. You ask an alim from a classical Sufi madrasa to explain Wahdatul Wujood and he will invariably give you the definition of Wahdatul Shuhood. Indeed, he will also dismiss the concept of Wahdatul Wujood in the process quite explicitly, saying this is not meant by Wahdatul Wujood. The actual concept of Wahdatul Wujood is dismissed as heresy as it is considered too close to advaita (non-duality) of Vedic Hinduism.

Gender equality in Islam
Gender segregation and discrimination is rife throughout the country. Practically everywhere, most of the shrines have stopped men and women visiting shrines together. A bizarre ruling came a couple of years ago form the trust of one of Mumbai’s iconic landmarks, the Haji Ali Dargah. It is a “grievous sin” as per Islam, it says, for women to be in close proximity of the grave of a male Muslim saint. It raised this point in the Bombay High Court on 20 October 2015 while defending its ban on women from entering the shrine’s inner sanctum (Mazaar). The “unanimous” stand of all trustees forms part of a resolution passed by the Dargah’s trust. It is strange that while men and women can perform Haj together and go around Kaaba Sharif and pray there together, they can’t visit a Sufi shrine together. Sufis were the epitome of kindness to all. Even in orthodox Islam, men and women should not be segregated in the best of Islamic tradition. There is no scripture of Islam superior to the Holy Quran. The Quran talks of men and women in the same breath in its verses in terms of prayer, their rights and rewards and punishments:

[Holy Quran 2:228]” And for women are rights over men similar to those of men over women.”

[16:97]: (Whoever does righteous acts, whether male or female, while he is a believer, verily, to him We will give a good life, and We shall pay them certainly a reward in proportion to the best of what they used to do.)

[33:35]  (Surely for men who submit to Allah and for women who submit to Allah, for believing men and for believing women, for devout men and devout women, for truthful men and truthful women, for steadfast men and steadfast women, for humble men and humble women, for charitable men and charitable women, for fasting men and fasting women, for men who guard their chastity and women who guard their chastity, for men who remember Allah much and for women who remember Allah much, for all of them Allah has prepared forgiveness and a mighty reward.

There is gender equality in Islam in religious obligations as well. Equal religious duties and rituals are prescribed for both women and men. Testimony of Faith (Shahadah), Prayer (Salah), Obligatory Charity (Zakat), Fasting (Saum), and Pilgrimage (Hajj) are equally required from both genders.

Gender segregation at Sufi Shrines
If God treats men and women equal in all religious obligations as well as rewards and punishments, no clerics should feel entitled to ban her from entering a Sufi shrine. But the fact that this is happening in a SUFI shrine and indeed in most Sufi shrines across the country is truly worrisome. Khanqah Alia Qadria Rizvia of Bareilly, for instance, among many others, does not allow women to enter its shrine premises.

Sufis were the most accepting of all people, but those who claim to be their followers, are certainly not worthy of being called even Sufi-oriented Muslims.

The spirit of Sufism is clearly in decline in India today despite the apparent vibrancy in its practices. The radical Wahhabi-Salafi thoughts appear to have seeped deeply into the veins of the Muslim society. The concept of Islam as a spiritual path to salvation is giving way to xenophobia, intolerance and totalitarianism of political Islam. Unless the concept of total non-duality, advaita, oneness of existence, Wahdatul Wujood is restored to its primacy in Islamic spiritualism, support for a humane version of Islam will continue to dwindle and even Sufi-Barailvi-Eiteqadi Muslim society will keep supporting gender segregation and discrimination in Sufi shrines, or violence in the name of killing apostates, etc. For it is the Wahdat-e-Wujoodi understanding of the universe and God as that gave Sufism its distinction as the most humane understanding of the creative infinite we worship, whether we are followers of the book that was revealed to Prophet Mohammad or the books that were revealed to any of the previous 124,000 prophets of Islam since Adam (AS).

Having discussed what ails us, it’s time to think if there is something we can do to set things right. As I said earlier, terrorism in the name of Islam has become the leitmotif of this new age that started with the biggest terrorist event at the dawn of the 21st century. This has resulted in a growing fear of Islam. A religion that had come as a rahmat (blessing) to mankind has become an object of fear. Some of the Islamophobia is certainly promoted by vested interests, but there is also a genuine fear of Islam among ordinary people around the world. A Muslim lady in Peshawar had voiced this most poignantly after the Peshawar school massacre by Taliban killing 142 children and teachers by asking: Is this Islam? We owe it to our religion that no one has to ask this question again. This is clearly our top priority now. I would like to make just a couple of submissions.

1.    The first step in resolving an issue is to accept that there is an issue. We have to accept that there are issues with our theology, the theology of consensus of all sections of Muslims, not just Salafi-Wahhabis, as we Sufi-oriented Muslims are wont to say very readily. The theology we have now is by and large a theology of violence, exclusion and supremacism, geared to achieving world domination. So, we need a new theology, a new understanding of Islam that is geared to accepting the present situation in which Muslims have to live as weak minorities, deriving our rights entirely from secular constitutions, in more than a hundred countries of the world including India. We must see that Muslim-majority nations, particularly those who claim to be run by Islamic governments, are probably the most corrupt, most inhumane, and also the most dependent on world powers. This also acts as an incentive to Jihadists to bring down these governments and use terrorism based on Islamic theology as a methodology for pursuing that goal. So, we need to evolve a theology of peace, pluralism, coexistence and justice including gender justice, that is internally consistent and coherent.  In order to do so we will have to relook at the core of our theology. Once this is accepted we will need to brainstorm together on how to go about it. But that is the next step.

2.    The very minimum that we mainstream and mystically-inspired Muslims need to do is to reinstate the actual Sufi understanding of Wahdatul Wujood in our hearts. That is true Sufism. If it resembles the concept of advaita in Vedanta, that is all the more reason it should be seen as the genuine understanding of Existence, of Being, and its Oneness (tawhid). This shouldn’t be the reason to discard it.  It only proves the truth of God’s commandments in Quran that we are all one nation, and God sent his emissaries to all societies who taught people in their tongues and the languages of their times, but the message was the same. Let us readopt Wahdatul Wujood fully. The attempt to reconcile Sufism with orthodoxy, seeking to become acceptable to orthodox ulema, has cost Sufism too much. Let us abandon this project and stand for what we believe in, if we do indeed believe in God’s immanence and transcendence rather than His separation from all Existence.

—–
I must present here some of the quotations from Sufi masters and theologians mentioned above to put the issue in perspective, take the discussion forward and try to find a way out of this labyrinth.

Appendix 1
Eleventh century Sufi mystic, theologian, jurist and philosopher Imam Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazali is said to have an understanding of Islam next only to that of Prophet Mohammad (saw). He is quoted ad nauseum in the media to have said about Jihad and relationship with non-Muslims:
“Just as scholastic theology is used with thinking people concerning the truth, the sword is used with the infidels after informing them with the truth…so just as it cannot be said that the sword was Mohammad’s most eloquent argument, neither can it be said that scholastic theology is the ultimate science.”–Ihy’a ‘Uloum ed-Din by al-Ghazali vol. V p. 35
…one must go on jihad at least once a year…one may use a catapult against them [non-Muslims] when they are in a fortress, even if among them are women and children. One may set fire to them and/or drown them…If a person of the Ahl al-Kitab [People of The Book – Jews and Christians, typically] is enslaved, his marriage is [automatically] revoked…One may cut down their trees…One must destroy their useless books. Jihadists may take as booty whatever they decide…they may steal as much food as they need…
 …the dhimmi is obliged not to mention Allah or His Apostle…Jews, Christians, and Majians must pay the jizya [poll tax on non-Muslims] …on offering up the jizya, the dhimmi must hang his head while the official takes hold of his beard and hits [the dhimmi] on the protuberant bone beneath his ear [i.e., the mandible] … They are not permitted to ostentatiously display their wine or church bells…their houses may not be higher than the Muslim’s, no matter how low that is. The dhimmi may not ride an elegant horse or mule; he may ride a donkey only if the saddle[-work] is of wood. He may not walk on the good part of the road. They [the dhimmis] have to wear [an identifying] patch [on their clothing], even women, and even in the [public] baths…[dhimmis] must hold their tongue….
“After the death of Muhammad, the man of the miracle [the Qur’an] and the apostle of truth and the companions, fearing the weakening of Islam, the decrease of the number of its followers, and the return of masses to their previous infidelity [This is referring to to hurub al-riddah— the Wars of Apostasy — which were fought during the reign of Caliph Abu Bakr and delayed the Wars of Conquest against the kuffar], saw that holy war and invading other countries for the sake of Allah, smashing the faces of the infidels with the sword and making people enter the religion of Allah as the most worthy of all tasks and better than all sciences.”–Ihy’a ‘Uloum ed-Din by al-Ghazali vol. V p. 35
—– Imam Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazali (1058 –1111). Kitab al-Wagiz fi fiqh madhab al-imam al-Safi’i, Beirut, 1979, pp. 186, 190-91; 199-200; 202-203. [English translation by Dr. Michael Schub.]
 —-
Appendix 2
Most revered Indian Sufi mystic and theologian, considered Mujaddid Alf-e-Thani, Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564—1624), says:
Shariat can be fostered through the sword….
Whenever a Jew is killed, it is for the benefit of Islam.
Kufr and Islam are opposed to each other. The progress of one is possible only at the expense of the other and co—existence between these two contradictory faiths is unthinkable…
The honour of Islam lies in insulting kufr and kafirs. One who respects kafirs, dishonours the Muslims. To respect them does not merely mean honouring them and assigning them a seat of honour in any assembly, but it also implies keeping company with them or showing considerations to them. They should be kept at an arm’s length like dogs. If some worldly business cannot be performed without them, in that case only a minimum of contact should be established with them but without taking them into confidence….
The highest Islamic sentiment asserts that it is better to forego that worldly business and that no relationship should be established with the kafirs. The real purpose in levying jizya on them [the non—Muslims] is to humiliate then to such an extent that, on account of fear of jizya, they may not be able to dress well and to live in grandeur. They should constantly remain terrified and trembling. It is intended to hold them under contempt and to uphold the honour and might of Islam….
Cow—sacrifice in India is the noblest of Islamic practices. The kafirs may probably agree to pay jizya but they shall never concede to cow—sacrifice.…
The execution of the accursed kafir of Gobindwal [a Sikh who lead an uprising against the oppressive Muslim rule of his community] is an important achievement and is the cause of great defeat of the accursed Hindus….
Whatever might have been the motive behind the execution, the dishonour of the kafirs is an act of highest grace for the Muslims. Before the execution of the kafirs I had seen in a vision that the Emperor had destroyed the crown of the head of Shirk. Verily he was the chief of the Mushriks and the leader of the kafirs….
— Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, Muslim revivalist movements in northern India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Agra, Lucknow: Agra University, Balkrishna Book Co, 1965, pp.
Also quoted in Yohanan Friedmann’s Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi: An Outline of His Thought and a Study of His Image in the Eyes of Posterity pp. 73-74
—-
Appendix 3
Shah Waliullah Muhaddis Dehlavi (1703—1762), is revered by Muslims as a mystic and theologian of the highest order. Some of the selections of his writings doing the rounds on internet are:
It has become clear to my mind that the kingdom of heaven has predestined that kafirs should be reduced to a state of humiliation and treated with utter contempt…. Should that repository of majesty and dauntless courage [Nizam al—Maluk] gird his loins and direct his attention to such a task he can conquer the world…. Thus, the faith will become more popular and his own power strengthened; a little effort would be profoundly rewarded. Should he make no effort, they [the Marathas] would inevitably be weakened and annihilated through celestial calamities and in such an event he would gain no credit…As I have learnt this unequivocally [from the divine] I spontaneously write to draw your attention to the great opportunity laid before you. You should therefore not be negligent in fighting jihad…Oh Kings! Mala a’la urges you to draw your swords and not put them back in their sheaths again until Allah has separated the Muslims from the polytheists and the rebellious kafirs and the sinners are made absolutely feeble and helpless.’
In his testament to [subsequent Caliph] Umar, [then Caliph] Abu Bakr had informed him that if he feared God, the entire world would be frightened of him [‘Umar]. Sages had declared that the world resembled a shadow. If a man ran after his shadow it would pursue him, and if he took flight from the shadow it would still pursue him. God has chosen you as the protector of the Sunnis as there is no—one else to perform this duty, and it is crucial that at all times you consider your role as obligatory. By taking up the sword to make Islam supreme and by subordinating your own personal needs to this cause, you will reap vast benefits.
We beseech you [in a letter to Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah Abdali Durrani] in the name of the Prophet to fight a jihad against the infidels of this region. This would entitle you to great rewards before God the Most High and your name would be included in the list of those who fought jihad for His sake. As far as worldly gains are concerned, incalculable booty would fall into the hands of the Islamic ghazis and the Muslims would be liberated from their bonds. The invasion of Nadir Shah who destroyed the Muslims left the Marathas and Jats secure and prosperous. This resulted in the infidels regaining their strength and in the reduction of the Muslim leaders of Delhi to mere puppets.
When the conquering army arrives in an area with a mixed Muslim—Hindu population, the imperial guards should transfer the Muslims from their villages to the towns and at the same time care for their property. Financial assistance should be given by governments to the deprived and the poor as well as to Sayyids and the ‘ulama. Their generosity would then become famous with prompt prayers for their victories. Each town would eagerly await the arrival of the Islamic army (‘that paragon of bounty’). Moreover, wherever there was even the slightest fear of a Muslim defeat, the Islamic army should be there to disperse infidels to all corners of the earth. Jihad should be their first priority, thereby ensuring the security of every Muslim.
— Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi. Shah Wali Allah and his times. Canberra, Australia, Ma’rifat Publishing House, 1980, pp. 294—296, 299, 301, 305.
——
Appendix 4
In his analysis of Shah Wali Allah and his times, pp. 285 286. Rizvi writes:
According to Shah Wali Allah the mark of the perfect implementation of the Shari’a was the performance of jihad. He compared the duties of Muslims in relation to the law to those of a favourite slave who administered bitter medicine to other slaves in a household. If this was done forcefully it was quite legitimate but if someone mixed it with kindness it was even better. However, there were people, said the Shah who indulged in their lower natures by following their ancestral religion, ignoring the advice and commands of the Prophet Muhammad. If one chose to explain Islam to such people like this it was to do then a disservice. Force, said the Shah, was the much better course — Islam should be forced down their throats like bitter medicine to a child. This, however, was only possible if the leaders of the non—Muslim communities who failed to accept Islam were killed; the strength of the community was reduced, their property confiscated and a situation was created which led to their followers and descendants willingly accepting Islam. The Shah pleaded that the universal domination of Islam was not possible without jihad and by holding on to the tails of cows.
——
Appendix 5
While these quotations thoughts appear quite out of sync with the circumstances of the present times, one has to remember that all scholars are products of their times. Even in their own lifetimes, their views keep changing and sometimes they appear to give completely contradictory views. Take, for instance, Imam Muhammad al-Ghazali’s many books. While in the above quote he seems to support offensive Jihad, in his Thematic Commentary on the Qur’an, he makes every effort to prove that the message of Quran is peaceful and pluralistic. Nothing shows this better than his commentary on Surah Taubah verse 5 (Q 9:5) which is considered even by earliest Sufi commentators as a sword verse that has abrogated as many as 124 verses of Quran preaching peace and pluralism. A brief quote from his commentary will be very illuminating, both of Ghazali’s attitude to pluralism and contradictions in his own thinking at various times.
Imam Al-Ghazali writes his Commentary on Surah Taubah verse 5, (Q.9:5):
“… Muslims are therefore basically opposed to war and are never the ones to start it. By the imperative of their own religion, they are taught not to impose their beliefs on others by force. Their mission is to impart and communicate Allah’s message, leaving people free to decide whether to believe or reject it. Those who refuse to believe are free to pursue their lives in peace as long as they do not pose any obstacle or threat to Islam and the Muslims, who perceive their faith as the strongest and most vital binding relationship between Allah and humankind and that it is their responsibility to make others aware of it and provide them with the opportunity to understand and appreciate it.
“This is the basis of the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in Islamic society. Allah says elsewhere in the Qur’an:
“Therefore, if they (the unbelievers) do not trouble you and cease their hostility towards you and offer you peace, God gives you no authority over them” [al-Nisa: 90]. Those who take up arms against a Muslim state or parts of it must be met with force, and if they are overcome, they should be disarmed. Once that is achieved, they are free to lead their own lives and practise their beliefs in peace and security under the protection of the Muslim authorities, in return for which they have to pay a levy.
“This is the background against which prescription of the Jizyah, or exemption tax, came into being. It is not due from those who are neutral and have never taken up arms against the Muslim state. The Qur’anic verse gives ample explanation for the reason behind the establishment of this tax, for it stipulates who should pay it. They are those “who do not believe in God and the Last Day, who do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden, and who do not follow the true religion, until they pay the exemption tax unreservedly and with humility.”
— Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali, “A Thematic Commentary on the Qur’an” [The International Institute of Islamic Thought, Second Printing, 2005]
 

The post Sufi Theologians Too Need To Cleanse Their Theology of Elements of Supremacism and Political Islam appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Protesting for political freedom outside the Supreme Court in Malé. Dying Regime via Flickr, CC BY

The Maldivian police have reportedly entered tourist resorts in their hunt for political opponents. In response to these authoritarian actions, protests erupted in the streets of the capital, Malé.

Even within the country, it’s not clear what exactly is happening. With contradictory and confused reports emerging minute-by-minute, other countries are now advising their citizens either to refrain from travelling to the Maldives, or to exercise caution if they do so.

This situation has also soured the diplomatic relationship between India and China after another former Maldivian president, Mohamed Nasheed, expressed his desire to see India send troops to help keep the piece. China, which has recently invested in the Maldives, responded that India “has no justification for intervening in the Maldives crisis”.

On the face of it, this might look like a political power struggle with causes both domestic and international. But there’s something else at work too: the Maldives’ very particular religious politics.
 

Hardline turn

Maldivian authorities claim that 100% of its population are Muslims, and you need to be Muslim to be a citizen. Conservative Islamic groups in the country have been vocal in their support of the current leadership.

In the 2013 election, when Yameen replaced Nasheed, the rhetoric used against Nasheed portrayed him as anti-Islamic. One pamphlet widely circulated on social media read: “President Nasheed’s devious plot to destroy the Islamic faith of Maldivians.” The current ruling party also organised a rally with the slogan “my religion, my nation” during this time of crisis.

A protest against president Abdulla Yameen.

Conservative religious elements are very visible in the Maldives. One Maldivian friend told me that someone yelled at him because his small shorts were an affront to Islamic values – and in today’s Malé, the niqab (the full veil) is more visible than ever before.

I myself recently visited the Maldives to talk to different universities about setting up exchange programs between my own university and Maldivian ones. As a scholar of religion, I was surprised to hear from these institutions that they had conducted research on Muslim extremists in the country. Among the countries that produce recruits to the so-called Islamic State (IS), the Maldives makes one of the highest per capita contributions: there are estimated to be more than 200 Maldivians fighting for IS in Iraq and Syria.
 

The Saudi factor

One international player in this crisis is Saudi Arabia. Like the Chinese, the Saudis have invested plenty of money in the Maldives – it recently granted the Maldives a US$150m loan to pay off its foreign debt. The political opposition in the Maldives blames Saudi Arabia for spreading the conservative and violent form of Islam that the current regime espouses.

According to the opposition, the Saudis finance conservative Maldavian imams who spread Wahhabist doctrines across the country. International relations scholar Azra Naseem also sees a pattern between the radicalisation of Maldivians and the influence of Saudi Arabia. As Naseem puts it:
 

The increasing hegemony of Salafist/Wahhabist ideologies over Maldivian religious and social cultures and thought, and its control of religious discourse, forbid Maldives from speaking of not just another religion but also to pick up on any other strand of thought in Islam other than their own. Sufism, which is so much a part of South Asian Islam … is discouraged in the Maldives if not outright outlawed.

These conservative trends are at work across South Asia. Sri Lanka, for example, is feeling the growing influence of so-called da’wa (missionary) movements such as Jamaat-e-Islami and Tablighi Jamaat. These movements started their missionary activities in the 1970s, but they have since become part of a violent and deadly conflict between so-called reformists (conservatives) and Sufis. The same dynamics are at work elsewhere too. But so far, only in the Maldives has a full-blown political crisis broken out – and the outcome of that crisis might yet turn out to be a preview of things to come elsewhere.

Andreas Johansson, Director of Swedish South Asian Studies Network (SASNET), Lund University

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

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Image credit: AP/Press Association Images

Let us stop pretending otherwise: Turkey is now under a dictatorial regime established step by step under the gaze of, and with tacit support from western governments and institutions. Kurdish and democratic forces within the country are paying a heavy price, not only because of the brutality of the AKP ruling elite informed by a mix of neoliberal economic policies and political Islam, but also the failure of western governments and institutions to read the script correctly and develop a principled response. The west’s failure today is similar to the appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s.

At the time of writing, at least 11 MPs from the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), including co-leaders Figen Yuksekdag and Selahattin Demirtas, have been arrested and the party’s headquarters have been raided. These atrocities followed long interruptions of the internet in the Kurdish region. This is a large-scale collective punishment with the aim of spreading fear among the population at large. One can only wonder how a NATO member and EU candidate can disrupt communications, business transactions and public services, including health provisions without any challenge from western governments.

Tracking the cumulative authoritarianism of AKP rule

The Turkish multi-party system had been a veneer for an essentially state-centric and authoritarian regime since 1947. The regime has always oscillated between parliamentary elections and military coups. The electoral victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 was presented as a breakthrough. Yet, the AKP had soon become an architect of cumulative authoritarianism and has recently acted as a midwife for a botched coup. This trajectory has been underpinned by an Islamo-Calvinist belief in the market economy that resonates with neoliberal economic dogmas. It requires adherence to an Islamic political order in which elections are devices to confirm those in power rather than means of holding them to account and ensuring minority rights.

11 MPs from the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), including co-leaders Figen Yuksekdag and Selahattin Demirtas, have been arrested and the party’s headquarters have been raided.Indeed, the transition to the current dictatorial regime started in 2005, soon after the AKP elite felt confident enough that there was sufficient support for Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s conception of democracy as a train, which you disembark once you reach the right station. In March 2005, less than six months after a local election victory, Erdogan branded demonstrators protesting police brutality against women in Istanbul as ‘Euro-informers’ – i.e., traitors whose loyalties are to foreign powers rather than to the Turkish state. This statement set in motion a 10-year process of authoritarian consolidation, during which all political dissent was equated with treason and conspiracy.

The first casualty of this consolidation process has been the institutions of good governance. Between 2005 and 2015, Turkey remained in the bottom 50% on the World Bank Governance Indicators.

Governance quality fell from the bottom 48% to the bottom 35% with respect to voice and accountability; and from the bottom 28% to 10% with respect to political stability. Its ranking when it comes to rule of law stagnated around 57% and eventually fell to around 50% by 2016. Large-scale corruption scandals involving government officials and their political backers have been covered up and those who exposed them silenced.

After the botched coup of July 2016, tens of thousands of academics and educationalists have been fired.

Press freedom was curtailed year after year. According to Freedom House data, Turkey was ‘partly free’ with respect to press freedom in 2005. In 2015, it became ‘not free’. In 2016, the legal and political environment of press freedom in Turkey was among the worst 10-15% in the world.

Turkey has never been known for academic freedom. State tutelage over the higher education system has been enshrined both in the Constitution and under the Higher Education Law. Academics have always been forced to toe the government’s line under successive AKP governments; and those who signed a letter calling for peace and for international monitoring of state violence in Kurdish towns and cities have been persecuted since late 2015.

After the botched coup of July 2016, tens of thousands of academics and educationalists have been fired, and the president has been given the power to hand pick all public university vice-chancellors, leading to an unprecedented atmosphere of fear in the system. According to Scholars at Risk’s 2016 report, the Turkish government's actions have “harmed the reputation of Turkey’s higher education sector as a reliable partner for research projects, teaching and study exchanges, and international conferences and meetings.”

Despite political pressure from within, and recommendations by international human rights lawyers since 2005,  successive AKP governments avoided meaningful peace negotiations with the Kurds. Eventually they pulled out of a half-baked ‘peace process’ just after the elections in June 2015. Indeed, between June and the second round of elections in November 2015, the AKP government used state-orchestrated violence to silence the People’s Democratic Party (HDP). After the elections in November, the AKP unleashed an unprecedented military attack on the Kurds, destroying towns and cities, killing innocent civilians, and causing a massive wave of internal displacement. The unlawful and disproportionate use of state violence has been documented in a Human Rights Watch report and acknowledged by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights.

11 HDP lawmakers were detained early Friday, Nov. 4, 2016 including co-leaders Demirtas and Yuksekdag. Image credit: Lefteris Pitarakis AP/Press Association Images.

More recently, the AKP government has arrested and detained the co-mayors of Diyarbakir, the largest Kurdish city, on the grounds that they are members of a terrorist organisation. The evidence against them consists of speeches they made in favour of democratic local autonomy and the provision of municipality services for the burial of PKK fighters killed in armed clashes with the security forces. This is despite the fact that burial services are among the duties and responsibilities of the municipalities across Turkey. The co-mayors have been detained and sent to jail in Kandira F-Type prison in Izmit province – more than 800 miles away from Diyarbakir!

In addition to scores of media outlets being shut down over the last two weeks of October 2016, the AKP government has ordered the raid of the main opposition newspaper Cumhuriyet and the houses of its journalists, editors and trustees. Currently, 15 journalists and top managers of the paper are under police custody with no access to lawyers.

The sweeping crackdown after the botched coup is implemented through decrees under the state of emergency. Although Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides for derogations from the Convention in states of emergency, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) remains the ultimate authority to determine whether measures taken during the state of emergency are in conformity with the Convention. The latter clearly provides that derogations are strictly required and proportionate. Even at the outset of the state of emergency, the Commissioner for Human Rightsstated that the first decree raised very serious questions of compatibility with the ECHR and rule of law principles, even after taking into account the derogation in place.

Since then, the scope, modality and arbitrariness of both government actions and state of emergency decrees have worsened beyond anything past Turkish governments have done.

The current regime in Turkey bears the hallmarks of a dictatorial regime.

This state terror cannot be justified by invoking derogations from ECHR under the state of emergency. In France, a state of emergency has been introduced, but necessary checks and balances have been put in place by the judiciary, the French Parliament, the National Human Rights Institution, and the Ombudsman. Furthermore, the measures taken by the French government have been far more limited in scope compared to those in Turkey. In the latter, the Parliament is totally dysfunctional, the judiciary under total control of the government, who had already introduced legislation that ensures the immunity of security forces for their actions in the crackdown against the Kurds.

Overall, the current regime in Turkey bears the hallmarks of a dictatorial regime. Erdogan and the AKP elite, together with the military, are building defences that will make the regime totally unaccountable and perhaps irreversible. One such defence is the instalment of a civilian mob culture in the media, mosques, neighbourhoods, universities, etc. This mob culture consists of: (i) demonising and criminalising all political opponents; (ii) state-centred encouragement of political lynching through various means, including arrests, business raids, cyber and media hostility campaigns, ethnic and religious hatred against the Kurds, Alevis and other minorities including the LGBTQ community; (iii) demands for re-introduction of the death penalty, for which Erdogan has declared support several times after the botched coup; and (iv) conspiracy theories that present the west as the enemy of Turkey.

The other level of defence is the transition to a ‘unitary presidential system’ in which the president would appoint the judiciary, the university rectors, and be in control of the security apparatus. This is highly likely to be adopted soon, with the support of the MPs of AKP and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP).

The implosion of the unipolar world system as an explanatory factor

Given that the evidence above has been common knowledge, it is safe to assume that western governments and institutions have also been aware of the dictatorial drift in Turkey. This begs two questions: (i) why has their response been muted; and (ii) have they been in a position to respond differently?

The answer to both questions lies in the crisis of the unipolar world system that the United States, with Europe in tow, has been trying to establish since the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the exception of the transition decade in the 1990s, the US has been totally unsuccessful in establishing itself as a monopoly power. On the other hand, European politicians have had to toe the line without any discernible benefits, with the exception of the false sense of power in the UK that has eventually led to Brexit. This dismal result has been associated with human cost and economic ruin in Iraq, Libya and Syria; and with continuing perceptions of insecurity despite the eastern expansion of NATO.

The failure has been due to three factors: (i) the rise of China and Russia as serious contenders for the status of world power; (ii) the high price that regional powers such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, India, etc. have demanded for their role as sub-contractors in the project; and (iii) the rise of transnational Islamic terrorist groups from the ashes of the destruction caused by western interventions aimed at regime change. The combination of these factors have led to two outcomes. First, the unipolar world system project has proved to be the shortest-lived experiment in world politics. Secondly, current uncertainties about how to move to a multi-polar system have been associated with costs, which can be expected to be even higher unless the electorates challenge the prevailing political dogmas in the west.

Looked at from this perspective, the west’s silence against cumulative authoritarianism in Turkey cannot be explained by fear of Syrian refugees or as a price for securing Turkey’s fight against ISIS. These are just manifestations of a deeper malaise – i.e., the obsession with the idea of a unipolar system – that has been based on two fallacies: (i) belief in the supremacy of the western economic and security systems; and (ii) belief in the latter’s ability to pick and choose its allies from a pool of secondary-actors such as Turkey, to achieve regional objectives.

Today both beliefs have proven unfounded: the western economic system has delivered high levels of within-country income and wealth inequalities, and increased fragility; the security system on the other hand has benefited only the arms industry catering for an increased appetite for military spendingwithout reducing the perceived security risks. All in all, the investment in the unipolar world system project has been truly disastrous for the western public, who financed the project either through low wages for the majority or by increased tax burdens on middle-income earners.

The west’s silence against cumulative authoritarianism in Turkey cannot be explained by fear from Syrian refugees.

The incapacity of western governments to react effectively to cumulative authoritarianism in Turkey can and should be read from this underlying anomaly. The US and Europe did not have leverage on Turkey because the latter (like other emerging regional powers) was willing to support the ambitions for a unipolar system only in return for increasing its influence in the Middle East. The US and Europe have agreed to this deal, cooked up clandestinely together with embedded ‘experts’ from academia and beyond.

Part of the deal has been to present Turkey as a role model for the Middle East despite mounting evidence of authoritarianism and institutional degradation. When the ‘role model’ argument lost its credibility after the botched coup, the west began to measure Turkey’s ‘value’ with a new currency: regime stability. That is why both the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Thorbjørn Jagland, and a retired NATO supreme allied commander, James Stavridis, called for stronger western support for the Turkish government – with little or no attention to the risk of human rights violations under the state of emergency. This was a nauseating indicator of the extent to which macht has overtaken recht in the formation of foreign policy in the west.

Aware of this set up, the Turkish government has: (i) ratcheted up its sectarian and interventionist foreign policy towards Syria and Iraq; (ii) worked with and supplied arms to terrorist organisations such as Al-Nusra, while turning a blind eye to ISIS activities within and outside its borders; (iii) adopted a hostile approach to the Kurdish political movement in Turkey and Syria; and (iv) suppressed all potential sources of domestic dissent.

In doing this, the AKP elite enjoyed a mixture of tacit and explicit support from western governments and institutions, who have muttered muted criticism followed by solid confirmation of Turkey’s strategic importance as an ally.

Appeasement politics, however, has backfired. Turkey is now a liability rather than an asset for western security. Its actions in Iraq and Syria have gone beyond support for or complicity with terrorist groups and begun to signal irredentist ambitions that complicate the west’s objectives in the region. Turkey is also playing the Russian card to push US and European policy makers to support its ambition of destroying the emerging Kurdish reality in Turkey and beyond. The next stage may well be a situation in which Turkey is ‘upgraded’ from liability to threat to European security – mainly due to higher levels of political instability under a dictatorial regime.

Turkey is now a liability rather than an asset for western security.

It is high time that western governments and institutions confess to their public and admit that the policy of appeasing Turkey in return for its support to the unipolar system idea has imploded. It is also high time to admit that the west has lost the moral argument against Russia. One does not have to subscribe to a benign conception of the Russian regime to see that it is Russia that argues for adherence to international law in combatting terrorism. Also, it is Russia that argues against unilateral interventions aimed at regime change, the consequences of which have been: (i) the mushrooming of transnational terrorist networks; (ii) loss of life and economic ruin in affected countries; and (iii) imposition of war bills on the western public whose perceived insecurities have only increased.

Hence, it is both necessary and rational for the western electorate to stop legitimising and financing the fallacies about a unipolar world system, which have only led to higher levels of economic and existential insecurity. Instead, we should force our governments and institutions to engage in a genuine debate, domestically and internationally, on how to move to a multi-polar world system in which the people – not foreign states with their own interests and agendas – are empowered to counteract authoritarian tendencies and practices within their own countries.

The new regime requires stricter rules against unilateral interventions, a stronger mandate for the UN, and a more effective human rights regime that is not hollowed out by regional/cultural exceptionalism. In a nutshell, we need a transformation similar in scale to the post-war experience of international institution building. We must push for this reckoning not only to show solidarity with fighters against the dictatorial regime in Turkey, but also to increase the chance of a democratic, secular, gender-equal and fair system in Turkey and elsewhere.
 

Mehmet Ugur is Professor of Economics and Institutions and member of Greenwich Political Economy Research Centre (GPERC) at the Department of International Business and Economics, University of Greenwich.

(This article was first published on OpenDemocracy.net)
 

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Javed Anand

There’s nothing a practising Muslim ever does without the invocation: “Bismillah ar-rahman ar-rahim (In the name of Allah, the most compassionate, the most merciful)”. About Prophet Muhammad he will tell you that Allah sent him to earth as “rahmat al il alamin (mercy unto mankind)”. The very word Islam means peace, you will be told. Allah, Prophet Muhammad, Islam, is all about peace, compassion, mercy. Get it?

No doubt Mumtaz Qadri, the assassin of Punjab governor Salmaan Taseer, believes himself to be a pious Muslim. No doubt bismillah ar-rahman ar-rahim preceded the bullets he pumped into a person he was trained, paid and sworn to protect, risking his life if need be. No doubt he committed cold-blooded murder in the name of “Allah, the most compassionate, the most merciful” in defence of a religion that means peace and in honour of the prophet (hurmat-e-rasool) who is meant to be mercy unto all mankind. Killing for peace? I just don’t get it.

Killing for peace? I just don’t get it.

Could it be that despite his self-perception, Qadri was actually under Satan’s evil influence? Banish the thought. For the “respected ulema” of Pakistan the man is a ghazi (holy warrior) now. (In Islam, a ghazi enjoys as high a status as a shaheed, or martyr.) If we happen to think otherwise, we too are blasphemers, kafirs, ‘wajib-ul-qatl (fit to be killed)’.

Killing may not be your or my idea of promoting peace but according to the “respected ulema” of Pakistan, you better believe it, that’s Islam. Read the joint statement issued by 500 “maulanas” from the Jamaat-e-Ahl-e-Sunnat Pakistan (JASP) which also issued a death threat to anyone who dared lead or even participate in the namaaz-e-janaza (funeral prayer) for Taseer: “The punishment for blasphemy against the prophet is only death as per the holy book [Koran], Sunnah [sayings and deeds of Prophet Muhammad], consensus of Muslim opinion and explanations by the ulema… this brave person [Qadri] has maintained the 1,400 years of Muslim tradition and has held the heads of 1.5 billion Muslims of the world high with pride.” No, you messiahs of murder, count me out.

Ironically, this very Barelvi sect from among the subcontinent’s Muslims had thus far been seen as Pakistan’s great big hope for peace, a counterforce waiting to be deployed against the Deobandis, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Ahl-e-Hadith, all of whom are guilty of injecting intolerance, extremism and terrorism into Islam. But a single murderous deed done by a “ghazi” has brought together Pakistan’s mutually warring “ulema” on a common platform. Whatever their other disagreements, they stand together in their worship of violence and contempt of the dissenting voice.

The credit for this unprecedented unholy alliance goes to the Jamaat-ud Dawah (JuD), another name for the terrorist outfit Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) which among numerous other heinous acts is responsible for the 26/11 terror attack on Mumbai and India. As evident from its very well attended rally in Lahore (on January 16 and 17) under the banner of the Tehreek-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool (Movement for the Honour of the Prophet), the JuD, the Deobandis and the Barelvis jointly pronounced a death sentence on anyone calling for change in Pakistan’s infamous blasphemy laws.

Such madness in our immediate neighbourhood is in itself sufficient cause for concern. More worrisome is the fact that the roots and trunks of Pakistan’s major religious outfits lie in India. Deobandis and Barelvis owe their name to Deoband and Bareilly, both of which are towns in Uttar Pradesh. The Ahl-e-Hadith was birthed on Indian soil; so did Maududi found his Jamaat-e-Islami in undivided India. And each one of them today has far greater reach within the country than they had at the time of partition.

Why is it that since the unpardonable murder of Taseer, not one Indian leader of consequence from any of these outfits has spoken a word against the outrage? My Urdu-speaking Muslim friends from Mumbai tell me this is equally true of Urdu newspapers with the honourable exception of The Sahafat Daily. This conspiracy of silence, though shocking, is not surprising. Each one of them preaches that the punishment for blasphemy, apostasy, heresy, is death in an Islamic state and complete social ostracism from the entire community where Islam is not wedded to power.

Fed such poisonous brew, the ummah may be forgiven for missing out on finer details. In secular India some years ago, the Raza Academy (a supposedly more tolerant Barelvi group) threatened to burn Taslima Nasreen alive if she dared come to Mumbai. In 2008 the Urdu press in Hyderabad poured scorn on the leaders and activists of the Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM) for their failure to kill her when they had the chance to do so.

“Educated Muslims have no choice but to get out of the clutches of the ulema,” opined a Muslim woman on a Google group last week. “If this is Islam, count me out,” wrote a Muslim male.

How do Muslims respond to the growing Islamophobia across the globe when the entire galaxy of “ulema” proclaims murder from the housetops? “Educated Muslims have no choice but to get out of the clutches of the ulema,” opined a Muslim woman on a Google group last week. “If this is Islam, count me out,” wrote a Muslim male.

So here’s the choice before educated Muslims. Opting out of Islam altogether or discovering that an Islam other than that of the “ulema” is possible. But to discover this other Islam, you need the sensibilities of a Farid Esack, a South African Islamic theologian whose moral and ethical integrity is evident from his statement: “If a choice has to be made between violence towards the text [holy scripture] and textual legitimisation of violence against real people then I would be comfortable to plead guilty to charges of violence against the text… Isn’t theology essentially about god? Yes, it is about god but my theology is about a god that is essentially just and compassionate.”

The time has come for a fatwa against the fanatics.

Here is the Link to the original sabrang website where the story can also be read
 

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