JUNE 1998: India under the National Democratic Alliance (I) government (under prime minister Vajpayee) followed by Pakistan (under Nawaz Sharif) entered into ‘the bottomless pit of nuclear rivalry.’ This piece authored by the late veteran peace activist, author and journalist, Praful Bidwai was Communalism Combat’s cover that month. We bring it to our readers now at Sabrangindia, with an accompanying piece by scientist, Zia Mian, to urge restraint and sanity in the region.

Nuclear weapons act like boomerangs on both India and Pakistan

For more than the one and a quarter billion people who live in South Asia, the world has been radically, horrifically, shockingly transformed. After the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan in May, they now live under the shadow of the Mushroom Cloud — that is, to put it bluntly, the threat of mass annihilation, unspeakable destruction, and epochal devastation. Unless India and Pakistan stop their descent into the bottomless pit of nuclear rivalry now, they will inflict unlimited damage upon their societies, states and, above all, their peoples.The bulk of the blame for this terrifying development must be squarely laid at the door of communalism. The nuclear obsession of a particular party was imposed upon a billion people on May 11, when the BJP–led minority government made a violent break with a policy with a 50–year–long continuity — of opposing nuclear deterrence and not exercising the nuclear weapons option. The BJP altered this radically, undemocratically, without the pretence of a strategic review, and without even the fig leaf of a security rationale.

The BJP’s decision to put India on the dangerous path of nuclearisation deeply offends all notions of civilised public conduct. It degrades, it does not enhance, India’s security. It has propelled us into a confrontation with our neighbours and lowered our global stature. India is the object of reprimand, reproach, and humiliating sanctions from the world community. Nuclearisation will promote the profoundly undemocratic values of militarism, secrecy, jingoism and male chauvinism. And it could prove economically ruinous. Most of all, it is fraught with unconscionably destructive human consequences.

Let us look at some of these on the basis of a scientific analysis. To start with, India and Pakistan are likelier to fight a nuclear war than the two rival blocs came close to at any point during the Cold War barring perhaps the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Even a limited exchange would result in the killing of lakhs of people in the two countries in ways that will make Genghis Khan look like an angel.

If a single nuclear weapon is exploded over a major city such as Bombay, Karachi, Lahore or Delhi, it could result in the death of up to 9,00,000 people, depending on factors such as population density, height of airbust and prevalent wind velocity. Apart from these early deaths, there would be hundreds of thousands of cancer and leukaemia victims due to radiation, besides a host of other serious illnesses and disorders. As Nikita Khrushchev once said: “The survivors would envy the dead”.

That is not all. The damage would be carried to a number of future generations. Some of the worst effects would be caused by plutonium–239, named after the God of Hell, and the most toxic substance known to science, which has a half–life of 24,400 years which means it will not decay fully for millions of years. A few millionths of a gram of plutonium, if ingested or inhaled, can cause cancers of the lung and the gastrointestinal tract over a period of time. The victims of a nuclear explosion would experience a series of effects.

Professor Karl Z. Morgan, former chairman of the International Commission for Radiological Protection, describes these as follows:

The first effect is an intense flux of photons from the blast, which releases 70 to 80 per cent of the bomb’s energy. The effects go up to third–degree thermal burns, and are not a pretty sight. Initial deaths are due to this effect.
The next phenomenon is the supersonic blast front. You see it before you hear it. The pressure front has the effect of blowing away anything in its path. Heavy steel girders were found bent at 90–degree angles after the Japanese bombings.

After the front comes the overpressure phase. This would feel like being under water at a few hundred metres’ depth. At a few thousand metres under the sea, even pressurised hulls implode. The pressure gradually dies off, and there is a negative overpressure phase, with a reversed blast wind. This reversal is due to air rushing back to fill the void left by the explosion. The air gradually returns to room pressure. At this stage, fires caused by electrical destruction and ignited debris, turn the whole area into a firestorm.

Then come the middle term effects such as cell damage and chromosomal aberrations. Genetic or hereditary damage can show up up to 40 years after initial irradiation. In a nuclear blast, with a crude, first–generation Hiroshima or Nagasaki–type bomb, everything within a radius of 0.8 km would be vaporised, with 98 per cent fatalities. There would be firestorms raging at a velocity of 500 kmph and an unbearable overpressure of 25 pounds per square inch. Within a radius of 1.6 km, all structures above ground would be totally destroyed, and the fatality rate would be 90 per cent.In the next concentric circle, with a radius of 3 km, there would be severe blast damage. All factories and large buildings would collapse, as would bridges and flyovers. Rivers would flow counter–current. Winds would blow at 400 kmph. The fatality rate would be 65 per cent.

Next comes severe heat damage within a radius of 4 km: everything flammable burns. People would suffocate because most of the available oxygen would be consumed by the fires. The likely wind velocities: 200 kmph. Likely fatalities: 50 per cent. Injuries: 45 per cent.

In the fifth zone, with a radius of 5 km, winds would blow at 150 kmph. People would be blown around. The fatality rate would be 15 per cent plus. Most survivors would sustain second– and third–degree burns. Residential structures would be severely damaged.

A huge electromagnetic pulse would be produced by the radio-radar portion of the multiple–wavelength discharge of radiation. The EMP effect increases the higher you go into the atmosphere. High–altitude explosions can knock out electronics by inducing a current surge in closed circuit metallic objects — computers, power lines, phone lines, TVs, radios, etc. The damage range can be over 1,000 km.

All these effects would be magnified roughly 25 times if a thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb with an explosive yield of one megaton is burst over an altitude of 8,000 ft (i.e. about 2,500 metres). India claims to have developed just such a bomb. If a 20 megaton device — which is not difficult to make once the thermonuclear technology is learnt — is used, the destruction would be roughly 100–fold greater.

After a nuclear blast, all water bodies within a radius of 100 to 300 km would be dangerously contaminated. As would all vegetation and the soil. Cattle would be so severely exposed to radiation that milk could not be consumed. Underground aquifers would remain polluted for years. Not just cities, but whole regions, comprising anything between five and 20 districts, would become wastelands.

Millions of people would be severely traumatised and will never be able to live normal, sane lives. Children would be the worst affected, with lasting physical and psychological damage, most of it irreversible.

In the South Asia context, a nuclear attack would have clear trans-border consequences. Bombing Lahore will amount to signing the death warrant for half of Amritsar’s population. Radioactive fallout from Jalandhar will not leave Pakistan’s Punjab unaffected. And Bombay’s bombing could have devastating effects in Sindh. Nuclear weapons will act like boomerangs on both India and Pakistan. Using them would tantamount to committing suicide.

Among the early casualties in a nuclear explosion would be the civil defence and medical infrastructure. As International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War say, First Aid would be reduced to Last Aid. There will be, can be, no defence against a nuclear bomb. These are not fanciful scare–mongering scenarios, but sober estimates based on hard–core physics and biology, developed by Nobel Prize–winning scientists and physicians. These estimates must be treated with the utmost seriousness and gravity.

The threat of megadeath today hangs over India and Pakistan. The very circumstance that a nuclear war between the two is possible should alarm us all. But the situation may be even worse: an India–Pakistan nuclear exchange appears likelier than an East–West nuclear attack at any time during the Cold War except perhaps the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. This is not because Indian and Pakistani politicians and nuclear scientists are more irresponsible than those in America and the former USSR. It is more because South Asia is the only part of the world which has experienced a relentless hot-cold war over 50 years. It bristles with mutual hatreds, suspicions and hostility on so many counts that any of them could turn into a flashpoint — the Kashmir Valley, the border dispute in the eastern sector, military exercises getting out of hand, as happened in 1987 under Gen. K. Sundarji.

The very fact that the two states continue to sacrifice hundreds of men in fighting an insane war at Siachen — the world’s highest–altitude conflict, where it costs Rs.1.5 lakh to reach one chapati to a soldier — speaks of the profound irrationality that mark their relations. And today, their politicians are actually talking about using nuclear weapons — witness Dr Farooq Abdullah’s statement of June 8. Equally worrisome is the likelihood that both are working on battlefield-level tactful nuclear weapons.(Hence the sub–kiloton tests). These considerably lower the danger threshold.

There is, besides, the horrific likelihood of accidental, unauthorised or unintentional use of nuclear weapons. This is not some fantasy, but a real possibility. More than 100 such incidents occurred during the Cold War in spite of scores of confidence-building measures and precautionary procedures adopted by the two warring blocs. These included multiple hot lines, permissive action links (PALs, which are computer chips with codes for authorisation), early warning systems, false alarm filters, efficient radars and expensive control and communications systems.

A Brookings Institution study says that it was sheer luck, not nuclear deterrence, or fear of unacceptable damage that prevented a nuclear war between the two blocs.

At the height of the Cold War, the lag time between the NATO and Warsaw Pact was never less than 30 minutes. Their strategic missiles would take that long to reach their targets. In the case of India and Pakistan, the missile flight–time would be just two to three minutes — grossly inadequate to take remedial action or activate war–prevention procedures. And given that virtually no interception of missiles is possible, a nuclear warhead could almost certainly be delivered across the border before there is time to react — with devastating results.

Nuclear weapons and missiles are highly complex systems with strong coupling between different subsystems and processes and hence a high chance of accidents. There is no way that their accidental or unauthorised use can be reliably prevented. There is, besides, the real possibility of a group of overzealous officers launching an attack on the “enemy” on their own. Pakistan, for instance, has had a series of army coup attempts by Islamic fanatics. If they have access to nuclear weapons, they could play havoc.

You just cannot take chances with nuclear weapons. They are too destructive to be left with even an infinitesimally low chance of use. That is why they must never be made, leave alone deployed, especially in this subcontinent where the two governments are working up bestial responses to one another and indulging in open war–mongering.

All of us citizens who do not wish to be roasted to death and turned into radioactive dust must act to prevent nuclear weapons from being made or deployed. This is too important a task to be entrusted to governments, least of all governments led by recklessly irresponsible fanatics and bigots. We must act by building a citizens’ movement that mounts pressure on our government to stop in its tracks and get them to retrace steps.

They must commit themselves never to test again, and drop all plans to make nuclear weapons, leave alone think of using them or threatening to use them under any circumstances.
We must act NOW. Or it could soon be too late.

Archived from Communalism Combat, June 1998, Cover Story

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Gauri Lankesh was given the Anna Politkovskaya Award in 2017, posthumously. And everyone who knew him and read him knows that the one feature Praful shared with both women (and with other women journalists like Rana Ayyub) was his own indomitable courage as a journalist and his passion for investigative reporting. (In India eleven journalists were murdered in 2017. That is almost 25% of the total number murdered worldwide last year.)
 

  

There’s a good Wikipedia entry on Politkovskaya, her extraordinary reporting on the war in Chechnya, and her opposition to the regime in Russia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anna_Politkovskaya#cite_note-politkovskaya-16

For a sample of Praful’s own hard-hitting journalism, see http://www.prafulbidwai.org/index.php?post/2010/08/27/A-tightening-noose, as relevant as ever today when SC benches have actually been fixed to make sure the Court fails to order a proper probe into the murder of Justice Loya, the last in a chain of murders that leads back, of course, to the ‘fake encounters’ that Praful discusses in this piece.

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From the June 1998 Issue of Communalism Combat

Image: Asian Age

Atal Behari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif have two things in common. Both of them have ordered five nuclear tests, and both of them justified their orders by claiming that their nuclear weapons are defensive. This argument was invented by the Americans to justify their nuclear weapons, after the Soviet Union started to build its own nuclear weapons. It was such a convenient argument that all the nuclear states started to use it once they built nuclear weapons. Now every country with nuclear weapons claims that its weapons are defensive, it is just other countries’ nuclear weapons that are a threat.How are nuclear weapons a threat? The first answer given is that an enemy may threaten to use nuclear weapons as a way to intimidate or blackmail and so win a war. As the most destructive weapons ever made, nuclear weapons should make states that have them invincible. They should be able to win all their wars. In fact, no one should want to fight such states because they have nuclear weapons.

The facts of the last fifty years tell another story. Nuclear weapons states have elected to fight wars on many occasions. They have lost many of them. Britain fought and lost at Suez, even though it had already developed nuclear weapons. The United States suffered significant defeats during the Korean War and the war ended with a stalemate. The French lost Algeria, even though they had their nuclear weapons. China’s nuclear weapons did not help against Vietnam.
The most famous examples are of course the defeat of the United States in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan despite having enormous numbers of nuclear weapons. In all these cases, a non-nuclear state fought and won against a nuclear-armed state.

Another fact from the last fifty years is that having nuclear weapons offers no protection against nuclear threats. During the Cold War, both the US and the Soviet Union made nuclear threats numerous times, with the United States making around twenty such threats and the Soviet Union making five or six. Even though both sides had nuclear weapons, this did not change the fact that they were threatened by the other side. If a state with nuclear weapons is going to make a threat, it will do so regardless of whether the state being threatened has nuclear weapons of its own.

The only other use for nuclear weapons that has ever been claimed is that nuclear weapons are supposed to deter attacks by other nuclear weapons and so prevent war between nuclear armed states. This is what is usually meant by nuclear deterrence. The normal example of nuclear deterrence that is used is between the superpowers during the Cold War.

The absence of war between them is widely attributed to both sides having nuclear weapons. This cannot however be proven. All that can be said is that the absence of war coincided with both sides having nuclear weapons. It is not logical to deduce that nuclear weapons prevented a war that would otherwise have taken place. The absence of war between the United States and the Soviet Union may simply have been due to neither side wanting a war. The experience of total war in World War II was so terrible that this may have been sufficient to prevent a major war. It is worth remembering over 20 million Soviets were killed in that war.

The history of the Cold War is in fact the history of the elusive search for deterrence. As the years passed and became decades, the amount of destructive power needed to create deterrence kept on increasing. From a few simple atom bombs, it became hundreds of bombs, then thousands and then came the hydrogen bomb, with a destructive power a hundred times greater than an atom bomb.

But, even having a few such hydrogen bombs was not enough. McGeorge Bundy, who was an advisor in the White House during both the Cuban Missile Crisis, has argued that deterrence works only if “we assume that each side has very large numbers of thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs) which could be used against the opponent, even after the strongest possible pre-emptive attack.”

It is this kind of nuclear arsenal that is credited by Bundy, and other American supporters of deterrence as being responsible for maintaining the ‘nuclear peace’ between the United States and Soviet Union. The urge to have weapons that could survive a pre-emptive attack is why both sides developed nuclear submarines and specially hardened silos for missiles. This effort to create deterrence cost the United States at least $4 trillion ($4000,000,000,000) to develop, produce, deploy, operate, support and control its nuclear forces over the past 50 years.

The Americans were not alone in thinking that large numbers of hydrogen bombs that could survive a nuclear attack were necessary for deterrence. All five of the established nuclear weapons states have tried to achieve this kind of nuclear arsenal. None of them has stopped developing their arsenals once they built simple nuclear weapons. They have not even relied on large numbers of such simple weapons. They have gone on to build weapons ten, if not hundred or thousand, times more destructive.

Even the smallest nuclear arsenal, belonging to Britain, has 200 thermonuclear weapons with a collective destructive power two thousand times greater than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.

There are, however, some important dissenting voices which say that deterrence never worked. General George Lee Butler, who until a few years ago actually commanded all of the United States strategic nuclear weapons has said the world “survived the Cuban missile crisis no thanks to deterrence, but only by the grace of God.” If general Butler is right, and even the fear created by “very large numbers” of hydrogen bombs was not enough to stop two nuclear states getting ready to go to war, then what purpose is served by this fear? What this fear can do is stop peace. Even though the Cold War is over and the Soviet Union gone, the nuclear weapons are still there. The US still has over 10,000 and Russia about as many. The fear now is not the other state, but the other’s nuclear weapons. As long as there are nuclear weapons there cannot be real peace.

History teaches us that nuclear fears cannot be calmed with nuclear weapons. The simple truth is that there has never been a weapon that can offer a defence against being afraid. The only defence against fear is courage and courage needs no weapons to make its presence felt.

(The writer, a scientist of Pakistani origin, teaches at MIT, USA)

Archived from Communalism Combat, June 1998, Cover Story
 

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Musharraf launches ‘half–a–revolution’

It is a measure of the cynicism that pervades India’s political climate today that many commentators have responded to Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf’s major address to the nation of January 12 with the question: "But will he be able to deliver results? Can he change ground realities? Will he really be able to stop cross–border terrorism and bring Pakistan’s jehadi fanatics to heel?"

This in itself may not be an irrelevant question. But in the circumstances, it’s the wrong question to ask. More precisely, it puts the cart before the horse. The real issue is, what is the true meaning, import and significance of Musharraf’s speech? Does his address constitute a major transformatory change of intent, or a radical shift of purpose, or is it only a trivial or marginal change from the "normal" rhetoric that Pakistan’s officialdom resorts to when it is in crisis? Whether Musharraf can actually translate his intent into practical results logically comes after this question.

To honestly answer the first question, we must recognise, and frankly acknowledge, that on January 12, Pervez Musharraf did something few heads of states ever do — especially when they are beleaguered and in deep crisis. He subverted a major component, if not a pillar, of the ideological foundation which has sustained the edifice of Pakistani society and politics for two decades. He began a major surgical operation on the tumour of militant, political Islam which has long afflicted that country’s body politic. And he launched an ambitious programme of reform of society, the like of which South Asia has never seen before.

Musharraf’s January 12 address will go down as a landmark in this region’s history — even if it were to remain a catalogue of the many disorders that affect Pakistan and a list of pious intentions. But it is likely to turn out to be much more than that. It was preceded, and followed, by South Asia’s biggest–ever crackdown on communal bigots and terrorists. Already, some 2,000 "terrorist" suspects have been rounded up, five organisations including Lashkar–e–Toiba and Jaish–e–Mohammed banned, and 300 of their offices closed down, locked and sealed.

Some of our leaders have slowly, reluctantly, grudgingly, begun to acknowledge the significance of Musharraf’s reform agenda, although they see it purely in terms internal to Pakistan’s domestic politics. Thus LK Advani, fresh from a visit to the US, said (Jan. 16) the address was "path–breaking" from the internal point of view. And AB Vajpayee has finally said (Jan. 17) that Musharraf’s address has many "positive elements". Yet others, especially hawkish media commentators, have called it a successful and effective "public relations" exercise.

It will not do to minimise Musharraf’s address as a defensive or diversionary tactic aimed at appeasing Western powers on the terrorism issue. More than two–thirds of his speech was devoted to diagnosing the pathology of Pakistani society and politics and to outlining an agenda for internal reform, rather than on making concessions on "external" issues like India’s demand to take "decisive" action against its list of 20 terrorists. Of course, there was a degree of flamboyance that went with Musharraf’s much–publicised speech, but PR considerations, alone or mainly, cannot explain its thrust.

What Musharraf has unveiled is a plan to put Pakistan on the road to modernisation and secularisation by severing the links between political Islam and the state, between the military and the mullahs, and between Kashmir and terrorist violence. At the heart of the plan is trenchant criticism of Pakistan’s dangerous mix of religion and politics, and the disastrous consequences this has had on the state and civil society. Whether the general succeeds in achieving his objectives or not, and how soon, it must be conceded that his agenda represents perhaps the most ambitious reform programme undertaken in any country, barring Turkey under Kemal Ataturk, to deal with the issue of religion and politics.

It is certainly the boldest such agenda ever outlined in South Asia since Nehru’s ‘Tryst with Destiny’ speech at Independence.

Musharraf’s reform programme represents a complete reversal of the Islamisation project launched by Zia–ul–Haq to acquire a figleaf of legitimacy for his brutal military dictatorship and to transform the very character of Pakistan. The logic of Zia’s project eventually unfolded in its most developed form through the Taliban, through Pakistan’s attempt to virtually annex Afghanistan and acquire "strategic depth", and through the promotion of a variety of militant groups in West and South Asia, especially in Kashmir.

Musharraf has started cutting the umbilical cord between the Pakistani state and jehadi terrorism. One can argue that this is only the beginning of what is likely to be a prolonged process which will inevitably involve purging the army of pernicious religious–political influences, and even cleansing the ISI. It is by no means certain that Musharraf will succeed. The Pakistan situation is fraught with uncertainty, strife and danger. His agenda will antagonise some of his own military colleagues. He has hit out at the bigoted mullahs who for years have been the mainstay of fanatical groups. Successive governments, including Musharraf’s, have found it hard to rein in such men. Numerous jehadi militants, inflamed by the Taliban’s defeat in Afghanistan, are only waiting to get their claws into Musharraf.

Musharraf has thus embarked on an extraordinarily bold and risky mission. He may have done so under pressure, even compulsion. But that should not detract from the importance of his endeavour and coherence of his purpose. Far–reaching changes are sometimes brought about not because there is a "genuine" change of heart, but because "soft" options vanish, and there is a compelling need to change.

It is tempting to argue, as some Pakistani commentators have themselves done, that only a General (Musharraf) could have undone the legacy of another General (Zia). It is also easy to draw parallels between Musharraf and Algeria’s secular military junta, which a decade ago prevented radical Islamicists from taking power despite their clear victory in elections.

However, that would be trivialising the importance of the overall plan for Pakistan’s political reform, which started unfolding within a week of Musharraf’s address. This has a strong democratisation component, linked as it is with preparations to hold elections by the Supreme Court-stipulated October 2002 deadline, the abolition of communal electorates, and a 48 percent increase in the strength of the National Assembly, along with a new political initiative on Kashmir. So, while Ataturk never succeeded in democratising but only in secularising Turkey, and the Algerian junta forcefully snuffed out democracy, Musharraf’s broadly secular reform comes coupled with a momentum in favour of democratisation of Pakistan’s polity.

Therefore, it would be sheer nitpicking and pettifogging to fault Musharraf for the many omissions in his speech. True, he didn’t refer to the "Lahore process" or the "Shimla agreement". Of course, he didn’t own up the damage that Islamabad militants have caused to Kashmiri civilians, or apologise for it. But that was hardly the function of his address. Did Jaswant Singh and Vajpayee ask if he apologised for what the Taliban had done in Afghanistan when he joined the US-led "anti–terrorist" coalition which New Delhi uncritically supports? What is relevant is that Musharraf unconditionally condemned all forms of terrorism and the "Kalashnikov culture" of all religious extremism. Of equal significance was his insistence that Pakistani groups must not mess around in other countries — no matter what the cause.

It is wrong to make a rigid separation between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ components of Musharraf’s address. They are strongly, organically, inter–connected or related. Implicit in the insistence on limiting Pakistan’s external role is the view that the country has paid dearly because it pandered to pan–Islamic ideas and the vision of an ummah or Islamic brotherhood at least in this region. Musharraf wants Pakistan to be seen as a ‘normal’, moderate, non–aggressive, responsible nation in the region and the world.

Backing this up is Musharraf’s internal agenda, including the redefinition of jihad as a fight against poverty, illiteracy and backwardness, and strict regulation of madrassas and mosques through a system of registration. His radical plan can potentially transform Pakistan into a modern, forward–looking, open society which is no longer obsessed with religion, or crude, intolerant, interpretations of it. He has clearly posed the choice between this future, and a grim fate for Pakistan if it chooses to be a paranoid, closed, religion-obsessed, backward society.

And yet, despite all its far-reaching, courageous, bold and radical content, Musharraf’s agenda is flawed on two counts. One, it lacks the strong energies that can only come from a "perspective from below", one that arises from the struggles and daily activities of the working people. It is thus very much a revolutionary reform "from above". Secondly, it relies for its self–actualisation on the agency of the Pakistani state, itself a thoroughly corrupt, compromised and unreliable entity. Thus, on a demanding view, Musharraf is attempting only "half–a–revolution" although it is infinitely more ambitious than the conservatism and timidity of Vajpayee & Co.

Musharraf of course asserts that Kashmir "runs through our blood". But he has been careful to decouple Kashmir’s "freedom struggle" from terrorist militancy. And he has offered a dialogue on Kashmir. India must accept this in a spirit of openness, good faith and generosity. It just won’t do to acknowledge — as New Delhi does — that Kashmir is an issue, a dispute, a problem, albeit a bilateral one, and then refuse a bilateral dialogue on one pretext or other. There is a real danger today that failure to discuss Kashmir bilaterally, which India agreed to do at Lahore and Agra, will invite external intervention, with unpalatable consequences.

The US is in a uniquely powerful position today as a hegemonic power which is courted by both New Delhi and Islamabad. India has used the US as the central interlocutor in its post–December 13 strategy of brinkmanship. Having allowed America such a pivotal role, it cannot easily resist its friendly (or not–so–friendly) involvement in Kashmir — if bilateralism fails. Bilateralism must be made to work in its authentic spirit.

Equally important, India must immediately de–escalate its military build–up on the western border. It would be ill–advised to wait for Pakistan to "surrender" any of the 20 terrorists it has named. Musharraf cannot be easily pressurised into handing over any of the Pakistani nationals in that list to Interpol, leave alone to India. Equally unlikely is the surrender of Dawood Ibrahim or Chhota Shakeel, who in any case are gangsters rather than terrorists. India could perhaps get some former Khalistanis exiled in Pakistan handed over to some external agency. But that would be a minor consolation in relation to the substantial gain from Musharraf’s outlawing of JeM and LeT.

It would be unwise as well as unrealistic for India to cast itself in the mould of a superpower by demanding that Pakistan give up the 20 suspects, or else… For one, India has not established convincing links between them and the Parliament attack; it has just cited or raked up old cases. For another, the US was itself wrong, as this writer has earlier argued, to use military force in Afghanistan, without exhausting legal and diplomatic possibilities. It has ended up killing at least 3,700 innocent Afghans — 500 more people than were killed in New York’s Twin Towers. And for a third, India cannot bend its near–strategic equal Pakistan to its will, as the US could with its adversaries in Afghanistan. India is not a superpower which can arrogate to itself the "right" to crush terrorism outside its borders.

It is in New Delhi’s own interest to de–escalate the current eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. The present build–up is the largest ever, with half a million armed men pitted against one another. Anything can go wrong: a terrorist attack inspired by a rogue agency out to sabotage Musharraf’s plans, an overzealous local commander on either side getting hyperactive, or a plain South Asia–style goof–up. The consequences would be disastrous.

The longer India waits, the greater the chances of a mishap. Today, the Vajpayee government can draw some satisfaction from the fact that Musharraf has taken concrete action against JeM or LeT — although not entirely under India’s muscle-flexing. Colin Powell during his visit has delivered a message in favour of dialogue and de-escalation. If the government acts on its own, rather than under US goading, it might even claim a minor victory and hope that this will help BJP a little in Uttar Pradesh. But Vajpayee must draw the line here. Instead of indulging in more brinkmanship, he should try to find an imaginative solution to the Kashmir issue by widening the opening that has emerged in the Valley both as a result of the Taliban’s ignominious defeat and Musharraf’s new turn against jehadi terrorism. But first of all, Vajpayee must de–escalate.          

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8  No. 75-76, Cover Story 1

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— Pervez Hoodbhoy 
(Professor of physics at Quaid–e–Azam University, Islamabad)

There are many Kargils to come, I fear. Nuclear weapons have made brinksmanship possible, meaning that one hopes to get as close to war as possible without actually having war. India and Pakistan shall keep playing this game indefinitely until such time as a tragic error or miscalculation rules out further play. Pakistan is totally serious about Kashmir. Call it an obsession if you will, but facts are facts, and all indications are that its support for the militants will increase in times to come. This was the essential content of the speech by the chief of army staff, General Pervez Musharraf, in Karachi on April 10 this year. 

Presently there is much jubilation here in Pakistan about Indian planes and helicopters being downed. Sadly, most people don’t realise how close this pushes us to the brink, and have no idea of how total and final a fall would be. They also do not understand the immense cost which Pakistani civil society has paid for supporting insurgency in Kashmir. 

One should never have had illusions about the Lahore Declaration; it was a mere consequence of international pressure, particularly from the US, for the two prime ministers to look as if they are serious about peace. Even so, it was a good thing and every attempt to reduce enmity and tensions is to be welcomed. The bus service is still doing well, after all. I feel that we must welcome negotiations at all levels even if the results are marginal.

We must, however, also recognise that the basics have not changed, and probably will not change unless something very major happens. If that “something” is less than war, we shall be very fortunate. India and Pakistan are likely to make it past Kargil this time, and to the end of this millenium, with high probability. But unless there is a radical departure from past behaviour, I doubt that we will make it past the next few decades ahead. 

Adopt a dual strategy
— Praful Bidwai 
(A senior journalist and founder member of Movement in India  on Nuclear Disarmament)

The peace movement in both countries should not assume it knows the answer.  Rather, it should adopt a dual strategy: advocate normalisation and progress in all areas,  independently of Kashmir; and call for a  modest beginning at coming to  grips with the Kashmir issue while the general relationship improves.

The first strategy is minimalist and worth pursuing regardless of the second. There is simply no reason why the grotesque conflict at Siachen, which has killed 10,000 and costs Rs. 3 crores a day, should  not be resolved or the Wular, Sir Creek and  trade  issues should remain undecided even though Kashmir is not settled. But this needs a much deeper commitment than was shown at Lahore. “Bus diplomacy” was symbolically welcome, but substantively very thin. The Lahore accords were not even about arms control, only about limited transparency.  India and Pakistan didn’t even agree to slow down  nuclear and missile development or to  stop  testing. Lahore didn’t mark a real breakthrough. We still need one.

As for Kashmir, it is vitally important that a process of discussion begins. But this must be defined and enunciated, first and foremost, by the Kashmiri people themselves.

Fortunately, a beginning seems to have been made. At the Hague Appeal for Peace conference last month, a cross–border dialogue took place among Kashmiris from different political tendencies, from the JKLF and the Hurriyat to Pannun Kashmir. This needs to be built upon.

Durable peace requires Kashmir solution and more
— Zia Mian
(Scientist of Pakistani origin teaching at MIT, USA)

There can be no doubt that both Indians and Pakistanis, must talk about Kashmir, with the Kashmiris, and find a solution. Unless there is a settlement over Kashmir, that the Kashmiris feel reflects their aspirations, any peace between India and Pakistan may not thrive or survive. Until it is erased from the maps and from people’s minds, the Line of Control will always be a place for Lack of Control, especially for demagogues and would be heroes. 
At the same time, it may be un–reasonable to assume that a settlement of the Kashmir issue would in itself create lasting peace. One of the lessons of the end of the Cold War was that even though the Soviet Union is no more, its nuclear weapons remain (about 10,000 are operational), as do those of the United States (about 8,000 are operational). Both are still prepared to fight a thermonuclear war against each other, and in the process obliterate themselves and the rest of us. The Cold War has led to a bitter, resentful, grudging, nuclear armed Cold Peace. At times it is hard to tell the difference between the two. 

Both these aspects must be kept in mind. A durable peace in the region needs a solution to Kashmir, but it requires far more. This requires that we rid ourselves of nuclear weapons. We must overcome nationalism as an ideology, transform the state as a political institution, and bring justice within society. 

In the situation we are now in, with fighting along the Line of Control and nuclear weapons casting their terrible shadow over the region, there has to be movement towards peace no matter what. If nothing else, it can be narrow and focussed on tiny steps forward, for example restraining nuclear weapons development and deployment, loosening the restrictions on people’s travel across the border, increasing trade and so on. But unless Kashmir is addressed there is always the danger that it will be the kind of movement where for every one step forward there shall be two steps backward. 

This is what seems to have happened with the Lahore Declaration. 
There should however not be too many illusions about the Lahore Declaration. It was the same two leaders who talked peace in Lahore who earlier had ordered the nuclear weapons tests. It was expedient, given international opinion, for them to stop fighting (at least for a while) and make up. Once the world moved on to other issues,  the battle was resumed. 
 

Track two has a limited objective
— J.N. Dixit
(Former Indian foreign secretary)

The thing to remember is that track–two diplomacy has been going on, through various initiatives, for the last ten years. What has been most significantly observed about such intiatives is that they have no impact on government policy at all. On either side, in Pakistan or in India, the power structures of the two governments do not take into account either what is discussed at these fora or the recommendations made. So while track–two diplomacy may be broadly useful, the immediate impact is not noticeable.

What happens at a time when we are faced with a situation like we presently are in at Kargil? Even those individuals who are committed to peace and rational thinking on such issues get disappointed and wonder how to carry on because, when a territorial dispute arises, popular resentment and national feelings are aroused. Even the people who are committed to the improvement of relations between the two neighbours are faced with a wider public opinion that becomes antagonistic. 

In Pakistan, newspapers, television and radio report news of the bombing of “our schools and the killing of our children”. In India, the heavy casualties, the violation of the sanctity of an international agreement — the incursion beyond the LOC seven–ten miles into our territory — all in the face of Pakistan claiming not to have made any mistake raises temperatures.

I do believe that for at least one year, even government–level talks are not going to make serious headway. The foreign ministers may meet several times over — so that the world cannot tell us that we are being unreasonable — but the inner impulses on either side will not contribute to coming to any reasonable compromises on either side.

Track one diplomacy gets vitiated by such developments such as the current situation in Kargil. And track two efforts serve a limited objective: they keep alive trends in public opinion and are important at that level but are limited in their impact and reach. Unfortunately, what is a forgone conclusion today is that even if there was earlier some possibility of imminent solutions, these have been irretrievably delayed further. 
 

The situation will defuse soon
— Dr. Mubashir Hasan
 (Former finance minister, Pakistan)

The process started by both the prime ministers, Nawaz Sharif and Atal Behari Vajpayee envisaged clearly talking on all issues including Kashmir. Unfortunately this unique intitiative, the first of its kind in fifty years, was first put off, or delayed by the dissolution of the Indian Lok Sabha and has now been stalled by the recent operations in Kargil. I foresee that grim though the situation in Kargil today seems, it will defuse within ten–fifteen days time. 

We must also remember that whenever the two governments come close to resolving issues or making a beginning even, something occurs to put a spoke in the wheel. It could be much–publicised news of USA supplying F16s to Pakistan that makes the Indians angry or it could be the news of a big explosion on Pakistani soil that makes the Pakistanis angry! These are the considered machinations of those international powers who do not want regional peace in South Asia. The Sharif–Vajpayee governments were for the first time in the process of co–relating their nuclear policies. An identical nuclear policy is in the interest of both Pakistan and India. This is not what vested international powers want.
 

Await more stable governments
— Nirmal Mukherjee 
(Former Indian cabinet secretary and governor, Punjab)

I don’t believe that the doings of peace groups are undone. I believe the urge for peace remains unchanged. The current situation in Kargil is illustrative of the games regimes play. My own view is that India is going through a situation of political flux (as our former prime minister, V.P. Singh has been saying) except that I feel that the results of the next election will be another pre–final. Until the voice of the oppressed, the vast majority, gets finally heard. In the midst of this flux, with weak governments at the helm, peace activists cannot do too much. They must hold their fire, conserve their energy, remain in touch, gather as many facts, and as much information about each other, as possible. And await a political climax over the next decade when the moves for peace find receptive listeners in government.
 

Peace pressure must continue
— B.M. Kutty
(Convenor, Pakistan Peace Coalition; also secretary, Sind province committee of Pak–India People’s Forum for Peace and Democracy)

It is true that the situation  presently looks very bleak and  frustrating. Something like the recent developments in Kargil appear to undermine by months and years the efforts put in by pro–peace organisations and individuals on both sides. But peace groups cannot afford to give up in either country. The argument for people to people contact, the need for increased interaction, remains as valid today as it was before. So, irrespective of what happens at the government level, we should go on pressing for further contacts.

Also peace groups cannot close their eyes to the fact that Kashmir remains a very sensitive issue between the two countries and a resolution of this issue is essential for durable peace. It has acquired a hydra–headed character that cannot be pushed under the carpet. We, therefore, will have to evolve perspectives for a resolution of the problem and thereafter mount pressure on the government on both sides to act on them. 

To begin with, a few things are very clear. The Kashmir problem cannot be solved militarily — neither by India’s military action nor by Pakistan’s intervention through support to this or that group. Both the governments have to agree that the people of Kashmir also count — no agreement will work unless it enjoys the confidence of the Kashmiri people. 

I personally believe that unless people of Kashmir on both sides are given an absolutely free choice, with no Indian troops present and without any Pakistani involvement, there will be no solution possible.
 

Kashmir’s accession to India is final
— Vishnu Bhagwat
(Former Chief of the Indian Navy)

In my mind, there can be no question of any moves towards lasting peace within the region being at all feasible with Pakistan insisting on intervention in Kashmir. This is true not only in the context of the recent infiltration in Kargil but in the context of Jammu and Kashmir as a whole. For India and for me, the question of Kashmir and its accession are final through the instrument of accession and no Indian government has any right to indulge in any kind of bargaining so far as the question of the status of Jammu and Kashmir within the Indian union is concerned. This is because, in more ways than one, Kashmir is not only the symbol of Indian secularism but the sine qua non of both the secular Indian constitution and the secular India state. It is literally the head of the body that is India. The will of the people of Kashmir was behind the accession of Kashmir to India as opposed to the rulers of not just Kashmir but Hyderabad, Junagadh and Jaipur who wanted independent status, their treaties with the British having lapsed. Under no circumstances can any state of the Indian union, be it Punjab, Kashmir or a government at the centre be encouraged or permitted to take on a non–secular, theocratic garb. 

On all other issues like trade and business, people–to–people links, cultural exchanges these are welcome since we are basically the same people. But I strongly feel that Kashmir cannot be a part of these levels of exchanges. Here I would like to quote the example of Abraham Lincoln who held the American union together at the cost of a civil war knowing full well the implications of such a war. Secession was something that was never entertained as a possibility let alone an eventuality. 

Archived from Communalism Combat, June 1999, Year 6  No. 54, Cover Story 2

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