Article 22(5) of the Constitution states as follows:

“When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.”

Article 22 of the Constitution also states that no law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than 3 months unless an advisory board consisting of person who are or have been qualified to be appointed as judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention.

State and preventive detention

As the institution of the state grows more powerful, it often manages to impose its will, sometimes at the expense of citizens’ basic freedoms. This is evident when individuals are denied bail and kept in jail for years, as seen in the case of Umar Khalid, who remains imprisoned without trial under various statutes.

Given these circumstances, it becomes crucial to recognize, document, and understand the procedural responsibilities of the state, particularly in relation to personal freedoms. In this context, the Supreme Court’s judgement in Jasheela Shaji vs. Union of India [2024 INSC 683] becomes especially important to examine.

Background of the case

The Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974(COFEPOSA) provides for preventive detention in certain cases for the purpose of conservation and augmentation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of smuggling activities and such connected matters.

Section 3(1) of the Act gives powers to the Central Government or the State government to empower an officer not below the rank of secretary to make an order for a person, including a foreigner, be detained with a view to prevent such person from smuggling or abetting the smuggling of goods, engaging or transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, or dealing in smuggled goods in other ways or harbouring people engaged in smuggling goods.

Pursuant to this power, the Detaining Authority had passed an order on August 31, 2023 to detain Appisserlil Kochu Mohammed Shaji (A.K.Shaji-the detenu) with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the augmentation of foreign exchange in future.

After being taken into custody on September 2, 2023, the Detenu was sent to the Central Prison, Poojapura, Trivandrum. On September 6, the grounds of detention were served against the detenu. Apart from the detenu’s statements, WhatsApp Chats, Voice Calls, Images revered from his Mobile etc, the detaining authority had relied on the statements of two people — Suresh Babu and Ms. Preetha Pradeep.

According to the Constitutional right under Article 22(5), the detenu had made representations to all three – the detaining authority, the Central Government and the Advisory Board. Since the central government or the detaining authority did not receive the representation, the former confirmed the August 31 detention order and directed that the detenu be detained for a period of one year from September 2, 2023.

When the detenu approached the Kerala High Court under a Habeas Corpus petition, the Court on March 4, 2024, dismissed the petition leading to the appeal at the Supreme Court.

Arguments

Appellant’s arguments:

1. The appellants counsel argued that the detention order clearly mentions that the statements of Ms. Preetha Pradeep were relied upon by the detaining authority while arriving at subjective satisfaction to pass the detaining order on August 31, 2023. The said statements were not provided to the detenu, thus affecting the right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. Counsel also submitted that the High Court had erred in deciding that the detaining authority could have arrived at the same decision without relying on Ms. Preetha Pradeep’s statements and thus, the detaining order is liable to be set aside.

2. The Detenu submitted the representation to the Jail Authorities on September 27, 2023, for onward transmission to the detaining authority and the central government—which were sent by ordinary post and could not be traced. After the notice was issued in the present case, records were called from the jail authorities and the representations were subsequently rejected by both the authorities on June 11 and 12, 2024. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the delay in transmitting the representations as well as the delay caused in deciding the representations would also adversely affect the right of the detenu for effective and speedy disposal of the representations.

3. Another submission was that the memorandum passed by the Central Government rejecting the representation of detenu shows that there was no real and proper consideration in lieu of absence of reasons.

4. On these counts, the counsel for the appellant had argued that the detention order be quashed and set aside.

Respondents’ arguments 

1. The counsel for the respondent argued that the Detaining Authority had correctly determined the detenu’s involvement in illegal foreign currency transactions based on the statement of Suresh Babu and WhatsApp messages. These materials demonstrated, according to the respondents’ arguments, the detenu’s engagement in hawala dealings, and the illegal purchase and sale of foreign currencies.

2. The counsel stated that the detenu’s case was referred to the State Advisory Board, which found sufficient grounds for detention, even if the statement of Ms. Preethi Pradeep was excluded. They relied on the case of Vakil Singh vs. The State of J&K [(1975) 3 SCC 545] to argue that “the grounds must contain the pith and substance of primary facts but not subsidiary facts or evidential details.” The case of Sowkath Ali vs. Union of India [(2000) 7 SCC 148] was also cited to maintain that if one ground for detention is unsustainable, the order can still be upheld based on other valid grounds.

3. Regarding the supply of documents, the counsel cited the case of M.S. Ummu Saleema vs. B.B. Gujara [(1981) 3 SCC 317], asserting that it is not necessary to furnish a copy of each and every document to which casual or passing reference may be made during the narration of facts, especially if those documents were not relied upon by the Detaining Authority when making the detention order. On the issue of delay in deciding the detenu’s representations, the counsel argued that the representations dated September 27, 2023 were not received by the Detaining Authority or the Central Government. However, following a court notice, the representations were decided in June 2024, and they maintained this did not constitute a delay.

The judgement:

The court addressed two key issues regarding the detenu’s right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India: (a) the impact of non-supply of Ms. Preetha Pradeep’s statement on the detenu’s ability to make an effective representation, and (b) the non-receipt and delay in deciding the detenu’s representation by the Detaining Authority and Central Government.

On the issue of not serving statements of Ms. Preetha Pradeep.

On the first issue, the court referred to previous judgments, highlighting that under Article 22(5), the detenu must be provided with the grounds of detention and any documents relied on by the Detaining Authority as soon as practicable. The right to make an effective representation would be compromised if such documents were not provided. It was emphasized that even if the detenu was already aware of the document’s contents, the failure to supply them would still violate their rights. The court cited the case of M. Ahamedkutty vs. Union of India [(1990) 2 SCC 1], affirming that documents forming the basis of detention must be given to the detenu, without which their representation would be incomplete.

The court also acknowledged the reliance on the case of L.M.S. Ummu Saleema vs. B.B. Gujaral [(1981) 3 SCC 317], which held that it is not necessary to supply documents casually referenced in the detention grounds if they are not relied upon by the Detaining Authority. However, the failure to supply crucial documents relied on for the detention decision would violate the detenu’s rights. The court reiterated that only those documents instrumental in the detention order must be provided, as noted in the case of Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran vs State of Tamil Nadu [(2000) 9 SCC 170]. This distinction was crucial in affirming that selective non-disclosure can affect the detenu’s constitutional rights.

The court examined the detention order which was based on eight key factual aspects, leading the authority to the conclusion- that the detenu had engaged in activities harming the country’s foreign exchange. Two significant statements by Ms. Preetha Pradeep, made on 5th and 6th July 2023, were central to the case. In her statements, she revealed transactions involving large sums of money being transferred to and from Suresh Forex Services Pvt. Ltd., with Shaji and Suresh Babu involved. These statements were crucial in establishing the link between the detenu and these transactions.

The court noted that these statements were not just casual references but were pivotal in forming the Detaining Authority’s “subjective satisfaction” about the detenu’s involvement in illegal activities. In addition to Preetha’s statements, other pieces of evidence, including statements from Suresh Babu and the detenu himself, were also considered.

However, the non-supply of Preetha’s statements to the detenu violated his right to an effective defense under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The court concluded that these documents were integral to the case and their absence prevented the detenu from making a proper representation. Thus, the detention order was deemed invalid due to the non-supply of vital material.

On whether the delay in considering the detenu’s representation violated his fundamental rights under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution

The court emphasised that Article 22(5) of the Constitution mandates the government to provide the detenu with the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the detention order. This representation must be considered promptly to ensure that the detenu’s rights are protected. The court found that a significant delay in considering such representations undermines this constitutional safeguard, indicating that the prolonged detention without timely review violates fundamental rights.

The court referenced several landmark cases to illustrate the importance of prompt handling of representations:

• Tara Chand vs. State of Rajasthan[(1981) 1 SCC 416]: This case highlighted that a one-month delay in transmitting a representation from jail to the detaining authority demonstrated gross negligence, violating the provisions of Article 22(5).
• Rattan Singh vs. State of Punjab [(1981) 4 SCC 481]: The court reinforced that, regardless of the detenu’s alleged unlawful activities, it is critical to adhere to legal requirements for speedy consideration of representations. The judgment underscored the necessity of lawful procedures being followed in all cases.
• Aslam Ahmed Zahire Ahmed Shaik vs. Union of India [(1982) 2 SCC 43]: In this case, the court stressed that delays caused by intermediary authorities, like jail officials, are unacceptable. A seven-day delay in forwarding the representation to the appropriate government body was criticized, emphasizing that such delays compromise the constitutional rights of the detenu.

These cases collectively affirm the court’s stance that undue delays in addressing representations not only contravene constitutional protections but also render continued detention unlawful.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the negligent handling of the representation resulted in a delay of nearly nine months in its consideration. Consequently, the court quashed the detention order, asserting that the detenu’s right to a timely decision on his representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution had been violated. The court ordered the immediate release of the detenu if he was not required in any other case.

Checks against preventive detention

Criminal Justice jurisprudence across the world has emphasised on the importance of checks and balances against preventive detention, even during the most urgent grounds such as national security.

The Hamdi v. Rumsfeld [542 U.S. 507 (2004)] ruling underscored that American citizens designated as enemy combatants have the right to contest their detention in court, emphasising due process protections even during wartime. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg highlighted the necessity of judicial oversight over executive power, asserting that Congress did not grant unchecked authority for indefinite detention. This decision significantly shaped preventive detention jurisprudence by reinforcing the importance of civil liberties amidst national security concerns.

After 9/11, the UK detained eleven foreign nationals suspected of terrorism under a state of emergency, but later the House of Lords ruled this scheme unlawful. The Court emphasized that detention must be justified, adhere to national laws, and not be arbitrary. It found the indefinite detention of non-nationals disproportionate and discriminatory, violating Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.[1]

Procedural checks mitigate the risk of discrimination inherent in preventive detention. History shows that marginalized groups are often disproportionately targeted by security measures. Implementing fair procedures protects vulnerable populations from bias and ensures that detention decisions are based on objective criteria rather than prejudice. These safeguards also promote accountability by compelling authorities to adhere to legal standards and providing regular reviews of detention cases, ensuring that individuals are not held indefinitely without justification.

[1] A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC] – 3455/05

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The post SC: Preventive Detention without following basic safeguards invalid appeared first on SabrangIndia.

On April 10, while setting aside a preventive detention order, the Supreme Court noted that such preventive detention laws in India are a colonial legacy with a high potential for abuse and misuse. The Court emphasized that these laws allowing the state with arbitrary powers must be scrutinized and used only in the rarest of the rare cases.

A Bench of Justice Krishna Murari and Justice V. Ramasubramanian said that, “Every procedural rigidity, must be followed in entirety by the Government in cases of preventive detention, and every lapse in procedure must give rise to a benefit to the case of the detenue. The Courts, in circumstances of preventive detention, are conferred with the duty that has been given the utmost importance by the Constitution, which is the protection of individual and civil liberties.”

This judgment hold true as preventive detention laws in India can be traced back to the early days of colonial rule. The then enactment Bengal State Prisoners Regulation III of 1818 had allowed detention without trial. It was extended by the British to other provinces and eventually took the shape of Defence of India Acts of 1915, justified as World War I measures.

It is important to note here that the numerous preventive detention laws and anti-terror legislations that exist in our country have become a vital component of India’s legal system, despite the fact that they were not intended to be. The state is abusing these laws to limit the personal liberty guaranteed to individuals in the Indian Constitution. Apart from National Security Act, the main law on preventive detention, we have the Prevention of Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988; the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974; the Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980; and the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, to name a few. In addition to this, almost every state has a Goondas Act, such as the U.P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970.

The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, is one of the most frequently invoked pieces of legislation that includes a provision for preventive detention. According to central government data, there have been 450 preventive detentions in Jammu and Kashmir since the abrogation of Article 370. Among the detainees are some of the state’s most prominent leaders and ex-CMs, including Farooq Abdullah, Omar Abdullah, and Mehbooba Mufti. These detentions have nothing to do with national security; the government enacted these laws to silence opposition voices.

Decades have passed, and instead of moving towards building a system where no state agencies have the power of infringing upon the individual liberty guaranteed to us, we are still stuck at the same position, with laws with vague wording and wide aspects allowing detention with trial and disbarring anticipatory bail.

The Indian courts have repeatedly reminded the state and its agencies that preventive detention laws are not intended to be used as tools of abuse. In June 2022, the Supreme Court had stated that powers under the preventive detention law are “exceptional” and cannot be used on a regular basis because they impinge on an individual’s freedom and liberty. The observation came as the Supreme Court overturned a detention order for two people in Telangana. Because these laws are highly administratively steered and limit the scope of judicial intervention, they sometimes place unrestrained and largely unsupervised power in the hands of the executive without any liability, allowing for grave misuse of such powers.

In November 2022, the Madras High Court had dealt with two writ petitions which were filed to issue a writ of habeas corpus against the detention orders passed by the District Magistrate and quashed the same and had directed the respondents to produce the body or person of the detenus. The division bench of M.S. Ramesh and N. Anand Venkatesh held that the impugned detention orders suffer from infirmity and illegality, thus set aside the same, and directed the respondent to release the detenus and pay them compensation. The Court had also examined the previous Prison Statistics India Report, and observed that Tamil Nadu had occupied an unenviable first place in detaining the maximum number of people under its preventive laws in the entire country, and had said that the inferences drawn can be twofold, either the State is inching towards lawlessness or that the jurisdiction of suspicion has now become a convenient and potent weapon in the hands of the law enforcing agencies to indiscriminately detain people by a conscious abuse of its statutory powers.

The Madras HC had further said that preventive laws have become the favourite hunting ground for the police and an instrument of convenience, whereby common criminals and undesirables are dealt with, on the sure knowledge that once a detention order is passed, such persons are bound to be jailed for at least 3-6 months, pending reference to the Advisory Board or a challenge before this Court by way of a habeas corpus petition.

On April 20, 2023, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court pointed out that the detaining authority had used the expressions “Public Order” and “Security of the State” with an wavering mind and uncertainty when issuing the detention order for Journalist Fahad Shah. A bench of Justice Wasim Sadiq Nargal noted that “public order” and “security of the State” are distinct concepts, though not always separate, and that while every breach of peace may amount to disturbance of law and order, every such breach does not amount to disturbance of public order, and every public disorder may not prejudicially affect “security of the State.”

Concentrating on the mandate of Section 8 of the Public Safety Act, the bench observed that the maintenance of public order and Security and Sovereignty of the country are two distinct expressions with different connotations that are demarcated on the basis of gravity and cannot be used concurrently, proving beyond any doubt that the detaining authority did not apply its mind when passing the order of detention.

The bench then directed for the detention order of journalist Fahad Shah to be quashed. The bench was hearing a Habeas Corpus petition filed by Fahad’s elder brother, who was challenging his detention order, pursuant to which he had been placed under preventive detention in accordance with an order issued by the District Magistrate of Srinagar.

Attention also needs to be given to the time it usually takes to apply for, let alone secure, judicial relief benefits the executive, something which they are fully aware of and take advantage if. Even when such laws are found to be misused, the ultimate goal of keeping the person behind bars for an extended period of time is met, as has been happing since the last 9 years. Even though the Supreme court has consistently stood up to any violation of citizens’ fundamental rights, the fact is that the high backlog of pending cases that is currently overburdening courts means that writ petitions against preventive detention orders take several months to be heard. In many cases, the bail cases mentioned before Supreme Court yield no result and have to be sent back to the lower courts as the judgments passed by them are lacking. As a result, the process becomes the punishment.

Brief Facts of the current case

In November 2021, officers from the Directorate of Revenue in Delhi arrested the appellant and other syndicate members based on an intelligence report about a syndicate of Chinese, Taiwanese, South Korean, and Indian nationals smuggling gold into India.

The DRI sent a proposal to the Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA) in January 2022 to issue an order of detention under the COFEPOSA Act against the appellant, and the detaining authority then passed the detention order in February 2022, and the appellant was arrested by the DRI.

The appellant sent a representation letter to the Central Government and then to the Advisory Board. Following a hearing, the Advisory Board advised the Central Government to reject the representation, which was done after a 60-day delay. The appellant then petitioned the High Court to quash the detention order, but it was dismissed on November 3, 2022.

However, due to the death of his father, the Court released the appellant from custody in January 2023 as interim relief. He was later released from detention because the detention order had expired.

The appellant has filed an appeal with the Supreme Court against the Delhi High Court’s November 3, 2022 judgment wherein the High Court had denied the appellant’s request to vacate the detention order due to a delay in hearing his representation.

Arguments put forth in the current case:

Counsel for the appellant:

The appellant’s counsel contended that, under Article 22(5) of the Indian Constitution, a representation made by the detainee in cases of preventive detention must be considered as soon as possible, and that an excessive delay in considering the representation is grounds for the detention order to be set aside.

The counsel cited the decisions given by the Apex Court in the case sof K.M. Abdulla Kunhi & B.L. Abdul Khader v. Union of India & Ors and Ankit Ashok Jalan v. Union of India & Ors. Judgment, both of which are Constitution Bench judgments, where it has been stated that the Central Government must wait for the decision of the Advisory Board, are in direct contravention with Constitution Bench judgments of this Court in Pankaj Kumar Chakraborty And Ors. v. State of West Bengal and the Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal, and due to the apparent conflict, the issue needs to be referred to a Larger Bench.

It was also argued that the documents provided to the appellant herein as grounds for his preventive detention were illegible and in Chinese, and thus the impugned detention order as against the appellant must be quashed on this basis as well.

Contentions of the respondents:

The respondents contended that there was no difference between the Pankaj and the Ashok Jalan cases, as argued by the appellant. They claimed that the appellant’s decisions were made under the Preventive Detention Act, whereas the Ashok Jalan and Abdullah Kuni cases were made under the COFEPOSA Act.

Analysis by the Court

1. Application of preventive detention laws.

According to the Supreme Court, preventive detention laws in India are a colonial legacy with a high potential for abuse and misuse. Laws with the potential to grant the state arbitrary powers must be scrutinized in all circumstances and used only in the most exceptional of circumstances.

The Court also stated that in cases of preventive detention, where a person is detained not for a crime committed but for a perceived risk of committing a crime, courts should always err on the side of caution and give the detainee the benefit of the doubt. Even minor procedural violations should be resolved in the detainee’s favor.

2. Delay in representation

According to the Supreme Court, in cases of COFEPOSA Act preventive detention, the detainee has the right to make representations to the detaining authority, the Government, and the Advisory Board. These representations must be decided as soon as possible, according to Article 22(5) of the Indian Constitution. The detainee is released if the representation is accepted by the government or the detaining officer. If the representation is rejected, the detention period is extended.

The Court found in this case that, while the detaining authority considered the appellant’s representation promptly, the Government took 60 days to consider it. The appellant contended that the delay was fatal to the prosecution’s case and was sufficient reason to vacate the detention order.

The Court held in the Pankaj Kumar Case that the central government must act independently of the Advisory Board and can decide the detenue’s representation without hearing from the Advisory Board.

The Court also cited the case of Abdulla Kunhi, in which the petitioner’s preventive detention under the COFEPOSA Act was challenged on the same grounds. This Court’s Constitution Bench considered the issues of submitting a representation before and after the matter was referred to the Advisory Board, and held that the Government must wait for the Advisory Board’s decision before making its own decision on the representation.

The Court observed that, while the two sets of judgments appear to be in conflict at first glance, a closer examination reveals otherwise.

The Court went on to explain that a detention order can be issued by either the government or a specially empowered officer under the COFEPOSA Act of 1974 and the Preventive Detention Act of 1950. Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, on the other hand, requires the empowered officer to seek approval from the Government for continued detention within 12 days of the detention. Only with the approval of the government can the detention be extended. After the initial 12-day period, this approval process effectively transfers power from the empowered officer to the government, making the government the detaining authority. The COFEPOSA Act, on the other hand, does not require such approval from the government, allowing the detaining authority and the government to remain separate and independent, as per the Court.

The Court made it clear that the mandate not to wait for the Advisory Board would only apply to the detaining authority. However, according to the Abdullah Kunhi Case, the Government must wait for the Advisory Board’s decision. There is no conflict between these two judgments because they apply to two separate authorities under the COFEPOSA Act. As a result, the court held that there was no need to refer this point of law to a Larger Bench because it has already been decided.

3. Supply of illegible documents cause prejudice

The Court stated that illegible documents provided to the detainee during preventive detention can jeopardize the detainee’s ability to file a representation. This violates the principles outlined in Article 22(5) of the Indian Constitution, which states that the detaining authority must explain the reasons for detention in a language that the detainee understands. It was determined that in such cases, the relief under Article 22(5) and the statutory provisions are void because the detenue cannot defend himself against an unknown threat.

The Court noted that the High Court had quashed the co-detainee’s detention order on the same grounds of illegible Chinese documents. It was noted that the current appellant’s circumstances were identical to those of the co-detainee. Analyzing the case, the Court had noted that the principle of parity applies in the present case since a co-detainee with identical circumstances had already been granted relief of quashing the detention order against him. In the case of Gian Chand v. Union of India & Anr., the court held that the principle of parity must apply in such cases.

Conclusion

Owing to the analysis provided above, the court set aside the detention order in the current case and concluded that, “This act of protecting civil liberties, is not just the saving of rights of individuals in person and the society at large, but is also an act of preserving our Constitutional ethos, which is a product of a series of struggles against the arbitrary power of the British state.”

The Court held that although the appellant has already been released due to the expiration of the detention period, the detention order must be set aside for the sake of clarity on the point of law. Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal.

The full order can be read here:

According to the preceding order, the right to legal consultation and representation should be viewed not only through a constitutional or statutory lens, but rather as a right that flows from the right to enjoy personal liberty, which is a fundamental human right. It is impossible for a layperson unfamiliar with legal knowledge and with no prior experience of such a situation to understand the reasons for his detention in the complicated world of law, and thus, safeguards had been put in place by our lawmakers. It is necessary to note that countries like United States of America and the United Kingdom are alien to the concept of preventive detention laws. Their criminal justice system works on due process of law. No other nation except India exercises preventive detention during peacetime.

As previously stated, courts have repeatedly held that statutory powers restricting an individual’s personal liberty should be used diligently, with great care, and not on a regular basis. Unfortunately, it appears that this advice has only scratched the surface and is falling on deaf ears, as the government continues to abuse these powerful weapons. Indeed, in many cases, such overarching regulations arose from the colonial State’s desire to suppress collective personal liberties of those in dissent. The fact that the leaders of a post-colonial, democratic polity have not been able to muster the will, or even the resolve, to repeal these laws points to a damaging loop of misuse and abuse. The excruciatingly long time it takes our legal system to dispose of such proceedings, combined with the detainee’s lack of any redressal mechanism other than the filing of writ petitions for quashing of preventive detention orders, ensures that the individual perpetually victimised. As a result, the ultimate goal of the detainee’s political or personal detention is catered to. Preventive detention gives the executive enormous power. Indian history bears witness to its draconian application against people who are accused of conspiring against the state or society. Thus, preventive detentions laws should no longer be viewed as a double edges sword that Indian cannot do away with or a necessary evil that we have to bear, these are colonial laws that serve authoritarian regimes, and must be repealed.

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On January 5, a division bench of the Gujarat High Court had quashed a detention order on the grounds that the mere filing of FIRs without any linkage to the violation of public order cannot bring the detainee’s case within the purview of the definition in section 2(b) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985.  

While granting the petition, Justices Vipul M. Pancholi and Hemant M. Prachchhak made the following observations: 

“it appears that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law, inasmuch as the offences alleged in the FIRs cannot have any baring on the public order as required under the Act and other relevant penal laws are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and that the allegations as have been levelled against the detenue cannot be said to be germane for the purpose of bringing the detenue within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act.” (Para 5)

Arguments by the counsel for the petitioner:

•  Mr. Bhavin S Raiyani, counsel for the petitioner, argued that, aside from the statement of witnesses, registration of the above FIRs, and Panchnama drawn in pursuance of the investigation, no other relevant and cogent material is on record connecting the detainee’s alleged anti-social activity with breach of public order, and thus the detention order should be set aside.

•  The advocate for the detenue further contended that the order of detention challenged in this petition deserves to be quashed and set aside on the grounds that registration of three offenses under the Prohibition Act cannot bring the detenue’s case within the purview of definition under section 2(b) of the Act.

• Furthermore, the counsel said that illegal behavior likely to be carried out or alleged to have been carried out, as alleged, cannot have any linkage or bearing with the maintenance of public order and can only be described as a breach of law and order.

Arguments by the state:

The AGP for the state contended that sufficient material and evidence was discovered during the course of the investigation, which was also provided to the detainee, indicating that the detainee is in the habit of engaging in the activity as defined in section 2(b) of the Act, and that, taking the facts of the case into account, the detaining authority correctly issued the order of detention.

The decision of the court:

After hearing both the parties and reviewing the evidence, the court determined that the detenue is not a person within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act unless and until there is evidence that the person has become a threat and menace to society in such a way that it has disrupted the entire tempo of society and that all social apparatus is in danger of disturbing public order at the instance of such person.

The court cited Pushker Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal AIR 1970 SC 852, in which the Supreme Court had declared that leading to disorder is not always sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act, but a disruption that will harm public order comes within the ambit of the Act.

The court also put emphasis on Shaik Nazeen v. State of Telangana and Ors and Syed Sabeena v. State of Telangana and Ors., in which the Supreme Court had held that the State is not without a remedy, as in case the detenu is much a menace to the society as is being alleged, then the prosecution should seek for the cancellation of his bail and/or move an appeal to the Higher Court. But definitely seeking shelter under the preventive detention law is not the proper remedy under the facts and circumstances of the case.

Giving regards to the arguments forwards, evidence presented and the cases cited, the Gujarat High Court allowed the petition and quashed and set aside the impugned order of detention. 

The order can be read here.

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The post Gujarat HC: Mere filing of FIRs insufficient grounds for arrest under the Preventive Detention Act appeared first on SabrangIndia.