Main Points:

Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in 1953 in Jerusalem by Sheikh Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, a scholar of Islamic jurisprudence and former member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology is rooted in a strict interpretation of Islamic governance. It rejects nationalism, democracy, and secularism, advocating instead for the revival of a unified Caliphate under Islamic law.

Hizb ut-Tahrir remains one of the most enigmatic and controversial Islamist movements in the modern era. With a highly disciplined structure and a clear ideological vision, it has survived despite decades of repression.

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), an international pan-Islamic political organization, has long been controversial and debated. Established in 1953, its stated objective is the re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate, which it sees as the only legitimate governing system for Muslims worldwide. While the group insists on non-violent means to achieve its goals, many governments have outlawed it due to its radical political ideology.

This article explores the origins, ideological framework, leadership perspectives, and legacy of Hizb ut-Tahrir, relying extensively on quotes from its leaders and publications.

Origins and Early History

Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in 1953 in Jerusalem by Sheikh Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, a scholar of Islamic jurisprudence and former member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Nabhani, disillusioned with what he saw as the secularization of the Arab world and the failure of existing Islamist movements, sought to create a political party that would focus on re-establishing the Caliphate as a comprehensive solution for Muslim governance.

Al-Nabhani emphasized that HT’s methodology was unique compared to other Islamic movements:

“We do not engage in practical politics in the sense of seeking power through participation in existing regimes. Our work is solely intellectual and political, aimed at changing the minds of the Ummah (Muslim community).”

From its inception, HT focused on recruiting members through intensive ideological training rather than mass activism. The party quickly spread to Jordan, Syria, and other parts of the Middle East, but it faced immediate repression from regional governments, many of which saw its calls for an Islamic state as a direct threat to their authority.

Ideological Framework

Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology is rooted in a strict interpretation of Islamic governance. It rejects nationalism, democracy, and secularism, advocating instead for the revival of a unified Caliphate under Islamic law.

The Role of the Caliphate

The Caliphate, according to HT, is the only legitimate system for Muslims because it is divinely mandated. The party argues that all Muslim-majority countries today suffer from “man-made” laws rather than divine rule, leading to corruption, oppression, and weakness.

As Abdul Qadeem Zallum, a later leader of HT, wrote:

“The Ummah has been living in darkness since the destruction of the Caliphate in 1924. Only by re-establishing it will Muslims regain their dignity and rightful leadership in the world.”

HT envisions a Caliphate that stretches across all Muslim lands, ruled by a single leader (Caliph) implementing Islamic law (Sharia) in all aspects of life—governance, economy, and society.

Rejection of Democracy

Hizb ut-Tahrir firmly rejects democracy, arguing that it is a Western-imposed system incompatible with Islam. In HT’s view, sovereignty belongs to Allah alone, not to the people.

Al-Nabhani argued in his writings:

“Democracy places legislation in the hands of humans, whereas in Islam, legislation comes only from Allah.”

HT considers electoral politics under secular governments to be illegitimate and sees participation in them as a betrayal of Islamic principles.

Opposition to Nationalism and the Nation-State

One of HT’s most distinctive ideological positions is its absolute rejection of nationalism. It views national borders in the Muslim world as artificial divisions imposed by colonial powers to weaken Islamic unity.

Zallum, elaborating on this point, stated:

“The so-called Arab world, the so-called Muslim world—these are colonial constructs. Our loyalty is to Islam, not to nations.”

This anti-nationalist stance has often put HT at odds with various governments that see national identity as crucial to their stability.

Methodology: Non-Violent but Radical

Despite its radical rhetoric, Hizb ut-Tahrir claims to follow a non-violent methodology. The group insists that it seeks to bring about the Caliphate through intellectual and political work, rather than armed struggle.

One of HT’s spokespersons stated:

“We reject terrorism and violence. Our method is one of ideological struggle, exposing the corruption of existing regimes and preparing the Ummah for Islamic rule.”

However, critics argue that HT’s rhetoric can inspire extremist violence by portraying secular governments as illegitimate and Western influence as a form of colonialism.

Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Global Expansion

Since its founding, Hizb ut-Tahrir has spread far beyond the Middle East. Today, it operates in over 40 countries, with strongholds in Central Asia, South Asia, and Europe.

Presence in the Middle East

HT’s attempts to gain traction in the Arab world have been met with repression. Many Middle Eastern governments, particularly in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, have outlawed the group and imprisoned its members.

Despite this, HT continues to have underground networks in many Arab countries, particularly in Syria, where it has attempted to influence Islamist factions.

Strength in Central Asia

HT has a significant presence in Central Asia, particularly in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. The governments of these countries view HT as a major security threat, accusing it of attempting to radicalize the population and undermine state authority.

The Uzbek government has been particularly aggressive in cracking down on HT, imprisoning thousands of its suspected members.

Growth in South Asia

HT has made notable inroads in Pakistan and Bangladesh, where it has targeted the military and educated elites for recruitment. It has repeatedly called for a military coup in Pakistan to establish an Islamic state.

A prominent HT leader in Pakistan stated:

“The Muslim armies must remove the traitorous rulers and establish the Caliphate, for they hold the power to do so.”

This open call for military intervention has led to multiple government crackdowns on HT activities.

European Presence

HT has also gained a following in Western countries, particularly in the UK, where it has a visible presence in Muslim communities. While it is banned in Germany and Russia, it continues to operate legally in some Western countries under the banner of free speech.

HT’s European branches focus heavily on intellectual debates, organizing lectures and conferences that critique Western democracy and foreign policy.

Legacy and Controversy

Impact on Islamist Movements

Hizb ut-Tahrir has played a significant role in shaping Islamist discourse. While it has never succeeded in establishing a Caliphate, its emphasis on the unity of the Muslim world has influenced many contemporary Islamist movements.

Some jihadist groups, including al-Qaeda and ISIS, have been indirectly influenced by HT’s vision of the Caliphate. However, HT officially rejects these groups’ use of violence, creating a paradox where it shares a similar ideological goal but differs in methodology.

Government Crackdowns and Bans

Many governments view Hizb ut-Tahrir as a threat to stability and have banned it. Countries that have outlawed HT include: Egypt, Pakistan, Russia, Germany, China (particularly in Xinjiang, where HT is accused of inciting separatism)

Despite bans, HT continues to operate clandestinely in many of these regions.

Internal Challenges

HT has faced internal struggles, including leadership disputes and strategic debates over whether to engage with existing political structures or continue its purist approach.

Additionally, the rise of violent extremist groups has made it difficult for HT to maintain its image as a non-violent organization. Many view its ideology as a stepping stone to radicalization.

Hizb ut-Tahrir remains one of the most enigmatic and controversial Islamist movements in the modern era. With a highly disciplined structure and a clear ideological vision, it has managed to survive despite decades of repression.

While it has not achieved its goal of restoring the Caliphate, HT’s impact on Islamic political thought is undeniable. Whether it will ever translate its ideology into tangible political power remains to be seen, but its presence in global Islamist discourse is unlikely to fade anytime soon.

A Detailed Refutation of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Ideology: Voices from Moderate Islam

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) presents itself as an intellectual and political movement dedicated to restoring the Islamic Caliphate. While it claims non-violence, its ideological underpinnings—rejection of democracy, nationalism, and participation in existing political systems—have made it a source of concern for governments and moderate Muslim scholars alike.

Throughout Islamic history, numerous respected scholars and leaders have espoused views that directly contradict HT’s core beliefs. This article presents a comprehensive refutation of HT’s ideology using insights from classical Islamic scholars, modern Muslim intellectuals, and contemporary political figures who argue for a more balanced and pragmatic understanding of Islam.

1. The Misuse of the Caliphate: A Historical and Theological Perspective

HT’s Claim:

Hizb ut-Tahrir asserts that the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 marked the beginning of the Muslim world’s decline. It claims that re-establishing a centralized Caliphate is a divine obligation and the only solution to the problems faced by Muslims today.

“The Ummah has been living in darkness since the destruction of the Caliphate in 1924. Only by re-establishing it will Muslims regain their dignity and rightful leadership in the world.” – Abdul Qadeem Zallum, former HT leader

Refutation: The Caliphate is Not a Religious Pillar

Islamic scholars throughout history have debated the nature and necessity of the Caliphate. While governance in Islam is important, it is not one of the five pillars of Islam (Shahada, Salah, Zakat, Sawm, Hajj), nor is it a core tenet of faith.

1.1 Classical Scholars on the Caliphate

The famous Islamic jurist Imam Al-Ghazali (1058–1111) argued that the unity of Muslims is more about faith and moral values than a political structure:

“The welfare of the people is not dependent on the existence of one ruler or a single Caliphate, but rather on the just administration of affairs, ensuring security, and upholding the principles of Islam.” – Al-Ghazali, Ihya Ulum al-Din

Similarly, Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), the great historian and sociologist, observed that political leadership in Islam evolved naturally over time and that power should be based on the needs of society rather than rigid historical models:

“The Caliphate as envisioned in early Islam was suitable for that time. Governance is shaped by economic and social conditions, and no single model can be deemed mandatory for all ages.” – Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah

1.2 Contemporary Scholars on the Caliphate

Renowned modern Islamic scholar Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926–2022) refuted the idea that a single political entity is necessary for the Muslim world:

“Nowhere in the Qur’an or authentic Sunnah is there a command that Muslims must have only one ruler. Unity in faith and cooperation in good deeds are required, but political unity under one state is neither a necessity nor a divine obligation.” – Yusuf al-Qaradawi

Even within early Islamic history, the concept of the Caliphate evolved and was never universally agreed upon. The Rightly Guided Caliphs (632–661) ruled differently from the later Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphs, demonstrating that governance structures changed according to circumstances.

The insistence on reviving the Caliphate as an obligation ignores both historical realities and Islamic jurisprudence. Justice, security, and good governance—rather than a single political entity—are the true Islamic ideals.

2. Rejection of Democracy and Elections: A False Dichotomy

HT’s Claim:

Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects democracy, arguing that only divine law (Sharia) should govern Muslims and that elections under secular systems are illegitimate.

“Democracy places legislation in the hands of humans, whereas in Islam, legislation comes only from Allah.” – Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, HT founder

Refutation: Islam Encourages Shura (Consultation) and Public Participation

HT’s opposition to democracy stems from a rigid and literalist interpretation of governance. However, Islam itself encourages Shura (consultation), accountability, and public participation, all of which align with democratic principles.

2.1 Qur’anic and Hadith Evidence for Consultation

The Qur’an explicitly commands consultation in governance:

“And those who have responded to [the need for] their ruler with consultation among themselves, and who spend from what We have provided them.” – (Qur’an 42:38)

The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) practiced consultation in state matters. He sought advice from his companions before major decisions, even when he had divine guidance. If democracy is about accountability and consultation, how can it be un-Islamic?

2.2 Statements from Muslim Scholars Supporting Democratic Principles

Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), an Egyptian reformer, argued that democracy was in line with Islamic principles of justice and consultation:

“The essence of democracy—justice, accountability, and consultation—is what Islam calls for. The problem is not democracy itself but those who misuse power under any system.”

Similarly, Maulana Wahiduddin Khan (1925–2021), an Indian Islamic scholar, defended democracy by emphasizing that Islam is against dictatorship:

“A government chosen by the people and accountable to them is closer to Islamic values than authoritarian rule. Tyranny is haram, whether in the name of religion or secularism.”

HT’s rejection of democracy is based on a false understanding of Islamic governance. The Qur’an and Sunnah encourage consultation, participation, and accountability, all of which align with democratic principles.

3. Nationalism and the Muslim Identity: A Misplaced Opposition

HT’s Claim:

HT rejects nationalism, claiming that it is a colonial construct that divides the Muslim Ummah.

“The so-called Muslim world—these are colonial constructs. Our loyalty is to Islam, not to nations.” – HT statement

Refutation: Islam Recognizes Diversity and Local Identity

HT’s rejection of nationalism contradicts Islamic teachings that acknowledge diversity and local identities as part of God’s creation.

3.1 Qur’anic and Prophetic Recognition of National Identity

The Qur’an states:

“O mankind, We have created you from a male and a female and made you peoples and tribes so that you may know one another.” – (Qur’an 49:13)

This verse clearly recognizes that different identities exist, and they are not inherently un-Islamic. The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) himself acknowledged tribal affiliations but condemned racism and oppression.

3.2 Scholars on Nationalism and Islam

Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), a philosopher and poet of South Asia, argued that Islam could accommodate nationalism within a broader spiritual framework:

“Love for one’s country does not negate love for Islam. A Muslim can be a patriot without abandoning his religious identity.”

Similarly, Prince Hassan of Jordan, a modern Islamic scholar, stated:

“Islamic unity is a spiritual bond, but political unity is not always practical. A just ruler, whether in a Muslim-majority or non-Muslim state, is preferable to an unjust Caliph.”

HT’s rigid opposition to nationalism ignores Islamic teachings that recognize diversity and local governance. Unity in faith does not require the dissolution of nation-states.

Final Thoughts: The Way Forward

Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology is rooted in a selective and rigid interpretation of Islamic history, ignoring centuries of jurisprudential development and political realities. Scholars from classical to modern times have consistently advocated for justice, consultation, and adaptability, rather than an uncompromising, monolithic state.

The real challenge for the Muslim world is not the re-establishment of a Caliphate but the promotion of justice, education, and good governance. As the Qur’an states:

“Indeed, Allah commands justice, good conduct, and giving to relatives and forbids immorality, bad conduct, and oppression.” – (Qur’an 16:90)

A better future for Muslims lies in progress, knowledge, and ethical leadership, not in romanticizing a political model that no longer fits the modern world.

Grace Mubashir is a PhD scholar at Islamic Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia and a freelance journalist based at Delhi

Article was first published on New Age Islam

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With billions of petro dollars to fund their global clout, the Saudi lobbies have simply brought off opposition to their continued efforts to spread Wahhabism worldwide.  In failing to confront Wahhabism, North America and Europe remain paralysed by a combination of political correctness and a racism of lower expectations while in Muslim majority countries, the Saudi lobbies have used the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Ikhwan to infiltrate every level of the State.  Together this ensures that the relentless radicalization of millions of urban, upper and middle class Muslim youth is going on at a relentless pace in only Pakistan, India, Middle East, Egypt, Somalia, Indonesia and Malaysia but also in North America and Europe through the concerted efforts of Saudi-funded Islamic TV channels. Examples of such channels include: Dr. Zakir Naik’s Peace TV (English and Urdu), Islam Channel, Iqraa TV and a few others.
 

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Image: Theresa May and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, March 2018. PA Images/Victoria Jones, all rights reserved.

A former Research Fellow at Chatham House and the ex-Director of the World Development Movement, British historian Mark Curtis has published several books on UK foreign policy, including 2003’s Web of Deceit: Britain’s Real Role in the World, endorsed by Noam Chomsky and John Pilger. Ian Sinclair asked Curtis about the recently published new edition of his 2010 book Secret Affairs: Britain’s Collusion with Radical Islam.

Ian Sinclair: With the so-called ‘war on terror’ the dominant framework for understanding Western foreign policy since 9/11, the central argument of your book – that Britain has been colluding with radical Islam for decades – will be a shock to many people. Can you give some examples?
Mark Curtis: UK governments – Conservative and Labour – have been colluding for decades with two sets of Islamist actors which have strong connections with each other.

In the first group are the major state sponsors of Islamist terrorism, the two most important of which are key British allies with whom London has long-standing strategic partnerships – Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The second group includes extremist private movements and organisations whom Britain has worked alongside and sometimes trained and financed, in order to promote specific foreign policy objectives. The roots of this lie in divide and rule policies under colonialism but collusion of this type took off in Afghanistan in the 1980s, when Britain, along with the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, covertly supported the resistance to defeat the Soviet occupation of the country. After the jihad in Afghanistan, Britain had private dealings of one kind or another with militants in various organisations, including Pakistan’s Harkat ul-Ansar, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), all of which had strong links to Bin Laden’s al-Qaida. Covert actions have been undertaken with these and other forces in Central Asia, North Africa and Eastern Europe.

For example, in the 1999 Kosovo war, Britain secretly trained militants in the KLA who were working closely with al-Qaida fighters. One KLA unit was led by the brother of Ayman al-Zawahiri, then Bin Laden’s right-hand man. The British provided military training for the KLA at secret camps in Kosovo and Albania where jihadist fighters also had their military centre. The ‘dirty secret’ of the July 2005 London bombings is that the bombers had links with violent Islamist groups such as the Harkat ul-Mujahidin whose militants were previously covertly supported by Britain in Afghanistan. These militant groups were long sponsored by the Pakistani military and intelligence services, in turn long armed and trained by Britain. If we go back further – to the 1953 MI6/CIA coup to overthrow Musaddiq in Iran – this involved plotting with Shia Islamists, the predecessors of Ayatollah Khomeini. Ayatollah Seyyed Kashani – who in 1945 founded the Fadayan-e-Islam (Devotees of Islam), a militant fundamentalist organization – was funded by Britain and the US to organise opposition and arrange public demonstrations against Musaddiq.

More recently, in its military interventions and covert operations in Syria and Libya since 2011, Britain and its supported forces have been working alongside, and often in effective collaboration with, a variety of extremist and jihadist groups, including al-Qaida’s affiliate in Syria. Indeed, the vicious Islamic State group and ideology that has recently emerged partly owes its origins and rise to the policies of Britain and its allies in the region.

Although Britain has forged special relationships with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, it has not been in strategic alliance with radical Islam as such. Beyond these two states, Britain’s policy has been to collaborate with Islamist extremists as a matter of ad hoc opportunism, though it should be said that this has been rather regular. Whitehall does not work with these forces because it agrees with them but because they are useful at specific moments: in this sense, the collaboration highlights British weakness to find other on-the-ground foot soldiers to impose its policies. Islamist groups appear to have collaborated with Britain for the same reasons of expediency and because they share the same hatred of popular nationalism and secularism as the British elite.

IS: Why has the UK colluded with radical Islamic organisations and nations?
MC: I argue that the evidence shows that radical Islamic forces have been seen as useful to Whitehall in five specific ways: as a global counter-force to the ideologies of secular nationalism and Soviet communism, in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan; as ‘conservative muscle’ within countries to undermine secular nationalists and bolster pro-Western regimes; as ‘shock troops’ to destabilise or overthrow governments; as proxy military forces to fight wars; and as ‘political tools’ to leverage change from governments.

This collusion has also helped promote two big geo-strategic foreign policy objectives. The first is influence and control over key energy resources, always recognised in the British planning documents as the number one priority in the Middle East. British operations to support or side with Islamist forces have generally aimed at maintaining in power or installing governments that will promote Western-friendly oil policies. The second objective has been maintaining Britain’s place within a pro-Western global financial order. The Saudis have invested billions of dollars in the US and British economies and banking systems and Britain and the US have similarly large investments and trade with Saudi Arabia; it is these that are being protected by the strategic alliance with Riyadh.

IS: You include a chapter in the new edition of the book exploring the UK and West’s role in Syria. Simon Tisdall recently noted in The Observer that the West has been “hovering passively on the sidelines in Syria”. This is a common view – including on the Left. For example, in September 2014 Richard Seymour asserted “The US has not been heavily involved” in Syria, while in February 2017 Salvage magazine published a piece by Dr Jamie Allinson, who argued it was a myth that “the US has pursued a policy of regime change” in Syria. What is your take on the West’s involvement in Syria?
MC: These are extraordinary comments revealing how poorly the mainstream media serves the public. I’ve tried to document in the updated version of Secret Affairs a chronology of Britain’s covert operations in Syria to overthrow the Assad regime. These began with the deployment of MI6 and other British covert forces in 2011, within a few months after demonstrations in Syria began challenging the regime, to which the Syrian regime responded with brute force and terrible violence. British covert action, mainly undertaken in alliance with the US and Saudi Arabia, has involved working alongside radical and jihadist groups, in effect supporting and empowering them. These extremist groups, which cultivated Muslim volunteers from numerous countries to fight Assad, have been strengthened by an influx of a massive quantity of arms and military training from the coalition of forces of which Britain has been a key part. At the same time, Britain and its allies’ policy has prolonged the war, exacerbating devastating human suffering.

UK support for Syrian rebel groups long focused on the Free Syrian Army (FSA), described by British officials as ‘moderates’. Yet for the first three years of the war, the FSA was in effect an ally of, and collaborator with, Islamic State and al-Qaida’s affiliate in Syria, al-Nusra. London and Washington continued to provide training and help send arms into Syria despite the certainty that some would end up in the hands of jihadists. Some of the militants who joined the Syrian insurgency with British covert support were Libyans who are believed to have been trained by British, French or US forces in Libya to overthrow Qadafi in 2011. Some went on to join Islamic State and also al-Nusra, which soon became one of the most powerful opposition groups to Assad.

Britain appears to have played a key role in encouraging the creation of the Islamic Front coalition in Syria in November 2013, which included groups which regularly worked with al-Nusra; these included Liwa al-Tawhid – a group armed by Qatar and which coordinated attacks with al-Nusra – and Ahrar al-Sham – a hardline Islamist group that rejected the FSA. Both groups contained foreign jihadists, including individuals from Britain. Ahrar al-Sham’s co-founder, Abu Khalid al-Suri, was linked to the 2004 Madrid bombing through a series of money transfers and personal contacts; a Spanish court document named him as Bin Laden’s ‘courier’ in Europe. The same network was connected to the 2005 London terror attack.

The UK role in Syria has not been minor but has been an integral part of the massive US/Arab arms and training operations, and British officials have been present in the control rooms for these operations in Jordan and Turkey. Britain also consistently took the lead in calling for further arms deliveries to the rebel forces. British covert action was in the early years of the war overwhelmingly focused on overthrowing Assad: evidence suggests that only in May 2015 did UK covert training focus on countering Islamic State in Syria.

IS: What role has the mainstream media played with regards to Britain working with radical Islam?
MC: It has largely buried it. In the period immediately after the 7/7 bombings in 2005, and more recently in the context of the wars in Libya and Syria, there were sporadic reports in the mainstream media which revealed links between the British security services and Islamist militants living in Britain. Some of these individuals have been reported as working as British agents or informers while being involved in terrorism overseas and some have been reported as being protected by the British security services while being wanted by foreign governments. This is an important but only a small part of the much bigger picture of collusion which mainly concerns Britain’s foreign policy: this is rarely noticed in the mainstream.

IS: The British public and the anti-war movement are not mentioned in your book, though they seem a potentially important influence on the nefarious and dangerous British foreign policies you highlight?
MC: Yes, it’s largely down to us, the British public, to prevent terrible policies being undertaken in our name. We should generally regard the British elite as it regards the public – as a threat to its interests. The biggest immediate single problem we face, in my view, is mainstream media reporting. While large sections of the public are deluged with misreporting, disinformation or simply the absence of coverage of key policies, there may never be a critical mass of people prepared to take action in their own interests to bring about a wholly different foreign policy.

The mainstream media and propaganda system has been tremendously successful in the UK – the public can surely have very little knowledge of the actual nature of British foreign policy (past or present) and many people, apparently, seriously believe that the country generally (although it may make some mistakes) stands for peace, democracy and human rights all over the world. When you look at what they read (and don’t read) in the ‘news’ papers, it’s no surprise. The latest smears against Corbyn are further evidence of this, which I believe amounts to a ‘system’, since it is so widespread and rooted in the same interests of defending elite power and privilege.

The other, very much linked, problem, relates to the lack of real democracy in the UK and the narrow elitist decision-making in foreign policy. Governments retain enormous power to conduct covert operations (and policies generally) outside of public or parliamentary scrutiny. Parliamentary committees, meant to scrutinise the state, rarely do so properly and almost invariably fail to even question government on its most controversial policies. Parliamentary answers are often misleading and designed to keep the public in the dark. Past historical records of government decision-making are regularly withheld from the public, if not destroyed to cover up crimes. British ‘democracy’, which exists in some forms, otherwise resembles more an authoritarian state.

There are fundamental issues here about how policy gets made and in whose name. It’s not an issue of whether Labour or Conservative is in power since both obviously defend and propagate the elitist system. Jeremy Corbyn himself represents a real break with this but the most likely outcome, tragically, is that the Labour extremists (called ‘moderates’ in the mainstream) and the rest of the conservative/liberal system which believes in militarism, neo-liberalism and the defence of privilege, will prevail if and when Corbyn becomes Prime Minister.

The signs are already there in the Labour manifesto for the last election, which would have continued the present extremism in most aspects of UK foreign policy, even if it promised some change and still represented a major challenge to the establishment. Again, it will obviously be up to us to change policies, democratize the media and transform British governance more broadly.

Ian Sinclair is the author of The March That Shook Blair: An Oral History of 15 February 2003, published by Peace News Press. He tweets @IanJSinclair.

Courtesy: https://www.opendemocracy.net/

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