This stay effectively halts any judicial action that could disturb public harmony or prejudice the resolution of the issues at hand. By freezing all proceedings, the court has ensured that the sensitive subject of religious places is dealt with calmly and with the utmost judicial oversight.

The order also addressed the delays in filing responses by the Union of India, noting that despite the issuance of notice as early as September 9, 2022, no counter affidavit or reply had been submitted. The court directed the Union to file its reply “within four weeks from today,” emphasising the need for timely compliance. The court also directed for the copies of the reply are to be served to all petitioners and respondents, who may file their rejoinders within four weeks of receiving it.

To facilitate the coordination of documents and arguments in this multi-party case, the court appointed Mr. Vishnu Shankar Jain as Nodal Counsel for those challenging the validity of the Act and Mr. Ejaz Maqbool for those supporting its enforcement or opposing the challenges. Additionally, Mr. Kanu Agarwal was designated as the Nodal Counsel for the Union of India, responsible for creating and maintaining a Google Drive link to upload the Union’s affidavit, which will be shared with all relevant parties. The court also established a shared email ID to streamline the exchange of pleadings, directing, “All the Nodal Counsel will have access to the said email ID to facilitate coordination.”

The court’s order reiterated its earlier framing of legal questions on October 12, 2022 regarding the scope and application of Sections 3 and 4 of the 1991 Act, which prohibit the alteration of religious character and nullify ongoing legal challenges to the status of places of worship as they stood on 15 August 1947. It noted that additional issues have arisen during the hearings and that the primary questions relate to “the contours, as well as the width and expanse of the said provisions.” The case is now scheduled to be heard next on February 17, 2025.

This order marks a decisive moment in the legal proceedings, as the Supreme Court’s stay prevents any disruptive developments while maintaining a controlled and coordinated process for addressing the constitutional challenge to the 1991 Act. It underscores the court’s commitment to safeguarding communal harmony and judicial decorum in one of the most sensitive and significant cases of our time.

(Detailed report on the judicial proceedings of December 12, 2024 can be read here.)

The complete order may be read below:

Intervention applications reflect broad stakeholder interest

Notably, recently, more intervention applications in the matter have also been filed by various prominent parties and individuals, reflecting the broad interest and stakes involved in the litigation. These include the Gyanvapi Mosque Managing Committee, Maharashtra MLA Dr. Jitendra Satish Awhad from the Nationalist Congress Party (Socialist), the Communist Party of India (Marxist), represented by Mr. Prakash Karat, Member of the Politburo, the Mathura Shahi Idgah Masjid Committee, and Rajya Sabha MP Manoj Jha. These interventions highlight the diverse perspectives and communal sensitivities surrounding the constitutional challenge to the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, underscoring its far-reaching social and political implications. These interventions highlight the diverse perspectives and communal sensitivities surrounding the constitutional challenge to the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, underscoring its far-reaching social and political implications.

1. Gyanvapi Mosque Managing Committee’s intervention

The Gyanvapi Mosque Managing Committee had filed an intervention before the Supreme Court, asserting its critical stake in the legal deliberations concerning the 1991 Act. The committee argued that multiple suits have been filed seeking the mosque’s removal, despite the clear bar imposed by Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, which preserve the religious character of places of worship as they existed on August 15, 1947.

Highlighting the far-reaching implications of declaring the Act unconstitutional, the committee stated that such a decision would have “drastic” consequences. It expressed concern that the Act’s misinterpretation had already led to legal challenges against several mosques and dargahs across the country, including the Gyanvapi Mosque. As per the report of LiveLaw, the committee emphasised: “The applicant is constrained to intervene in the present proceedings as a misreading/misinterpretation of the 1991 Act, and the salutary reasons for which it had been enacted, is being sought to be diluted by filing of suits against Mosques and, even before issues are struck, seeking interim directions for survey of the Mosques or an ASI inspection.”

The application referenced recent instances where ex-parte interim orders were issued by district courts, including orders allowing a survey of the Gyanvapi Mosque and the Sambhal Jama Masjid, as examples of how the 1991 Act is being undermined. (The detailed report on Sambhal violence may be read here, here and here.)

Additionally, the committee invoked the doctrine of non-retrogression, which the Supreme Court had discussed in the Ram Janmabhoomi Temple Case. It argued that under this principle, the State has a “non-derogable obligation” to uphold the country’s commitment to secularism as enshrined in the Constitution. The committee emphasised that any weakening of the 1991 Act would represent a step backward in protecting the secular fabric of the nation.

2. Indian Union Muslim League’s intervention

The Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), represented by its General Secretary and Kerala MLA PK Kunhalikutty along with Lok Sabha MP ET Muhammed Basheer, had filed an intervention application before the Supreme Court in the ongoing challenges to the validity of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991. The IUML’s intervention underscores the importance of the Act in safeguarding secularism and religious freedoms for all faiths in India. The application emphasises that secularism has been recognised as a part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution, thus rendering the Act immune from any amendments by Parliament.

The IUML’s application, as per LiveLaw, highlights the Act’s dual purposes, both of which are crucial for preserving public order and harmony. Firstly, the Act prohibits the conversion of any place of worship, ensuring that the religious character of such places is not altered. Secondly, the Act imposes a positive obligation on the State to maintain the religious character of every place of worship as it stood on August 15, 1947, the date when India became an independent, democratic, and secular nation. The application underscores that this date is pivotal, marking the emergence of India as a modern State with no official religion and providing equal rights to all religious denominations. As the application states: “This August 15, 1947 is crucial because on that date this nation was emerged as a modern, democratic and sovereign State thrusting back such barbarity into the past once and for all.”

Further, the IUML stresses that the 1991 Act is instrumental in fostering unity, peace, and mutual respect among India’s diverse religious communities. The application also draws attention to recent incidents in Sambhal, Uttar Pradesh, as a stark reminder of the need for such legislation. The IUML contends that if the Act had been properly enforced, incidents like the one in Sambhal, which resulted in the tragic loss of six lives, could have been prevented. The increasing number of suits concerning places of worship, the IUML argues, is exactly the type of issue the 1991 Act was designed to address. As they assert, “The mushrooming of suits concerning places of worship is precisely the mischief sought to be curtailed by the introduction of this impugned Act.”

Through its intervention, the IUML advocates for the continued preservation of the Act, highlighting its critical role in maintaining communal harmony and upholding the secular values enshrined in India’s Constitution.

3. Jitendra Satish Awhad’s Intervention

Dr. Jitendra Satish Awhad, a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) from Mumbra-Kalwa and a representative of the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), had filed an intervention in the Supreme Court proceedings challenging the 1991 Act. Awhad’s application underscored the Act’s crucial role in preserving secularism, promoting communal harmony, and preventing the tensions that could disrupt national unity.

Drawing from the historical context of his constituency, Awhad highlighted that Mumbra-Kalwa became a refuge for those displaced by the 1992-93 Bombay riots, which had caused significant social and physical divides between communities. Over time, efforts have been made to rebuild trust and unity among the diverse communities in the region. Awhad warned that any dilution of the 1991 Act could jeopardise these efforts, potentially unravelling the progress made in fostering peace.

Awhad’s intervention further stresses the historical importance of the Act, especially in the immediate aftermath of India’s independence when the country faced significant religious and communal strife. He noted that the Act reflects Parliament’s considered response to these concerns, aiming to stabilise the nation and promote cohesion by preventing disputes over religious sites that could destabilise public order and communal harmony. As per LiveLaw, his application states that “There exists a clear and reasonable nexus between the Act’s prohibition on altering the religious character of places of worship and its overarching objective of fostering national unity and integrity.”

Awhad’s application has been filed through AoR Anas Tanwir and is drawn by Advocates Neha Singh and Ebad Ur Rahman. Additionally, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) has also intervened in the case, supporting the constitutionality of the Act and its role in safeguarding India’s secular fabric.

4. Communist Party of India (Marxist) intervention

The Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)), represented by Mr. Prakash Karat, Member of the Politburo, had filed an Intervention Application before the Supreme Court. The CPI(M) strongly advocates for the Act’s critical role in preserving India’s secular fabric by preventing any alteration to the religious character of places of worship as they stood on August 15, 1947. This prohibition is central to ensuring the communal harmony and national cohesion that the Act was designed to uphold.

In its application, the CPI(M) underscores the Act’s importance in preventing conflicts rooted in historical disputes, arguing that its legislative intent is crucial in maintaining peace and preventing further strife. The party also emphasises that the Act safeguards the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 (equality), 15 (non-discrimination), 21 (right to life and liberty), and 25 (freedom of religion) of the Indian Constitution, ensuring equality, non-discrimination, and the freedom of all citizens to practice their religion without fear of interference or alteration.

The CPI(M) further warns that any attempt to repeal or alter the Act would undermine these constitutional principles, posing a threat to secularism and the rule of law, both of which are foundational to India’s democratic framework. The application highlights the growing number of litigations challenging the religious character of various places of worship, including mosques and dargahs. Referring specifically to recent cases involving the Sambhal Mosque and the Ajmer Dargah, the CPI(M) asserts that such cases “intend to destabilise the legislative intent and constitutional mandate enshrined in the Act,” warning that this “relentless wave of litigation” threatens to erode India’s secular values.

5. Rajya Sabha MP Manoj Jha’s intervention

Manoj Kumar Jha, a Member of Rajya Sabha representing the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), had also moved an intervention application before the Supreme Court. In his submission, Jha argues that the 1991 Act is fully aligned with the Indian Constitution and promotes its core values, especially the commitment to secularism and equality for all religions.

The application, filed through Advocate-on-Record Fauzia Shakil, asserts that the Act does not contravene any fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution. Instead, it strengthens the constitutional tenets by protecting the religious character of places of worship as they existed on 15 August 1947. Jha emphasises that the Act serves as a legislative guarantee, ensuring that these places of worship are preserved by the State, in line with the nation’s secular commitments.

As Jha’s application states, the 1991 Act is critical to upholding the Preamble of the Constitution and Articles 14 (equality), 15 (non-discrimination), 25 (freedom of religion), 26 (freedom to manage religious affairs), and 51A (fundamental duties). It underscores the secular obligations of the State and India’s pledge to treat all religions equally, reaffirming the Act’s constitutional validity. According to the report of LiveLaw, the application asserts, “There is no need for the top Court to intervene or ground to declare the Act unconstitutional,” stressing that the legislation is essential for maintaining national unity and preserving the secular fabric of the country.

In his application, Jha also draws attention to the rise of sectarian politics, which has intensified in recent times. He warns that the increasing weaponisation of religion and the polarisation of communities pose significant threats to constitutional values. He adds, “The recent incidents of weaponising religion, polarising communities and fostering a divisive agenda is creating repercussions where dissent and diversity face increasing threats,” thus reinforcing the need for the 1991 Act to prevent such divisiveness and preserve India’s secular ideals.

Related:

When the Supreme Court directed protection for the Gyan Vapi Mosque, upheld the Places of Worship Act, 1991 (1994, 1995, 1997)

UP: After Gyanvapi, Mathura Court Orders Shahi Idgah Survey; ‘Violation’ of Places of Worship Act, Say Activists

When and How Ram Vilas Paswan made a strong pitch for the Places of Worship Act, 1991

“Temple restoration” suits on the rise; what about the Places of Worship Act?

The post Supreme Court issued stay on suits on survey against religious places, interventions had highlighted the Act’s intent to preserve India’s secular character appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In the months prior to the demolition of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992, a violent mobilisation led by men who were to rise to constitutional posts (Atal Bihari Vajpayee and LK Advani), the Indian Parliament passed the Places of Worship Act, 1991. This law was meant to ensure that no place of worship of any religious dispensation was ever made subject to such an ignominious mobilization, again. On the radar of the supremacist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Bajrang Dal have been dozens of mosques and shrines the most prominent being the Gyan Vapi Mosque at Kashi (Varanasi) and the Shahi Idgah Mosque at Mathura. “Ayodhya sirf Jhanki hai, Kashi Mathura Baki Hai” (Ayodhya is but a glimse, Kashi, Mathura yet to be done) is the slogan that rang on Indian streets where the mob ruled in the early 1990s.

In November 1993, then again 1994-95 and 1997, petitioner Mohammed Aslam alias Bhure who was an active litigant in the Babri Masjid case petitioned the Supreme Court of India expressing concern and anxiety praying for express ideas to protect the Gyan Vapi Mosque and the Shahi Idgah one too.

Three separate benches of the Supreme Court of India made it explicitly clear that the Places of Worship must be protected and the law (PWA, 1991) strictly implemented.

Sabrangindia has accessed these orders and presents a timeline:

1994 Justices M.N. Venkatachaliah, Chief Justice, S Mohan and Dr AS Anand passed an Order in September of that year. (Mohamed Aslam Bhure had petitioned the Court in November 1993.)

Reiterating seven prayers listed by the petitioner in its Order, the Supreme Court makes specific observations on prayer (v) that asks for cases to be registered as per provisions of Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, against any person who violates the Act by causing damage or converting these places from their existing religion to the religion of other denominations.

The Observations of the Supreme Court are telling:

 “So far as prayer (v) is concerned, it is the statutory obligation of the State to enforce the provisions of the Act. It does not need reiteration that the duty is a fortiori in matters of such serious public concern. In view of the plain obligations of the State to enforce the law, any direction on the hypothetical possibility of violation, amounts to no more than recanting the provisions of the statute itself.” (Para 4)

Ironically, at the time of recording of the 1994 Order as the judgement itself documents, the District Magistrates of both Mathura and Varanasi and the Home Secretary to the State Government of Uttar Pradesh were present in the Supreme Court.

Noting this the Supreme Court observes,

 “Learned Attorney General (then Milon Banerjee) submitted that after the events of December 6, 1992, the Central and State Governments are keenly alive to the need for an appropriately heightened security environment respecting places of worship referred to, and that the Governments are straining every nerve and resource to ensure such safety. Learned Attorney General submitted that adequate security measures for safeguarding these places of worship have been enforced and in operation…..” (Para 6)

The matter does not end there. The judgement goes on to record:

    “Shri AK Ganguly (then Solicitor General), upon instructions from the District Magistrates and the Home Secretary submit that the prayers sought for by the petitioner are, indeed, the subject matter of deep, anxious and committed concern of the Government and all precautions and safety measures have been evolved and are in operation with respect to these places of worship. (Para 7)

Given the fact that, as the three judge bench of the Supreme Court observes, both the State and Central Governments are keenly alive to the problem and have taken adequate steps and these measures are already in operation, no further specific directions are passed by the Court. (Para 8)

The entire SC Order may be read below.

1995 Justices BN Kirpal, Chief Justice, SC Sen and two others passed an Order in August of that year. (Mohamed Aslam alias Bhure had petitioned the Court in 1994.)

Again, it was petitioner Mohammed Aslam alias Bhure who petitioned the court invoking the Places of Worship Act, 1991.

The Order of the Supreme Court observes, that,

“..the Petitioner has filed this petition to ensure protection of the Gyanvapi mosque at Kashi – Banaras and Shahi Idgah Mosque Mosque at Mathura, both in the State of U.P. In this behalf he has also invoked ‘the provisions of the Places of Worship ( Special Provisions) Act, 1991, which, says he, prohibits conversion of any place of worship of any religious denomination into a place of worship of a different section or religious denomination and enjoins maintenance of the status of all religious places as on 15.8.’47. The expression ‘place of worship’ inter alia includes a mosque. Lastly, he contends that Article 49 casts a duty on the state to protect monuments and places or objects of artistic of historical interest.”

“The reliefs claimed the essentially in the nature of directions to be issued to the respondents which include the state of UP, it’s chief Minister as well as the Union of India and their officers and servants to take adequate precautionary measures to protect the two mosques from the threats posed by the office bearers, workers and volunteers of the VHP, Bajrang Dal and the BJP. Directions are also sought to ensure, that people in large numbers do not collect at the two sites. There is also a prayer for the appointment of Union of India as a Receiver of these places.

“While we appreciate the concern and anxiety of the petitioner we see no reason to believe that the Central Government and the State Governments are remiss about performing their statutory and constitutional obligations referred to by the petitioner. It is their duty to take all such measures as are necessary including the restrictions on the number of people visiting the aforesaid place or places of worship to protect the said two places from possible and apprehended assaults. The two Governments, we are sure, are mindful of their obligations and we have no reason to doubt that they will be found wanting in the performance of their constitutional and statutory duties of protecting those places: Good governance demands that of them and it is also essential for the maintenance of law and order, peace and tranquility.”

A copy of this Order of the Supreme Court reiterating its faith in the State and Central government’s commitment to the rule of law was sent to the Chief Secretary of the State of U.P. as well as to the Secretary of U.P. as well as to the secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, by the Registrar General of this Court by FAX message for information and necessary action.

The third significant order of the Supreme Court in the matter, in the immediate wake of the demolition of the Babri Masjid was passed in 1997.

1997 Order of the Supreme Court, Justices AM Ahmadi, Chief Justice and Sujata V. Manohar. (Mohamed Aslam Bhure had petitioned the Court in November 1996.)

Again, at the outset, the Court observes that the matter relates to protection of the two places of worship, the Court notes the previous 1994 and 1995 Orders of the Supreme Court where specific directions to both to implement the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 and protect both the shrines (Mosques) were given, the Court proceeds to issue specific and clear directions.

The Supreme Court Order recounts that the Order passed by a Judge (of a Court subordinate to the Supreme Court!) “ensuring status quo” has caused some “difficulty” as by that the police seems to interpret the order to mean that barricades to protect the Mosques cannot be strengthened, enhanced or added to. The Court then, in 1997 proceeds to recount (the abovementioned pararaphs) from the Supreme Court Order of August 17, 1995 (B.N. Kirpal, SC Sen and two others) wherein the SC had made it abundantly clear that all necessary steps must be taken by the authorities “to protect the places of worship.”

Moreover, the Supreme Court specifically observes,

 “We do not think that the Government and police authorities would have any difficulty in understanding our previous order and to understand the same since we had in no uncertain terms permitted them to do everything that is necessary to protect the places of worship. No order of any subordinate court can be construed to run counter to this Court’s Order.” (Para 2)

Clearly with the very nature of the state undergoing a drastic change, some would argue in a worryingly anti-constitutional direction, today in the third decade of the 21^st century, close to 25 years later, the directives in these first orders of the Supreme Court related to the Gyan Vapi Mosque at Varanasi and Shahi Idgah Mosque at Mathura fall on deaf years. The hasty fashion and manner in which “prayers” were allowed inside the Gyan Vapi Mosque on the late evening of February 1, 2024, after an order of a subordinate question, begs these questions.

While these Orders in this sensitive case were not available on the Supreme Court, Sabrangindia has accessed them from law archives

1994 Justices M.N. Venkatachaliah, Chief Justice, S Mohan and Dr AS Anand passed an Order in September of that year may be read here

1995 Justices BN Kirpal, Chief Justice, SC Sen and two others passed an Order in August of that year may be read here

1997 Order of the Supreme Court, Justices AM Ahmadi, Chief Justice and Sujata V. Manohar may be read here

Related:

Puja in Gyanvapi: Mosque Committee announces bandh, Shahr Mufti Batin Nomani appeals for peace

The post When the Supreme Court directed protection for the Gyan Vapi Mosque, upheld the Places of Worship Act, 1991 (1994, 1995, 1997) appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Close to a year (22 months) after the Supreme Court issued notice to it in the matter, the Centre on Monday (January 9) sought even more time to present its stand on petitions challenging the Constitutional validity of the 1991 Places of Worship Act. The Centre states that it is “consulting” on the issue and “the process” is on. The court gave the Centre time “till February end”.

When queried by Chief Justice of India D Y Chandrachud whether the Centre had filed the counter-affidavit explaining its position, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta said, “Kindly fix it for hearing. We are consulting. The process is going. We may file it before that.”

After a brief hearing, the bench, which also included Justice P S Narasimha, told the Solicitor General, “File your counter. We will give you time till February end.” The bench added that it will take up the petitions after that.

The 1991 Places of Worship Act, was enacted when the Babri Masjid still stood and sought to stem future divisive uprisals: the Act mandates that the nature of all places of worship, barring the one at Ayodhya, be maintained as it was on August 15, 1947.

Over two years back, in June 2020, a Lucknow-based trust, Vishwa Bhadra Pujari Purohit Maha sangh, and lawyer Ashwini Upadhyay (a BJP member) had moved the Supreme Court challenging the Act. Later, the Jamiat Ulema-I-Hind, too, approached the court seeking permission to intervene in the matter.

Act basic feature, SC said: 2019

In its famed Ayodhya judgment of November 2019, the Supreme Court had, while granting land for the construction of the temple, hailed the Places of Worship Act, 1991. It described the law as “a legislative instrument designed to protect the secular features of the Indian polity, which is one of the basic features of the Constitution”.

On Monday, appearing for some of the intervenors, Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal said there cannot be a PIL challenging a view taken by the court. His reference, apparently, was to the Supreme Court lauding the Act in the Ayodhya title suit judgment.

Respondents have relied on what the Supreme Court had said about the Act in the Ayodhya case to claim that the judgment already recognised the purposes of the legislation. On the other hand, petitioners, have contended that the Act was not in challenge in the Ayodhya dispute and that whatever was said by the court regarding the legislation would only constitute obiter dicta (opinion of the judge and hence not legally binding).

During a previous hearing in October 2022, while responding to a specific query from the court, Mehta — representing the present political dispensation — too, had opined that what was said in the Ayodhya case “may not” cover the validity of the Act. “May not be covered. That (what was said in the Ayodhya case) was in a different context,” the Solicitor General had said.

On Monday, January 8, the bench said it will consider Sibal’s preliminary objections to the maintainability of the pleas when it takes them up for hearing.

It was on March 12, 2021, that the Supreme Court first issued notice in the matter and sought the Centre’s views. On September 9, 2022, the court gave the Government two weeks to file its response. This was then further extended at the Centre’s request and on November 14, 2022, when the SG submitted that a “comprehensive affidavit will be filed by the Union government dealing with various facets of the case… after due deliberation”. This comprehensive document is still awaited.

The petitioners have challenged the Act, contending that it bars the power of remedy of judicial review, which is a basic feature of the Constitution and therefore outside the legislative competence of Parliament. The Act, they say, also violates the principle of secularism.

Referring to the 2019 Ayodhya judgment, the petitioners said that “in case the Ayodhya case would not have been decided, the Hindu devotees would have been denied justice. Therefore any restriction on the right to approach the Civil or High Court is against the basic principle of rule of law, which is a necessary component of a welfare State”.

Related:

SC to hear pleas challenging the Place of Worship Act on October 11
The Challenge to Places of Worship Special Provisions Act, 1991 is Misconceived
Gyanvapi case: SC extends interim order; ‘Shivling’ to remain protected without obstructing right to offer namaz
When worship itself becomes a crime

The post Places of Worship Act: Again, Centre seeks more time, SC says Feb-end appeared first on SabrangIndia.

New Delhi: Three controversial issues will be introduced as private members bill in the Rajya Sabha on Friday.

The Places of Worship Special Provisions) Repeal Bill, 2022, The Uniform Civil Code in India Bill, and Bill to repeal the Waqf Act, 1995 are scheduled to be tabled.

BJP MP Kirodi Lal Meena will introduce a Bill to provide for the constitution of the National Inspection and Investigation Committee for preparation of Uniform Civil Code and its implementation throughout the territory of India and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

Harnath Singh Yadav will introduce a Bill to repeal the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 and Bill to repeal the Waqf Act, 1995.

Reports of standing Committee on consumer Affairs and report of joint Committee on office of profit will also be presented in the house.

Courtesy: The Daily Siasat

The post Three controversial issues of UCC, waqf & places of worship Act in pvt members bill appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Centre has been granted time till December 12 to file a comprehensive affidavit in response to pleas challenging certain provisions of the Places of Worship Act, 1991. A bench comprising Chief Justice D Y Chandrachud and Justice J B Pardiwala was informed by Solicitor General Tushar Mehta that the Centre was deliberating the matter at the highest level and thus was seeking more time to file response, which has been pending since March 2021. The case will be heard in the first week of January 2023.

The Act, legislated by Parliament in the backdrop of the Ramjanmabhoomi agitation, freezes the status of religious places as they existed on August 15, 1947.   After the Babri mosque demolition, the central government passed this law to save and protect the religious character of all places of worship, to avoid any such communal disturbances in the future. The law kept the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid dispute out of its purview, without citing any reasons for the same but probably because the case was sub-judice at that point in time.

About the petitions

Former BJP Delhi Spokesperson Ashwini Upadhyay, BJP Rajya Sabha Member Dr. Subramanian Swamy, and others filed writ petitions challenging the Places of Worship Act, 1991. Moreover, parties filed roughly 15 impleading petitions, some of which were in favor of the law and others of which were against it. The petition by Ashwini Upadhyay alleged that the 1991 law creates an “arbitrary and irrational retrospective cut-off date” of 15 August, 1947, for maintaining the character of the places of worship or pilgrimage against encroachment done by “fundamentalist-barbaric invaders and law-breakers”. He also contended that the 1991 Act took away the rights of Hindus, Jain, Buddhists, Sikhs to restore their places of worship destroyed by “barbaric invaders”. 

The Royal Family of Kashi, Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind, and other parties who submitted impleadment and intervention applications were also permitted to present their arguments at the case’s hearing. On September 8, the erstwhile royal family of Kashi filed the application claiming that the Act is a “textbook example of a legislation that was passed in the most undemocratic of manners possible,” disregarding the fundamental rights of those who are harmed, especially the right of formerly colonised indigenous communities to seek the reclamation of occupied religious and cultural sites.

Dr. Subramanian Swamy, the leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party, attempted to argue that the PoW Act should be read down in order to exempt the Kashi Vishwanath and Mathura Temple from its provisions. It is noteworthy that both temples are currently in the middle of litigations w.r.t mosques being built alongside them.

The Places of Worship Act

The Act states that all suits, appeals or any other proceedings regarding converting the character of a place of worship, which are pending before any court or authority on August 15, 1947, will abate as soon as the law comes into force. But there are exceptions to this as well, any place of worship referred to in the said sub-sections which is an ancient and historical monument or an archaeological site or remains covered by the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 is not declared to maintain its religious character. It is unclear why this was done.

One then wonders why are there suits in courts in this day and age making attempts to reinvigorate Hindu temples and why were they being entertained in courts if the law does not allow it? The language of the Act is clear when it states that no suit shall lie on or after such commencement (of the Act) in any court for conversion of the religious character of any place of worship, existing on the 15th day of August, 1947. So, clearly, it is not just a penal law that provides punishment for contravention but also disallows suits that seek to challenge places of worship.

The section 3 of the Act clearly states, “No person shall convert any place of worship of any religious denomination or any section thereof into a place of worship of a different section of the same religious denomination or of a different religious denomination or any section thereof.” The objective of the law was clearly to maintain communal harmony in the future.

Petition against the Act is misconceived

As rightly pointed out by an article published by Newsclick, the petitions challenging the Places of Worship Act are misplaced and misconceived. The Act is rooted in the realisation that the need to protect religious places and to maintain its character is a sine qua non to avoid religious conflagrations. It was one of the contributory factors towards the evolution of secularism as an essential feature of modern constitutions. The plea to invalidate the Act and allow conversion (or re-conversion) of certain places of worship through suits, petitions or otherwise is thus not only antithetical to the fundamental values and express provisions of the Constitution, but undoes the civilisational gains of humanity in terms of secularism being a sine qua non of a peaceful and progressive society.

Even without the Act, any attempt at conversion of religious places would run counter to freedom of religion as well as to the values of liberty, equality and fraternity, which are the basic features of the Constitution. The Act expressly enunciates and delineates what is inherent in the Constitution; any such articulation cannot even remotely be unconstitutional.

Related:

SC to hear pleas challenging the Place of Worship Act on October 11

The Challenge to Places of Worship Special Provisions Act, 1991 is Misconceived

Gyanvapi case: SC extends interim order; ‘Shivling’ to remain protected without obstructing right to offer namaz

When worship itself becomes a crime

The post Centre seeks time to respond for ‘detailed consultations’: Plea challenging Places of Worship Act in SC appeared first on SabrangIndia.

THE Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 protects places of worship of all denominations and sections thereof equally. Thus, the Act is based on the principle of equal entitlement of persons belonging to any religious denomination or section thereof.

It is germane to note that the right to freedom of religion is guaranteed to all persons equally under Article 25 of the Constitution. The right of one person to freely practice their religion is subject to right of another person to exercise the aforesaid freedom. The Act, thus, puts into practice a constitutional mandate, and it is unimaginable to term it as unconstitutional.

In Acharya Maharajshri Narandraprasadji Anandprasadji Maharasj versus State of Gujarat (1974), a Constitution bench of the Supreme Court observed:

“No rights in an organised society can be absolute. Enjoyment of one’s rights must be consistent with the enjoyment of rights also by others. Where in a free play of social forces it is not possible to bring about a voluntary harmony, the State has to step in to set right the imbalance between competing interests and there the Directive Principles of State Policy, although not enforceable in courts, have a definite and positive role introducing an obligation upon the State under Article 37 in making laws to regulate the conduct of men and their affairs.” (emphasis supplied by author)

Thus, the Act enforces non-retrogression of one of the basic features of constitutionalism, that is, secularism.

The Act enforces non-retrogression of one of the basic features of constitutionalism, that is, secularism.

Any attempt at ‘undoing’ the perceived injustices of the past shall open a Pandora’s box of history, and is not only impracticable but may also result in chaos and anarchy known to ancient and medieval times. It is important to emphasize that the idea of constitutionalism and modern constitutions, including our Constitution, provide a fortuitous escape from such barbarous and authoritarian societies.

The phenomenon of shared sovereignty of the king and the deity, or the king as the appointee of the deity was a common occurrence in ancient and medieval times, and the advent of any new king resulted in the demolition of deities of the previous ruling class. This phenomenon was rife between not only different religions, but between different denominations in such religions/belief systems as well as sections thereof. Some common instances in this regard are as follows:

1. Destruction of a Jewish temple in Jerusalem by the Neo-Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar II in 587 BCE.
2. Roman installation of the Temple of Jupiter in place of the Second Temple on Temple Mount in 70 CE.
3. Instances of demolition of temples by Hindu kings:
   a. In the early 10th century, the Rashtrakuta king Indra III destroyed the temple of Kalapriya, which was patronised by his arch enemy, Pratiharas.

   b. When the Kashmiri ruler Lalitaditya treacherously killed the king of Gauda (Bengal), his attendants sought to seek revenge. They clandestinely entered Lalitaditya’s capital and made their way to the temple of Vishnu Parihasakesava, the principal deity of the Kashmiri kingdom. However, they mistook a silver image of another deity for Parihasakesava, and took to grounding it to dust even as Kashmiri soldiers fell upon them.
   Though the Gaudas failed to achieve the desired result, their act of retribution does illustrate the symbolism inherent in destroying the image the ruler worshipped.

4. Instances of image appropriation by Hindu kings:
   a. In 642 CE, the Pallava ruler Narasimhavarman I defeated the Chalukyas, sacked their capital of Vatapi, and brought the image of Ganesha to his kingdom in Tamil Nadu. The image acquired the sobriquet of Vatapi Ganapati.

   b. In 950 CE, the Chandella ruler Yashovarman built the Lakshman temple at Khajuraho to house the Vishnu Vaikunth, made of gold. This image was initially obtained from Mount Kailash by the “Lord of Tibet”, from whom the Sahi King of Orissa wrested it. The Pratihara ruler Herambapala defeated the Sahis and wrested the image of the deity. Yashovarman then defeated Herambapala’s son, Devapala, and took it away to Khajuraho.

In this context, American Professor of Religion and Asian Studies Richard Davis notes, “There is no question that medieval Hindu kings frequently destroyed religious images as part of more general rampages.”

The Act is also rooted in the realisation that the need to protect religious places and to maintain its character is a sine qua non to avoid religious conflagrations. It was one of the contributory factors towards the evolution of secularism as an essential feature of modern constitutions.

The Act is rooted in the realisation that the need to protect religious places and to maintain its character is a sine qua non to avoid religious conflagrations.

It is to be noted that the religious wars and confrontations of Europe in 16th, 17th and 18th centuries provided an impetus to develop secular nation-states in the succeeding period. For example, the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) between Protestantism and Catholicism for the control of power over central Europe cost approximately 5 to 8 million people’s lives, and wiped out more than half of the population of certain regions in modern Germany.

The plea of the petitioner in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay versus Union of India to invalidate the Act and allow conversion (or re-conversion) of certain places of worship through suits, petitions or otherwise is thus not only antithetical to the fundamental values and express provisions of the Constitution, but undoes the civilisational gains of humanity in terms of secularism being a sine qua non of a peaceful and progressive society.

The prevention of such mischief is essential to maintain a peaceful and stable society, to facilitate a regime based on liberty, equality and fraternity, and ensure the effective functioning of the Constitution. Any attempt at unravelling the Act or the norms enshrined therein shall not only jeopardise the secular character of the Constitution, but comprise a threat to the whole fabric of fundamental rights, and indeed the very constitutional form of government in our country. Hence, any attempt at subversion of the Act must be nipped in the bud.

The Act recognises that our nation’s independence provides a constitutional basis for the equality of religion, and pre-empts repetition of the perceived injustices of the past. It reaffirms Independence as the moment when India committed itself to a constitutional democracy.

The destruction of religious places has been one of the tools of imposing the authority of upcoming totalitarian regimes, as mentioned above. In modern democracies, the same may manifest itself in the form of majoritarianism, or outright authoritarianism. This tradition runs antithetical to the notion of constitutionalism, and is baleful for the working of the Constitution.

Independence as the basis

The petitioner’s contention in Ashwani Kumar Upadhyay that in the Act, the cut-off date to maintain status quo in the character of a place of worship is arbitrary, cannot be further from historical and constitutional reality, and seems to be an attempt at deliberate naivete.

The Act recognises that our nation’s independence provides a constitutional basis for the equality of religion, and pre-empts repetition of the perceived injustices of the past. The Act reaffirms Independence as the moment when India committed itself to a constitutional democracy. The Supreme Court is deeply cognizant of this historical reality and of the need to avoid the same is evident from the judgement of its Constitution bench in M. Siddique (D) & Ors. versus Mahant Suresh Das & Ors. (2019), popularly known as the ‘Ayodhya judgement’:

“There is a purpose underlying the enactment of the Places of Worship Act. The law speaks to our history and to the future of the nation. Cognizant as we are of our history and of the need for the nation to confront it, Independence was a watershed moment to heal the wound of the past. Historical wrongs cannot be remedied by the people taking the law in their own hands. In preserving the character of places of public worship, Parliament has mandated in no uncertain terms that history and its wrongs shall not be used as instruments to oppress the present and the future.”

Again:

“This Court cannot entertain claims that stem from the actions of the Mughal rulers against Hindu places of worship in a court of law today. For any person who seeks solace or recourse against the actions of any number of ancient rulers, the law is not the answer. Our history is replete with actions that have been judged to be morally incorrect and even today are liable to trigger vociferous ideological debate. However, the adoption of the Constitution marks a watershed moment where We, the People of India, departed from the determination of rights and liabilities on the basis of our ideology, our religion, the colour of our skin, or the century when our ancestors arrived at these lands, and submitted to the rule of law. Under our rule of law, this Court can adjudicate upon private property claims that were expressly or impliedly recognised by the British Sovereign and subsequently not interfered with upon Indian Independence.”

It is clear that the plea of conversion (or re-conversion) is tantamount to swinging one’s fist irrespective of the harm caused to others, and is thus abhorrent to the Constitution.

The Act is firmly entrenched in the aspirational values of a free India, as enunciated during our freedom struggle. Mahatma Gandhi’s vision of a secular democratic State has been brought out by historian Bipan Chandra in his journal article Gandhiji, Secularism and Communalism (2004):

“M K Gandhi was basically and fully secular despite being deeply religious is well-known, as also that he wanted India to be a secular democratic state. And he asserted on 9 August 1942: “Free India will be no Hindu Raj, it will be Indian raj based not on the majority of any religious sect or community but on the representatives of the whole people without distinction of religion.””

This model of secularism, based on equal treatment to all religions and the absence of any State religion, is reflected in the Indian Constitution.

The Delhi High Court, in Surksh Chandra Chiman Lal Shah versus Union Of India & Ors. (1975), also observes that the source of Indian secularism is the freedom movement “which assured protection to the minorities and neutrality of the State in regard to all religions”:

“The evolution of the concept of secularism in modern India has a very different background. Inspired by the spirit of toleration and liberalism which characterised the Hindu thought from ancient times, the Indian National Congress developed a non-communal approach in politics leaving religion as being a matter of the conscience of the individual. The secularism in India developed as a part of nationalism and Freedom Movement which assured protection to the minorities and neutrality of the State in regard to all religions. This policy was embodied in the resolution of the Congress passed in 1931 at Karachi.”

Act only articulates what is inherent in the Constitution

Even without the Act, any attempt at conversion of religious places would run counter to freedom of religion as well as to the values of liberty, equality and fraternity, which are the basic features of the Constitution. The Act expressly enunciates and delineates what is inherent in the Constitution; any such articulation cannot even remotely be unconstitutional.

The plea of the petitioner for the aforementioned judicial remedy is in essence a plea to provide remedy for violation of the freedom of religion of persons belonging to other denominations or sections thereof. Such a plea to violate fundamental rights is grossly unconstitutional to begin with, and ought to be dismissed forthwith.

The plea of the petitioner thus runs counter to the provisions of freedom of religion, which is subject to inter alia morality. The term ‘morality’ needs to be understood based on the ‘harm principle’, which essentially means “your freedom to swing your fist ends where my nose begins”. It is clear that the plea of conversion (or re-conversion) is tantamount to swinging one’s fist irrespective of the harm caused to others, and is thus abhorrent to the Constitution.

In National Legal Services Authority versus Union of India (2014), the Supreme Court observed that the internal morality of the Constitution is based on dignity and equality of all human beings:

“As we have pointed out above, our Constitution inheres liberal and substantive democracy with the rule of law as an important and fundamental pillar. It has its own internal morality based on dignity and equality of all human beings. The rule of law demands protection of individual human rights. Such rights are to be guaranteed to each and every human being. These TGs, even though insignificant in numbers, are still human beings and therefore they have every right to enjoy their human rights.” (emphasis supplied by author)

The plea in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay runs counter to such equality, and contends that the rights of persons belonging to certain denominations or sections thereof is to be preferred over others. Thus, it violates all norms of constitutional morality.

Judicial remedy

The Act does not curtail the judicial remedy for any guaranteed right. For there cannot be a judicial remedy to enforce claims of one party in derogation of the guaranteed rights of another party. The plea of the petitioner for the aforementioned judicial remedy is in essence a plea to provide remedy for violation of the freedom of religion of persons belonging to other denominations or sections thereof. Such a plea to violate fundamental rights is grossly unconstitutional to begin with, and ought to be dismissed forthwith.

Also, the contention that the Act bars any remedy against illegal encroachment is factually wrong. The remedy for illegal encroachment on the property of any such place of worship is available under the relevant laws. In fact, the Act protects the places of worship of any religion against encroachments which are in the nature of conversion of such places of worship of other religious denominations, or other sections of the same denomination.

In the end, it ought to be emphasized that on certain occasions, it may be necessary to ascertain the character of a place of worship, but the same must be permitted only in rare cases, in which the dispute is genuine and based on regular usage of the place by people belonging to different contending denominations or sections thereof. Otherwise, the possibility of ascertainment is wrought with mischief, since a place of worship may deliberately be brought into dispute and then the contending party may invite judicial intervention for ascertainment of its character.

In cases where ascertainment is allowed, the reference date of the same ought to be August 15, 1947, and not the perceived usage of a particular place by a different contending religious denomination in historical antiquity.

Indeed, the mere presence of the Cross will not turn an article of Christian faith into an article of the Zoroastrian faith; nor does an article of Zoroastrian faith make it a structure of Christian faith.

But if there is a structure where a Ganesha idol is placed in the sanctum sanctorum along with other accoutrements usual of a denominational temple, the mere presence of a cross on one side is not sufficient to raise reasonable doubt as to the character of the place.

Hence, the exercise of ascertainment must be based on reasonable grounds with strong proof of dispute as on August 15, 1947, and must be carried out in an utmost impartial and fair manner. Only then, the Act may prove effective in protecting the constitutional mandate that it seeks to effectuate.

Courtesy: Newsclick

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BJP leader Ashwini Upadhyay has filed a petition before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act 1991 as it bars remedies against illegal encroachment on the places of worship and pilgrimages prior to August 15, 1947. A bench of CJI SA Bode and Justice AS Bopanna has issued notice to Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Law and the Ministry of Culture.

Advocates Vikas Singh and Gopal Sankaranarayanan appearing for the petitioner argued that “Centre has excluded the birthplace of Lord Ram at Ayodhya (from the application of the Act) but not the birthplace of Lord Krishna in Mathura, though both are the incarnations of Lord Vishnu, the creator.”

The petition asserts that the law has created an arbitrary, irrational retrospective cut-off date and in the process has legalised the illegal acts of invaders who encroached upon religious institutions back in the day. The plea submits that the provisions of the law, particularly, section 2,3 and 4 take away rights of Hindus, Jains, Buddhists, and Sikhs to reclaim their places of worship through Courts.

It is argued that the law violates principle of secularism and is contrary to State’s duty to protect historic places under Article 49 and to preserve religious cultural heritage under Article 51A of the Constitution and further violates Article 14 (right to equality), Article 15 (right against discrimination), Article 21(right to life & personal liberty), Article 25 (right to pray practice propagate religion), Article 26 (right to manage maintain administer places of worship-pilgrimage) and Article 29 (right to conserve culture) of the Indian Constitution, reports LiveLaw.

The petition further contends that pilgrimage and ‘public order’ are both state subjects and Centre does not have legislative competence to enact such a law. The plea also argues upon the definition of ‘places of worship’ and states that places erected or constructed in derogation of the personal law cannot be called ‘places of worship’.

About the law

While temple restoration suits started cropping up in the past few years slightly stirring the communal pot, this petition has gone ahead and challenged the law that has managed to keep, to some extent, such communal rifts at bay. Such temple restoration suits were barred by this Act and hence, this petition aims to remove the hurdle created by this law to facilitate more such suits.

The purpose of the law was to prohibit conversion of any place of worship and to provide for the maintenance of the religious character of any place of worship as it existed on August 15, 1947. 

The section 3 of the Act clearly states, “No person shall convert any place of worship of any religious denomination or any section thereof into a place of worship of a different section of the same religious denomination or of a different religious denomination or any section thereof.” The objective of the law was clearly to maintain communal harmony in the future. 

“We see this Bill as a measure to provide and develop our glorious traditions of love, peace and harmony,” the then-Home Minister, S.B. Chavan had said in the Lok Sabha on September 10, 1991. “The country’s tradition of amity and harmony came under severe strain during the pre-Independence period. After Independence, we have set about healing the wounds of the past and endeavoured to restore our traditions of communal amity and goodwill to their past glory,” he had said, reported The Hindu.

The law states that all suits, appeals or any other proceedings regarding converting the character of a place of worship, which are pending before any court or authority on August 15, 1947, will abate as soon as the law comes into force. But there are exceptions to this as well, any place of worship referred to in the said sub-sections which is an ancient and historical monument or an archaeological site or remains covered by the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 is not declared to maintain its religious character. It is unclear why this was done.

Destruction of temples in history

Notion of temple desecration was a very politically motivated action in the context of pre-modern India, prevalent from even before the advent of Islam into India, as argued by History Professor Richard Eaton. Royal temples housing the state deity symbolised the sovereignty of the king. Temples have been desecrated in inter-dynasty conflicts as well. In 642 A.D, the Pallava king Narasimhavarman attacked the Chalukyas and destroyed their royal temple looting their state deity from their capital. Such actions of destroying royal temples and looting the central deity were carried out with the explicit aim of detaching a vanquished king from the most visible sign of his former legitimacy. 

Thus, the act of temple desecration was well established within the Indian political rhetoric. While history records that Aurangzeb did destroy temples like the famed Vishwanath temple at Varanasi, and the Keshav Nath temple at Mathura, there was no instruction given regarding the general desecration of all temples throughout the empire and in fact, he has been documented to have patronised temples and their functionaries. The Vishwanath temple (built by Jai Singh) was destroyed as punishment for Jai Singh’s complicity in facilitating Shivaji Maharaj’s escape from Aurangzeb’s prison. To confuse this to be an expression of his faith would be a historical anachronism.

Related:

Gyanvyapi mosque case: Suit filed in Varanasi court for restoration of temple
Monk group demands Muslims return “Hindu property”
“Temple restoration” suits on the rise; what about the Places of Worship Act?
History taken out of context: Historians slam Qutub Minar plea

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The suit filed for restoration of temples in the Qutub Minar complex in Delhi is the latest in a line of similar suits invoking land disputes at temple sites in Mathura as well as Varanasi. After the Babri mosque demolition, the central government passed a law to save and protect the religious character of all places of worship, to avoid any such communal disturbances in the future. Then how are these suits seeking restoration of temples and reclamation of land justified? Does the law allow it? We shall deal with these questions in this article.

The suit filed in a Delhi court to restore temples in the Qutub Minar complex which also houses a mosque seems to be inspired from the suit recently filed in a Mathura court for removal of Shahi Idgah mosque which is adjacent to Krishna Janmabhoomi. While a Senior Civil Judge Chhaya Sharma had dismissed a similar suit, Mathura District court admitted the plea and the hearing is underway, with next hearing scheduled for January.

When the Ayodhya dispute was at its peak in early 1990s, right wing organisations like Viswa Hindu Parishad (VHP) had laid claim on two other sites: the Shahi Idgah mosque in Mathura, and the Gyanvyapi mosque in Varanasi. A suit pertaining to the latter was entertained by a district court in Varanasi but the order is pending in appeal at the Allahabad High Court. 

The suits in the matters of Shahi Idgah in Mathura and Gyanvyapi in Varanasi or Kashi were expected after the Ayodhya verdict came out in favour of Hindu petitioners. The slogans of “Yeh to kewal jhanki hai, Kashi, Mathura baaki hai.” (This is just a sneak peek, Varanasi and Mathura are still left) had filled the Ayodhya air when kar sevaks were marching on for the demolition of the Babri mosque.

India has had a dark history dealing with temple-mosque disputes. The Babri Masjid demolition and the subsequent communal riots that followed and have scarred an entire generation of both communities. It was to prevent any such further disputes, the Narsimha Rao government, which was in power when Babri Masjid demolition was carried out in all pomp and show, passed the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991.

The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act

The purpose of the law was to prohibit conversion of any place of worship and to provide for the maintenance of the religious character of any place of worship as it existed on August 15, 1947. The law kept the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid dispute out of its purview, without citing any reasons for the same but probably because the case was sub-judice at that point in time.

The section 3 of the Act clearly states, “No person shall convert any place of worship of any religious denomination or any section thereof into a place of worship of a different section of the same religious denomination or of a different religious denomination or any section thereof.” The objective of the law was clearly to maintain communal harmony in the future. 

“We see this Bill as a measure to provide and develop our glorious traditions of love, peace and harmony,” the then-Home Minister, S.B. Chavan had said in the Lok Sabha on September 10, 1991. “The country’s tradition of amity and harmony came under severe strain during the pre-Independence period. After Independence, we have set about healing the wounds of the past and endeavoured to restore our traditions of communal amity and goodwill to their past glory,” he had said, reported The Hindu.

The law states that all suits, appeals or any other proceedings regarding converting the character of a place of worship, which are pending before any court or authority on August 15, 1947, will abate as soon as the law comes into force. But there are exceptions to this as well, any place of worship referred to in the said sub-sections which is an ancient and historical monument or an archaeological site or remains covered by the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 is not declared to maintain its religious character. It is unclear why this was done.

One then wonders why are there suits in courts in this day and age making attempts to reinvigorate Hindu temples and why were they being entertained in courts if the law does not allow it? The language of the Act is clear when it states that no suit shall lie on or after such commencement (of the Act) in any court for conversion of the religious character of any place of worship, existing on the 15th day of August, 1947. So, clearly, it is not just a penal law that provides punishment for contravention but also disallows suits that seek to challenge places of worship.

All of these suits rely on history which clearly states that temples were destroyed, and mosques were built in their place, by invaders as a mark of victorious conquest. Historians slammed the Qutub complex plea and stated that history was being taken out of context in suits like these. Professor and historian Harbans Mukhia said, “History is not a matter of public opinion. Historical events take place in their context. You can’t isolate a 12th century fact from its context and present it in 21st century and claim victimhood. Where does logic find a place in all this?”

Destruction of temples in history

Notion of temple desecration was a very politically motivated action in the context of pre-modern India, prevalent from even before the advent of Islam into India, as argued by History Professor Richard Eaton. Royal temples housing the state deity symbolised the sovereignty of the king. Temples have been desecrated in inter-dynasty conflicts as well. In 642 A.D, the Pallava king Narasimhavarman attacked the Chalukyas and destroyed their royal temple looting their state deity from their capital. Such actions of destroying royal temples and looting the central deity were carried out with the explicit aim of detaching a vanquished king from the most visible sign of his former legitimacy. 

Thus, the act of temple desecration was well established within the Indian political rhetoric. While history records that Aurangzeb did destroy temples like the famed Vishwanath temple at Varanasi and the Keshav Nath temple at Mathura, there was no instruction given regarding the general desecration of all temples throughout the empire and in fact, he has been documented to have patronised temples and their functionaries. The Vishwanath temple (built by Jai Singh) was destroyed as punishment for Jai Singh’s complicity in facilitating Shivaji Maharaj’s escape from Aurangzeb’s prison. To confuse this to be an expression of his faith would be a historical anachronism.[1]

Related:

History taken out of context: Historians slam Qutub Minar plea
Suit for restoration of temples in Qutub Minar Complex claims “National shame must be vanished”

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