Indian Muslim woman Shagufta Sayyd prays in Mumbai, India. AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool

The Trump administration has been using the phrase “radical Islam” when discussing the “war on terror.” From his inauguration address to remarks to military leaders, President Trump has been warning against “Islamic terrorists.”

Many different kinds of individuals and movements get collapsed into this category of radical Islam. A common one that is increasingly being used by politicians and journalists both in Europe and the U.S. to equate with “radical Islam” is the Salafist tradition.

For example, Michael Flynn, who recently resigned as national security advisor, was clear that what unites terrorists is their belief in the “ideology” of Salafism. Sebastian Gorka, deputy assistant to the president, also describes Salafism as a “fundamental understanding of Islam” that justifies terrorism.

France and Germany are targeting this movement, vowing to “clean up” or shut down Salafist mosques, since several arrested and suspected terrorists had spent time in these communities.

As a scholar of religion and politics, I have done research in Salafi communities, specifically in France and India, two countries where Muslims are the largest religious minorities.

Salafists constitute a minority of the Muslim population. For example, in France, estimates range from 5,000 to 20,000 – out of a Muslim population of over 4 million. Security experts estimate a worldwide number of 50 million out of 1.6 billion Muslims.

But there’s not much understanding of Salafism, its history and its diversity. In fact, Muslims themselves often have different definitions of what it means to be a Salafist.
So, who are Salafists?

Origins of Salafism

The Arabic term salaf means “ancestors.” It refers technically to the first three generations of Muslims who surrounded the Prophet Muhammad. Because they had direct experience with the original Islamic teachings and practices, they are generally respected across the Muslim world.

Self-identified Salafists tend to believe they are simply trying to emulate the path of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. This might include an array of practices from dress to culinary habits as well as ethical teachings and commitment to faith.

Salafism as a movement is believed to have originated in the 19th and 20th centuries. Some historians claim it started as a theological reform movement within Sunni Islam. The impetus was to return to the original teachings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad and the Quran – a consequence, in part, of social changes and Western colonialism.

They specifically cite the works of Egyptian, Persian and Syrian intellectuals from the 19th century as shaping Salafist movements. One recent study, however, argues that these intellectuals from the past never even used the term Salafism. In other words, there is no authoritative account of how or when exactly this movement originated.

Finally, it is also open to debate as to which Islamic groups, schools of thought and practices may be considered Salafist. This is because groups and individuals who are labeled Salafist do not always view themselves this way. And they disagree amongst each other over what defines authentic Salafist practice.

Here’s what my research shows

The vast majority of people who loosely affiliate with Salafism, however, are either simply nonpolitical or actively reject politics as morally corrupt. From 2005-2014, I spent a total of two years as an ethnographic researcher in the cities of Lyon, in southeastern France, and in Hyderabad, in south India. I clearly observed this among these two communities.

Every week I participated in mosque lessons and Islamic study circles among dozens of Salafist women. These communities maintain strict separation between men and women, but I was able to interact with and interview a few men as well.

Based on conversations and observation, I learned that they actually avoided politics. They did not attend protests or do advocacy, and in Lyon many did not vote in elections.

It is the case that there are Muslim women, including many converts, who actively embrace Salafism. They take up strict forms of veiling and work hard to practice their religion every day.

Let’s take Amal, a 22-year-old woman who grew up in a working-class neighborhood in southeastern France. I met her during my time as an ethnographic researcher on Muslim minorities in France. Amal identifies with the Salafist tradition in Islam. And if we go by the definitions being floated around, she would be considered a “radical Muslim”: She prayed five times daily, fasted all 30 days of Ramadan, and wore the “jilbab,” a loose, full-body garment that covers everything but the face. Steadfast in her religiosity, she also studied the Quran regularly and attended local mosques in the area.

She worked hard to live her life in accordance with the ethical teachings of Islam. This included spending part of her week tutoring Muslim girls in the neighborhood who homeschooled. Amal worried a great deal about their futures in France, since anti-veiling legislation had constrained their opportunities. She also quietly worried about the future of Islam, believing it is under siege both by governments and by the ungodly and destructive work of the Islamic State.

Religious does not mean radical

As anthropologists of religion have shown, Salafi women are not passive adherents. Nor are they forced into strict practices by their husbands. Still, this doesn’t mean they’re all the same.

Among the French Salafist women I knew, most were the daughters and granddaughters of immigrants from the former French North African colonies. Almost a third were converts to Islam that chose specifically the Salafist tradition as opposed to mainstream currents of Islam. They were drawn to the clear expectations, rigorous routines and teachings about trusting God.

While some of the women were raised in religious families, many broke away from their Muslim families or earned the wrath of their parents for turning to Salafism. Because the parents practiced a cultural form of Islam, or did not practice at all, they did not want their daughters to wear the jilbab. Despite this disapproval, the women focused a great deal on what it meant to have faith in God, and they emphasized that they had to continually struggle to strengthen that faith.

These struggles included various ethical behaviors including not talking too much, suppressing one’s ego and respecting people’s privacy. Along the way, some committed “sins,” like smoking or lying, and deviated from the teachings by not praying or fasting. Some even doubted their faith, which they considered normal and acceptable.

In my research, non-Muslims as well as other Muslims claimed Salafists were judgmental of those who did not believe or practice like them. In my observation, the contrary was the case: Salafis emphasized that one’s faith and piety were deeply private matters that no one but God had the right to judge.

Diverse views

However, like any movement or tradition, Salafism is profoundly diverse and encompasses a number of debates and struggles for legitimacy.

So, there are those self-identified Salafists around the world who join political organizations or participate in political debates. These include, for example, several political parties in Egypt and the Ahl-i-Hadees in India.

A small minority, estimated to be 250,000 in number by security experts, rejects nation-states and embraces political violence. They span continents but are centered in Iraq and Syria.

Different from Wahhabism

In today’s climate, however, it has become a political term. This is partly because of its connection to Saudi Arabia.

Salafism is sometimes referred to as Wahhabism, the Saudi Arabian variant of the movement that is intimately tied to the Saudi regime. They share some intellectual roots and theological emphases, but they also differ, especially in how they approach Islamic jurisprudence. While Wahhabis follow one of the main Sunni orthodox schools of law, Salafis tend to think through legal questions independently. So equating the two is a mistake.

For some Salafists, labeling them as Wahhabi is a way to dismiss their faith or even insult them. Identifying with Salafism does not mean one supports the politics of the Saudi state. In my research, in both India and France, people sometimes noted concerns about the Saudi government’s political corruption or human rights record.

Yet outwardly, practices might overlap. For example, many Salafist women wear the niqab (that covers the face). Saudi intellectual centers and sheikhs provide literature and training in numerous countries. They circulate lectures as well as money for building mosques and schools.

And of course, Mecca and Medina are the spiritual centers for Muslims more broadly. In this way there is a transfer of intellectual and spiritual resources from Saudi Arabia that supports Salafist communities around the globe.

Avoiding stereotypes, assumptions

Why is it important to recognize the complexity and diversity of the Salafist movement?

It is true that as one part of the global Islamic revival, it appears to be growing. And it likely will remain part of the social landscape in a number of cities for the foreseeable future.

But, it is important not to assume that people’s religious faith and practices are the same as terrorist violence. It fuels fear and hatred – like the kind that inspired the recent shootings at the mosque in Quebec or the arson attack that burned down a mosque in Texas.

So, from my perspective, when we hear politicians warn us of the “global Salafi threat,” or if we see a woman like Amal walking down the street in her jilbab, it’s vital to remember the dangers of simplistic (and mistaken) stereotypes of “radical Muslims.”

(Z. Fareen Parvez is Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Massachusetts Amherst).

This article was first published on The Conversation. The original article may be read here.
 

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The decision is noteworthy in a country whose population is 99% Muslim. So what does the ban mean?

The Moroccan Ministry of Interior cited security concerns as the reason for the ban. It argued that wearing the burqa could help criminals and terrorists hide their identities. Indeed, several criminals have reportedly used the burqa or niqab – a veil that covers the face but not the eyes – to perpetrate crimes, including theft.

But beyond immediate security concerns, the real worry for the moderate Moroccan government is the spread of radical, Salafist Islam. Salafism has been linked to ISIS and terrorism in North Africa. Morocco’s concern with terrorism is exacerbated by the fact that it receives about 10 million visitors a year and partly depends on tourism revenues for its development. The government believes that banning the burqa will limit expression of radical Islam and will help contain it.
 

Women’s wear tells a story

A very small minority of women wear the burqa in Morocco – a country where modernity and tradition live together and whose king, Mohammed VI, fosters moderate Islam.

The djellaba – a hooded robe – is the historical, national garment of Moroccan women. It’s traditionally worn with a veil called a litham and worn together they cover the woman’s face and body, except her eyes. During the fight for independence, especially in the 1940s, the djellaba was a symbol of nationalism and a shield of identity.

Today, the djellaba is mostly worn without the litham.

But with the rise of political Islam in the mid-1980s came various new, foreign veiling practices – including the hijab, the niqab and the burqa. Under the influence of the Gulf nations, the hijab – a scarf that covers the hair – gradually infiltrated Moroccan society and came to be worn along with the djellaba or other western-type clothing.

Like the hijab, the niqab and the burqa are linked to the spread of Salafist Islam in North Africa. The niqab and burqa are worn especially in radical Islamist or Salafist circles in conservative regions in the north of Morocco. Hundreds of jihadists have travelled from this region to fight in Syria and Iraq .

Within this context, the burqa is perceived by many Moroccans as alien to their culture. Among intellectuals in general – except the ultra conservative Salafists – the wearing of the burqa is perceived as an unwelcome Wahhabi practice.
 

Opinions split

It’s notable that the ban hasn’t created a mass outcry. This can probably be attributed to the decision to ban the sale and production of burqas, rather than the burqa itself – at least for the time being. But the burqa ban has certainly split opinion in the country.

The Salafist extremist Abu Naim issued a video on his Facebook page calling those who made this decision “infidels, apostates and renegades who are leading a war against God”.

Some Salafist Muslim groups like Annahda wa Al Fadila (Renaissance and Virtue) have strongly criticised the move. They warn that the burqa ban is a first step towards banning the niqab. This, they argue, would lead to a real split in Moroccan society, where more women wear the niqab.

Progressive women’s organisations argue that the ban is justified because the burqa oppresses women. Nouzha Skalli, a former Minister for Family and Social Development, welcomed the ban and described it as “an important step in the fight against religious extremism”. Saida Drissi, Chair of the Democratic Association of the Women of Morocco, pointed out that “when it’s about wearing a hijab, a burqa, Salafists all agree… but we never hear them [protest] when a girl can’t wear a miniskirt”.

Others reject the burqa as a neocolonial import from the Gulf states.

The Northern Moroccan National Observatory for Human Development considered the decision “arbitrary” and an “indirect violation of women’s freedom of expression”.

But for the Amazigh researcher and activist Ahmed Assid the ban of the manufacture and sale of the burqa is legitimate and desirable. He welcomed the move because this foreign garment has been used improperly to aid criminal and terrorist acts.
 

The new paradox and women’s rights

The burqa ban and the debate that it has fomented has drawn attention to the tension that exists in Morocco between official moderate Islam and conservative Islam, which is a growing minority.

This is the new paradox in Morocco. And it has significant implications for women’s rights. On the one hand, recent legal and institutional reforms have had a significant impact on democracy and the modernisation process in Moroccan society. These include the amended constitution of 2011, which guarantees gender equality and women’s political participation, and the reform of the Family Code in 2004.

On the other hand, the Salafists who defend the burqa and the niqab want to Islamise society further. They ultimately aim to establish the Islamic caliphate in Morocco, which allows beheadings, the captivity of women, sexual jihad, and anti-women fatwas.

Given this paradox, the burqa ban, which favours moderate Islam and secularism, is significant. Although it’s obviously motivated by security concerns, the ban is part of a broader fight against religious extremism and terrorism.

Moha Ennaji, Professor of Linguistics, Gender, and Cultural Studies, International Institute for Languages and Cultures
 

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

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It is rather rich of Zakir Naik to write an Open Letter to the government about his perceived sense of persecution at the hands of Indian authorities.

As I have written in previously, every person including Zakir Naik should be probed within the due process of law. To create conditions in which he is forced to live outside India without a clinching evidence is hardly excusable. That he is followed by thousands of Muslims who have not become terrorists is proof enough that there is a complex set of causative factors behind every act of terror. A complex phenomenon such as terrorism should not be simplified as the result of the teaching and sermons of some individual.

Zakir Naik’s letter however goes further. It accuses the government of the day of selectively targeting Muslims. Zakir Naik becomes the victim within this narrative by becoming one of the 170 million of India’s Muslims.
The problem starts right here. A majority of Muslims here are poor and uneducated and mostly do not have a voice. On comparison, Zakir Naik owns a million-dollar enterprise and has a powerful lobby fighting for his defence. How then can he compare himself with the average Indian Muslim?

Moreover, Zakir Naik speaks openly against the religious practice of the majority of Indian Muslims. He has accused them of being open to polytheism and not following the correct tenets of Islam. How then does he become one of them? Clearly his ideas about Islam is much at variance with that of the majority of Indian Muslims. And that’s precisely the reason why he cannot represent the majority of Indian Muslims. For almost all major schools of Islam in India, barring Salafi-Wahhabi-Ahl-e-Hadeesi, Zakir Naik represents something other than Islam; in fact, the majority even refuse to certify him as a religious scholar.

It sounds patently hypocritical when Zakir Naik talks about ‘murder of democracy’ and violation of ‘fundamental rights’. Of course, all this is peppered by the undertone of ‘justice’ which he argues has been denied in his case. Talking in terms of democracy and rights would almost make Zakir Naik a believer in these secular ideas. However, all his own speeches and conduct have belied this.

A person who sings praises for the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, accepts their hospitality and prize is now talking about democracy and human rights. Why didn’t he remember them when the Saudis gave him millions to promote their ideology of Islamism?

A person who sings praises for the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, accepts their hospitality and prize is now talking about democracy and human rights. Why didn’t he remember them when the Saudis gave him millions to promote their ideology of Islamism? As a champion of democracy, why did he accept Saudi money when it is well documented that there are flagrant violations of all kinds of rights in that kingdom. What kind of democracy is he talking about when his mentor hangs and stones people for petty crimes in full public view?

There cannot be any doubt that Zakir Naik is talking about democracy and rights without even believing an iota in these concepts. After all, didn’t his Islamist predecessors argue that democracy was a system of men and what they wanted was to bring the system of God? Has Zakir Naik all of a sudden turned secular when confronted with man-made laws?

In the same letter, Zakir Naik argues that he is promoting peace and harmony in society through developing an understanding of Islam. Again, he probably knows that this is not the case. Through his erroneous understanding of the text, he has created newer religious schisms within the Muslim society so much so that there was a fatwa against him. If he cannot create harmony even within Muslim society, then heaven only knows how he is going to create peace and harmony within the Indian society. His sermons actually have the opposite effect: of promoting enmity between different religious groups in society.

If one is hell bent on arguing that Islam is the best religion in the world and that polytheism of the Hindus is a backward and deplorable religious worldview, then how does this promote peace and tolerance? If he continues to justify that Islam alone is the saviour of world, then how does this promote peace and mutual respect? Calling such sermons of a third rate pedant as dialogue militates against the very idea of a dialogical plural world. Zakir Naik is not interested in dialogue: he is a fascist demagogue who wants the entire world to convert to his point of view.

His hypocrisy on democracy begins to unravel the minute he takes recourse to the Quran. There are many passages within the text to cite in terms of pluralism and tolerance. But to quote the verse which tells Muslims to be patient and wait for their eventual victory over the polytheists is perhaps too much. This is not a man who is a believer in the virtues of secular laws like democracy. This is a man who wants to unfurl the Islamic flag everywhere, demean and trounce all other religious traditions. The recourse to democracy and the language of rights are only a means to an end: that of establishing the supremacy of Islam.

(Arshad Alam is a NewAgeIslam.com columnist).

This article was first published on NewAgeIslam.

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