Facts, procedural history & the Court’s reformative lens

The case dates back to 2003, when Shubha (accused no. 4) was set to marry a man, a union that she did not want or choose, but one that was forced upon her by family considerations. The prosecution demonstrated that she held animosity towards the marriage and worked with others to plot the murder of her fiancé. Both the trial court and the Karnataka High Court found her guilty of Sections 302/120-B IPC and sentenced her to imprisonment for life. The case was reviewed by the Supreme Court and, after considering the record, Justices M.M. Sundresh and Aravind Kumar found the evidence of conspiracy convincing and compelling and directed that the conviction be upheld.

What made this ruling truly distinctive was not simply reinstating guilt, but the court’s articulation of social context. The court recognised that the behaviour exhibited by Shubha was a product of alienation caused by being married off against her will. An alienation that the court described as “the worst form of alienation.” While the court recognised this was not to be a defence of culpability, it emphasised that the conditions of gendered invalidation must be considered at sentencing and post-sentence relief stages, if a person was deemed to have been coerced. Consequently, while invoking Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution, it stressed that pardon powers were a constitutional vehicle of individualised justice – one that should openly consider gendered oppression as legitimate grounds for clemency. In suspending the arrest for eight weeks, to enable Shubha to seek relief from the governor, the court’s ruling indicated that processes of clemency required engagement with gendered oppression.

Social context versus retributive logic in Indian courts

The Shubha decision makes us wonder: have Indian courts consistently take into account the social context when women engage in crime under coercion, or has retributive logic been dominant? The record shows a mixed, often inconsistent, picture.

In some instances, courts invoke coercion and systemic oppression as important mitigating factors. For example, in cases involving women who commit murder or manslaughter of their abusive partners after protracted violence, some High Courts have appealed to the long-standing nature of domestic violence as an acknowledgment of provocation, by virtue of coercion. In the context of honour cases, where women kill under the pressure of the family, again, courts have articulated, at times, the coercive background as relevant to culpability. These decisions show courts are willing to place women’s actions in structural contexts of patriarchy, violence, and limited agency.

At the same time, there is more often than not, retributive reasoning. In cases of homicide where intent and planning have been established, courts have articulated that social context and coercion cannot abrogate responsibility. For example, in Kehar Singh v. State (1988), the Court held that personal or political motivation for killing could not mitigate the culpability for murder. Lastly, in many honour killings and conspiracies to murder cases, courts have been more punitive, demanding stricter sentences for deterrence and for the sanctity of life as opposed to situating context within mitigation.

The jurisprudence, then, is inconsistent: there are reformative strands, but they typically take second place to traditional retribution. Shubha is an effort to marry both currents – placing liability but allowing for reform and mercy in cases where coercive power influenced behaviour is the causation of the crime.

Reformative justice and gendered social contexts

There is no mistaking that the Shubha decision reflects a careful but significant move towards more compassionate and contextualised treatment of women in conflict with the law. The Court maintained accountability by upholding the conviction but also offered recognition of the coercive reality of forced marriage, opening the door to mercy and rehabilitation. This simultaneous emphasis illustrates an important recognition of the fact that punishment cannot be understood separately from the social systems that structure women’s behaviour, particularly in a society in which family control, patriarchy, and honour codes remain entrenched.

The shift toward compassionate treatment produces a clear implication for sentencing practice. The finding encourages both first instance judges and appellate judges to record social facts and any coercive pressures that influence culpability, including forced marriage, prolonged domestic abuse, or economic dependence. These narratives help courts exercise a more considered approach to punishment and provide a credible evidentiary basis for executive review of punishment proposals. This re-orientation could eventually cultivate a sentencing culture that emphasises deterrence and reformation rather than purely retributive reasoning.

The ruling also presents an altered vision for the role of executive clemency under Articles 72 and 161. By inviting Shubha to request a pardon from the Governor, the Court signalled that mercy is not just political grace but a constitutional safeguard of individualised justice. If consistently applied, this would create an expectation for state authorities to consider mercy applications in a timely and transparent manner, particularly in cases where gendered coercion has informed criminal behaviour. Related to this idea of carving out space to consider mercy is the potential for rehabilitation: if coerced marriage is structural harm, this strengthens the case for gender-responsive rehabilitation programming (counselling, vocational programming, access to legal aid, and safe housing post-release) for women in prison. In this context, rehabilitation is not only seen as a component of clemency but as a necessary precursor to successfully reintegrating into society.

Risks, criticism, and a path forward

The Shubha ruling is promising, but it is not without risks. Critics may worry that this mental health context creates different standards for women compared to men, who, similarly, may be acting under coercive pressures. Others will warn of a slippery slope: it becomes concerned with the social context at the expense of culpability, including for intentional and premeditated crimes.  Finally, the effect of executive mercy varies by state and is politically driven rather than principled, and can therefore be arbitrary.

Concerns over presumptions of public policy in favour of leniency and reforms aimed at the offender’s mental state have been raised in previous cases. For example, various courts have considered leniency in cases involving “honour killings” (Shivani v. State of Haryana; State v. Rani). They recognized family coercion, societal pressures, and gendered vulnerabilities as relevant considerations in criminal conduct while also endorsing proportional sentences to ensure confidence in the joint processes of responsibility and punishment.

To mitigate prospective harms, a structure of procedural safeguards is essential. Courts must document coercive situations with factual, transparent findings so that context-driven reasoning does not degrade into irrational discretion. Executives should require uniform timelines and reasoned approaches for mercy petitions, and gender-responsive pre-sentencing reports prepared by psychologists and social workers should provide an evidentiary basis for assessing coercion claims. To maintain fairness and public safety, a rehabilitation programme should be coupled with the clemency decision.

Seen in this light, Shubha adds value to justice without undermining accountability. It requires Indian criminal law to remain firm in punishing spousal murder while expressing compassion about how coercive social structures shape culpability. If this ruling becomes standard, it could mark a significant point toward a principled, gender-sensitive, and rehabilitative justice system similar to lessons from earlier reform-oriented cases while ultimately addressing consistency and context-sensitive application.

Towards a gender-aware and reformative criminal justice

The ruling in Shubha v. State by the Supreme Court of India signifies an important moment in the history of Indian criminal law.  It highlights an important departure from the strict retributive stance towards context-sensitive and reformative justice. By recognizing the coercive circumstances that led to the commission of the crime by Shubha, and allowing her to seek a pardon, the Court has brought gendered social realities into focus within criminal law–an evolution which may emerge in new sentences, clemency petitions, and rehabilitative interventions from the Courts in the future.

There will be obstacles to a continued consistent approach in practice; however, this ruling supplies an initial manual for thinking about how judges and supporting actors can weave empathy, social context, and reformative thinking into judicial reasoning. Most importantly, it is a simple reminder that justice is not merely punishment–it is understanding the human and social conditions that lead people to commit a crime, especially women who commit a crime in the face of coercion.  By demonstrating this, Shubha v. State begins a liberating journey towards a more compassionate, fair, and gendered criminal justice system in India.

Judgements cited here may be read below:

Shubha v. State of Karnataka, 2025

Kehar Singh v. State (1988)

Shivani v. State of Haryana; State v. Rani, 2025

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this community resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

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The division bench of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice while hearing Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 234 of 2020 related to the condition of detention centres in Assam where individuals with a doubt citizenship and deemed foreigner were kept in detention, directed the central government for immediate deportation of 17 declared foreigner. The court further directs that priority should be given to deport 4 persons who have spent more than 2 years in the Detention Centre.

Brief Background of the case:

On December 12, 2011, an ex-parte order was passed by the Foreigners Tribunals, declared the petitioner’s husband, the petitioner and their children to be foreigners. The petitioner’s husband had initially appeared in the Foreigners Tribunal but thereafter remained unrepresented due to financial inability.

The Petitioner’s husband approached the Gauhati High Court for setting aside and quashing of the Foreigners Tribunal order dated 01.12.2011, but his petition was dismissed. The petitioner thereafter approached the Supreme Court also but again his petition was dismissed by the court.

The petitioner submitted that the task of detaining persons declared to be foreigners was undertaken following the issuance of Notification No. PLB. 149/2008/88 dated 17.06.2009 by the Political (B) Department of the Government of Assam.  By this notification, it was ordered that the movement of persons detected as Foreigners by the Foreigners Tribunal shall be restricted and they shall be required to reside in the detention centres immediately after their detention and till they are deported to their place of origin.

The Petitioner further submitted that the petitioner’s husband’s parents along with him had migrated to India in 1964 and are thereby citizens of India and are thereby citizens of India by virtue of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955.

According to the petitioner, at present there are 802 persons living in the detention centre of Assam according to information provided on 11.02.2020 in the Rajya Sabha by the Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The Petitioner relied of the order of Supreme Court on dated 11.05.2019 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1045 of 2018 in which SC held that detenus who have completed more than three years may be released subject to the condition prescribed.

The writ petition can be read here:

Supreme Court order dated May 16, 2024:

On May 16, 2024, the division bench of Supreme Court said “The Assam Legal Services Authority has not reported about the facilities which are made available to the declared foreigners in the Detention Centre. The report shows that there is a detention centre also known as transit camp at Matia, Goalpara district of Assam. There are 17 declared foreigners detained in the said Detention Centre/Transit Camp out of which 04 have already spent more than 02 years.

The apex court further added that “We are of the view that the Union of India must take immediate steps for deporting these 17 declared foreigners as it is not the case that there are any offences registered in India against them. Priority should be given to deport 04 persons who have spent more than 02 years in the Detention Centre. The Advocate-on-Record for the Union of India shall forward a copy of this order to all the concerned Authorities of the Union of India to take immediate steps for deporting these 17 declared foreigners. A compliance affidavit shall be filed by an appropriate officer of the Union of India within a period of two months from today.”

The court also directed to the Committee appointed by the Assam State Legal Services Authority shall again visit the detention centre with a view to find out the nature of the facilities made available to the declared foreigners in the said Detention Centres.

And, the report of ASLSA shall be filed before the next date, the court said.

Now the matter is listed for July 26, 2024 to consider the compliance affidavit of the Union of India.

The order of Supreme Court dated 16.05.2024 can b read here:

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Brief Background of the Case:

On November 22, 2019, Maya Rani Barman “the petitioner” was declared a foreigner under the Foreigner Act, 1946 by the Foreigners Tribunal, Lakhimpur (Assam).

The petitioner claimed that she is an Indian citizen by birth and born and brought up in the of village Gopalpur, District-Cooch Behar, West Bengal and studied up to Class-V at Gopalpur High School and as per her School Certificate, her date of birth is 15th of April 1961. She got married to one Bishnu Barman, son of late Shiben Chandra Barman of Harmoti Gaon, District-Lakhimpur.

However, a case was registered against the petitioner bearing Case No. 4057/2011 (District No. 23/1997) by the Foreigners Tribunal No. 1st, Lakhimpur, North Lakhimpur upon a reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (Border), Lakhimpur (Assam).

The Petitioner appeared before the Tribunal and contested the case by filling her written Statement, adduced her evidence in chief along with relevant and supported documents to prove her nationality. But, the Tribunal did not consider the documents that she relied on.

On November 22, 2019, the Foreigners Tribunal at Lakhimpur passed the impugned final order/opinion order. The petitioner claimed that the tribunal passed the impugned order arbitrarily without appreciating the evidence, declared her to be a foreigner who had illegally entered into the territory of India (Assam) from the specified territory of Bangladesh after 25.03.1971.

Petitioner moved the High Court for relief:

On January 1, 2023, Maya Rani (the petitioner) aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned decision of the Foreigners Tribunal dated 22.11.2019 passed by the Member, Foreigners Tribunal No. 1^st, Lakhimpur (Assam) filed a petition bearing Writ Petition  (Civil) No. 154/2023 before the Gauhati High Court under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution.

The petitioner’s counsel submitted that the petitioner has exhibited the Voter Identity Card issued in her name along with the School Transfer to prove her linkage with her father. Further added that, though the petitioner annexed a photo copy of a Ration Card and an affidavit sworn by her mother etc. but inadvertently those certificates were not exhibited by her. It is submitted by Mr. Biswas that the petitioner produced the School Transfer Certificate to prove her linkage with her father Lt. Monteswar Ray, stating further that father of the proceedee had purchased a parcel of land in the year 1960, but, due to flood the Sale Deed of the said land got damaged and therefore, the petitioner could not produce the original copy of said Sale Deed before the Tribunal.

The counsel for petitioner further submits that the documents so provided by the petitioner was sufficient to prove herself to be the Citizen of India. however, the Tribunal without considering the documents which were relied by the petitioner/proceedee, passed the impugned Final Order dated 22.11.2019 arbitrarily and declared her as a foreigner of post 1971 stream, which is liable to be set aside and quashed.

On the other side, Standing Counsel for Home department Assam was submitted that the petitioner could not produce any document to establish herself to be the daughter of her projected father, one Lt. Monteswar Ray who is claimed to be the Citizen of India by the petitioner. The counsel added that o submitted that though the petitioner has submitted one School Transfer Certificate but she failed to prove the said certificate as well as its contents by producing any reliable evidence of the issuing authority. In that context, counsel relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India and Another Vs. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 491, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that “admission of a document in a Court may amount to admission of its contents but not its truth”.

Added that, Voter Identity Card along with other documents as produced by the petitioner in her Written Statement are not at all sufficient to prove herself to be the Citizen of India as claimed by her as she completely failed to prove any link with her projected father whom stated to be an Indian Citizen.

The Home Department, Assam submitted that the petitioner/proceedee failed to adduce reliable evidence exhibit requisite documents so as to prove her linkage with her projected father and grandparents and thereby the petitioner failed to discharge her burden under Section 9 of the Foreigners’ Act, 1946.

No relief granted to the Petitioner, High Court affirmed the decision of Tribunal:

On January 1, 2024, the division bench of Justice Manash Ranjan Pathak and Justice Mitali Thakuria observed that the petitioner claimed that her father Lt. Monteswar Ray was also an Indian Citizen, who purchased a land in India in the year 1960, but she could not produce the Sale Deed before the Tribunal as it was destroyed due to burning of the Record Room in the year 1974 and also failed to produce any documents like continuous/regular payment of land revenue for the said land before the Tribunal by exhibiting Land Revenue Paying Receipt on behalf of her projected father.

The bench further observed that before Tribunal the petitioner exhibited a Transfer Certificate issued in her name by Gopalpur High School, Gopalpur, Cooch Behar, West Bengal issued on 08.08.2015, but she could not adduce any evidence of the Headmaster of the said High School, i.e., its issuing authority or any authorised teacher and/or employee of the said High School to prove the contents of the said certificate exhibited by the petitioner, so as to prove herself to be the daughter of her projected father Lt. Monteswar Ray.

The Court added further that the petitioner did not produce any voter lists of the years 1965 or 1966 and 1971 to prove that her parents had cast vote in the years 1966 and/or 1971. We found that the petitioner not only failed to prove her linkage with her projected father Lt. Monteswar Ray but also failed to produce any documents to prove that her projected father was an Indian Citizen.

On the forgoing findings the division bench held that the Tribunal after due appreciation of the entire facts of the case and evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioner arrived at the impugned opinion/judgment dated 22.11.2019 which is without any illegality and perversity. We, therefore, are of the view that the impugned final order passed by the Foreigners’ Tribunal North Lakhimpur, Assam in Lakhimpur, holding the petitioner to be a foreigner under the Foreigners’ Act, 1946 who had illegally entered into the territory of India (Assam) from the specified territory of Bangladesh on or after 25.03.1971 does not call for any interference.

The judgement of High Court dated 11.01.2024 can be read here:

Petitioner moved Supreme Court against the impugned order of HC:

On April 19, 2024, aggrieved by the decision of the Gauhati High Court declaring the petitioner to be a foreigner, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

The appeal said that it was ‘practically impossible’ for the woman to get the documents as she had shifted to Assam on account of her marriage, while originally belonging to Cooch Behar in West Bengal. “In course of her migration, it was not possible to keep track of those documents since her parents have already died,” the plea said.

Petitioner said that the documents establishing her link to her parents, both Indian citizens, have been destroyed in floods. Further, the High Court wrongly discarded her school-leaving certificate as proof of Indian residency and citizenship on grounds of the headmaster not having been cross-examined. 

“It is not possible for her to bring the Headmaster from West Bengal to Lakhimpur, Assam,” she said.

On May 17, 2024, the three judges’ bench of SC consisting Chief Justice of India, Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Mishra have issued notice and sought response from the Union of India, Assam Government, Election Commission of India and NRC Coordinator Assam over the matter within three months.

”In the meantime, no coercive steps shall be taken against the petitioner on the basis of the impugned judgement and order dated 11 January 2024 of the Gauhati High Court in WP(C) No. 154 of 2023” the bench directed to the respondents.

The order of the Supreme Court dated 17.05.2024 can be read here:

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“Media trials are defined as certain regional or national news ‘events’ in which the criminal justice system is co-opted by the media as a source of high drama and entertainment”

– M Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra [1962 AIR 605]

No right guaranteed to the citizens of India, including fundamental freedoms granted by the Constitution of India, are absolute in nature. Press or media, considered the fourth pillar of democracy, derive rights from the right to freedom of speech and expression in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, but the same are also subject to reasonable restriction. Through provisions and judicial precedents, these caveats have evolved over decades. Some guidelines have also been issued to ensure that the conduct of media channels and anchors remain responsible, neutral, unbiased and professional, meeting the Constitutional mandate. Conduct of television channels remains in the breach, however.

Public platforms, especially the commercial “mainstream” channels, have come under serious scrutiny by courts, especially in recent times, for running contentious shows, some amounting to outright media trials. Since these channels play a significant role in affecting the opinions of a wide populace, the courts have, time and again, defined their limits and emphasised upon the media entering the court’s arena by touching upon matters that are sub-judice or criminal in nature, running a parallel media trial.

There have been many judgements delivered by Constitutional Courts where they have laid down the caveats on freedom of speech and expression for the media. The Supreme Courts in the Harijai Singh and Anr [AIR1997SC73], a bench led by Justice Kuldip Singh had held that press freedom is neither total nor infinite.

“But it has to be remembered that this freedom of press is not absolute, unlimited and unfettered at all times and in all circumstances as giving an unrestricted freedom of the speech and expression would amount to an uncontrolled licence. If it were wholly free even from reasonable restraints it would lead to disorder and anarchy. The freedom is not to be misunderstood as to be a press free to disregard its duty to be responsible. In fact, the element of responsibility must be present in the conscience of the journalists. In an organised society, the rights of the press have to be recognised with its duties and responsibilities towards the society. Public order, decency, morality and such other things must be safeguarded. The protective cover of press freedom must not be thrown open for wrong doings.” (Para 10)

In this judgement the Supreme Court has also emphasised that media discussions on ongoing investigations and cases need to stay within responsible limits to ensure that a thorough investigation and an impartial trial of are conducted. As per the Court, when such media trials and coverage of cases cross the moral, ethical and legal line, and are televised only to generate a sensation and to draw profit out it, the same must be prohibited by law.

“It is the duty of a true and responsible journalist to strive to inform the people with accurate and impartial presentation of news and their views after dispassionate evaluation of the facts and information received by them and to be published as a news item. The presentation of the news should be truthful, objective and comprehensive without any false and distorted expression.” (Para 10)

In another case of Venkatesh @ Chandra and Anr vs. State of Karnataka [Criminal Appeal Nos. 1476-1477 of 2018], the Supreme Court of India bench of former Justices U.U. Lalit and P S Narasimha had briefly dealt with the issue of media trials while delivering a judgment on conviction on offense of dacoity. In the judgment, the bench had criticised the practice of prosecuting agency recording the entire statement of the accused rather than only that part of the statement which leads to the discovery of facts as per Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The Court observed that only that part of the statement should be covered that leads to discovery as such statements may have a direct tendency to influence and prejudice the mind of the Court. 

In the same judgment, the court had emphasised that matters relation to crime, including what forms a conclusive piece of evidence, must be dealt by courts and not by media. According to the Court, holding any debates or discussions that touch upon matters that fall within the domain of Courts “amount to direct interference in administration of Criminal Justice.”

“What has further aggravated the situation is the fact that said statements on DVD recorded by the Investigating Agency were played and published in a program named “Putta Mutta” by Udaya TV. Allowing said DVD to go into the hands of a private TV channel so that it could be played and published in a program is nothing but dereliction of duty and direct interference in the administration of Justice. All matters relating to the crime and whether a particular thing happens to be a conclusive piece of evidence must be dealt with by a Court of Law and not through a TV channel. If at all there was a voluntary statement, the matter would be dealt with by the Court of Law. The public platform is not a place for such debate or proof of what otherwise is the exclusive domain and function of Courts of law. Any such debate or discussion touching upon matters which are in the domain of Courts would amount to direct interference in administration of Criminal Justice.” (Para 21)

While the aforementioned cases briefly touched upon the issue of media trials, they also touched upon the impact on the on minds of viewers and the harm that it causes in the administration of justice.

Finally, the issue of media trials was fully dealt with by the Bombay High Court in the case of Nilesh Navalakha and ors vs Union of India and ors. [PIL (ST) No. 92252 of 2020], wherein the bench led by the then Chief Justice Dipankar Dutta had considered Public Interest Litigations (PILs) filed against the media trials being run by certain TV channels in the name of “investigative journalism” and the role that electronic media played in derogation of characters of those being investigated by police and courts in the Sushant Singh Rajput case. The bench, also comprising Justice Girish Kulkarni, had admonished media houses of indulging in such a media trial while reiterating the role of statutory authorities under the Cable Television Networks Act and directed them to take necessary action in complaints received by them.

Nilesh Navalakha and ors vs Union of India and ors

Facts of the case:

On June 14, 2020, actor Sushant Singh Rajput was reported to have died an unnatural death in his house in Mumbai. Pursuant to the news of his death, various TV channels initiated intense discussion during prime time on the probable cause of death of the actor. Some of such channels, under the guise of “investigative journalism”, spread the message among its viewers that the Mumbai Police has been passing off a homicidal death as a suicidal death. On this premise, the news channel ran their parallel trial and a close acquaintance of the actor, who herself is an actress, was repeatedly accused of orchestrating Rajput’s death. Even as the Supreme Court of India, Central Bureau of Investigation, Enforcement Directorate and the Narcotics Control Bureau were investigating the multiple facets of the case, TV channels were indulging in their own separate trials and theories.

Issues highlighted and relief sought by the petitions filed:

The judgment dealt with four different petitions pertaining to media coverage by certain news channels on the suicide case of actor Sushant Singh Rajput which led to a media trial affecting the rights of the accused as well as maligning the reputation of Mumbai Police. The petitioners included individuals Prerna Arora, Asim Sarode, Nilesh Navalakha and others; Mahesh Narayan Singh (former IPS) and other retired civil servants as well as an NGO named In Pursuit of Justice.

In the petitions moved before the Supreme Court, the issue highlighted with reference to the SSR case was that some of the TV channels in their programmes displayed headlines which, in effect, taunt the actor for dying by suicide and raised question as to whether he was into consumption of drugs. The insensitivity of such TV channels was emphasised upon in the pleas filed, when the petitioners highlighted the headlines/questions that were displayed/posed knowing fully well that the same would/could never be rebutted by the individual to whom it is directed.

The court noted that all but one of the writ petitions raised common issues with regard to the role of the electronic media in reporting matters concerning investigation into the unnatural death of the actor, thus amounting to a ‘media trial’. In view of the same, the petitioners had alleged that the electronic media in derogation of their legitimate media rights were broadcasting irresponsible and unethical news programmes of a nature amounting to slander and also amounting to a direct interference in the course of investigation, as undertaken by the investigating agencies, of a highly prejudicial nature. The petitioners further contended that some of the television channels had televised interviews with material witnesses and even indulged in cross-examining witnesses.

It was mainly asserted by the petitioner that the electronic media took upon themselves the role of the investigating agencies, prosecutors and adjudicators in pronouncing persons guilty of committing an offence, even before the formal investigation was completed by the investigating agencies. Additionally, it was claimed that the news channels had also resorted to reckless reporting against the state agencies on whom the powers of investigation are conferred by law. It is the petitioners’ main contention that such interference by the electronic media in the course of a lawful investigation of any alleged crime defies all cannons of legal legitimacy.

Based on these grounds, the reliefs sought by the petitioners were for the issuance of necessary directions to the media channels by courts urging for temporary postponement of news reporting in any form of a media trial or parallel investigation into the probe being done regarding the alleged unnatural death of the actor. The petitioners had also prayed for the issuance of the writ of mandamus containing directions/guidelines not to allow electronic, radio, internet or any other form of media from publishing any false, derogatory and scandalous news reports which may either jeopardize the reputation of the police and affect administration of justice, and to only indulge in a balanced ethical and objective reporting.

Observations made by the Court on freedom of speech of electronic media:

The 251-page judgment of the Bombay High Court, a constitutional court, is now the most recent jurisprudential marker on established standards for media publications, electronic media and networks when they report ongoing investigations and legal proceedings. While laying down several norms specifying the conduct that needs to be followed by anchors during debates and programmes, the Court noted that the petitioners had not urged the Court for a gag order, but had rather moved the courts to right a wrong in view of the apathy of the Union of India and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. (Para 212)

Through the judgment, one of the main questions dealt by the Court was whether media conducting a trial when a police investigation is in progress amounts to obstruction in administration of justice and thus amounts to criminal contempt of court.

“…we hold that any act done or publication made which is presumed by the appropriate court (having power to punish for contempt) to cause prejudice to mankind and affect a fair investigation of crime as well as a fair trial of the accused, being essential steps for “administration of justice”, could attract sub-clause (iii) of section 2(c) of the CoC (Contempt of Court) Act depending upon the circumstances and be dealt with in accordance with law.” (Para 248)

The court also observed that “a person cannot be dehumanized, disreputed, vilified and maligned qua his societal existence at the hands of the media in an attempt to sensationalize any crime which is under investigation.” (Para 247)

In its judgement, the Court had acknowledged that ‘Freedom of speech and expression’ guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is indeed the life blood of our democracy. The court had further deemed the said right to be crucial as it ensures free flow of opinions and ideas essential to sustain the collective life of the citizenry. However, the Court had stated that the right to freedom of speech and expression like all other rights in the Constitution is also not absolute; it is subject to imposition of reasonable restrictions. Re-iterating this, the Court had stated that

“Notwithstanding that freedom of speech is the bulwark of a democratic government and the role of the press/media to discover the truth and to ensure proper functioning of the democratic process is undoubtedly salutary, at the same time, the press/media must remember that its concern for discovery of truth and maintenance of purity in all streams of good governance by opening up channels of free discussion of issues should stop short of exceeding the permissible legal and Constitutional means.” (Para 228)

The court also emphasised upon the role that media plays in moulding the opinion of the common person in India, making it all the more essential for them to abide by the rules of responsibility, neutrality and impartiality in their reporting.

“Given the circumstance that the press/media has the ability to mould the opinion of the society by publicity of certain facets of an investigative process, which could give rise to strong public emotions and prejudice the case of one party or the other, it ought to refrain from taking stances in its presentations which are biased and show a predilection for a particular point of view having enormous potential of deflecting the course of justice.” (Para 312)

While the Court recognised the existence of many judgments of the Supreme Court as well as guidelines issued by self-regulatory mechanisms that aims to keep media under check, it emphasised the need for courts to bring in some corrective measures.

“Drawing from experience, there is good enough reason to conclude that the hope and trust are belied and the self-regulatory mechanism has failed to deliver in adequate measure in keeping erring media houses under check. It is now time that some corrective action is taken, lest judicial independence remains only on paper and right-thinking people start losing faith in the justice delivery system and doubt the capacity of the Courts to correct what needs to be corrected.” (Para 316)

Observations made by the Court on media playing the role of investigator(s):

In the judgment, the Court had specifically mentioned the programmes that were run by Times Now and Republic TV. Commenting on the claims made by these channels, the Court remarked upon the various concerns in their coverage, from lack of courtesy toward women, propagation of unfounded theories and uncalled scathing attacks against Mumbai Police.

“In the process, in an attempt to out-smart each other (for reasons which we need not discuss here), these two TV channels started a vicious campaign of masquerading as the crusaders of truth and justice and the saviours of the situation thereby exposing, what in their perception, Mumbai Police had suppressed, caring less for the rights of other stakeholders and throwing the commands of the Cr.P.C. and all sense of propriety to the winds. It amuses us not a little that Republic TV doffed its own hat, in appreciation of what its team had achieved, without realizing that it could be irking and invite adverse comments.” (Para 329)

“These TV channels took upon themselves the role of the investigator, the prosecutor as well as the Judge and delivered the verdict as if, during the pandemic, except they all organs of the State were in slumber.” (Para 329)

On the media deeming the investigation of the Mumbai Police to be shoddy even as the Supreme Court had expressed their prima facie satisfaction of Mumbai Police not having indulged in any wrong doing, the Court stated the same to be disregard of the rule of law. In the judgment, the court held the same to be lacking in bona fides and aimed at interfering with and/or obstructing administration of justice. Furthermore, the court found the same to have the propensity to shake the public confidence in the capability of the police machinery and the efficacy of the judiciary.

“We have no hesitation to record that this sort of reporting by the media is immensely prejudicial to the interests of the accused and could dent the process of a future fair trial and derail due administration of criminal justice, once the matter reaches the appropriate court having jurisdiction.” (Para 329)

On the issue of programmes levying unfounded accusations and allegations, in this case against Mumbai Police, even as the cases await verdict in court, the Court instructed media houses to not display any biased information or incorrect reporting.

“Any biased information or incorrect reporting may damage not only the good and clean reputation of a police officer, built over the years, but also the institution to which he belongs. We need to remind that every journalist/reporter has an overriding duty to the society of educating the masses with fair, accurate, trustworthy and responsible reports relating to reportable events/incidents and above all to the standards of his/her profession. Thus, the temptation to sensationalize should be resisted.” (Para 331)

Specific directions issued by the Court:

The court issued the following specific restrictions on press/media and directed the media to refrain from displaying/printing any news item or initiating debate/discussion in the nature:

1. In relation to death by suicide, depicting the deceased as one having a weak character or intruding in any manner on the privacy of the deceased;

2. That causes prejudice to an ongoing inquiry/investigation by:

i) Referring to the character of the accused/victim and creating an atmosphere of prejudice for both;

ii) Holding interviews with the victim, the witnesses and/or any of their family members and displaying it on screen;

iii) Analysing versions of witnesses, whose evidence could be vital at the stage of trial;

iv) Publishing a confession allegedly made to a police officer by an accused and trying to make the public believe that the same is a piece of evidence which is admissible before a Court and there is no reason for the Court not to act upon it, without letting the public know the nitty-gritty of the Evidence Act, 1872;

v) Printing photographs of an accused and thereby facilitating his identification;

vi) Criticising the investigative agency based on half-baked information without proper research;

vii) Pronouncing on the merits of the case, including pre-judging the guilt or innocence qua an accused or an individual not yet wanted in a case, as the case may be;

viii) Recreating/reconstructing a crime scene and depicting how the accused committed the crime;

ix) Predicting the proposed/future course of action including steps that ought to be taken in a particular direction to complete the investigation; and

x) Leaking sensitive and confidential information from materials collected by the investigating agency;

3. Acting in any manner so as to violate the provisions of the Programme Code as prescribed under section 5 of the CTVN Act read with rule 6 of the CTVN Rules and thereby inviting contempt of court; and

4. Indulging in character assassination of any individual and thereby mar his reputation. (Para 349)

The court held that these directions are not exhaustive but indicative and any news report by press/media ought to conform to Programme Code, the norms of journalistic standards and the Code of Ethics and Broadcasting Regulations; and any default would invite not only action from concerned authorities under the law but would also amount to criminal contempt of court under the CoC Act. (Para 350)

Directions for responsibly inviting guests at debates:

In the judgment, the court also took into consideration the contention raised by media houses that when guests are invited to speak, it is difficult to censor their statements. The court held that while that may be true, it does not grant any speaker the license to either abuse or defame any particular individual which would make the channel as well as the individual liable for defamation and in case it amounts to obstruction to administration of justice then both the media house and the speaker can be liable for criminal contempt of court.

“It has been urged on behalf of the media houses that on diverse occasions, the guests are invited to speak and address the audience on a particular topic during programmes which are telecast live and, in such cases, it is difficult for the media houses to censor the statements of such guests. What the media houses say could be true, but that would not grant any speaker the license to either abuse or defame any particular individual, who could be the target of the speech, to tarnish his reputation in the eyes of the viewers or to indulge in interference with and/or obstruction to administration of justice by such public speaking.” (Para 351)

The bench did not limit themselves to only the conduct of the anchors during the programmes, but also issued guidelines for when guests are invited to the programmes for their opinions. The court held that in case a defamatory statement is made, the targeted individual could sue the media as well as the speaker. On the other hand, if any speaker indulges in interference with and/or obstruction to administration of justice by such public speaking, both the media house and the speaker may be proceeded against for criminal contempt.

“It would not be enough for the media house to put up a disclaimer at the end of the programme that it does not associate itself with the views of the speaker and thereby evade liability. To obviate such situation, the media houses would be well advised to inform, guide and advise the guest speakers to refrain from making public utterances which are likely to interfere with and/or obstruct administration of justice and thereby attract contempt.” (Para 351)

The court further emphasised upon the essential role that anchor plays to ensure that debates do not drift away from topics of discussions and drift away from permissible limits.

“The role of the anchor, in such cases, is also important. It is for him/her to apply his/her mind and avoid the programme from drifting beyond the permissible limits. Muting the speaker if he flies off or shows tendency of flying off at a tangent could be one of several ways to avoid embarrassment as well as contempt.” (Para 351)

Furthermore, the following fundamental directives were also issued by the Court:

• The privacy and dignity of the victim must always be respected;
• The sensitive information related to the case should never be made public.
• The confession/admission made in front of an investigator cannot published;
• The interviews of anyone who is connected to the case may not be undertaken when the matter is sub-judice.

Forming the conclusion of the judgment were similar other observations of the Court emphasised that the press must deliver news stories in their genuine and accurate form. The Court further stated that it must include the account of the events as it was honestly recorded, without exaggeration or bias, and any form of distortion and the incidence should not be overemphasised for the sake of gaining more and more viewers.

The complete judgment can be read below:

Bombay High Court reiterates Nilesh Navalakha judgment:

The Bombay High Court was faced with another case where media houses had crossed a line and published objectionable content in a criminal case, harming the reputation of the parties involved.

Facts of the case:

In Pune, a Class 10 student had fallen off the balcony of her house and died. After this incident, various print and electronic media started circulating news alleging that the deceased was having illicit relations with one Y. Around 12 audio clips of alleged conversations of daughter X with some unknown persons were circulated by political parties and media, the contents of which were to defame the name and image of the Petitioner and his family and his daughter.

The Counsel for the petitioner, Shirish Gupte, cited the directions and guidelines issued by the Bombay High Court bench headed by Chief Justice Dipankar Dutta in Nilesh Navalakha v. UOI and ors. The counsel had provided how the High Court bench had reprimanded the media houses and warned them against conducting ‘media trials’ and had said that that if news channels had in fact found any incriminating evidence pertaining to any case, they should provide it to the police.

Order of the Court:

The bench comprising Justices Manish Pitale and SS Shinde issued notice to the respondents and in the interim directed them to scrupulously follow the guidelines in the Nilesh Navlakha case and not to publish or give any unnecessary publicity to the incident of death of the daughter X of the Petitioner and further alleged illicit relationship with Y.

The order can be read here:

Concrete implementation remains lacking, anchors continue with media trials:

“The role of the anchor is very important. Hate speech either takes place in the mainstream television or it takes place in the social media. Social media is largely unregulated. As far as mainstream television channel is concerned, we still hold sway, there the role of anchor is very critical because the moment you see somebody going into hate speech, it’s the duty of the anchor to immediately see that he doesn’t allow that person to say anything further.”

Retired Supreme Court Justice KM Joseph, along with Justice Hrishikesh Roy, had emphasised the importance of press freedom and role of anchor while hearing a clutch of 11 writ petitions seeking the court’s intervention to regulate hate speech. On September 21, 2022 the Supreme Court bench in the matter of Shaheen Abdullah vs. Union of India [W.P.(C) No. 940/2022] had singled out the debates conducted on the electronic media which they held were “the chief medium of hate speech”.

During the hearings of the case, which is still being heard in the Supreme Court albeit by a different bench, had once again brought the issue of the negative role that anchors have been playing and the spread of hate and misinformation through media. Notably, in the said matter the necessity of regulating media and laying down laws for the same was also highlighted.

Justice Joseph observed, “We should have a proper legal framework unless we will have a framework people will continue and the most important point is where is our nation headed, if it is hate speech on which we are feeding on where is our nation headed”.

An additional factor was highlighted in this comment by Justice Roy: “Hate drives TRPs, drives profit.” The said observation had shed light on the issue of media houses picking up contentious issues and thinking of themselves as “profit centres”, enabling and allowing people to make unchecked controversial remarks on television.  The court pointed out that while television hosts permit certain panellists to make venomous remarks, they prevent the opposite side from airing its opposing viewpoints by muting their microphones. The bench then ruled that errant news anchors should face stern punishment and be removed from the broadcast.

Justices Joseph and Roy have asked the government to come back with proposals of what can be done to regulate the media on hate speech and suggested that perhaps something along the lines of the Vishaka guidelines, issued by the Supreme Court in 1997 before the law on sexual harassment was enacted in 2013, could be considered.

No such regulations have been issued, to date, by the Union government.

The order can be read here:

Court scrutiny on anchors and media continues:

In August 2023, the Supreme Court had deemed the limit of Rs 1 lakh on imposition of fine on television channels for airing disputed news by the self-regulatory mechanism by News Broadcasters and Digital Association (NBDA) to be ineffective. The said observation was made by the Supreme Court bench while hearing a petition by the NBDA challenging the Bombay high court’s aforementioned judgment in Nilesh Navalakha. The NBDA had challenged the 2021 verdict as it contained adverse observations about the lack of teeth in the self-regulation of TV channels.

A three judged bench of the Supreme Court, led by the Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud and comprising Justice JB Pardiwala, and Justice Manoj Misra, had questioned the proportionality of the penalties imposed on TV channels for airing disputed news, stating that the same should be equal to the profits earned by the channels, rather than being limited to Rs 1 lakh fine. The court had also noted that the said limitation of 1 lakh on fines was fixed way back in 2008.

During the arguments, the acknowledged NBDA’s stance against pre-censorship or post-censorship on news channels through statutory mechanism, while stressing upon the necessity for an effective self-regulatory mechanism. As highlighted in the order of the Court, the bench urged that there was a need to strengthen the self-regulatory mechanism and stated that it will issue guidelines to strengthen the regulation of TV channels.

Notably, the said guidelines are yet to be issued by the Supreme Court.

The full order of the Court can be viewed here:

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The post How free is free and can there be freedom without responsibility: Courts on media coverage of trials, erring conduct of anchors appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A Supreme Court bench comprising Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud, Justice JB Pardiwala, and Justice Manoj Misra was also informed by senior advocate Sukumar Pattjoshi, appearing for the Election Commission, that the submission of the Aadhaar number was not mandatory under Rule 26-B of the Registration of Electors (Amendment) Rules 2022. The senior counsel had submitted that nearly 66,23,00,000 Aadhaar numbers had already been uploaded in the process of finalising electoral rolls. It was added that the submission of the Aadhaar number was not mandatory under Rule 26-B of the Registration of Electors (Amendment) Rules 2022 and hence the Election Commission was looking into issuing appropriate clarificatory changes in the forms introduced for that purpose.

It is essential to note here that the said undertaking has been made by the Election Commission in a petition filed in the Supreme Court that highlighted issues with Form 6 (Application Form for new voters) and Form 6B (Letter of Information of Aadhaar number for the purpose of electoral roll authentication) of the ECI forms for registration in e-roll. The said petition had been filed by G.Niranjan, Senior Vice President, Telangana Pradesh Committee. Based on the undertaking made by the ECI, the Court disposed of the writ petition. Concerns had been raised about whether individuals who have not linked their Aadhaar with their Voter ID will face exclusion from electoral roll registration. It had been argued that that the right to vote is one of the “most sacred rights” and cannot be denied if a person does not have an Aadhaar card.

Prior to this, in December 2022, former Union Minister for Law and Justice, Kiren Rijiju, had stated in the Rajya Sabha during a Parliamentary session that linking Aadhaar with Voter ID is voluntary and consent of the elector is required to be obtained to link the same.

Election authority mandates linking of Aadhaar with Voter IDs:

The Registration of Electors (Amendment) Rules 2022 was notified by the Central Government in June 2022 to provide for linking Aadhaar number with election ID cards. Form 6B is the application form by which a voter can inform the Aadhaar number for the purpose of electoral roll authentication.

In August 2022, the Election Commission of India had launched the program to collect Aadhaar number of electors ‘on a voluntary basis’. In accordance to the Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021, the Electoral Registration Officers were permitted to ask the elector to provide their Aadhaar numbers for the purpose of establishing identity. However, the same was supposed to be only voluntary.

Notably, a petition remains pending in the Supreme Court which challenges the Election Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2021 and the Registration of Electors (Amendment) Rules 2022.

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The post ECI undertaking to SC: Aadhaar number not mandatory to enrol as voter appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The bench also further permitted persons, including victims, witnesses and others related to CBI cases, to appear physically before the designated Gauhati court if they don’t want to appear online.

The SC also directed the Manipur government to provide proper internet services to facilitate hearing in CBI cases through online mode at the Gauhati court. Manipur has been under a consistent internet ban that has hampered rights and access to information and also services since May ¾ 2023.

At the last hearing, on August 21, the top court had appointed the Justice Gita Mittal committee to oversee relief and rehabilitation of the victims of ethnic violence in Manipur. As many as 10 cases, including the one related to sexual assault of two women whose video had gone viral on social media, were transferred to the CBI.

Observing that several Manipur residents may have lost their identity documents in the ethnic strife, the Supreme Court-appointed panel has urged the top court to pass a slew of directions to the state government and others, including the UIDAI, to ensure Aadhaar cards are made available to those displaced and the victims’ compensation scheme is broadened.

This  panel had submitted three reports highlighting the need for reconstruction of identity documents, upgradation of compensation and appointment of domain experts to facilitate its functioning. Over 160 people have been killed and several hundred injured since ethnic violence first broke out in the state on May 3 when a ‘Tribal Solidarity March’ was organised in the hill districts to protest against the majority Meitei community’s demand for Scheduled Tribe status.

The Supreme Court on Friday, August 25 asked the Chief Justice of Gauhati High Court to nominate one or more judicial officers in Gauhati to deal with the production and remand of the accused in the Manipur violence-related cases which have been transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

A three-judge bench presided by Chief Justice of India D Y Chandrachud ordered this following a request made by Solicitor General Tushar Mehta.

Mehta told the bench also comprising Justices J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra that 27 cases have been transferred to the CBI. He added that some of these cases may be triable by a magistrate and some by a sessions judge.

“Instead of troubling the judges in Manipur where there might be some issues of the judge belonging to a tribe etc., the suggestion is that one sessions judge may be designated by the Chief Justice of Gauhati as Assam is a border state and there is connectivity facility. If this request is accepted, the issues of production, custody of accused etc. would arise. The concern of CBI is that in most parts of Manipur, the situation now is normal, but there may be security issues if we have to transfer physically for the purpose of production etc. So that may be permitted through virtual mode. And any accused is to be kept in judicial custody, that can be kept in Manipur though the judge is in Assam,” Mehta submitted.

He added that these were the “broad requests that would ensure that justice is not only done but also seen to be done”. Allowing the request, the bench issued certain directions saying it was doing so “at the present stage, bearing in mind the overall environment and the need for ensuring a fair process of criminal justice administration”.

The Supreme Court allowed the designated courts to take up via online mode, all applications for the production of the accused, remand, judicial custody, extension of custody and other proceedings in connection with the investigation, bearing in mind both distance and security issues.

The SC bench said that the judicial custody of the accused, if and when granted, shall be permitted in Manipur to obviate transit. It also permitted the statements of witnesses under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure can be recorded in the presence of a local magistrate in Manipur and asked the acting Chief Justice of the Manipur High Court to designate one or more magistrates as the need may arise, for this.

“Applications seeking arrest warrant etc. are permitted to be made by the investigating officers through the online mode,” the Supreme Court said, adding, “Chief Justice of Gauhati HC is requested to preferably select judges who are conversant in one or more languages of Manipur”.

On concerns that internet services have not been fully restored in the state, the court recorded in its order that the “SG has assured the court that the government of Manipur shall take all necessary steps to ensure that proper internet connectivity is made available…to facilitate compliance of the direction”.

However, senior Advocate Indira Jaising, appearing for a petitioner, urged the court to allow those who wanted to physically approach the court to do so. SG Mehta said the concern is that the CBI may get hundreds of applications from people saying they want to go and ask the agency to provide security.

The CJI said the court cannot compel anyone to appear by online mode and said in its order that “the above directions shall not preclude any witness or person who desires to appear in person to do so before the judge in Gauhati”.

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The post SC transfers CBI cases related to Manipur violence to Assam, asks Gauhati HC CJI to choose trial judges appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Refusing to entertain the pleas, the Supreme Court bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Sanjay Karol subsequently asked the petitioners to refrain from viewing such channels if they do not like the content, while reaffirming that viewers were free to not watch such channels. The bench added that the freedom of speech and expression of those in the industry would have to be kept in mind.

“Who compels you to watch all these channels? If you do not like them, then do not watch them. When some wrong thing is shown, it is also about perception. Is there not freedom of expression? Even if we say no media trials, how can we stop things on the internet and all? How can we grant such prayers? Who takes it seriously, tell us? There is freedom not to press the TV button,” Justice Oka remarked, as reported by LiveLaw.

Justice Oka then added that legal remedies are available to those who are offended by content on TV. Furthermore, he commented that the orders and guidelines of the Supreme Court are not being followed, hence this content should not be taken seriously.

“In a lighter vein, what all is said about judges on social media, Twitter; we do not take it seriously. Who will lay down guidelines? Tell your clients not to watch these news channels, and do something better with their time.”

The Bench dismissed the plea moved by Reepak Kansal, which was the lead plea, pointing out that the prayers were too broad and that a committee with a retired judge was already in place. The Bench granted the counsel for Nilesh Navlakha liberty to move the jurisdictional High Court and allowed him to submit representations for the claim involving the creation of a media tribunal.

“Why can’t you go to the High Court, why [Article] 32 petition? Why should every matter be dealt with by the Supreme Court? Do you think the High Courts are incompetent to hear these matters? Do not forget we are all products of the High Courts,” Justice Oka had remarked, as reported by LiveLaw.

Who had filed the said pleas?

Reepak Kansal, a lawyer based in Delhi, filed one of the petitions in the current case, urging the court to create an independent regulating body to deal with “sensational reporting” on news broadcasts, as reported by LiveLaw. The Economic Times reported that Kansal had claimed that scandalous coverage of important matters “just for the sake of viewership and notoriety” frequently ends in the “tarnishing of the reputation of a person, a community, or a religious or political organization”. The petitioner claimed that the tense nature of the programming on these networks led to public violence. Particularly, Kansal had prayed that the top court restrict the “assassination of dignity” of individuals, communities, religious saints and religious and political organisations by these broadcasting channels in the name of “freedom of press”, as per the LiveLaw report.

In the other PIL, filed by director Nilesh Navalakha and activist Nitin Memane, it was pleaded that a “media tribunal” be created to hear and expeditiously decide allegations against media organizations and television stations.

In the said plea, it was further alleged that argued that the Union Ministry for Information and Broadcasting had completely failed to carry out its mandate and enforce the Program Code that television broadcasters are required to follow.

The petitioners argued that self-regulation of these channels has been deemed to be insufficient as a solution.

The Bench dismissed the plea moved by Reepak Kansal, which was the lead plea, pointing out that the prayers were too broad and that a committee with a retired judge was already in place. The Bench granted the counsel for Nilesh Navlakha liberty to move the jurisdictional High Court and allowed him to submit representations for the claim involving the creation of a media tribunal.

Developing Indian jurisprudence on hate speech

Previously, Justices K.M. Joseph (who has now retired) and Hrishikesh Roy made up the division bench that also observed that they will look at the present law’s insufficiency to effectively address hate speech. In September 2022, the executive wing of government was harshly criticised by the Supreme Court for doing little to stop instances of hate speech even while major TV news stations have come under fire for regularly hosting discussions that allow for the expression of hatred. The Supreme Court bench had also sharply criticised television news channels for airing hate speech and silencing other speakers and participants while expressing concern over the rising frequency of such remarks across the nation. The Court had also flagged the fact that television channels in India are creating divisions in the society since such channels are driven by agenda and compete to sensationalise news.

The Supreme Court bench had expressed its serious concern at the news channels running unregulated, even exclaiming “Where is our nation headed!” The Court had then gone on to emphasise the need of having a strict regulatory framework against hate speech and questioned the Indian government as to “why it is standing as a mute witness while all this is happening?”

Instances of some electronic media misdemeanors

An application was filed by the Anjuman Intezamia Masjid Committee in the Varanasi court to restrain them from spreading any false news. On August 9, the said Mosque committee which manages the Gyanvapi Mosque in Varanasi moved the District Court to restrain the electronic and print media from publishing ‘false news’ about the ongoing ASI Survey of the Gyanvapi premises.

The said application stated that the ASI or its officials have not made any statement pertaining to the ongoing survey, however, social media, print media and electronic media are arbitrarily spreading wrong and false news about it.

“They have been publishing and disseminating information related to the areas inside the mosque which have not been surveyed to date, due to which, there is a wrong impact on the daily life of the public and different types of things are being generated in the minds of the public and the enmity is spreading,” the application added as provided by the LiveLaw.

Citizens for Justice and Peace has filed no less than three dozen complaints over the past three years before the NBDSA –and obtained several favourable orders –against the unprofessional and below standards content of several electronic media channels that appear to be on a round the clock job of stigmatising and demonsing India’s most marginalised sections.

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The post SC asks petitioners to not watch channels spreading hate, states that legal remedies available already appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The said petition, filed by activist Shachi Nelli, was being heard by a division bench of Justices AS Bopanna and MM Sundresh. Notably, activist Shachi Nelli had filed the petition, seeking consent from the Attorney-General to initiate contempt proceedings against Narsinghanand. Nelli had argued that Narsinghanand’s remarks undermined the authority of the Supreme Court and interfered with the course of justice. Consent for contempt proceedings was granted by the Attorney-General in response to Nelli’s letter.

It is essential to note that although the bench agreed to issue notice to the respondent and seek his response, no returnable date was given.

Brief of the letter sent by activist Shachi Nelli:

In January 2022, activist Shachi Nelli had written to the Attorney-General of India seeking consent to initiate contempt proceedings against this Meerut-born priest, Yati Narsinghanand Saraswati, alias Deepak Tyagi, who is also an accused in Haridwar ‘Dharam Sansad’ hate speech case, over his ‘derogatory’ remarks against the Constitution and the Supreme Court.

In the viral interview, when he was asked about the court proceedings in the ‘Dharam Sansad’ case, Yati Narsinghanand had allegedly said that the Constitution will ‘consume’ the 100 crore Hindus in the country and those who believe in this charter and the extant system will ‘die the death of a dog’. As per a LiveLaw report, Yati Narsinghanand’s exact remarks, as excerpted in Nelli’s letter, were:

“We have no trust in the Supreme Court of India and the Constitution. The Constitution will consume the 100 crore Hindus of this country. Those who believe in this Constitution will be killed. Those who believe in this system, in these politicians, in the Supreme Court and in the Army will all die the death of a dog.”

The said letter had also referred to another portion of the same interview where the right-wing leader, on the issue of the arrests made by the police in the case, had made derogatory remarks against the police by using a transphobic slur and said, “When Jitendra Singh Tyagi went by the name Wasim Rizvi and wrote his book, not a single policeman, not one of these ‘hijde’ policeman or politician had the courage to arrest him.”

Through the letter, Nelli had alleged that the comments made by Yati Narsinghanand sought to “undermine the majesty of the institution and the authority vested in the Supreme Court of India”, and was “a vile and clear attempt at interfering in the course of justice by means of abusive rhetoric and baseless attacks on the integrity of the Constitution and the courts”.

In the month of January only, the then attorney-general KK Venugopal, had granted consent to initiate contempt proceedings against Yati Narsinghanad over his remarks about the Supreme Court and the Constitution, noting that they were a direct attempt to lower the authority of the Supreme Court in the minds of the general public.

In October, 2022, while hearing the contempt petition filed by Nelli, the top court had sought the transcripts of the interview in which Narsinghanand had allegedly made the contentious remarks.

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The said bench was considering two petitions, the first of which was a petition filed by the Manipur Tribal Forum Delhi seeking the protection of the Kuki tribe by the Indian Army. The Manipur Tribal Forum’s IA had claimed that the Kukis are being ethnically cleansed by an armed communal organisation, prays for the protection of the tribe by the Indian Army since the State and its Police force are not trusted by the tribals.

The other petition was filed by Chairman of the Hill Areas Committee (HAC) of the Manipur Legislative Assembly, Dinganglung Gangmei, challenging the direction of the Manipur High Court to consider the inclusion of Meitei community in the Scheduled Tribe list. It is essential to note here that the issue related to assigning the Scheduled Tribe status for Meitei had triggered the riots in the state. It was argued in Gangmei’s petition that directing the state government to recommend a tribe for the Scheduled Tribes List does not fall within the jurisdiction of the High Court.

Senior advocate Dr. Colin Gonsalves, who was representing the Manipur Tribal Forum, stated that things had gotten worse in Manipur than it was earlier. To this, the Solicitor General of India disagreed, stating that the situation is steadily improving as a result of the deployment of sufficient armed personnel and the establishment of relief camps. The curfew has been lowered to 5 hours each day, which is an improvement, he continued.

“My learned friend may not give this a communal angle- like Christians or something. Real human beings are being dealt with”, SG had further stated, as reported by LiveLaw.

Disagreeing further, Advocate Gonsalves stated to the court that despite the State’s previous guarantees and assurances, the situation has “escalated.” He added that there were 20 murders as of the date of the last hearing, but the said has now gone up to 110. He claimed that numerous terrorist group leaders were publicly urging the eradication of the Kukis, and no police action has been taken against them despite the fact that there were open calls for violence. Adv. Gonsalves also mentioned that one leader appeared in a Karan Thapar interview and made direct threats against Kukis. According to Gonsalves, these militant organisations are “state sponsored.”

“As long as these armed groups are not disbanded and allowed to go and kill, there will be an escalation of violence. Last night, 3 tribals killed and 1 beheaded, first beheading of tribals. These are the Meities, they are the dominant group. I have given a list of all the hundreds of Kukis who have been killed village wise. The Kukis are not attacking. The Kukis are in the villages defending. The Meities are defending. The armed groups are crossing the lines. Once they cross the line, the women gather in large numbers and stop the army. The army has released two press statements that they are not allowed to do their duty and protect the people”, Gonsalves stated, as reported by LiveLaw.

Another counsel, appearing for the International Meities Organization, said that there should be an investigation into the source of assault weapons and the militant groups behind the violence. “The suspicion is that the militants have come out of the shelters and are fighting, otherwise how will you explain the assault weapons? There should be a headcount of the militants. Union of India should look into this aspect”, the counsel had said, as reported by Livelaw. The Court asked the SG to take specific instructions on this aspect as well.

Earlier status report of the state

In May, the bench led by CJI DY Chandrachud had called for a status report from the State regarding the security measures and relief camps. Following the order, the State submitted a status report in the third week of May, stating:

1. 62 companies of CAPF and 126 columns of army/Assam rifles have been deployed for assisting in the area domination, sanitisation, and maintenance of law and order situation in the state.
2. A total of 318 relief camps have been opened where more than 47914 persons have been given relief.
3. Specific security measures are being taken in every district and every locality as per the needs of this specific area. The district police, CAPF, CDO, and VDF are being deployed in various areas. The patrols are doing regular patrolling and round-the-clock security is being deployed in general and religious places by way of foot patrolling.
4. Free passage of people from relief/safe locations to airport/native places is taking place and about 3124 people have been helped through flights.
5. The state home department has issued instructions to DGP and all district SSP to register FIR’s of all reported cases irrespective of jurisdiction.

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The post Manipur Violence: SC bench seeks updated status report from State on rehabilitation, law & order situation appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Advocate Sharukh Alam mentioned the petition seeking urgent listing as the ‘mahapanchayat'(conclave) is scheduled to be held tomorrow (June 15). She told the bench that an ultimatum has been given by certain groups to a particular community to leave the place before the ‘mahapanchayat’. She further pointed out that the Supreme Court had earlier issued a mandamus to the Uttarakhand Government to take steps to ensure that no hate speeches are made.

However, the bench asked the petitioner why they had not moved the High Court. “Law and order is for the administration to handle. You move the High Court. Why do you come here?” Justice Nath asked.

“Why do you express distrust in approaching HC? If there is a mandamus by this Court, High Court will pass orders. You should have some trust in the High Court.Why can’t you trust the administration?”, Justice Amanullah asked.

Shahrukh Alam explained that she has approached the Supreme Court in view of the earlier mandamus issued by it to th Uttarakhand Government in the hate speech matter. However, the bench said that the High Court can also pass appropriate orders if there is already a direction given by the Supreme Court.

Following that, the petitioner sought permission to withdraw the petition. The bench then proceeded to dismiss the petition as withdrawn, granting petitioner liberty to avail alternate remedies under the law.

Purola and several other towns in Uttarakhand have been plunged into a communal frenzy over the alleged kidnapping of a 14-year-old girl by two men – a Hindu and a Muslim– on May 26, which has been termed a case of ‘love jihad’ by local residents. While both accused were arrested promptly, the incident provoked deep communal tension in the town, which has eventually spread to neighbouring areas in the state. These provocations have seen police being inactive and not preventing hate speech or even brazen attempts to stigmatise and socio-economically boycott the entire Muslim community. Over the following days, as reported by the Times of India on June 6, certain outfits reportedly held protests in several areas and attacked the shops and houses of Muslims in Purola.

Not only this, “notices” in the name of one ‘Devbhumi Raksha Sangathan’ were pasted on the shutters of shops owned by Muslim traders from June 6 onwards, threatening them to vacate the premises before the Mahapanchayat on June 15 or face dire consequences.

Reports have also claimed that ‘Vishwa Hindu Parishad’ has also written a letter to the Tehri-Garhwal administration saying that if Muslims – euphemistically referred to as ‘the particular community’ – do not leave from certain belts of Uttarakhand, the group, along with Hindu Yuva Vahini and Tehri-Garhwal Traders’ Union will block the highway on June 20 in protest. Reports suggest that several Muslim families, fearing for their safety, have left the town following the hate campaign against them.

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The post SC orders petitioners to move HC on ‘Mahapanchayat’ immediately, also write to authorities: Uttarakhand Communal Tensions appeared first on SabrangIndia.