A Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta indicated that all matters in the batch would be closed, while explicitly preserving the liberty of parties to pursue other remedies under law. One case alone—Kazeem Ahmad Sherwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.—was kept pending, limited to monitoring the progress of trial and allied proceedings arising out of a 2021 alleged hate crime against a Muslim cleric in Noida.

The January 20 hearing was not merely procedural. It functioned as a consolidated reckoning—bringing together nearly every strand of hate-speech litigation that has occupied the Court since 2020, and laying bare the Court’s evolving understanding of its own role, the limits of judicial supervision, and the persistent failures of enforcement.

The Beginning: 2020 and the turn to the Supreme Court

The present batch of cases originated in 2020, at a moment when hate speech entered the Supreme Court not as a marginal criminal issue, but as a structural constitutional concern.

The immediate triggers were:

• The “Corona Jihad” campaign during the COVID-19 pandemic, which communalised disease and cast Muslims as biological and civic threats; and
• Sudarshan TV’s “UPSC Jihad” programme, which alleged a conspiracy by Muslim candidates to infiltrate the civil services.

Petitioners argued that these narratives violated equality, dignity, and fraternity, and that State authorities had either failed to act or were complicit through inaction.

In 2020, the Supreme Court intervened to restrain the telecast of the “UPSC Jihad” programme, marking an early acknowledgment that certain forms of hate speech—especially when amplified through mass media—implicate constitutional values beyond ordinary criminal law.

This was the Court’s first decisive signal that hate speech would not be treated merely as offensive expression, but as conduct capable of restructuring social hierarchies and legitimising exclusion.

Expansion of the Docket: Dharam Sansads and genocidal speech (2021–2022)

The hate-speech docket expanded dramatically in 2021–22, following Dharam Sansad events and religious gatherings where speakers openly called for:

• Violence against Muslims,
• Economic boycotts,
• Armed mobilisation, and
• Genocide.

Petitions by Qurban Ali, Major General S.G. Vombatkere, journalists, civil liberties organisations, and religious bodies highlighted a disturbing pattern:

• Hate speech events were openly announced,
• Police often granted permission or remained passive, and
• FIRs, if registered at all, rarely resulted in arrests or prosecutions.

This phase forced the Court to confront not isolated speeches, but a systemic failure of enforcement.

October 2022: The Court steps in

In October 2022, the Supreme Court issued what remains its most consequential intervention on hate speech.

The Court directed that police authorities must register FIRs suo moto in cases involving:

• Promotion of communal hatred, or
• Offending religious sentiments,

without waiting for a formal complaint. Failure to act, the Court warned, would invite contempt proceedings.

The reasoning was explicit: Hate speech strikes at fraternity, corrodes secularism, and threatens constitutional morality. It cannot be left to the discretion of local authorities who may be unwilling to act.

This order marked the Court’s shift from reactive adjudication to supervisory constitutional enforcement.

2023: Nationwide application and preventive policing

In April 2023, the Supreme Court extended its October 2022 directions to all States and Union Territories, making clear that:

• The obligation to act was nationwide;
• Enforcement must be religion-neutral; and
• Police must act proactively, not defensively.

Throughout 2023, the Court:

• Passed preventive orders ahead of announced rallies,
• Directed videography of events,
• Required status reports on FIRs and investigations,
• Entertained contempt petitions alleging non-compliance.

The Court also began drawing upon its Tehseen Poonawalla (2018) jurisprudence on mob lynching, exploring whether similar preventive, remedial, and punitive frameworks could be adapted to hate speech.

Yet even as directions multiplied, enforcement remained uneven—setting the stage for judicial introspection. Across these six years, the Court was not operating in an evidentiary vacuum. Ground-level documentation repeatedly entered the record, including through material placed by Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) under its Hate Watch (HW) programme. These compilations drew from verified complaints filed by CJP across multiple States before police authorities, district administrations, minority commissions, and other statutory bodies. The same may be accessed here.

During various hearings, this data—reflecting patterns of non-registration of FIRs, selective enforcement, delayed action, and repeat offending by the same speakers—was intermittently brought to the Court’s attention. The material served a dual function: it both corroborated petitioners’ claims of systemic enforcement failure and demonstrated that hate speech was not episodic, but embedded in everyday administrative practice. While the Court acknowledged these inputs at different stages, their presence underscored a recurring tension in the proceedings: between empirical evidence of ground-level inertia and the Court’s increasing reluctance to continue long-term supervisory engagement.

Recalibration: “We cannot monitor the entire country” (2024–2025)

By late 2024 and 2025, a notable shift occurred.

Benches—including Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta—began articulating concern that the Supreme Court:

• Could not act as a permanent national monitoring authority;
• Could not substitute itself for police stations, magistrates, and High Courts; and
• Would not legislate from the bench in the absence of parliamentary action.

This was not a repudiation of earlier orders, but a recognition of institutional limits: judicial directions had reached their ceiling without corresponding executive will. The trajectory of this batch of litigation—from its inception as a broad constitutional intervention to its present narrowing—mirrors a discernible shift in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence when confronted with complex societal harms. What began as a wide-ranging judicial attempt to frame hate speech as a threat to fraternity, secularism, and constitutional morality gradually contracted into a posture of institutional restraint, marked by repeated assertions of jurisdictional and functional limits.

Over time, the Court’s role evolved from norm-setting and preventive oversight to a more confined emphasis on statutory remedies, executive responsibility, and case-specific adjudication. The impending closure of most petitions reflects not a denial of the harm caused by hate speech, but a judicial recalibration—signalling that the enforcement deficit cannot indefinitely be remedied through continuing mandamus. This recalibration forms the immediate backdrop to the January 20 hearing.

January 20 Hearing: A comprehensive closing of the docket

The January 20 hearing brought together every unresolved dimension of the hate-speech litigation. At the outset, the Bench indicated that it was inclined to:

• Close all connected matters, and
• Leave parties free to pursue statutory and constitutional remedies elsewhere.

The sole exception would be Kazeem Ahmad Sherwani, which involved a concrete hate crime and an ongoing criminal process.

Arguments of the petitioners

1. The problem is enforcement, not law: Advocate Nizam Pasha, appearing for Qurban Ali, made a central submission:

The crisis is not legal inadequacy, but institutional reluctance—especially when alleged offenders are linked to the ruling establishment.

He argued that:

• Hate speech events are often advertised in advance;
• When the Court previously intervened, events were cancelled or toned down, proving the effectiveness of oversight;
• The same habitual offenders operate across States;
• FIRs are registered but arrests and follow-up are absent, enabling repetition.

Pasha also referred to an application seeking takedown of an AI-generated video, allegedly circulated by the BJP’s Assam unit, portraying Muslims as poised to overtake the State if the party lost elections. He argued that hate speech frequently prefigures hate crime, calling for precisely the acts that later occur.

2. Hate speech as a constitutional tort: Advocate Sharukh Alam, appearing in Kazeem Ahmad Sherwani, urged the Court to reject the framing of hate speech as merely a law-and-order problem.

She argued that:

• Hate speech entrenches discrimination and exclusion;
• It should be understood as a constitutional tort, engaging Articles 14, 15, and 21;
• In the Noida case, the Maulana was stripped and assaulted because of his religious identity.

The State of Uttar Pradesh denied the hate-crime characterisation, stating that:

• A chargesheet had been filed,
• Trial was underway, and
• Departmental action had been taken.

The Bench decided to retain this matter alone, limited to monitoring progress.

3. The sanction question: Senior Advocate Siddharth Aggarwal, appearing for Brinda Karat, raised a distinct legal issue: Whether prior sanction is required at the FIR stage, a view adopted by a Magistrate and upheld by the Delhi High Court.

Aggarwal argued that:

• Sanction is required only at the cognisance stage, not for FIR registration;
• The issue is pending reference in Manju Surana.

Justice Vikram Nath asked him to submit a brief note, recognising the issue’s doctrinal importance.

4. Media, elections, and civil liberties:

• Senior Advocate M.R. Shamshad (Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind) highlighted the growing targeting of religious personalities, with FIRs refused on erroneous sanction grounds.
• Advocate Amit Pai cited failure to register FIRs even in cases of casteist speech by elected officials.
• Senior Advocate Sanjay Parekh (PUCL) recalled the Court’s earlier reliance on Tehseen Poonawalla, while acknowledging the need for adaptation.
• Senior Advocate Sanjay Hegde, as amicus curiae, posed a structural question: Can hate speech be meaningfully curbed when social-media and broadcast platforms profit from virality?

State and institutional responses

• ASG S.V. Raju claimed substantial compliance, stating FIRs were registered in most cited cases.
• NBDA sought to be heard, citing self-regulatory guidelines.
• Election Commission, through Senior Advocate Dama Seshadri Naidu, stated it already had enforcement mechanisms and was open to strengthening them.

The court’s direction

After hearing all parties, the Bench:

• Directed brief written notes within two weeks,
• Reserved orders,
• Ordered closure of all matters except Kazeem Ahmad Sherwani, which will continue on the next date.

Conclusion: What January 20 ultimately signals

From restraining a television programme in 2020, to mandating suo motu FIRs nationwide, to threatening contempt, the Supreme Court spent nearly six years attempting to compel the State to confront hate speech as a constitutional harm.

The January 20 hearing marks an institutional conclusion: the Court has articulated the law; enforcement must now occur elsewhere.

Yet the decision to keep Kazeem Ahmad Sherwani alive—and to seek notes on unresolved legal questions—suggests that the Court has not abandoned the field entirely. It has instead stepped back from continuous supervision, leaving behind a dense jurisprudential trail that future courts, litigants, and lawmakers will have to grapple with.

As matters stand, the Supreme Court has reserved orders, directed the filing of brief notes, and indicated closure of all but one surviving case. Final orders are imminent, and with them, a formal conclusion to one of the Court’s longest-running engagements with hate speech as a constitutional issue. Whether this moment comes to be seen as a principled withdrawal in deference to institutional boundaries—or as a premature retreat from constitutional guardianship—will depend less on the text of the final order, and more on what follows on the ground. Whether this represents constitutional restraint or constitutional retreat is a question that will outlive this batch of cases.

Detailed reports of these matters may be read here and here.

Related:

When Genocide is provoked from the Stage: Raebareli hate speeches, Bhagalpur dog whistles, and a delayed FIR

The Politics of Processions: How the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra amplified hate speech in plain sight

The Orchestrated Extremism: An analysis of communal hate speech in India’s election cycle (2024–2025)

CJP urges NCM action against hate speech campaign vilifying Bengali Muslims as ‘Infiltrators’

The post Hate Speech Before the Supreme Court: From judicial activism to institutional closure appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This was the thirteenth occasion on which the petitions have been listed before the Supreme Court. The proceedings arise from a group of writ petitions pending since 2020, raising substantial constitutional questions concerning the scope of freedom of conscience, personal liberty, equality, and the extent of State power to regulate religious conversion and interfaith marriages. Senior Advocate Chander Uday Singh, Advocate Srishti Agnihotri and Advocate Sanjana Thomas are representing CJP, the first and lead petitioner in the case.

Origin and expansion of the challenge

The challenge was first initiated in January 2020, when the Supreme Court issued notice on petitions questioning the constitutional validity of laws enacted by certain States to regulate religious conversion. These early petitions focused on statutes in Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh.

Over time, similar laws were enacted in additional States. In 2023, the Supreme Court permitted Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP)—the lead petitioner in the batch—to amend its writ petition to bring within the scope of the proceedings comparable statutes enacted in Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, and Karnataka. As a result, the present batch now concerns nine State enactments, each styled as a “Freedom of Religion” or “Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion” law.

The petitions contend that although framed as measures to prevent forced or fraudulent conversions, the impugned statutes impose criminal, procedural, and administrative burdens on the exercise of individual choice in matters of faith and marriage.

Hearing of April 16, 2025: Applications for early hearing and interim relief

A significant procedural development occurred on April 16, 2025, when the Supreme Court heard applications filed by Citizens for Justice and Peace seeking (i) an early hearing of the long-pending petitions and (ii) interim relief in light of continued enforcement of the impugned laws.

The matter was heard by a Bench comprising then Chief Justice of India Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Sanjay Kumar. The applications were filed against the backdrop of the ongoing operation of the anti-conversion statutes across several States and subsequent legislative amendments, including amendments enhancing penalties and expanding the scope of offences.

Appearing for CJP, Senior Advocate Chander Uday Singh submitted that the interim applications were necessitated by the manner in which the laws were being implemented on the ground. It was urged that certain provisions—particularly those relating to prior declarations before conversion, criminalisation of conversion associated with marriage, third-party complaints, and reversal of burden of proof—were resulting in repeated invocation of penal provisions against consenting adults. Singh requested the Court to issue notice on the interim relief application and to stay the operation of the most consequential provisions pending final adjudication.

On behalf of the Union of India, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta contested the submission that there were instances of misuse warranting interim relief. In response, the Bench directed Attorney General R. Venkataramani to examine the applications and indicate the Union’s position on the various prayers raised therein, including identifying aspects that may not be opposed.

The Court further directed that States and non-applicants file responses to the interim applications, even in the absence of a formal notice, with a view to ensuring that pleadings are completed expeditiously. The matter was directed to be listed on a non-miscellaneous day, signalling the Court’s intent to take up the applications in a substantive manner.

Details of the proceedings may be read here.

Proceedings of September 16, 2025: Directions on pleadings and de-tagging

The batch of petitions, along with the pending interlocutory applications, came up for consideration on September 16, 2025, before a Bench comprising then Chief Justice of India B.R. Gavai and Justice K. Vinod Chandran.

At this stage, the Court directed nine respondent States—Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, and Karnataka—to file detailed responses to the applications seeking interim stay of their respective statutes.

The Court granted four weeks’ time to the States to file affidavits in reply and indicated that the matter would be taken up for consideration of interim relief after completion of pleadings. To facilitate the preparation of common compilations and streamline submissions, the Court appointed Advocate Srishti Agnihotri as nodal counsel for the petitioners and Advocate Ruchira Goel as nodal counsel for the respondents.

During the same hearing, the Court considered a separate Public Interest Litigation filed by Advocate Ashwini Upadhyay, which sought directions for a pan-India law to criminalise religious conversions carried out through deceit or coercion. The Bench clarified that the subject matter of that petition was distinct from the constitutional challenge to existing State enactments and accordingly de-tagged the Upadhyay petition from the present batch.

Detailed proceedings may be read here.

Nature of the impugned statutes

Across the nine States, the impugned laws generally contain provisions that regulate religious conversion through a combination of prior declarations, criminal penalties, and procedural presumptions. The petitioners have argued that these provisions, taken together, create a legal regime in which conversion is treated as inherently suspect, particularly when it occurs in the context of interfaith relationships or marriage.

A central feature of many of the statutes is the requirement that a person intending to convert must give prior notice to a District Magistrate or other designated authority. In several States, this declaration is followed by a police inquiry or verification process, and in some cases, the declaration is required to be publicly displayed. The petitions argue that such requirements subject the exercise of freedom of conscience to prior executive approval, thereby altering the constitutional relationship between the individual and the State.

Another significant feature is the manner in which conversion associated with marriage is addressed. Several statutes presume that conversion undertaken for the purpose of marriage is suspect and may amount to conversion by force, fraud, or allurement. According to the petitioners, this effectively places consensual interfaith marriages under criminal scrutiny, even in the absence of any allegation by the individuals concerned.

The statutes also commonly permit persons other than the allegedly aggrieved individual to lodge complaints, thereby enabling third-party intervention in private relationships. In addition, many of the laws reverse the burden of proof, requiring the accused to demonstrate that a conversion was voluntary, and impose stringent bail conditions that can result in prolonged incarceration.

During the course of the hearings, CJP (petitioners) drew the Court’s attention to legislative amendments and judicial developments relating to individual State statutes.

Particular reference was made to amendments introduced by the State of Uttar Pradesh in 2024 to its Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act. It was submitted that these amendments enhanced the penal consequences under the statute, including the introduction of minimum sentences extending to long terms of imprisonment and the imposition of bail conditions similar to those found in special statutes. It was also pointed out that the amendments expanded the category of persons who may lodge complaints under the Act.

The petitioners (CJP) also relied on interim orders passed by High Courts in challenges to similar laws. The Gujarat High Court has stayed the operation of certain provisions of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act on the ground that they impinge upon the right of consenting adults to marry. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has stayed provisions requiring prior declaration to the District Magistrate. Appeals against these interim orders are presently pending before the Supreme Court.

Related proceedings and de-tagging of a connected petition

During the September 16, 2025 hearing, the Supreme Court also addressed the status of a petition filed by Advocate Ashwini Upadhyay, which sought directions for the enactment of a central law regulating religious conversions. The Court directed that this petition be de-tagged from the present batch, observing that its subject matter was distinct from the challenge to the constitutional validity of existing State enactments.

Submissions on personal liberty and gender concerns

In addition to CJP, several interveners have placed submissions on record. The National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW) has raised concerns regarding the impact of these laws on women’s autonomy, particularly in cases involving interfaith relationships. It has been contended that the statutory framework tends to treat adult women as lacking agency in matters of choice, thereby inviting State and familial intervention.

Position as of the latest listing

As of the listing on January 28, 2026, the Supreme Court has not yet heard arguments on the interlocutory applications seeking interim relief, nor has it commenced final hearing on the constitutional validity of the impugned statutes. The matter now stands listed for February 3, 2026.

The outcome of the forthcoming proceedings will determine whether interim directions are issued pending final adjudication of questions that bear on the interpretation of Articles 14, 21, and 25 of the Constitution, and on the extent to which the State may regulate religious conversion without infringing upon personal liberty and freedom of conscience.

Below is a table, computed for the CJP’s 2020 petition and presented to the Court, which provides the most egregious sections of the law in some of these states:

Detailed reports may be read here and here.

Related:

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Join the fight against the love jihad laws

“Love Jihad” laws curb individual and collective freedoms

The post Hearing in batch of CJP-led petitions challenging state Anti-Conversion laws defers in SC; Interim relief applications pending since April 2025 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As per Bar & Bench, the order was passed by a Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi, while hearing a batch of three writ petitions challenging the 2026 Regulations. Though interim in nature, the order is notable both for the breadth of constitutional concerns flagged by the Court and for the decision to suspend a regulatory framework expressly designed to address caste-based discrimination in higher education.

What follows is not merely a recounting of the proceedings, but a critical examination of why a stay was granted, whether settled principles governing interim interference were adhered to, and how the Court’s reasoning engages—sometimes uneasily—with the constitutional understanding of caste, equality, and structural disadvantage.

Background: From the 2019 PIL to the 2026 Regulations

The 2026 Regulations were framed pursuant to proceedings in a 2019 writ petition filed by Radhika Vemula and Abeda Salim Tadvi, the mothers of Rohit Vemula and Payal Tadvi, both of whom reportedly died by suicide after facing sustained caste-based discrimination within their educational institutions. According to LiveLaw, the PIL sought the creation of a robust institutional mechanism to address caste discrimination on campuses, contending that existing safeguards—particularly the 2012 UGC Regulations—had proved insufficient.

The petition may be read here.

Over the years, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasised the need for a stronger, more effective framework, even inviting stakeholder suggestions while the draft regulations were under consideration. After this consultative process, the UGC notified the 2026 Regulations in January 2026, expressly superseding the 2012 framework.

A close reading of the orders passed in that matter reveals a judicial trajectory that sits in visible tension with the later decision to place the 2026 Regulations in abeyance.

1. January 3, 2025: Court acknowledges systemic failure and demands data, enforcement, and redesign

In its order dated January 3, 2025, the Court expressly recognised that adjudication could not proceed without assessing how universities had implemented the 2012 Equal Opportunity Cell Regulations, and whether those mechanisms had actually worked in practice.

The order may be read below:

Crucially, the Bench:

• directed the UGC to collate nationwide data on Equal Opportunity Cells,
• sought disclosure of complaints received and Action Taken Reports, and
• required the UGC to place its newly formulated draft regulations on record.

This was not a neutral procedural step. It reflected a judicial acknowledgment that formal regulatory existence had not translated into substantive protection for marginalised students. The Court was, at this stage, explicitly concerned with implementation failure, not over breadth or misuse.

2. April 24, 2025: The Court permits notification — and treats the Regulations as additive, not suspect

By April 24, 2025, the Court went further. While disposing of an application seeking to restrain the notification of the draft regulations, the Bench refused to halt the regulatory process. Instead, it clarified that the UGC was free to notify the regulations and that they would operate in addition to the recommendations of the National Task Force constituted in Amit Kumar v. Union of India.

The order may be read below.

Two aspects of this order matter for present purposes:

First, the Court expressly noted that the steps taken by the UGC pursuant to the Payal Tadvi–Rohith Vemula petition were “in the right direction,” signalling judicial approval of a stronger, institutionalised framework to address discrimination, harassment, and mental health crises in universities.

Second, the Court treated the regulations as iterative and corrigible—open to additions, deletions, and refinement based on stakeholder input and the Task Force’s findings. There was no suggestion that the very idea of a caste-conscious equity framework was constitutionally suspect.

3. September 15, 2025: Court endorses a robust, explicitly caste-conscious regulatory vision

The September 15, 2025 order is perhaps the clearest articulation of what the Court itself considered necessary to remedy caste-based discrimination in higher education.

The order may be read below.

After recording detailed submissions by senior counsel Indira Jaising, the Court flagged — without rejection — a set of far-reaching structural safeguards, including:

• a clear prohibition on all known forms of discrimination,
• an express ban on segregation based on rank or performance,
• grievance redressal bodies with mandatory representation from SC/ST/OBC communities,
• personal liability of institutional heads for negligence,
• caste-sensitive mental health counselling,
• NAAC-linked audits and social data collection, and
• withdrawal of grants for non-compliance.

What is striking is that many of these proposals go well beyond the minimal guarantees under the 2012 framework. The Court did not characterise them as excessive, divisive, or constitutionally dubious. Instead, it treated them as necessary correctives to entrenched structural discrimination.

The contradiction: Seen in this light, the later stay of the 2026 Regulations marks a sharp doctrinal and institutional turn.

In the Payal Tadvi–Rohith Vemula petitiom, the Court:

• acknowledged caste-based discrimination as systemic and institutional,
• accepted that neutrality and general anti-ragging norms were inadequate,
• encouraged regulatory expansion and refinement, and
• emphasised accountability, representation, and enforceability.

Yet, in staying the 2026 Regulations, the Court shifted focus to concerns of vagueness, misuse, and over breadth—without explaining why these concerns could not be addressed through interpretation, amendment, or guidelines, the very tools it had earlier endorsed.

This creates a deeper constitutional unease: how does one reconcile a jurisprudence that recognises caste as a structural axis of harm with an interim order that treats caste-specific regulation as inherently suspect? The stay order appears to privilege abstract equality concerns over the lived realities that animated the original petition — the deaths of students failed by institutional indifference.

The Payal Tadvi–Rohith Vemula proceedings were premised on the understanding that caste discrimination in universities is not episodic, but embedded in evaluation systems, hostel allocation, disciplinary processes, and grievance mechanisms. The Court’s own directions repeatedly moved towards differentiated, targeted protections.

Against that record, the suspension of the 2026 Regulations risks flattening constitutional analysis into a question of formal symmetry—treating all students as equally situated—precisely the approach that the Court itself had earlier found wanting.

It is against this backdrop—of Court-monitored reform aimed at addressing demonstrable institutional failures—that the interim stay assumes particular significance.

The Present Proceedings: What transpired before the Court

The challenge to the Regulations came by way of three writ petitions, filed by Mritunjay Tiwari, Advocate Vineet Jindal, and Rahul Dewan. The principal target of challenge was Regulation 3(1)(c), which defines “caste-based discrimination” as discrimination on the basis of caste against members of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes.

According to LiveLaw, the petitioners contended that:

• The definition is restrictive and exclusionary, as it does not recognise caste-based discrimination against persons belonging to non-reserved or “general” categories;
• This exclusion renders such persons remediless, even if subjected to caste-linked harassment or institutional bias;
• The provision violates Article 14 by creating an unreasonable classification lacking a rational nexus with the stated objective of promoting equity.

From the outset, the Bench subjected the Regulations to close scrutiny. Three issues dominated the hearing:

1. The dual definitions of “discrimination” (Regulation 3(1)(e)) and “caste-based discrimination” (Regulation 3(1)(c));
2. The omission of ragging from the 2026 Regulations, despite its inclusion in the 2012 framework; and
3. The use of the term “segregation” in Regulation 7(d), particularly in relation to hostels, classrooms, and mentorship groups.

The Court repeatedly remarked that the Regulations appeared vague, capable of misuse, and potentially productive of social division rather than cohesion.

The Interim Order: What the Court did

By its interim order dated January 29, 2026, the Supreme Court:

• Issued notice to the Union of India and the UGC, returnable on March 19, 2026;
• Directed that the 2026 Regulations be kept in abeyance; and
• Exercising powers under Article 142, ordered that the UGC Regulations of 2012 would continue to operate in the meantime.

As per Bar&Bench, the Court framed four substantial questions of law, broadly concerning:

• The rationality and necessity of defining “caste-based discrimination” separately;
• The impact of the Regulations on sub-classifications within backward classes;
• Whether “segregation” envisaged under the Regulations violates constitutional equality and fraternity; and
• Whether the omission of ragging constitutes a regressive and unconstitutional legislative choice.

While these questions undoubtedly merit careful adjudication, the grant of an interim stay itself demands closer scrutiny.

Why was a stay granted — and was it justified?

Ordinarily, courts exercise considerable restraint while staying statutory or delegated legislation, especially when such legislation is aimed at addressing systemic discrimination. The established standard requires a strong prima facie case, demonstrable irreparable harm, and a balance of convenience favouring suspension.

In the present case, the Court relied primarily on:

• Ambiguity in drafting,
• Possibility of misuse, and
• The perceived exclusion of general category individuals from the definition of caste-based discrimination.

However, ambiguity and potential misuse have traditionally been treated as grounds for interpretation, not suspension, particularly in the context of welfare or protective legislation. The order does not demonstrate how the continued operation of the Regulations would cause irreversible harm sufficient to justify a blanket stay. Notably absent is any engagement with the harm caused by suspending a framework designed to respond to caste-based exclusion—an exclusion that is neither hypothetical nor speculative.

The Court’s reliance on the revival of the 2012 Regulations as a safeguard also assumes that the earlier framework was adequate, despite the fact that the 2019 PIL itself was premised on its failure to prevent institutional discrimination.

The Conceptual Problem: What is “caste-based discrimination”?

At the heart of the Court’s concern lies an unresolved conceptual question: is caste-based discrimination symmetrical?

The petitioners — and, to some extent, the Court — appear to approach caste as a neutral identity marker, capable of disadvantaging any individual depending on circumstances. This framing overlooks the constitutional understanding of caste as a structural system of hierarchy, not merely a personal attribute.

Indian constitutional jurisprudence has consistently recognised that caste-based discrimination is not simply discrimination involving caste, but discrimination arising from historical, social, and economic subordination of specific communities. To ask why upper-caste individuals are not explicitly protected under a provision addressing caste-based discrimination is to ignore this asymmetry.

Importantly, the Regulations already define “discrimination” broadly and in caste-neutral terms. Any harassment, humiliation, or unfair treatment faced by individuals from non-reserved categories is squarely covered under this definition. The absence of a separate label of “caste-based discrimination” for such individuals does not render them remediless.

The Court’s concern, therefore, risks collapsing the distinction between structural oppression and interpersonal conflict, treating unequal social realities as constitutionally equivalent.

The Slippery Comparison: “Upper castes” and de-notified or extremely backward communities

As noted by legal scholar Gautam Bhatia, one of the petitioners has argued that the impugned regulation suffers from a constitutional flaw comparable to the presumption underlying the colonial Criminal Tribes Act, 1871, which stigmatised entire communities as inherently criminal and was later repealed for violating principles of equality and constitutional morality. This submission, however, appears to rest on an analogy that implicitly places socially dominant or ‘upper’ caste groups on the same constitutional footing as communities that were historically criminalised and later de-notified.

De-notified tribes, in particular, have faced:

• Colonial-era criminalisation;
• Persistent social stigma;
• Economic exclusion; and
• Institutional invisibility even within reservation frameworks.

To suggest that excluding general category individuals from the definition of caste-based discrimination creates an equal protection problem risk flattening historical injustice into abstract formalism. Constitutional equality does not require identical treatment of groups situated in radically unequal positions. Indeed, such an approach may itself violate the principle of equality by treating unequal’s alike.

The Court’s rhetorical invocation of a “casteless society,” while normatively appealing, sits uneasily with judicial precedent cautioning that claims of castelessness often precede, rather than follow, the dismantling of caste hierarchies.

Vagueness, misuse, and the burden on protective legislation

The Court’s repeated emphasis on the “possibility of misuse” raises a familiar but contested trope in Indian constitutional adjudication. It is well settled that: The possibility of abuse of a law is no ground to strike it down.

This principle assumes even greater importance in the context of protective regulations, which have historically been diluted through misuse arguments advanced by socially dominant groups. The order does not explain why ordinary safeguards—such as inquiry mechanisms, appellate review, and judicial oversight—would be insufficient to address misuse on a case-by-case basis.

By foregrounding speculative misuse over structural exclusion, the order risks imposing a higher justificatory burden on equity-oriented regulations than on other forms of delegated legislation.

Ragging, non-regression, and judicial overcorrection

The Court’s concern regarding the omission of ragging from the 2026 Regulations is doctrinally significant, particularly in light of Justice Bagchi’s invocation of the principle of non-regression, as reported by LiveLaw. However, even assuming the omission is a serious flaw, it is not self-evident that the appropriate response was to stay the entire regulatory framework, rather than:

• Read the Regulations harmoniously with existing anti-ragging norms;
• Issue interpretative directions; or
• Direct limited corrective amendments.

The chosen course reflects a form of judicial overcorrection, where legitimate concerns about incompleteness lead to wholesale suspension.

Article 142 and the revival of the 2012 Regulations

The use of Article 142 to revive the 2012 Regulations raises further questions. While intended to prevent a regulatory vacuum, the move effectively substitutes judicial preference for executive policy, without a finding that the earlier framework better advances constitutional values.

This is particularly striking given that the 2026 Regulations were framed pursuant to Court-monitored proceedings and stakeholder consultations following the 2019 PIL. The revival thus appears less as a neutral stopgap and more as a normative rollback, albeit temporarily.

What the Supreme Court Directed in the Payal Tadvi–Rohith Vemula PIL — and why the stay order sits uneasily with it

The Supreme Court’s interim stay of the UGC (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026 must be read against the backdrop of the Court’s own continuing supervision in Abeda Salim Tadvi v. Union of India—the petition arising from the institutional failures that culminated in the deaths of Payal Tadvi and Rohith Vemula.

Conclusion: interim caution or substantive retreat?

The Supreme Court’s interim order undoubtedly reflects a desire to prevent social fragmentation and regulatory excess. Yet, in its emphasis on neutrality, symmetry, and speculative misuse, the Court risks diluting the constitutional logic of substantive equality that has long justified differentiated protections for caste-oppressed communities.

The deeper danger lies not merely in staying one set of regulations, but in the judicial reframing of caste-based discrimination as a universally symmetrical phenomenon, detached from history and structure. Whether this framing endures at the final stage will determine whether the Court’s intervention is remembered as a moment of careful constitutional recalibration—or as a cautious but consequential retreat from the promise of transformative equality.

The complete order may be read below:

Related:

A Cultural Burden: The ascending hierarchy of caste warfare and the crisis of the Indian republic

Freedom Deferred: Caste, class and faith in India’s prisons

Everyday Atrocity: How Caste Violence Became India’s New Normal

Two Dalit and Tribal girls brutalised in Andhra Pradesh: Pattern of caste violence exposes deep-rooted injustice

Caste Cloud Over Ambedkar Jayanti: From campus censorship to temple exclusion

CJP Maharashtra: Surge in communal and caste-based violence with six incidents in January 2025

2024: Love Jihad as a socio-political tool: caste, endogamy, and Hindutva’s dominance over gender and social boundaries in India

The post The stay of UGC Equity Regulations, 2026: The interim order, the proceedings, and the constitutional questions raised appeared first on SabrangIndia.

For a country that saw the Bhopal Gas Tragedy and many such incidents where lack of regulation resulted in massive loss of human life and toll on victims that exists to date, this turnaround is rather surprising. That too, for it to have triggered by a judgement of the Supreme Court, an institution that has been a guardian of environment from the T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India case, where tree-felling and non-forestry activity in forests across the country was stopped by an order of the Supreme Court to the Niyamgiri hills case where indigenous Dongria Kondh tribe successfully fought against Vedanta Aluminium’s bauxite mining project, using the Forest Rights Act (FRA) 2006 to assert their cultural and religious rights over the sacred hills.[1]

Background: Tracing the Origins of “Prior” Clearance

To appreciate the magnitude of the conflict between the May 2025 and November 2025 Vanashakti judgments, it is essential to situate the dispute within the broader evolution of environmental constitutionalism in India.

In the wake of the 1972 Stockholm Conference and the catastrophic Bhopal Gas Tragedy of 1984, India developed a legal regime grounded in the “Precautionary Principle.” Interpreted by the Supreme Court as part of Article 21 (the Right to Life), this principle requires that environmental protection measures must anticipate, prevent, and address sources of environmental degradation before any damage occurs.

The principal mechanism for implementing this principle is the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification. Introduced in 1994 and updated in 2006, the EIA framework mandates that certain industrial and infrastructure projects must secure “prior” Environmental Clearance (EC) before any construction begins. The underlying rationale is that any environmental harm, such as deforestation or wetland destruction, is often irreversible. If assessments are conducted post-construction, they serve merely as a bureaucratic formality, failing to achieve the goal of sustainable development.

However, a significant gap has emerged between this normative ideal and the realities of India’s rapid industrialization, ready crony land grab. Successive governments, prioritising the “Ease of Doing Business,” began to grant “ex post facto” (retrospective) clearances to projects that had already commenced operations unlawfully. This practice created a moral hazard—companies found it cheaper to violate the law and pay penalties later than to undergo the rigorous and time-consuming process of prior assessment. The Vanashakti litigation originated when the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) attempted to formalize this practice through a 2017 Notification and a 2021 Office Memorandum (OM), thereby turning what was intended as amnesty into a standard procedure.

The May 2025 Judgment: The Normative Firewall

On May 16, 2025, a two-judge bench consisting of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan delivered a judgment that aimed to uphold the “Rule of Law” over economic expediency.

Textualist Rigidity and the “Anathema” of Retrospection

The May judgment adopted a strict and literal interpretation of the EIA Notification 2006, holding that the requirement for “prior” EC is mandatory. Relying on precedents such as Common Cause v. Union of India (2017) and Alembic Pharmaceuticals v. Rohit Prajapati (2020), the bench emphasised that ex post facto clearances are “completely alien to environmental jurisprudence” and constitute an “anathema” to the EIA framework. Permitting operations without prior assessment, the Court reasoned, effectively condones violations. If EC is eventually denied after construction, the environmental harm is already irreversible; if granted, the “precautionary principle” is rendered meaningless.

The Sanctity of Executive Undertakings

The Court also scrutinised the legal history of the 2017 Notification, which had offered a six-month “amnesty” window for violators. When challenged before the Madras High Court, the Union Government had assured the court that this was a “one-time measure.” The May bench found that the subsequent 2021 OM—which perpetuated the amnesty indefinitely—breached this judicial undertaking. The Court held that the executive cannot renege on its assurance to the court, striking down the 2021 OM as arbitrary and violative of Article 14.[2]

Rejection of Monetary Regularisation

The May judgment explicitly rejected the notion that penalties under the “Polluter Pays Principle” could substitute for prior compliance. It noted that while Section 15 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 provides for penalties, it does not authorize the regularization of illegal structures. As a result, the Court held that even if penalties are paid, illegal constructions lacking prior clearance must be halted and demolished. The bench stressed that the “Polluter Pays Principle” cannot be twisted into a license to pollute.[3]

The November 2025 Review: The Pragmatic Recalibration

In a dramatic turnaround just six months later, a three-judge Review Bench led by Chief Justice B.R. Gavai (with Justice Bhuyan dissenting) set aside the May judgment.

 The “Per Incuriam” Doctrine and the Battle of Precedents

The Review Bench invoked the doctrine of per incuriam—rendered in ignorance of binding law—to overturn the May judgment. The majority held that the May Bench had failed to consider coordinate bench decisions in Electrosteel Steels Ltd. (2021)[4], Pahwa Plastics (2022)[5], and D. Swamy (2023)[6].

The May Bench had relied on Common Cause and Alembic to assert that ex-post facto EC is illegal. The Review Bench argued that while Alembic described such clearances as “anathema,” it ultimately allowed industries to continue operating after paying fines.

The Review Bench interpreted the relief granted in Alembic (allowing the industry to operate) as the binding principle of law, whereas the May Bench considered the relief as an exceptional measure under Article 142, treating the prohibition on retrospective EC as binding law.

Ultimately, by prioritising Electrosteel—which stated that the Environment Protection Act “does not prohibit” ex post facto clearance—over the strict reading of Common Cause, the Review Bench found the May judgment erroneous for ignoring the more recent “balanced approach” adopted by the Court.[7]

2. The Doctrine of “National Assets” and Sunk Costs

Economic consequences were a decisive factor in the Review Judgment. The Court accepted the Union’s argument that the May judgment would require the demolition of “national assets” valued at over ₹20,000 crore.[8]

The Court cited specific examples such as the AIIMS hospital in Odisha (962 beds) and the greenfield airport in Vijayanagar as projects facing potential demolition.[9]

The Review Bench further argued that demolishing these large-scale projects would cause more environmental damage (from dust and debris) than allowing them to remain operational. The Court rhetorically questioned whether demolishing effluent treatment plants would truly benefit environmental protection.[10] This reasoning, in effect, used environmental concerns to justify non-enforcement of environmental law.

Statutory Flexibility

Contrary to the May judgment, the Review Bench held that Section 15 of the Environment Protection Act does not mandate demolition. The Act, according to the Review Bench, allows for flexibility, and the executive can “amend or modify” notifications as needed.[11] Thus, the 2021 OM was not seen as violating the “one-time” judicial undertaking but as a valid exercise of executive power, especially as it was issued following directions from the National Green Tribunal (NGT).

Analytical Critique: The Erosion of Certainty

The rapid shift between the Vanshakti verdicts reveals a deep schism within India’s environmental constitutionalism. While the Review Judgment saved billions in investment, it set a precarious precedent that undermines the rule of law in three key areas.

The Inversion of Stare Decisis (Precedent)

The main issue with the Review Judgment is its handling of precedent. Justice Bhuyan’s dissent pointed out that Electrosteel and Pahwa—relied on by the Review Bench—were two-judge bench decisions, as was Common Cause, which formed the foundation of the May judgment and offered a comprehensive interpretation of the EIA Notification.

The Review Bench declared the May judgment per incuriam for not following Electrosteel, but the dissent argued that Electrosteel itself was per incuriam for disregarding the binding principle established in Common Cause.[12]

The Review Bench’s position—that the relief granted in Alembic (allowing industries to continue) constitutes binding laws jurisprudentially problematic. The Supreme Court often uses its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to grant case-specific relief while maintaining a contrary legal principle. By elevating discretionary relief to binding precedent, the Review Judgment effectively legalises violations, signaling to lower courts that statutory prohibitions on retrospective clearance can be ignored when economic stakes are high.

The Institutionalisation of Fait Accompli

The Review Judgment entrenches the doctrine of Fait Accompli in Indian law, suggesting that violations on a sufficiently large scale become practically irreversible.

By explicitly referencing the ₹20,000 crore investment as a justification for recall, the Court signaled that the “Right to Environment” is subordinate to the “Right to Investment.” This creates a dangerous incentive for developers to proceed with construction and heavy investments before obtaining clearance, believing that courts will hesitate to order the destruction of “national assets.”

Moreover, the reasoning that demolition itself would cause pollution effectively shields all large-scale illegal infrastructure from enforcement. The further along illegal construction is, the more “environmentally damaging” it becomes to remove, thus guaranteeing its persistence. This undermines the “Precautionary Principle,” which is based on prevention rather than after-the-fact remediation.

Simply put, if the municipality of a city refrains from demolishing the encroachment buildings on banks of lakes, the city will be prone to flood and is exposed to more vulnerabilities than before. Vanshakti II judgement fully fails to engage with this very obvious and basic logic.

Conclusion: From Gatekeeper to Toll Collector

The shift from the May judgment to the November Review marks a transformation in the Supreme Court’s role in environmental governance. The May judgment sought to act as a Gatekeeper, upholding the “Prior Clearance” requirement to prevent environmental degradation before it occurs. In contrast, the Review Judgment recasts the Court as a Toll Collector, allowing violations to continue in exchange for fines and remedial actions.

While the Review Judgment provides a practical solution to the immediate issue of “stranded assets” such as the Odisha AIIMS and the Vijayanagar Airport, it causes enduring harm to the credibility of India’s environmental regulatory regime. It endorses the executive’s strategy of “dilution by notification,” where statutory mandates are weakened to accommodate industrial needs. Most significantly, it undermines the finality of Supreme Court judgments, implying that even environmentally protective verdicts can be recalled if the economic arguments are persuasive enough.

For developers, the message is unambiguous: compliance is optional, so long as one can afford the cost of post-facto forgiveness.

Amen.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organization)

[1] Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd vs Ministry Of Environment & Forest &Ors, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 180 of 2011

[2] Para 30, Vanshakti v. Union of India 2025 INSC 718 (Vanshakti I)

[3] Para 27, Vanshakti I

[4] Electrosteel Steels Limited v. Union of India and Others  (2023) 6 SCC 615

[5] Pahwa Plastics Private Limited and Another v. Dastak NGO and Others (2023) 12 SCC 774

[6] D. Swamy v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board and Others (2023) 20 SCC 469

[7] Para 55.1, CREDAI vs. Vankshakti 2025 INSC 1326 (Vanshakti II)

[8] Para 108, Vanshakti II (CJI Gavai)

[9] Paras 109, 110, Vanshakti II (CJI Gavai)

[10] Para 7 (VIII), Vanshakti II (Justice K. Vinod Chandran)

[11] Para 75, Vanshakti II (CJI Gavai)

[12] Para 20, Vanshakti II (Justice Bhuyan)

Related:

Cries for Environmental Justice: India at a low 176/180 countries in the 2024 Environmental Performance Index

June 5: World environment day & the increasing importance of seed conservation by farmers and rural communities

Strengthening indigenous communities means protection of the environment 

The post The Judicial Ouroboros: The Vanashakti Reversal & Crisis of Environmental Finality in India appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi, and Justice Vipul Pancholi was hearing an application filed by Hindu Front for Justice, which sought permission for day-long Basant Panchami rituals at the site on January 23, coinciding with Friday Juma Namaz. The proceedings and directions were reported by LiveLaw.

Background: A contested sacred space

The Bhoj Shala, an 11th-century monument protected by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), occupies a deeply contested place in India’s religious and legal landscape. Hindus regard the structure as a temple dedicated to Goddess Vagdevi (Saraswati), while Muslims consider it the Kamal Maula Masjid.

Since 2003, a court-monitored arrangement has been in place permitting Hindu puja on Tuesdays and Muslim namaz on Fridays, a fragile equilibrium that has periodically come under strain, as per The Hindu.

Arguments before the Court

Appearing for the Hindu applicants, Advocate Vishnu Shankar Jain submitted that Basant Panchami holds exceptional religious significance, with the auspicious muhurat extending from sunrise to sunset, during which uninterrupted pujas and havans are traditionally performed.

Jain urged the Court to consider whether Juma Namaz could be shifted to after 5 PM, allowing Hindu rituals to continue throughout the day without interruption.

Representing the Muslim side, Senior Advocate Salman Khurshid, appearing for the Kamal Maula Mosque Committee, firmly opposed the suggestion, pointing out that Juma Namaz is time-specific and must be performed between 1 PM and 3 PM, in accordance with Islamic religious practice. He clarified that once the namaz concluded, worshippers would vacate the premises, as has been the practice.

Justice Bagchi intervened during the exchange, remarking that the Court was conscious of the religious significance of both practices and cautioning against arguments that ignored doctrinal constraints—an observation noted by LiveLaw.

Administration’s role and court-endorsed arrangement

Seeking to de-escalate tensions and ensure public order, Additional Solicitor General K.M. Nataraj, appearing for the Union of India and the ASI, proposed a pragmatic administrative solution. He suggested that if the mosque committee provided an estimate of the number of persons expected to attend the namaz, the district administration could cordon off a separate enclosure within the compound, complete with distinct ingress and egress, and issue passes to prevent overcrowding or provocation.

Khurshid agreed to furnish the numbers on the same day, a position welcomed by the Court. The Advocate General of Madhya Pradesh also assured the Bench that law and order would be strictly maintained, a commitment the Court formally recorded, as reported by Bar & Bench.

Supreme Court’s recorded directions

In its order, the Bench recorded the consensus arrangement as follows:

“A fair suggestion was given that for the duration of Juma Namaz between 1 PM and 3 PM, an exclusive and separate area within the same compound, including separate ingress and egress, shall be made available so that namaz can be performed peacefully. Similarly, a separate space shall be made available to the Hindu community to conduct traditional ceremonies on the occasion of Basant Panchami.”

The Court further noted that the district administration may issue passes or adopt any other fair mechanism to ensure that no untoward incident occurs.

In a rare and deliberate appeal, the Bench urged both communities to exercise mutual respect and restraint, stressing that cooperation with civil authorities was essential to maintaining communal harmony.

Clarification on pujas and non-interference with merits

When Jain pressed the Bench to explicitly record that Basant Panchami pujas could continue uninterrupted from sunrise to sunset, the Court clarified that this was already permitted under an existing ASI order, and nothing in its directions curtailed that right.

Importantly, the Bench emphasised that its directions were purely interim and facilitative, and did not reflect any opinion on the merits of the larger dispute, which remains sub judice.

Larger Case: ASI survey and High Court proceedings

The application was heard in the backdrop of a Special Leave Petition filed in 2024 by the Maulana Kamaluddin Welfare Society, Dhar, challenging a Madhya Pradesh High Court order directing the ASI to conduct a scientific survey of the disputed complex.

In April 2024, the Supreme Court had allowed the survey to continue but imposed strict safeguards:

• No physical excavation that could alter the structure’s character
• No action on the survey findings without the Supreme Court’s prior approval
• Maintenance of status quo at the site

During Thursday’s hearing, LiveLaw reported, the Court was informed that the ASI has completed the survey and submitted its report in a sealed cover to the High Court.

Accepting a suggestion by Salman Khurshid, the Supreme Court directed that:

• The High Court may unseal the ASI report in open court
• Copies be supplied to both parties
• Where copying is not feasible, inspection may be allowed in the presence of counsel
• Parties be permitted to file objections
• The matter thereafter be taken up for final hearing

The Court further directed that the writ petition pending before the Indore Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court be heard by a Division Bench headed by the Chief Justice or one of the senior-most judges, and disposed of the SLP accordingly.

Continuing status quo

Until final adjudication, the Supreme Court ordered that:

• Status quo at the site shall be maintained
• Parties must continue to abide by the ASI’s April 2023 operational order
• No step shall be taken that alters the religious character of the structure

A judicial tightrope

The Court’s orders reflect a careful judicial balancing act—protecting religious freedoms under Articles 25 and 26, while preventing escalation at a site emblematic of India’s broader debates on faith, history, and constitutional secularism.

By foregrounding administrative coordination, mutual respect, and non-interference with pending adjudication, the Supreme Court has, for now, sought to ensure peace at Bhoj Shala—while leaving the ultimate question of its religious character to be resolved through due process of law.

Related:

In UP’s Mosque Coverings, a New Chapter From The Hindutva Playbook Unfolds

Supreme Court blocks execution of Nagar Palika’s order regarding well near Sambhal Mosque, prioritises peace and harmony

Sambhal’s darkest hour: 5 dead, scores injured in Mosque survey violence as UP police face allegations of excessive force

Sufidar Trust, Walajah Big Mosque: The 4 decades long tradition of Hindus serving Iftar meals to Muslims during Ramzan

Conspiracy or Coincidence? Mosques defaced in March after spate of hate speeches provoking the crime weeks before

CJP escalates complaint against Times Now Navbharat show on Gyanvapi Mosque to NBDSA

The post Supreme Court brokers interim peace at bhoj shala, allows basant panchami pujas and Friday namaz under strict safeguards appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A quick search of the 142-page judgement, delivered by a bench comprising Justices Aravind Kumar and NV Anjaria, finds these key words missing. Instead, the judgement expanded the contours of terrorism. Further, it created two categories of accused – leaders and followers. Researchers Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam were designated as “architects” of the conspiracy and denied bail, whereas student activist Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed were granted bail under stringent censorial conditions. All of them have been in jail since 2020.

While freedom of speech and the right to political dissent are significant contextual elements in the judgment, the Supreme Court explicitly clarified that they are not the core legal issues determining the outcome of the bail applications.

Critics, however, argue that the top court’s judgment sets a dangerous precedent by classifying political dissent and protest speeches as acts of terrorism.

Conditional freedom that robs the right to speak

Supreme Court imposed strict conditions while granting bail to the Fatima, Rehman, Khan, Haider and Ahmed. Apart from the ₹2 lakh personal bond each with two local sureties of the like amount, the top court also gagged the five activists from speaking about any issue from any platform after their release.

Conditions also include that they are:

• Required to stay within the territorial limit of Delhi NCT for the pendency of the trial. Not allowed to leave the city without court’s permission. Any request for travel shall disclose reasons, which would then be considered by the trial court “strictly” on its “merits”
• Surrender passports if any. If there is no passport, then an affidavit to be filed to that effect. Furthermore, immigration authorities have been direction to prevent any exit from the country without the court’s permission
• Twice weekly check-ins at the Delhi Police Crime Branch police station. The police are then required to submit monthly attendance reports to court; Furnish full current address and all contact details with the investigating officer of the case. there must be a seven-day notice before any change to the same.
• Co-operate during the trial, appear at every date unless exempted by court and ensure they don’t act in any way to delay the same
• No witness tampering, or any contact with them at all – direct or indirect. Not allowed to participate in the activities of any group or organization linked to the subject matter of the present FIR/ final report
• Complete media gag
• Gag on attending any rallies – political or otherwise, physically or virtually till the conclusion of the trial
• Not allowed to distribute any posts, handbills, posters, fliers, banners
• “Maintain peace and good behavior.” Violation of this condition gives the police “liberty” to seek revocation of bail

UAPA comes a full circle

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Gulfisha Fatima vs State (2026 INSC 2) represents a ‘coming to a full circle’ moment for the Unlawful Activity (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967. The UAPA, which was originally meant to address “secessionist” activities, was later amended and rebranded as India’s anti-terror law.

Around 1962-63, the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru envisioned UAPA to act as a deterrence against secessionist ideologies and preserve national integration. In the backdrop of the 1965 India-Pakistan war, UAPA was primarily intended to tackle the strong secessionist movement in Tamil Nadu which wanted to be a sovereign state. It was followed by a series of preventive detention laws and, when India signed and ratified all major United Nation counter-terrorism conventions after 9/11, the UAPA was specifically amended in 2004 to align with the country’s international obligations.

The law, in its current avatar, is so vast and vague, that even expressing disaffection towards the state or affection for another state, as in the case of the three Kashmiri youth who were jailed under sedition charges for allegedly cheering for Pakistan’s cricket team when it won the 2021 T20 World Cup, is liable for prosecution.

When protest becomes an act of terrorism

Can protest speeches, public meetings and WhatsApp group membership constitute conspiracy under Sections 16–18 of the UAPA at the bail stage?

According to the Supreme Court: Yes, they can. Even if the protests were peaceful assemblies.

The Supreme Court’s January 5 judgement essentially redefined terrorism. Even though the judgment recognized freedom of speech as a protected right, it stopped where an allegedly pre-planned conspiracy for systemic violence began. Ironically, cases against BJP politicians like Kapil Sharma, who made incendiary speeches on the eve of the breakout of violence in Delhi in 2020, continue at a snail’s pace,

Yet, the January 5 judgement read: “The factual record placed by the prosecution repeatedly returns to a distinction that is central to the case: the differentiation between a conventional dharna and a chakka jam. This is not treated as semantics. It is treated as strategy.”

“A dharna may be expressive; a chakka jam, as alleged, is disruptive by design. The prosecution case is that the sustained choking of arterial roads, replication of blockade sites, and the movement of crowds from minority clusters into mixed population areas were not accidental expressions of dissent, but calibrated acts meant to generate confrontation, overwhelm law enforcement, and create conditions for violence,” it added.

The top court said Delhi Police did not rely on a “single speech, a single meeting, or a single blockade” to oppose bail, rather it relied on “a course of conduct, spread over weeks, involving repeated meetings, formation of coordinating bodies, issuance of directions, and alleged preparations for escalation.”

“The Court cannot, at the bail stage, segregate this course of conduct into isolated benign fragments and assess each in abstraction,” the judgment read.

The Supreme Court reiterated that “dissent and protest occupy a protected space in a constitutional democracy,” however, that protection does not extend to a design that involves “systemic disruption, engineered confrontation, and preparatory steps towards violence”.

“At this stage, the Court must resist from committing two errors. The first is to criminalise speech merely because it is politically charged. The second is to immunize a continuing course of conduct merely because it contains language of non-violence,” the judgment read.

“In the application of such law, the Court does not proceed on identity, ideology, belief, or association. It proceeds on role, material, and the statutory threshold governing the exercise of jurisdiction,” the judgment read. “…[the judgment] neither endorses the prosecution case nor prejudges the guilt of any accused,” the court said adding that it applied the law as it stands, “recognising that individual liberty must be protected, but that it must also withstand the legitimate demands of national security and collective safety.”

“This balance is not a matter of preference rather it is a matter of constitutional duty,” the court added.

Selective application of law

While the Supreme Court’s judgment could be seen as a mixed bag of relief for some accused, in the denial of bail to Imam and Khalid, the top court selectively applied its own judgement and those of the high court on free speech or even bail under section 43d of the UAPA.

In cases like Vernon Gonzalves, Shoma Sen, Arvind Kejriwal, Manish Sisodia, Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh, Sheikh Javed Iqbal, the top court granted bail due to prolonged incarceration despite the bar under section 43D of the UAPA act.

On free speech, the Supreme Court in its 2015 Shreya Singhal judgment said that dissenting discourse is not a crime. In its Balwant Singh judgment, the court emphasized that shouting stray slogans like “Khalistan Zindabad” were not a crime.

In fact, the Delhi High Court granted bail to student activists Devangana Kalita, Natasha Narwal and Asif Iqbal Tanha—co-accused in the 2020 Delhi Riots conspiracy case—and pulled up the Delhi Police for its “wanton use” of the UAPA.

In this case, the High Court clearly stated: “… in its anxiety to suppress dissent and in the morbid fear that matters may get out of hand, the State has blurred the line between the constitutionally guaranteed ‘right to protest’ and ‘terrorist activity’. If such blurring gains traction, democracy would be in peril.”

“… the intent and purport of the Parliament in enacting the UAPA, and more specifically in amending it in 2004 and 2008 to bring terrorist activity within its scope, was, and could only have had been, to deal with matters of profound impact on the ‘Defence of India’, nothing more and nothing less,” it added.

Process is the punishment

In the past decade, the State (or corporations) has often been accused of (mis)using the law to stifle dissent. In effect, making the process of law the punishment. Sedition (the old and new avatar), UAPA, defamation, Copyright Act are all being used against free speech.

The NewsClick founder editor Prabir Purkayastha was charged under the draconian UAPA for publishing “propaganda” reports on China that allegedly served to endanger the “sovereignty, unity and security of India.” He secured bail after seven months in custody after the Supreme Court held that his arrest was “invalid in the eyes of the law.”

Sedition, in its new avatar, has been used against climate activist Sonam Wangchuk, Ashoka University professor Ali Khan Mahmudabad, stand-up comic Kunal Kamra, satirists Madri Kakoti and Shamita Yadav better as Dr Medusa and Ranting Gola respectively, Bhojpuri singer Neha Singh Rathore, TV star and Big Boss winner Akhil Marar, a 20-year-old autorickshaw driver Sahil Khan and even Pushpa Sathidar, wife of the late actor Vira Sathidar, who was booked for merely reciting the acclaimed Faiz Ahmed Faiz poem ‘Hum Dekhenge’ at a meeting.in Nagpur in May 2025.

Even after sedition cases are dropped, the punishing process does not end, as the ordeal of Manipuri journalist Kishore Wangkhemcha, booked for speaking out about the struggles of leaders of Manipur or film maker Aisha Sultana, charged for criticising the Lakshadweep administrator, bears out..

Clearly, the price of dissent and critical thought is extremely high. And now, a Supreme Court order penalises peaceful protest and expression as acts of terror, effectively putting an undemocratic premium on the freedom to speak freely.

*About the Author: After an almost decade-long career as a photojournalist in Mumbai, Ritika now covers the Indian judiciary and hopes to simplify the law and decode the judiciary. Now based in Delhi, Ritika is a writer, part-time dreamer & full-time K-drama addict who escapes the city when she’s not bingeing on K-dramas.

Courtesy: Free Speech Collective

The post When Speech Becomes an Act of Terrorism appeared first on SabrangIndia.

So it is the historian in me that hopes that the Supreme Court’s decision to deny bail to both Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid as a document will be read ‘against the grain’ perhaps in the not too distant a future. One must today divorce hope from reason in order to this. Such an action is vital to our sanity today.

Those of us who were fortunate enough to be in the Delhi region in late 2019 early 2020, such as myself, were able to witness, if not participate, in one of independent India’s most creative, sustained, non-violent and therefore powerful movements against the Indian state’s intention to restrict definitions of a hard-won citizenship. The movement brought onto the streets, quite literally, large numbers of Muslim women who had rarely participated in public political life, and who sustained their movement for weeks, with little or no overt political support.

This reverberating sound of the National Anthem is the mark of Shaheen Bagh’s love for the country.
India is our nation and we our its citizens.
Come celebrate #JantakaRepublicDay pic.twitter.com/p96NWRngdp

— Shaheen Bagh Official (@Shaheenbaghoff1) January 26, 2020

Is it any wonder that young people were mesmerised by the hopes of that moment, that site, which experimented with new styles and repertoires of protest and communication? Is it any wonder that Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid, given their interest in historical research and their political awareness, were drawn to the movement, like many of their age and background?

Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid were no bomb-throwing revolutionaries. I taught both of them, and they impressed me with their intelligence, diligence and capacity for thinking differently. I did not always agree with the ideas they had. I was often irritated by their style of learning, which bordered on the irreverent. But like most JNU (and CHS) students, they were passionately attached to argument, driven by the elemental hunger to read, write, argue, and speak boldly, sometimes even giddily, of many things that had come into their grasp.

JNU’s mission was to provide that intellectual space where the young could take the risks of thinking, arguing, and arriving at conclusions, even dreams that may remain unrealised. This happened not only in our classrooms, and seminars, but in our canteens, messes, open spaces, and in the wonderful ‘philosophy of the night’ that went on into the wee hours in all our hostels, night after night.

Four years before the anti-CAA/NRC agitation, the media-manipulated vilification of the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) and its student leaders including Umar Khalid and Kanhaiya Kumar was exposed in detail by Sabrangindia in reports that may be read here

Can we fault Sharjeel, Umar, Natasha, or Devangana for dreaming of a better world than the one our generation had left him? Many students from CHS were similarly gripped by the desire to build a new future. Our students enjoyed and appreciated the chance of framing questions, reading sources, and assessing ideas on their own. Some of these were harebrained, some shot through with brilliance. But CHS/JNU fostered spaces where these, and other contrary, ideas could be tried out, adopted, defeated in argument, or abandoned, without fear of reprisal.

Instead, Sharjeel and Umar have been incarcerated for five-plus- one more years of the most creative, productive years of their lives — all because of words they chose to use in public.

On this 75th year of our Republic, we must commemorate figures like Sharjeel and Umar who are paying a heavy price for their speech acts, ideas. We must never forget, that legions of others, who openly called for violence against other Indians, continue to enjoy their freedoms today, and even occupy public office — because they have the right names, and have the right political patrons.

We have become acutely aware of the contradictions that BR Ambedkar had warned us about. He had known that democracy was just top dressing in India. He knew that violent contradictions would erupt when the social structure of our inherently hierarchical, unjust society, undermined the Republic’s hard-won political freedoms and liberties.

As the insightful literary scholar, Rahamat Tarikere, has pointed out, India has a long history of producing some of the loftiest ideas, whether religious or not, but our social practice has never matched these ideals. What chance of a less inequitable world – I hesitate to use the more decisive ‘just’ and ‘equal’ — when the very people who are capable of dreaming that possibility, our young, are forced into a form of social death?

But I am confident that Sharjeel and Umar will emerge from these trials with all their ideals intact. In fact, I am sure, that even behind those prison walls, they think, read, dream, and survive, perhaps even transforming the oppressive space to which they have been condemned. Here I can do no more than cite the brilliant words of Mahmoud Dervish, the Palestinian poet:

It is possible
It is possible, at least sometimes
It is possible especially now
To ride a horse
Inside a prison cell
And run away….

It is possible for prison walls
To disappear,
For the cell to become a distant land
Without frontiers
What did you do with the walls?
I gave them back to the rocks.
And what did you do with the ceiling?
I turned it into a saddle.
And your chain?
I turned it into a pencil.

The prison guard got angry.
He put an end to my dialogue.
He said he didn’t care for poetry,
And bolted the door of my cell.
He came back to see me
In the morning,
He shouted at me.
Where did all this water come from?
I brought it from the Nile
And the trees?
From the orchards of Damascus
And the music?
From my heartbeat

The prison guard got mad;
He put an end to my dialogue.
He said he didn’t like my poetry,
And bolted the board of my cell.

But he returned in the evening:
Where did this moon come from?
From the nights of Baghdad.
And the wine?
From the vineyards of Algiers.
And this freedom?
From the chain you tied me with last night,
The prison guard grew so sad…
He begged me to give him back his freedom.

Be with us again, in freedom, Sharjeel and Umar.

Be with us again, in freedom, Sharjeel and Umar.

(This post by the author, Janaki Nair taught at the Centre for Historical Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University until her retirement in 2020 was posted on social media and may be read here.)

Related:

After Five Years in Jail, Bail Still Barred for Two: Supreme Court denies bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in Delhi riots case

Delhi High Court dismisses bail pleas of Umar Khalid, Sharjeel Imam, and others in 2020 Riots Conspiracy Case

Jailed Without Trial: Umar Khalid’s 4-Year Ordeal Ignites Solidarity

The post JNU Teacher to her Jailed Students: ‘Be with us again, in freedom, Sharjeel and Umar’ appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The verdict was delivered by a Bench of Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice N.V. Anjaria, which held that although prolonged incarceration demands constitutional scrutiny, the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA continued to operate against Khalid and Imam, as the prosecution material disclosed a prima facie case against them.

At the same time, the Court stressed that all accused are not on the same footing, and that a role-specific, accused-specific analysis was constitutionally necessary even in conspiracy cases — a principle that led to bail being granted to the remaining five appellants.

The judgment was reserved on December 10, 2025, and arises from appeals challenging the September 2, 2025 judgment of the Delhi High Court, which had denied bail to all seven accused.

‘Qualitatively Different Footing’: Why bail was denied to Khalid and Imam

Reading from the operative portion of the judgment, the Bench made it clear that it had “consciously avoided adopting a collective or unified approach”, instead undertaking an independent examination of the role attributed to each accused.

According to LiveLaw, the Court recorded its satisfaction that the prosecution material, if taken at face value as required at the bail stage, disclosed a “central and formative role” played by Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the alleged conspiracy behind the February 2020 violence in Northeast Delhi.

“The material suggests involvement at the level of planning, mobilisation and strategic direction, extending beyond episodic or localised acts,” the Court observed.

On this basis, the Bench concluded: “This Court is satisfied that the prosecution material discloses a prima facie allegation against the appellants Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam. The statutory threshold under Section 43D(5) stands attracted qua these appellants. This stage of the proceedings does not justify their enlargement on bail.”

As reported by Bar & Bench, the Court cautioned that to disregard the distinction between central roles and facilitatory roles would itself result in arbitrariness, even in cases alleging a common conspiracy.

However, the Court clarified that Khalid and Imam may apply for bail afresh either:

• after the examination of protected witnesses, or
• after the completion of one year from the present order.

Both accused have now been in custody for over five years, without the trial reaching the stage of recording evidence.

Arguments raised by the defence

1. Umar Khalid: ‘No violence, no presence, no terrorist act’

During the hearings, Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal, appearing for Umar Khalid, mounted a sustained challenge to both the factual foundation and the legal characterisation of the allegations.

As reported by LiveLaw, Sibal had argued that there was no evidence linking Khalid to any act of violence, and emphasised that Khalid was not even present in Delhi when the riots broke out. According to the defence, this fact alone fatally undermined the allegation that Khalid played any operational role.

A central plank of the prosecution case rested on a speech delivered by Khalid in Amravati, Maharashtra. Sibal read out portions of the speech to demonstrate that Khalid had expressly called for non-violent, Gandhian methods of protest.

“We will not answer violence with violence… We will meet violence with non-violence,” Sibal quoted from the speech.

Sibal argued that calls for “chakka jams” or road blockades are legitimate forms of civil disobedience in a democracy, and that such methods have historically been employed across political movements, including the farmers’ protests, without being labelled as terrorism.

Specifically challenging the invocation of the UAPA, Sibal submitted that Section 15 cannot be stretched to criminalise protest activity, and that even highway or rail blockades do not amount to “terrorist acts” unless accompanied by a clear intent to threaten the country’s economic security or sovereignty. To do otherwise, he warned, would dangerously collapse the distinction between dissent and terrorism.

Despite these submissions, the Supreme Court held that at the bail stage, it could not weigh defence rebuttals, and confined its enquiry to whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, crossed the statutory threshold.

2. Sharjeel Imam: ‘In custody during riots, speech is not violence’

Appearing for Sharjeel Imam, Senior Advocate Siddharth Dave similarly argued that the prosecution’s case was built on attribution and inference rather than direct evidence.

According to Bar & Bench, Dave pointed out that Imam was already in custody in other cases at the time the riots occurred, making it impossible for him to have participated in any on-ground violence or mobilisation.

Dave acknowledged that Imam’s speeches may have been controversial or unpalatable, but argued that political speech, however provocative, does not automatically amount to incitement to violence. He cautioned against equating dissenting or radical speech with terrorist intent.

He also flagged the danger of pre-trial stigmatisation, noting that Imam had been branded an “intellectual terrorist” by the State despite there being no conviction or completed trial.

The prosecution, however, relied heavily on video clips of Imam’s speeches, particularly those in which he spoke about cutting off the “Chicken Neck” or Siliguri corridor, the narrow passage connecting the Northeast to the rest of India.

As reported by LiveLaw, the Delhi Police alleged that these speeches showed an intent to:

• paralyse the functioning of the State, and
• attract international attention during the visit of then US President Donald Trump in February 2020.

The Supreme Court accepted that these allegations, taken at face value, were sufficient at the bail stage to constitute a prima facie case, while clarifying that it was not expressing any final opinion on guilt.

Bail Granted to Five Accused: Liberty with stringent conditions

In contrast, the Supreme Court granted bail to Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa Ur Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed, holding that their continued incarceration could not be justified on parity with Khalid and Imam.

For Gulfisha Fatima, Senior Advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi made a pointed submission, reported by LiveLaw, that keeping students and young activists in jail for over five years without the trial even beginning makes a “caricature of our criminal justice system”.

Singhvi highlighted that co-accused Devangana Kalita, Natasha Narwal and Asif Iqbal Tanha were granted bail in 2021 on similar allegations, yet Fatima continued to remain incarcerated.

While granting bail, the Court clarified that the relief does not dilute the allegations. According to LiveLaw, the Bench imposed twelve stringent bail conditions, warning that any misuse of liberty would permit the trial court to cancel bail after hearing the accused.

Details of the judgment pronouncement

1. UAPA and Bail: Delay is not a ‘trump card’, says Court

One of the most closely analysed portions of the judgment concerns the relationship between prolonged incarceration and bail under UAPA. Justice Aravind Kumar observed, as reported by LiveLaw, that in prosecutions under special statutes like the UAPA:

• delay in trial cannot function as a “trump card” that automatically overrides statutory restrictions on bail.

However, the Court simultaneously acknowledged that:

• delay serves as a trigger for heightened judicial scrutiny, especially where incarceration is prolonged.

The Bench clarified that Section 43D(5) does not completely oust judicial scrutiny, and courts must conduct a structured enquiry, limited to:

1. whether the prosecution material, if accepted at face value, discloses a prima facie offence;
2. whether the role attributed to the accused has a reasonable nexus with the alleged offence; and
3. whether the statutory threshold for denial of bail is crossed.

Crucially, the Court reiterated that defence arguments and rebuttals cannot be examined at the bail stage, reinforcing the asymmetrical nature of bail adjudication under the UAPA.

2. Article 21, speedy trial and the limits of judicial intervention

The judgment repeatedly returns to Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty.

Justice Kumar noted that:

• pre-trial incarceration cannot be equated with punishment, and
• the right to a speedy trial is an integral facet of Article 21.

At the same time, the Bench held that in UAPA cases, Article 21 must operate within the statutory framework, and that the Court cannot substitute legislative judgment merely because detention is prolonged.

As reported by Bar & Bench, the Court stated that: “The UAPA as a special statute represents a legislative judgment as to the conditions on which bail may be granted at the pre-trial stage.”

This formulation, while doctrinally consistent with prior UAPA rulings, has been read by legal observers as reinforcing the exceptional nature of liberty under anti-terror laws, even where trials remain stalled for years.

3. Broad reading of ‘terrorist act’ under Section 15

The Supreme Court also rejected a narrow interpretation of Section 15 of the UAPA, holding that “terrorist acts” are not confined to physical violence or loss of life.

According to LiveLaw, the Court held that the provision also covers acts that:

• disrupt essential services, or
• threaten economic stability.

The statutory scheme, the Court noted, extends culpability even to preparatory and organisational acts, significantly broadening the scope of UAPA prosecutions.

Directions to expedite trial

Recognising the constitutional implications of prolonged incarceration, the Supreme Court directed the trial court to ensure that the examination of protected witnesses proceeds without delay, and that the trial is not unnecessarily prolonged. However, the Court did not fix any outer time limit for completion of the trial.

Context: Five years of incarceration

The case arises from the February 2020 communal violence in Northeast Delhi, which left 53 people dead, hundreds injured, and large-scale destruction of property.

Over the last five years, the Delhi Police has pursued a “larger conspiracy” theory, focusing largely on student activists and organisers of anti-CAA protests — an approach that has drawn sustained criticism from civil liberties groups.

Notably, as reported in Indian and international media, a group of US lawmakers recently wrote to Indian Ambassador Vinay Mohan Kwatra, expressing concern over Umar Khalid’s prolonged pre-trial detention, highlighting the growing global scrutiny of the case.

Today’s ruling reinforces a consistent judicial position that while individual differentiation among accused is constitutionally necessary, the UAPA’s elevated bail threshold continues to operate as a near-insurmountable barrier for those alleged to occupy “central” roles — even after half a decade of incarceration without trial.

It leaves unresolved the deeper constitutional question that continues to haunt UAPA prosecutions: at what point does prolonged pre-trial detention itself become punishment?

Related:

The Word is the World: How the Delhi riots conspiracy case ritualises silence

How the Delhi riots case remains stagnant with close to a dozen student leaders incarcerated

5 Years of Delhi Riots: Some Punished, Some Rewarded!

Delhi Police on Trial: Three court orders reveal collusion, cover-ups, and custodial torture by police officers during 2020 Delhi riots

Delhi Riots 2020: Umar Khalid withdraws plea from Supreme Court citing “change in circumstances”

Hate speeches amplified by television, incited targeted violence against Muslims: CCR Report, Feb ‘20 Delhi riots

The post After Five Years in Jail, Bail Still Barred for Two: Supreme Court denies bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in Delhi riots case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The judgment did not come out of thin air. It followed months if not years of ‘instant justice’ enabled by bulldozers, in well-publicized incidents as far back as 2021 in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Delhi, and Haryana, almost always following communal incidents or protests. Many, most obviously in the named jurisdictions, were occurring at night, without rehabilitation, and impacted Muslim, Dalit, and migrant communities disproportionately.

A year has passed. The question to ask is whether these guidelines changed state practice, or whether bulldozers continued to operate in ways that undermined the rule of law – often ways that reinforced reports that we, at CJP and Sabrang India have already documented.

The Judgment that Promised a Reversal

When it rendered its decision in November 2024, the Supreme Court intended to firmly ground demolition practices within constitutional limits. The Bench reiterated that demolitions cannot occur without a statutory basis and must abide by the basic tenets of due process: individuals should be given a notice tailored specifically to them, an opportunity to respond promptly to the notice, a hearing at which to be heard in a meaningful way, and a speaking order evidencing the administrative rationale.

It also spoke to the absurdity of dealing with rehabilitation as an afterthought, especially when it involves vulnerable communities. While some of these principles had stalked Indian law before the decision, the judgment unified them all in one framework during a time when bulldozer-led punitive state action was becoming more commonplace. It indicated we would be seeing efforts to recalibrate the conduct of state institutions in the following year, while signalling to us that we should expect greater adherence to procedural safeguards.

A Year on the Ground: Patterns of Demolition Post the Gavai-Viswanathan verdict

Although in November 2024, the Supreme Court reiterated that demolition cannot take place without notice, a hearing, or rehabilitation, the next twelve months were characterised by a number of drives across states which showed a decidedly different reality on the ground: Demolitions were limited by varying degrees in reliance of this judgement and occurred in urban renewal, and post-arson and riot punitive acts, as reflected in CJP’s and Sabrang India’s reporting, the list below illustrates how state practice was inconsistent, replicating the very failure of procedures the Court had attempted to rectify.

• March 2025

Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh

A key legal development in the aftermath of the judgment occurred in Prayagraj when the Supreme Court awarded ₹10 lakh in compensation each to six residents whose homes were demolished without due process. As reported by Sabrang India in “Supreme Court slams Prayagraj demolitions…”, the Supreme Court found that the Prayagraj Development Authority did not adhere to the statutory due process when demolishing the homes, thus confirming the long-held position of the demolished families. While the Supreme Court’s intervention was valuable, it occurred years after the demolitions happened, indicating a trend where judicial relief is only provided after the damage has already been done.

• May 2025

Madrasi Camp, Delhi

In Delhi, the demolition of Madrasi Camp in Jangpura has once again raised questions about whether the municipality is conforming to the Supreme Court’s guidelines. As Sabrang India’s article, “Madrasi Camp demolition: CPIM Delhi demands halt…” states, residents asserted that they did not receive a substantial notice and were neither promised nor consulted about rehabilitation. The demolition was carried out with a significant police force present, raising apprehensions that evictions continued in the capital even after the verdict, without full compliance with procedural requirements.

• April – May 2025 

Chandola Lake, Ahmedabad

Ahmedabad’s anti-encroachment drive around Chandola Lake was one of the biggest demolitions in the post-judgment year. In Sabrang India’s coverage of the same event (“Gujarat HC refuses stay…”), it noted that the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was clearing structures that were predominantly occupied by Muslim residents, under the Gujarat High Court judgment, as it pertained to reclaiming the lake. Though the recourse to the Gujarat High Court challenged the practice, it did not specifically cease the demolition of the houses, nor addressed the rehabilitation of families or just a simple notice.

• March – April 2025 

Nagpur, Maharashtra

The destruction of Fahim Khan’s home in Nagpur highlighted anxieties over punitive administrative action; residents of Nagpur argued that the short notice period of 24 hours did not provide adequate due process. Sabrang India’s report, “Demolition of Fahim Khan’s home…” noted the demolition was significant in the local political climate and raised even more questions over the motive and process in a post-judgement political landscape.

• January 2025 

Dwarka District Islands, Gujarat

In the Dwarka district, clearance operations ordered by the administration after floods impacted fishing communities and places of religious worship. As Sabrang India reported, houses, community shelters, and several mazars and a dargah were demolished. Residents reported that all notices received came too late to counter the action adequately, which instead made it one of the most significant coastal demolitions this year.

• November 2025 

Gurugram, Haryana

In Haryana, the demolition of a longstanding Dalit settlement located on Old Delhi Road exemplified how marginalized communities are still subjected to abrupt unilateral administrative action after the Supreme Court’s ruling. Residents argued that they had not been given the promises regarding rehabilitation, and that they were not given sufficient opportunity to contest the eviction.

• May 2025 

Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh

In Ujjain, the Ujjain Development Authority initiated a demolition campaign along Mahakal Road. Despite official claims that a notice had been issued months ahead of time, residents affected by the demolition vehemently disputed the timing and sufficiency of the notice. Although the High Court had engaged in surveillance of certain aspects of the proceedings, details of the operation also highlighted the disparity of attention to due process in these matters throughout the state.

• Other States Across 2025 

In addition to these key events, there were many additional demolitions, albeit smaller in scale, that further complicated the patterns of uneven compliance with the judgement safeguards. In Delhi, several slum clusters in Mangolpuri, Seemapuri, and near the Yamuna floodplains were partially demolished from June to September 2025. Residents in these areas contended that municipalities referenced notes in affidavits that had never been served individually to residents. Additionally, in UP, families were told that demolitions after flooding in Prayagraj and Varanasi were justified as “emergency measures.” Families maintained that, especially in Prayagraj, there appeared to be selective enforcement and confusion about categorizing the land as within the floodplain or “vacant.” In Kashmir, demolitions after counter-insurgency operations in the Pulwama region. Although families claimed there were no formal charges against them, the demolitions left families without a home, which drew civil liberties objections. Finally, in Punjab, demolitions associated with NDPS-related investigations were conducted, which resulted in a troubling blurring of the lines between crime-control and punitive administrative action. This suggests that bulldozer governance had begun to arrive in new legal categories, disjointed from purely communal-based incidents.

Cumulatively, these expanded incidents along this timeline show that although some agencies claimed procedural compliance, the reality in most cases still demonstrated the same post-incident demolitions, disputed notices, crude procedure, and inadequate rehabilitation, all features that were squarely inconsistent with the principles reaffirmed in the judgment.

Due Process and Rule of Law: What the Year Revealed

The demolitions conducted across states during the year following the judgment demonstrate how the gap between constitutional protections and public administration remains intact. The Supreme Court upheld the paramount importance of notice, hearing, and rehabilitation, yet in most reported drives the involuntary responses relied on notices that were either insufficiently raised, or disputed, sometimes delivered to affected households on the night before demolition or after machinery had arrived.

Hearings were virtually absent, and affected families were united in reporting that they were not afforded any opportunity to present a defence to an allegation of encroachment or illegality. Rehabilitation – outlined specifically by the Court for vulnerable groups – was rarely planned, and never actualized. The judicial responses, when they occurred, were often post-facto rather than pro-facto: the most direct orders, such as the imposition of the Supreme Court’s admonition of the Prayagraj demolitions, and the Orissa High Court ruling on the Cuttack community centre, came months, if not years, after the demolition. The High Court made efforts to call for affidavits or provide interim stays on demolitions, but without a method of enforcement, these steps amounted to little more than symbolic acknowledgment of demolition abuses. The judiciary did not have a mechanism for monitoring the demolitions or following up on the assurances to protect vulnerable families. In the absence of enforcement and in the absence of a court interceding pro-facto, routine use of bulldozing remains an option for administrative attention.

All of the incidents throughout the year show that while the courts have provided clarity of law, process continues to be treated by executive branch actors as a process of ritual and not of constitutional obligation that depends on and can range from excesses of the political or administrative context of where a demolition occurs to focusing on the time and nature of the demolition process, such as while in progress, an act undertaken to restore public order through law enforcement, through ordinary adjustments, including diminished due process for the loved ones of the deceased.

Judicial vs Executive Approaches: A Deepening Divide

In the year following Gavai, we saw an increasingly divergent distance between judicial statements of due-process standards and the executive branches’ practices of adhering to those standards. Courts certainly exhibited, especially in a few notable cases, a willingness to hold state actors accountable: Justice Abhay Oka’s Supreme Court Bench, for example, not only condemned Prayagraj’s unlawful demolitions, but also awarded damages and called for an inquiry to hold the officials accountable. Further still, the Orissa High Court ordered to recovery from the former officer in the Cuttack community-centre case. What emerged among a few courts was the express judicial acknowledgment that demolitions without notice and hearing were not simply “administrative” violations, but constitutional violations. Courts, however, did go so far as to issue contempt notices, such as was seen in the proceedings following the demolitions of the Goalpara community centre, in Maharashtra, and in Delhi, indicating that litigants and judges were considering the guidelines proposed in the judgement, as enforceable obligations. Exceptionally, of course, given how rarely an executive agency is sanctioned for non-adherence to due-process protections.

For most of the demolitions and drives in Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, and parts of Delhi and Uttar Pradesh, no disciplinary investigations, prosecutions, or public censures were found. In a few cases, officers were transferred soon after a disputed demolition, but these were simply transferred and not punitive. Even when courts demanded accounts from officials or demanded affidavits, the lapses began to fade into the mass of administrative inertia without consistency or follow-up. The unpredictable but frequent comparisons between the court’s occasional harsh language and the executive branch’s nearly total impunity show the central tension of the post-Gavai year: the words could be said and stated clearly from the Bench, but they could easily be replaced by immediate political, policing, or developmental goals on the ground without a structural mechanism to enforce them.

Constitutional Lens: Articles 14, 21, and 300A

The demolitions conducted across states in the post-judgement timeframe repeatedly placed strain on the constitutional protections outlined in Articles 14, 21, and 300A. Article 14 had more visible effects, where enforcement patterns appeared uneven with bulldozers appearing fastest in Muslim-majority bastis, Dalit settlements, migrant clusters, and other communities with precarious housing. The patterns of the law, particularly the selective invocation of laws regarding encroachment, often within hours of community violence, politicians, and other events, suggested that the police powers were used in a discriminatory manner, informed less by planning considerations and more by the social makeup of neighbourhoods.

Article 21, which underpins the right to life and dignity, is equally undermined. Eviction of temporary structures without any notice does more than involve the destruction of premises; it obliterates the social architecture of family life—livelihoods, safety, and considerations of community. Reporting in The Indian Express of demolitions in Nagpur, Ujjain, Prayagraj, and Delhi were made in consideration of families rendered homeless overnight, with a complete lack of accommodation, with implications for precarious living conditions and a vulnerability to other harms, and dispossession, especially without provision for hearing or rehabilitation in cases of demolition, implicitly indicates a constitutional injury.

Article 300A of the Gavai judgment was arguably the most consistently breached. While state authorities cited legislative authority for demolition, the lack of a fair process, advance notice, and transparent decision-making weakened the “authority of law” mandated by the Constitution. The year’s data suggest that, notwithstanding a robust judicial restatement, the constitutional principles that seek to constrain state authority remain tenuous in the face of administrative urgency or political pressure.

When Landmark Judgments Remain Symbolic

The post-judgement reality reflects a larger trend in a defraying Indian constitutionalism, where even the most impactful judgments risk being reduced to mere symbols. The doctrine implemented in D.K. Basu did not stop custodial torture; Tehseen Poonawalla did not stop lynching; Shreya Singhal did not stop the ongoing usage of Section 66A years after its invalidation. Likewise, the decision, which celebrated the re-centering of due process in demolition practice, has not transformed the habitual behaviour of entrenched administratively.

One reason for this is structural: Indian courts, as a general rule, only intervene when something is brought before them, typically well after demolitions have occurred. As a number of petitions noted by LiveLaw in 2025 highlight, families only arrive in court because their homes are gone – effectively turning the judiciary into an after-the-fact remedial body instead of a preventative one. High Courts occasionally interject with some stern words, but even orders with some public interest stay orders only deal with the facts and circumstances of the individual case.

The political context is also important. In electoral and police discourse, bulldozers have gained a symbolic meaning, viewed as a form of “decisive/aggressive governance” against a select section, India’s marginalized, especially Dalits, Adivasis and the Muslim minority. This symbolism lessens the normative weight of judicial reasoning, giving officers the belief that constitutions are secondary to political mobility. In this context, even a decisive and pathbreaking judgment is susceptible to becoming a citation rather than a restraint.

What Will It Take to Replace the Rule of Bulldozer with the Rule of Law?

A significant transition from bulldozer-led governance to rule-of-law-based governance necessitates more than occasional judicial reprimands. It requires institutional mechanisms that facilitate the provision of procedural safeguards before building demolitions occurring, not after the fact. Mandatory reporting protocols, both before demolitions and immediately following demolitions, that include documentation of public notices, hearings, and rehabilitation plans would create a minimal record of accountability. The reports could be subject to audits by judicially appointed committees or independent agencies.

Courts may also be able to use some form of structured monitoring (as exists in certain environmental and prison-reform litigation) of the state parties in future cases. The state government could make periodic affidavits of compliance, with the threat of civil contempt for systemic non-compliance, and the high courts do registry tracking of demolition cases and violations of the judgement framework by the agency.

Furthermore, executive accountability should reach beyond symbolic shifts of power to committees that was entirely outside of the executive altogether; the state approximate automatic inquiries into demolitions that lack documented due process, the recorded public findings, along with other penalties, serve as deterrents. States may also want to consider codifying the norms in Statutes or regulations, or using agency policies, making these administrative actions defined offences for non-compliance. It is also necessary that rehabilitation be planned and adequately funded. Due process will only be administratively seen as part of the professional duty when officers are routinely and predictably held accountable for the compliant or non-compliant forms of their practice.

A Strong Judgment met With Structural Impunity

The judgment in November 2024 reiterated the core constitutional guarantees: no demolition without prior notice, an opportunity for a hearing and a fair process. It was a principled and timely expression of limits on the powers of the state, especially in the moment when bulldozers had been commonly adopted as some form of immediate administrative response. Yet the following year will demonstrate how even strong jurisprudence may wither away in a context of systemic impunity.

Policies of demolition continued across the states, with at times uneven practices or minimal respect for due process. In a great number of cases, the courts provided relief only after homes had been demolished or schools were turned into rubble. What usually accompanied these rulings were strong observations from the Supreme Court and some High Courts, and an order of compensation, but those decisions were usually either limited in nature or retrospective. State agencies suffered virtually no immediate consequences for their actions, and without institutions capable of monitoring enforcement, the guidelines remained aspirational.

The judgement also highlights the growing disconnect between constitutional principles and everyday executive decision-making. Without continued monitoring, transparent accountability, and meaningful legislative frameworks, a robust ruling cannot control entrenched bureaucratic practices. The promise we have enshrined in the Constitution is hanging in doubt so long as the bulldozer can demolish traditional patterns of adherence to due process.

The judgment may be read below –

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related: 

Encroachment or erasure? India’s demolition wave and the law

‘An eye for an eye’- new law of the land for the Muslim minorities in India?

Muslims in the new India: How one week showcases their escalating persecution

Bulldozer Justice: How Unlawful Demolitions are Targeting India’s Marginalised Communities

The post When the Rule of the Bulldozer Outpaces the Rule of Law: One year after this landmark judgment appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Supreme Court also directed a special court to conduct trial on a day-to-day basis to record the statements of the nine remaining witnesses. Langa has been ordered to extend full cooperation with the proceedings and seek no adjournment on the ground that his petition seeking the case be quashed is pending. The Enforcement Directorate (ED) has been directed to file a status report on compliance with these directions. The matter has been listed for further consideration on January 6.

Langa had been arrested by the Gujarat Police last year in a case involving allegations of Goods and Services Tax (GST) fraud and was subsequently booked in multiple cases. The ED later registered a case against him under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA). It was senior advocate Kapil Sibal appeared for Langa. Opposing the plea, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta alleged that Langa had extorted money, claiming that threats were made to publish adverse material if payments were not made. “A journalist is found to be extorting money… We want to file an additional counter,” Mehta told the court.

Sibal objected to the move, stating that the ED was seeking to change its stand. He argued that allegations of “Rs 68-crore fraud” were exaggerated, asserting that “it is not even Rs 68 lakh.” Sibal further pointed out that no charge sheet had been filed in the predicate offence forming the basis of the PMLA case. “I have been in custody since October 2024. For what offence? It is not murder,” he submitted, calling allegations of influencing witnesses “shocking”.

Sibal also alleged that crucial documents had not been furnished to the defence, stating that there was no supplementary complaint and that the prosecution could not “have it both ways”. Finally after heated exchanges in court and taking note of the fact that only nine witnesses remain to be examined, the court granted interim bail. During a brief exchange after the order, Mehta reiterated the allegation of extortion, to which Sibal responded by suggesting that industrialists were targeting journalists. Mehta denied any political motive, stating that the prosecution was acting purely in a professional capacity. When the exchange escalated, the CJI intervened, stressing that the trial must not be delayed and cautioning Langa against misusing his position as a journalist. Sibal responded that any such violation would be grounds for cancellation of bail.

The Gujarat high court had denied bail to Langa following which he had approached the Supreme Court.

Related:

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