This came after the Calcutta High Court had quashed the deportation orders against six persons — including eight-month pregnant Sunali (Sonali) Khatun, her husband Danish Sheikh, and their eight-year-old son Sabir — and directed that all six be brought back to India within four weeks. The deadline expired on October 24, 2025, but the Union government moved the Supreme Court on October 22, just two days before the compliance period ended. Reports indicate that the families of the deported persons were preparing to seek contempt proceedings in the High Court to ensure the order’s enforcement.

Detailed report of the Calcutta High Court order may be read here.

In its plea before the apex court, the Union government has reportedly questioned the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court to hear the case, arguing that similar matters were already pending before the Delhi High Court. As per TOI, appearing for the Union, Additional Solicitor General Asok Kumar Chakrabarti contended that the petitioner, Bhodu Sheikh — Sunali’s father and resident of Birbhum — had suppressed this fact when filing the habeas corpus petition.

In brief: Calcultta HC order of repatriation

Earlier, in response to the Calcutta High Court’s direction to disclose the details of the deportation process, the Union had maintained that the six detainees were Bangladeshi nationals. However, the affidavit failed to clarify from which location or under whose authority the pushback occurred.

The High Court had taken a stern view of this omission. In its September 26 judgment in Bhodu Sheikh v. Union of India & Ors., a Division Bench comprising Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty and Justice Reetobroto Kumar Mitra observed that the deportation had been carried out in “hot haste,” in complete disregard of the Ministry of Home Affairs memo dated May 2, 2025, which mandates that no deportation can occur without a 30-day verification process through the home State.

Rejecting the Union’s claim that the deportees had “confessed” to being Bangladeshi nationals, the Court held that such statements made before police officers “without any procedural safeguards” violated Articles 14, 20(3), and 21 of the Constitution. The Bench noted that Sunali’s Aadhaar and PAN cards proved she was born in 2000 — making it factually impossible for her to have “entered India illegally in 1998,” as claimed by authorities.

Emphasising that “suspicion, however grave, cannot replace proof,” the judges declared the deportation and detention orders of June 24 and 26, 2025, unconstitutional. They ruled that the executive’s conduct had “crippled the constitutional grant of fairness and reasonableness” and ordered the Union government, FRRO Delhi, and Delhi Police to repatriate the six persons within four weeks via the Indian High Commission in Dhaka. A plea by the Union government to stay the order was rejected outright, with the Bench observing that “liberty once lost must be swiftly restored.”

Bangladesh Court recognition of the six victims as Indian Citizens

In a parallel and extraordinary development, a Bangladeshi court also ruled in favour of the deported families. On September 30, 2025, the Senior Judicial Magistrate of the Sadar Court in Chapainawabganj declared that all six persons — Sunali Khatun, Danish Sheikh, their minor son Sabir, Sweety Bibi (32), and her two sons aged six and sixteen — were Indian citizens, not Bangladeshis.

Citing their Aadhaar numbers and residential proof from Birbhum, the Magistrate concluded that they were “wrongfully pushed across the border” by Indian authorities. The court directed that the order be transmitted to the Indian High Commission in Dhaka for “appropriate diplomatic action,” effectively placing the onus on New Delhi to initiate their repatriation.

Detailed report may be read here.

Political Reactions: Trinamool Congress accuses Union of defiance

As the Union’s deadline to comply with the High Court’s order expired on October 24, the Trinamool Congress (TMC) accused the Union government of “brazenly defying” a judicial directive and “abandoning” its own citizens.

On October 24, according to the report of The Hindu, TMC alleged that the BJP-led Union government had “flouted the Calcutta High Court’s order with arrogance and indifference.” The party questioned: “Does being in power give BJP the licence to flout a High Court order? To ignore the suffering of women and children? To turn ordinary citizens into bargaining chips in a vindictive, performative game of power?”

According to The Hindu, the statement further said: “First these hapless people were branded Bangladeshis and dumped across the border. Then, after a long legal battle, the court found otherwise and ordered their repatriation. But the Centre has shown no urgency, no humanity, and no basic decency to bring them home.”

TMC leaders Sashi Panja (Minister for Women and Child Development) and Samirul Islam (Rajya Sabha MP and Chairman, Migrant Workers Welfare Board) condemned the Union’s inaction. As per The Hindu, Ms. Panja said that “The deportation was wrong. The Trinamool fought this battle. The central government did not take a single step to bring them back. They continued to label them as Bangladeshis so that they remain in Bangladesh.”

Mr. Islam told The Hindu that the government’s failure to act was “unconstitutional and inhuman,” noting that the Bangladesh court had already recognised the deportees as Indian citizens. He added that the West Bengal government was struggling to establish any communication with the six persons stranded across the border and that Sunali Bibi had not yet delivered her child.

Broader Context: Crackdown on Bengali-Speaking Workers

This controversy unfolds amid reports that thousands of Bengali-speaking migrant workers have been detained, interrogated, or expelled from BJP-ruled states since May 2025, under suspicion of being undocumented immigrants. As Citizens for Justice and Peace has noted, several workers were declared “foreigners” within days of their detention and pushed across the Bangladesh border, often without inquiry or notice to their home States. Human rights groups and lawyers have described these deportations as “undocumented, unconstitutional, and xenophobic.”

The Sunali Khatun deportation case — now at the centre of legal and diplomatic tensions between India and Bangladesh — has come to symbolise the dangers of executive overreach and ethnic profiling, raising critical questions about citizenship, due process, and accountability under India’s constitutional framework.

Detailed reports on such illegal deportations may be read here, here and here.

Related:

Calcutta High Court strikes down arbitrary deportations of West Bengal residents, orders return from Bangladesh

Gauhati High Court seeks Centre’s May 2025 deportation notification as legality of re-detention of Abdul Shiekh and Majibur Rehman is scrutinised

Another Pushback Halted: SC stays deportation of woman declared foreigner, issues notice on challenge to Gauhati HC order

CJP Win! Gauhati HC stays deportation of Ajabha Khatun, will address bail demand on April 4

Assam’s New SOP Hands Citizenship Decisions to Bureaucrats: Executive overreach or legal necessity?

The post Union government challenges Calcutta High Court repatriation order, moves Supreme Court instead even as Bangladesh declares six deported Bengalis Indian citizens appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Forest Rights Act was passed in 2006 following decades of struggle by forest-working peoples to redress the exclusionary legacy of colonial and post-colonial forest laws. The FRA acknowledges the rights of individual and community access to land, housing, and to minor forest produce, and grants the Gram Sabhas authority to manage and protect forests. The intent of the FRA was to transfer authority from the centralised forest-administrative bodies (like the Forest Department) to local communities and to make the Gram Sabha’s consent a precondition for the approval of any forest diversion. And de-centralisation was recognised as key to protection of both land rights and forest protection.

The Forest (Conservation) Act, enacted in 1980 –and hurriedly amended in 2023 without debate– has a centralised approach to conservation and, following amendments in 2023, has gone further still to consolidate centralized control over forest land. The amendments narrowed the definition of the term “forest” and included broad exemptions for strategic and commercial projects, and also authorised the regularization of diversions under the law. The amendments to the FCA have dismantled community consultation, removed environmental protection, and ultimately weakened the requirements to divert land from indigenous peoples in favour of land acquisition for development. The FCA now enables diversion of forest land for national security and infrastructure development, particularly in border areas, and weakened the requirement for Gram Sabha consent, designed to make community consultation a formality after the diversion has occurred.

It is crucial at this junction to recall the eviction order, passed by the Supreme Court in February 2019 that became the ground for nationwide and lasting protests by forest dwellers and Adivasis. The intent and impact of the order would have been to displace as many as one crore forest community members. Hence, its passage became yet another pivotal moment in the struggle for land and forest rights in India. The order triggered mobilisation among Adivasi and forest community members and immediate civil society response at the nation level, notably the All India Union of Forest Working Peoples (AIUFWP) and Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP). Within two weeks, national civil society intervention (close to a dozen and a half interim applications were finally filed) led to the Court staying its eviction order. This move was also necessitated after an affidavit, filed by the Ministry of Tribal Affairs that requested a full reconsideration of the case. The matter still awaits hearing before the Supreme Court, and demonstrates the ongoing struggle over the rights of statutory recognition against conservation. On October 24, 2025, again, the Ministry of Tribal Affairs (MOTA) has –once more–sharply rebutted a plea which has challenged before the Supreme Court (SC) the legal validity of the 2012 Rules, made under the law, The Indian Express has learnt. In a counter affidavit filed before the SC in the same matter, the Centre has not only defended the legal validity of the Act but also stressed that the law goes beyond mere land ownership regularisation and aims to restore dignity, livelihoods, and cultural identity of forest-dependent communities.

AIUFWP is a national, women-led membership union representing forest-dwelling communities, agricultural workers, and Adivasis. It creates leadership for grassroots communities, especially among Adivasi women, advocates for distributive justice, and works with stakeholders across India to secure legalisation and recognition of community based customary forest rights. CJP operates as a legal rights and advocacy organisation, in close alliance with the AIUWFP by supporting ground-level training and legal interventions. CJP is both drafter and co-petitioner in the detailed interlocutory application (IA) filed before the Supreme Court in 2019. This IA detailed the historic disenfranchisement of India’s indigenous peoples that led to the enactment of the 2006 law, the systemic grievances with claims being denied, due process failings and the deliberate bypassing of Gram Sabhas, and violations of the statute scheme for the Forest Rights Act, 2006 by the forest administration. It also emphasised that mass evictions (not mandated in the law itself) were without constitutional justification and violated natural justice and legal protections.

In the follow-up hearings, the Supreme Court, going well beyond its original order, required states to file affidavits investigating state processes concerning the assessment of forest rights claims and about claims that were denied altogether. Determining whether community land rights are properly granted is now a question of what the Court would deem sufficient transparency in state action.

Apart from this crucial matter (Wildlife First, in which Adivasi unions and others have intervened), at the same time, the apex court of India –another bench–is considering challenges to amendments made to the Forest (Conservation) Act enacted hurriedly in 2023, which would broaden the chasm between statutory protection (under the FRA 2006) and state sovereignty (under the FCA). As publicly noted in one of the recent bench observations, the principle basis for halting mass evictions focused on the unresolved policy and law contradiction between the tenurial and welfare entitlements granted by the Forest Rights Act and the hard restrictions allegedly imposed for sake of conservation by the Forest (Conservation) Act. Thus, this continuing litigation is sitting at the crossroads of India’s obligations—to forest-dwelling peoples and conservation—creating a tension and dispute between rights-based justice and regulatory control the recurrent subject for adjudication in the future.

Criticism of the FCA amendments is directed specifically to their consequences in the North-East, where a multitude of forests are not recognised officially by the state yet serve as crucial in-state clearings for indigenous communities or communities in general. The amendments have bypassed (pushed aside) Gram Sabhas, authorised less participatory governance, and fostered concerns regarding green credits and monoculture afforestation. The Godavarman judgment (1996) expanded the definition of “forest” to include unclassified and community forests; however, the newly repealed law does not recognise large areas subject to exploitation.

The approach of the Supreme Court has fluctuated over the years: see for example the direction of the Wildlife First case, and then the Niyamgiri judgment acknowledged consent from Gram Sabhas prior to forest diversion. Nevertheless, the legal condition for indigenous rights is presently ambiguous and somewhat unpredictable on fore use, where the discretion of execution has taken priority over community rights and constitutional guarantees.

The exclusion of indigenous communities from forest governance has a historical precedent, as far back as colonial rule where laws regarded them as encroachers instead of custodians of land and resources. The FRA can be understood as an acknowledgement and a corrective action towards this injustice, recognising the rights of Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers to land, resources, and self-governance. The FRA was a multifaceted, energising outcome for these communities after decades of mobilising their rights and advocating for their access to and enjoyment of forests as an acknowledgment of their livelihoods and to democratise forest governance and restore dignity to marginalised communities.

In many ways, the expansion of centralised governance through The Forest (Conservation) Act has been legitimized via the Supreme Court’s Godavarman judgement of 1996, an important case that greatly expanded the administrative definition – and control over the meaning of “forest.” Centralization directly contradicts the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (FRA), which creates firm ground for a decentralised, community-based rights agenda of forest management. The tension is not simply administrative or logistical but is an observed and constitutionally established tension in the power relationship between the executive and authoritative and empowered Gram Sabhas, flooring the foundational conflict of purpose between development, conservation, and indigenous rights.

The Godavarman judgment explicitly stated, “…the word ‘forest’ must be understood according to its dictionary meaning. This description covers all statutorily recognized forests, whether designated as reserved, protected or otherwise for the purpose of Section 2(i) of the Forest (Conservation) Act. The term ‘forest land’, occurring in Section 2, will not only include ‘forest’ as understood in the dictionary sense, but also any area recorded as forest in the government record irrespective of the ownership.” (Godavarman v UOI, 1996). By contrast, the FRA 2006 frames the legal mandate as, “…to recognize and vest the forest rights and occupation in forest land in forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers who have been residing in such forests for generations but whose rights could not be recorded; in order to correct the historical injustice done to the forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers who are integral to the very survival and sustainability of the forest ecosystem.”

The 2023 FCA amendments, with a narrower definition of what qualifies as “forest,” and less opportunity for Gram Sabha participation, are yet another movement towards executive power, effectively disenfranchising the FRA’s commitment to decentralisation and democracy. This constitutional tension is yet to be resolved and is at the forefront of ongoing litigation and policy discussions concerning forest governance, development priorities, and the protection of indigenous and community rights.

Conclusion

There is an urgent need for a renewed and comprehensive framework that reconciles the inherent community and historic rights of communities over land/the commons and those of “the state” that seeks to unilaterally claim land for corporate development. Such a people’s right driven scheme would be one that upholds constitutional protections, revives community governance, and ensures community participation in environmental assessments. It will take the reversal of community jurisdiction and accountability of the state to limit logging in India’s forests, and the Supreme Court’s intervention could be a new beginning. India will only be able to protect its forests when it also protects the rights of those who have historically cared for them; by reaffirming the primacy of Gram Sabhas, transparency in impact assessments, and a stronger legal basis for rights recognition.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Urvi Kehri)

Image Courtesy: business-standard.com

References:

• India: Legacies and Challenges of the Land & Forest Rights Movement Booklet
• https://cjp.org.in/forest-conservation-amendment-act-2023-a-challenge-to-adivasi-land-rights-and-environmental-protections/
• https://cjp.org.in/what-is-the-forest-rights-act-2006-and-how-are-we-defending-it/
• https://cjp.org.in/sokalo-gond-and-nivada-rana-lead-the-campaign-for-forest-rights-in-sc/
• https://cjp.org.in/forest-rights-case-sc-directs-states-to-file-compliance-affidavits/
• https://cjp.org.in/forest-conservation-amendment-bill-north-east-to-bear-the-brunt/
• https://thewire.in/environment/the-forest-rights-act-and-the-battle-for-indias-forests
• https://www.scobserver.in/cases/constitutionality-of-the-frawildlife-first-v-ministry-of-forest-and-environment-eviction-of-forest-dwellers-background/
• https://www.sanctuarynaturefoundation.org/article/the-forest-%28conservation%29-amendment-act%2C-2023
• https://www.scobserver.in/journal/the-amended-green-law-is-full-of-red-flags-forests-amendment-act-2023/
• https://www.scobserver.in/reports/arguments-on-february-28th-2019/
• https://www.scobserver.in/reports/wildlife-first-v-ministry-of-forest-and-environment-eviction-of-forest0dwellers-arguments-on-september-12th-2019/
• Godavarman v UOI, 1996, Supreme Court of India

The post Supreme Court examines Forest Rights Act 2006 versus Conservation Law, makes national headlines appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This article discusses the recent Supreme Court’s interim order in the petitions challenging the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 and examines the quantum of interim relief granted against relief prayed for and comments on whether such interim relief was indeed adequate to protect the petitioners or not.

I. The Waqf Amendment Act, 2025 in brief

Before further discussion over the interim order passed by the Supreme Court in the petitions challenging the validity of the Waqf Amendment Act, 2025, it is important to understand what the amendment did. An in depth analysis of the provisions and the consequent impact of such provisions can be read here.

First, it attempted to redefine who could create a Waqf by requiring the dedicator (donor of the property) to demonstrate they had been practicing Islam for at least five years, while asserting lawful ownership over the property. Second, the Act prospectively abolished “Waqf by User” (property becoming Waqf merely through consistent religious use as it was the case of many Islamic religious institutions that have been existing since the 1800s or even before). Third, the post-amendment Section 3C introduced a mechanism allowing a designated government officer to unilaterally declare properties identified as Waqf to be “Government property,” thereby removing them from Waqf oversight. Crucially, the law also mandated compulsory registration and applied the Limitation Act, 1963, curtailing traditional protections against adverse possession claims over Waqf land.

The Disquieting Juxtaposition: Waqf vs. Others

The critical issue of discriminatory application looms large, implicating Articles 14 (Equality) and 15 (Non-Discrimination). Petitioners argued that the rigorous state control proposed by the amendments—particularly concerning land management and the mandatory inclusion of non-Muslims in governance—was unfairly imposed upon the Muslim community compared to other religious institutions.

In the landmark Shirur Mutt case (1954), which defined much of the state’s power over religious endowments, the Supreme Court indeed recognized that the right of a religious denomination to administer its property, while regulated by law (Article 26(d)), must fundamentally leave the right of administration to the denomination itself.[1] A law that entirely removes this right and vests it in an outside authority is deemed a violation. Furthermore, the imposition of a compulsory annual contribution under the Madras Act was struck down, not as a fee for services rendered, but as a “tax,” placing it beyond the legislative competence of the state. The rationale was clear: while the state could regulate the secular administration of religious trusts to ensure they are properly managed, it could not levy a tax for the promotion or maintenance of a particular religion.

There exists a stark disparity in the manner charitable institutions of different religions are treated under law, particularly when one examines the proposed Waqf Amendment provisions that impose disproportionately stringent control over the Islamic institution of Waqf. The issue is straightforward. For decades, major Hindu temples have been administered by boards composed entirely of Hindus, and at no point has the government proposed that, since temple administration is a secular activity, persons of other faiths may be appointed to those boards. Consider the endowment legislations in Karnataka[2], Andhra Pradesh[3], and Tamil Nadu[4] — each expressly requires that the commissioners and officers appointed under their respective Acts must profess the Hindu religion. This differential treatment in which Non-Muslim participation is being proposed stands in clear violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law.

II. Erosion of Legal Safeguards: Property, Custom, and the Collector’s Writ

The most urgent grievances raised before the Supreme Court related to the potential for bureaucratic expropriation of historic Waqf properties, facilitated by three key amendments: the demise of ‘Waqf by User’, the mandatory registration mandate, and the introduction of a new mechanism for determining ‘Government property’.

A. The Sudden Takedown of ‘Waqf by User’ and the Time Bar

For centuries, the concept of Waqf by User acknowledged that consistent religious use of a property could establish it as a Waqf, even without a formal written deed or dedication. The petitioners stressed that many old Waqfs, lacking formalized documents, rely solely on this doctrine for their title and survival. The 2025 Amendment, however, abolished the doctrine prospectively.

The court dealt with the state’s concern saying that this doctrine had been systemically misused to encroach upon vast tracts of government land, citing instances where thousands of acres were claimed as Waqf property merely through user.

However, the sting lay in Section 36 (10) of the Amended Act, which imposed a mandatory registration requirement for all Waqfs within six months of the Act’s commencement. Failure to register within this period effectively barred the Waqf from instituting or commencing any suit or legal proceeding for the enforcement of its rights. While a proviso allows the court to entertain an application if sufficient cause for delay is shown, forcing centuries-old institutions, often poor and disorganized, to scramble for registration within a tight six-month window—after decades of varying legislative requirements and historical neglect by official bodies—constitutes a threat to rights enshrined in Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution

This provision creates precarious conditions for community rights, essentially rendering unregistered Waqfs remediless. The court’s justification was rather technical: that Mutawallis had decades to register since the 1923 Act. Yet, to adopt this technical justification would be to ignore the ground realities—the lack of formal deeds, illiteracy, and systemic administrative failures by Waqf Boards themselves—and imposing an iron-clad registration bar seems an exercise of power ill-suited to securing justice for historical endowments. The resultant inadequacy is that while the title by use remains theoretically protected for existing properties, the inability to legally defend or enforce rights over that property due to an administrative lapse effectively neuters the title. By now, the six months have passed.

B. The Usurpation of Judicial Authority by the Executive (Sec 3C)

Perhaps the most alarming feature of the amendment was the introduction of Section 3C, establishing a mechanism for determining whether property claimed as Waqf was, in fact, “Government property”. This power was granted to a “designated officer” above the rank of Collector, who, after an inquiry “as per law,” would submit a report to the State Government. If the officer determined the property was government property, they were empowered to order corrections in revenue records and direct the Waqf Board to update its records.

The petitioners vehemently challenged the provisos to Section 3C(2) and the entire mechanism of Sections 3C(3) and 3C(4). The core objection was that entrusting a revenue officer—a functionary of the executive—with the power to determine the title of property, and subsequently mandating changes in revenue records, flagrantly violates the separation of powers, an essential principle enshrined in the Constitution. The determination of property title is a function reserved for judicial or quasi-judicial bodies.

The Supreme Court, while prima facie upholding the initial clauses of Section 3C, intervened by staying the critical executive actions: the provision that the property would cease to be Waqf until the officer’s report (Proviso to Section 3C(2)), and the powers given to the designated officer to order corrections in revenue records (Sections 3C(3) and 3C(4)).[5]

The court correctly asserted that the final determination of title must rest with the specialised Waqf Tribunal, established under Section 83, which is a judicial or quasi-judicial body with appeal rights to the High Court. Furthermore, the court directed that until the Tribunal makes a final adjudication, neither the Waqfs can be dispossessed, nor can the revenue records be altered.[6]

While this stay is crucial—it halts the immediate damage of executive unilateralism—the court’s action necessarily remains an interim restraint on procedure. It does not yet nullify the underlying legislative intent, which remains an aggressive mechanism to “de-recognize” property. The final battle over whether the state can legally employ such an executive process for title investigation, even if followed by judicial remedy, awaits the final hearing.

C. The Re-imposition of Limitation

A historical protection for Waqf property, long deemed dedicated perpetually to God, was enshrined in the un-amended Waqf Act, 1995: Section 107 provided that the Limitation Act, 1963, would not apply to suits for recovery of immovable Waqf property. This immunity protected endowments from being lost through adverse possession, recognizing their unique religious and charitable status, where the owner (Allah) cannot lose title.

The 2025 Amendment, via Section 44, abolished this immunity, mandating that the Limitation Act shall apply to all proceedings related to claims or interests in Waqf property from the date of the Act’s commencement. This change was argued to be a necessary reform to align Waqf law with general property law.

For the rights under Article 25 and 26, this provision is deeply injurious, instantly exposing centuries of undocumented or poorly managed property to adverse possession claims and creating an immense burden on Waqf Boards to initiate lawsuits, many of which may now be time-barred. The petitioners did submit that the combined effect of this amendment and the deletion of the special provision for evacuee property (Section 108) means that potential recovery suits concerning historical properties, including those tied to post-Partition dislocation, could be barred by limitation.

The Supreme Court, in its interim analysis, found no prima facie case for staying this provision, arguing that applying the Limitation Act removes discrimination that existed in the un-amended Act, thereby treating Waqf property equally to other property claims.[7] This judicial stance, however, overlooks the foundational religious and jurisprudential difference: Waqf property is distinct from ordinary private property; it is permanently dedicated to a charitable or pious purpose, and management (by the Mutawalli) is merely custodial, not proprietary. To strip this perpetual immunity without offering a robust, workable transitional mechanism is an existential blow to the community’s ability to defend its patrimony.

III. The State as Arbiter

The amendments also sought to heavily influence the composition and criteria for Waqf creation, bringing the state’s regulatory gaze directly upon matters of religious identity and leadership.

A. Non-Muslim Inclusion and Secular Administration

The amendments to the composition of the Central Waqf Council (Section 9) and State Waqf Boards (Section 14) allowed for the inclusion of non-Muslim members, which petitioners argued was a direct interference in the management of religious affairs (Article 26(b)). The religious character of the Board, they argued, is inseparable from its administrative duties. Conversely, the state maintained that the functions of the Board and Council—dealing with finance, property, encroachment, and audit—are predominantly “secular activities,” which the state is empowered to regulate. The Mutawalli deals with administrative matters, while the Sajjadanashin handles the religious activities.

The court adopted a middle path, reflecting a structural compromise often seen in Indian jurisprudence. It placed limits on the executive’s expansive power, directing that the Central Waqf Council (out of 22 members) shall not consist of more than 4 non-Muslim members, and State Boards (out of 11 members) shall not exceed 3 non-Muslim members. Furthermore, though it declined to stay the provision regarding the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), it directed that an effort should be made, “as far as possible,” to appoint a CEO from the Muslim community.[8]

This, while acknowledging the need to preserve majority Muslim representation, essentially validates the state’s claim that Waqf governance is a secular activity amenable to external, cross-community administrative supervision. This position maintains that the “scale of expenses” and “administration of property” are secular affairs that can be regulated by authorities. However, this judicial accommodation reinforces the state’s role as the final arbiter of what constitutes ‘religious’ versus ‘secular’ functions—a role that academics and petitioners alike have long found problematic, not only generally but also from the case perspective.

B. The Five-Year Practice of Islam Requirement

Section 3(r) of the Amended Act stipulated that a Waqf could only be created by a person “showing or demonstrating that he is practising Islam for at least five years” and who is the lawful owner of the property. This provision was challenged as arbitrary and violating Articles 14, 15, and 25.

The state defended the rule, recalling historical legislative concerns dating back to 1923, that Waqf endowments were often used as a “clever device” to defraud creditors or evade law. The new requirement, the state argued, aimed to ensure that only genuine practitioners, and not fraudulent converts seeking a legal shield for property, could dedicate a Waqf.

The Supreme Court recognised the legislative intent but stayed the operation of this condition, not on the grounds of constitutional invalidity, but due to procedural vagueness. The court noted that in the absence of a clearly defined statutory mechanism for determining whether a person has “practised Islam for at least five years,” the provision would necessarily lead to an arbitrary exercise of power. Thus, the condition remains stayed until Government frame rules to create a viable mechanism.[9] This offers temporary procedural relief but fails to address the more substantive critique: why the state feels compelled to legislate criteria for demonstrating genuine religious practice, a function traditionally far outside the boundaries of a secular state.

Moreover, the Supreme Court in its order, while dealing with the critique that defaulters are dedicating their property to the Almighty to defraud creditors, stated that a possibility of people changing their religion to Islam to defraud the creditors cannot be ruled out. This written observation is rather peculiar since it is used to close the doors on what could have been an analysis on whether an exceptional case of a provision allowing some misuse mandates that such provision be void or not. However, the Supreme Court neither goes into that direction nor does it leave a chance open for it to be discussed at a later stage. It simply puts the reason of absence of rules over how to show if someone has been practicing Islam or not as a justification for the stay over this provision.

IV. The Shadow of Exclusion: Tribal Lands

In two areas—properties dedicated by non-Muslims and properties in tribal areas—the Court refused to grant any interim stay, upholding the state’s legislative decisions that carved out exclusions, even though these raised questions of religious liberty and non-discrimination.

Prohibition on Land in Scheduled or Tribal Areas (Section 3E)

Section 3E explicitly states that no land belonging to Scheduled Tribes under the Fifth or Sixth Schedules shall be declared or deemed to be Waqf property, regardless of any other law. This restricts the religious freedom (Articles 25 and 26) of Scheduled Tribe members who practice Islam and wish to dedicate property.

The state and the court’s prima facie view supported the amendment, rationalizing it as a measure to protect the existence of “cultural minorities” whose religious practices are distinct from Islamic religion. The legislative intent was to avoid conflicting provisions and protect the constitutional autonomy granted to tribal lands.

The inadequacy of the interim order here stems from the blanket nature of the prohibition. While protecting tribal culture is a constitutional priority, preventing an individual Muslim member of a Scheduled Tribe from exercising their right to dedicate their own property as Waqf appears to be an overly broad measure. By failing to stay this provision, the court permits a form of religious restriction justified by cultural protection, without fully weighing the individual rights of practicing Muslims within those tribal groups.

V. The Opportunity Cost: Alternatives to Sweeping Invalidation

The state’s underlying intentions, prima facie, for the 2025 amendments was the misuse, waste, and systematic misappropriation of Waqf properties by some incompetent or unscrupulous mutawallis, sometimes even in collusion with government agencies.

However, the question remains whether the state, faced with misuse, chose the most appropriate and constitutionally sensitive remedy.

As early as 1923, the legislature acknowledged the “menace of mismanagement” and responded by proposing compulsory registration, penalties, audits, and official superintendence.

The pre-amendment Waqf Act specifies duties and disqualifications of mutawallis (such as failure to maintain accounts, misuse of funds, or being convicted of encroachment). Removal provisions were extensive. Furthermore, penalizing unauthorized alienation of property was addressed by Section 52A, which prescribed imprisonment and recovery of the property.

The argument that a more appropriate, less constitutionally aggressive path existed rings true: instead of fundamentally challenging the integrity of historical titles through the abolition of Waqf by User and the imposition of executive title determination (Section 3C), the state could have rigorously enforced the existing accountability, anti-encroachment, and penalty provisions against corrupt mutawallis.

By enacting sweeping structural amendments—like applying the Limitation Act to title disputes and delegating title scrutiny to the Executive—the state opted for a sledgehammer approach to solve a problem of governance and corruption, thereby endangering the legitimate, centuries-old endowments that sustain the community. The Supreme Court’s interim relief, while protecting the procedural sanctity of title adjudication (by striking down the executionary steps of Sec 3C), ultimately permits these structural, title-threatening changes (like the prospective abolition of Waqf by User and the application of the Limitation Act) to stand pending final adjudication. This approach risks resulting in a protective regime whose effect is inadequate when weighed against the magnitude of the rights, religious history, and communal identity hanging in the balance.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

[1] The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Shri Lakshmindar Tirtha Swamiyar of Shri Shirur Mutt 1954 SCR 1005

[2] Section 7, The Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act, 1997

[3] Section 3, Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions And Endowments Act, 1987

[4] Section 10, The Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959

[5] Para 209, IN RE: The Waqf Amendment Act, 2025 (1) 2025 INSC 1116 (Waqf Interim Order)

[6] Para 209, Waqf Interim Order.

[7] Para 201, Waqf Interim Order

[8] Para 189, Waqf Interim Order.

[9] Para 140, Waqf Interim Order

Related:

Waqf Act Amendments Partly Stayed: SC blocks government control, backs registration and reforms

Amid Waqf Debate, Should Hindu Endowment Boards be Held Responsible for the Sorry Plight of Dalits?

Waqf Amendment Act 2025: SC grants some time to Centre on condition no non-Muslims appointed to Board, Council & no change in any Waqf status

SC to UoI on Waqf Amendment: ‘Are you willing to allow Muslims on Hindu endowment boards?’

The post Understanding the Supreme Court’s Interim Intervention in the Waqf Amendments, 2025 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

ADR has issued a clarification in response, presenting its version of events and reiterating its stated commitment to accuracy, transparency, and non-partisan public interest work

Background

During the hearing on October 9, 2025, senior advocate Rakesh Dwivedi, representing the Election Commission, alleged that ADR submitted incorrect and unverified information in its plea. Specifically, he pointed out a case where the person cited by ADR as having been excluded from the final voter list was not even included in the draft electoral roll. Further complicating matters, the details provided appeared to correspond to a different individual—a woman—raising questions about the accuracy of the information presented.

The Supreme Court Bench, led by Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi, expressed significant concern over ADR’s conduct, remarking, “We wonder if such a person even exists.”

Defending the submissions, ADR’s counsel Prashant Bhushan stated that the information had been provided by a “very responsible person” and suggested that the District Legal Service Authority could assist in verifying the claims. Despite this, the court remained unconvinced and declined to issue any blanket relief based on the affidavits, given their questionable nature.

Not filed, but shared on request, nature of the document clarified

On October 11, ADR clarified that the affidavit in question was not formally filed as part of court proceedings. Rather, it was tendered across the bar—a standard legal practice—only in response to a specific question from the Court.

The organisation emphasised that this distinction is important to prevent the mischaracterisation of its actions and intent during the hearing.

Verifiable details: voter information was accurate and public

The voter whose details were shared in the affidavit is a resident of 115, Shaheed Sthal Road, Gulzarbagh, Patna – 800007, with EPIC No. YHX3046307. His details appear at Serial No. 653 in Part No. 52 of the 184 Patna Sahib constituency, as recorded in the publicly available electoral roll on the ECI’s official website.

ADR asserts that every single detail furnished in the affidavit was accurate and verifiable through official ECI records—contradicting the claim that the elector was “fake” or improperly identified.

Draft roll confusion: same link, multiple versions

ADR further explained the likely source of the confusion. The elector or someone assisting him had probably checked his name in the “Draft Roll – 2025”, published by the ECI in January 2025, where his name was clearly listed.

The issue arose, ADR says, because the “Draft Roll – 2025” and the “SIR Draft 2025” are both hosted on the same webpage and dropdown menu on the ECI’s website. This technical overlap may have led to misunderstanding or misinterpretation in the courtroom.

“That with regard to the elector’s statement that his name appeared in the draft roll, it is clarified that the elector/someone on his behalf had possibly checked his name on the “Draft Roll – 2025” of January 2025 on which his name was duly mentioned.  It is to be noted that both the “Draft Roll- 2025” and “SIR Draft 2025” have been published by the ECI on the same web link and same drop-down menu (as shown in the image below) available at https://voters.eci.gov.in/download-eroll?stateCode=S04. His details are available on the Draft Roll – 2025 for AC 184 Part No. 52 at Serial No. 653, and every detail furnished in the affidavit matches that record” ADR stated

Screenshots of the elector’s name on Draft Roll – 2025, Final Roll – 2025, SIR Deleted List, and his current status

The records clearly show that the voter was listed in the Draft Roll and subsequently excluded—pointing to a possible procedural lapse, not misrepresentation.

Shahid Voter Status

Misleading allegations: ADR refutes claim of falsification

ADR called the ECI counsel’s claim—that the EPIC number belonged to another person or that the voter was non-existent—misleading and avoidable. The organisation pointed out that a simple EPIC number lookup on the ECI portal would have verified the details without ambiguity.

Instead, ADR says, an inaccurate assertion was made in court, which risked damaging its credibility and caused undue distress to the elector involved.

Voter under duress

ADR expressed serious concern over the treatment of the elector, who has allegedly been summoned, hounded, and threatened by officials following the court hearing.

Such action, the organisation warns, could discourage voters from speaking up about their deletion from rolls or from seeking redress when proper procedures—like speaking orders—are not followed by the authorities.

⁠”It is highly unfortunate that the said elector is being hounded, summoned, and threatened by the officials since the Supreme Court’s hearing dated 07.10.2025. This will further create more distrust, fear, and reluctance on the part of electors to come forward in case of their deletion from the electoral rolls or in case speaking orders have not been given to them” ADR said

We continue to stand by fact-based, non-partisan work: ADR

ADR concluded its statement by reaffirming its commitment to fact-based, non-partisan work. For over 25 years, the organisation has built trust among voters, civil society, and institutions by providing accurate, data-driven insights into electoral and governance issues.

ADR in its statement assured the Courts, lawyers, and voters that we continue to stand by fact-based, non-partisan work.

Related

The Erased Record: A constitutional challenge to the election commission’s 45-day data destruction mandate

India’s election system is being weaponised, will the Opposition act?

Bihar SIR: 65 Lakh electors flagged for deletion, SC said “if there is mass exclusion, we will immediately step in”

The post ADR refutes allegation of giving false voter affidavit in SC hearing appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Court ruled that a person can only be convicted under Section 149 if the prosecution establishes—either directly or through credible circumstances—that the accused shared the “common object” of the assembly that committed the offence.

The bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan delivered the verdict allowing two criminal appeals filed by ten individuals who had been convicted under Sections 302 (murder) and 149 (unlawful assembly) for a violent 1988 clash in Katihar district, Bihar, arising from a dispute over government-allotted agricultural land.

The appellants had been sentenced to life imprisonment by the Katihar Sessions Court, and the Patna High Court had upheld the conviction in 2013. The Supreme Court, however, found that the evidence against the accused was “vague, omnibus, and insufficient to establish a shared common object.”

Background: The 1988 Katihar clash

The case originated from a violent altercation on November 20, 1988, in Katihar district, when two groups clashed over the harvesting of paddy on land distributed by the Bihar government. The prosecution alleged that a mob of 400–500 people armed with guns, spears, and sticks attacked the complainant Jagdish Mahato (PW-20) and his brother Meghu Mahato, killing Meghu and another villager, Sarjug Mahato.

Seventy-two individuals were named in the FIR, of whom twenty-four were charge-sheeted. The Katihar Sessions Court convicted twenty-one under Sections 302 and 149 IPC, while the Patna High Court in 2013 upheld the conviction of eleven. The remaining accused approached the Supreme Court, arguing that they were innocent villagers wrongly implicated merely for being present.

Supreme Court’s analysis

The limits of constructive liability: Justice Pardiwala, writing for the bench, clarified that Section 149 IPC cannot be invoked mechanically to hold all persons present at the scene guilty. The Court observed that presence and participation are not synonymous, and that criminal liability under Section 149 arises only when an accused shares the common object of the assembly.

“At the same time, mere presence at the scene does not ipso facto render a person a member of the unlawful assembly, unless it is established that such an accused also shared its common object. A mere bystander, to whom no specific role is attributed, would not fall within the ambit of Section 149 of the IPC. The prosecution has to establish, through reasonably direct or indirect circumstances, that the accused persons shared a common object of the unlawful assembly.” (Para 54)

The seven-factor test for determining common object: To guide future courts, the Supreme Court formulated a seven-part test to determine whether a person’s presence amounted to participation in an unlawful assembly:

1. The time and place where the assembly was formed;
2. The conduct and behaviour of its members near the scene;
3. The collective conduct of the assembly, as distinct from that of individual members;
4. The motive underlying the crime;
5. The manner in which the incident unfolded;
6. The nature of weapons carried and used; and
7. The nature, extent, and number of the injuries inflicted, and other relevant considerations.

The Court emphasised that these indicators must be objectively applied to ensure that constructive liability does not turn into collective punishment.

“Rule of Caution” in mob prosecutions: In a pointed caution to trial courts, the bench noted that cases involving large mobs often carry a risk of over-implication and require “utmost care” to distinguish between actual participants and passive onlookers.

“The law on the point can be summarized to the effect that where there are general allegations against a large number of persons, the court must remain very careful before convicting all of them on vague or general evidence. Therefore, the courts ought to look for some cogent and credible material that lends assurance. It is safe to convict only those whose presence is not only consistently established from the stage of FIR, but also to whom overt acts are attributed which are in furtherance of the common object of the unlawful assembly.” (Para 61)

Citing Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1964), the bench reiterated that in cases with numerous accused, courts should rely on at least two or three consistent and trustworthy witnesses before confirming guilt.

Justice Pardiwala underscored that this caution does not dilute the principle of constructive liability, but ensures its fair and judicious application, particularly in incidents arising from mob violence or communal tension.

“This Court, as a matter of caution, has enunciated parameters to safeguard innocent spectators or passive onlookers from being convicted merely on account of their presence. This cautionary rule, however, does not dilute the doctrine of constructive liability, under which proof of an overt act by each individual is not indispensable. Where the presence of a large number of persons is established and many are implicated, prudence mandates strict adherence to this rule of caution.” (Para 55)

Findings and acquittal

The Court found that the prosecution had failed to link the ten appellants to the common object of the mob or to any specific act of violence. The evidence, it said, was “vague, contradictory, and omnibus in nature,” insufficient to prove their participation beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court also expressed concern over the casual manner in which the investigating authorities had registered and pursued the case, noting inconsistencies between witness accounts and medical evidence.

“It cannot be said that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. A case attains that standard when all its links are firmly established and recognizable to the eyes of a reasonable person. In the present matter, the prosecution version does not appear to stem from a truthful narration of facts.” (Para 82)

Clarifying “Common Object”

The verdict further explained that the phrase “in prosecution of the common object” means that the crime must have been directly connected to or committed in furtherance of the assembly’s object. Liability arises only if members intended or knew that the offence was likely to be committed.

“While ascertaining this fact, it is of utmost importance to consider whether the assembly consisted of some persons who were merely passive onlookers who had joined the assembly as a matter of idle curiosity, without the knowledge of the common object of the assembly, since such persons cannot be said to be members of the unlawful assembly. We say so because, the nucleus of Section 149 is “common object”.” (Para 52)

Significance: A defining standard for mob liability

This judgment marks a major reaffirmation of individualised culpability in collective offences. It establishes that criminal responsibility cannot be imposed by association, and that courts must rigorously differentiate active participants from innocent spectators. The decision will have far-reaching implications for cases involving mob violence, communal clashes, and political protests, where mass arrests and omnibus charges are common.

By setting a structured evidentiary standard, the Court has not only clarified Section 149 IPC but also reinforced the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty against arbitrary criminal liability.

The complete judgment may be read here.

Related:

CJP files complaint to Maharashtra DGP, SP Jalgaon over police participation in communal rally amid Suleman Pathan lynching probe

Violence & Sanatan Dharma: Now suspended lawyer defends shoe attack on CJI Gavai, claims it was a protest against ‘bulldozer’ remark”

Calcutta High Court quashes arbitrary deportation, orders return of West Bengal families from Bangladesh

Free speech, even in bad taste, is protected if no incitement to violence: HP HC

The post Mere Presence Does Not Imply Guilt: Supreme Court defines clear test for liability under unlawful assembly appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The appellants, Putai (Accused No. 1) and Dileep (Accused No. 2), were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow, on March 14, 2014, for offences under Sections 376(2)(g) (gang rape), 302 (murder), and 201 (destruction of evidence) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Putai was sentenced to death for the offense under Section 302 IPC, alongside rigorous life imprisonment for gang rape and seven years of rigorous imprisonment for destruction of evidence. Dileep received rigorous life imprisonment for both murder and gang rape. The Allahabad High Court subsequently confirmed Putai’s death penalty and dismissed the appeals on October 11, 2018.

The Supreme Court’s verdict to acquit the appellants, who had spent over a decade in custody, stands as an indictment of a criminal justice process plagued by systemic frailties, procedural negligence, and some parts of evidence characterized by the apex court as being “a piece of trash paper” due to no procedure having been followed. This article conducts an analysis of the Putai case, using it as a lens to expose the collapse of the evidentiary framework and the critical need for institutional accountability, particularly in capital punishment cases resting solely on circumstantial evidence.

Section I: The Collapse of the Evidentiary Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and the Burden of Proof

The prosecution’s case against Putai and Dileep was based on circumstantial evidence. In such trials, Indian jurisprudence requires an exceptionally high standard of proof, famously articulated in the Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra precedent, which demands the establishment of five “golden principles.” These principles mandate that the circumstances forming the conclusion of guilt must be fully established, must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the accused’s guilt, must be of a conclusive nature, must exclude every hypothesis except the one to be proved, and must form a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.

The Supreme Court, applying this rigorous standard, found that the prosecution in Putai failed to meet this high threshold at every turn. The Court recognised the critical distinction between circumstances that “may be proved” and those that “must be proved,” emphasising that the legal distance between the two “is small but has to be travelled before the prosecution can seek conviction of the accused”.[1]

A. The Failure to Establish Incriminating Circumstances

The prosecution sought to link Putai to the crime based on three core circumstantial elements: the recovery of the victim’s articles, the suspicious conduct of the accused, and the DNA evidence.

1. Dubious Recovery of Articles: The personal articles of the child victim—chappals, a water canister, and an underwear—were found in a field, which accused No. 1, Putai, was cultivating. While the State argued that this shifted the burden onto Putai to explain the circumstances under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Court found the recovery itself doubtful.[2]

The father, Munna, in his initial complaint, mentioned finding the chappals, water canister, and blood stains, but was totally silent regarding the recovery of the victim’s underwear. The Court found it “impossible to believe” that the search party, which included the victim’s father and others would have noticed the minor details like the chappals and water canister, yet missed the underwear in the same field. This omission was deemed “far too significant to be overlooked”.[3] The Supreme Court concluded that the recovery of the underwear seemed to be a “planted recovery and a creation by the Investigating Officer intended to give succour to the prosecution case”.[4]

2. The Sniffer Dog Theory against Dileep: The prosecution’s case against accused No. 2, Dileep largely rested on the claim that a small male comb was recovered from a field, and a sniffer dog, after smelling the comb, led the police to Dileep’s house. The Court stated that this theory is “shrouded in a cloud of doubt and unacceptable on the face of record”.[5]

• Contradictory Identification: Multiple prosecution witnesses offered starkly conflicting testimonies regarding the comb’s colour: one said bluish-green, another said dirty and light red, another said sky-blue, and Investigating Officer said green. These contrasting versions made the recovery itself doubtful.
• Implausible Linkage: The claim that witnesses could identify the comb, an ordinary plastic item, as belonging to Dileep simply because they had seen him using it was found to be “absolutely farfetched and unbelievable”. The Court viewed this insistence as a “strong indicator” that the prosecution was “hell bent upon implicating the accused No. 2-Dileep in this case by hook or by crook”.[6]
• Procedural Failure: The entire sniffer dog procedure lacked contemporary documentation. Furthermore, the Investigating Officer claimed he had immediately sealed the comb at the spot, which logically meant it could not have been available for the sniffer dog to smell, rendering the entire theory unworthy of credence.

3. Suspicious Conduct of Putai: The High Court and Trial Court treated the testimony the victim’s mother, as incriminating. She claimed to have seen Putai rushing into his house, washing his hands and face, changing his clothes, and then going away on his cycle without inquiring about the commotion regarding the missing child.

The Supreme Court firmly rejected the inference of guilt. The Court observed that washing hands and changing clothes after returning from work was “absolutely natural” behaviour for a labourer or farmer, and would not raise suspicion.[7] Furthermore, Putai’s explanation in his Section 313 CrPC statement—that his parents were ill and hospitalised—provided an innocent context for his haste and preoccupation, a fact admitted by the victim’s in cross-examination.[8]

Section II: The Forensic Catastrophe: DNA Evidence and the Broken Chain of Custody

The handling of forensic evidence in the Putai case was so flawed that the Supreme Court described the resulting reports as “a piece of trash paper” and concluded they “pale into insignificance”. This systematic failure reveals catastrophic lapses in collection, preservation, and analysis that fall far short of established international standards.[9]

A. Inadmissible and Contradictory DNA Reports

The first DNA examination report dated January 18, 2014 was inconclusive, merely stating that a “male specific allele” was found in the victim’s slide and swab, with no opinion regarding the blood samples of Putai and Dileep.

Years later, during the High Court appeal, the prosecution produced a supplementary DNA report (dated December 2, 2014) via an affidavit dated April 12, 2017. This new report, generated using Y-Filer Kit and HID Kit tests, contradictorily claimed that the material from the victim’s slide matched the allele profiles of both Putai and Dileep.

The Supreme Court found this supplementary report to be “inconsequential and inadmissible” due to a host of fatal procedural flaws:

1. Denial of Rebuttal: The supplementary DNA report was never put to the accused-appellants under Section 313 CrPC, denying them the statutory right to explain or rebut the new incriminating material.[10]
2. Unexamined Expert: The scientific expert, who issued the reports, was not recalled or re-examined on oath to prove the contradictory supplementary report.[11]
3. Improper Use of Affidavit: The supplementary report was tendered via the affidavit of an officer (Deputy Director, FSL, Lucknow) who was not connected with the issuance of the report. The Court clarified that the DNA report is a substantive piece of evidence, not merely formal, and thus could not be tendered in evidence through an affidavit under Section 293 of the CrPC (now Section 329 of the BNSS, 2023).[12]
4. Breach of Sanctity: Given that the scientific expert did not state that any forensic material was preserved for further examination after the first report, the Court presumed the samples must have been opened or consumed. Once the samples were opened, their sanctity was breached, rendering any subsequent supplementary analysis unreliable.[13]

B. The Catastrophic Breakdown of the Chain of Custody

The most critical failure was the complete absence of proof regarding the chain of custody, which is essential to guarantee that evidence has not been contaminated or tampered with.[14] The specific failures were comprehensive:

• Collection Procedure: The blood samples of the accused were collected on November 26, 2012, nearly two and a half months after their arrest on September 7, 2012. The prosecution failed to provide any oral evidence or exhibit any document to prove the procedure, date, or time of drawing these blood samples.
• Consent: Although consent of the accused-appellants was purportedly taken before drawing the samples, no document proving such consent was exhibited in evidence.
• Post-mortem Samples Discrepancy: The medical professionals provided contradictory evidence regarding the collection of samples from the victim’s body. One stated she took two vaginal swabs and two smear slides but did not mention sealing them or the date of transmission. Another stated he took eight slides of smear and swabs, and claimed they were seized, sealed, and handed over to Constables. However, he failed to prove any document pertaining to this procedure, such as a memorandum of sealing.
• Transmission and Storage: The prosecution failed to examine the official(s) who carried the samples to the FSL or the malkhana (evidence room) In-charge.

Critically, not a single document pertaining to the safe keeping or transmission of the samples—including the malkhana register, roznamcha entry, forwarding letter, or the receipt issued from the FSL—was exhibited during the trial.

The Court concluded that the failure to prove the relevant documentation for collection and the “total lack of evidence regarding the chain of custody” of the blood samples made the entire exercise “farce and frivolous.”

Section III: A System on Trial: Investigative Incompetence and the Crisis of Accountability

The final acquittal was not merely due to weak evidence, but was a direct consequence of what the Supreme Court deemed a “lacklustre and shabby investigation and so also laconic trial procedure”. This institutional failure crippled the search for truth from the very outset.[15]

A. A Catalogue of Critical Investigative Omissions

The Court identified several fundamental errors that demonstrated either gross incompetence or deliberate fabrication:

• Failure to Send Crucial Evidence to FSL: The Investigating Officer seized the victim’s clothes, including the frock and the underwear, but inexplicably did not forward these crucial articles to the FSL for scientific analysis. The Court found it surprising that in a case of sexual assault and murder, the IO did not send these articles, giving rise to a “strong suspicion that the recovery of these articles was a planted recovery”.
• Failure to Search Accused’s House: Despite the prosecution’s own theory that Putai rushed home and changed his clothes, no extensive search of the accused-appellants’ house was made to look for incriminating evidence. This omission reinforced the Court’s view that the ‘suspicious conduct’ theory was an “exaggeration”.[16]
• Failure to Examine Neighbours: The incident occurred in open fields, accessible to “all and sundry”. Although the incident happened between 7:00 PM and 8:00 PM when darkness was beginning to fall, the police did not care to examine anyone from the neighbouring fields or locality. This failure created doubt regarding the bona fides of the police actions.[17]
• Failure to Identify Material Objects: The material objects (clothes, etc.) were exhibited in the evidence of the Investigating Officer, but were never shown to the victim’s parents, Munna and Chandravati, for identification when they testified.[18]

B. Capital Punishment and the Constitutional Imperative

The fact that Putai was awarded and confirmed a death sentence on the basis of such flimsy evidence demonstrates the profound risk within India’s capital punishment regime. The irreversible nature of the death penalty demands that it only be imposed in the “rarest of rare” cases, based on unimpeachable, cogent evidence. The Putai case serves as a terrifying example of how investigative incompetence and flawed judicial scrutiny at the lower court levels can lead to the gravest miscarriage of justice by extinguishing a human life irretrievably.

C. The Double Tragedy: Denial of Justice for the Victim

While the acquittal corrected the injustice against the accused, it simultaneously constitutes a a tragic failure of justice for the minor child victim and her family. The gruesome act of rape and murder remains unsolved. The investigation not only failed to secure a conviction but also likely destroyed the possibility of ever identifying and prosecuting the actual perpetrator.

This situation results in a “secondary victimisation” of the family, who are left without closure or justice, their faith in the system shattered due to institutional incompetence. The acquittal, in this context, is not an endpoint of justice but a marker of its complete absence, proving that a flawed investigation is the antithesis of both the accused’s right to a fair trial and the victim’s right to meaningful justice.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court demonstrated that the conviction, upheld by two lower courts, rested on a foundation of conjectures and procedural violations, where the fundamental principles governing circumstantial evidence were ignored and scientific evidence, vital in such cases, was rendered “worthless” due to an absolute lack of procedural rigor.

However, the tragedy of Putai lies in its double failure: it subjected the accused to a decade-long ordeal under the shadow of the death penalty, while simultaneously failing the minor victim and her family by making the accountability of the actual assailant impossible. The judgment is an urgent call for systemic overhaul. True justice for both the innocent accused and the grieving victim can only be achieved through a system built on a bedrock of scientific integrity, rigorous adherence to procedure, and unwavering accountability for all institutional actors.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

[1] Para 69

[2] Para 37

[3] Para 43

[4] Para 56

[5] Para 36

[6] Para 38

[7] Para 32

[8] Para 35

[9] Para 75

[10] Para 66

[11] Para 66

[12] Para 75

[13] Para 64

[14] Para 65

[15] Para 73

[16] Para 71

[17] Para 74

[18] Para 68

Related:

Liberty, Evidence and Cooperation: A legal analysis of Jugraj v. State of Punjab

A Proposal on Collegium Resolutions: Towards a single comprehensive format

Free speech, even in bad taste, is protected if no incitement to violence: HP HC

The post SC acquits two men accused of rape of a minor; terms the case an example of shabby and lacklustre investigation appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A courtroom disrupted

The usual morning mention round in Supreme Court’s Court No. 1 turned chaotic within minutes. At around 11:35 a.m., an advocate in full courtroom attire stood, removed a shoe (or attempted to unroll a bundle), and sought to throw it toward the bench. The act was accompanied by a sharp slogan that “Sanatan Dharam ka Apmaan Nahi Sahega Hindustan.”

Lawyers present have recalled that the object barely reached the dais — security moved swiftly. The man was escorted out, the session halted briefly, and then resumed. Chief Justice Gavai, visibly composed, turned to the next advocate and said “Don’t get distracted. We are not distracted by this.” With that, the Court proceeded as though unshaken.

The man in the robe: Rakesh Kishore

The person behind the outburst was soon identified: Advocate Rakesh Kishore, aged 71, enrolled in the Bar Council of Delhi in 2009. He held multiple bar cards — including the Supreme Court Bar Association, Shahdara Bar Association, and BCD, as reported

According to the Indian Express, Kishore resides in Mayur Vihar Phase 1, Delhi, and over the years has been associated with disputes relating to his housing society. Residents say elections in his society have not been held in recent times; complaints against him include one over an alleged assault of a senior citizen in 2021. The Delhi Police that functions under the direct control of India’s dreaded Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) –and is known for its aggressive surveillance of ordinary citizens was surprisingly charitable with the offender. Charging protesting citizens with a draconian law, the UAPA, in this instance, the same force has chosen to go soft. Citing the “reason” that the SC Registry was not pressing charges, they released Kishore within hours, maintaining he had no prior criminal record. Since then, the offender has been widely interviewed by a government-friendly media.

“More offended by rule of law than religion?” Suspended advocate reacts to CJI’s Mauritius remark

Speculation was rife on the “motive” with media quick to attribute the contemptuous aggression at CJI Gavai’s reported remark to a petitioner who had prayed for “replacing” the deity of Vishnu at Khajurao, a UNESCO world site and under the jurisdiction of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI). The CJI had later clarified his remarks in the Khajuraho case, emphasising respect for all religions and saying social media misinterpretations had amplified the controversy.

However, suspended advocate Rakesh Kishore, after being released by Delhi Police, has expressed discontent—not over any religious sentiment, but in response to a public statement made by the Chief Justice of India (CJI) during a visit abroad.

In a statement to news agency ANI, he said he was deeply hurt by what he perceived as mockery from the judiciary—especially comments by the CJI in a case involving a damaged Vishnu idol at Khajuraho. He asserted he felt “no regret” and claimed his act was a reaction to what he viewed as contempt directed at believers of Sanatan Dharma.

Referring to the CJI’s remarks in Mauritius — “The Indian legal system is governed by the rule of law, not the rule of bulldozers” — Kishore responded, stating, “…The CJI should consider that, holding such a high constitutional position, he ought to understand the significance of ‘Milord’ and maintain its dignity… You go to Mauritius and say that the country will not run with a bulldozer. I ask the CJI and those opposing me: Is the bulldozer action by Yogi ji against those who encroached on government property wrong? I am hurt and will continue to be so…”

Further, Kishore invoked “divine guidance,” saying that he could not rest after what he believed was an insult. He reiterated that he was neither drunk nor under influence, but acting from emotional distress. His reaction appears rooted more in political alignment and perceived personal affront than in any specific legal principle or religious issue.

#WATCH | Delhi: Countered on his action against the highest position holder in judiciary, suspended Advocate Rakesh Kishore, who attempted to hurl an object at CJI BR Gavai, says, “…CJI should think that when he is sitting on such a high constitutional post, he should… pic.twitter.com/6WgPZmQjO7

— ANI (@ANI) October 7, 2025

The Trigger: a temple idol, a viral remark, and Mauritius speech on ‘Bulldozer Justice’

The roots of Rakesh Kishore’s outburst appear to lie in entrenched casteist hatred and perceived ideological insult. In September 2025, the Supreme Court dismissed a public interest petition seeking the reconstruction of a damaged Lord Vishnu idol at the Javari Temple in Khajuraho. When the bench — led by CJI B.R. Gavai — rejected the plea, the Chief Justice remarked, “Go and ask the deity itself to do something.”

While intended to highlight the Court’s view that the matter fell under the jurisdiction of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), the comment sparked a firestorm online. It was widely seen — and misrepresented — as flippant and disrespectful to religious sentiments. Social media amplified the controversy, framing it as an affront to Sanatan Dharma, giving rise to a charged narrative of judicial insensitivity.

Further CJI Gavai’s recent speech in Mauritius, where he invoked his 2024 ruling on illegal demolitions, reminding the world that the highest court in the land stands against injustice. In that judgment, the Court had clearly held that the executive cannot act as judge, jury, and executioner.

SC Judgment A Clear Message That India Governed By Rule Of Law & Not Rule Of Bulldozer : CJI BR Gavai In Mauritius#SupremeCourt #CJIBRGavai https://t.co/vxQzhxm2ir

— Live Law (@LiveLawIndia) October 3, 2025

Citing this principle abroad, the CJI said, “The Indian legal system is governed by the Rule of Law, not by the rule of the bulldozer.” Though meant to reaffirm constitutional values, this statement became another flashpoint. Critics like Kishore interpreted it as an indirect attack on certain state-level actions — particularly in Uttar Pradesh. Amid these twin provocations, Kishore claimed he acted out of emotional distress and divine compulsion, viewing both statements as cumulative insults to his faith and belief system.

There is a further twist to the tale. During the Dussehra vacation of the Supreme Court Bareilly in Uttar Pradesh (a state that has been one of the prime offenders in aggressive demolitions of minority properties and places of worship) saw a series of demolitions, including the ancestral home of Olympic Gold Medallist and Padma Shri Mohd. Shahid demolished in Varanasi Road widening drive, end September.

Online Hate Build-Up against CJI Gavai

The attack on CJI Gavai and his august office as also his identity did not happen in isolation. Weeks before far right platforms were airing interviews instigating violence against India’s first Buddhist Chief Justice. Right wing “influencer”, Ajeet bharti with Kaushlesh Rai and Editor of Opindia (another instigator rightwing digital platform), Anupam Singh can be heard inciting people to violence against the CJI. During the conversation, Kaushlesh says, “I’m a Gandhian. I don’t support violence. If I did, I would have said, ‘Look, if Gavai ji gets into a fight, he lives in the courthouse, and there are Hindu lawyers there. At least one Hindu lawyer should grab Gavai ji’s head and hit him hard against the wall, so that it breaks into two pieces. But I don’t support violence at all.’ During the conversation, Ajit Bharti had also suggested surrounding Justice Gavai’s car. Kaushlesh Rai goes on to say, “Oct 2nd is coming, what Godse did is beyond your capability, but you can become Gandhi. What is the max punishment for spitting in Gavai’s face under the IPC? Not more than Six months? It’s nothing more than that. Hindus can’t even do this?”

Bar Council of India suspends lawyer

Within hours of the shocking display of hate and contempt, the Bar Council of India (BCI) issued an interim suspension of Kishore’s license to practice. The BCI’s order — under the Advocates Act, 1961 — called his conduct “prima facie inconsistent with the dignity of the Court.”

#BREAKING| BCI suspends practice of Advocate Rakesh Kishore, who attempted to attack CJI BR Gavai today

The Council has also initiated disciplinary proceedings against Kishore #SupremeCourt #cjibrgavai pic.twitter.com/Pv4lvPYTaV

— Live Law (@LiveLawIndia) October 6, 2025

According to order, he has been barred from appearing, pleading, acting or practising in any court or tribunal across India. Courts, tribunals and bar associations were to be informed. A show-cause notice was issued, requiring Kishore to explain in 15 days why the suspension should not continue.

Courts and its pesky choices

To date, the Supreme Court Registrar General opted not to initiate criminal proceedings. The Delhi Police, after questioning Kishore for a few hours, released him, citing lack of a case file from the Court, as per reports

The Court itself stayed silent in public. It neither issued a press release nor filed an FIR. Some legal observers interpreted this as a strategic restraint—refusing to magnify the act by escalating it. Yet many felt a full judicial revulsion or contempt action would have better affirmed the Apex Court’s institutional strength.

Legal fraternity condemnation

Leading bar bodies and senior advocates were quick to speak out. The Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (SCAORA) called the act “unbecoming” of a lawyer and urged suo moto contempt proceedings. They argued the gesture threatened to “scandalise the office of the CJI” and damage public faith in the court.

Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (SCAORA) passes resolution condemning the “unwarranted and intemperate gesture” of an advocate who allegedly disrespected the Chief Justice of India and companion judges, calling it an assault on judicial independence.#SupremeCourt pic.twitter.com/0PWFOq1lCl

— Bar and Bench (@barandbench) October 6, 2025

The Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) condemned the act in strong terms, stressing institutional dignity, decorum and constitutional duty.

It was senior counsel, Kapil Sibal’s tweet on X at around 5 p.m. yesterday, October 6 that pushed the moral bar high, commenting on the absence of any condemnation from either the Prime Minister, Home Minister or Law Minister.

CJI

The uncivilised behaviour of a member of the Supreme Court Bar must be publicly condemned by one and all since it is affront to the majesty of the court

The silence of the PM , the Home Minister and the Law Minister is to say the least surprising

— Kapil Sibal (@KapilSibal) October 6, 2025

Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) has unanimously condemned the “reprehensible act” by an advocate inside the courtroom of CJI Justice B.R. Gavai on Oct 6. Calling the conduct “utterly unbecoming of an officer of the court,” the SCBA said it strikes at the foundation of mutual… pic.twitter.com/VHcF3RNovh

— Bar and Bench (@barandbench) October 6, 2025

Senior advocate Indira Jaising went further, labelling the act “ideological and casteist” and calling upon the Attorney General to initiate contempt of court action. She urged the Supreme Court judges to issue a united statement rejecting ideological attacks on secular courts.

Attorney General should take action for contempt of court for an ideological castest attack on a secular court https://t.co/Fk4XrWTGOX

— Indira Jaising (@IJaising) October 6, 2025

The Solicitor General, Tushar Mehta, offered a more tempered take. He condemned the act as a product of misinformation and social media frenzy, praised the CJI’s composure, and warned that his restraint must not be mistaken for institutional weakness.

Attack on the CJI is an assault on the dignity of our judiciary and the spirit of our Constitution: Rahul Gandhi

Rahul Gandhi, Leader of the Opposition, took to X to lambast the attack, “The attack on the Chief Justice of India is an assault on the dignity of our judiciary and the spirit of our Constitution.”

The attack on the Chief Justice of India is an assault on the dignity of our judiciary and the spirit of our Constitution.

Such hatred has no place in our nation and must be condemned.

— Rahul Gandhi (@RahulGandhi) October 6, 2025

Congress directed criticism at Prime Minister Narendra Modi, noting that for hours the PM’s office remained silent. In a post, Congress taunted the PM: “Your silence is deafening — it screams complicity.”

“India’s Chief Justice B.R. Gavai was brazenly attacked in the Supreme Court today. Yet, not one word of condemnation from the Prime Minister so far. Mr. Modi, your silence is deafening and screams of complicity. You must speak up.”

India’s Chief Justice B.R. Gavai was brazenly attacked in the Supreme Court today.

Yet, not one word of condemnation from the Prime Minister so far.

Mr. Modi, your silence is deafening and screams of complicity.

You must speak up. pic.twitter.com/vodFnPjMye

— Congress (@INCIndia) October 6, 2025

Sonia Gandhi, former party president, expressed “profound distress,” calling the act an “assault not just on the CJI, but on the Constitution.”

“No words are adequate to condemn the attack on the Honourable Chief Justice of India in the Supreme Court itself. It is an assault not just on him, but on our Constitution as well. Chief Justice Gavai has been very gracious but the nation must stand in solidarity with him unitedly with a deep sense of anguish and outrage” she said

Statement of CPP Chairperson Smt. Sonia Gandhi Ji

No words are adequate to condemn the attack on the Honourable Chief Justice of India in the Supreme Court itself. It is an assault not just on him, but on our Constitution as well.

Chief Justice Gavai has been very gracious… pic.twitter.com/3FgEk2q5gV

— Congress (@INCIndia) October 6, 2025

There is no place for such reprehensible acts in our society, utterly condemnable: PM Modi

Pressure mounted. Late evening on October 6, PM Modi posted a condemnation. He wrote, “Spoke to CJI BR Gavai. The act is utterly condemnable. Such reprehensible behaviour has no place in a civilised society.” He hailed the CJI’s composure as a testament to judicial dignity.

Despite this, critics noted that the PM’s response came only after public pressure escalated. The delay was spun as political hesitation.

“I appreciated the calm displayed by Justice Gavai in the face of such a situation. It highlights his commitment to values of justice and strengthening the spirit of our Constitution” PM Modi said

Spoke to Chief Justice of India, Justice BR Gavai Ji. The attack on him earlier today in the Supreme Court premises has angered every Indian. There is no place for such reprehensible acts in our society. It is utterly condemnable.

I appreciated the calm displayed by Justice…

— Narendra Modi (@narendramodi) October 6, 2025

Underlying currents: caste, religion & polarisation

The act was not merely a shocking security breach — it looked like a violent manifestation of ideological, religious and caste bias.

CJI Gavai is a practising Buddhist from the Dalit community, and some spokespeople observed that targeting him via religious slogans—Sanatan Dharma—had distinct caste overtones. The fact that a lawyer in the name of religious pride attempted assault on a Dalit judge stirred discomfort.

In legal circles, there is now renewed urgency around access control as how did a man with a proximity card enter the courtroom and bring an item?

The attacker was in full uniform , wearing a proximity card and was carrying a bag as well along with a rolled up bundle of some papers. He apologized to J. Chandran saying that “it” was only for J. Gavai.

— Anas Tanwir (@Vakeel_Sb) October 6, 2025

The unflinching bench: how the chief justice responded

What has drawn admiration across the board is CJI Gavai’s restraint during the moment. As chaos briefly erupted, he paused, remained still, and directed his courtroom not to be distracted. That calmness — amid a surprise attack — was lauded inside and outside legal circles.

Senior Advocate Sanjay Hegde, commenting on an unusual incident, praised the CJI Gavai for maintaining a calm and composed demeanour throughout. He noted that such odd events are not unprecedented in the Indian judiciary. Recalling a similar episode from the past, he mentioned that CJI Hidayatullah, who was also from Nagpur, once had a shoe thrown at him by a disgruntled litigant.

Displaying remarkable composure and wit, Justice Hidayatullah reportedly said, “The man has lost his case, he should not lose his shoe as well.”

Full marks to the calm and composed demeanour with which the CJI continued the proceedings. Such odd events have happened before as well. CJI Hidayatullah, also from Nagpur had a shoe thrown by a disgruntled litigant. He ordered the shoe to be returned saying, “The man has lost… https://t.co/9XXfBjOwDV

— SANJAY HEGDE (@sanjayuvacha) October 6, 2025

Inside the court, no visible disruption followed the incident. The CJI continued hearing cases scheduled for the day, according to sources. His poise came to symbolise institutional durability in the face of provocation.

What comes next — contempt proceedings? Will the court act?

Legal bodies like SCAORA and senior advocates have urged the Supreme Court to take suo moto contempt notice, emphasising that any attempt to assault or scandalise the highest seat of justice cannot go unchecked.

While the CJI displayed remarkable composure, the judiciary now faces a crucial moment, whether to continue exercising restraint or to respond firmly to uphold its institutional authority.

Beyond contempt proceedings, the Court should consider imposing some penalty, and setting a clear precedent against courtroom misconduct—especially when it’s cloaked in ideological justification. Such steps would necessary for public trust, protect judicial dignity, and send a strong message that the sanctity of the courtroom is inviolable. The need for a unified condemnation of the incident by the whole of the Supreme Court is also the need of the hour.

The nation now watches: will the Supreme Court let the moment pass — or rise to define it?

Related:

“Bulldozer Justice” rebuked: Orissa High Court orders 10 lakh compensation for illegal demolition of community centre

Supreme Court rebukes “Bulldozer Justice,” plans to issue nationwide guidelines to prevent arbitrary demolitions

Supreme Court to hear urgent pleas against state-sanctioned bulldozer demolitions in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan

The post Violence & Sanatan Dharma: Now suspended lawyer defends shoe attack on CJI Gavai, claims it was a protest against ‘bulldozer’ remark” appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The consistent tension between the state’s power to investigate crime and the individual’s fundamental right to liberty forms a fundamental pillar of criminal jurisprudence in any constitutional democracy. Within this dynamic, the judiciary serves as the final arbiter, tasked with balancing the imperatives of law enforcement with the sacrosanct principles of personal freedom. The Supreme Court of India’s decision in Jugraj Singh v. State of Punjab stands as an illustration of this tradition.[1] A bench comprising of Justices Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhuyan, in its judgement stated that merely because nothing incriminating could be discovered would not mean that there is non-co-operation on the part of accused. While the case itself presents a common factual scenario—an individual implicated solely on the disclosure statement of a co-accused and the subsequent opposition to bail on grounds of non-cooperation—the Court’s treatment of these issues offers an important reaffirmation of established constitutional safeguards.

This article argues that the judgment in Jugraj is a crucial restatement of liberal bail jurisprudence, reiterating the foundational principles through a three-pronged analytical approach. First, it shows the inherent weakness of a co-accused’s confession as a basis for criminal implication, thereby demanding a higher threshold of prima facie evidence from the prosecution at the bail stage. Second, it narrowly and correctly defines the scope of “cooperation with the investigation,” aligning it with the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. Third, by scrutinising the investigative agency’s own diligence, the judgment implicitly critiques prosecutorial overreach and investigative inertia, reinforcing the judiciary’s role as a check on the executive’s power to curtail liberty.

The significance of Jugraj lies not in the creation of new legal doctrine. It is in its function as a necessary course correction. In an era where even politicians in power are being targeted on the pretext of not cooperating with the investigation by agencies like the ED, the Supreme Court’s decision serves as an important reminder to lower courts and law enforcement agencies. It shows that the foundational principles of liberty, articulated decades ago in landmark cases such as Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, remain undiluted and must be rigorously applied against any procedural practice that seeks to undermine them. This article will deconstruct the Jugraj judgment by analysing its factual and legal underpinnings, situating it within the broader jurisprudential context of evidence law and anticipatory bail, and exploring its implications for the rights of the accused and the obligations of the state.

The Judgment in Focus: Factual Matrix and Ruling in Jugraj v. State of Punjab

The case of Jugraj Singh presented a set of circumstances that are frequently encountered in trial courts across the country, making the apex court’s intervention particularly instructive.

Facts

The appellant, Jugraj Singh, sought anticipatory bail in connection with a case registered at Police Station Sadar Patti, District Tarn Taran. His implication in the case was not based on any direct evidence or recovery of incriminating material from his person or premises. Instead, the entire basis for his arraignment was a disclosure statement made by a co-accused, Rashpal Singh, from whom a recovery had been affected. This singular fact formed the crux of the appellant’s plea for pre-arrest bail.

Compounding the matter was a crucial detail that the Supreme Court found particularly relevant: the appellant had been “similarly implicated” in a prior case, also on the basis of a co-accused’s disclosure statement, and had been granted the protection of anticipatory bail in that instance. Despite this history and the nature of the evidence, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh rejected his anticipatory bail application on April 3, 2025, prompting the appeal to the Supreme Court. Recognising the tenuous nature of the implication, the Supreme Court, on June 23, 2025, granted the appellant interim protection from arrest. This protection was made conditional upon a standard and vital requirement which states that he joins the investigation as and when called upon to do so by the Investigating Officer.

Arguments advanced by the Parties

The arguments before the Supreme Court centred on whether this interim protection granted on June 23, 2025, should be made absolute. The appellant’s case was straightforward, resting on fundamental principles of criminal law. He argued that his implication was false and malicious, stemming solely from the inadmissible statement of a co-accused. He emphasised that nothing incriminating had been recovered from him and pointed to the past instance of similar implication as evidence of a pattern of harassment. Implicitly, he contended that he had complied with the interim order by joining the investigation.

The State of Punjab, in its counter-affidavit, did not dispute the foundational premise. It conceded that Jugraj Singh’s implication was indeed based on the confessional statement of the co-accused. However, to oppose bail, the State levelled the allegation of non-cooperation. The sole basis for this serious charge was the appellant’s statement during questioning that he had thrown his mobile phone into a river.

The Supreme Court’s reasoning deconstructed

The Court first addressed and defined the concept of cooperation, holding that “Merely because nothing incriminating could be discovered would not mean that there is non-co-operation on the part of accused”. This observation delinks the outcome of an interrogation from the process of cooperation itself. The absence of a discovery cannot be retrospectively used to label the accused as non-cooperative.

Second, the court noted a glaring omission in the State’s counter-affidavit i.e., there was no mention of any independent effort made by the police to verify the appellant’s claim or to pursue alternative leads. The Court pointedly observed that the State had not stated “that any effort was made to trace out the mobile number of the appellant and collect the call detail records or that any raid was carried to find out whether he is in possession of any incriminating material”.

This is instructively significant. It establishes a direct relationship between the quality of the foundational evidence and the credibility of the prosecution’s subsequent procedural objections. The prosecution’s case rested exclusively on a co-accused’s statement, a form of evidence legally recognized as weak. Faced with this fragile foundation, the State’s only recourse to deny bail was the allegation of non-cooperation. The Court perceived this as an attempt to secure custody to compensate for the lack of substantive evidence. It was insufficient for the State to merely allege it; the State had to first demonstrate that it had exhausted its own investigative avenues. This implies a judicial principle: the weaker the prima facie case against an accused, the less weight a court will give to generic and unsubstantiated allegations of non-cooperation used to deny bail.

Ultimately, considering the nature of the evidence, the precedent of the appellant receiving similar protection, and the lack of substance in the non-cooperation claim, the Supreme Court made the interim bail order absolute, subject to standard conditions.

Foundation of implication: Deconstructing evidentiary value of a co-accused’s statement

The Supreme Court’s decision in Jugraj was heavily influenced by the evidentiary quality of the material used to implicate the appellant. A look into the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, reveals why a case built solely on the statement of a co-accused is considered fundamentally weak.

Legislative framework

The Indian Evidence Act treats confessions made to police with extreme caution, born from the recognition of the power imbalance between the accused and the state.

• Sections 25 and 26: Section 25 states that no confession made to a police-officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. Section 26 states that no confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. These sections create an absolute bar on proving confessions made to a police officer or by a person in police custody, unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. This is a safeguard against coercion.
• Section 27: This Section creates a narrow exception wherein when a fact is discovered as a consequence of information from an accused in custody, “so much of such information.as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” The discovery lends credibility to the information. In Jugraj, the State made no claim that any fact was discovered based on information from the appellant.
• Section 30: This is the most pertinent provision. It states that when multiple persons are tried jointly, a confession by one affecting himself and others can be “taken into consideration” against the others. However, jurisprudence is clear: such a statement is not substantive evidence. It is not given under oath, nor is it subject to cross-examination. As established in the landmark case of Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the confession of a co-accused is a matter of the highest caution and can only be used to lend assurance to other evidence.[2] It cannot be the sole basis for conviction. The rationale is that an accused person has a powerful incentive to implicate others to exculpate themselves or to receive a lighter sentence.

Connecting legislative framework to Jugraj

The implication of Jugraj Singh rested exclusively on Rashpal Singh’s disclosure statement. There was no independent corroboration, no recovery, and no other material linking him to the offence. This reliance on the weakest form of evidence, legally insufficient to sustain a conviction, made the State’s opposition to anticipatory bail untenable. The decision provides u and affirms a vital principle for bail jurisprudence: the court must examine the prima facie quality and admissibility of the evidence.

Shield of Liberty: anticipatory bail, the enduring legacy of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia

The legal instrument through which Jugraj Singh sought freedom was anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). His case is rooted in the jurisprudential history of this provision, benchmarked by Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab.[3]

Jurisprudential evolution of section 438 CrPC

Introduced in 1973 based on the 41st Law Commission Report, anticipatory bail was designed to protect individuals from harassment and wrongful incarceration through malicious accusations. It is a pre-arrest legal remedy, giving substance to the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The Sibbia doctrine: Magna Carta of Anticipatory Bail

The scope of Section 438 was settled by a five-judge Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab (1980). The Supreme Court emphatically rejected the restrictive approach taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which had sought to impose rigid conditions, such as limiting it to “exceptional cases” and importing the restrictions of regular bail under Section 437.

The key principles laid down in Sibbia are:

• Liberal Interpretation: The provision must be interpreted liberally in favour of personal freedom.
• No Inflexible Rules: The Court refused to lay down a “straitjacket formula.” The decision must be based on the specific facts of each case.
• Wide Discretion: The discretion vested in the higher courts is wide and should not be fettered by self-imposed, restrictive conditions.
• Reasonable Apprehension: The “reason to believe” an arrest is imminent must be based on reasonable grounds, not vague fears.

Modern Application and Jugraj

The pro-liberty ethos of Sibbia has been consistently reaffirmed, notably in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra (2010)[4] and the Constitution Bench decision in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2020), which held that anticipatory bail is not by default time-bound.[5]

The judgment in Jugraj is a textbook application of the Sibbia doctrine. The Court faced a classic scenario Section 438 was designed to address: an individual facing arrest based on weak, potentially inadmissible evidence. By looking past the State’s procedural objections to the substantive merits, the Court exercised its wide discretion to protect the appellant’s liberty. The decision fulfils the very purpose for which Section 438 was enacted, acting as a vital shield for individual freedom.

Defining the Line: “Cooperation with Investigation” versus the Right against Self-Incrimination

The State’s primary argument against Jugraj Singh was his alleged “non-cooperation.” The Supreme Court’s handling of this issue firmly situates the concept of cooperation within the framework of the fundamental right against self-incrimination.

The Constitutional Bedrock: Article 20(3)

Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India provides that “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” This right ensures that the burden of proving guilt lies squarely on the prosecution, which must gather evidence through its own independent efforts, not by coercing the accused. It represents a fundamental departure from an inquisitorial system of justice, where the accused can be questioned to extract truth, to an accusatorial system, where the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

Judicial Interpretation of “Cooperation”

Cooperation involves an accused person adhering to the legal process: joining the investigation when summoned and making oneself available for questioning. Crucially, it does not mean admitting guilt or making a confession. The right to remain silent is a vital facet of the right against self-incrimination, and its exercise cannot be construed as non-cooperation.

Applying the Standard to Jugraj

The appellant had complied with the core requirement of the interim bail order: he joined the investigation. The State’s entire allegation of non-cooperation hinged on his statement about his mobile phone. Demanding that the appellant produce his phone, which could contain evidence against him, would be a textbook violation of Article 20(3).

Instead of focusing on the veracity of the appellant’s statement, the Court shifted the focus to the investigative agency’s own responsibilities. Its pointed observation about the State’s failure to trace the phone number or collect Call Detail Records (CDRs) is critical. This judicial manoeuvre implicitly redefines “non-cooperation.” It is not merely the accused’s silence but the prosecution’s failure to investigate. By highlighting what the police did not do, the Court reframed the issue. The State’s argument was, “The accused is not cooperating because he won’t give us the evidence.” The Court did not consider this because the State is supposed to find the evidence and not imply on the basis of someone’s acts or omissions.

It is important to distinguish this from genuine non-cooperation, such as absconding, tampering with evidence, or intimidating witnesses, which would warrant denial of bail. The appellant had done none of these; his refusal to self-incriminate was the exercise of a fundamental right.

Synthesis and Concluding Analysis

The judgment in Jugraj v. State of Punjab is a synthesis of three fundamental pillars of Indian criminal law: the rules of evidence, the principles of anticipatory bail, and the constitutional right against self-incrimination. The case began with a weak evidentiary foundation, necessitating the protective remedy of anticipatory bail. The State’s attempt to defeat this claim rested on an allegation of non-cooperation that was constitutionally impermissible. The Supreme Court, by seeing through this procedural gambit, wove these three threads together, affirming that liberty cannot be curtailed on weak evidence, and the shield of pre-arrest bail cannot be pierced by a flawed interpretation of cooperation.

Its value lies in its clear-headed application and forceful restatement of foundational principles. In a legal system where the process can often become the punishment, the judgment provides a much-needed reinforcement of the delicate balance between effective crime detection and the protection of constitutional rights.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

[1] 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 837

[2] MANU/SC/0031/1952

[3] MANU/SC/0215/1980

[4] MANU/SC/1021/2010

[5][5] MANU/SC/0100/2020

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The post Liberty, Evidence and Cooperation: A legal analysis of Jugraj v. State of Punjab appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A Bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta dismissed the SEC’s appeal against a July 2025 Uttarakhand High Court order that had stayed the controversial clarification. The apex court upheld the High Court’s reasoning, and said the SEC’s stand was legally untenable.

“When the Statute expressly prohibits the registration of a voter in more than one territorial constituency or electoral roll, the clarification issued by the State Election Commission appears to be in the teeth of the law,” the bench observed.

The Court refused to entertain the SEC’s argument and expressed displeasure at how a statutory body could override express legislative provisions.

What the clarification said

The SEC had issued a notice stating that a candidate’s nomination would not be rejected merely because their name appeared in more than one Gram Panchayat, Territorial Constituency or Municipal Body’s electoral roll.

“The nomination paper of a candidate will not be rejected only on the ground that his name is included in the electoral roll of more than one Gram Panchayat/Territorial Constituencies/Municipal Body”, the SEC clarified

This clarification came after complaints were filed during local elections alleging that several candidates were registered in multiple rolls but were still allowed to contest. The SEC defended the move as a procedural interpretation, not a violation.

Supreme Court calls out SEC overreach

However, the Supreme Court was clear that such an administrative clarification cannot dilute or override clear provisions of the Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016. The relevant law — Section 9(6) and 9(7) — explicitly bars voters from being listed in more than one territorial constituency or electoral roll.

“The clarification appears to be contrary to the mandate of the statute. It deserves to be stayed and shall not be acted upon,” the top court ruled.

By backing the High Court’s stay, the apex court not only dismissed the SEC’s appeal but also imposed costs — sending a strong message about accountability in electoral governance.

Order of the Supreme Court dated 26.09.2025 can be read here

Petitioner flags violation of electoral integrity

The original case was filed by Shakti Singh Barthwal before the Uttarakhand High Court on July 9, 2025. He alleged that the SEC had failed to properly scrutinise nomination papers, allowing individuals registered in multiple voter lists to contest — a clear breach of election norms. His counsel, Advocates Abhijay Negi, Snigdha Tiwari and Sujoy Chatterjee, argued that the SEC’s clarification effectively legitimised a flawed process, putting the sanctity of the   electoral process at risk.

The High Court had stayed the clarification and found it to be prima facie unlawful.

High Court had already raised red flags in its order

The Division Bench of Chief Justice G Narendar and Justice Alok Mahra had earlier found the SEC’s clarification to be “in the teeth of statutory provisions.” The Court quoted Section 9(6) and 9(7) of the Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, noting that the law clearly prohibits multiple registrations, whether across panchayats or urban local bodies.

“Such a clarification goes against the express mandate of the law and cannot stand,” the High Court had said while granting an interim stay on the SEC’s action.

Order of the Uttarakhand High Court dated 11.07.2025 can be read here

The next hearing in the case is listed for December 16, 2025 before the High Court.

In Brief: what the law says [Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016]

• Section 9(6): No person can be registered in more than one territorial constituency or more than once in the same roll.
• Section 9(7): No person can be registered in a panchayat roll if they are listed on any municipal or cantonment roll — unless their name is struck off from there.

Background: SEC’s Disputed Move

The controversy stems from the SEC’s attempt to manage administrative complaints during elections by issuing a clarification that candidates need not worry about duplicate entries in different rolls. But instead of easing confusion, the move backfired legally — leading to a judicial dressing-down and now a financial penalty imposed by the Supreme Court. Election commissions are bound by statutory limits. Administrative clarifications cannot act as shortcuts around the law — a principle both the High Court and the Supreme Court have now reasserted.

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The post SC fines Uttarakhand Election Commission Rs. 2 Lakh for flouting voter roll rules appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This analysis examines both facets of this pivotal judgment.

A case of investigative failure

The case was brought up by Sukdeb Saha after his 17-year-old daughter, Ms. X, died after a fall from her hostel building in Vishakhapatnam, where she was enrolled in a coaching institute. The appellant’s plea to the Supreme Court was precipitated by a series of glaring deficiencies and contradictions in the local police investigation, which led him to lose faith in the state machinery and seek a transfer of the case to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

The Court documented the investigative lapses, which collectively painted a picture of an inquiry that was, at best, ineffective and, at worst, designed to obscure the truth. Key failures identified by the Court included:

1. The unsubstantiated suicide theory: The police hastily concluded the death was a suicide without a suicide note, psychological history, or corroborating witness statements, a conclusion the Court deemed a “post-facto justification.”
2. Contradictory CCTV evidence: Footage showed a discrepancy in the clothing of the girl seen going to the terrace and the victim found on the ground, a contradiction the police made no effort to reconcile.
3. Misrepresentation of medical state: The police and hospital claimed the victim was unconscious upon admission, but an AIIMS medical board report and eyewitness accounts confirmed she was conscious and responsive, indicating a missed opportunity to record her statement.
4. Conflict of interest: A single medical officer served as the autopsy surgeon, the chemical analyst, and a member of the internal inquiry committee, an “egregious conflict of interest” that compromised the investigation’s integrity.
5. Destruction of forensic evidence: The victim’s viscera were prematurely destroyed by the forensic lab before a court-mandated DNA comparison could be completed, an act that “irrevocably compromised the proceedings.”
6. Withholding key reports: The authorities failed to produce the Chemical Analysis Report and the final opinion on the cause of death, documents of “foundational evidentiary value.”

Based on this litany of failures, the Court concluded that the case met the “compelling necessity” standard required for transferring an investigation. It held that a CBI probe was essential to ensure impartiality, restore public confidence, and deliver justice to the bereaved family.

1.      The Sukdeb Saha Guidelines for Student Well-being

The judgment’s second, and more far-reaching, part transitions from the specific case to the systemic issue of student mental health. The Court framed the rising number of student suicides—over 13,000 in 2022 according to NCRB data—as a “deepening crisis” and a “systemic failure” of an education system that prioritizes relentless competition over holistic well-being.

Drawing a parallel to its intervention in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan[(1997) 6 SCC 241], where it filled a legislative vacuum on workplace sexual harassment, the Court invoked its powers under Article 141 of the Constitution to issue binding interim guidelines. It grounded these guidelines in the constitutional “Right to Mental Health” as an integral part of the Right to Life under Article 21, as well as India’s international law obligations.

The following 15 guidelines were issued, establishing a preventive and supportive framework applicable to all educational institutions across India until a formal legislative framework is enacted.

The Guidelines

The following are the exhaustive guidelines as laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgment:

1. All educational institutions shall adopt and implement a uniform mental health policy, drawing cues from the UMMEED [Understand, Motivate, Manage, Empathise, Empower, Develop] Draft Guidelines, the MANODARPAN initiative, and the National Suicide Prevention Strategy. This policy shall be reviewed and updated annually and made publicly accessible on institutional websites and notice boards of the institutes.
2. All educational institutions with 100 or more enrolled students shall appoint/engage at least one qualified counsellor, psychologist, or social worker with demonstrable training in child and adolescent mental health. Institutions with fewer students shall establish formal referral linkages with external mental health professionals.

III. All educational institutions shall ensure optimal student-to-counsellor ratios. Dedicated mentors or counsellors shall be assigned to smaller batches of students, especially during examination periods and academic transitions, to provide consistent, informal, and confidential support.

1. All educational institutions, more particularly the coaching institutes/centres, shall, as far as possible, refrain from engaging in batch segregation based on academic performance, public shaming, or assignment of academic targets disproportionate to students’ capacities.
2. All educational institutions shall establish written protocols for immediate referral to mental health services, local hospitals, and suicide prevention helplines. Suicide helpline numbers, including Tele-MANAS and other national services, shall be prominently displayed in hostels, classrooms, common areas, and on websites in large and legible print.
3. All teaching and non-teaching staff shall undergo mandatory training at least twice a year, conducted by certified mental health professionals, on psychological first-aid, identification of warning signs, response to self-harm, and referral mechanisms.

VII. All educational institutions shall ensure that all teaching, non-teaching, and administrative staff are adequately trained to engage with students from vulnerable and marginalised backgrounds in a sensitive, inclusive, and non-discriminatory manner. This shall include, but not be limited to, students belonging to Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), Other Backward Classes (OBC), Economically Weaker Sections (EWS), LGBTQ+ communities, students with disabilities, those in out-of-home care, and students affected by bereavement, trauma, or prior suicide attempts, or intersecting form of marginalisation.

VIII. All educational institutions shall establish robust, confidential, and accessible mechanisms for the reporting, redressal, and prevention of incidents involving sexual assault, harassment, ragging, and bullying on the basis of caste, class, gender, sexual orientation, disability, religion, or ethnicity. Every such institution shall constitute an internal committee or designated authority empowered to take immediate action on complaints and provide psycho-social support to victims. Institutions shall also maintain zero tolerance for retaliatory actions against complainants or whistle-blowers. In all such cases, immediate referral to trained mental health professionals must be ensured, and the student’s safety, physical and psychological, shall be prioritised. Failure to take timely or adequate action in such cases, especially where such neglect contributes to a student’s self-harm or suicide, shall be treated as institutional culpability, making the administration liable to regulatory and legal consequences.

1. All educational Institutions shall regularly organise sensitisation programmes (physical and/or online) for parents and guardians on student mental health. It shall be the duty of the institution to sensitise the parents and guardians to avoid placing undue academic pressure, to recognise signs of psychological distress, and to respond empathetically and supportively. Further, mental health literacy, emotional regulation, life skills education, and awareness of institutional support services shall be integrated into student orientation programmes and co-curricular activities.
2. All educational institutions shall maintain anonymised records and prepare an annual report indicating the number of wellness interventions, student referrals, training sessions, and mental health-related activities. This report shall be submitted to the relevant regulatory authority, which may be the State Education Department, University Grants Commission (UGC), All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE), Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), or as otherwise indicated.
3. All educational institutions shall prioritise extracurricular activities, including sports, arts, and personality development initiatives. Examination patterns shall be periodically reviewed to reduce academic burden and to cultivate a broader sense of identity among students beyond test scores and ranks.

XII. All educational institutions, including coaching centres and training institutes, shall provide regular, structured career counselling services for students and their parents or guardians. These sessions shall be conducted by qualified counsellors and shall aim to reduce unrealistic academic pressure, promote awareness of diverse academic and professional pathways, and assist students in making informed and interest-based career decisions. Institutions shall ensure that such counselling is inclusive, sensitive to socio-economic and psychological contexts, and does not reinforce narrow definitions of merit or success.

XIII. All residential-based educational institutions, including hostel owners, wardens and caretakers, shall take proactive steps to ensure that campuses remain free from harassment, bullying, drugs, and other harmful substances, thereby ensuring a safe and healthy living and learning environment for all students.

XIV. All residential-based institutions shall install tamper-proof ceiling fans or equivalent safety devices, and shall restrict access to rooftops, balconies, and other high-risk areas, in order to deter impulsive acts of self-harm.

1. All coaching hubs, including but not limited to Jaipur, Kota, Sikar, Chennai, Hyderabad, Delhi, Mumbai, and other cities where students migrate in large numbers for competitive examination preparation, shall implement heightened mental health protections and preventive measures. These regions, having witnessed disproportionately high incidents of student suicides, require special attention. The concerned authorities, namely, the Department of Education, District Administration, and management of educational institutions, shall ensure the provision of regular career counselling for students and parents, regulation of academic pressure through structured academic planning, availability of continuous psychological support, and the establishment of institutional mechanisms for monitoring and accountability to safeguard student mental well-being.

2.      Enforcement and accountability

To ensure these guidelines are not merely advisory, the Court established a robust, time-bound enforcement and accountability mechanism:

1. State-level action: All States and Union Territories were directed to notify rules for the registration and regulation of private coaching centers within two months, incorporating the mental health safeguards.
2. District-level oversight: A District-Level Monitoring Committee, chaired by the District Magistrate/Collector, should be constituted in every district to oversee implementation, conduct inspections, and handle complaints.
3. Central accountability & judicial supervision: The Union of India was directed to file a compliance affidavit within 90 days. The Supreme Court has retained supervisory jurisdiction, listing the matter for a follow-up hearing on October 27, 2025, to review compliance.

In conclusion, the Sukdeb Saha judgment is a powerful judicial intervention that addresses both an individual plea for justice and a national social crisis. It sets a new precedent for holding institutions accountable for the mental well-being of students and provides a comprehensive, actionable framework to foster safer and more supportive educational environments across India. However, whether this will materialise into effective implementation, that too in the face of powerful coaching and education business lobby across India is yet to be seen.

 (The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

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