The BJP’s reaction, though seemingly focused on the Tamil Nadu vs. Governor judgement, seemed excessive in relation to the judgment itself. While the ruling does hold weight in political terms, it does not seem to warrant the level of aggression directed at the judiciary. There are numerous options to deal with the restrictions the judgement imposes on BJP’s agenda like a review or adjustments could be pursued without needing to escalate tensions with the Court in such a dramatic manner. This suggests that the real concern is not just about the Governor’s judgment but rather about broader fears over the judiciary’s increasing influence in matters closely tied to the BJP’s ideological agenda.

When viewed alongside the ongoing challenge to the 2025 Waqf Amendment, however, the intensity of the response becomes clearer. The Waqf issue is far more central to the BJP’s ideological vision, and any judicial involvement in the matter feels far more significant to the party. In this context, the backlash against the Supreme Court over the Governor case can be seen less as a reaction to that judgment alone and more as part of a broader effort to signal the BJP’s discomfort with judicial interventions in areas it views as essential to its agenda.

To fully understand this dynamic, it’s essential to also look at the history of the Waqf Act, 1995 particularly the 2013 amendment, shaped by the Sachar Committee Report and the 2008 Joint Parliamentary Committee Report. This article will explore the context of that amendment, its shortcomings and later discuss what prompts these kinds of changes in the legal regime by majoritarian governments. A detailed look examination of the 2024/25 Amendment can be read here.

The Sachar Committee Report: Unveiling disparities and untapped potential

Commissioned by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government in March 2005, the seven-member High Level Committee, chaired by Justice Rajindar Sachar, was tasked with preparing a comprehensive report on the social, economic, and educational status of the Muslim community in India. Submitted in November 2006 and tabled in Parliament shortly after, the Sachar Committee Report became a landmark document, providing stark evidence of the developmental deficits faced by Indian Muslims relative to national averages.

The Committee recommended targeted programs for skill development, credit access, and market support, particularly in backward districts and clusters where Muslim artisans were concentrated.

Crucially, the Sachar Report shone a spotlight on Waqf properties as a vast, yet profoundly underutilised, resource for potential community development. It identified over 4.9 lakh registered Waqf properties across India, encompassing an estimated 6 lakh acres of land.^[1] While the book value was pegged at Rs. 6,000 crores, the Committee estimated the market value to be significantly higher, potentially around Rs. 1.2 lakh crores (in 2006). Despite this immense asset base, the annual income generated was a mere Rs. 163 crores, representing a paltry 2.7% return on the decades-old book value. The report contrasted this with the potential for generating at least Rs. 12,000 crores annually (a 10% return on estimated market value) if the properties were managed efficiently and put to marketable use.

The Committee implicitly and explicitly pointed towards significant mismanagement, widespread encroachment (including alleged unauthorised occupation by government agencies), and administrative inefficiencies as key reasons for this underperformance.^[2] It recommended strengthening Waqf administration, applying laws like the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 to remove encroachments, recovering rent arrears at market rates, and potentially exempting Waqf properties from certain restrictive laws (like Rent Control Acts) to unlock their potential.^[3] The Sachar Report thus framed Waqf not just as a matter of religious endowment management but as a critical potential resource for addressing the very socio-economic backwardness it had documented, creating a strong impetus for reform.

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013 v/s The Waqf Act, 1995: A comparative overview

A Joint Parliamentary Committee on Waqf was constituted on 2nd January 2006 by the Rajya Sabha Chairman in consultation with the Lok Sabha Speaker to assess the Waqf Act’s implementation, to suggest amendments for retrieving encroached properties, and improve the functioning of the Central Waqf Council and State Waqf Boards.

The report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Waqf on Amendments to the Waqf Act, 1995 presented on March 4, 2008 suggested changes to make the 1995 Act more effective, particularly in achieving the retrieval of encroached Waqf properties. This Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), formed in 2006, analysed numerous suggestions and proposed substantial amendments.

Key recommendations focused on tightening the Act’s framework:

• Adding clear definitions for ‘Encroacher’ and ‘Waqf Premises’;
• Mandating faster (within one year) and more frequent (every 10 years) state-funded surveys of Waqf properties, including those existing since 1947, and giving these surveys legal weight in revenue records.
• Strengthening Waqf Tribunals by expanding their composition (including a judicial chair, a civil servant, and a Muslim law expert), granting them exclusive jurisdiction over Waqf cases, and setting time limits for decisions.
• Enhancing the Central Waqf Council’s advisory role and potentially transforming it into a commission with supervisory powers.
• Restructuring State Waqf Boards with elected and nominated members and defining procedures for removing the Chairman.
• Specifying qualifications for the CEO (must be Muslim, appointed from a Board-suggested panel).
• Drastically curtailing the alienation of Waqf property by declaring sales void and allowing leases only under strict conditions.
• Significantly strengthening anti-encroachment measures by empowering the CEO with eviction powers (akin to a Collector), defining encroachment broadly, introducing hefty penalties (imprisonment and fines) for encroachers (as a cognisable offence), and penalising negligent public servants; and asserting the Waqf Act’s precedence over conflicting local revenue laws.

The JPC also suggested establishing national bodies for Waqf property development and promoting education among Muslims, leveraging surplus funds.

In pursuance of the report, an amendment was made.

Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013(Amendment Act, 2013), introduced several significant changes to the Waqf Act, 1995, aiming to address issues highlighted by the Sachar Committee and other stakeholders. Here’s a comparison of key provisions altered by the 2013 amendment:

• Nomenclature and Definitions
  • 1995 Act: Used the spelling “Waqf”. Definitions did not exist for term “encroacher” and a limited definition existed for “Waqf”. ((Section 3(s)2))
  • 2013 Amendment: Standardised the spelling to “Waqf” throughout. It expanded the definition of “encroacher” to explicitly cover those occupying property after lease/license expiry or termination. The definition of “Waqf” was broadened to explicitly include certain communal land entries (Shamlat Patti, etc.). It also added the requirement for a mutawalli (manager) to be an Indian citizen and allowed states to set further qualifications. (Sections 2 and 5 of the Amendment Act, 2013)
• Survey of Waqf Properties
  • 1995 Act: Provided for the survey of Waqf properties by a Survey Commissioner appointed by the State Government (Section 4).
  • 2013 Amendment: Mandated the completion of surveys within one year if not already done, requiring the appointment of Survey Commissioners where necessary. This aimed to address the issue of incomplete or outdated property records. (Section 6 the Amendment Act, 2013)
• Protection Against Encroachment
  • 1995 Act: Section 54 outlined procedures for removing encroachers, but enforcement was often seen as weak. Tribunals had powers to handle disputes.
  • 2013 Amendment: Strengthened Tribunal powers to assess damages from unauthorized occupation and recover them as land revenue arrears. It also introduced penalties for public servants failing to prevent or remove encroachments. This was a direct response to the widespread encroachment problem (Sections 9 of the Amendment Act, 2013).
• Alienation of Waqf Property
  • 1995 Act: Contained restrictions on alienation, requiring Board sanction for leases, sales, exchanges, or mortgages.

2013 Amendment: Imposed a stricter regime by explicitly prohibiting the sale, gift, mortgage, or exchange of Waqf property altogether. (Section 31 of the Amendment Act, 2013)

Leases were permitted but generally capped at 30 years, requiring prior Board sanction and adherence to regulations ensuring market-based rent. This aimed to prevent the permanent loss of Waqf assets. (Section 35 of the Amendment Act, 2013)

• Waqf Tribunals
  • 1995 Act: Established State-level Waqf Tribunals for dispute resolution. Their decisions were indeed subject to High Court review. The composition included judicial and administrative officers, and often an expert in Muslim law.
  • 2013 Amendment: Formalised the three-member structure for Tribunals: (i) a judicial officer (Chairperson), (ii) a senior state civil servant, and (iii) explicitly, a person with knowledge of Muslim law and jurisprudence. The amendment maintained the status of Tribunal decisions. (Section 43 of the Amendment Act, 2013)
• State Waqf Boards and Central Waqf Council:
  • 1995 Act: Established State Waqf Boards for management and a Central Waqf Council primarily for advisory functions. Board composition varied but was predominantly Muslim.
  • 2013 Amendment: Mandated the inclusion of at least two women members in each State Waqf Board. It significantly strengthened the powers of the Central Waqf Council, enabling it to issue binding directives to State Boards on performance, record maintenance, surveys, encroachment handling, and financial reporting, aiming for greater central oversight and accountability. (Sections 11 and 13 of the Amendment Act, 2013)
• Financial Accountability:
  • 1995 Act: Under Section 72, the mutawalli of every waqf was supposed to pay an amount not exceeding 7% of waqf’s annual income to the Board.
  • 2013 Amendment: Ensured that mutawallis can claim up to 20% for farming costs as deduction from the net annual income of which 7% was to be paid to the Board —but only if they farm the land themselves, not if it’s leased out. It also reinforced the need for regular auditing of Waqf accounts. (Section 41 of the Amendment Act, 2013)

In essence, the 2013 amendments sought to tighten controls, enhance protections, clarify definitions, and increase oversight compared to the 1995 framework, largely influenced by the issues raised in the Sachar Report.

The 2013 Amendments- An examination

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013, emerged from a context demanding urgent reform. The Sachar Committee Report had laid bare not only the socio-economic challenges facing Indian Muslims but also remarked on the inefficiency in leveraging Waqf properties for community benefit. Coupled with long-standing criticisms of the 1995 Act’s implementation, including issues highlighted by Joint Parliamentary Committees (JPCs), the pressure to act was significant. K. Rahman Khan, the then Union Minister for Minority Affairs, spearheaded the legislative effort, presenting it as a product of wide consultations.

While the amendments introduced seemingly positive changes like stricter alienation rules and enhanced central oversight, they failed to address the root causes of mismanagement and underutilisation in a comprehensive manner. The focus seemed skewed towards strengthening controls and administrative structures on paper, rather than ensuring practical implementation, capacity building, and, crucially, facilitating the development potential highlighted by Sachar.

A major shortcoming was the failure to translate the Sachar Committee’s vision of Waqf as a development resource into reality. The 2013 Act lacked robust mechanisms or incentives to encourage the productive and marketable use of Waqf assets. While preventing alienation is important, simply locking up properties without facilitating their development does little to generate the income needed for education, healthcare, or skill development initiatives. The establishment of the National Waqf Development Corporation (NAWADCO) under Minister Khan’s tenure seemed promising, but its subsequent failure to gain traction shows the lack of a sustained, well-thought-out strategy for development within the 2013 framework. This suggests a superficial engagement with the Sachar report’s core economic argument, possibly rushed through without adequate planning for execution.

Furthermore, the amendments enhanced the powers of Waqf Boards and the Central Council but seemingly without sufficient attention to improving their operational capacity, transparency, or accountability on the ground. The persistence of issues like incomplete surveys years after the mandated deadline , continued widespread encroachment despite new penalties, mismanagement and corruption point to a significant gap between legislative intent and administrative reality. Empowering bodies without ensuring they have the resources, skills, and robust oversight needed for effective functioning can be counterproductive. This suggests the reforms may have been pushed through without fully considering the practical challenges of implementation across diverse state contexts.

The declaration by Minister Khan, upon the Act’s passage, that it was “perfect” seems indicative of an overestimation of the legislative changes and perhaps an underestimation of the deep-seated systemic problems. Consequently, the 2013 amendments, despite being presented as a definitive solution, ultimately proved inadequate. Their failure to effectively tackle mismanagement, unlock development potential, or ensure consistent enforcement created a vacuum. This environment of unresolved issues and perceived shortcomings – stemming perhaps from a rushed legislative process that prioritized symbolic changes over deep institutional reform – arguably paved the way for the more drastic and ill-motivated amendments proposed in 2025. The legacy of the 2013 Act is thus one of missed opportunities and incomplete reform, highlighting the pitfalls of addressing complex governance challenges with hurried legislative fixes.

Why is BJP badgering for a Waqf Reform?

Despite the hawkish stance BJP has taken consistently against institutions that could hold it accountable-from media to the Election Commission and even judiciary to an extent, it never was public with its rupture with the judiciary. It found no difficulty in arranging post-retirement plum posts for some influential judges like Chief Justice (as he was then) Ranjan Gogoi, Justice Arun Misra, Justice Abdul Nazeer etc. However, this time, it has found Waqf hearings serious enough to rake up an issue that it otherwise would not have- the scope of judicial review of the Supreme Court. This is a mighty issue and a 240 seat BJP is not cut out for it. And yet, we see how the party is willing to take its chance, especially during the Waqf Hearings. Why?

Waqf has featured in BJP’s Election manifestos for a while now. In the 1998 election manifesto, the party promised that it will protect Waqf properties from being usurped by unscrupulous individuals and help Waqf boards to develop these properties for the welfare of poor Muslim families. In the 2009 BJP’s manifesto  stated that will examine the recommendations of the Joint Parliamentary Committee regarding Waqf properties, and would, in consultation with Muslim religious leaders, take steps to remove encroachments from and unauthorised occupation of waqf properties. In its 2014 manifesto, the last one which mentions Waqf, the party stated that it will empower Waqf Boards in consultation with religious leaders; taking steps to remove encroachments from and unauthorized occupation of Waqf properties. The 2019 and 2024 manifestos restricted themselves to mentioning Triple Talaq and did not have any mention of Waqf. While not giving space in the manifesto, the BJP led NDA government has given space for Waqf in its legislative agenda. This points to a deeper, ideology driven agenda.

From Locke’s labour theory of property in Two Treatises of Government to Hegel’s concept of property as the externalisation of free will in the Philosophy of Right, the Western philosophical canon has long enshrined property ownership as intrinsic to personal liberty and political agency. Liberal theorists such as John Stuart Mill and modern defenders of Rawlsian distributive justice have further situated property within the architecture of equal citizenship, whereby the capacity to hold and transfer property undergirds the social contract and democratic legitimacy. In this tradition, property is not merely a material possession but a socially sanctioned claim to recognition, status, and autonomy. Thus, the disruption of minority property rights often signals a deeper project of political unmaking and ontological negation. As Hannah Arendt articulates in The Origins of Totalitarianism, the erasure of the “right to have rights” is a revocation of a right leading to statelessness, Historically, this logic has been basis of violent projects of ethnonational purification: the Nazi regime’s Verreichlichung (Aryanization) of Jewish assets, the legal dispossession of Armenians under Ottoman decrees such as the 1915 Abandoned Properties Law show how property becomes both a terrain and instrument of racialized statecraft. Property regimes, far from being neutral or apolitical, thus emerge as critical sites where inclusion is conferred or denied.

While the Waqf Amendment, 2025 does not have the same level of intensity as the extreme laws stated above, the concerning fact is that these amendments constitute an othering of the property relations relating to charity for the Muslims. When combined with the vehemence with which the BJP has been trying to enact laws that specifically exclude or target Muslim minorities (Criminalisation of Triple Talaq, Citizenship Amendment), Waqf Amendment, 2025 is not only an opportunity missed to reform Waqf system for the better, but also a not-so-sly attempt to promote majoritarianism.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

^[1] Pg.240, Sachar Committee Report. Available at:https://minorityaffairs.gov.in/WriteReadData/RTF1984/7830578798.pdf

^[2] Pg. 243, Sachar Committee Report

^[3] Pg. 255, Sachar Committee Report

Related:

Waqf Amendment Act 2025: An erosion of rights under the garb of reform

Amendments to the Waqf Law were needed, but the grab-and-control Waqf Amendment Act, 2025 is not the answer

The AMU Teachers’ Association (AMUTA) and Waqf Worries: Ordinary members of the Qaum are caught between a self-serving elite and a majoritarian Regime

The Waqf Bill 2024: An Open Letter to the Joint Committee of Parliament, the Opposition, and India’s Muslim Communities

The post ‘Reforms’: Sachar Committee, the 2013 Amendments and the motive behind the proposed changes in the Waqf Regime appeared first on SabrangIndia.

There exists a deep communication gap even among the non-partisan (voices) on the issue of the Waqf. This needs to be bridged. Every society and religion have provisions and practices, both related to charity and public welfare. In present day India, an era of majoritarian ascendance and minority-bashing, weaponising of this welfarist institutional –even noble– practice is easy. On the other hand, huge Waqf assets and proceeds have been (unfairly) controlled and siphoned off by some among the self-serving religious and secular elites among Muslims in connivance with (sic) the state and state-regulated Waqf Boards, for decades. This duality is a double whammy for the average Muslim citizen, regardless of whether the political dispensation has been overtly anti-Muslim or ostensibly pluralist.

An instance from my ancestral village

In my own native village in rural north Bihar, there are at least three to four graveyards. The largest one is, as per documentation, owned by some families, but used for community burials by all Muslim castes (biradris) and classes of the village. Another one is owned by three specific families. In the three contiguous graveyards, each family buries its own dead in their respective spots. Yet another one, adjacent to it, belongs to the Muslim communities of Mir-Shikars, Rayeens, Mansuris (Pasmanda Muslim communities). The land is said to have been donated by a Bhumihar-Brahman– Hindu upper caste — landlord of the village, the economic status of whose descendants are reported to have dwindled very significantly. What happens then if the (2025 amended provision) of “Waqf by user” is applied to these graveyards in my native village which fall under Waqf properties, without detailed documentation. As per the just legislated law (Waqf Amendment Act 2025), the Hindu inheritors of these lands may claim their ownership (!!) and one can then imagine the socio-political fallout, particularly in an era of “everyday communalism”.

The older mosque of my ancestral village stands on a piece of land which belonged to a widow without any children. The rest of the plot of the land is home to the house of the legal inheritors of the donor, who possess their document of proprietorship. On and off, some other villagers, hostile to, or envious of, the descendant who owns the house (legal inheritor), keep claiming that the rest of the plot of the land (apart from that on which the mosque stands) too belongs to the Waqf (mosque). Thus, a dispute has been kept alive, intra-Muslim. The very same widow-donor is said to have donated another plot of her land and the produce from this other plot of land is s meant for the costs and upkeep (chiraghi, i.e, lighting) of the mosque. This has been all through oral endowments, not documented. If oral practice were not followed, the legal inheritor of the widow-donor could/can always reclaim the land. Recently, certain “pious” people of the village expressed their intent to sell away that part of the land so that a tall, 80-feet tall minar (spire) could be built! Without such an imposing minar, the identity of a newly arrived, affluent (neo-rich) Muslims cannot be displayed, a phenomenon that also creates a sense of awe (and dominance) among both Muslims and Hindus of the locality. This handful of demonstrably “pious” villagers — with pretensions to religious education and knowledge of the Shariah—choose to forget the fact that a Waqf land cannot be put to use for any purpose other than for what has been specified by the donor (Waqif). They also choose to forget the fact that in the face of the non-existence of any written documentation and the lack of registration of such details with the Waqf Board; or non-registration in a court of law to that effect, their step would/could encounter a big obstacle. Who would be the “seller” in the land-registration office? The seller, in such a scenario, has necessarily to be a legal inheritor of the land. That the newly constructed tall minar on the northern wall of the mosque (the metallic road touches the northern wall of the mosque, hence, it involves another question of legality) would (or could) attract the attention of Hindu religious processions and therefore it is (also) potentially explosive– another important issue– that I put aside at the moment. [On more than one occasion, some instances of communal conflict that revolve around the “spot” of religious structures in the past have also brewed on the misplaced priorities of local Muslim communities, who otherwise perennially complain of educational and economic backwardness).

Religiosity of the Waqf

Some academic works, for instance, Khalid Rashid (1978), Gregory Kozlowsky (1985), P. Munawar Husain (2021), etc., on the theme of Waqf, also throw up some important questions:

Is the creation and existence of Waqf strictly as per the Sharia? The Holy Quran makes no mention of awqaf or any institution similar to them. Abu Hanifa (AD 699-767 AD) “disapproved of the institution”?  Collections of the fatawa of religious scholars in India have contained both favourable and un-favourable statements on the institution of Waqf.

Waqf, in actual practice, was not necessarily and strictly either a charitable trust or a foundation of faith. Many of these, such as the Waqf-e-Aulad, were/are selfish practices too, besides of course, also being altruistic. In this specific category (Waqf-e-Aulad), the maximum proceeds of most of awqaf are theoretically and practically earmarked for the members of the family and kinship. Every Waqif (donor) wanted his or her offspring to inherit the fruits of that ingenuity of the [Waqf], to preserve the world of their founders.

The British Indian court’s approach towards following literal Quranic rules of inheritance made Muslim landholders carve out other “legal” ways of preserving the holdings by creating awqaf. Therefore, beginning in 1879, the High Courts of India handed down a series of decisions which overturned any endowment considered to benefit primarily the settler’s own family. The Privy Council in 1894 observed that Muslim endowments must be religious and “charitable”; public, not private. The Courts’ premise was: Muslims ought to follow their own Holy Scripture, Quran, to inherit parental assets.

Who were the mutawallis (managers) of the earliest Awqaf, viz., Khyber, Sawad (Iraq, which was then a part of Iran), and Ramlah in Palestine, founded in 912 AD) Waqf by Faiq, a eunuch, distinguished as having the earliest written record (on a stone tablet)? All of these three earliest awqaf (s) in Islamic history became non-existent due to encroachment by soldiers and other influential elites in the early centuries of Islam. “Military and political leaders gradually appropriated the territory’s income. Such encroachment on endowments was by no means rare. Though awqaf aimed at permanence, few attained it”. The Buwayhids, a family of Iranian, not Arab origin, had a hand in dismembering that [Sawad] endowment.

The creation of Waqf, in most cases — as observed by judges during British colonial rule –had more to do with circumventing the Quranically defined rights of inheritance and division/distribution of the properties (estates) and their proceeds among his/her heirs. Waqf-creation was a way of putting a complete restriction on sale and purchase of the assets/properties by the heirs.  “Waqf is a (unique)/typical phenomenon which partakes the characteristics of endowment, gift and many such sister concepts but, at the same time, stands apart”. “The removal of encroachments upon the Waqf properties is relegated to the executive wing rather than a judicial exercise. The appointment and removal of mutawallis is another complicated issue”.

In the early years of the 19th century, a number of persons from India’s Muslim elite began to convert their property into awqaf. This was a way to protect their family’s fortunes and the social prominence which accompanied it. In both kinds of awqaf, viz., Waqf-e-Aam (exclusively for charitable purposes) and Waqf-e-Aulad, through mutawllis (managers), self-interest could be both preserved and perpetuated.

In 1879, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (when he was in the Viceroy’s legislative council) published an article in his Urdu journal, Tazhib- al-Akhlaq, titled “A plan for saving Muslim Families from destruction and extinction” (“Ek Tadbir: Mussalmanon ke Khandanon ko Tabahi awr Barbadi se Bachaane ki“). In this article, he noted, that a Waqf was “allowed”, or “permitted” (mujaz). Could this mean that while he did not outright disapprove of the practice, he was not a vocal supporter of the institution?

Sir Syed’s four important concerns were: (a) that the property placed in a Waqf be accurately and fully described. (b) his proposal insisted that, once drawn up, a waqfnamah (deed of Waqf) be registered with the district officer or the district collector or magistrate; (c) The shares of the waqf‘s income had to be precisely laid out in the Waqfnamah. (d) Also, the succession to the office of mutawalli had to be clearly established. He wanted the Muslim waqifs to introduce significant content of charity in their waqf so that the European judges may not “mis-read” it as lacking in charity.

Ameer Ali (1849-1928) however disagreed with Sir Syed; Shibli (1857-1914) in his 21-pages long essay on Waqf-e-Aulad (1908) argued that even this form of Waqf is charitable, which endorsed Ameer Ali. Shibli’s theologically premised argument was less convincing as the Waqf-e-Aulad does not promise charity for the ordinary, common Muslim. Eventually, bending under the pressure of the Muslim orthodoxy, Sir Syed was not able to propose the draft-bill in the Imperial Legislative Council.

Interesting facts about some Indian Awqaf: A Muslim woman in Bengal even allowed her deed of Waqf to begin with an invocation to the goddess Durga. In Tamil, a mutawalli preferred to be called Dharmakarta –indigenous usage not Persio-Arabic terminology. Najiban, a tawaif of Bareilly also created a Waqf. It was only when the British Indian State ran interference that the Hoogly College[1] was established out of the Waqf created by Mohd Mohsin. The deed of the Mohd Mohsin Waqf did not have such a provision. Since the period of Caliph Umar’s (the awqaf of Khyber and Sawad), the Awqaf were always under “direct” control of the state.

India’s Waqf estates (Charitable endowments) earmarked for modern education, healthcare and similar welfare activities

Mohammad Mohsin (1732-1812) of Hooghly created a Waqf. It was only with the intervention of the East India Company (colonial) state, that the Waqf established a college in 1836 (Chinsura, West Bengal), now affiliated to the Burdwan University. This College produced alumni such as Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Muzaffar Ahmed, ABM Habibullah, and many more in various fields, including films and sports. Subsequently, with interventions of the Calcutta reformist, Abdul Latif (d. 1893), scholarships and other stipends for students were also instituted, out of the income from the Mohsin Waqf estate.

In Haryana and Kashmir, some educational institutions are also run by Waqf, though, it is unclear, how much of the running costs are contributed by the financial grants of the Waqf Boards via the provincial government’s ministries of minority affairs. This is something that needs to be brought out more clearly.

There are many Waqfs within the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) which provided land and scholarship to students. The noted Physicist Prof Wali Mohammad (1886-1968) is one such person who created Waqf for AMU. A students’ residential Hall (with many hostels) for engineering students, has been constructed on the Waqf land donated by Professor Wali Mohammad, in the 1990s. The Hall, meant for the Engineering students, got named after Nadim Tarin, for the reasons one fails to understand. Thus, the donor (Waqif) of the land, despite being a noted Physicist, has been sadly anonymized, almost completely erased from the history of AMU and its donors. This action was not performed by any anti-Muslim political party. There are many more Waqf lands within AMU which await a transparent acknowledgement and display (of inherited ownership) on the AMU website to ensure comprehensive wider public knowledge and also, accountability. The AMU has also been losing its lands frequently and intermittently, in one or other ways.

“Muslim waqfs and endowments are an old institution but like most other assets, have been generally mismanaged… generations past have been dissatisfied with the way Muslim Waqifs and Mutawallis,… and the governments, have handled waqf properties. Islamic governments have done no better, and in India” too the British imperialist and secular republican governments have fared no better, wrote, the economist and former Vice Chancellor of AMU, A M Khusro, in his Foreword to Khalid Rashid’s book (1978). 

Contentious legislative histories of the Waqf in India

After the failed attempt of Sir Syed in 1879, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, astute politician that he was, jumped into the Waqf fray, ostensibly to protect the interests of the Muslim landed elites who needed the Waqf Validation Act of 1913. This Act, supported by the colonial state, aimed to safeguard the landed assets of these elites, who were seen as potential allies against a growing anti-colonial movement. The Swadeshi Movement, which opposed the religious-communal partition of Bengal, had forced the colonial state to annul the (Bengal) partition in 1911-192, necessitating a political arrangement to secure Muslim support. So much so that, unlike the Sir Syed’s draft (1879), Jinnah (1913) also succeeded in getting a clause added that stated that the registration of a Waqfnamah was not mandatory.

Subsequently, Jinnah enlisted more consolidated support of Muslims through the Shariat Act of 1937 which was based on the Aurangzeb era codification of Shariat, Fatawa-e-Alamgiri of the late 17^th century. Through the Shariat Act 1937-1939, he secured hugely consolidated political support of the separatist Muslim elites and soon after, he succeeded in winning Pakistan for them. Pakistan reformed Muslim Personal Laws in March 1961. Many other Muslim countries have introduced reforms but India’s Muslims continue to resist state interference not only in the issue of the un-Quranic Instant Triple Talaq but also in the AMU’s malignant governance and gross abuse of autonomy[2]

It is also not be out of place to mention here that presently India has 32 Waqf Boards, with only Bihar and UP having separate Waqf Boards for Shias and Sunnis. The Dawoodi Bohra community, historically, has shown a preference for managing their religious properties through trusts rather than under the purview of Waqf Boards. This preference stems from their unique religious governance structure, which centralises authority in the al-Dai-al-Mutlaq.

Moral weakness of building resistance and solidarity

While the “liberal” (or, less illiberal) era of the Indian republic has often been obliging of the Muslim regressive tendencies, the current majoritarian era pursues its own divisive political agenda. For instance, it has criminalised the Instant Triple Talaq (ITT) in 2019 but did not strengthen the provisions of maintenance to the divorced women. Whereas, the Supreme Court’s verdict (in the Danial Latifi case 2001) had already clarified that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (MWPRD) does provide for maintenance, surely the 2019 Act should have further strengthened the provision? Especially since, maintenance for the divorced women is the most crucial aspect of this issue in the sphere of both equity and rights?

Such has been the political history of India’s Muslims in the 20^th century (colonial and republican eras) and their stubbornness against state intervention to any reform that they have foregone the moral strength needed to resist the Waqf Amendment Act 2025. Worse, this kind and character of Muslim politics, particularly since the 1980s, has been identified by many scholars as a contributing factor to the rise of majoritarianism in India today. Concealing the pathetic aspect of widespread mismanagement of Waqf assets for decades, will now further deplete the moral strength required to build understanding and solidarity required to resist an unwanted law.

Pertinently, the need for a satisfactory political arrangement to safeguard any monopoly on landed assets is equally applicable for Hindu Mahanths and their Mutths. The current dispensation is not concerned about these Hindu institutions which also suffer from similar ills of non-transparent mal-functioning. Unfortunately, it is also true that the institution of Mahanths and Maths remains under-explored academically by historians of Peasant and Agrarian Relations. [Prakash Jha’s film Mrityudand (1997) attempts to depict some of the degenerative aspects of the institution of Mahanth, but this was a melodramatic depiction on celluloid].

The BJP-dominated regime has no intention of introducing a similar law to reform this Hindu institution of Mahanths’ Muths. This is therefore an additional reason why Muslim communities and justice-loving people look upon the Waqf Amendment Act 2025 with alarming concern. The legislative control that it seeks to seize gives a clear impression of targeting only Muslims with this discriminatory treatment.

Specifically, there is a real apprehension that the (amended) Act –presently under challenge—will turn into a tool to harass Muslims by the sinister and wide network of local majoritarian forces and outfits in those smaller villages and mohallas where the written deeds of Waqf and mosques are not available, as is the case with the abovementioned instance from my own ancestral village. Another alarming aspect of the Act is the Places of Worship Act, 1991 falling under the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act, 1904. According to Kapil Sibal[3] , this specific aspect was also concealed from the Members of Parliament from the Opposition, right until the day it was finally debated in the two Houses of Parliament.

Many scholars also feel that Israel –in West Asia—has also played this politics of usurping available Waqf land and thereby pursuing the politics of dispossessing the Arabs by illegitimate means. Haitam Suleiman and Robert Home in their 2010 essay demonstrate that most Waqf property within Israel has been expropriated by the Israeli state under Absentee Property Laws, a sensitive and complicated issue within the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This instance justifiably alarms India’s Muslims further, about the BJP’s intent.

Briefly, to sum up. India’s Waqf urgently need reforms in terms of actualising the maximum potential of revenue, proceeds, and its use for charitable purposes, that is, towards capacity-building for the weaker sections of the citizenry. Khalid Rashid (1978) estimated that Waqf assets actualise only a mere 3.5% of its actual promise in terms of use for charitable purposes. Waqf land need to be protected from encroachers. Waqf-loot happens with the connivance of both the state and the Muslim elite controlling the Waqf Boards.

The Act legislated in 2025 doesn’t promise any such reformatory intent not does it reflect any sincerity towards breaking this nexus (between the state and the Waqf-looting elites). Protecting the Waqf and realizing its basic objective of charity and welfare remains as elusive as ever. A more thorough and sincere implementation of the Waqf (Amendment) Act 2013 –with some amendments– would have been a more constructive step rather than legislating a new law.

Finally, it must also be notes that a large proportion of Waqf property comprises graveyards (Qabristan) which do not yield any income. A paltry section (mostly orally endowed and unregistered) Waqf assets are owned by village/Mohalla mosques (which are maintained through meagre resources or no income). These “assets” add to the quantum of property of Waqfs, but do not yield returns. This is the point that the Sachar Report (2006), which highlighted the poverty of India’s Muslim minority, failed to note. However, the Sachar Report did reveal that, “There are more than 4.9 lakh registered Wakfs [Waqf estates and assets] spread across the country but the current annual income from these properties is only about Rs.163 crores, which amounts to a meagre rate of return of 2.7 percent…. The current… market value (income to be generated out) of [these] Wakf properties can be put at Rs.1.2 lakh crore.

The present, BJP-dominated NDA-III regime, therefore, should have considered emulating Turkey whose laws of 1868 and 1924 make the Waqf institutions more robust in terms of education, healthcare, municipal and civic amenities and even in disaster relief. Politically, such an emulation may have helped the BJP outsmarting the Opposition, without creating the attendant social friction.

The author is a professor, Modern and Contemporary Indian History, Aligarh Muslim University, and author of Muslim Politics in Bihar: Changing Contours.

(This article is an expanded version of Outlook’s May 1, 2025 issue ‘Username Waqf’ where it appeared under the title, ‘A Fractured Timeline’; this is an expanded version being published at the specific request of the author, a regular columnist with Sabrangindia)

[1]  Two decades later than their first venture, the British rulers made another effort to engage Muslims in their pattern of education by taking control of the Imambada Madrasa at Hooghly run under the endowment made by Haji Mohammed Mohsin in 1806. Now it is functioning as the oldest law college in the country, named as Hooghly Mohsin College in 1937.

[2] https://www.academia.edu/127645531/UGC_Draft_Regulations_2025_Question_of_Univ_Autonomy_and_AMUs_Abuse_of_Autonomy).

[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VYQEyPP-A2M; Kapil Sibal Calls Waqf Bill Unconstitutional, Alleges Political Agenda

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Ram  and  Hanuman  in  Bengali  popular  psyche

To  come  down  to  brass  tacks,  Ram  and  Hanuman  had  always  been  butts  of  ridicule  in  Bengali  popular  sayings.  To  quote  one  –  “Kala  khelo  jato  bandor,  rajya  pelo  Ramchandar”  (Ram  acquired  the  throne  due  to  the  banana-chewing  monkeys) .   The  followers  of  Ram  are  looked  down  upon  as  exploiters  and  humbugs,  as  the  following  saying  indicates:  “ Ram  nam  mukhey,  chhuri  rekhey bukey”  (They  swear  by  the  name  of  Ram,  while  threatening  us  with  a  dagger  at  our  chests).  (Re:  Sushil  Kumar  Dey:  Bangla  Prabad).

In   Bengali  colloquial  slang,  the  name  Ram  is  often  used  in  a  derisive  and  derogatory  sense   –  like  the  term   Ram-chhagal  (a  goat  named  Ram)  to  describe  a  fat  goat.  It  is  also  used  as  a  suffix  in  terms  like  Boka-Ram  (a  foolish  Ram)  to  dismiss  someone  as  an  idiot.   The  trend  of  demystification  of  Ram  in  Bengal  reached  its  height  when  the  Bengali  poet  Madhusudan  Dutta  in  the  mid-nineteenth  century  composed  the  iconoclastic  epic  poem  Meghnad Badh  Kavya,  where  he  paid  homage  to  Ravana’s  son  Meghnad  (known  also  as  Indrajit)  who  more  than  once  defeated  Ram  and  Lakshman  in  the  battlefield  as  described  in  Valmiki’s  Ramayana.  In  his  poem,  Madhusudan  denounced  Lakshman  for  resorting  to  the  devious  mode  of  killing  Meghnad  by  sneaking  into  Nikumbhila,  the  prayer  hall  where  Meghnad  was  engaged  in  praying.  Taking  advantage  of  his  unarmed  state,  Lakshman  murdered  him.  Explaining  his  decision  to  valorize  Meghnad,  Madhusudan  in  a  letter  to  his  friend  Rajnarayan  Basu  wrote:  “I  despise  Ram  and  his  rabble,  but  the  idea  of  Ravana  elevates  and  kindles  my  imagination;  he  was  a  grand  fellow.”  (January  25,  1824).

Despite  this  tradition,   this  year,   a  Bengali  BJP  leader  managed  to  organize  a  Ram  Navami  procession  in  Kolkata  by  recruiting  the  local  unemployed  youth  –  promising  them  jobs  if  they  bring  BJP  to  power.  He  allured  them  by  repeating  Modi’s  slogan  of  `double-engine’,   meaning                 the  engine  in  the  states  can  only  function  if  they  are  aligned  to  the  central  engine  in  Delhi  run  by  the  BJP.

Homogenizing  the  diverse  Hindu  people  under  the  hegemony  of   Ram 

The  centralizing  authoritarian  Modi  government,  which  is  running  into  conflict  with  Opposition  ruled  states,  and  threatening  the  spirit  of  federalism  that  is  embedded  in  our  Constitution,  is  trying  to  justify  its  misdeeds  by  invoking  the  name  of  Ram,  playing  on  the  religious  sentiments  of  the  majority  Hindu  population.  After  attempting  to  impose  Hindi  as  a  national  language  all over  India  and  crush  linguistic  diversities,  the  Modi  government  is  now  trying  to  project  the  Hindu  god  Ram  as  a  national  icon  in  the  name  of  unifying  all  Indians  under  the  umbrella  of  nationalism.  Anyone  refusing  to  worship  Ram  and  join  Ram  Navami  processions  will  be  hauled  up  for  blasphemy.

Yet,  in  the  southern  states,  people  treat  Ram  and  Sita  and  worship  them  in  different  ways  that  are  in  stark  contrast  with  the  practices  followed  in  the  Hindu-Hindi  heartland.  The  Ramayana  that  the  Tamilians  read is  the  version  by  Kampan,   the  12^th  century  author  of  Iramavataram,  which  in  certain  sections  vastly  differ  from  Valmiki’s narrative, and puts  Sita  on  a  higher  pedestal.   Similarly,  Telegu-speaking  women  in  Andhra  Pradesh  and  Telangana  have  invented  a  Ramayana  of  their  own  by  composing  and  singing  songs  that  domesticate  the  travails  of  Sita  in  terms  of  their  own  diurnal  experiences.  In  Kerala,  the  Rama  story  is  visualized  through  puppet  plays,  which  reduce  the  size  of  the  monumental  epic  characters  to  that  of  dolls  to  be  manipulated  by  the  puppeteers  from  behind  the  scenes.  (Re:  Many  Ramayanas.  The  Diversity  of a  Narrative  Tradition in  South  Asia.  Ed. Paula  Richman.  OUP.  New  Delhi.  1992)

Given  these  diverse  interpretations  of  Ramayana, and  the  different  understanding  of  Ram  and  Sita   in  popular  perception,  varying  from  one  region  to  another,  the  Modi  government’s  attempt  to  impose  Ram  as  a  hegemonizing  icon  on  all  Hindus  cannot  work.  Further,  his  determination  to    elevate  Ram  as  a  Hindi-speaking  god  is  alienating  the  Hindus  of  the  southern  states.  Their  chief  ministers  are  protesting  against  the  infliction  of   Hindi  on  their  official  correspondence.

Positioning  Ram  and  Hanuman  against  Muslims,  depicted  as  present  followers  of  Ravana.

The  state-sponsored  elevation  of  Ram  through  ceremonies  like  Ram  Navami  are  aimed  at  unifying  these  diverse  and  often  mutually  conflicting  sections  of  the  Hindu  population.  But  such  ceremonies  are  also  becoming  tools  in  the  hands  of  the  Hindu  fanatical  outfits  like  Vishva  Hindu  Parishad  and  Bajrang Dal  who  deliberately  organize  demonstrations in  front  of  mosques,  shouting  slogans   insulting  the   Muslim worshippers  there.  Shops  run  by  Muslims  are  being  forcibly  closed down  by  the  goons  of  these  outfits  during  Hindu  religious  festivals.  Muslim  pedestrians  are  being  harassed  by  these  goons  who  force  them  to  shout  `Jai  Shri  Ram.’

Defending  the  weaponization  of  Ram  Navami  by  the  Sangh  Parivar,  a  BJP  leader  from  West  Bengal, Dilip  Ghosh  while  recently  addressing  a public  rally  in  the  North  24-Parganas  district  there  proudly  claimed:  “Ten  years  ago,  people  didn’t  know  what  Ram  Navami  processions  were.  Today,  such  processions  are  being  held  in  every  locality  because  Hindus  have  realized  they  need  to  unite.”  He  then  advised  Hindus  to  keep weapons  at  home  for  self- protection.  (Re:  Times  of  India.  April  18,  2025).   By  admitting  that  ten  years  ago  Bengalis  didn’t  know  what  Ram  Navami  processions  were,  he  acknowledges  that  it  is  a  newly  imported  festival  under  the  auspices  of  the  BJP.  Not  satisfied  with  imposing  Ram  Navami  as  a  national  ceremony  on  all  the  diverse  sections  of  our   people,  the  Sangh  Parivar  is  now  demanding  that  privilege  for  Ram’s  army  general,  the  monkey-god  Hanuman.  Hanuman  Jayanti  was  celebrated  on  a  massive  scale  this  year  in  BJP-ruled  states,  where  the  governments  spent  money  from  their  exchequer  to  subsidize  these  celebrations.  It  is  necessary  to  remind  our  people  that  this  money  is  being  diverted  from   the    taxes  that  they  pay  which are  accumulated  in  the  exchequer.  Do  all  the  tax-payers,  coming  from  different  religious  denominations,   want  their  taxes  to  subsidize  the  religious  ceremonies  of  a  single  community,  the  majoritarian  Hindus  ?

Agitation  against  the  Waqf (Amendment)  Act  –  considered  as  Na-pak  by  Muslims

The  enactment  of  the  Waqf  (Amendment)  Act  has  become  the  proverbial  last  straw  on  the  camel’s  back.  The  Muslim  community  could  not  bear  it  any  more  and  they  have  come  out  in  the  legislature  as  well  as  in the  streets  to  voice  their  protest.  The  Act  is  a  controversial  piece  of  legislation.  Some Muslim  organizations  have  expressed  apprehensions  that  it  would  curb  the    Waqf  board’s  power  to  distribute  charity, and  its  control  over  its  properties.   Some  other  Muslim  groups  have  reserved  their  opinions.

The  opposition  to  the  Act  took  a  violent  communal  shape  in  the  Murshidabad  district  of  the  Trinamul-ruled  state  of  West  Bengal.  Islamist  fanatical  groups  (Muslim  counterparts  of  the  Hindu  fanatical  Bajrang  Dal  and  Vishwa  Hindu  Parishad)  attacked  Hindu  homes  and  killed  a  father  and  son  duo.  They  alleged  that  stones  were  thrown  on  their  anti-Waqft  demonstration  by  this  Hindu  family.  A   Muslim  man  has  been  accused  and arrested  in  this  connection.  At  around  the  same  time,  a  Muslim  youth  was  killed  by  police  bullets.  There  are  unconfirmed  reports  that  Islamic  terrorists  from  Bangladesh  have  infiltrated  into  Bengal  after  the  present  Yunus-led  caretaker  government  (which  is  anti-India  and  has  lifted  ban  on  Islamic  fundamentalist  organizations  and  allowed  them  to  cross  over  to  Bengal  to  create  unrest). Yet,  if  we  go  back  to  the  past  in  Bengal,  there  had  always  been  a  general  public  recognition  and  grateful  acknowledgment  by  Hindus  also,  of  Muslim  owners  transferring  their  lands  and  properties  to  the  Waqf  board  for  charitable  purposes.   We  come  across  an  old  Bengali  document  signed  by  one  Habibullah  Bahar       who “Waqf  koriya  Islamer  sebaye  bilaya  diyachhilen”  (donated  his  property  in  the  name  of  Waqf).  (Re:  Byaboharik  Bangla  Abhidhan.  Bangla  Academy.  Dhaka.  1992)

The post Ram and Hanuman Vs Ravana of anti-waqf (amendment act) agitation appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Recording the Centre’s assurance, the Supreme Court noted the following:

• No appointments of non-Muslims to the Waqf Boards or the Central Waqf Council will be made under the amended law until further orders.
• No steps will be taken to de-notify or disturb properties recognised as waqf—whether by user, by court declarations, or prior to the amendment.
• The matter is to be listed for further hearing on May 5, 2025. The union government has a week to file its reply, with rejoinders due within five days thereafter.
• The matter will now be heard under the title: “In Re: Waqf Amendment Act”, marking it as one of constitutional importance.

This order came in a batch of petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 on grounds that it violates the rights of the Muslim community and undermines the legal framework governing religious endowments.

Court expresses constitutional doubts over the Act

The three-judge Bench led by Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna, with Justices Sanjay Kumar and KV Viswanathan, heard detailed arguments over two days, on April 16 and April 17, before recording the Union’s undertakings. The Court’s oral observations reflected deep concern over the potential impact of the amended provisions.

Among the first issues raised was the deletion of “waqf by user”, a legal principle long used to recognise religious endowments based on public use over time. CJI Khanna, during the hearing on April 16, observed that many prominent dargahs, graveyards, and mosques gained waqf status through community usage rather than written instruments. “You are erasing centuries of history,” he cautioned, noting the risk that thousands of such properties could be wiped off waqf registers.

Equally troubling to the Court was the amendment allowing non-Muslims to be appointed to the Waqf Boards and the Central Waqf Council. CJI Khanna pointedly asked the Solicitor General: “Would you allow a non-Hindu on a Temple Trust?”—emphasising that Article 26 of the Constitution grants religious denominations the right to manage their own institutions.

The Court also took issue with provisions enabling district Collectors to initiate de-notification of waqf properties, calling it “very dangerous.” CJI Khanna questioned whether executive officials could be empowered to override judicial orders or undermine waqf declarations made by statutory bodies or courts.

Union backtracks under pressure, assures status quo

Faced with sharp judicial scrutiny, on April 17, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta gave repeated assurances that the government would not take any action under the amended Act that could adversely affect the waqf community until the Court decides on interim reliefs. He undertook that:

• No non-Muslim members would be appointed to any Waqf Board or the Central Waqf Council.
• The government would not de-notify waqf lands, including those identified through user or court proceedings.
• Any decision regarding future implementation would be deferred pending further orders of the Court.

Accepting these undertakings, the Court chose not to formally stay the legislation—respecting the presumption of constitutionality—but recorded the Union’s commitments in its judicial order. The matter will be next heard on May 5, 2025, and the Court directed the union government to file its counter-affidavit within a week. State governments who have also intervened will also place their stand on affidavit within the same days. Following that, all petitioners have been asked to file the rejoinder to the government within a subsequent five days.

Petitions raise fundamental challenges to the amendment

The petitions—filed by Members of Parliament (including from the Congress, AIMIM, DMK, RJD, CPI, IUML, and Samajwadi Party), religious bodies (All India Muslim Personal Law Board, Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind), and civil society groups (such as the Association for Protection of Civil Rights)—raise serious constitutional concerns.

They argue that the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025:

• Violates Article 26, by interfering in the management of religious institutions by permitting non-Muslims on waqf boards.
• Undermines Article 25 and 29, by curbing the rights of Muslims to preserve and manage their religious and cultural endowments.
• Breaches Article 14, by arbitrarily empowering administrative authorities to strip properties of their waqf status.

Among the most contentious provisions are:

• Deletion of “waqf by user”, potentially erasing the status of properties long treated as waqf by local communities.
• Administrative de-notification powers, allowing Collectors to initiate proceedings even where courts have declared properties as waqf.
• A new threshold for creation of waqf, limiting it to Muslims with five years’ standing.
• Reduced representation of women on Waqf Boards.
• Exclusion of waqf properties within scheduled areas and under ASI protection.

Senior advocates Kapil Sibal, CU Singh, and others, who appeared for the petitioners, had pressed for interim relief during the hearings and urged the Court to recognise the immediate threat posed by the law. They described the amendments as a “systematic attempt to dismantle waqf protections” and called it a State-led effort to dispossess the Muslim community of its religious and charitable properties.

The Court, while refraining from granting a stay, had sent a clear signal through its oral remarks and structured case management that it sees the matter as a constitutional test of legislative overreach into religious freedoms.

What lies Ahead

The next hearing in the week of May 5, 2025 will be crucial, as the Court will consider whether the undertakings given by the union are sufficient, or if formal interim orders are warranted. It is also expected to delve deeper into the core constitutional questions: Can the State interfere with the internal management of religious endowments? Does deleting “waqf by user” constitute historical erasure? Can administrative officers override judicial declarations?

In a political and legal climate increasingly hostile to minority rights, the Court’s intervention has come as a relief for many. However, this is only the beginning of a prolonged battle to safeguard minority rights in India.

Related:

“Urdu Is Not Alien”: Supreme Court reclaims the language’s place in the Indian Constitutional fabric

SC to UoI on Waqf Amendment: ‘Are you willing to allow Muslims on Hindu endowment boards?’

When Courts Fail Survivors: How patriarchy shapes justice in sexual offence against women cases

The post Waqf Amendment Act 2025: SC grants some time to Centre on condition no non-Muslims appointed to Board, Council & no change in any Waqf status appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to reports from PTI and IANS, the confrontation resulted in multiple injuries to civilians and police personnel alike, with several police vehicles set ablaze by protesters. The situation quickly escalated, prompting the deployment of a large police force and the declaration of a high alert in the region. Traffic along the Basanti Highway was brought to a halt for several hours due to road blockades and the sit-in protest by demonstrators.

Later that evening, West Bengal Police issued a statement assuring that the situation in Bhangar had been brought under control. They confirmed that criminal cases had been registered against individuals involved in arson and violence. The Kolkata Police also took to social media to caution citizens against believing or spreading unverified information, warning that legal action would be taken against anyone found circulating rumours or misinformation.

VIDEO | West Bengal: Tension in South 24 Parganas’ Bhangar as Indian Secular Front (ISF) workers clashed with city police. They also set a van ablaze. More details awaited.

(Full video available on PTI Videos – https://t.co/bnF8OnGu37) pic.twitter.com/fk17Jufpl3

— Press Trust of India (@PTI_News) April 14, 2025

The Flashpoint: Why did the clashes occur?

The tension began when ISF supporters attempted to travel from Bhangar and neighbouring areas like Minakhan and Sandeshkhali to attend a rally in central Kolkata’s Ramlila Maidan. The rally, which was to be led by ISF leader and Bhangar MLA Naushad Siddique, aimed to protest against the Waqf (Amendment) Act. However, the rally lacked formal police permission.

Police intervened near Bhojerhat on the Basanti Highway to prevent the large crowd from proceeding, citing law and order concerns. Protesters, however, accused the police of unjustified repression and argued that their right to peaceful assembly was being violated. When the crowd attempted to breach police barricades, clashes broke out. The situation quickly deteriorated as some demonstrators resorted to stone-pelting and reportedly set fire to police vehicles. A number of officers sustained injuries in the melee.

Despite the chaos, Siddique eventually addressed the rally at Ramlila Maidan, delivering a fiery speech criticising both the BJP-led central government and the ruling Trinamool Congress (TMC) in the state. “This law is not just an attack on Muslims, it is an assault on the very spirit of the Constitution. It must be withdrawn,” he said. He accused the BJP of attempting to engineer communal polarisation and slammed the TMC for suppressing legitimate dissent. “If the Chief Minister claims this Act will not be implemented in Bengal, why are her police blocking our peaceful protest?” Siddique asked, as per PTI.

He also suggested that the unrest was being used to divert public attention from the Supreme Court’s recent cancellation of over 25,000 teaching jobs in the state, a scandal that has caused considerable political embarrassment for the TMC government.

The ISF, a relatively new political force in West Bengal led by the Siddique family of Furfura Sharif, has positioned itself as a defender of minority rights and has sought to channel growing discontent among Muslims in the state. The party’s increasing assertiveness has brought it into direct confrontation with both the ruling TMC and the BJP, which dominate Bengal’s political landscape.

Parallel violence to Murshidabad

The violence in Bhangar came on the heels of communal unrest in parts of Murshidabad district, including Suti, Dhulian, and Jangipur. Protests against the Waqf (Amendment) Act turned violent on April 11, after a bout of previous incident of violence that took place on April 8, leading to the deaths of three people. Several others were injured, and property was damaged in what police sources described as targeted communal violence, with reports emerging of attacks against Hindu communities.

Over 200 arrests have been made in connection with the Murshidabad violence, a senior police official confirmed. Additional Director General (Law & Order) Javed Shamim stated that peace had been largely restored in affected pockets of Murshidabad and Malda districts. Shops and businesses have begun reopening, and senior officials remain deployed to monitor the situation. “Route marches are being carried out regularly, and the police presence will continue to ensure order,” he said, as per The Times of India.

In light of the unrest, internet services have been suspended in certain areas to prevent the spread of inflammatory rumours and misinformation. Authorities have also started the process of facilitating the safe return of people displaced by the violence to their homes. Certain claims have been doing rounds that 400 Hindu families have fled from West Bengal.

Detailed reports on the violence in Murshidabad may be read here and here.

Related:

Amid rumours blaming Muslims, drunk café owner Siddharth Singh arrested for vandalising Veer Tejaji idol in Jaipur

In Congress-ruled Himachal, Hindutva goons ask minorities to leave state, saying ‘Don’t pollute Himachal’

Mob violence, police torture justifiable practices feel a significant section of India’s police: Study

22 arrested, internet suspended as Murshidabad recovers from Waqf Act protest violence

The post Fresh Unrest in Bengal: Violent clashes erupt over Waqf (Amendment) Act in South 24 Parganas appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The violence resulted in the tragic deaths of three individuals, including a father-son duo, who were found brutally stabbed in their home, and a young protester who succumbed to bullet wounds inflicted during clashes with the police. None of the deceased – Ijaz Ahmed, a student, and a father and son of one Das family, Haragovinda and Chandan – were actively instigating violence or part of any political outfit, as their friends and neighbours claimed, and yet they were killed. The escalation of violence saw public outrage and large-scale disruptions, with protesters blocking roads, attacking police vehicles, and intensifying confrontations with security personnel. Despite the assurances from West Bengal’s Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee that the law would not be implemented in the state, the unrest continued to spread, further exacerbating the already sensitive political situation.

In response to the deteriorating law-and-order situation, the Calcutta High Court intervened on April 12, 2025, following a petition filed by BJP leader Suvendu Adhikari. The court directed the deployment of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) to restore order in Murshidabad and other affected areas. The court’s intervention highlighted the inability of local authorities to handle the violent protests effectively, leading to heightened concerns over the implications of the Waqf Amendment Act and the potential long-term consequences of the violence on the region’s communal harmony. The Murshidabad incident, along with the subsequent unrest in various districts, underscores the complex intersection of religion, politics, and law in India, further fuelling a sense of uncertainty among the state’s population.

Calcutta High Court orders deployment of central forces in Murshidabad

In an urgent hearing convened on April 12, the Calcutta High Court directed the deployment of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) in West Bengal’s Murshidabad district, following violent clashes during protests against the recently enacted Waqf Amendment Act. The unrest, which has left at least three people dead, prompted swift judicial intervention in response to a plea moved by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Suvendu Adhikari.

Chief Justice T.S. Sivagnanam constituted a special division bench comprising Justices Soumen Sen and Raja Basu Chowdhury to hear the matter. The petition, filed by Adhikari and lawyer Tarun Jyoti, sought the immediate deployment of central forces in view of the escalating violence and deteriorating law and order in the region.

During the hearing, the court was informed that the protests in Murshidabad — particularly in areas like Jangipur and Dhulian — had descended into chaos, with violent mobs clashing with the police, pelting stones, setting police vehicles on fire, and injuring several personnel. The violence also disrupted railway services, as protestors damaged infrastructure and blocked tracks, leading to the cancellation and diversion of multiple trains. A railway crossing gate between Dhulianganga and Nimtita was also vandalised.

Acknowledging the gravity of the situation, the bench criticised the inadequacy of the state government’s response, stating that the measures undertaken so far were insufficient to contain the violence. “Action had to be taken on a war footing to arrest the rioters,” the court observed, as per the Scroll. It added that had central forces been deployed earlier, the escalation of violence could potentially have been avoided.

The High Court made it unequivocally clear that constitutional courts could not remain passive observers in the face of such internal disturbances. “Constitutional courts cannot be a mute spectator and embroil itself in technical defences when the safety and security of the people are at danger,” the bench remarked, as quoted by Bar and Bench.

Accordingly, the court directed the deployment of CAPF in Murshidabad district, with instructions that the forces coordinate closely with the state’s civil administration to restore peace and normalcy. Significantly, the bench clarified that this direction was not limited solely to Murshidabad — should similar situations arise in other districts, the central forces must be promptly deployed there as well.

In addition, the High Court instructed both the West Bengal government and the Union government to file detailed reports outlining the steps taken to manage the situation. The matter has been posted for further hearing on April 17, 2025.

The protests stem from widespread discontent with the Waqf Amendment Act, 2024, which was passed by Parliament on April 4 and received Presidential assent on April 5, coming into effect on April 8. The law introduces sweeping changes to the original Waqf Act of 1995, including amendments to 44 sections. Among its controversial provisions are the inclusion of non-Muslims on Waqf boards, restrictions on property donations, and changes to the functioning of Waqf tribunals — measures that many critics argue significantly dilute the autonomy of Muslim religious endowments and increase governmental control.

Despite the state government’s assertion that the plea was politically motivated and that law enforcement agencies had already taken adequate measures — including the deployment of six companies of the Border Security Force (BSF) — the High Court found that the reality on the ground indicated otherwise. It noted the persistence of unrest in multiple districts, underlining the need for urgent and coordinated action.

The full order may be viewed here.

Incidentally, Murshidabad has more than 66 percent Muslim population, as per the 2011 census, and TMC bagged all three parliamentary seats in 2024, including Jangipur at the epicentre of the weekend’s violence. Of the district’s 22 assembly seats, TMC has 20; the party controls all 26 Panchayat Samitis and nearly all of the 250 Gram Panchayats. Out of eight Municipalities of the district, TMC has seven, and the one that is left out – Domkal – is run by a TMC-appointed administrator. With such a heavy police domination, representatives of the party in power in the state do have questions to answer.

The Congress, the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM), and other parties have already approached the Supreme Court to challenge the constitutional validity of the amended legislation. Meanwhile, the situation in parts of West Bengal remains tense, with Murshidabad emerging as an epicentre of the protests and related violence.

Arrests mount amid continued tensions

The situation in West Bengal’s Murshidabad district remained tense but relatively calm on April 13 following days of violent protests against the controversial Waqf Amendment Act. According to PTI, the West Bengal Police confirmed that 12 more individuals were arrested overnight in connection with the unrest, raising the total number of arrests to 150. Officials stated that prohibitory orders were still in effect and internet services had been suspended in the affected areas.

Police officers, quoted anonymously, reported that areas like Suti, Dhulian, Samserganj, and Jangipur—previously at the epicentre of the unrest—were under close surveillance and had seen no fresh outbreaks of violence. “Raids continued through the night, and 12 more people were taken into custody,” said one officer, as per the Hindustan Times. “The situation is currently peaceful.”

The protests began on April 8 and intensified after Friday prayers on April 11. Even as Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee had stated on April 10 that the amended Waqf Act would not be implemented in West Bengal, violence struck again in the state. “I know you are aggrieved because of the enactment of the Waqf Act,” said CM Banerjee, as per Times of India. “Have faith, nothing will happen in Bengal by which one can divide and rule.”

On April 11, violent protests erupted in West Bengal’s Murshidabad district following Friday prayers, primarily centred around opposition to the Waqf (Amendment) Act. Protesters argue that the Act has been imposed without sufficient consultation or consideration of the socio-economic priorities of the community, such as employment and healthcare. Tensions escalated when large gatherings defied prohibitory orders and blocked National Highway-12 from Dakbanglo More in Shamsherganj to Sajur More in Suti. Police reports indicate that the situation turned violent after stones were hurled at a police van, resulting in injuries to at least ten personnel. Security forces resorted to lathi charge and later used tear gas to control the situation. In some instances, officers were forced to take shelter in nearby mosques.

Fresh violence erupted in Dhulian under the Samserganj block on April 12. Police confirmed that one person suffered a bullet injury during the clash, though senior officials said they were still verifying the full details. The unrest also disrupted public infrastructure. Protesters damaged a railway crossing gate between Dhulianganga and Nimtita, forcing the cancellation and diversion of several trains, according to Eastern Railway officials.

In total, at least 18 police personnel were injured, and scores of civilians, including women and children, have been displaced. The district administration suspended internet services and imposed prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the BNSS, equivalent to Section 144 of the CrPC, to contain the situation.

In response, the state administration had deployed six companies of the Border Security Force (BSF).

Political fallout and government response

The political fallout has been swift. BJP leaders, including Suvendu Adhikari and state president Sukanta Majumdar, criticised the Trinamool Congress government for allegedly soft-pedalling on violence by “a section of minorities.” Majumdar asserted that a future BJP government would crush such “vandalism” within minutes and accused the current regime of appeasement politics.

Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee responded by stating that the Waqf (Amendment) Act would not be implemented in West Bengal, asserting that the state government would not allow any attempt to “divide and rule”. She urged for unity and calm, but her remarks did little to quieten the situation on the ground.

Opposition parties, particularly the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), were quick to capitalise on the unrest. Adhikari also alleged that over 400 Hindus were displaced and forced to flee to Malda district out of fear. He described the violence as “jihadist terror” and accused the Trinamool Congress (TMC) government of indulging in “appeasement politics”, further fuelling communal polarisation.

Current situation and outlook

The Murshidabad violence is a grim reminder of the fragility of communal harmony in politically polarised and socio-economically marginalised regions. The protests highlight growing discontent within sections of the Muslim community, who feel unheard in national policymaking. At the same time, the BJP’s sharp rhetoric and the high-pitched calls for action raise concerns about communal profiling and the danger of deepening divides.

As of April 13, 150 people have been arrested, and no fresh incidents have been reported. Police are conducting continuous raids, and security personnel are maintaining a tight vigil in the affected areas. However, the damage has already been done. Markets were looted, homes vandalised, and families displaced. Videos have emerged of victims recounting how mobs entered their homes and destroyed property, as residents now demand a permanent BSF presence in these vulnerable areas.

#WATCH | Kolkata, West Bengal | On Murshidabad violence, ADG Law and Order, Jawed Shamim says, “We have to ensure that we get the right persons only because one wrong arrest can lead to the case coming to cloud. We are trying to ensure that the case is dealt with the greatest… pic.twitter.com/aidTIm9cnQ

— ANI (@ANI) April 14, 2025

The State’s response has been reactive rather than proactive. The Chief Minister’s refusal to implement the law appears more a political manoeuvre than a principled stand. Meanwhile, the High Court’s intervention underscores a judicial acknowledgement of the failure of local law enforcement.

Ultimately, the incident points to a confluence of legislative opacity, administrative failure, and political opportunism, turning a policy dispute into a tragic episode of communal violence. It is also essential to highlight here that West Bengal will be seeing Lok Sabha elections in 2026, Murshidabad might not just be a law-and-order flashpoint but a symbol of a larger crisis in India’s secular fabric.

It is essential to note here that a different angle has also emerged regarding the violence in Murshidabad, with the locals of the area saying that there was a presence of unidentified young men during the violence who were not from the area. Several residents recounted that a group of boys, aged around 15 to 18, dressed in black hoodies and armed with rods and sticks, appeared just before the unrest broke out. “These were not our boys,” one person said, adding that both Hindu and Muslim youth from the locality had been working together to safeguard nearby temples. This observation has fuelled concerns that the violence may not have been entirely organic, but instead instigated by external elements with a vested interest in disrupting communal harmony. This lesser-reported aspect of the violence is now being brought to light by residents of the area. Questions are now being raised about who these young men were, who brought them into the area, and what their intentions were—an angle that demands serious attention amid the rush to communalise the incident.

“We didn’t see any of our local boys, some other unknown 15-18 year old boys who we didn’t recognise came with rods& sticks wearing black hoodies. Our local boys both Hindus and Muslims were guarding mandirs.” Listen to voices from #Murshidabad —the nasty Godi media won’t show… pic.twitter.com/7uU4UTmW43

— Sagarika Ghose (@sagarikaghose) April 14, 2025

A political fault-line exposed

The recent eruption of violence in Murshidabad, West Bengal, over the amended Waqf Act lays bare the volatile intersection of religion, law, and politics that continues to define India’s communal landscape. The April 11 unrest, which claimed three lives and left scores injured, has reignited political tensions ahead of the 2026 Assembly elections. At the centre of the conflict is the controversial Waqf (Amendment) Act, passed by the Union government — a piece of legislation that critics, including West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, have denounced as a deliberate attempt to sow division and inflame religious sensitivities.

Banerjee, in a strongly worded statement, reaffirmed that Bengal would not implement the amended law. Urging for calm, she cautioned against “irreligious behaviour in the name of religion” and accused unnamed political actors of weaponising faith for electoral gain. Emphasising that the legislation was passed by the union — not the state — she distanced her government from the violence and warned of legal action against those spreading misinformation. Her message was unequivocal: the Waqf Amendment is not only unconstitutional but dangerously incendiary, and the Union government must be held accountable for its fallout.

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), however, presented a starkly different narrative. State leaders alleged that Hindu families were being driven out of Murshidabad’s Dhulian area, citing “religious persecution” and accusing the TMC of “appeasement politics.” Leader of the Opposition Suvendu Adhikari claimed that over 400 Hindus had fled across the Ganga, while state BJP president Sukanta Majumdar criticised TMC MPs for remaining silent in the face of the crisis. Their rhetoric, framing the incident as the outcome of the TMC’s so-called minority appeasement, was in line with the BJP’s broader electoral messaging in Bengal.

Fact Check – #BJP #Bengal has put out a tweet with 9 pictures of violence, tagging them as incidents that happened in Bengal during #Hindu festival soon after #MurshidabadViolence .

One tweet with 9 old images. None of them are from Murshidabad, 7 of them are not from #Bengal… pic.twitter.com/4FdLO7zggq

— Tamal Saha (@Tamal0401) April 13, 2025

Amid this escalating blame game, both the Congress and the Left mounted a scathing critique of the TMC and BJP, accusing them of exploiting the unrest for political gain. Congress MP Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury accused the state administration of being “asleep at the wheel,” while the CPI(M) condemned the police for being “mute spectators” and demanded Army deployment.

Caught in the middle of these political crossfires are the people of Murshidabad — whose lives have been turned upside down. Even if claims of a mass exodus remain unverified, the devastation on the ground is undeniable. Homes have been vandalised, shops looted, property destroyed, and public trust shattered. Three people have died, civilians and police personnel have been injured, and daily life has come to a standstill in many parts of the district. Children have missed school, local businesses have suffered, and fear has spread across communities. As politicians argue over narratives, it is ordinary citizens who continue to pay the highest price.

The violence in Murshidabad is more than a law-and-order issue — it is a stark reminder of how religious identity continues to be manipulated in Bengal’s political theatre. As national and regional parties jostle to control the narrative, what gets lost is the constitutional promise of justice, accountability, and equal protection under the law — regardless of religion.

Detailed story on the previous incident of violence in Murshidabad may be read here.

Related:

Amid rumours blaming Muslims, drunk café owner Siddharth Singh arrested for vandalising Veer Tejaji idol in Jaipur

In Congress-ruled Himachal, Hindutva goons ask minorities to leave state, saying ‘Don’t pollute Himachal’

Mob violence, police torture justifiable practices feel a significant section of India’s police: Study

22 arrested, internet suspended as Murshidabad recovers from Waqf Act protest violence

The post Protests over Waqf (Amendment) Act escalate into violence in West Bengal; Calcutta HC intervenes appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The image of Egyptian Islamist thinker Sayyid Qutb at a protest rally in Kozhikode, Kerala, may appear a trifle during political discord. But in reality, it holds great and troubling importance that deserves closer examination—especially in a country like India, where democratic values and peaceful coexistence are continuously under challenge.

The rally was meant to be a protest against the Waqf Amendment Bill. Most of the Muslim groups in India interpret this bill as the central government meddling in Muslim religious and charity funds. But when an image of Sayyid Qutb was flashed—carried aloft by protesters—the protest meant something different and was something more than what it was intended to be.

To understand why this was a big issue, you need to know who Qutb was, what he thought, and how his thoughts influenced some of the most violent factions in recent history.

Sayyid Qutb: The Radical Intellectual

Sayyid Qutb was an Egyptian writer, intellectual, and influential member of the Muslim Brotherhood of the 1950s and 60s. He began as a literary critic and secular nationalist, but Qutb changed his religion after he went to the United States and later to an Egyptian prison under Gamal Abdel Nasser’s regime.

While in prison, he wrote prolifically—his best-known works are Fi Zilal al-Qur’an (In the Shade of the Qur’an) and Ma’alim fi al-Tariq (Milestones). In Milestones, Qutb declared that modern Muslim societies had fallen into Jahiliyyah, a Qur’anic term that was originally used to describe a time of ignorance before Islam existed in Arabia. Qutb believed that governments and societies of the present day that did not conform to Shari’ah were in this state of ignorance and were therefore illegitimate.

He argued that only a few believers—the vanguard—should arise and topple these regimes in order to establish Islamic rule. While Qutb never directly promoted suicide bombing or attacks on civilians, his model of viewing modern secular states as illegitimate has been widely adopted by militant and terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

Even Qutb’s brother, Muhammad Qutb, travelled to Saudi Arabia with his thoughts and assisted in spreading them through schools and mosques. Osama bin Laden is said to have been influenced by these ideas.

Why Qutb’s Ideas Will Not Fit for India

India is not an Islamic state. India is a secular democracy and multicultural. Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, and others live in India. The Indian Constitution provides individuals the right to practice their religion, personal laws, and safeguards for minority rights.

Qutb sees the world very differently from this world. He does not think that you should co-exist or bargain with a secular democratic order; he desires to combat and re-shape it through revolutionary means.

Using his face in an Indian protest sends a chilling message: that to be Muslim in India is to be identified with a global Islamist idea and not with the Indian Constitution. This symbolism can be (and already has been) used by right-wing political elements to claim that Indian Muslims are shaped by foreign, extremist ideas.

It must be remembered that this is not just an optics issue. In the volatile communal environment of India, even a symbol can be inflammatory. The picture of Qutb was not just misread—it was fundamentally in conflict with the very message that the protest was attempting to convey: that Indian Muslims wish to defend their religious buildings within the framework of Indian democracy.

A Self-Defeating Symbol for a Legitimate Cause

Protests against Waqf Amendment Bill are political and legal. Muslim communities are within their rights to protest against government intervention in religious trusts. Waqf boards have been a feature of India’s legal landscape since British times and play significant religious and charitable roles.

When demonstrators hold the image of the man who was demonstrating against non-religious government, they weaken their case. The message changes from “defend our rights in the Indian system” to “reject the Indian system altogether.”

This causes confusion among allies, inspires enemies, and feeds into current Islamophobic discourses. It provides political fuel for those who blame the Muslim community for being separatist, even when the community is calling for constitutional rights.

Alienating the Broader Public One of the most significant tasks of a protest in a democracy is not merely to be heard by those who already agree with it, but to convince the undecided and to touch the emotions of the wider public. This requires a clear message and well-considered symbols.

By mentioning Qutb, even as an aside, the protest drove away non-Muslim Indians who otherwise could have lent their support. The average Indian citizen will not differentiate between Qutb’s political ideology and the legitimate call for religious freedom. What they will listen to is a protest which seems to identify itself with figures known worldwide for Islamist extremism.

Indian Muslims do not accept most of these beliefs. Indian Islamic history has overall been one of moderation, acceptance, and coexistence with other faiths—either through Sufi tradition, reform efforts, or efforts to interact with the constitution. Qutb does not represent the real life of Indian Muslims.

The Danger of Misplaced Solidarity

In a world where Muslims are being treated unfairly and exposed to war, it is no wonder that some protest movements draw inspiration from international Islamic leaders. Many are driven to mobilize in favour of Muslim causes worldwide, from Egypt to Palestine. But such acts of solidarity must be well-considered.

There exists a tremendous difference between displaying a Palestinian flag and displaying a photo of Sayyid Qutb. The flag represents the resistance of a nation against occupation; the photo represents an idea that has been used to justify brutal domination and violence.

India’s Muslim citizens need to recognize this difference. Solidarity does not equal symbols. Borrowing other people’s symbols, particularly those of nations with complicated histories, is a potential issue in India’s unique democratic and plural environment.

A Lesson in Political Messaging

What we witness from the Kozhikode protest is that messaging is important. Symbols are important. And context is most important of all.

The photo of Qutb was probably employed by some or a limited number of protesters and not the key protest organizers. But in today’s world of rapidly spreading images and political openings, a single image can represent an entire movement.

In Kerala, it served to divert the national discussion from the significant issues regarding the Waqf Bill to the sensational allegations of Islamist support. This is not a victory for the protesters. It is a distraction—and a destructive one.

Moving Forward: Responsible Protest and Clear Vision

 Indian Muslims are confronted with serious challenges: increasing marginalization, communal violence, and increasing state surveillance of their institutions. Their political action and protests have to be strategic, disciplined, and Constitution-based. Individuals such as B.R. Ambedkar, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, and Sir Syed Ahmad Khan are better role models for demonstrations than Sayyid Qutb. These leaders were of the opinion that they should speak, learn, reform, and cooperate with the Indian state—instead of boycotting it.

There is power in moderation, and strength in clarity. As one Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ says:

خَيْرُ الْأُمُورِ أَوْسَطُهَا

“The best of affairs are those that are moderate.”

(Musnad Ahmad)

If Indian Muslim activists want their demands to be heard and respected, they must also speak a language that resonates with India’s constitutional and pluralistic values—not imported ideologies that sow division.

Courtesy: New Age Islam 

The post Why Sayyid Qutb’s Symbolism during a Waqf Protest Was dangerous and self-defeating appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The open letter, released on April 8, observes that as concerned Catholics, committed to values of justice, fraternity and inter-faith harmony which even the Church upholds, constitutional values of equality, freedom of faith and protection of minority rights are key.

The letter also elaborates on an example of a conflict in Kerala wherein the Catholic community in Kerala is currently facing a distressing situation in Munambam, where 400 to 600 Christian families in a coastal village are under the threat of displacement due to a local Waqf claim over the land and states that though extremely unfortunate, this is a localised matter that should be addressed through legal, negotiated, and conciliatory means. This case, already under judicial consideration, should not have served as the basis for supporting a national legislative change that now has far-reaching implications for another religious minority community, state the authors of the open communication. They observe that the CBCI press note/letter risks legitimising state intrusion under the guise of reform.

The entire text of the open letter may be read below:

April 8, 2025

To

The Catholic Bishops Conference of India

Dear Bishops,

We write to you as concerned members of the Catholic community in India—laity, religious and clergy—deeply committed to the values of justice, fraternity, and interfaith harmony that the Church upholds. As citizens of a secular and democratic republic, we also hold dear the constitutional values of equality, freedom of religion, and the protection of minority rights.

We read with growing concern the recent press statement issued by the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of India (Ref: CBCI/PR/25-03) urging political parties in Parliament to support the proposed amendments to the Waqf Act. This intervention, in our view, raises several serious issues that merit careful reconsideration.

Since then, the proposed amendments have been passed by both Houses of Parliament and have now received presidential assent, making them law. The new Act introduces significant changes to the governance of Waqf properties, including the inclusion of non-Muslims in Waqf Boards—an issue that has generated widespread apprehension and opposition, particularly from the Muslim community and a range of political parties. One of the central concerns is that the legislation infringes on the autonomy of a religious minority’s institutional affairs.

While we understand that the Catholic community in Kerala is currently facing a distressing situation in Munambam, where 400 to 600 Christian families in a coastal village are under the threat of displacement due to a local Waqf claim over the land, we believe that this is a localized matter that should be addressed through legal, negotiated, and conciliatory means. This case, already under judicial consideration, should not have served as the basis for supporting a national legislative change that now has far-reaching implications for another religious minority community. The CBCI letter risks legitimising state intrusion under the guise of reform.

It is important to recognise that responses shaped primarily by immediate or local anxieties may inadvertently lead to consequences that also affect the Christian community’s long-term interests. A precedent that enables state interference in the affairs of one minority may well open the door to similar intrusions into the rights and governance of other religious communities, including Christians.

At a time when Christian institutions are themselves under increasing scrutiny and pressure from political and state authorities—and when the number of reported incidents of violence and discrimination against Christians has sharply risen, including over 800 documented cases in 2024 alone—we must be particularly vigilant in safeguarding the broader principles of minority rights and religious freedom. As citizens, it is our constitutional duty to uphold the rights of all religious communities and to stand in solidarity with those whose freedoms are under threat.

We hope that the CBCI will engage in deeper reflection and consultation before issuing public statements on matters that have wide-ranging consequences. The strength of our witness as a Church lies in our commitment to justice, peace, and solidarity—not only within our own community but with all those who are vulnerable.

We trust that this concern will be received in the spirit of respectful dialogue and shared responsibility that binds us all in faith.

Sincerely in Christ,

1. Susan Abraham, Lawyer and Human Rights Activist
2. Allen Brooks, Ex Chairperson, Assam State Commission for Minorities
3. John Dayal, Ex Member, National Integration Council
4. Brinelle D’Souza, Academic and Activist
5. Dorothy Fernandes PBVM, Former National Convener, Forum of Religious for Justice & Peace
6. Walter Fernandes SJ, Director, North Eastern Social Research Centre, Guwahati
7. Astrid Lobo Gajiwala, Secretary, Ecclesia of Women in Asia
8. & Indian Women’s Theological Forum
9. Frazer Mascarenhas SJ, Former Principal, St. Xavier’s College Mumbai
10. AC Michael, Ex Member, Delhi Minorities Commission
11. Elsa Muttathu PBVM
12. Prakash Louis SJ, Activist, Patna
13. Thomas Pallithanam, People’s Action For Rural Awakening & Meluko, AP
14. Cedric Prakash SJ, Activist, Ahmedabad
15. Lisa Pires PBVM, Working in Goa on Issues of Trafficking and Migration

Related:

Letter to Minorities Minister: Waqf bell tolls for Christians too

Was the Waqf Beneficial for Muslim Society?

The Waqf Bill 2024: An Open Letter to the Joint Committee of Parliament, the Opposition, and India’s Muslim Communities

The post Christian academics, activists write to CBCI urging re-think on newly enacted Waqf law appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This protest was in line with an open call by the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) urging Muslims across the country to express their opposition to the Act by donning black armbands. While similar demonstrations occurred without incident in other states, including Karnataka and Bihar—where even ministers participated—Uttar Pradesh responded with an unprecedented show of state power and repression. The administration has accused hundreds of Muslim men in Muzaffarnagar of “disrupting peace” and “inciting the public,” even though there were no reports of violence, disruption, or unlawful assembly during or after the prayers.

BIG ANNOUNCEMENT

वक्फ़ संशोधन बिल के खिलाफ मुस्लिम पर्सनल लॉ बोर्ड का बड़ा ऐलान!

रमज़ान के इस आख़री जुमा, जुमातुल विदा को मुसलमान यह काम ज़रूर करें…

This Ramazan’s Jumma Tul Wida Let us Protest against Waqf Amendment Bill by this method #IndiaAgainstWaqfBill… pic.twitter.com/FPFC0XSZbk

— All India Muslim Personal Law Board (@AIMPLB_Official) March 27, 2025

The Charges: Disrupting peace by wearing armbands

On April 5, the City Magistrate of Muzaffarnagar issued notices under Section 130 of the Indian Civil Defence Code to more than 300 Muslims, accusing them of “inciting the general public and endangering law and order.” The sole basis for this accusation, as per the notice, was that they wore black armbands inside the mosque while offering prayers—a constitutionally protected form of expression.

The notices demand that each of the accused appear in court on April 16, 2025 and furnish a surety bond of ₹2 lakh, failing which further legal consequences may follow. The language of the notice makes sweeping and speculative claims, stating that “it is believed that in the future, the respondents may incite the general public and spread misinformation,” thereby justifying pre-emptive action against individuals who have not violated any law.

This use of Section 130—a preventive provision meant to maintain peace in times of actual threat—is being grossly misapplied here to punish individuals for peaceful, symbolic dissent. The invocation of such provisions in the absence of any violence or disorder raises serious questions about the arbitrary use of executive power to criminalise protest.

Lack of evidence, arbitrary targeting

What makes the state’s action even more alarming is the complete absence of individualised inquiry or due process. Notices have been issued not only to those who participated in the protest, but also to people who weren’t even present or aware of the protest.

According to Maktoob Media, Naeem Tyagi, principal of Madrasa Mahmudiya, is among those who received a notice. He categorically stated that he did not wear a black armband and only learned of the protest after arriving at the mosque. “Thousands came for Friday prayers—some wore armbands, many did not. No slogans were raised. There was no demonstration, no speech, no incident,” he said.

Similarly, Shabbir, a resident of Sarwat village, received a notice and has declared his intention to challenge it in court. “If MPs can wear black clothes to protest inside Parliament, how is our peaceful action at a mosque any different?” he questioned, as per a report in Maktoob Media. Shabbir also noted that some people listed in the notices haven’t lived in the village for years—suggesting a blanket, communalised approach rather than a lawful, fact-based response.

The local police, when contacted by journalists, failed to offer any explanation or legal justification for their actions and instead disconnected calls—a disturbing reflection of the lack of transparency and accountability that surrounds this crackdown.

Selective policing and disproportionate response

The administration’s action in Muzaffarnagar cannot be seen in isolation. It comes in the context of heightened policing and surveillance across Muslim-majority districts in Uttar Pradesh. Following the passage of the Waqf Amendment Act in Parliament, alerts were issued in districts such as Lucknow, Moradabad, Rampur, Bareilly, Meerut, Amroha, Aligarh, Firozabad, and Shamli, and large contingents of police and paramilitary forces were deployed. Flag marches were conducted by senior police and administrative officers to “maintain peace.”

This alleged militarised response to a symbolic protest smacks of disproportion and is deeply telling of the communal mind-set that governs state action in Uttar Pradesh. In other parts of the country—such as Karnataka—people peacefully offered Eid prayers wearing black armbands, including elected officials and government representatives. States in cities such as Delhi, Mumbai, Lucknow, Bhopal, Kolkata, Jaipur, Ranchi, Nuh, and Coimbatore, and in smaller towns like Baran, Tonk, Bhagwanpur, Mandya, Belagavi, and Bidar, scores of Muslim men and clerics were seen with black bands tied to their sleeves—a show of unity and political expression from a community often vilified for its protest. No such action was taken against them. Only in Uttar Pradesh was this peaceful and silent protest by Muslims was met with threats, intimidation, and legal coercion.

The Act, the right to dissent and the criminalisation of Muslim expression

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2024, introduced by Minority Affairs Minister Kiren Rijiju, has sparked nationwide concern among citizens. The Act, which got the President’s assent on April 6, claims to “streamline administration” and “increase transparency,” but many have argued that it allows greater state control over Waqf properties and undermines the autonomy of religious endowments managed by the Muslim community.

Opposition to the Act is not only legitimate but rooted in constitutional freedoms. Protest—particularly peaceful protest—is a cornerstone of democratic expression. To wear a black armband is a time-honoured form of dissent. It has been used globally—from the Vietnam War protests in the US to anti-CAA movements in India—as a non-violent signal of disagreement with state policy.

Criminalising this form of protest by branding it a security threat is not only constitutionally untenable, but morally bankrupt and politically motivated. Additionally, this is not an isolated incident. It fits a larger pattern in many BJP ruled states, especially the state of Uttar Pradesh, where Muslims have routinely been penalised for protest—whether it was the anti-CAA movement, the Friday prayers after incidents of lynching, or even expressions of solidarity with global Muslim causes. Protesters have been met with FIRs, house demolitions, mass arrests, and police violence, while calls for violence from other quarters are often ignored or legitimised.

Remarkably, this show of peaceful resistance came even as state agencies in some BJP-ruled states issued veiled threats and warnings.  In Sambhal, Uttar Pradesh, local police had earlier warned that offering Eid prayers on public pavements could result in revocation of arms licences or passports. Nonetheless, young men in the town were seen participating in the armband protest during Friday prayers, stitching their own bands or using pieces of cloth—demonstrating that grassroots mobilisation continues despite intimidation.

In Bhopal, clerics clarified that the black armband protest was strictly tied to Jumat-ul-Vida, not Eid, to avoid conflating it with religious celebrations. Bhopal Qazi Syed Mustak Ali Nadvi reiterated that the AIMPLB had called for a solemn, prayerful protest—not for confrontation or public disruption.

As per ANI, Maulana Khalid Rasheed Farangi Mahali, who led the Friday prayers at Aishbagh Eidgah in Lucknow, joined the protest by wearing a black armband himself. Addressing the community, he reiterated the Board’s concerns, stating that the now passed legislation was not in the interest of Muslims and urging Parliament to withdraw it

The current episode in Muzaffarnagar is another stark reminder of how law is used as a tool of political repression, especially against Muslims in the state. The government’s message is clear: any form of Muslim political expression, however peaceful, is suspect. Dissent is not just discouraged—it is actively punished.

A silent resistance with powerful symbolism

Despite the limited time between the announcement and the day of prayer, participation was widespread. In many mosques, the Friday khutbah (sermon) included references to the implications of the now passed legislation, which the Board and its supporters believe poses a grave threat to the autonomy and sanctity of religious endowments managed under Waqf. At Delhi’s historic Jama Masjid, hundreds of worshippers participated in the armband protest. A worshipper there remarked that the turnout might have been even higher had senior clerics like Imam Ahmed Bukhari publicly endorsed the call.

Prominent figures in the community did, however, lend their weight to the demonstration. In Lucknow, Maulana Khalid Rasheed Farangi Mahali, Imam of Aishbagh Eidgah and chairman of the Islamic Centre of India, led Alvida prayers while wearing a black armband. He reiterated the community’s concerns and appealed for justice not just regarding the Act but also in the context of Palestinian suffering, which was observed in tandem with International Quds Day—another global protest against Israeli occupation.

The AIMPLB had clarified that their call for protest was intended specifically for Jumu’atul Wida and not for Eid, although some Eid congregations across the country did see black armband-wearing worshippers as well. In historic locations such as Jama Masjid in Delhi, hundreds joined the protest in silence, reflecting both unity and urgency in the face of what the Board described as a legislative attack on community assets.

“Today’s protest is a message to Parliament that Indian Muslims are united in their opposition to this Bill. We are deeply worried about its consequences on our mosques, madrasas, dargahs, and graveyards,” said Maulana Mahali, as per a report in The Hindu.

In public statements and on social media, the Board has described the Act as “controversial, discriminatory, and damaging,” and warned that it would pave the way for the state to arbitrarily appropriate or interfere in the functioning of Waqf institutions under the guise of reform and transparency.

AIMPLB spokesperson S.Y.R. Ilyas hailed the response to the black armband protest as a sign of growing political awareness within the Muslim community. “We issued the call very late, but the overwhelming turnout reflects the desperation of the community to protect its institutions. This is only the beginning,” he said, as per Free Press Journal.

The protest was part of AIMPLB’s broader strategy to mobilise constitutional and democratic resistance to the Act. The Board’s 31-member Action Committee has resolved to continue using peaceful and lawful methods to oppose the recently passed amendments, which they have labelled as “controversial, discriminatory, and damaging”.

On social media, the AIMPLB declared the Act to be a “sinister conspiracy” designed to strip the Muslim community of its historical religious and charitable properties—mosques, Eidgahs, madrasas, graveyards, dargahs, khanqahs, and more. In its official statement, the Board called upon every Muslim to treat resistance to the Act as a collective responsibility, urging them to take part in silent yet visible protest.

मुसलमानों से एक महत्वपूर्ण अपील

वक़्फ़ संशोधन विधेयक 2024 के खिलाफ
जुमा-तुल-विदा के मौके पर अपने बाजू पर काली पट्टी बांधकर विरोध दर्ज करें

और इस हैशटैग को इस्तेमाल करते हुए फोटो ट्वीट करें #IndiaAgainstWaqfBill pic.twitter.com/sLs5oU6I1R

— All India Muslim Personal Law Board (@AIMPLB_Official) March 27, 2025

Beyond Armbands: Solidarity with Palestine and political resistance

In addition to the black armbands, some worshippers also carried Palestinian flags and placards, expressing solidarity with residents of Gaza and aligning the protest with broader concerns about justice and human rights. The overlap with Quds Day, observed globally on the last Friday of Ramzan to protest Israeli actions in Palestine, added to the emotional and political tenor of the day.

Meanwhile, the AIMPLB’s campaign to oppose the Waqf Act has not been limited to symbolic gestures. In recent months, it has organised multi-party dharnas in Patna and New Delhi, drawing support from political parties like the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). Leaders such as Lalu Prasad Yadav and Tejashwi Yadav have publicly backed the protests, amplifying the message that the legislation is viewed not just as a communal issue, but as a constitutional and democratic concern.

Conclusion: A call for accountability and Constitutionalism

In an age where peaceful protest is frequently met with surveillance, criminalisation, or suppression—particularly when it comes from Muslims—the success of the black armband demonstration is both symbolic and substantial. It shows that people across the country are willing to unite in the defence of their institutions and rights.

The UP-government’s action against black armband protesters is legally unsound, constitutionally indefensible, and morally reprehensible. It undermines the very principles of democracy by punishing individuals not for what they did, but for who they are and what they might do in the future. It reflects a regime that is less interested in public order and more invested in silencing minority dissent through intimidation and fear.

The judiciary must intervene to uphold the constitutional rights of those targeted and ensure that the right to peaceful protest is protected. Civil society, too, must speak out and stand in solidarity with the victims of this arbitrary state action. If wearing a black band in protest is a crime in today’s India, then democracy itself is in peril.

Related:

Uttarakhand HC orders unsealing of Madrassa, SC steps in to hear Jamiat’s petition against Dhami govt’s crackdown against Madrassa

CJP submits objections to Maharashtra Special Public Security Bill, 2024 over serious threats to civil liberties

SC: Recent judgment in the Imran Pratapgarhi case, what are police powers under section 173 (3) BNS?

Was the Waqf Beneficial for Muslim Society?

The post Black Armbands, State Crackdown: UP targets Muslims for peaceful protest against Waqf Act appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The origins of this institution is obscure; but one thing is certain is that it did not have an Islamic root. Waqf like institutions were present in the Roman Empire as well as amongst the Sassanians. And it appears most likely that the early Islamic society borrowed this institution from the Sassanids. Although it was later theologically justified as devoting a property to Allah, there is no record of earliest Muslims instituting any such grant. The earliest Waqf in Muslim societies therefore date after the establishment of the empire, rather than during the period of the Rashidun Caliphate. But once Muslims adopted it, they made wide use of it. Through this institution, they funded hospitals, madrasas, caravan Sarais, etc. Instituting a Waqf was simple: the property was bequeathed in perpetuity to God and a manager was appointed for overseeing the property. This property could generate income which was to be spent for welfare purposes; part of the income thus generated went to the family of the founder of the Waqf.

Thus, apart from serving an important function, Waqf was also a means to provide for the financial fortunes of the future generation. Over the years, the latter function dominated the former. Thus, in many cities of the Muslim world, like Algiers and Istanbul, Waqf properties formed nearly 30-50% of all real estate. Since all Waqfs were exempt from taxation, this only meant that the state had less and less revenue to operate with. The presence of this institution, which served the important purpose of social service, therefore also had its downside: that of limiting the value of state revenue. Although a huge empire, but the Ottomans were forced to take loans from other countries and foreign banking consortiums.

Becoming a mechanism of tax evasion was one of the many malfunctions of the Waqfs. The very nature of the institution made it rigid and hence unsuited to the changing economic realities. Once a Waqf was instituted, its purpose could not be changed or altered. Many Muslims, for example, established caravan Sarais throughout the silk route during the middle-ages. These Sarais served traders and their animals for a fee, the proceeds of which went to the upkeep of the building and to the children of the founder. However, as the silk route changed over time, these Sarais felt into disuse and could no longer be financially viable. But, owing to the fact that the Waqf was created for the specific purpose of serving traders and merchants in perpetuity, there was no legal way to change the nature, function or the purpose of these Waqfs.

Similar is the case in India. It is all very good to feel proud about the value of Waqfs and to what better uses it can be put. But the reality is that the very nature of these properties will not allow Muslims to put them to a different use. Certainly, there are issues like government encroachment of Waqf properties. Huge number of them are also lying unused due to litigation which takes decades to solve. But even without these factors, the very nature of Waqf would make it extremely difficult to liquidate the property or to change its use. If someone instituted a madrasa as a Waqf, then it has to perform that function in perpetuity. God forbid if the founder also mentioned some books that he thinks should be taught in that madrasa, then those books also cannot be removed from the curriculum even after hundreds of years. It is this rigidity that makes Waqfs unsuitable for our times. However, Muslims of the time cannot be faulted for not planning ahead hundreds of years. The fault lies with us, the present-day Muslims, for rooting for the revival of Waqfs without realizing its negative effects.

The late middle-ages was the time when banking consortiums were coming up throughout the Western world. Merchants and traders were coming together, pooling resources and establishing banks with huge capital which gave impetus to the upcoming industrial revolution. Something very opposite was going on in the Muslim world. They had the resources but these were increasingly getting locked up in immovable assets through the creation of Waqfs. The financial resources were therefore locked up and its very nature made it obligatory that it could not be used for any other purpose. Moreover, different Waqfs could not be merged together unless the founder had left explicit instructions to do so; which was very rare. Even when some Muslims realized their folly, it was too late and many did not speak up fearing the clergy who had by now declared these Waqfs as sacred institutions. Moreover, since Waqfs could only be created by the wealthy, this only meant that the elite of Muslim world bound itself within a rule which was no longer beneficial. Also, this institution was not beneficial for the children of the rich as the latter got dependent on the largesse provided by the Waqf and hence did not do anything meritorious in the lives.

Today in India when we talk about the potential value of Waqf properties and how it can change the fate of Muslims, we must take into consideration its historical nature into account. The only way in which all the money that is locked up in various Waqfs can be put to better use it by a willingness to change the ‘sacred’ character of these institutions. But are there enough Muslims willing to take this call?

A regular contributor to NewAgeIslam.com, Arshad Alam is a New Delhi based independent researcher and writer on Islam and Muslims in South Asia.

Courtesy: New Age Islam

The post Was the Waqf Beneficial for Muslim Society? appeared first on SabrangIndia.