The BJP’s reaction, though seemingly focused on the Tamil Nadu vs. Governor judgement, seemed excessive in relation to the judgment itself. While the ruling does hold weight in political terms, it does not seem to warrant the level of aggression directed at the judiciary. There are numerous options to deal with the restrictions the judgement imposes on BJP’s agenda like a review or adjustments could be pursued without needing to escalate tensions with the Court in such a dramatic manner. This suggests that the real concern is not just about the Governor’s judgment but rather about broader fears over the judiciary’s increasing influence in matters closely tied to the BJP’s ideological agenda.

When viewed alongside the ongoing challenge to the 2025 Waqf Amendment, however, the intensity of the response becomes clearer. The Waqf issue is far more central to the BJP’s ideological vision, and any judicial involvement in the matter feels far more significant to the party. In this context, the backlash against the Supreme Court over the Governor case can be seen less as a reaction to that judgment alone and more as part of a broader effort to signal the BJP’s discomfort with judicial interventions in areas it views as essential to its agenda.

To fully understand this dynamic, it’s essential to also look at the history of the Waqf Act, 1995 particularly the 2013 amendment, shaped by the Sachar Committee Report and the 2008 Joint Parliamentary Committee Report. This article will explore the context of that amendment, its shortcomings and later discuss what prompts these kinds of changes in the legal regime by majoritarian governments. A detailed look examination of the 2024/25 Amendment can be read here.

The Sachar Committee Report: Unveiling disparities and untapped potential

Commissioned by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government in March 2005, the seven-member High Level Committee, chaired by Justice Rajindar Sachar, was tasked with preparing a comprehensive report on the social, economic, and educational status of the Muslim community in India. Submitted in November 2006 and tabled in Parliament shortly after, the Sachar Committee Report became a landmark document, providing stark evidence of the developmental deficits faced by Indian Muslims relative to national averages.

The Committee recommended targeted programs for skill development, credit access, and market support, particularly in backward districts and clusters where Muslim artisans were concentrated.

Crucially, the Sachar Report shone a spotlight on Waqf properties as a vast, yet profoundly underutilised, resource for potential community development. It identified over 4.9 lakh registered Waqf properties across India, encompassing an estimated 6 lakh acres of land.^[1] While the book value was pegged at Rs. 6,000 crores, the Committee estimated the market value to be significantly higher, potentially around Rs. 1.2 lakh crores (in 2006). Despite this immense asset base, the annual income generated was a mere Rs. 163 crores, representing a paltry 2.7% return on the decades-old book value. The report contrasted this with the potential for generating at least Rs. 12,000 crores annually (a 10% return on estimated market value) if the properties were managed efficiently and put to marketable use.

The Committee implicitly and explicitly pointed towards significant mismanagement, widespread encroachment (including alleged unauthorised occupation by government agencies), and administrative inefficiencies as key reasons for this underperformance.^[2] It recommended strengthening Waqf administration, applying laws like the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 to remove encroachments, recovering rent arrears at market rates, and potentially exempting Waqf properties from certain restrictive laws (like Rent Control Acts) to unlock their potential.^[3] The Sachar Report thus framed Waqf not just as a matter of religious endowment management but as a critical potential resource for addressing the very socio-economic backwardness it had documented, creating a strong impetus for reform.

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013 v/s The Waqf Act, 1995: A comparative overview

A Joint Parliamentary Committee on Waqf was constituted on 2nd January 2006 by the Rajya Sabha Chairman in consultation with the Lok Sabha Speaker to assess the Waqf Act’s implementation, to suggest amendments for retrieving encroached properties, and improve the functioning of the Central Waqf Council and State Waqf Boards.

The report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Waqf on Amendments to the Waqf Act, 1995 presented on March 4, 2008 suggested changes to make the 1995 Act more effective, particularly in achieving the retrieval of encroached Waqf properties. This Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), formed in 2006, analysed numerous suggestions and proposed substantial amendments.

Key recommendations focused on tightening the Act’s framework:

• Adding clear definitions for ‘Encroacher’ and ‘Waqf Premises’;
• Mandating faster (within one year) and more frequent (every 10 years) state-funded surveys of Waqf properties, including those existing since 1947, and giving these surveys legal weight in revenue records.
• Strengthening Waqf Tribunals by expanding their composition (including a judicial chair, a civil servant, and a Muslim law expert), granting them exclusive jurisdiction over Waqf cases, and setting time limits for decisions.
• Enhancing the Central Waqf Council’s advisory role and potentially transforming it into a commission with supervisory powers.
• Restructuring State Waqf Boards with elected and nominated members and defining procedures for removing the Chairman.
• Specifying qualifications for the CEO (must be Muslim, appointed from a Board-suggested panel).
• Drastically curtailing the alienation of Waqf property by declaring sales void and allowing leases only under strict conditions.
• Significantly strengthening anti-encroachment measures by empowering the CEO with eviction powers (akin to a Collector), defining encroachment broadly, introducing hefty penalties (imprisonment and fines) for encroachers (as a cognisable offence), and penalising negligent public servants; and asserting the Waqf Act’s precedence over conflicting local revenue laws.

The JPC also suggested establishing national bodies for Waqf property development and promoting education among Muslims, leveraging surplus funds.

In pursuance of the report, an amendment was made.

Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013(Amendment Act, 2013), introduced several significant changes to the Waqf Act, 1995, aiming to address issues highlighted by the Sachar Committee and other stakeholders. Here’s a comparison of key provisions altered by the 2013 amendment:

• Nomenclature and Definitions
  • 1995 Act: Used the spelling “Waqf”. Definitions did not exist for term “encroacher” and a limited definition existed for “Waqf”. ((Section 3(s)2))
  • 2013 Amendment: Standardised the spelling to “Waqf” throughout. It expanded the definition of “encroacher” to explicitly cover those occupying property after lease/license expiry or termination. The definition of “Waqf” was broadened to explicitly include certain communal land entries (Shamlat Patti, etc.). It also added the requirement for a mutawalli (manager) to be an Indian citizen and allowed states to set further qualifications. (Sections 2 and 5 of the Amendment Act, 2013)
• Survey of Waqf Properties
  • 1995 Act: Provided for the survey of Waqf properties by a Survey Commissioner appointed by the State Government (Section 4).
  • 2013 Amendment: Mandated the completion of surveys within one year if not already done, requiring the appointment of Survey Commissioners where necessary. This aimed to address the issue of incomplete or outdated property records. (Section 6 the Amendment Act, 2013)
• Protection Against Encroachment
  • 1995 Act: Section 54 outlined procedures for removing encroachers, but enforcement was often seen as weak. Tribunals had powers to handle disputes.
  • 2013 Amendment: Strengthened Tribunal powers to assess damages from unauthorized occupation and recover them as land revenue arrears. It also introduced penalties for public servants failing to prevent or remove encroachments. This was a direct response to the widespread encroachment problem (Sections 9 of the Amendment Act, 2013).
• Alienation of Waqf Property
  • 1995 Act: Contained restrictions on alienation, requiring Board sanction for leases, sales, exchanges, or mortgages.

2013 Amendment: Imposed a stricter regime by explicitly prohibiting the sale, gift, mortgage, or exchange of Waqf property altogether. (Section 31 of the Amendment Act, 2013)

Leases were permitted but generally capped at 30 years, requiring prior Board sanction and adherence to regulations ensuring market-based rent. This aimed to prevent the permanent loss of Waqf assets. (Section 35 of the Amendment Act, 2013)

• Waqf Tribunals
  • 1995 Act: Established State-level Waqf Tribunals for dispute resolution. Their decisions were indeed subject to High Court review. The composition included judicial and administrative officers, and often an expert in Muslim law.
  • 2013 Amendment: Formalised the three-member structure for Tribunals: (i) a judicial officer (Chairperson), (ii) a senior state civil servant, and (iii) explicitly, a person with knowledge of Muslim law and jurisprudence. The amendment maintained the status of Tribunal decisions. (Section 43 of the Amendment Act, 2013)
• State Waqf Boards and Central Waqf Council:
  • 1995 Act: Established State Waqf Boards for management and a Central Waqf Council primarily for advisory functions. Board composition varied but was predominantly Muslim.
  • 2013 Amendment: Mandated the inclusion of at least two women members in each State Waqf Board. It significantly strengthened the powers of the Central Waqf Council, enabling it to issue binding directives to State Boards on performance, record maintenance, surveys, encroachment handling, and financial reporting, aiming for greater central oversight and accountability. (Sections 11 and 13 of the Amendment Act, 2013)
• Financial Accountability:
  • 1995 Act: Under Section 72, the mutawalli of every waqf was supposed to pay an amount not exceeding 7% of waqf’s annual income to the Board.
  • 2013 Amendment: Ensured that mutawallis can claim up to 20% for farming costs as deduction from the net annual income of which 7% was to be paid to the Board —but only if they farm the land themselves, not if it’s leased out. It also reinforced the need for regular auditing of Waqf accounts. (Section 41 of the Amendment Act, 2013)

In essence, the 2013 amendments sought to tighten controls, enhance protections, clarify definitions, and increase oversight compared to the 1995 framework, largely influenced by the issues raised in the Sachar Report.

The 2013 Amendments- An examination

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013, emerged from a context demanding urgent reform. The Sachar Committee Report had laid bare not only the socio-economic challenges facing Indian Muslims but also remarked on the inefficiency in leveraging Waqf properties for community benefit. Coupled with long-standing criticisms of the 1995 Act’s implementation, including issues highlighted by Joint Parliamentary Committees (JPCs), the pressure to act was significant. K. Rahman Khan, the then Union Minister for Minority Affairs, spearheaded the legislative effort, presenting it as a product of wide consultations.

While the amendments introduced seemingly positive changes like stricter alienation rules and enhanced central oversight, they failed to address the root causes of mismanagement and underutilisation in a comprehensive manner. The focus seemed skewed towards strengthening controls and administrative structures on paper, rather than ensuring practical implementation, capacity building, and, crucially, facilitating the development potential highlighted by Sachar.

A major shortcoming was the failure to translate the Sachar Committee’s vision of Waqf as a development resource into reality. The 2013 Act lacked robust mechanisms or incentives to encourage the productive and marketable use of Waqf assets. While preventing alienation is important, simply locking up properties without facilitating their development does little to generate the income needed for education, healthcare, or skill development initiatives. The establishment of the National Waqf Development Corporation (NAWADCO) under Minister Khan’s tenure seemed promising, but its subsequent failure to gain traction shows the lack of a sustained, well-thought-out strategy for development within the 2013 framework. This suggests a superficial engagement with the Sachar report’s core economic argument, possibly rushed through without adequate planning for execution.

Furthermore, the amendments enhanced the powers of Waqf Boards and the Central Council but seemingly without sufficient attention to improving their operational capacity, transparency, or accountability on the ground. The persistence of issues like incomplete surveys years after the mandated deadline , continued widespread encroachment despite new penalties, mismanagement and corruption point to a significant gap between legislative intent and administrative reality. Empowering bodies without ensuring they have the resources, skills, and robust oversight needed for effective functioning can be counterproductive. This suggests the reforms may have been pushed through without fully considering the practical challenges of implementation across diverse state contexts.

The declaration by Minister Khan, upon the Act’s passage, that it was “perfect” seems indicative of an overestimation of the legislative changes and perhaps an underestimation of the deep-seated systemic problems. Consequently, the 2013 amendments, despite being presented as a definitive solution, ultimately proved inadequate. Their failure to effectively tackle mismanagement, unlock development potential, or ensure consistent enforcement created a vacuum. This environment of unresolved issues and perceived shortcomings – stemming perhaps from a rushed legislative process that prioritized symbolic changes over deep institutional reform – arguably paved the way for the more drastic and ill-motivated amendments proposed in 2025. The legacy of the 2013 Act is thus one of missed opportunities and incomplete reform, highlighting the pitfalls of addressing complex governance challenges with hurried legislative fixes.

Why is BJP badgering for a Waqf Reform?

Despite the hawkish stance BJP has taken consistently against institutions that could hold it accountable-from media to the Election Commission and even judiciary to an extent, it never was public with its rupture with the judiciary. It found no difficulty in arranging post-retirement plum posts for some influential judges like Chief Justice (as he was then) Ranjan Gogoi, Justice Arun Misra, Justice Abdul Nazeer etc. However, this time, it has found Waqf hearings serious enough to rake up an issue that it otherwise would not have- the scope of judicial review of the Supreme Court. This is a mighty issue and a 240 seat BJP is not cut out for it. And yet, we see how the party is willing to take its chance, especially during the Waqf Hearings. Why?

Waqf has featured in BJP’s Election manifestos for a while now. In the 1998 election manifesto, the party promised that it will protect Waqf properties from being usurped by unscrupulous individuals and help Waqf boards to develop these properties for the welfare of poor Muslim families. In the 2009 BJP’s manifesto  stated that will examine the recommendations of the Joint Parliamentary Committee regarding Waqf properties, and would, in consultation with Muslim religious leaders, take steps to remove encroachments from and unauthorised occupation of waqf properties. In its 2014 manifesto, the last one which mentions Waqf, the party stated that it will empower Waqf Boards in consultation with religious leaders; taking steps to remove encroachments from and unauthorized occupation of Waqf properties. The 2019 and 2024 manifestos restricted themselves to mentioning Triple Talaq and did not have any mention of Waqf. While not giving space in the manifesto, the BJP led NDA government has given space for Waqf in its legislative agenda. This points to a deeper, ideology driven agenda.

From Locke’s labour theory of property in Two Treatises of Government to Hegel’s concept of property as the externalisation of free will in the Philosophy of Right, the Western philosophical canon has long enshrined property ownership as intrinsic to personal liberty and political agency. Liberal theorists such as John Stuart Mill and modern defenders of Rawlsian distributive justice have further situated property within the architecture of equal citizenship, whereby the capacity to hold and transfer property undergirds the social contract and democratic legitimacy. In this tradition, property is not merely a material possession but a socially sanctioned claim to recognition, status, and autonomy. Thus, the disruption of minority property rights often signals a deeper project of political unmaking and ontological negation. As Hannah Arendt articulates in The Origins of Totalitarianism, the erasure of the “right to have rights” is a revocation of a right leading to statelessness, Historically, this logic has been basis of violent projects of ethnonational purification: the Nazi regime’s Verreichlichung (Aryanization) of Jewish assets, the legal dispossession of Armenians under Ottoman decrees such as the 1915 Abandoned Properties Law show how property becomes both a terrain and instrument of racialized statecraft. Property regimes, far from being neutral or apolitical, thus emerge as critical sites where inclusion is conferred or denied.

While the Waqf Amendment, 2025 does not have the same level of intensity as the extreme laws stated above, the concerning fact is that these amendments constitute an othering of the property relations relating to charity for the Muslims. When combined with the vehemence with which the BJP has been trying to enact laws that specifically exclude or target Muslim minorities (Criminalisation of Triple Talaq, Citizenship Amendment), Waqf Amendment, 2025 is not only an opportunity missed to reform Waqf system for the better, but also a not-so-sly attempt to promote majoritarianism.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

^[1] Pg.240, Sachar Committee Report. Available at:https://minorityaffairs.gov.in/WriteReadData/RTF1984/7830578798.pdf

^[2] Pg. 243, Sachar Committee Report

^[3] Pg. 255, Sachar Committee Report

Related:

Waqf Amendment Act 2025: An erosion of rights under the garb of reform

Amendments to the Waqf Law were needed, but the grab-and-control Waqf Amendment Act, 2025 is not the answer

The AMU Teachers’ Association (AMUTA) and Waqf Worries: Ordinary members of the Qaum are caught between a self-serving elite and a majoritarian Regime

The Waqf Bill 2024: An Open Letter to the Joint Committee of Parliament, the Opposition, and India’s Muslim Communities

The post ‘Reforms’: Sachar Committee, the 2013 Amendments and the motive behind the proposed changes in the Waqf Regime appeared first on SabrangIndia.

There exists a deep communication gap even among the non-partisan (voices) on the issue of the Waqf. This needs to be bridged. Every society and religion have provisions and practices, both related to charity and public welfare. In present day India, an era of majoritarian ascendance and minority-bashing, weaponising of this welfarist institutional –even noble– practice is easy. On the other hand, huge Waqf assets and proceeds have been (unfairly) controlled and siphoned off by some among the self-serving religious and secular elites among Muslims in connivance with (sic) the state and state-regulated Waqf Boards, for decades. This duality is a double whammy for the average Muslim citizen, regardless of whether the political dispensation has been overtly anti-Muslim or ostensibly pluralist.

An instance from my ancestral village

In my own native village in rural north Bihar, there are at least three to four graveyards. The largest one is, as per documentation, owned by some families, but used for community burials by all Muslim castes (biradris) and classes of the village. Another one is owned by three specific families. In the three contiguous graveyards, each family buries its own dead in their respective spots. Yet another one, adjacent to it, belongs to the Muslim communities of Mir-Shikars, Rayeens, Mansuris (Pasmanda Muslim communities). The land is said to have been donated by a Bhumihar-Brahman– Hindu upper caste — landlord of the village, the economic status of whose descendants are reported to have dwindled very significantly. What happens then if the (2025 amended provision) of “Waqf by user” is applied to these graveyards in my native village which fall under Waqf properties, without detailed documentation. As per the just legislated law (Waqf Amendment Act 2025), the Hindu inheritors of these lands may claim their ownership (!!) and one can then imagine the socio-political fallout, particularly in an era of “everyday communalism”.

The older mosque of my ancestral village stands on a piece of land which belonged to a widow without any children. The rest of the plot of the land is home to the house of the legal inheritors of the donor, who possess their document of proprietorship. On and off, some other villagers, hostile to, or envious of, the descendant who owns the house (legal inheritor), keep claiming that the rest of the plot of the land (apart from that on which the mosque stands) too belongs to the Waqf (mosque). Thus, a dispute has been kept alive, intra-Muslim. The very same widow-donor is said to have donated another plot of her land and the produce from this other plot of land is s meant for the costs and upkeep (chiraghi, i.e, lighting) of the mosque. This has been all through oral endowments, not documented. If oral practice were not followed, the legal inheritor of the widow-donor could/can always reclaim the land. Recently, certain “pious” people of the village expressed their intent to sell away that part of the land so that a tall, 80-feet tall minar (spire) could be built! Without such an imposing minar, the identity of a newly arrived, affluent (neo-rich) Muslims cannot be displayed, a phenomenon that also creates a sense of awe (and dominance) among both Muslims and Hindus of the locality. This handful of demonstrably “pious” villagers — with pretensions to religious education and knowledge of the Shariah—choose to forget the fact that a Waqf land cannot be put to use for any purpose other than for what has been specified by the donor (Waqif). They also choose to forget the fact that in the face of the non-existence of any written documentation and the lack of registration of such details with the Waqf Board; or non-registration in a court of law to that effect, their step would/could encounter a big obstacle. Who would be the “seller” in the land-registration office? The seller, in such a scenario, has necessarily to be a legal inheritor of the land. That the newly constructed tall minar on the northern wall of the mosque (the metallic road touches the northern wall of the mosque, hence, it involves another question of legality) would (or could) attract the attention of Hindu religious processions and therefore it is (also) potentially explosive– another important issue– that I put aside at the moment. [On more than one occasion, some instances of communal conflict that revolve around the “spot” of religious structures in the past have also brewed on the misplaced priorities of local Muslim communities, who otherwise perennially complain of educational and economic backwardness).

Religiosity of the Waqf

Some academic works, for instance, Khalid Rashid (1978), Gregory Kozlowsky (1985), P. Munawar Husain (2021), etc., on the theme of Waqf, also throw up some important questions:

Is the creation and existence of Waqf strictly as per the Sharia? The Holy Quran makes no mention of awqaf or any institution similar to them. Abu Hanifa (AD 699-767 AD) “disapproved of the institution”?  Collections of the fatawa of religious scholars in India have contained both favourable and un-favourable statements on the institution of Waqf.

Waqf, in actual practice, was not necessarily and strictly either a charitable trust or a foundation of faith. Many of these, such as the Waqf-e-Aulad, were/are selfish practices too, besides of course, also being altruistic. In this specific category (Waqf-e-Aulad), the maximum proceeds of most of awqaf are theoretically and practically earmarked for the members of the family and kinship. Every Waqif (donor) wanted his or her offspring to inherit the fruits of that ingenuity of the [Waqf], to preserve the world of their founders.

The British Indian court’s approach towards following literal Quranic rules of inheritance made Muslim landholders carve out other “legal” ways of preserving the holdings by creating awqaf. Therefore, beginning in 1879, the High Courts of India handed down a series of decisions which overturned any endowment considered to benefit primarily the settler’s own family. The Privy Council in 1894 observed that Muslim endowments must be religious and “charitable”; public, not private. The Courts’ premise was: Muslims ought to follow their own Holy Scripture, Quran, to inherit parental assets.

Who were the mutawallis (managers) of the earliest Awqaf, viz., Khyber, Sawad (Iraq, which was then a part of Iran), and Ramlah in Palestine, founded in 912 AD) Waqf by Faiq, a eunuch, distinguished as having the earliest written record (on a stone tablet)? All of these three earliest awqaf (s) in Islamic history became non-existent due to encroachment by soldiers and other influential elites in the early centuries of Islam. “Military and political leaders gradually appropriated the territory’s income. Such encroachment on endowments was by no means rare. Though awqaf aimed at permanence, few attained it”. The Buwayhids, a family of Iranian, not Arab origin, had a hand in dismembering that [Sawad] endowment.

The creation of Waqf, in most cases — as observed by judges during British colonial rule –had more to do with circumventing the Quranically defined rights of inheritance and division/distribution of the properties (estates) and their proceeds among his/her heirs. Waqf-creation was a way of putting a complete restriction on sale and purchase of the assets/properties by the heirs.  “Waqf is a (unique)/typical phenomenon which partakes the characteristics of endowment, gift and many such sister concepts but, at the same time, stands apart”. “The removal of encroachments upon the Waqf properties is relegated to the executive wing rather than a judicial exercise. The appointment and removal of mutawallis is another complicated issue”.

In the early years of the 19th century, a number of persons from India’s Muslim elite began to convert their property into awqaf. This was a way to protect their family’s fortunes and the social prominence which accompanied it. In both kinds of awqaf, viz., Waqf-e-Aam (exclusively for charitable purposes) and Waqf-e-Aulad, through mutawllis (managers), self-interest could be both preserved and perpetuated.

In 1879, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (when he was in the Viceroy’s legislative council) published an article in his Urdu journal, Tazhib- al-Akhlaq, titled “A plan for saving Muslim Families from destruction and extinction” (“Ek Tadbir: Mussalmanon ke Khandanon ko Tabahi awr Barbadi se Bachaane ki“). In this article, he noted, that a Waqf was “allowed”, or “permitted” (mujaz). Could this mean that while he did not outright disapprove of the practice, he was not a vocal supporter of the institution?

Sir Syed’s four important concerns were: (a) that the property placed in a Waqf be accurately and fully described. (b) his proposal insisted that, once drawn up, a waqfnamah (deed of Waqf) be registered with the district officer or the district collector or magistrate; (c) The shares of the waqf‘s income had to be precisely laid out in the Waqfnamah. (d) Also, the succession to the office of mutawalli had to be clearly established. He wanted the Muslim waqifs to introduce significant content of charity in their waqf so that the European judges may not “mis-read” it as lacking in charity.

Ameer Ali (1849-1928) however disagreed with Sir Syed; Shibli (1857-1914) in his 21-pages long essay on Waqf-e-Aulad (1908) argued that even this form of Waqf is charitable, which endorsed Ameer Ali. Shibli’s theologically premised argument was less convincing as the Waqf-e-Aulad does not promise charity for the ordinary, common Muslim. Eventually, bending under the pressure of the Muslim orthodoxy, Sir Syed was not able to propose the draft-bill in the Imperial Legislative Council.

Interesting facts about some Indian Awqaf: A Muslim woman in Bengal even allowed her deed of Waqf to begin with an invocation to the goddess Durga. In Tamil, a mutawalli preferred to be called Dharmakarta –indigenous usage not Persio-Arabic terminology. Najiban, a tawaif of Bareilly also created a Waqf. It was only when the British Indian State ran interference that the Hoogly College[1] was established out of the Waqf created by Mohd Mohsin. The deed of the Mohd Mohsin Waqf did not have such a provision. Since the period of Caliph Umar’s (the awqaf of Khyber and Sawad), the Awqaf were always under “direct” control of the state.

India’s Waqf estates (Charitable endowments) earmarked for modern education, healthcare and similar welfare activities

Mohammad Mohsin (1732-1812) of Hooghly created a Waqf. It was only with the intervention of the East India Company (colonial) state, that the Waqf established a college in 1836 (Chinsura, West Bengal), now affiliated to the Burdwan University. This College produced alumni such as Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Muzaffar Ahmed, ABM Habibullah, and many more in various fields, including films and sports. Subsequently, with interventions of the Calcutta reformist, Abdul Latif (d. 1893), scholarships and other stipends for students were also instituted, out of the income from the Mohsin Waqf estate.

In Haryana and Kashmir, some educational institutions are also run by Waqf, though, it is unclear, how much of the running costs are contributed by the financial grants of the Waqf Boards via the provincial government’s ministries of minority affairs. This is something that needs to be brought out more clearly.

There are many Waqfs within the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) which provided land and scholarship to students. The noted Physicist Prof Wali Mohammad (1886-1968) is one such person who created Waqf for AMU. A students’ residential Hall (with many hostels) for engineering students, has been constructed on the Waqf land donated by Professor Wali Mohammad, in the 1990s. The Hall, meant for the Engineering students, got named after Nadim Tarin, for the reasons one fails to understand. Thus, the donor (Waqif) of the land, despite being a noted Physicist, has been sadly anonymized, almost completely erased from the history of AMU and its donors. This action was not performed by any anti-Muslim political party. There are many more Waqf lands within AMU which await a transparent acknowledgement and display (of inherited ownership) on the AMU website to ensure comprehensive wider public knowledge and also, accountability. The AMU has also been losing its lands frequently and intermittently, in one or other ways.

“Muslim waqfs and endowments are an old institution but like most other assets, have been generally mismanaged… generations past have been dissatisfied with the way Muslim Waqifs and Mutawallis,… and the governments, have handled waqf properties. Islamic governments have done no better, and in India” too the British imperialist and secular republican governments have fared no better, wrote, the economist and former Vice Chancellor of AMU, A M Khusro, in his Foreword to Khalid Rashid’s book (1978). 

Contentious legislative histories of the Waqf in India

After the failed attempt of Sir Syed in 1879, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, astute politician that he was, jumped into the Waqf fray, ostensibly to protect the interests of the Muslim landed elites who needed the Waqf Validation Act of 1913. This Act, supported by the colonial state, aimed to safeguard the landed assets of these elites, who were seen as potential allies against a growing anti-colonial movement. The Swadeshi Movement, which opposed the religious-communal partition of Bengal, had forced the colonial state to annul the (Bengal) partition in 1911-192, necessitating a political arrangement to secure Muslim support. So much so that, unlike the Sir Syed’s draft (1879), Jinnah (1913) also succeeded in getting a clause added that stated that the registration of a Waqfnamah was not mandatory.

Subsequently, Jinnah enlisted more consolidated support of Muslims through the Shariat Act of 1937 which was based on the Aurangzeb era codification of Shariat, Fatawa-e-Alamgiri of the late 17^th century. Through the Shariat Act 1937-1939, he secured hugely consolidated political support of the separatist Muslim elites and soon after, he succeeded in winning Pakistan for them. Pakistan reformed Muslim Personal Laws in March 1961. Many other Muslim countries have introduced reforms but India’s Muslims continue to resist state interference not only in the issue of the un-Quranic Instant Triple Talaq but also in the AMU’s malignant governance and gross abuse of autonomy[2]

It is also not be out of place to mention here that presently India has 32 Waqf Boards, with only Bihar and UP having separate Waqf Boards for Shias and Sunnis. The Dawoodi Bohra community, historically, has shown a preference for managing their religious properties through trusts rather than under the purview of Waqf Boards. This preference stems from their unique religious governance structure, which centralises authority in the al-Dai-al-Mutlaq.

Moral weakness of building resistance and solidarity

While the “liberal” (or, less illiberal) era of the Indian republic has often been obliging of the Muslim regressive tendencies, the current majoritarian era pursues its own divisive political agenda. For instance, it has criminalised the Instant Triple Talaq (ITT) in 2019 but did not strengthen the provisions of maintenance to the divorced women. Whereas, the Supreme Court’s verdict (in the Danial Latifi case 2001) had already clarified that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (MWPRD) does provide for maintenance, surely the 2019 Act should have further strengthened the provision? Especially since, maintenance for the divorced women is the most crucial aspect of this issue in the sphere of both equity and rights?

Such has been the political history of India’s Muslims in the 20^th century (colonial and republican eras) and their stubbornness against state intervention to any reform that they have foregone the moral strength needed to resist the Waqf Amendment Act 2025. Worse, this kind and character of Muslim politics, particularly since the 1980s, has been identified by many scholars as a contributing factor to the rise of majoritarianism in India today. Concealing the pathetic aspect of widespread mismanagement of Waqf assets for decades, will now further deplete the moral strength required to build understanding and solidarity required to resist an unwanted law.

Pertinently, the need for a satisfactory political arrangement to safeguard any monopoly on landed assets is equally applicable for Hindu Mahanths and their Mutths. The current dispensation is not concerned about these Hindu institutions which also suffer from similar ills of non-transparent mal-functioning. Unfortunately, it is also true that the institution of Mahanths and Maths remains under-explored academically by historians of Peasant and Agrarian Relations. [Prakash Jha’s film Mrityudand (1997) attempts to depict some of the degenerative aspects of the institution of Mahanth, but this was a melodramatic depiction on celluloid].

The BJP-dominated regime has no intention of introducing a similar law to reform this Hindu institution of Mahanths’ Muths. This is therefore an additional reason why Muslim communities and justice-loving people look upon the Waqf Amendment Act 2025 with alarming concern. The legislative control that it seeks to seize gives a clear impression of targeting only Muslims with this discriminatory treatment.

Specifically, there is a real apprehension that the (amended) Act –presently under challenge—will turn into a tool to harass Muslims by the sinister and wide network of local majoritarian forces and outfits in those smaller villages and mohallas where the written deeds of Waqf and mosques are not available, as is the case with the abovementioned instance from my own ancestral village. Another alarming aspect of the Act is the Places of Worship Act, 1991 falling under the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act, 1904. According to Kapil Sibal[3] , this specific aspect was also concealed from the Members of Parliament from the Opposition, right until the day it was finally debated in the two Houses of Parliament.

Many scholars also feel that Israel –in West Asia—has also played this politics of usurping available Waqf land and thereby pursuing the politics of dispossessing the Arabs by illegitimate means. Haitam Suleiman and Robert Home in their 2010 essay demonstrate that most Waqf property within Israel has been expropriated by the Israeli state under Absentee Property Laws, a sensitive and complicated issue within the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This instance justifiably alarms India’s Muslims further, about the BJP’s intent.

Briefly, to sum up. India’s Waqf urgently need reforms in terms of actualising the maximum potential of revenue, proceeds, and its use for charitable purposes, that is, towards capacity-building for the weaker sections of the citizenry. Khalid Rashid (1978) estimated that Waqf assets actualise only a mere 3.5% of its actual promise in terms of use for charitable purposes. Waqf land need to be protected from encroachers. Waqf-loot happens with the connivance of both the state and the Muslim elite controlling the Waqf Boards.

The Act legislated in 2025 doesn’t promise any such reformatory intent not does it reflect any sincerity towards breaking this nexus (between the state and the Waqf-looting elites). Protecting the Waqf and realizing its basic objective of charity and welfare remains as elusive as ever. A more thorough and sincere implementation of the Waqf (Amendment) Act 2013 –with some amendments– would have been a more constructive step rather than legislating a new law.

Finally, it must also be notes that a large proportion of Waqf property comprises graveyards (Qabristan) which do not yield any income. A paltry section (mostly orally endowed and unregistered) Waqf assets are owned by village/Mohalla mosques (which are maintained through meagre resources or no income). These “assets” add to the quantum of property of Waqfs, but do not yield returns. This is the point that the Sachar Report (2006), which highlighted the poverty of India’s Muslim minority, failed to note. However, the Sachar Report did reveal that, “There are more than 4.9 lakh registered Wakfs [Waqf estates and assets] spread across the country but the current annual income from these properties is only about Rs.163 crores, which amounts to a meagre rate of return of 2.7 percent…. The current… market value (income to be generated out) of [these] Wakf properties can be put at Rs.1.2 lakh crore.

The present, BJP-dominated NDA-III regime, therefore, should have considered emulating Turkey whose laws of 1868 and 1924 make the Waqf institutions more robust in terms of education, healthcare, municipal and civic amenities and even in disaster relief. Politically, such an emulation may have helped the BJP outsmarting the Opposition, without creating the attendant social friction.

The author is a professor, Modern and Contemporary Indian History, Aligarh Muslim University, and author of Muslim Politics in Bihar: Changing Contours.

(This article is an expanded version of Outlook’s May 1, 2025 issue ‘Username Waqf’ where it appeared under the title, ‘A Fractured Timeline’; this is an expanded version being published at the specific request of the author, a regular columnist with Sabrangindia)

[1]  Two decades later than their first venture, the British rulers made another effort to engage Muslims in their pattern of education by taking control of the Imambada Madrasa at Hooghly run under the endowment made by Haji Mohammed Mohsin in 1806. Now it is functioning as the oldest law college in the country, named as Hooghly Mohsin College in 1937.

[2] https://www.academia.edu/127645531/UGC_Draft_Regulations_2025_Question_of_Univ_Autonomy_and_AMUs_Abuse_of_Autonomy).

[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VYQEyPP-A2M; Kapil Sibal Calls Waqf Bill Unconstitutional, Alleges Political Agenda

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Part 1: The Legacy of Waqf – From pious endowments to modern law

The concept of Waqf is deeply rooted in Islamic jurisprudence, representing a unique form of religious and charitable endowment. In Islamic law, Waqf signifies the permanent dedication, by a person professing Islam (known as the Waqif), of any property, whether movable or immovable, for purposes recognized by Muslim law as pious, religious, or charitable. Crucially, once a property is declared Waqf, its ownership is considered to vest in God Almighty, rendering it inalienable – it cannot typically be sold, gifted, or inherited. The income generated from these properties is earmarked for specific objectives outlined by the Waqif, such as the upkeep of mosques, dargahs, graveyards, imambaras, the support of educational institutions (madrasas), or providing assistance to the poor and needy within the community. A caretaker, known as a Mutawalli, is usually appointed to manage the property’s day-to-day affairs.

There are 872,000 registered Waqf properties across the country, running into lakhs of acres. This immense scale explains the socio-economic and religious significance of Waqf assets within the Muslim community.

The administration of these properties has evolved through various legislative frameworks over the past century. An early attempt at regulation was the Mussalman Wakf Act, 1923. Post-independence, the Waqf Act, 1954, marked the first significant effort to establish a structured system for managing these endowments. This Act underwent several amendments (in 1959, 1964, 1969, and 1984) aimed at refining administrative processes.

A more comprehensive legal structure arrived with the Waqf Act, 1995. This Act repealed the 1954 law and its subsequent amendments, seeking to provide for the “better administration of Auqaf (Waqfs) and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”. The 1995 Act laid down the framework for establishing State Waqf Boards and a Central Waqf Council, defining their powers and functions. Further amendments were introduced in 2013 by the then UPA government, which, among other changes, formally established the statutory framework for State Waqf Boards and increased the permissible lease period for Waqf properties from three years to thirty years, aiming for better utilization of assets.

This historical progression of legislation reveals a trend towards increasing formalisation and state intervention in the management of Waqf properties. What began as a community-managed religious practice gradually came under greater regulatory scrutiny, reflecting the complex interplay between religious institutions, community autonomy, and the state’s administrative imperatives. The sheer scale and value of Waqf assets have inevitably drawn governmental interest, shifting the focus over time from purely religious oversight towards broader concerns of administration, management efficiency, and, as recent events suggest, potentially political control. The 1995 Act itself represented a significant step in this direction, setting the stage for the more pervasive changes introduced in 2025.

Part 2: Understanding the Waqf Act, 1995: Key Provisions Explained

The Waqf Act, 1995, served as the cornerstone of Waqf administration in India for nearly three decades before the recent amendments. Understanding its key provisions is essential to grasp the significance of the changes brought about by the 2025 Act.

Defining and recognizing Waqf (Section 3 (r) – Pre-amendment)

The 1995 Act recognised Waqf formation through three primary means:

1. Declaration: A formal dedication of property by its lawful owner for religious or charitable purposes under Muslim law.
2. Waqf by User: This crucial provision allowed a property to be recognised as Waqf if it had been used for a long period for any religious or charitable purpose recognized under Muslim law, even in the absence of a formal dedication deed. This acknowledged the reality of many historical endowments, particularly older mosques, graveyards, or community spaces, where formal documentation might be lost or non-existent but continuous religious use established its character.
3. Waqf-alal-aulad: An endowment where the benefits primarily accrue to the founder’s family or descendants for a specified period, with the ultimate benefit designated for a religious or charitable purpose upon the extinction of the family line.

Governance Structure

The Act established a hierarchical structure for Waqf administration:

• State Waqf Boards (Establishment under Section 13, Composition under Section 14 – Pre-amendment): The Act mandated the establishment of a Waqf Board in every state. States could also establish separate Boards for Shia and Sunni Waqfs if their population and Waqf numbers warranted it.
  • Composition: The Boards were designed to be predominantly composed of Muslim members, reflecting the religious nature of the institutions they governed. Section 14 provided for a mix of elected and nominated members. Elected members included up to two representatives each from electoral colleges comprising Muslim Members of Parliament (MPs), Muslim Members of State Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) and Legislative Councils (MLCs), and Muslim members of the State Bar Council. Nominated members included government officials and individuals recognized for their expertise in Islamic law, finance, or administration. The Act also mandated the inclusion of at least two women members.
  • Functions (Section 32): The Boards were vested with the general superintendence of all Waqfs within the state. Their key functions included ensuring that Waqfs were properly maintained, controlled, and administered according to the Act, Muslim law, and the specific objectives laid out in the Waqf deed; settling schemes for management; directing the utilization of surplus income for approved purposes; scrutinizing and approving budgets submitted by Mutawallis; and appointing or removing Mutawallis under specified conditions.
• Central Waqf Council (Establishment under Section 9 – Pre-amendment): At the national level, the Act provided for a Central Waqf Council.
  • Composition: It was chaired by the Union Minister in charge of Waqf. Critically, Section 9 stipulated that, barring the Minister, all other members of the Council had to be Muslims. These included MPs, scholars of Islamic theology, representatives of national-level Muslim organizations, and former judges of the Supreme Court or High Courts. At least two members were required to be women.
  • Role: The Council’s function was primarily advisory. It was tasked with advising the Central Government, State Governments, and the State Waqf Boards on matters concerning the effective administration of Waqfs and the functioning of the Boards.
• Mutawalli (Defined in Section 3 (i)): The Act defined a Mutawalli as any person appointed, either verbally or under any deed or instrument by which a Waqf has been created, or by a competent authority, to manage or administer such Waqf. They were the primary managers at the property level, responsible for implementing the Waqf’s objectives and managing its income and expenditure, subject to the oversight and direction of the State Waqf Board.
• Survey Commissioner (Section 4 – Pre-amendment): The state government was required to appoint a Survey Commissioner to conduct preliminary surveys of all Waqf properties existing in the state. The Commissioner was responsible for identifying Waqfs, investigating their nature and extent, and submitting a report to the state government and the Waqf Board.

Identifying and Managing Waqf Property

• The Power of Section 40 (Pre-amendment): This section granted the State Waqf Board the power to determine, after conducting an inquiry, whether a particular property was Waqf property. The Board could issue notices to interested parties and hold hearings.
• Registration of Waqfs (Section 36): The Act mandated the registration of all Waqfs, whether created before or after the commencement of the Act, at the office of the respective State Waqf Board.
• Protection of Waqf Property: The Act included provisions to safeguard Waqf assets:
  • Restrictions on Alienation (Section 51): It generally prohibited the sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, or transfer of Waqf property. Leases exceeding one year (or three years for agricultural land) required prior sanction from the Board (Section 56). The 2013 amendment significantly extended the permissible lease period up to 30 years with Board approval, aiming for better economic utilization.
  • Penalties for Encroachment (Section 52A – added by 2013 amendment): This section defined ‘encroacher’ and prescribed penalty of imprisonment for up to two years, for illegally occupying Waqf property.

Dispute Resolution

• Waqf Tribunals (Establishment under Section 83 – Pre-amendment): To handle disputes related to Waqf properties, the Act mandated that state governments constitute one or more Tribunals. These Tribunals had jurisdiction over questions such as whether a property is Waqf, disputes regarding Mutawallis, or issues concerning Waqf administration.
  • Composition: Section 83 specified the composition: a Chairman who was a member of the State Judicial Service (holding a rank not below that of a District, Sessions, or Civil Judge, Class I), one member from the State Civil Services (equivalent in rank to at least an Additional District Magistrate), and crucially, one member having knowledge of Muslim law and jurisprudence. This composition aimed to blend judicial, administrative, and religious legal expertise.
  • Jurisdiction (Section 85): The Tribunals were granted exclusive jurisdiction over Waqf matters, explicitly barring suits or legal proceedings in civil courts concerning any dispute required to be determined by the Tribunal under the Act.
• Finality of Tribunal Decisions (Section 85 – Pre-amendment): The Act did allow the High Court to exercise revisional jurisdiction – it could call for records and pass orders either on its own motion (suo motu) or on the application of the Board or an aggrieved person on any matter which has been determined by the tribunals, and even modify such order.

Exemption from Limitation Act (Section 107 – Pre-amendment)

• A significant protective measure was Section 107, which stipulated that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (which sets time limits for initiating legal action) would not apply to any suit for the possession of immovable property in any Waqf. The purpose of this exemption was to safeguard Waqf properties from being lost due to adverse possession – where an encroacher occupies land openly and continuously for a prescribed period (typically 12 years for private immovable property under the Limitation Act). Section 107 allowed Waqf Boards to initiate recovery proceedings for encroached land regardless of how long the encroachment had persisted.

Significance of the 1995 Act

The 1995 Act, therefore, represented a layered legal architecture attempting to balance the unique religious nature of Waqf with the requirements of modern administration and state oversight. Provisions ensuring Muslim majority representation on Boards and Councils, and the inclusion of Muslim law experts in Tribunals, sought to maintain the institution’s religious integrity. However, the very establishment of state-controlled Boards, the appointment of Survey Commissioners, the broad powers under Section 40, and the Tribunal system itself signified substantial state involvement.

Part 3: The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025: What has changed?

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, introduces sweeping changes to the 1995 framework, impacting nearly every aspect of Waqf definition, governance, property management, and dispute resolution. The government has renamed the legislation the “Unified Waqf Management, Empowerment, Efficiency, and Development Act” (UMEED Act), in line with the government’s enthusiasm to rename things.

Redefining Waqf creation and scope:

• New Criteria for Declaration (Amended Section 3(r), New Section 3A): The Act imposes new conditions for creating a Waqf by declaration. Firstly, only a person who has demonstrably practiced Islam for at least five years can now declare a Waqf. Secondly, the Act explicitly requires the person creating the Waqf (Waqif) to be the lawful owner of the property being dedicated.
• Abolition of ‘Waqf by User’ Prospectively (Amended Section 3(r)): The Act removes the concept of ‘Waqf by user’ for recognising future This means properties cannot be newly recognised as Waqf based solely on long-term religious or charitable use without a formal declaration by a qualified owner. While the amendment includes a proviso stating that existing properties registered as ‘Waqf by user’ before the Act’s commencement will remain Waqf, it adds a crucial exception: this protection does not apply if the property is “wholly or in part, in dispute or is a government property”. This exception clause creates uncertainty for many existing ‘Waqf by user’ properties, particularly those facing legal challenges or situated on land claimed by the government.
• Waqf-alal-aulad clarification (new Section 3A(2)): The amendment specifies that the creation of a Waqf-alal-aulad (family Waqf) must not result in the denial of inheritance rights to the Waqif’s heirs, explicitly including women heirs, or infringe upon the rights of others with lawful claims. This is presented by the government as a measure to ensure gender equality and protect inheritance rights.

Shift in Property identification and Survey:

• Deletion of Section 40: The Section 40, which empowered State Waqf Boards to declare properties as Waqf after an inquiry, has been entirely removed.
• Collector’s Role in Survey (Amended Section 4): The role of the Survey Commissioner is abolished. Instead, the District Collector (or an authorised officer not below the rank of Deputy Collector) is now responsible for conducting surveys of potential Waqf properties. These surveys are to be conducted according to the procedures laid out in the state’s revenue laws. This transfers significant authority from a potentially specialised body focused on Waqf to generalist revenue administration officials, raising concerns about potential bias and lack of specialized knowledge.
• Government property: The Act explicitly states that any government property identified as Waqf will cease to be considered Waqf property. In cases of uncertainty regarding ownership between Waqf claims and government claims, the Collector is empowered to determine ownership and report to the state government.

Changes in governance bodies (Amended Sections 9, 14):

• Inclusion of Non-Muslims: A major structural change is the mandatory inclusion of non-Muslim members in both the Central Waqf Council and the State Waqf Boards. The Act specifies at least two non-Muslim members for State Boards and mandates two non-Muslims on the Council, while also removing the previous requirement that certain categories of Council members (like MPs, former judges, eminent persons) must be Muslim.
• Nomination over Election: The previous system where some members of State Waqf Boards were elected by specific Muslim electoral colleges (MPs, MLAs/MLCs, Bar Council members) has been abolished. The Act now empowers the state government to nominate all members of the State Waqf Boards. This significantly increases state government control over the composition and functioning of the Boards.
• Mandated Representation: While increasing government control, the Act also mandates specific representation within the nominated Boards. They must include at least one member each from Shia, Sunni, and recognized Backward Classes among Muslims. Additionally, if there are Bohra or Agakhani Waqfs in the state, one member from each of these communities must be included. The requirement for female representation is retained, specifying that at least two Muslim members must be women.

Tribunal reforms (Amended Section 83, Omission of Section 85 finality clause):

• New Composition: The Tribunal will now consist of three members like before but with some changes in the composition: a Chairman who is a current or former District Court judge, and a member who is a current or former state government officer of the rank of Joint Secretary or equivalent and a person having the knowledge of Muslim law.
• Appeal to High Court: In essence, provides a 90 day time limit to appeal the tribunal’s decisions to the High Court. However, the appeal provision existed in the 1995 act too.
• Digital Mandate and Financial Changes:
• Central Portal and Database (New Section 3B, Amended Section 3(ka)): The Act mandates the establishment of a central online portal and database managed by the Central Government. All existing Waqfs registered under the Act prior to the amendment are required to file detailed information about the Waqf and its properties on this portal within six months of the Act’s commencement.
• Contribution Reduction: The mandatory annual contribution payable by Waqfs from their net annual income to the State Waqf Board for administrative expenses is reduced from 7% to 5%.

Applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 (Omission of Section 107):

• Perhaps one of the most impactful changes is the omission of Section 107 of the 1995 Act. This means the Limitation Act, 1963, which sets time limits for filing lawsuits, will now apply to Waqf properties like any other property from now on. Consequently, the special protection Waqf properties previously enjoyed against claims of adverse possession is removed. Individuals or entities who have illegally occupied Waqf land for the period specified under the Limitation Act (often 12 years for immovable property) could potentially claim legal ownership, severely hindering the ability of Waqf Boards to reclaim long-encroached properties and effectively legitimizing past illegal encroachments.

These amendments, viewed collectively, represent a significant shift in the governance philosophy surrounding Waqf. While the 1995 Act balanced community involvement with state oversight, the 2025 changes appear to tilt this balance decisively towards state control. The removal of the Board’s power under Section 40, the replacement of the Survey Commissioner with the Collector, the introduction of nominated Boards with mandatory non-Muslim presence, and the altered Tribunal composition all point to a reduced role for community institutions and increased authority for government functionaries.

Part 4: A question of rights: How the 2025 amendments impact minorities

The passage of the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, has been met with strong opposition and rightly so. A widespread concern regarding its impact on the fundamental rights of India’s Muslim minority is prevalent. Why?

Erosion of religious autonomy (Violation of Article 26)

Article 26 of the Indian Constitution grants every religious denomination the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes and to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. The 2025 Act infringes upon this right by significantly increasing government control over Waqf administration. The transfer of survey powers to the District Collector, the replacement of elected Board members with government nominees, and, most notably, the mandatory inclusion of non-Muslims in the governing bodies (State Boards and Central Council) are direct state interference in the management of inherently religious and charitable endowments established under Muslim law.

Concerns over Non-Muslim representation

While the government presents the inclusion of non-Muslim members on Waqf Boards and the Council as a move towards inclusivity and secular administration, this provision fails to hide the intentions of the ruling establishments to somehow gain control over the spaces that have been reserved for Muslims. When contrasted with the strict norms for say the Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam where the service rules mandate that any appointment to any category of post in the TTD should be made from among the persons professing Hindu Religion. Some employees were pulled up in February 2025 for engaging in non-Hindu activities and were sent memos.

The question of whether our society can hire individuals from different religions for non-religious roles—and what it reveals about us if we cannot—is a separate and deeply important conversation in itself. However, what needs to be noted here is that if traditional Hindu dominions like the TTD have such strict and well accepted rules over all categories of employees, it is not fair to have non-Muslims’ representation in dominions that have been held by Muslims for generations now. This is not a question of essential religious practices but a question of how spaces occupied by two religions are being treated differently.

The argument is that Waqf properties are specifically dedicated under Islamic law for purposes defined by that law, and their management should primarily rest with members of the Muslim community who understand the religious context and obligations.

Weakening property protection and potential for dispossession

Several amendments are directly weakening the legal protections afforded to Waqf properties, raising fears of systematic dispossession:

Impact of Removing Section 107

The repeal of the exemption from the Limitation Act, 1963, is arguably one of the most damaging changes. By making Waqf properties subject to claims of adverse possession (typically after 12 years of uninterrupted illegal occupation), the Act potentially legitimizes decades of encroachment and makes it significantly harder, if not impossible, for Waqf Boards to recover vast tracts of land illegally occupied in the past. This fundamentally undermines the principle of Waqf property being inalienable and perpetually dedicated.

For example, in Telangana, more than 70% of Waqf land has been encroached by various elements. Now, the biggest protection to Waqf was that even if the encroachers squatted on the land for more than 12 years, they would not have had the right to claim it and this changed with the amendment thus putting the encroached properties in danger.

Impact of abolishing ‘Waqf by User’

Removing the possibility of recognizing new Waqfs based on long-term usage closes off a vital avenue for protecting historical community assets where formal documentation is lacking. Furthermore, the caveat that even existing registered ‘Waqf by user’ properties lose protection if they are disputed or on government land creates significant vulnerability.

Collector’s Enhanced Role: Empowering the District Collector, a revenue official accountable to the state government, to conduct surveys and determine ownership in case of disputes involving government land fuels concerns about political interference and decisions potentially biased against Waqf claims. 

Arbitrary restrictions and discrimination

Certain provisions that have been brought via the amendment are plain arbitrary and discriminatory

• The ‘5-year practice’ rule

The requirement that a person must have practiced Islam for at least five years to create a Waqf is an arbitrary and intrusive limitation on religious freedom. It imposes an unnecessary burden of proof on individuals born into the faith and lacks a clear legislative rationale.

• Exclusion of ‘Waqf by User’

The prospective abolition of ‘Waqf by user’ is discriminatory against a historically significant method of recognizing community endowments based on established practice.

Conclusion

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, enacted under the banner of the “Unified Waqf Management, Empowerment, Efficiency, and Development (UMEED) Act,” seeks to reform the administration of Waqf properties in India. However, a critical examination reveals that its provisions represent a significant regression, fundamentally undermining the religious autonomy and property rights of the Muslim minority, thereby challenging constitutional safeguards.

A central pillar of this critique rests upon the Act’s assault on the autonomy guaranteed under Article 26 of the Constitution, which allows religious denominations to manage their own affairs. The systematic replacement of elected members on State Waqf Boards with government nominees, coupled with the mandated inclusion of non-Muslim members in both State Boards and the Central Waqf Council, constitutes an unprecedented level of state interference in the governance of institutions intrinsically linked to Islamic faith and practice. This contrasts starkly with the governance norms often applied to the endowments of other faiths, raising legitimate concerns about discriminatory application of legislative principles.

Furthermore, the Act delivers a severe blow to the protection of Waqf properties. The repeal of Section 107 of the 1995 Act, which shielded Waqf properties from the Limitation Act, 1963, is particularly damaging. This single amendment potentially legitimizes decades of illegal encroachment by allowing claims of adverse possession, threatening the recovery of vast tracts of land  that were intended for perpetual religious and charitable use. This action directly contradicts the core Islamic principle of Waqf property being inalienable.

While framed as a move towards transparency and efficiency, the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, functions as a mechanism for increased state control over minority religious institutions and assets. It markedly weakens property protections, erodes constitutionally guaranteed autonomy, and introduces potentially discriminatory clauses. Far from progressive reform, the Act represents a shift that jeopardizes the integrity and security of Waqf institutions and properties across India, rightly prompting serious constitutional challenges.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

Related:

Amid Waqf Debate, Should Hindu Endowment Boards be Held Responsible for the Sorry Plight of Dalits?

Waqf Amendment Act 2025: SC grants some time to Centre on condition no non-Muslims appointed to Board, Council & no change in any Waqf status

SC to UoI on Waqf Amendment: ‘Are you willing to allow Muslims on Hindu endowment boards?’

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“This attack on the Supreme Court, as an institution, and qua the Chief Justice of India Mr Justice Sanjiv Khanna, as an individual, is unacceptable and must be dealt with in accordance with the law,” the statement added.

The association urged the attorney general to take action against Dubey. Already an advocate on record Anans Tanvir has approached the SC with a plea to launch contempt proceedings to which a division bench of the court, led by Justice Gavai asked the advocate to seek the Attorney General (AG). The hearing on this is listed for next week as there has been no response from the AG.

Under the 1971 Contempt of Courts Act, an individual can file a contempt petition in the Supreme Court only with approval from the attorney general or the solicitor general, it has been reported.

In his letter to the SC, Tanvir had argued that contempt proceedings should be initiated against Dubey for his “grossly scandalous” and “misleading” pronouncements on the CJI that were aimed at “lowering the dignity and authority of the Court.”

The SCBA in its resolution has stated that “this attack on the Supreme Court as an institution and qua the Chief Justice of India, Mr Justice Sanjiv Khanna as an individual is unacceptable and must be dealt with in accordance with law.”

The resolution may be read here.

Besides the bar association, the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association on Tuesday passed a resolution condemning Dubey’s remarks, Live Law reported.

“Such remarks are not only factually baseless and deeply irresponsible, but they also amount to a direct and unwarranted attack on the independence, dignity, and majesty of our country’s highest constitutional court,” the resolution was quoted as saying.

The Advocates-on-Record Association added that Dubey’s statements were “defamatory in nature and seek to lower the judiciary’s authority in the eyes of the public”.

The resolution emphasised the importance of judicial independence in a democracy and stated that while disagreements with the court’s decisions are acceptable, they must be expressed respectfully and within legal bounds.

The association also urged public representatives to “exercise restraint, uphold constitutional values, and respect the dignity of the judiciary”.

The post SCBA demands contempt action against BJP MP for remarks about CJI Sanjiv Khanna appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Recording the Centre’s assurance, the Supreme Court noted the following:

• No appointments of non-Muslims to the Waqf Boards or the Central Waqf Council will be made under the amended law until further orders.
• No steps will be taken to de-notify or disturb properties recognised as waqf—whether by user, by court declarations, or prior to the amendment.
• The matter is to be listed for further hearing on May 5, 2025. The union government has a week to file its reply, with rejoinders due within five days thereafter.
• The matter will now be heard under the title: “In Re: Waqf Amendment Act”, marking it as one of constitutional importance.

This order came in a batch of petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 on grounds that it violates the rights of the Muslim community and undermines the legal framework governing religious endowments.

Court expresses constitutional doubts over the Act

The three-judge Bench led by Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna, with Justices Sanjay Kumar and KV Viswanathan, heard detailed arguments over two days, on April 16 and April 17, before recording the Union’s undertakings. The Court’s oral observations reflected deep concern over the potential impact of the amended provisions.

Among the first issues raised was the deletion of “waqf by user”, a legal principle long used to recognise religious endowments based on public use over time. CJI Khanna, during the hearing on April 16, observed that many prominent dargahs, graveyards, and mosques gained waqf status through community usage rather than written instruments. “You are erasing centuries of history,” he cautioned, noting the risk that thousands of such properties could be wiped off waqf registers.

Equally troubling to the Court was the amendment allowing non-Muslims to be appointed to the Waqf Boards and the Central Waqf Council. CJI Khanna pointedly asked the Solicitor General: “Would you allow a non-Hindu on a Temple Trust?”—emphasising that Article 26 of the Constitution grants religious denominations the right to manage their own institutions.

The Court also took issue with provisions enabling district Collectors to initiate de-notification of waqf properties, calling it “very dangerous.” CJI Khanna questioned whether executive officials could be empowered to override judicial orders or undermine waqf declarations made by statutory bodies or courts.

Union backtracks under pressure, assures status quo

Faced with sharp judicial scrutiny, on April 17, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta gave repeated assurances that the government would not take any action under the amended Act that could adversely affect the waqf community until the Court decides on interim reliefs. He undertook that:

• No non-Muslim members would be appointed to any Waqf Board or the Central Waqf Council.
• The government would not de-notify waqf lands, including those identified through user or court proceedings.
• Any decision regarding future implementation would be deferred pending further orders of the Court.

Accepting these undertakings, the Court chose not to formally stay the legislation—respecting the presumption of constitutionality—but recorded the Union’s commitments in its judicial order. The matter will be next heard on May 5, 2025, and the Court directed the union government to file its counter-affidavit within a week. State governments who have also intervened will also place their stand on affidavit within the same days. Following that, all petitioners have been asked to file the rejoinder to the government within a subsequent five days.

Petitions raise fundamental challenges to the amendment

The petitions—filed by Members of Parliament (including from the Congress, AIMIM, DMK, RJD, CPI, IUML, and Samajwadi Party), religious bodies (All India Muslim Personal Law Board, Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind), and civil society groups (such as the Association for Protection of Civil Rights)—raise serious constitutional concerns.

They argue that the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025:

• Violates Article 26, by interfering in the management of religious institutions by permitting non-Muslims on waqf boards.
• Undermines Article 25 and 29, by curbing the rights of Muslims to preserve and manage their religious and cultural endowments.
• Breaches Article 14, by arbitrarily empowering administrative authorities to strip properties of their waqf status.

Among the most contentious provisions are:

• Deletion of “waqf by user”, potentially erasing the status of properties long treated as waqf by local communities.
• Administrative de-notification powers, allowing Collectors to initiate proceedings even where courts have declared properties as waqf.
• A new threshold for creation of waqf, limiting it to Muslims with five years’ standing.
• Reduced representation of women on Waqf Boards.
• Exclusion of waqf properties within scheduled areas and under ASI protection.

Senior advocates Kapil Sibal, CU Singh, and others, who appeared for the petitioners, had pressed for interim relief during the hearings and urged the Court to recognise the immediate threat posed by the law. They described the amendments as a “systematic attempt to dismantle waqf protections” and called it a State-led effort to dispossess the Muslim community of its religious and charitable properties.

The Court, while refraining from granting a stay, had sent a clear signal through its oral remarks and structured case management that it sees the matter as a constitutional test of legislative overreach into religious freedoms.

What lies Ahead

The next hearing in the week of May 5, 2025 will be crucial, as the Court will consider whether the undertakings given by the union are sufficient, or if formal interim orders are warranted. It is also expected to delve deeper into the core constitutional questions: Can the State interfere with the internal management of religious endowments? Does deleting “waqf by user” constitute historical erasure? Can administrative officers override judicial declarations?

In a political and legal climate increasingly hostile to minority rights, the Court’s intervention has come as a relief for many. However, this is only the beginning of a prolonged battle to safeguard minority rights in India.

Related:

“Urdu Is Not Alien”: Supreme Court reclaims the language’s place in the Indian Constitutional fabric

SC to UoI on Waqf Amendment: ‘Are you willing to allow Muslims on Hindu endowment boards?’

When Courts Fail Survivors: How patriarchy shapes justice in sexual offence against women cases

The post Waqf Amendment Act 2025: SC grants some time to Centre on condition no non-Muslims appointed to Board, Council & no change in any Waqf status appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The image of Egyptian Islamist thinker Sayyid Qutb at a protest rally in Kozhikode, Kerala, may appear a trifle during political discord. But in reality, it holds great and troubling importance that deserves closer examination—especially in a country like India, where democratic values and peaceful coexistence are continuously under challenge.

The rally was meant to be a protest against the Waqf Amendment Bill. Most of the Muslim groups in India interpret this bill as the central government meddling in Muslim religious and charity funds. But when an image of Sayyid Qutb was flashed—carried aloft by protesters—the protest meant something different and was something more than what it was intended to be.

To understand why this was a big issue, you need to know who Qutb was, what he thought, and how his thoughts influenced some of the most violent factions in recent history.

Sayyid Qutb: The Radical Intellectual

Sayyid Qutb was an Egyptian writer, intellectual, and influential member of the Muslim Brotherhood of the 1950s and 60s. He began as a literary critic and secular nationalist, but Qutb changed his religion after he went to the United States and later to an Egyptian prison under Gamal Abdel Nasser’s regime.

While in prison, he wrote prolifically—his best-known works are Fi Zilal al-Qur’an (In the Shade of the Qur’an) and Ma’alim fi al-Tariq (Milestones). In Milestones, Qutb declared that modern Muslim societies had fallen into Jahiliyyah, a Qur’anic term that was originally used to describe a time of ignorance before Islam existed in Arabia. Qutb believed that governments and societies of the present day that did not conform to Shari’ah were in this state of ignorance and were therefore illegitimate.

He argued that only a few believers—the vanguard—should arise and topple these regimes in order to establish Islamic rule. While Qutb never directly promoted suicide bombing or attacks on civilians, his model of viewing modern secular states as illegitimate has been widely adopted by militant and terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

Even Qutb’s brother, Muhammad Qutb, travelled to Saudi Arabia with his thoughts and assisted in spreading them through schools and mosques. Osama bin Laden is said to have been influenced by these ideas.

Why Qutb’s Ideas Will Not Fit for India

India is not an Islamic state. India is a secular democracy and multicultural. Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, and others live in India. The Indian Constitution provides individuals the right to practice their religion, personal laws, and safeguards for minority rights.

Qutb sees the world very differently from this world. He does not think that you should co-exist or bargain with a secular democratic order; he desires to combat and re-shape it through revolutionary means.

Using his face in an Indian protest sends a chilling message: that to be Muslim in India is to be identified with a global Islamist idea and not with the Indian Constitution. This symbolism can be (and already has been) used by right-wing political elements to claim that Indian Muslims are shaped by foreign, extremist ideas.

It must be remembered that this is not just an optics issue. In the volatile communal environment of India, even a symbol can be inflammatory. The picture of Qutb was not just misread—it was fundamentally in conflict with the very message that the protest was attempting to convey: that Indian Muslims wish to defend their religious buildings within the framework of Indian democracy.

A Self-Defeating Symbol for a Legitimate Cause

Protests against Waqf Amendment Bill are political and legal. Muslim communities are within their rights to protest against government intervention in religious trusts. Waqf boards have been a feature of India’s legal landscape since British times and play significant religious and charitable roles.

When demonstrators hold the image of the man who was demonstrating against non-religious government, they weaken their case. The message changes from “defend our rights in the Indian system” to “reject the Indian system altogether.”

This causes confusion among allies, inspires enemies, and feeds into current Islamophobic discourses. It provides political fuel for those who blame the Muslim community for being separatist, even when the community is calling for constitutional rights.

Alienating the Broader Public One of the most significant tasks of a protest in a democracy is not merely to be heard by those who already agree with it, but to convince the undecided and to touch the emotions of the wider public. This requires a clear message and well-considered symbols.

By mentioning Qutb, even as an aside, the protest drove away non-Muslim Indians who otherwise could have lent their support. The average Indian citizen will not differentiate between Qutb’s political ideology and the legitimate call for religious freedom. What they will listen to is a protest which seems to identify itself with figures known worldwide for Islamist extremism.

Indian Muslims do not accept most of these beliefs. Indian Islamic history has overall been one of moderation, acceptance, and coexistence with other faiths—either through Sufi tradition, reform efforts, or efforts to interact with the constitution. Qutb does not represent the real life of Indian Muslims.

The Danger of Misplaced Solidarity

In a world where Muslims are being treated unfairly and exposed to war, it is no wonder that some protest movements draw inspiration from international Islamic leaders. Many are driven to mobilize in favour of Muslim causes worldwide, from Egypt to Palestine. But such acts of solidarity must be well-considered.

There exists a tremendous difference between displaying a Palestinian flag and displaying a photo of Sayyid Qutb. The flag represents the resistance of a nation against occupation; the photo represents an idea that has been used to justify brutal domination and violence.

India’s Muslim citizens need to recognize this difference. Solidarity does not equal symbols. Borrowing other people’s symbols, particularly those of nations with complicated histories, is a potential issue in India’s unique democratic and plural environment.

A Lesson in Political Messaging

What we witness from the Kozhikode protest is that messaging is important. Symbols are important. And context is most important of all.

The photo of Qutb was probably employed by some or a limited number of protesters and not the key protest organizers. But in today’s world of rapidly spreading images and political openings, a single image can represent an entire movement.

In Kerala, it served to divert the national discussion from the significant issues regarding the Waqf Bill to the sensational allegations of Islamist support. This is not a victory for the protesters. It is a distraction—and a destructive one.

Moving Forward: Responsible Protest and Clear Vision

 Indian Muslims are confronted with serious challenges: increasing marginalization, communal violence, and increasing state surveillance of their institutions. Their political action and protests have to be strategic, disciplined, and Constitution-based. Individuals such as B.R. Ambedkar, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, and Sir Syed Ahmad Khan are better role models for demonstrations than Sayyid Qutb. These leaders were of the opinion that they should speak, learn, reform, and cooperate with the Indian state—instead of boycotting it.

There is power in moderation, and strength in clarity. As one Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ says:

خَيْرُ الْأُمُورِ أَوْسَطُهَا

“The best of affairs are those that are moderate.”

(Musnad Ahmad)

If Indian Muslim activists want their demands to be heard and respected, they must also speak a language that resonates with India’s constitutional and pluralistic values—not imported ideologies that sow division.

Courtesy: New Age Islam 

The post Why Sayyid Qutb’s Symbolism during a Waqf Protest Was dangerous and self-defeating appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The United Waqf Management, Empowerment, Efficiency, and Development (UMEED) Bill 2024, introduced by the ruling BJP-led Union government, has now been referred to the Joint Committee of Parliament (JCP) for further examination. Upon reviewing the draft Bill and observing reactions from the Opposition, media, and academics, it becomes evident that a crucial aspect is missing from the discourse. The responses from Muslim organisations follow a familiar pattern: an outright rejection of reforms deemed as religious matters, coupled with a resistance to any state intervention aimed at reforming these areas. This has been the typical stance on issues like Muslim Personal Law, Muslim University governance, and Waqf administration.

This reaction necessitates an intervention to bring forth a broader perspective.

The scope of the flawed bill

The proposed Bill ostensibly addresses the management and mismanagement of Waqf properties, rather than delving into the theological or historical legitimacy of Waqf as an institution. It seeks to address concerns about the assets held under Waqf, the proceeds they generate, and the persistent corruption within the Waqf administration. However, some Opposition leaders seem to be treating the Waqf Bill in the same way as they have treated other religious matters, such as the Shariat Act of 1937 and the governance of Aligarh Muslim University (AMU).

It is important to clarify that, regardless of the Supreme Court’s upcoming verdict on AMU’s minority status, structural reforms in the governance of AMU will remain unresolved. For instance, the AMU will still have a preponderance (over 80%) of membership of the internal teachers in the Executive Council. In all these cases, there exists a widely held belief within all Muslim communities that the state should not interfere, that no reforms should emerge from within the community, and that these matters are divinely ordained and therefore immutable. This belief perpetuates a sense of Muslim exceptionalism, exclusivity, and isolation from the state.

Both the government and the Opposition appear to be engaging in the usual “vote-bank politics”, addressing their respective constituencies based on identity. This approach has already caused significant harm to India’s Muslim communities, due to the bizarre stance of their own self-serving elites as well as the ruling and intellectual elites of the country. It is crucial for ordinary Muslims to be informed by their theological and secular institutions (such as Deoband, Nadwah, Aligarh Muslim University, Jamia Millia Islamia, and MANU Hyderabad) that Waqf, arguably, does not have explicit Quranic or Shariah mandates. Imam Abu Hanifa (699-767) also didn’t approve of it as an institution indisputably and explicitly sanctioned by Sharia. Waqf-e-Aam and Waqf-e-Aulad (types of Waqf) are often more about circumventing Quranic inheritance rules and preventing division among heirs than about altruism and charity and public welfare. They are not divinely ordained.

The historical context of Waqf

In the latter half of the 19th century, Waqf in India became a means to fund identity politics and secure representation in colonial governance institutions. Gregory Kozlowski’s 1985 book, Muslim Endowments and Society in British India, highlights that most Waqfs in India emerged during this period when the colonial state turned land into a commodity. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), a visionary pragmatist, was aware of both the British Indian judges’ concerns about Waqf-e-Aulad (Waqf for descendants) and the self-interests of the Muslim landed aristocracy. British judges rightly saw Waqf-e-Aulad as circumvention of Quranic inheritance laws and in their judgments invalidated many of these Waqfs, as they lacked charitable elements. This is why they kept invalidating such Awqaf, annoying the Muslim landed elites turning into Waqifs.

Sir Syed therefore, proposed a middle path. In 1879 –as member of the Viceroy’s Legislative council– he introduced a draft bill advocating that Waqf properties be used also for more meaningful and tangible charitable purposes such as education, healthcare, and social welfare, not just for mosques and madrasas. He argued that if managed properly, Waqf could be a powerful tool for social change and community development, brings out Prof. Shafey Kidwai’s column (India Today, August 13, 2024). Sir Syed’s proposal was also published in 1877 in his periodical Tehzibul Akhlaq, with the title, ‘A Proposal for Salvaging Muslim Families from Extinction and Destruction’. This was vehemently opposed by orthodox Muslims who saw the insistence on charity and public welfare as an innovation (bidat). As a result, Sir Syed succumbing to the conservatives and orthodoxy withdrew the bill.

In contrast, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the cunning politician, by the second decade of the 19th century, jumped in to protect the interests of the Muslim landed elites who needed the Waqf Validation Act of 1913. This act, supported by the colonial state, aimed to safeguard the landed assets of these elites, who were seen as potential allies against the growing anti-colonial movement. The Swadeshi Movement, which opposed the religious-communal partition of Bengal, had forced the colonial state to annul the (Bengal) partition in 1911-192, necessitating a political arrangement to secure Muslim support.

Such a political arrangement to safeguard the monopoly on landed assets is equally true for the Mahanths and their Mutths .Unfortunately this institution of Mahanths and Maths remains under-explored by the historians of peasant and agrarian relations. Prakash Jha’s film Mrityudand (1997) attempts to depict some of the degenerative aspects of the institution of Mahanth, but it eventually turned more into a melodramatic movie.

The BJP has got no intent of introducing a similar Bill to reform this Hindu institution of Mahanths’ Muths? This is therefore an additional reason why Muslim communities look upon the proposed Bill with alarming concern, as it creates an impression of targeting only Muslims with discriminatory treatment. One more apprehension is, turning the Bill into a tool to harass Muslims by local majoritarian forces and outfits in those smaller villages and mohallas where written deeds of a Waqf and mosques aren’t available.

The nature of Waqf: Neither divine nor immutable

Waqf is not the exact equivalent of charitable endowments in the “Christian” West. In many cases, as said earlier, it is a means of circumventing Quranic inheritance regulations. Just as the community’s elites have misled others into believing that Shariat is divinely ordained, Waqf has also been portrayed as an immutable, divinely sanctioned institution. This deception needs to be exposed for the greater common good.

Moreover, the looting and encroachment of Waqf assets have been a recurring issue across the Islamic world since the 7th century AD. This mismanagement occurred with the earliest prominent Waqfs, such as Khyber and Sawad (Iraq) during Caliph Umar’s time, and the Rumlah (Palestine) Waqf established in 912 AD by a person named Faíq (which has earliest surviving written record-stone inscription). All three “earliest” Waqf estates have since become non-existent, as their assets were looted by military and other elites!

Waqf mismanagement and loot

The looting of Waqf assets is almost as old as the institution itself. In India, there is a consensus that Waqf properties suffer from gross mismanagement and looting. Despite numerous legislations, the loot continues unabated. The existing laws, therefore, require a thorough re-examination. Unfortunately, neither the ruling party nor the Opposition has highlighted this consensus in the Lok Sabha, in media, or in academic debates. The near silence of academics from institutions like AMU and JMI on this matter is particularly notable.

The “Muslim-friendly” “secular” Opposition refrains from addressing Waqf loot because doing so would justify the need for the Bill. This also explains why their interventions in the Lok Sabha are superficial and merely rhetorical. The Opposition cannot afford to state frankly that Waqf is not divine and requires human intervention for reform in order to prevent its loot and redirect it for the welfare and empowerment of the Muslim communities.

Academics, theologians and other knowledge elites have been shallow in their interventions. They have not voiced the concerns and apprehensions they discuss privately about the implications of the proposed Bill. The Muslim community needs to see through this politics, not only of the politicians but also of their own knowledge elites. Why aren’t these academics helping legislators and the community understand the issue in a holistic manner?

The real threat posed by the Bill is to the elites within the Muslim community. The proposed Bill challenges the exclusive Muslim representation in Waqf Boards as mandated by Section/clause 14 of the Waqf Act of 1995. This section, which deals with the social composition of Board Executives, is being questioned in the new Bill. The provision for Muslim-exclusive privileges in Waqf representation is being removed, which is a significant point of concern, alarm and contention. Another alarming concern is the proposal to do away with the enabling provisions enshrined in section 40 of the Waqf Act, 1995. It gives powers to the Board to acquire, issue notices or hold an enquiry into the ownership of the property that it has reasons to believe belongs to the Waqf.

Proposed reforms

While the proposed Bill has its deep flaws, the lack of detailed articulation by its opponents hinders constructive debate. Historically, state intervention has sometimes yielded positive results, as seen in the Mohsin Waqf of Hooghly, where the British colonial state established the Mohsin Hooghly College in 1836, going beyond the original terms of the original Waqf. The Waqf Bill of 2024 should explicitly incorporate such progressive steps. Parliament should legislate to ensure Waqf Boards take similar rewarding actions.

Muslim communities must abandon their collective hypocrisy. For instance, the practices, such as Instant Triple Talaq (ITT), are un-Quranic yet they stubbornly refuse to reform themselves as much as they resist the state intervention. Despite, Ali Miyan Nadvi’s assurance to the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the AIMPLB refuses to provide for maintenance to divorced Muslim women. They keep opposing the Supreme Court verdicts in this regard.  Likewise, adoption of a child is not prohibited by Quran (it only prohibits concealing the biological paternity of the child adopted) and custody is absolutely valid as was the case with Zayd the adopted son of the Prophet Muhammad, yet, the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) refuses to reform it. Their stubbornness is immensely supported by most of the academics of the modern institutions such as the AMU and JMI. Political leaders like Akhilesh Yadav, Asaduddin Owaisi, and the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) must take a clear stand on this issue.

Some Tentative Recommendations for the Waqf Bill 2024

1. Creation of a Waqf Tribunal: Establish a tribunal consisting of judges of the rank of High Court judges as the exclusive body for resolving Waqf cases, with the Supreme Court as the appellate authority.
2. Enhanced Land Survey: A Land Survey Commissioner should be comprised of at least three officers in each Board.
3. Mandatory Gender and Caste Representation: The Waqf Board’s composition should be diversified and this should be made mandatory (with Muslims of all castes and women as members).
4. Digital Transparency: Waqf assets, deeds, and real estate records should be digitized and made publicly accessible online for transparency and vigilance.
5. Promotion of Charitable Activities: The Bill should mandate that Waqf properties be used aggressively for establishing modern educational and research institutions, especially quality residential schools under Article 30 of the Constitution.
6. Strict Penalties for Mismanagement: Penalties for those who grab, usurp or mismanage Waqf properties should not be diluted. Rigorous imprisonment should be enforced.
7. Memorialization of Waqf Creators: Waqf creators (Waqif) should be remembered in a befitting manner, be honored, and their deeds digitized and made publicly available.
8. Defined Roles for Mutawallis: The roles of Mutawallis (Waqf administrators) should be clearly defined, with fixed tenures of 3-5 years. Eligibility criteria should be established for their appointment.
9. Accountability Mechanisms: A robust check and balance mechanism should be implemented for both Mutawallis and Waqf Boards.
10. Mandatory annual auditing, and the income of the Waqf Boards should be made available for public vigilance.

Hope, the stakeholders would listen to the above words!

(The author is a Professor of History, Aligarh Muslim University)

The post The Waqf Bill 2024: An Open Letter to the Joint Committee of Parliament, the Opposition, and India’s Muslim Communities appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This protest was in line with an open call by the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) urging Muslims across the country to express their opposition to the Act by donning black armbands. While similar demonstrations occurred without incident in other states, including Karnataka and Bihar—where even ministers participated—Uttar Pradesh responded with an unprecedented show of state power and repression. The administration has accused hundreds of Muslim men in Muzaffarnagar of “disrupting peace” and “inciting the public,” even though there were no reports of violence, disruption, or unlawful assembly during or after the prayers.

BIG ANNOUNCEMENT

वक्फ़ संशोधन बिल के खिलाफ मुस्लिम पर्सनल लॉ बोर्ड का बड़ा ऐलान!

रमज़ान के इस आख़री जुमा, जुमातुल विदा को मुसलमान यह काम ज़रूर करें…

This Ramazan’s Jumma Tul Wida Let us Protest against Waqf Amendment Bill by this method #IndiaAgainstWaqfBill… pic.twitter.com/FPFC0XSZbk

— All India Muslim Personal Law Board (@AIMPLB_Official) March 27, 2025

The Charges: Disrupting peace by wearing armbands

On April 5, the City Magistrate of Muzaffarnagar issued notices under Section 130 of the Indian Civil Defence Code to more than 300 Muslims, accusing them of “inciting the general public and endangering law and order.” The sole basis for this accusation, as per the notice, was that they wore black armbands inside the mosque while offering prayers—a constitutionally protected form of expression.

The notices demand that each of the accused appear in court on April 16, 2025 and furnish a surety bond of ₹2 lakh, failing which further legal consequences may follow. The language of the notice makes sweeping and speculative claims, stating that “it is believed that in the future, the respondents may incite the general public and spread misinformation,” thereby justifying pre-emptive action against individuals who have not violated any law.

This use of Section 130—a preventive provision meant to maintain peace in times of actual threat—is being grossly misapplied here to punish individuals for peaceful, symbolic dissent. The invocation of such provisions in the absence of any violence or disorder raises serious questions about the arbitrary use of executive power to criminalise protest.

Lack of evidence, arbitrary targeting

What makes the state’s action even more alarming is the complete absence of individualised inquiry or due process. Notices have been issued not only to those who participated in the protest, but also to people who weren’t even present or aware of the protest.

According to Maktoob Media, Naeem Tyagi, principal of Madrasa Mahmudiya, is among those who received a notice. He categorically stated that he did not wear a black armband and only learned of the protest after arriving at the mosque. “Thousands came for Friday prayers—some wore armbands, many did not. No slogans were raised. There was no demonstration, no speech, no incident,” he said.

Similarly, Shabbir, a resident of Sarwat village, received a notice and has declared his intention to challenge it in court. “If MPs can wear black clothes to protest inside Parliament, how is our peaceful action at a mosque any different?” he questioned, as per a report in Maktoob Media. Shabbir also noted that some people listed in the notices haven’t lived in the village for years—suggesting a blanket, communalised approach rather than a lawful, fact-based response.

The local police, when contacted by journalists, failed to offer any explanation or legal justification for their actions and instead disconnected calls—a disturbing reflection of the lack of transparency and accountability that surrounds this crackdown.

Selective policing and disproportionate response

The administration’s action in Muzaffarnagar cannot be seen in isolation. It comes in the context of heightened policing and surveillance across Muslim-majority districts in Uttar Pradesh. Following the passage of the Waqf Amendment Act in Parliament, alerts were issued in districts such as Lucknow, Moradabad, Rampur, Bareilly, Meerut, Amroha, Aligarh, Firozabad, and Shamli, and large contingents of police and paramilitary forces were deployed. Flag marches were conducted by senior police and administrative officers to “maintain peace.”

This alleged militarised response to a symbolic protest smacks of disproportion and is deeply telling of the communal mind-set that governs state action in Uttar Pradesh. In other parts of the country—such as Karnataka—people peacefully offered Eid prayers wearing black armbands, including elected officials and government representatives. States in cities such as Delhi, Mumbai, Lucknow, Bhopal, Kolkata, Jaipur, Ranchi, Nuh, and Coimbatore, and in smaller towns like Baran, Tonk, Bhagwanpur, Mandya, Belagavi, and Bidar, scores of Muslim men and clerics were seen with black bands tied to their sleeves—a show of unity and political expression from a community often vilified for its protest. No such action was taken against them. Only in Uttar Pradesh was this peaceful and silent protest by Muslims was met with threats, intimidation, and legal coercion.

The Act, the right to dissent and the criminalisation of Muslim expression

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2024, introduced by Minority Affairs Minister Kiren Rijiju, has sparked nationwide concern among citizens. The Act, which got the President’s assent on April 6, claims to “streamline administration” and “increase transparency,” but many have argued that it allows greater state control over Waqf properties and undermines the autonomy of religious endowments managed by the Muslim community.

Opposition to the Act is not only legitimate but rooted in constitutional freedoms. Protest—particularly peaceful protest—is a cornerstone of democratic expression. To wear a black armband is a time-honoured form of dissent. It has been used globally—from the Vietnam War protests in the US to anti-CAA movements in India—as a non-violent signal of disagreement with state policy.

Criminalising this form of protest by branding it a security threat is not only constitutionally untenable, but morally bankrupt and politically motivated. Additionally, this is not an isolated incident. It fits a larger pattern in many BJP ruled states, especially the state of Uttar Pradesh, where Muslims have routinely been penalised for protest—whether it was the anti-CAA movement, the Friday prayers after incidents of lynching, or even expressions of solidarity with global Muslim causes. Protesters have been met with FIRs, house demolitions, mass arrests, and police violence, while calls for violence from other quarters are often ignored or legitimised.

Remarkably, this show of peaceful resistance came even as state agencies in some BJP-ruled states issued veiled threats and warnings.  In Sambhal, Uttar Pradesh, local police had earlier warned that offering Eid prayers on public pavements could result in revocation of arms licences or passports. Nonetheless, young men in the town were seen participating in the armband protest during Friday prayers, stitching their own bands or using pieces of cloth—demonstrating that grassroots mobilisation continues despite intimidation.

In Bhopal, clerics clarified that the black armband protest was strictly tied to Jumat-ul-Vida, not Eid, to avoid conflating it with religious celebrations. Bhopal Qazi Syed Mustak Ali Nadvi reiterated that the AIMPLB had called for a solemn, prayerful protest—not for confrontation or public disruption.

As per ANI, Maulana Khalid Rasheed Farangi Mahali, who led the Friday prayers at Aishbagh Eidgah in Lucknow, joined the protest by wearing a black armband himself. Addressing the community, he reiterated the Board’s concerns, stating that the now passed legislation was not in the interest of Muslims and urging Parliament to withdraw it

The current episode in Muzaffarnagar is another stark reminder of how law is used as a tool of political repression, especially against Muslims in the state. The government’s message is clear: any form of Muslim political expression, however peaceful, is suspect. Dissent is not just discouraged—it is actively punished.

A silent resistance with powerful symbolism

Despite the limited time between the announcement and the day of prayer, participation was widespread. In many mosques, the Friday khutbah (sermon) included references to the implications of the now passed legislation, which the Board and its supporters believe poses a grave threat to the autonomy and sanctity of religious endowments managed under Waqf. At Delhi’s historic Jama Masjid, hundreds of worshippers participated in the armband protest. A worshipper there remarked that the turnout might have been even higher had senior clerics like Imam Ahmed Bukhari publicly endorsed the call.

Prominent figures in the community did, however, lend their weight to the demonstration. In Lucknow, Maulana Khalid Rasheed Farangi Mahali, Imam of Aishbagh Eidgah and chairman of the Islamic Centre of India, led Alvida prayers while wearing a black armband. He reiterated the community’s concerns and appealed for justice not just regarding the Act but also in the context of Palestinian suffering, which was observed in tandem with International Quds Day—another global protest against Israeli occupation.

The AIMPLB had clarified that their call for protest was intended specifically for Jumu’atul Wida and not for Eid, although some Eid congregations across the country did see black armband-wearing worshippers as well. In historic locations such as Jama Masjid in Delhi, hundreds joined the protest in silence, reflecting both unity and urgency in the face of what the Board described as a legislative attack on community assets.

“Today’s protest is a message to Parliament that Indian Muslims are united in their opposition to this Bill. We are deeply worried about its consequences on our mosques, madrasas, dargahs, and graveyards,” said Maulana Mahali, as per a report in The Hindu.

In public statements and on social media, the Board has described the Act as “controversial, discriminatory, and damaging,” and warned that it would pave the way for the state to arbitrarily appropriate or interfere in the functioning of Waqf institutions under the guise of reform and transparency.

AIMPLB spokesperson S.Y.R. Ilyas hailed the response to the black armband protest as a sign of growing political awareness within the Muslim community. “We issued the call very late, but the overwhelming turnout reflects the desperation of the community to protect its institutions. This is only the beginning,” he said, as per Free Press Journal.

The protest was part of AIMPLB’s broader strategy to mobilise constitutional and democratic resistance to the Act. The Board’s 31-member Action Committee has resolved to continue using peaceful and lawful methods to oppose the recently passed amendments, which they have labelled as “controversial, discriminatory, and damaging”.

On social media, the AIMPLB declared the Act to be a “sinister conspiracy” designed to strip the Muslim community of its historical religious and charitable properties—mosques, Eidgahs, madrasas, graveyards, dargahs, khanqahs, and more. In its official statement, the Board called upon every Muslim to treat resistance to the Act as a collective responsibility, urging them to take part in silent yet visible protest.

मुसलमानों से एक महत्वपूर्ण अपील

वक़्फ़ संशोधन विधेयक 2024 के खिलाफ
जुमा-तुल-विदा के मौके पर अपने बाजू पर काली पट्टी बांधकर विरोध दर्ज करें

और इस हैशटैग को इस्तेमाल करते हुए फोटो ट्वीट करें #IndiaAgainstWaqfBill pic.twitter.com/sLs5oU6I1R

— All India Muslim Personal Law Board (@AIMPLB_Official) March 27, 2025

Beyond Armbands: Solidarity with Palestine and political resistance

In addition to the black armbands, some worshippers also carried Palestinian flags and placards, expressing solidarity with residents of Gaza and aligning the protest with broader concerns about justice and human rights. The overlap with Quds Day, observed globally on the last Friday of Ramzan to protest Israeli actions in Palestine, added to the emotional and political tenor of the day.

Meanwhile, the AIMPLB’s campaign to oppose the Waqf Act has not been limited to symbolic gestures. In recent months, it has organised multi-party dharnas in Patna and New Delhi, drawing support from political parties like the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). Leaders such as Lalu Prasad Yadav and Tejashwi Yadav have publicly backed the protests, amplifying the message that the legislation is viewed not just as a communal issue, but as a constitutional and democratic concern.

Conclusion: A call for accountability and Constitutionalism

In an age where peaceful protest is frequently met with surveillance, criminalisation, or suppression—particularly when it comes from Muslims—the success of the black armband demonstration is both symbolic and substantial. It shows that people across the country are willing to unite in the defence of their institutions and rights.

The UP-government’s action against black armband protesters is legally unsound, constitutionally indefensible, and morally reprehensible. It undermines the very principles of democracy by punishing individuals not for what they did, but for who they are and what they might do in the future. It reflects a regime that is less interested in public order and more invested in silencing minority dissent through intimidation and fear.

The judiciary must intervene to uphold the constitutional rights of those targeted and ensure that the right to peaceful protest is protected. Civil society, too, must speak out and stand in solidarity with the victims of this arbitrary state action. If wearing a black band in protest is a crime in today’s India, then democracy itself is in peril.

Related:

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CJP submits objections to Maharashtra Special Public Security Bill, 2024 over serious threats to civil liberties

SC: Recent judgment in the Imran Pratapgarhi case, what are police powers under section 173 (3) BNS?

Was the Waqf Beneficial for Muslim Society?

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The origins of this institution is obscure; but one thing is certain is that it did not have an Islamic root. Waqf like institutions were present in the Roman Empire as well as amongst the Sassanians. And it appears most likely that the early Islamic society borrowed this institution from the Sassanids. Although it was later theologically justified as devoting a property to Allah, there is no record of earliest Muslims instituting any such grant. The earliest Waqf in Muslim societies therefore date after the establishment of the empire, rather than during the period of the Rashidun Caliphate. But once Muslims adopted it, they made wide use of it. Through this institution, they funded hospitals, madrasas, caravan Sarais, etc. Instituting a Waqf was simple: the property was bequeathed in perpetuity to God and a manager was appointed for overseeing the property. This property could generate income which was to be spent for welfare purposes; part of the income thus generated went to the family of the founder of the Waqf.

Thus, apart from serving an important function, Waqf was also a means to provide for the financial fortunes of the future generation. Over the years, the latter function dominated the former. Thus, in many cities of the Muslim world, like Algiers and Istanbul, Waqf properties formed nearly 30-50% of all real estate. Since all Waqfs were exempt from taxation, this only meant that the state had less and less revenue to operate with. The presence of this institution, which served the important purpose of social service, therefore also had its downside: that of limiting the value of state revenue. Although a huge empire, but the Ottomans were forced to take loans from other countries and foreign banking consortiums.

Becoming a mechanism of tax evasion was one of the many malfunctions of the Waqfs. The very nature of the institution made it rigid and hence unsuited to the changing economic realities. Once a Waqf was instituted, its purpose could not be changed or altered. Many Muslims, for example, established caravan Sarais throughout the silk route during the middle-ages. These Sarais served traders and their animals for a fee, the proceeds of which went to the upkeep of the building and to the children of the founder. However, as the silk route changed over time, these Sarais felt into disuse and could no longer be financially viable. But, owing to the fact that the Waqf was created for the specific purpose of serving traders and merchants in perpetuity, there was no legal way to change the nature, function or the purpose of these Waqfs.

Similar is the case in India. It is all very good to feel proud about the value of Waqfs and to what better uses it can be put. But the reality is that the very nature of these properties will not allow Muslims to put them to a different use. Certainly, there are issues like government encroachment of Waqf properties. Huge number of them are also lying unused due to litigation which takes decades to solve. But even without these factors, the very nature of Waqf would make it extremely difficult to liquidate the property or to change its use. If someone instituted a madrasa as a Waqf, then it has to perform that function in perpetuity. God forbid if the founder also mentioned some books that he thinks should be taught in that madrasa, then those books also cannot be removed from the curriculum even after hundreds of years. It is this rigidity that makes Waqfs unsuitable for our times. However, Muslims of the time cannot be faulted for not planning ahead hundreds of years. The fault lies with us, the present-day Muslims, for rooting for the revival of Waqfs without realizing its negative effects.

The late middle-ages was the time when banking consortiums were coming up throughout the Western world. Merchants and traders were coming together, pooling resources and establishing banks with huge capital which gave impetus to the upcoming industrial revolution. Something very opposite was going on in the Muslim world. They had the resources but these were increasingly getting locked up in immovable assets through the creation of Waqfs. The financial resources were therefore locked up and its very nature made it obligatory that it could not be used for any other purpose. Moreover, different Waqfs could not be merged together unless the founder had left explicit instructions to do so; which was very rare. Even when some Muslims realized their folly, it was too late and many did not speak up fearing the clergy who had by now declared these Waqfs as sacred institutions. Moreover, since Waqfs could only be created by the wealthy, this only meant that the elite of Muslim world bound itself within a rule which was no longer beneficial. Also, this institution was not beneficial for the children of the rich as the latter got dependent on the largesse provided by the Waqf and hence did not do anything meritorious in the lives.

Today in India when we talk about the potential value of Waqf properties and how it can change the fate of Muslims, we must take into consideration its historical nature into account. The only way in which all the money that is locked up in various Waqfs can be put to better use it by a willingness to change the ‘sacred’ character of these institutions. But are there enough Muslims willing to take this call?

A regular contributor to NewAgeIslam.com, Arshad Alam is a New Delhi based independent researcher and writer on Islam and Muslims in South Asia.

Courtesy: New Age Islam

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First of all, let me congratulate you for successfully piloting the Waqf Bill, now rechristened UMEED, which in both Hindi and Urdu means “Hope”. I am sure President Droupadi Murmu will soon give her assent to the Bill and it will become the law of the land. In this context, I remember the agricultural Acts the Modi government had to rescind following a massive protest from the farmers.

I liked your assertion in the Lok Sabha that you yourself belong to a minority community and you do not feel any discrimination against minorities. As you are the minister in charge of minority affairs, can you say with confidence that there is no such discrimination?

As you are a Buddhist, I do not have to tell you that the Buddhists have built great Peace Pagodas like the one in Delhi and elsewhere. They are all architectural marvels and I never miss them on my visits to places like Leh in Ladakh, Darjeeling in West Bengal, and Kathmandu in Nepal.

I am sure that you will not contest me when I say that the greatest pilgrim centre for Buddhists the world over is not Lumbini in Nepal, where Siddhartha Gautama was born. Instead, it is the Mahabodhi Temple in Bodh Gaya where Lord Buddha attained enlightenment under a Bodhi tree. I have visited the place several times.

In the eighties, I did a cover story on the Mahabodhi Temple for the Sunday Magazine of the Hindustan Times. One of the highlights of the article was the demand the Buddhists were making for control of the temple. They resent Hindu Brahmins doing Puja there and the Hindus controlling the administrative affairs of the temple.

The agitation for control of the temple still goes on, though it does not get traction in the media. As a Buddhist and Minister for Minority Affairs, you will do a great service to the nation if you can liberate the Mahabodhi Temple from the immoral control of non-Buddhists. Instead, you want non-Muslims to have a say, if not control, of the Waqf Boards at the Centre and in the states.

You should see this in the light of the Tirupati temple authorities’ draconian decision to terminate the services of all their non-Hindu employees. The argument is that Tirupati temple belongs to the Hindus and only Hindus can work there. I don’t think you have taken any action against the retrenchment of the few non-Hindu employees.

The greatest Hindu pilgrimage centre in Kerala, from where I come, is Sabarimala, which is controlled by the Devaswom Board. The MLAs can vote for various posts in the board but only Hindu MLAs can take part in the voting. The Vaishnodevi temple in Jammu and Kashmir is run by a Trust. The Lieutenant-Governor holds the post of Chairman of the Trust.

If a non-Hindu is appointed governor, a Hindu has to be appointed chairman of the Trust. Once, when General S.K. Sinha was governor and no ice lingam was formed in the Amarnath cave, he managed to procure tonnes of ice from as far away as Jammu to create an ice lingam. Alas, a press photographer published the pictures of the ice lingam which had dirty hand marks of the workers who made it. Sinha escaped unscathed.

Early this week, the details of the will of Ratan Tata, worth Rs 10,000 crore, appeared in the media. Most of the wealth has gone to philanthropic organisations. What attracted me is a clause under which his favourite dog, Tito, and other pets will benefit from a Rs 12 lakh fund, which will be used to care for his pets, ensuring that each of them will receive Rs 30,000 per quarter for their care. He also mentioned that his cook, Rajan Shaw, will take care of Tito after his demise.

The executors of the will have a duty to ensure that the money is distributed as mandated by Tata.

In the seventh century, Umar ibn al-Khattab, also spelled Omar, who later became the Caliph, owned land on the shores of the Khyber. He approached the Prophet on what he should do with the land. He was advised to give it to Allah, which will, of course, deprive him of all his authority over the land. The land could be used only for religious or charitable purposes and the person responsible for it was known as Mutawalli. I owe this information to an article by Advocate T. Asaf Ali in the Madhyamam daily.

A Jew who fought unsuccessfully against the Prophet bequeathed all his property for similar purposes. All the rules and regulations governing Waqf follow from this precedent. This reaffirms the point that Waqf properties cannot be sold for profit; they can only be used for religious or charitable purposes.

Under UMEED, only a person who has been a practising Muslim for at least five years can will away his property as Waqf. Since you studied the Bill, let me ask you how will you determine whether a person remained a Muslim for five years or not?

A person becomes a Muslim when he dedicates his prayer solely to Allah and considers Mohammed as the final prophet and messenger of God. Of course, his religious practices are enumerated in the Five Pillars of Islam: the declaration of faith (shahadah), daily prayers (salah), almsgiving (zakat), fasting during the month of Ramadan (sawm), and the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) at least once in a lifetime.

Anybody can become a Christian and the longevity of his faith does not matter to God. That is why the thief on the cross attained salvation because he believed in Jesus as the Son of God. He did not live even for a day after his conversion. This being the case, on what basis do you say that to be a Muslim one must practice the religion for five years?

Last Sunday, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the RSS headquarters at Nagpur. He also visited the Deekshabhoomi, the ground where people led by Dr B.R. Ambedkar got ordained as Buddhists. This religious mass conversion at one place was the first ever of its kind in history. The day they took Deeksha, they became Buddhists.

You may like to know why Ambedkar chose Nagpur for his conversion to your religion. Nagpur is where the Nags lived on the banks of the Nag river. They were the ones who fought vigorously against the invading Aryans. And they were the ones who propagated Buddhism in far corners of the land, including Arunachal Pradesh, to which you belong.

When the British wanted to build a house for the Viceroy in Delhi, they did not go to a temple for a model. Instead, they looked at a Buddhist vihara to draw ideas. When you take UMEED to the Rashtrapati Bhavan for the President’s signature, please check whether the building resembles a temple or a Buddhist vihara.

On the day Parliament was debating the Waqf Bill, UP Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath claimed that the Waqf authorities had declared the area where the Mahakumbh was held as Waqf property. Even if it is true, did it prevent Yogi from driving away every Muslim selling even Bisleri water bottles from the banks of the Ganga?

Home Minister Amit Shah even claimed that the Waqf authorities could have declared Parliament House as Waqf property. You and your party have perfected the art of scare-mongering. You don’t even leave Aurangzeb, who died 318 years ago.

The whole world knows that Mukesh Ambani’s grotesque house, Antilia, in Mumbai—consuming power worth Rs 70 lakh every month—is situated on Waqf land. Has Ambani suffered on this account? But you portrayed the Waqf Boards as more powerful than even the Supreme Court.

And some persons, like Baselios Cleemis, the current Major Archbishop-Catholicos of the Syro-Malankara Catholic Church, fell for it. He saw the issue from the perspective of the residents of Munambam, numbering 600 families, mostly Catholic. If Ambani could not be evicted from his Antilia, how could they be evicted?

The broader issue was that the Muslims were not consulted on the drafting of the Bill. You mentioned that it was vetted by a parliamentary committee. Was even one suggestion of an Opposition member accepted? During the debate in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, was even one amendment suggested by an Opposition MP accepted? It was a Bill of the government, by the government, and for the government.

With non-Muslims allowed to decide Waqf-related issues, the Muslims will lose control of their Waqf properties. The Waqf Boards will be deprived of assets to run madrasas, orphanages, and hospitals. The Bill’s agenda is clear to the discerning.

Small wonder that the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC), which controls Sri Harmandir Sahib or Darbār Sahib, also called the Golden Temple, has opposed the Bill, for it knows that tomorrow, the government can amend the Sikh Gurdwara Act to their disadvantage. Alas, the Catholic Church leadership can’t see the woods for the trees.

The Catholic and other churches own thousands of acres of land and properties worth billions of rupees. Using the same argument, the government can easily take them over. In fact, many Church-run schools and colleges are situated on government land given by the British on lease for 100 years. The government has already started putting pressure on the church to vacate such properties, as in the Army Cantonment in New Delhi.

While Parliament was discussing the Waqf Bill, some Opposition members drew Parliament’s attention to the attack on two Catholic priests in Jabalpur. As Minister in charge of Minority Affairs, who prevented you from opening your mouth on the action you have taken on the matter?

Nonetheless, I was glad to hear you quoting the Sachar Committee report. Justice Rajinder Sachar appeared for me in a case the Punjab and Haryana High Court instituted, suo motu, against me and some of my colleagues at The Tribune. Have you ever thumbed the pages of his report except to find out what it said about Waqf properties? You say that if the Waqf properties are put to commercial use, Muslims will earn a lot.

That is exactly what is happening under crony capitalism. Government properties are handed over to the likes of Ambani and Adani so that they can become the world’s richest, pushing the poor down the ladder further and further. True, if they are handed over the Waqf properties, they will surely earn billions—so that they can have their swimming pools on their rooftops while the women in Mumbai stand for hours to get a pitcher of water.

By the way, the Sachar Committee made many suggestions, including a mechanism to monitor whether the government’s minority welfare measures benefit the communities concerned.

What amused me the most was your assertion that Muslim welfare was your government’s prime concern. You don’t have a single Muslim colleague in the ministry of which you are a member. Muslims constitute about 200 million in this country. It is unbelievable that the Prime Minister cannot find a single Muslim from among them to represent the community. Forget the Centre—mention one name of a Muslim minister in any of the BJP governments, from Gujarat to Manipur and Delhi to Uttarakhand.

Modi demonstrated his concern for Muslims by introducing the law banning triple talaq during his second term. Divorce frees a woman from marital bondage, especially when the husband no longer wishes to live with her. In many ways, it is better than abandonment of wives.

It has been over five years since the triple talaq law was enacted. Can you name even one conviction under it? The law was designed to appease Hindutvawadis rather than genuinely help Muslims. Unfortunately, the Waqf Bill follows the same pattern, aimed at depriving Muslims of their limited rights. I only wish Christians had realised— to borrow poet John Donne’s words—that the bell tolls not just for Muslims, but for them as well.

Yours etc.

Courtesy: Indian Currents

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