The Covenant of Prophet Muhammad with the Monks of Mount Sinai, also called the Ashtiname of Muhammad.  A copy of this document is kept at the Saint Catherine’s Monastery.

—–

In most of such cases, judicial decisions are in fact political in nature. There was a growing campaign in Turkey to convert the museum into a mosque, with repeated polls showing overwhelming support for such a move. Erdogan, the Turkish president, heads a party, one of whose important aims is to re-Islamize Turkish society. Hagia Sophia had become a symbol of this desire and the ruling party had cultivated this sentiment amongst the people for long. Any argument against the move meant going against the popular mood of the people. It is no surprise that the main opposition parties did nothing to mobilise a counter opinion.

In all probability, this move will further boost the popularity of Erdogan within Turkey, but internationally, Muslims will face renewed questioning over the nature of their faith. One of the first to be questioned will be Muslim minorities throughout the world. In Europe and in parts of Asia, Muslims have been petitioning various governments for securing their religious rights. What Turkey has done will make their situation difficult in terms of positioning their argument. Recently, Muslims were elated when they heard the azan for the first time from mosques across Germany. The three million Turkish minority in Germany will now have tough time to explain this symbolic action to the German people. At a time when Islamophobia is on the rise in Europe and elsewhere, this action will be exploited by far-right parties to further stigmatise Muslims.
 

The Hagia Sophia is an enormous architectural marvel in Istanbul, Turkey

——

Christians who follow the Eastern Orthodox Church will be most hurt by this decision. For centuries, the Hagia Sophia has been the symbol of their devotion and pride. It is important to realise that there are Christian minorities living in different parts of the Middle-East. With the rise of radical Islam, there position has become precarious. Hundreds of them have already been killed, many dispossessed of their homes. At a time when they need re-assurance regarding their safety and security, this move by Turkish government will have the opposite impact of making their position all the more vulnerable.

The USA and Russia, along with other countries have already denounced the move and have asked Turkey to learn from the shared values of Islam and Christianity. However, it is time that their hypocrisy is called out. If they really believed in the philosophy of shared values, then Spain should ideally allow prayers in the mosque of Cordoba which is now a Cathedral. And Greece should apologise to the Muslim world for demolishing mosques built by the Ottomans. More importantly, recognising Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, which much of the western world did recently, is hardly a strategy rooted in mutual respect and sharing between the two religions. The Christian world seems to remember religious tolerance and pluralism only when their sacred monuments come under threat.

The real impact of this move will be felt by Muslims themselves. Due to a number of reasons, Islam has earned a bad name through its association with terrorism, intolerance and anti-pluralistic theology. What signal is Erdogan sending to jihadis and other radicals who want to convert and control the whole world? Today, they must be the most vocal supporters of Erdogan. This highly symbolic move reeks of Islamist supremacy which Muslims, especially those who are in minority, will find hard to justify. Erdogan might argue that the issue is one of Turkish sovereignty, but even he knows fully well that its reverberations will be felt beyond national boundaries.

Erdogan had a choice to let Hagia Sophia be as it is, a museum of international importance which was accessible to members of all religious faith. Or, the same space could have been used for both Islamic and Christian practices with some creative solutions. After all, Muslims also have strong claim to the site since they have prayed there for almost five hundred years and their religious sentiment should also be taken into consideration. Many would say that this is utopic, but then if both religions pray to the same God, then why is it that they cannot share the same ritual space?

In the early years of Islam, caliph Umar refused to pray at the Christian site of Holy Sepulchre after the bloodless conquest of Jerusalem, stating that it might become a precedent for later Muslims to convert Churches into mosques. A few centuries later, the Ayyubids would build a mosque where Umar had prayed, just a short distance from Christianity’s holiest church, thus making the fears of the caliph almost prophetic. Even earlier, the prophet of Islam had granted safety and security to monks of Mount Sinai, stating in no uncertain terms that the holy places of Christians must be protected. Muhammad’s Testament of assurance is still preserved within the four walls of Saint Catherine’s monastery. Erdogan could have looked to these traditions within Islam and made tolerance and co-existence the present credo of Islam. In choosing the obverse, he has made the claims of Islamic pluralism sound hollow.

Arshad Alam is a NewAgeIslam.com columnist.

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President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is considering converting the Hagia Sophia to a Mosque, which has been a museum since its conquest. As Muslims, we appeal to President Erdogan to keep it as a Museum, and not convert it to a Mosque.  

“Hagia Sophia was one of the largest Christian Cathedral in the Eastern Roman Empire for 1000 years, and is one of the most contested buildings and is creating controversy again,” reported Aljazeera. Indeed, it will create animosity between Islam and Christianity.  

The idea of converting Hagia Sofia to a mosque offers a short-term political gain, but at the cost of long-term harmony between Muslims and Christians.  

The role of Muslims is to mitigate conflicts and nurture goodwill – a formula embedded in Prophet’s actions; he was a blessed peacemaker. Islam means peace, and it behooves us to achieve peace and harmony through our actions and words. 

The Greek Orthodox Church mourns the loss of their Church to Muslim conquest; however, they have accepted it. If this is converted to a mosque, it amounts to rubbing salt on the wounds. It will rekindle hostilities that none of us want. Today, societies are moving towards respecting the otherness of others.  

Hazrat Umar set a great example – after conquering Jerusalem, he was offered to pray in the Holy Sepulcher. He chose not to pray inside the church for the concern that the future generation of Muslims will convert it into a Mosque.  

Quran 22:40 essentially says God’s name is extolled abundantly in Churches, Synagogues, and Mosques. We have to protect the places of Worship. God will most certainly assist him who succors His cause: verily, God is all-knowing and almighty. 

The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) has paved the way for building bridges among different communities in the United States. It is the largest Muslim civic body in America. It maintains good relationships with all populations, including the Greek Orthodox hierarchy. ISNA has played Amin’s role in building a cohesive America and has earned the goodwill of Jews, Christians, Hindus, and others. Out of a sense of righteousness, they have stood up for Muslims against Islamophobic rhetoric during 9/11, and it continues today. We, the Muslims, appreciate them.  

 Dr. Sayyid M. Saeed, President of ISNA, said, “The conversion of the Hagia Sophia was against the historical examples set by the righteous Caliphs, beginning with Abu Bakr when he advised his general heading to conquer foreign lands. The Umayyad Caliphs apologized and paid for the church land used to build the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. As American Muslims, we celebrate this Islamic provision in US law that enabled us to build 3 thousand mosques in the last half a century. Hagia Sophia is not just a Church but the main symbol of the Greek Orthodox Church. It is a slap on the entire system of the Greek Orthodox Church and Greece. It fostered permanent hate against Muslims and Islam in those quarters.” 

Dr. Saeed further adds, “The destruction of the Babri Mosque in India is a historical example of religious bigotry. We cannot do the same thing to Hagia Sophia.”   

Indeed, we have to be consistent in our policies – if we apply it in one place, we must be able to use it in every situation. As an Indian American Muslim, it hurts me to see the destruction of the Babri Mosque, and it equally hurts me to see the Hagia Sophia converted to a Mosque. We have to set an excellent example for the world. The Alhambra is a UNESCO World Heritage Site, let Hagia Sophia be one as well. 

We urge President Erdogan to consider the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad, who was and is a mercy to mankind. He granted permanent protection to places of Worship in the covenant he issued in 628 AD. A majority of Muslims believe in the sanctity of the location of Worship. We hope President Erdogan can be a catalyst in correcting false perceptions about Muslims and not convert Hagia Sophia into a Mosque. The majority of Muslims will applaud him for walking on the right path. May God bless him. 

*Dr. Mike Ghouse is the founder and president of the Center for Pluralism. He is a speaker, thinker, author, community consultant, pluralist, activist, newsmaker, and an interfaith wedding officiant. Mike is deeply committed to Free speech, Human Rights, and Pluralism in Religion, Politics, Societies, and the workplace. He has dedicated his life to building cohesive societies and offers pluralistic solutions to the media and the policymakers. More about him at www.TheGhousediary.com. 

Other pieces by Dr. Mike Ghouse:

July 4th Message: Muslims have a special bond with America

Hindutva loses some heft in the US Congress

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Democracy is at risk worldwide. And the economy may be, too.

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro created a new cryptocurrency called the ‘Petro’ to combat hyperinflation. Reuters/Carlos Garcia Rawlins

Seventy-one out of the world’s 195 countries saw their democratic institutions erode in recent years, according to the 2018 year-end report by democracy watchdog Freedom House, a phenomenon known as “democratic backsliding.” Signs of backsliding include elected leaders who expand their executive powers while weakening the legislature and judiciary, elections that have become less competitive and shrinking press freedom.

When government institutions erode like this, it isn’t just bad for democracy – it also hurts countries economically, research shows.

To understand why, we applied our background as political scientists focused on developing economies to study Venezuela, Turkey and Hungary – all countries that have seen varying degrees of democratic backsliding in recent years.
 

The authoritarian economic problem

All three countries have struggled economically as their democratically elected leaders turned nakedly authoritarian over the past five years.

In Turkey, President Recep Erdoğan has been steadily consolidating presidential powers for years while attacking the independence of both the legislative and judicial branches, as well as restricting press and academic freedoms. Turkey’s economy has struggled in kind, with gross domestic product dropping about 60 percent between 2013 and 2016. Its currency, the lire, also collapsed last year, plunging the country into crisis.

Under the autocratic leadership of President Nicolás Maduro – who is now in a bitter power struggle to retain the presidency – Venezuela has seen financial ruin. Inflation hit 80,000 percent there last year, and food and medicine are scarce. Venezuela’s government stopped releasing economic data in 2014, but its gross domestic product is believed to have shrunk by around 15 percent for each of the last three years.

Meanwhile, Hungary has stagnated as Prime Minister Victor Orbán has become increasingly undemocratic. Since the 2014 election, when Orban’s grip on power really tightened, growth has mostly dropped, from 4 percent in 2014 to 2 percent in 2016. The World Bank predicts that Hungary’s economy will continue to contract through 2020 and beyond.
 

Leaders are fallible

Authoritarianism isn’t always bad for the economy. Autocratic China and Singapore are both economic success stories, growing at double digits – a pace largely unseen in Western democracies.

But these countries were never set up to be democracies.

When a one-time democracy turns toward authoritarianism, however, the economic effect is often negative. That’s because, in a democracy, economic policy is meant to be made jointly, by various elected officials from the executive and legislative branches. Other independent government agencies, like the U.S. Federal Reserve or central bank, help decide economic policy, too.

Lawmakers check impulsive decisions by presidents in a number of formal and informal ways, our research shows. Policies that relate to government investments, taxing and spending, among other issues, are generally the result of negotiation between the two branches.

When legislatures can no longer effectively serve this function – because they’ve been sidelined, as in Venezuela and Turkey, or because they are dominated by the ruling party, as in Hungary – there’s little to prevent authoritarian leaders from making bad choices that hurt the economy.

Turkey is a good example of the risks that come from having one all-powerful, fallible leader.

In July 2018, President Erdoğan expanded his executive powers to include making key appointments to Turkey’s central bank and appointed his son-in-law to lead economic policy in Turkey. Erdoğan then restricted the bank from raising interest rates to curb rising inflation – despite warnings from economists that this move would lead the value of the Turkish currency to plummet. And, of course, it did.

Turkey’s currency, the lire, collapsed after a series of unwise economic decisions made largely by President Erdoğan. Reuters/Khalil Ashawi
 

Social unrest is bad for the economy

Legislatures play an important role in setting economic policy also because, as representative bodies made up of different political parties, they serve as channels through which people and social groups can make demands on policymakers.

In healthy legislative debate in a functioning democracy, opposing parties develop economic policies that help their constituents. They also try to change laws that they believe will hurt the people they represent.

When authoritarian leaders sideline opposition parties and stack the legislature with their supporters, the only way for citizens to air their grievances is on the streets.

Venezuelans staged months of mass daily protests in 2017 after President Maduro stripped Venezuela’s opposition-dominated parliament of its powers. They are marching again now, demanding Maduro’s ouster.

Social unrest can deepen economic woes, especially when it gets violent. Riots may destroy physical infrastructure like oil pipelines or block highways that keeps the country running. People may flee for their own safety, leaving jobs undone and critical positions unfilled.
 

Democratic backsliding reduces foreign investment

International markets, too, dislike social unrest. When protests are prolonged or if the governments crack down violently, it is common for investors to flee.

International investors get worried, too, when parliaments have too few opposition parties to effectively check the executive branch, our study finds.

When democratically elected leaders turn authoritarian, investors get nervous, withdrawing funds and reducing investments.

Since 2013, Hungary, Venezuela and Turkey have all seen notable declines in their foreign direct investment, a measure of global confidence in a country, according to the World Bank. Declines range from 66 percent in Venezuela to 300 percent in Hungary.

One reason investment drops as democracy erodes is because investors fear the government could begin meddling in their businesses in ways that reduce profits.

This is a common strategy of authoritarian leaders from both the right and the left.

Since taking sweeping control of Hungary’s parliament in 2018, for example, President Orban’s right-wing Fidesz party has reasserted government control over major energy firms, taking over public utilities and increasing government oversight of foreign companies that operate in the country.

In Venezuela, the left-wing Maduro has taken over food production in the country, ordering companies like Nestle and Pepsi to vacate their factories in 2015.
 

It’s all about the legislatures

Our study found one condition that allows economies to thrive even when democracy is in decline: functioning political parties in independent legislatures.

In the Philippines, hard-right president Rodrigo Duterte has imprisoned, even killed, thousands of citizens as part of his “war on drugs.” Duterte has also arrested powerful people who criticize his policies. So far, however, the Filipino parliament is still fairly functional, with opposition parties that operate freely.

Consequently, the Filipino economy remains unaffected by Duterte’s authoritarianism. Gross domestic product has grown at a good rate of around 7 percent since 2012. Foreign investments have also been increasing.

Sharing some power with lawmakers gives the economy a boost. Ultimately, that may help these authoritarian-leaning leaders stay in power longer.
 

Nisha Bellinger, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boise State University and Byunghwan Son, Assistant Professor of Global Affairs, George Mason University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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A foreign woman was sexually assaulted and robbed by the driver of a public bus in Ankara at night last year.

A heavy penal court in Ankara had sentenced the driver, İbrahim Tuncay, to more than 34 years in prison after refusing his argument for a lighter sentence suggesting that the woman should not have been out in the street at 11 p.m. and she had “consent.”

After his request was rejected by a higher court, Tuncay had filed his final appeal to Turkey’s Court of Cassation.

The Court of Cassation’s 14th Penal Chamber upheld the earlier rulings in a final verdict on June 6, stressing that issuing the maximum possible sentence in the case was the right decision.

According to the ruling, going out at any time she wants is a woman’s constitutional right, which is under the guarantee of the state.
 

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Things between Saudi Crown Prince Salman and Turkish President Erdogan have become rather tense. AP Photo/Burhan Ozbilici

Articles based on anonymous accounts from Turkish officials report that Turkey has video and audio proof that Saudi Arabian agents detained, murdered and dismembered Khashoggi, a sharp critic of his government who lived in Washington, D.C. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan raised the stakes even further when he said that a search of the Saudi consulate showed evidence of toxic materials that were painted over.

The affair is just the latest to drive a wedge between the two key Middle Eastern powers – countries that have in the past shared close ties to each other and to the United States.

How did their friendship turn frosty?

I’ve been studying and writing about the region for decades. And like with many other relationships in the Middle East, it’s complicated – and that’s why the current crisis could lead to a surprising twist.
 

Early days

Although diplomatic relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were established in 1932, neither country showed much interest in the other until the late 1960s.

Turkey’s secular ruling elite was more keen to have strategic and economic ties with the West than to the Arab world. Turkey joined the NATO alliance in 1951 – two years after its formation – and maintained good relations with Israel from the start, much to the disappointment of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries.

This began to change in the ‘60s and ’70s when Turkey made two moves that led to stronger relations with Saudi Arabia and resulted in increased trade. In 1969, it joined the nascent Organization of Islamic States, based in Saudi Arabia and intended to be a “collective voice of the Muslim world.” And in 1975, Turkey initiated diplomatic relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization, which sought to end the occupation of Palestinian territories in Israel.

Relations continued to improve in the 1980s but deteriorated in the ’90s when the kingdom took Syria’s side in several disputes with neighbor Turkey.

These ups and downs in Saudi-Turkish relations were partly a result of Turkey’s political instability, including several military coups in the ’80s and ’90s. Relations tended to improve when Islamist or civilian parties – which felt close cultural and religious links with Turkey’s Muslim neighbors – were in power but worsened after the military deposed them.

King Abdullah shake hands with Erdogan during the first visit of a Saudi monarch to Turkey since 1966. AP Photo/Umit Bektas

Warmer ties

Relations between the two countries found a firmer footing after the Justice and Development Party – commonly known as the AKP – gained power in Turkey in 2002 and continued to improve throughout the decade.

In contrast to the secular governments that had ruled Turkey since 1923, the AKP and its leader Erdogan put a high priority on building stronger relationships with its Arab and Muslim neighbors.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the resulting change in the balance of power in the region brought Turkey and Saudi Arabia even closer together. Both were concerned about Iraq falling into the hands of their common rival, Iran, whose military and political influence increased as a result of the invasion. They also wanted to contain Iran’s influence in Syria and Lebanon.

As a result of these closer ties, in August 2006 the late King Abdullah became the first Saudi leader to visit Turkey since 1966 and made another trip the following year. In return, then-Prime Minister Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia four times from 2009 to 2011.
The high-level diplomatic contacts fostered growing business and investment. Turkish exports of textiles, metals and other products to Saudi Arabia soared from US$397 million in 2000 to $3.6 billion in 2012. And Saudi businessmen who felt unwelcome in the U.S. and Europe after 9/11 saw Turkey as an attractive destination.
 

A springtime chill in the air

Relations took a sharp turn in the 2011, starting with the Arab spring uprisings that led to the overthrow of governments in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

As an advocate of political Islam, Erdogan welcomed the revolutions and the new governments they yielded. The Saudi government, on the other hand, saw the revolts as destabilizing.

This disagreement came to a peak when Mohammad Morsi, who was closely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, won that Egypt’s first post-Hosni Mubarak election in 2012. Erdogan supported Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power, which was opposed by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States like the United Arab Emirates. These countries had a long history of hostility towards Muslim Brotherhood activities throughout the Arab world and were concerned that these victories would energize the movement in their own countries.

The rift between Turkey and Saudi Arabia intensified after a military coup ousted Morsi in 2013. Erdogan strongly condemned it and gave the Muslim Brotherhood refuge in Turkey, while Saudi Arabia offered billions in financial aid to cement Egypt’s new military rulers.

Relations took another hit in 2014 when Saudi Arabia actively undermined Turkey’s bid to become a nonpermanent member of the United Nations’ Security Council.

More recently, Saudi Arabia and Turkey found themselves on opposite sides over the Qatar crisis in June 2017. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt severed all ties with Qatar – and tried to enforce an economic blockade – over the latter’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups. They were also upset with Qatar’s refusal to terminate its ties with Iran.

Turkey reacted by expanding its engagement with Qatar, offering economic aid and sending more troops to its small military base in that country. Indeed, Turkish food shipments to Qatar played a crucial role in its ability to withstand the blockade.

Jamal Khashoggi, missing since Oct. 2, is believe to have been killed. Flickr/The Project on Middle East Democracy, CC BY

Interpreting Turkey’s response to Khashoggi

So what does this all mean for the current crisis?

Western media have mostly portrayed Turkey’s handling of the latest incident involving Khashoggi’s disappearance as an indication of deteriorating Saudi-Turkey relations.

That might not, however, be the case. The Turkish government is trying to balance multiple conflicting goals in the way it handles this crisis.

On the one hand, it is trying to show a full commitment to discovering what happened and has put enormous pressure on Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman by leaking details of his government’s involvement. But I believe it is also mindful of preventing a further escalation of tensions with Saudi Arabia, which remains a major investor in Turkey.

Meanwhile, Turkey is struggling with a severe financial and external debt crisis at the moment and is desperately trying to attract foreign capital. A withdrawal of Saudi investment or tourists could worsen the crisis.

Erdogan’s initial hesitation in pointing the finger – leaving it to “anonymous officials” – and his call for a joint investigation gave Saudi leadership time to come up with a response strategy, which appears to be blaming “rogue killers.”

In this he seems to share President Donald Trump’s interest in giving Saudi Arabia a face-saving way out of the crisis. The U.S. and the Trump administration also have a lot on the line in their relationship with the Saudi government.

Interestingly, one result of this ordeal, which has plunged Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the West into chaos, may be more cooperation and better ties between the U.S. and Turkey, which now have a great deal of leverage over the kingdom.

Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in Economics of the Middle East, Brandeis University
 

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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EPA/Turkish President Press Office

To everybody’s amazement, during a campaign lasting only 50 days, Ince transformed himself from an also-ran into a serious contender. He managed to pull support from all sections of society to his large rallies with an election slogan of “we will make peace, we will grow and we will share”.

While his supporters never thought a second round presidential vote would be anything but a foregone conclusion, they hoped Ince could capture enough of the vote to force one to happen – or even win the first round. But they were sorely disappointed. Instead, the sitting president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, pulled off a surprise of his own: he captured nearly 53% of the presidential vote, heading off a second round, while Ince garnered only 31%. While he accepted his defeat, he looks set to remain a significant opponent to Erdoğan, especially if he becomes the leader of his party, the CHP.

There were many other surprises besides. The HDP, the main pro-Kurdish party, managed to enter parliament even though its leader spent the campaign in prison. The nationalist MHP, the AKP’s election ally, managed to get more than 11% even though its leader didn’t organise a single rally. This will deprive the AKP of its outright parliamentary majority, meaning it will be more dependent than ever on the MHP.

At the same time, these results usher in a dramatic realignment of the political system. Turkey’s president will now hold extensive executive powers, and parliament will be much less significant. There will be no prime ministry, and all ministers will be appointed from outside the parliament by the president.

For those who have been worrying about Erdoğan’s increasingly autocratic rule until now, it seems their nightmare is about to enter a new phase. But Erdoğan isn’t out of the woods either.
 

Hard times

The country is facing one of its most serious economic crises of recent times, with the Turkish Lira worryingly weak and interest rates climbing. Turkey is hosting at least 3.5m Syrian refugees with no prospect of a peace settlement in the hellish conflict across the border. Erdoğan has only a few friends in the international arena besides Russia’s Vladimir Putin. The prospect of EU membership has evaporated, and the US is now far from a dependable ally.

The Kurdish crisis, too, is still waiting for a political settlement, but the AKP’s increased dependency on the staunchly nationalist MHP will make a political resolution on that front even harder.

AKP supporters celebrate in Ankara. EPA/Erdem Sahin

More importantly, these elections leave Turkish society all the more polarised and divided. For the 50% that voted for parties other than the AKP in the parliamentary polls, Turkey is a country of fear, mistrust and uncertainty. Erdoğan will need to work hard to win their hearts and minds, though in recent years he has seemed mainly interested in catering to his own 50% of the population.

With the promises made by opposition candidates during the election campaign, Erdoğan has also promised a prosperous new Turkey, a high-quality democracy where the rule of law would be the norm. He promised to lift the state of emergency shortly after the elections, to build his controversial Istanbul Canal, to open public parks throughout the country, and give every neighbourhood its own state-run cafe where tea and cake would be free.

Given the state of the economy, these promises sound like a tall order. But having run the country for 16 years, one thing Erdoğan has on his side is experience. Indeed, that’s why many of his supporters voted for him. But promises are all very well; the question now is whether Erdoğan will make good on them – and what will happen if he doesn’t.

Alpaslan Ozerdem, Professor of Peace-Building, Co-Director of Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University
 

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

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A huge banner for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan goes up in Ankara, Turkey, on June 17, 2018. Qin Yanyang/Press Association. All rights reserved.

Turkish democracy has been in a slow motion crisis for some time now. Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is frequently mentioned in the same breath as Victor Orban, Rodrigo Duterte, and Vladimir Putin. His Justice and Development Party has been running the country under a state of emergency since the summer of 2016, using anti-terrorism and defamation laws to imprison large numbers of journalists, NGO workers and opposition politicians. Last year, the party won a referendum to grant major new powers for the president. In April this year, Erdoğan called a snap election to vote in the next president of Turkey. The most likely challenger is the CHP’s candidate Muharrem İnce who will have an uphill battle.
 

The “national willpower” 

For the AKP the most important aspect of democracy is the vote, while separation of powers, freedom of the press and independent judiciary are regarded as irrelevant compared to the power of the “the national willpower” as the AKP catchphrase goes. A ballot victory is considered a carte blanche and that’s why elections still matter to the AKP as their sole source of legitimacy. However, their corrupt control of the media and willingness to stoop to all manner of dirty tricks (as seen in the 2015 election and 2017 referendum) means that elections are far from fair. A ballot victory is considered a carte blanche and that’s why elections still matter to the AKP as their sole source of legitimacy.

That being said, this election is going to be very tight. Approval ratings suggest that the population is closely divided on the president, and that gap seems to have got even closer. Moreover, in last year’s referendum, despite ample evidence of cheating, the AKP was only able to scrape a small majority. With anecdotal evidence of concern regarding government overreach and a worsening economy (the lira is among the worst performing currencies in the emerging markets; the inflation rate is at 12.64% in May, and expected to rise even further; two of Turkey’s major holding companies, Doğuş and Yıldız, have recently requested debt structuring from banks), even loyal followers of AKP are apprehensive of what is yet to come. This presents a real opportunity for an opposition candidate to pick up the votes from wavering AKP voters.
 

Discriminatory secularism

The biggest presidential contender after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is Muharrem İnce of The Republican People’s Party, or CHP, the first party of modern Turkey founded by Atatürk. Whether he can beat Erdoğan is a crucial question in Turkish politics. However, the CHP has a long, troubled legacy tarnished with discriminatory secularism that they have to overcome if they are to win this coming election. 

The first problem facing CHP is the way that the new presidential system works. The move towards executive presidency was engineered by AKP for a number of reasons. The first and the most obvious is that according to the constitution of Turkey, Erdoğan is not able to serve as prime minister again, having to step back to the largely ceremonial office of the president. The other, less clear aspect is the calculation about how to make electoral success more likely for AKP, removing the possibility of a coalition. In June 2015, after thirteen years of single-party rule, AKP lost its parliamentary majority in national elections when the pro-Kurdish HDP won 13% of the votes, getting a sizeable share from the AKP. When coalition talks with the MHP (the nationalist party) and CHP fell apart, the country was rushed into snap elections in November. In the highly turbulent four months that followed, with a resurgence of terror attacks and the collapse of the ceasefire with PKK, AKP regained power in the parliament, winning 49.5% of the votes.

In less than two years after this victory, AKP issued a leaflet for MPs to promote the executive presidency to their constituencies ahead of the 2017 referendum. One of the promised virtues in the leaflet was as follows: “The executive presidency system leaves no room for a coalition and (therefore) ensures stability.” Erdoğan himself stated that “there will be no opportunity for a coalition in the new system. With the team he gathers, the president will govern the country for five years.” 

Polling puts the current ratings for presidential candidates as approximately 48.7% for AKP’s Erdoğan, 25.8% for CHP’s İnce, 14.4% for İYİ’s Akşener, 10.1% for HDP’s Demirtas , 0.6% for Saadet Party’s Karamollaoğlu, 0.4% for Vatan Party’s Perinçek; on paper enough opposition voters to form a coalition in a parliamentary system. In presidential elections there will be two rounds of voting. If one candidate doesn’t pass the 51% threshold in the first round, the field will be reduced to two candidates, probably AKP’s Erdoğan at 48.7% and CHP’s İnce at 25.8%. For CHP to win in the presidential system they will have to take voters from the eliminated parties and ideally from the AKP. The CHP is the main political engineer of the top-down secularism that was the dominant force in politics until the AKP rose to power.

This is where CHP’s own long and troubled history becomes a real obstacle. The CHP is the main political engineer of the top-down secularism that was the dominant force in politics until the AKP rose to power. For a considerable segment of Turkish population, the principle of “secularism” has a toxic history mired in discrimination and humiliation. Throughout the decades, it was implemented as the removal of religion, rather than state impartiality towards all forms of religion. The most palpable and recurrent conflict was related to the headscarf. Women with visible signs of their faith were banned from education and employment in the public sector, with private businesses mimicking the status quo and effectively excluding them.

Nur Serter, former vice rector of Istanbul University, set up “persuasion rooms” on the campus to persuade students with headscarf to uncover. Years later, a book that sheds light on what happened in those rooms refers to the experience as “psychological torture.” In the meantime, Ms. Serter enjoyed immunity from prosecution while she served as CHP member of the parliament for eight years and refused to share the video records of the sessions. Time and again, CHP tried to impede any efforts that would allow the headscarf on university campuses. AKP was the party that eventually brought the headscarf into public life. It is therefore unsurprising that the group where Erdoğan polls best is amongst women who identify as conservative.
 

Where Erdoğan polls best

As the most visible marker of Islamic faith, the headscarf is an issue for religious conservatives of both sexes that symbolises their broader experience of discrimination by the secular government. But that discrimination seeped into other parts of conservative lives, particularly in the field of education which was organised by the secularist establishment with a very specific ‘state sanction’ version of Islam. Imam Hatip schools were the only places a person could go to get an Islamic education, but the CHP has a history of hostility towards them: for example when Erdoğan enrolled in the Imam Hatip school in the 1960s it was CHP policy not to open any more. Students that attended them reported discrimination both official and unofficial. In 2013, Erdoğan himself said that, while attending the school, he was told that the only job he could get after graduation was as an undertaker. When Erdoğan talks about the deep state, it isn’t entirely a propaganda tool.

There is also a long history of anti-democratic interventions by secular parties and governments against religious voters in Turkey. When Erdoğan talks about the deep state, it isn’t entirely a propaganda tool. The last successful coup d’état was in 1997 when the Kemalist military forced the Islamist prime minister Necmettin Erbakan, Erdoğan’s mentor and predecessor, to resign and dissolve the coalition government.

There have been numerous other attempts to make participation in the political system difficult for people outside of the secularist parties. It is something that Erdoğan experienced personally when he was imprisoned in 1998 for reading out a political poem. In 2007, the fifth year of AKP power, the CHP blocked the presidential election to keep Abdullah Gül, an AKP candidate and former foreign minister from taking office. They were solidly backed in this by the constitutional court, the military and other parties. The calculation was simple: with Erdoğan’s party holding both the prime ministry and the office of the speaker of parliament, the secularist establishment attempted to withhold the last pillar of government from Islamists. It worked. Gül was not elected as president. However, the government then called a general election and the Turkish public voted overwhelmingly for the AKP in a backlash vote; and eventually Gul was made president. Only a year later, a prosecutor demanded the closure of AKP and a ban on its leading members from participating in political life on the grounds that the party sought to establish a sharia order. The call was overturned by the constitutional court, but the AKP was stripped of state funding as a penalty. Women with Islamic covering are now everywhere in the public sphere, as paramedics, judges, lawmakers and police officers.

Gradually, the military control of Turkish politics has been removed, one of the achievements of the early AKP and the EU accession talks. With the AKP gaining in confidence, the headscarf issue was resolved without any public dissent. Women with Islamic covering are now everywhere in the public sphere, as paramedics, judges, lawmakers and police officers. These changes would have been unthinkable under a secularist government. New mosques are being built all across Turkey and the Imam Hatip schools are thriving. Religious voters feel like they have a lot to lose with the return of a secular party in power.
 

Rapprochement?

Despite the risk of alienating their secular base, the CHP is not unaware of the importance of gaining religious votes and have made attempts at rapprochement. In 2012, on a trip to Bosnia, CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu mentioned that his party adhered to an “elegant form of religiosity”, which is as ambiguous as it sounds. Two years later, they nominated Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, former head of the Islamic Cooperation Organization (ICO) for the presidency. Widely regarded as a tactical move to topple Erdoğan with a like-minded rival, AKP loyalists didn’t pay too much attention to his campaign.

Muharrem Ince speaks during a rally in his hometown Yalova city, June 14, 2018. DepoPhotos/Press Association. All rights reserved.

CHP’s current presidential candidate Muharrem İnce is a practising Muslim, and his wife refers to him as a “strong but private believer” who doesn’t like to display his faith. He doesn’t even mention secularism in his manifesto for the future, concentrating rather on the many urgent priorities on the country’s agenda including the economy, education and foreign policy. He has also declared the headscarf “no longer an issue of the people.” He refers to AKP voters as “brothers and sisters who have voted AK Party.” Muharrem İnce is a practising Muslim, and his wife refers to him as a “strong but private believer” who doesn’t like to display his faith.

However, it is questionable whether CHP can win the hearts of the religious electorate. When İnce went to a Friday prayer, onlookers watched for blunders. As he held a gilded frame of the first letter of the Arabic alphabet upside down, his video was ridiculed on social media.

More systemic concerns also come to the fore. His party’s election promises include nine-year compulsory primary education. Education, however, is a partisan issue rooted in the shadow of a pre-AKP era when the middle school segments of Imam Hatip schools were shut down and their high school graduates were blocked entry to universities, and consequently into the high-skilled labor market.

Today, a significant portion of the government budget goes into Imam Hatip schools that accept children from age ten. Both conservative media and the Deputy Prime Minister were quick to attack the CHP’s clause as an attempt to return to the days when early entry to Imam Hatip upper schools that offer religious tutoring were blocked. That particular allegation has no substance. However, using their media domination as leverage, the AKP seizes every opportunity to reinforce the lack of trust among religious people for CHP. 
 

Monstrous media control

Any political party that wants to challenge Erdoğan in the coming election will have to deal with all the corrupt methods that the government has used over and over again. They will have to find a way round the monstrous media control that the government has managed to build for itself.

But there is a constituency for change in Turkey from secular and religious people who are concerned about the state of the economy, the authoritarian policies of the government and the severe violations of justice after the coup attempt in July 2016.

However, for Erdoğan to be voted out of power on June 24, it will require religious voters to cross the floor and vote for the CHP candidate. But the illiberal methods of the secular establishment in the past are still very much in the political memory of these voters, making it hard for them to put their faith back into a secularist government, and making the re-election of Erdoğan more likely. 

Luke Frostick is a British writer living in Istanbul and the editor of the Bosphorus Review of Books.

Courtesy: https://www.opendemocracy.net/
 

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The unusual triple alliance coming out of Syria could change the regional balance of power and unhinge NATO — if it holds together at all.

opeth91 / Shutterstock

An unusual triple alliance is emerging from the Syrian war — one that could alter the balance of power in the Middle East, unhinge the NATO alliance, and complicate the Trump administration’s designs on Iran.

It might also lead to yet another double cross of one of the region’s largest ethnic groups, the Kurds.

However, the “troika alliance” — Turkey, Russia, and Iran — consists of three countries that don’t much like one another, have different goals, and whose policies are driven by a combination of geo-global goals and internal politics.

In short, “fragile and complicated” doesn’t even begin to describe it.

How the triad might be affected by the joint U.S., French, and British attack on Syria is unclear, but in the long run the alliance will likely survive the uptick of hostilities.

Consolidating Erdogan’s Grip
Common ground was what came out of the April 4 meeting between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Meeting in Ankara, the parties pledged to support the “territorial integrity” of Syria, find a diplomatic end to the war, and to begin a reconstruction of a Syria devastated by seven years of war. While Russia and Turkey explicitly backed the UN-sponsored talks in Geneva, Iran was quiet on that issue, preferring a regional solution without “foreign plans.”

“Common ground,” however, doesn’t mean the members of the “troika” are on the same page.

Turkey’s interests are both internal and external. The Turkish Army is currently conducting two military operations in northern Syria, Olive Branch and Euphrates Shield, aimed at driving the mainly Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) out of land that borders Turkey. But those operations are also deeply entwined with domestic Turkish politics.

Erdogan’s internal support has been eroded by a number of factors: exhaustion with the ongoing state of emergency imposed following the 2016 attempted coup, a shaky economy, and a precipitous fall in the value of the Turkish lira.

Rather than waiting for 2019, Erdogan called a snap election last week, and beating up on the Kurds is always popular with right-wing Turkish nationalists. Erdogan needs all the votes he can get to implement his newly minted executive presidency that will give him virtually one-man rule.

Driving a Wedge in NATO
To be part of the alliance, however, Erdogan has had to modify his goal of getting rid of Syrian President Bashar Assad and to agree — at this point, anyhow — to eventually withdraw from areas in northern Syria seized by the Turkish Army. Russia and Iran have called for turning over the regions conquered by the Turks to the Syrian Army.

Moscow’s goals are to keep a foothold in the Middle East with its only base, Tartus, and to aid its long-time ally, Syria. The Russians aren’t deeply committed to Assad personally, but they want a friendly government in Damascus. They also want to destroy al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, which have caused Moscow considerable trouble in the Caucasus.

Russia also wouldn’t mind driving a wedge between Ankara and NATO. After the U.S., Turkey has NATO’s second largest army. NATO broke a 1989 agreement not to recruit former members of the Russian-dominated Warsaw Pact into NATO as a quid pro quo for the Soviets withdrawing from Eastern Europe. Since the Yugoslav War in 1999, the alliance has marched right up to the borders of Russia. (The 2008 war with Georgia and 2014 seizure of the Crimea were largely a reaction to what Moscow sees as an encirclement strategy by its adversaries.)

Turkey has been at odds with its NATO allies around a dispute between Greece and Cyprus over sea-based oil and gas resources, and it recently charged two Greek soldiers who violated the Turkish border with espionage. Erdogan is also angry that European Union countries refuse to extradite Turkish soldiers and civilians who he claims helped engineer the 2016 coup against him. While most NATO countries condemned Moscow for the recent attack on two Russians in Britain, the Turks pointedly did not.

Turkish relations with Russia have an economic side as well. Ankara wants a natural gas pipeline from Russia, has broken ground on a $20 billion Russian nuclear reactor, and just shelled out $2.5 billion for Russia’s S-400 anti-aircraft system.

The Kurdish Question
The Russians don’t support Erdogan’s war on the Kurds and have lobbied for the inclusion of Kurdish delegations in negotiations over the future of Syria. But Moscow clearly gave the Turks a green light to attack the Kurdish city of Afrin last month, driving out the YPG that had liberated it from the Islamic State and Turkish-backed al-Qaeda groups. A number of Kurds charge that Moscow has betrayed them.

Will the Russians stand aside if the Turkish forces move further into Syria and attack the city of Manbij, where the Kurds are allied with U.S. and French forces? And will Erdogan’s hostility to the Kurds lead to an armed clash among three NATO members?

Such a clash seems unlikely, although the Turks have been giving flamethrower speeches over the past several weeks. “Those who cooperate with terrorists organizations [the YPG] will be targeted by Turkey,” Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag said in a pointed reference to France’s support for the Kurds. Threatening the French is one thing, picking a fight with the U.S. military quite another.

Of course, if President Trump pulls U.S. forces out of Syria, it will be tempting for Turkey to move in. While the “troika alliance” has agreed to Syrian “sovereignty,” that won’t stop Ankara from meddling in Kurdish affairs. The Turks are already appointing governors and mayors for the areas in Syria they have occupied.

Keeping the U.S. at Bay
Iran’s major concern in Syria is maintaining a buffer between itself and the very aggressive U.S., Israeli, and Saudi alliance, which seems to be in the preliminary stages of planning a war against the second-largest country in the Middle East.

Iran is not at all the threat it’s been pumped up to be. Its military is miniscule and talk of a so-called “Shiite crescent” — Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon — is pretty much a western invention (although the term was dreamed up by the Sunni king of Jordan).

Tehran has been weakened by crippling sanctions and faces the possibility that Washington will withdraw from the nuclear accord and re-impose yet more sanctions. The appointment of National Security Adviser John Bolton, who openly calls for regime change in Iran, has to have sent a chill down the spines of the Iranians.

What Tehran needs most of all is allies who will shield it from the enmity of the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia. In this regard, Turkey and Russia could be helpful.

Iran has modified its original goals in Syria of a Shiite-dominated regime by agreeing to a “non-sectarian character” for a post-war Syria. (Erdogan has also given up on his desire for a Sunni-dominated government in Damascus.)

War and Oil
War between the U.S. or its allies and Iran would be catastrophic, an unwinnable conflict that could destabilize the Middle East even more than it is now. It would, however, drive up the price of oil, currently running at around $66 a barrel.

Saudi Arabia needs to sell its oil for at least $100 a barrel, or it will very quickly run of money. The ongoing quagmire of the Yemen war, the need to diversify the economy, and the growing clamor by young Saudis — 70 percent of the population — for jobs requires lots of money, and the current trends in oil pricing are not going to cover the bills.

War and oil make for odd bedfellows. While the Saudis are doing their best to overthrow the Assad regime and fuel the extremists fighting the Russians, Riyadh is wooing Moscow to sign on to a long-term OPEC agreement to control oil supplies. That probably won’t happen — the Russians are fine with oil at $50 to $60 a barrel — and are wary of agreements that would restrict their right to develop new oil and gas resources.

The Saudis’ jihad on the Iranians has a desperate edge to it, as well it might. The greatest threat to the kingdom has always come from within.

The rocks and shoals that can wreck alliances in the Middle East are too numerous to count, and the “troika” is riven with contradictions and conflicting interests. But the war in Syria looks as if it’s coming to some kind of resolution — and at this point Iran, Russia, and Turkey seem to be the only actors who have a script that goes beyond lobbing cruise missiles at people.
 

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(Image: Democracy Chronicles / Flickr)

Viewed one way, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan looks unassailable.

He weathered last year’s coup attempt, jailed more than 50,000 opponents, fired more than 100,000 civil servants, beheaded the once powerful Turkish military, eviscerated much of his parliamentary opposition, dismissed almost half of the county’s elected officials, and rammed through a constitutional referendum that will make him an all-powerful executive following the 2019 election. In the meantime, a seemingly never-ending state of emergency allows him to rule by decree.

So why is the man running scared?

Because the very tools that Erdogan has used to make himself into a sort of modern day Ottoman sultan are backfiring.

The state of emergency is scaring off foreign investment, which is central to the way the Turkish economy functions. The loss of experienced government workers has put an enormous strain on the functioning of the bureaucracy. And the promises he made to the electorate in order to get his referendum passed are coming due with very little in the till to fulfill them.

“No Neighbors Without Problems”
Part of the problem is Erdogan himself. In that sense he’s a bit like U.S. President Donald Trump, who’s also alienated allies with a combination of bombast and cluelessness. The Turkish president is in a war with Washington over a corruption trial, at loggerheads with Germany (and most of the European Union) over his growing authoritarianism, and — with the exception of Russia, China, Qatar, and Iran — seems to be quarreling with everyone these days.

It’s certainly a far cry from a decade ago when the foreign policy of Ankara was “zero problems with the neighbors.” As one Turkish commentator put it, it’s now “no neighbors without problems.”

What’s thrown a scare into Erdogan, however, isn’t so much the country’s growing diplomatic isolation, but the economy — and how that might affect the outcome of presidential elections in 2019.

Hot Money, Cold Corruption
In the run up to the constitutional referendum last year, the government handed out loans and goodies to the average Turk. Growth accelerated, unemployment fell, and the poverty rate was reduced.

But the cost of priming that pump has come due at the very moment that international energy prices are on the rise. Turkey imports virtually all of its energy, but when the price of oil was down to a little more than $30 a barrel, the budget could handle it.

The price of oil in December, however, was close to $60 a barrel, and a recent agreement between Saudi Arabia and Russia to curb production will drive that price even higher in the future. Rate hikes for gasoline and heating will be up sharply in the coming months.

Meanwhile, Turkish unemployment is over 13 percent, inflation is close to 12 percent, and the Turkish lira has fallen 12 percent against the dollar. With energy costs rising and currency value declining, Turkey is struggling through an economic double whammy.

Economist Timur Kuran of Duke University says the Turkish economy is in serious trouble. “The AKP (Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party) is doing massive long-term damage to the Turkish economy. Corruption is up, the quality of education has fallen, the courts are massively politicized, and the people are afraid to speak honestly.”

Kuran argues that any growth is based on short-term investments, so-called “hot money,” drawn in by high interest rates. “This is not a sustainable strategy. It makes Turkey highly vulnerable to a shock that might cause an outflow of resources.”

Under Erdogan, corruption does seem to be increasing. In 2013, Transparency International ranked Turkey 53rd out of 175 countries on its Corruption Perception Index. By 2016, the country had risen to 75th out of 176 countries.

Turkey’s economy is highly dependent on foreign money, but the continuing state of emergency and rule by decree is scaring off investors. Figures by the country’s central bank show that Turkey is losing $1 billion a week in foreign investments. The United Kingdom, a major investor in Turkey, has reduced its investments by 20 percent since the declaration of the state of emergency.

The uncertainly has spread as well to Turkish citizens, who are putting their money into foreign investments in order to preserve their savings. From the end of 2016 to this November, Turks moved $17.2 billion to foreign firms.

Erdogan is blaming Turkish banks — in particular the central bank — for rising interest rates and the downturn in the economy. But Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the centrist and secular opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), argues: “The real reason why foreign investments other than real estate purchases are decreasing is that [foreign investors] feel insecure in a country where law, justice, and press freedom are non-existent.”

Outflanked at Home
The state of emergency allows the government to suppress trade union strikes, but it has been less successful in damping down what was once a AKP strong suit: rural farmers.

One of Erdogan’s economic “reforms” was to open Turkish markets to foreign competition, which has resulted in losses for the country’s livestock farmers and agricultural growers. Meat producers are up in arms over an agreement with Serbia to import 5,000 tons of red meat, and tea, grape, tobacco, and apricot growers have been hard hit by falling prices and foreign competition. Hazelnut growers were so incensed at the government’s base price for their produce that they organized a large march under the banner of “Justice for Hazelnuts.”

A study found that foreign imports had reduced the number of families involved in growing tobacco from 405,882 families in 2002 to 56,000 in 2015.

It’s not so much the marches that worry Erdogan, but the fact that some 20 million rural Turks are up in arms against the government, anger that might translate into votes in 2019. In the April 2017 referendum, rural votes solidly supported the AKP, while urban centers — particularly their youth — voted no. Losing cities like Ankara and Istanbul — the city where Erdogan began his political career — was a shock for the AKP, but losses in rural areas would be a political train wreck.

While Erdogan strains to keep the economic lid on long enough to get through 2019, there are fissures opening within his own party. A wing of the AKP is not happy with Erdogan’s foreign policy disputes and the impact that they’re having on the economy.

On his right, former interior minister Meral Aksener has formed the Iyi Parti — or “Good Party” — and says she plans to challenge Erdogan for the presidency. Aksener appeals to the more nationalist currents in the AKP and hopes to attract support from the extreme right wing National Action Party (MHP). She is currently polling around 16 percent.

Polls indicate that the “Good Party” is cutting into the AKP’s support, which has dropped to 38 percent. Erdogan needs at least 51 percent, the figure that he claims he got in the referendum (outside observers called the election deeply flawed, however). Aksener could split Erdogan’s support within the AKP and the MHP, thus denying him a majority.

Nor has the CHP thrown in the towel. Besides organizing marches by angry rural residents, CHP leader Kilicdaroglu pulled off a 25-day, 280-mile “Justice March” last summer that may have involved as many as a million people.

The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), Turkey’s leftist party closely tied to its Kurdish population, has been decimated by arrests and seizure of its assets, but it is still the third largest party in parliament. “It may appear that injustice has won, but this will not last,” HDP parliament member Meral Danis Bestas told
Al-Monitor. “Turkey’s future truly lies in democracy, rights and freedom.”

Erdogan has enormous power and has out muscled and out maneuvered his opponents for the past 20 years. But Turks are growing weary of his rule and, if the economy stumbles, he may be vulnerable.
That’s why he is running scared.
 

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Turkish Muslims pray near Fatih Mosque in Istanbul during a protest against the attacks on the Muslim people in Arakan in Myanmar. EPA-EFE/ERDEM SAHIN

United Nations (UN) human rights chief Zeid Raad Al Hussein has called the Rohingya’s plight a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” following a similar statement from UN Secretary General António Guterres. While Western countries have been slow and hesitant to respond, leaders of Muslim-majority countries – particularly Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan – have sought to place as much international pressure as possible on the Myanmar government.

The strongest and most vocal response of all has come from Turkey. Indeed the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, appears to have appointed himself as the international voice of the Rohingya Muslims.
 

Turkey’s aid response

According to a Turkish government statement, Erdoğan is the first one that managed to get permission for humanitarian aid to enter Myanmar. The Burmese government had, at the peak of the violence, blocked all UN aid towards the Rohingyas.

And so, on September 7, Turkey’s foreign aid agency, TIKA, became the first foreign outfit to deliver an initial shipment of 1000 tons of basic foodstuffs and medicine to the conflict zone in Rakhine state, where the majority of Rohingyas live.

Turkey simultaneously announced plans to distribute humanitarian aid to the Rohingya camps in Bangladesh. The move was widely publicised as Emine Erdoğan, the Turkish president’s wife visited the camps at the same time.
 

Public denunciation

Meanwhile, during a meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, Erdoğan as the current chief of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) formally condemned Myanmar’s attitude towards Rohingyas, taking the lead on the topic on behalf of the organisation. He had previously called the ongoing violence a genocide.

Since the crisis broke on August 25, the Turkish president has taken several actions to gather Muslim leaders across the world to put pressure on the Myanmar government. On August 31, he spoke with the leaders of Mauritania, Pakistan, Iran and Qatar urging them to join forces to find a way to stop the violence against the Rohingyas.

Alongside Erdoğan, other Turkish politicians have addressed the issue. Remarks by Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the foreign minister, garnered global attention. Mehmet Şimşek, deputy prime minister, even tweeted unrelated images to raise the point, creating a bit of an embarassment.

So how are we to explain Turkey’s ambition to take the lead in this current crisis?
 

Global ambitions

The political vacuum prompted by the Trump administration’s retreat from global leadership has surely played a part. But, more evidently, Turkey’s longstanding pro-Western approach has shifted. Turkey is a NATO member and aspired to join the EU for years, but under President Erdoğan’s lead and the current AKP government, the country’s foreign policy has shifted towards the global south, seeking new opportunities.

Turkey’s foreign policy doctrine now promotes what Bilkent University academics Pinar Bilgen and Ali Bilgiç label “civilisational geopolitics”, “an understanding of culture and civilisation as preordained determinants of international behaviour”.

As Bilgin and Bilgiç argue, this new doctrine aims at placing Turkey at the core of geopolitical issues between the West and the rest of Asia, justifying this global engagement by its political heritage – mainly based on its Central Asian and Ottoman history.

Rakhine State Chief Minister Nyi Pu receives bags of rice from Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu in 2016. EPA/NYUNT WIN

The shift became most obvious at the end of the 2000s. It has been identified most closely with Ahmet Davutoğlu, a scholar of geopolitics and Turkey’s foreign minister from 2009–14. In 2010 Foreign Policy called him “the brains of Turkey’s global reawakening”.
Under Davutoğlu’s watch, Turkey’s global diplomatic footprint expanded dramatically, especially in Asia and Africa. He opened Turkey’s first embassy in Myanmar in 2012 both to take advantage of the potential trade opportunities from the country’s post-2008 liberalisation and because of the Rohingya issue.

A subsequent trip in 2013 saw him tour refugee camps and call on the Burmese government to extend citizenship rights to the Rohingya people. This new foreign policy coincides with Turkey’s decade-long ambition to become a global humanitarian power or what Turkish scholars E. Fuat Keyman and Onur Zakak call a “humanitarian state”.

The Turkish humanitarian approach has been cast by journalist and former Somali Minister of Planning, Abdirahman Ali, as a middle way between the Western aid model and its Chinese counterpart. Whereas the former is highly conditional, bureaucratic and often security-focused and the latter tends to bolster corrupt ,authoritarian regimes, the Turkish approach – Ali claims – typically bypasses bureaucracy and emphasises “a ‘moral’ standard anchored in protecting human rights and helping the weak”.
Turkey has backed this ambition with increased funding for humanitarian assistance over the last five years. Development Initiatives – a UK based NGO – recently reported that now Turkey ranks second in the world for humanitarian aid, having spent around US$6 billion in 2016 (the top-ranked US spent $6.3 billion).
 

The champion of Muslims’ rights

One of the other factors is domestic politics. Indeed, much of Erdoğan’s public posturing on the Rohingya issue is entirely self-serving. The image of a strong Turkey reaching out to Muslim’s everywhere in the world– plays very well at home. During his 15-year tenure as Turkey’s leader, the country’s once-marginalised pious Muslim citizens have become increasingly prominent in media, business and politics.

Ardent supporters in Turkey – not to mention large segments of public opinion across the Muslim world – thus see him as a champion of Muslim rights everywhere.

Erdoğan has studiously crafted this image throughout other crisis, such as in Egypt’s during the 2011-12 Morsi regime or in Palestine. His very public spats with Israel and the West have led some pro-Palestinian columnists in Arabic newspapers to call him the “new Nasser”.
 

Competition ahead

Nevertheless, in recent days there has been a modest push back from Saudi Arabia, which appears to be chaffing at Turkey’s leadership on the crisis. Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Turkey released a statement emphasising the Kingdom’s strong, decades-long support for the Rohingyas. Iran has followed too, promising shipments to reach Myanmar soon.

Erdoğan has promised to raise the Rohingya issue on September 19, at the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly – which Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi is avoiding.

His calls to protect Muslims worldwide could be a key moment for Turkey’s diplomatic leadership but whether other Muslim countries would follow or not will tell the limits of Turkey’s so-called “humanitarian politics”.
 

Simon P. Watmough, Postdoctoral research associate, European University Institute

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

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