UIDAI | SabrangIndia News Related to Human Rights Tue, 20 Feb 2024 10:24:30 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.2.2 https://sabrangindia.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Favicon_0.png UIDAI | SabrangIndia 32 32 Logical, Legal Compulsion for West Bengal, other states to un-sign MoUs with UIDAI: Expert to Mamata Banerjee https://sabrangindia.in/logical-legal-compulsion-for-west-bengal-other-states-to-un-sign-mous-with-uidai-expert-to-mamata-banerjee/ Tue, 20 Feb 2024 09:23:47 +0000 https://sabrangindia.in/?p=33304 In a brief yet succinct communication, with references to detailed articles and backgrounders, Dr Gopalkrishna has, while welcoming chief minister (CM), West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee’s concerns on the “mass de-activation of Aadhaar cards in Burdwan and other districts of Bengal,” urged her to un-sign WB’s MoU with UIDAI

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In a brief communication, with detailed referances to detailed articles and backgrounders, Dr Gopalkrishna has, while welcoming Mamata Banerjee’s concerns on the “mass de-activation of Aadhaar cards in Burdwan and other districts of Bengal,” urged her to un-sign WB’s MoU with UIDAI signed in 2010.

The 2010 Memorandum between UIDAI and West Bengal when CPI-M ruled the state may be read here.

On Sunday, February 18, media reported how Mamata Banerjee, chief minister (CM), West Bengal had lashed out at the Union Government on cases of thousands of Bengal residents receiving letters from branch offices of the UIDAI “de-activating their Aadhaar cards. Sanmarg a portal had also carried reports on Saturday.

Today, Tuesday, February 20, Dr Gopalkrishna, in an open letter to Mamata Banerjee has, while welcoming her move urged how and why, after the Supreme Court’s verdict of September 26, 2018 and November 13, 2019, in the aftermath of the Aadhaar Act, 2016 (as amended in 2019), there is a logical and legal compulsion for States to un-sign their MoUs with UIDAI.

The professor points out that these MoUs were signed in the pre-Aadhaar Act era and continued to operate in the era when unconstitutional Sections like Section 57 of Aadhaar Act was recognised and declared as unconstitutional and illegitimate by the Supreme Court’s verdict of September 26, 2018 and by the deletion of Section 57 by the amendment of 2019 in Aadhaar Act. The verdict of November 13, 2019 recognised that the entire Act is unconstitutional.

Section 57 of un-amended Aadhaar Act, 2016 stated that “Nothing contained in this Act shall prevent the use of Aadhaar number for establishing the identity of an individual for any purpose, whether by the State or anybody corporate or person, pursuant to any law, for the time being in force, or any contract to this effect”.

Section 25 of the Amendment Act 2019 states that Section 57 of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 has been omitted with effect from July 24, 2019.

This MoU signed between the West Bengal government & UIDAI “is outdated and it imperils the autonomy of the State and the citizens. Your considered intervention will pave the way for other States to act on this MoU which is facilitating unlimited and indiscriminate mass surveillance and mass spying at the behest of World Bank’s eTransform Initiative and its partners since 2010. “

Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL) welcomes your letter to Hon’ble Prime Minister on the subject of “Aadhaar is becoming inactive” in defence of the natural and fundamental rights of fellow citizens.

Dr Gopalkrishna’s Open Letter to CM West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee:

“I submit that a 7-judge Constitution Bench has been constituted to declare it to be so in order to adhere to judicial discipline. The fact remains no sane person will wait for formal announcement of poison to desist from consuming poison.

Aadhaar Act is a poisonous law.

“It is a black law akin to the colonial law which was bitterly resisted by Mahatma Gandhi’s first Satyagrah. Our Hon’ble Chief Justice of India has declared this law to be a fraud on the Constitution of India in his order dated September 26, 2018. He has reiterated it on at least two more occasions. In this backdrop, constitutional, legal, judicial and political imagination creates a logical compulsion to resist this law which creates an architecture of unlimited government based on 360 degree surveillance. It is eroding the constitutionally mandated autonomy of States beyond repair.

“I submit that West Bengal’s Home Department signed the attached MoU with UIDAI on July 1, 2010. Shri A.G. Ghosh, OSD & ex-officio Special Secretary signed it on behalf of Home Department, West Bengal Government and Shri Nirmal Kumar Sinha, Deputy Director General, UIDAI, Planning Commission signed it on behalf of UIDAI.

“This MoU is outdated and it imperils the autonomy of the State and the citizens. Your considered intervention will pave the way for other States to act on this MoU which is facilitating unlimited and indiscriminate mass surveillance and mass spying at the behest of World Bank’s eTransform Initiative and its partners since 2010.

“Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL) welcomes your letter to Hon’ble Prime Minister on the subject of “Aadhaar is becoming inactive” in defence of the natural and fundamental rights of fellow citizens.

(Source: https://www.livehindustan.com/national/story-why-aadhaar-is-becoming-inactive-west-bengal-mamata-banerjee-wrote-a-letter-asking-for-reply-from-pm-9346756.html)

Reference articles by Dr Gopalkrishna:

“India’s First Metadata case: Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench to decide illegitimacy of Aadhaar Act amid Great Data Robbery” (https://mainstreamweekly.net/article13958.html), “India’s First Metadata Case and Pegasus – Part 2” (http://mainstreamweekly.net/article14053.html) and India’s First Metadata case: Mass Surveillance, Mass Spying and Unending Census Part 3 (http://mainstreamweekly.net/article14196.html) provides robust argument in this regard.

Having worked on the subject since 2010, I will be happy to share more details regarding the illegitimacy of Aadhaar Act. ”

Background provided by Dr Gopalkrishna (excerpted from his articles):

Metadata ability to redefine human existence in ways which are yet fully to be perceived. Justice DY Chandrachud, in the November 2019 judgment before he assumed office as CJI, drew on the paper of Christina Moniodis titled “Moving from Nixon to NASA: Privacy’s Second Strand- A Right to Informational Privacy”. Dr. Chandrachud cites her with approval. He states that metadata “results in the creation of new knowledge about individuals; something which even she or he did not possess. This poses serious issues for the Court. In an age of rapidly evolving technology it is impossible for a judge to conceive of all the possible uses of information or its consequences.”

Also drawing from the Yvonne McDermott’s paper “Conceptualizing the right to data protection in an era of Big Data”, Dr. Chandrachud observes, “The contemporary age has been aptly regarded as “an era of ubiquitous dataveillance, or the systematic monitoring of citizen’s communications or actions through the use of information technology”. It is also an age of “big data” or the collection of data sets. These data sets are capable of being searched; they have linkages with other data sets; and are marked by their exhaustive scope and the permanency of collection.”

The (2019) verdict refers to the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Tele2 Sverige AB vs. Post-och telestyrelsen (2016) wherein it was seized with the issue as to whether in light of Digital Rights Ireland, a national law which required a provider of electronic communications services to retain meta-data (name, address, telephone number and IP address) regarding users/subscribers for the purpose of fighting crime was contrary to Article 7, 8 and 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The CJEU struck down the provision allowing collection of such meta data on grounds of lack of purpose limitation, data differentiation, data protection, prior review by a court or administrative authority and consent.

Here are some reasons for scrapping Aadhaar databases scheme and repealing Aadhaar Act (as enunciated by Dr Gopalkrishna):

1. The majority order of the Supreme Court’s 5-Judge Constitution Bench on September 26, 2018, has pointed out that the UID/Aadhaar Number project and NPR project are part of the one database convergence scheme. NPR has been mentioned at least on eight occasions in the order to underline the same. A centralized database is the most vulnerable entity in the digital world. The leakage of the database of UK’s children has revealed the old maxim, “If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear, has been given a very public burial”. This has been thoroughly debunked. This maxim is attributed to Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels. Database State, a report from the UK, states: ‘In October 2007, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (Department) lost two discs containing a copy of the entire child benefit database.’ Only blind faith in a Utopian State can persuade people to think that they have nothing to fear after trusting their personal sensitive information to a Database State and non-State actors like Safran, Ernst & Young and Accenture.

2. One of the earliest documents that refer to UIDAI, a 14-page document titled ’Strategic Vision: Unique Identification of Residents’ prepared by Wipro Ltd for the government envisaged the close linkage that the UIDAI’s Aadhaar would have with the electoral database. The use of the electoral database mentioned in Wipro’s document remains on the agenda of the proponents of UID/Aadhaar.

3. The 41-page Wikileaked document titled ’Creating a unique identity number for every resident in India’ that declared itself to be a ’Confidential- property of UIDAI’ reveals that from day one the Union government wanted to create a file on each of “1.2 billion residents”, the division of work between Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)’s NPR and Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY)’s UID/Aadhaar was/is merely an attention diversion tactics to outwit citizen’s scrutiny.

The ongoing merger of the electoral database with UID/Aadhaar number debunks UIDAI’s claim in the confidential document that UID/Aadhaar number “will not contain intelligence” and “the location of the person. “From these disclosures, it seems that the government has adopted an adversarial role vis-a-vis Indians and acting beyond its constitutional mandate in order to pander to the interests of the commercial czars, non-state actors and foreign intelligence companies.

4. In an RTI reply dated October 25, 2013, UIDAI shared a truncated contract agreement with Ernst & Young. The contract agreement states that “the Unique ID will be a random 12-digit number with the basis for establishing uniqueness of identity being biometrics”. It announces that “we will provide a Unique Identity to over 113.9 crore people.”

This is evidently a fraudulent announcement because UIDAI with which the agreement has been signed had the mandate to provide Unique Identity to only 60 crore residents of India, and not to 113.9 crore people.

It is evident that while the government kept Ernst & Young informed about its motive, it kept states, citizens, the parliament and the Supreme Court in the dark. The contract agreement reveals that “biometric systems are not 100 % accurate” and “uniqueness of the biometrics is still a postulate.” This admission pulverizes the deceptive edifice on which MEITY’s UID/Aadhaar and MHA’s NPR rests.

5. Section 57 of un-amended Aadhaar Act, 2016 stated that “Nothing contained in this Act shall prevent the use of Aadhaar number for establishing the identity of an individual for any purpose, whether by the State or anybody corporate or person, pursuant to any law, for the time being in force, or any contract to this effect”.

It implies that UID/Aadhaar of “over 113.9 crore people” has been shared with foreign private body corporates like Ernst & Young. It is only after the horse had escaped the barn that the door was closed through Section 25 of Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019 in compliance with the Court’s order dated September 26, 2018.

Section 25 of the Amendment Act 2019 states that Section 57 of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 has been omitted with effect from July 24, 2019.

6. At paragraph 8 of the majority order authored by Justice A K Sikri, it is recorded that “a Processes Committee was set up on July 03, 2006, to suggest the process for updation, modification, addition and deletion of data and fields from the core database to be created under the Unique Identification for BPL Families project.

This Committee, on November 26, 2006, prepared a paper known as ’Strategic Vision Unique Identification of Residents’. Based thereupon, the Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) was set up on December 04, 2006, to collate the National Population Register under the Citizenship Act, 1955 and the Unique Identification Number project of the Department “of Information Technology.

Subsequently, “a Committee of Secretaries was formed. The said Committee gave its recommendations which were discussed by EGoM. After approving the Aadhaar Scheme in principle, it instructed the Cabinet Secretary to convene a meeting to finalise the detailed organisational structure of the UID.

After considering the recommendation of the Cabinet Secretary, Notification No. A-43011/02/2009-Admn.I was issued on January 28, 2009, by the Government of India which constituted and notified the UIDAI.” Annexure 1 of this notification that constituted UIDAI deals with the Role and Responsibilities of UIDAI. The fourth point in this notification reads: “implementation of UID scheme will entail” taking “necessary steps to ensure collation of NPR with UID (as per. approved strategy)”.

7. The minutes of a meeting of the Committee of Secretaries held under Chairmanship of Cabinet Secretary November 23, 2015 talks of “integrating the twin approaches under NPR and Aadhaar.”

The “integrating the twin approaches under NPR and Aadhaar” which is referred here is the same as taking “necessary steps to ensure collation of NPR with UID (as per. approved strategy)” underlined in the notification mentioned in the Aadhaar Act.

8. A Ministry of Home Affairs communication dated July 19, 2019 states that “The National Population Register (NPR) thus prepared, was seeded with Aadhaar number during its updation exercise in 2015 along with a collection of demographic details of new household members. Approx. 60 crores Aadhaar numbers have been seeded in NPR Database.”

This communication discloses that “It has now been decided by the Ministry of Home Affairs to update the existing NPR database during April 2020 – September 2020 along with House listing & Housing Census phase of Census 2021. While updating the NPR, the Aadhaar number of all the individuals whose Aadhaar number is not available in the NPR Database will also be collected along with various other items. Necessary notification for updating NPR in 2020 will be issued shortly.”

9. 
The Court’s order reveals that “A core group was set up to advise and further the work related to UIDAI…The core group, inter alia, decided that it was better to start with the electoral roll database of 2009 for undertaking the UIDAI project.” If an UID/Aadhaar-enabled Biometric Attendance System is indeed a ‘digital equivalent’ of an ‘age-old attendance register,’ why did the National Human Rights Commission object to a radio collar which can also be argued by sophists to be a ‘digital equivalent’? It may be recalled that the Union Ministry of External Affairs had agreed with the NHRC’s assessment. The Union minister of external affairs informed Parliament that some 18 students were detained and released in the US with radio monitoring devices on their ankles, pending completion of investigations for possible involvement in irregularities. ’We have also strongly protested the radio collars as unacceptable, which should be removed immediately.’ If the ‘digital equivalent’ means biometric equivalent as well, then radio collar and DNA-based identity and attendance will also be deemed equivalent to ‘age-old attendance register.’ It is quite evident that such claims are deeply misleading.

10. The reference to ‘such other biological attributes’ in Section 2 (g) of Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016, and the definition of ‘biometrics’ under the Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information) Rules, 2011 under section 87 read with section 43A of Information Technology Act, 2000 underlines that it includes ‘the technologies that measure and analyse human body characteristics, such as “fingerprints”, “eye retinas and irises”, “voice patterns”, “facial patterns”, “hand measurements” and “DNA” for authentication purposes.’ It is abundantly clear that the plan of UID/Aadhaar-based surveillance does not end with the collection of fingerprints and iris scan, it goes quite beyond it.

The confidential document of UIDAI reveals that “One way to ensure that the unique identification (UID) number is used by all government and private agencies is by inserting it into the birth certificate of the infant. Since the birth certificate is the original identity document, it is likely that this number will then persist as the key identifier through the individual’s various life events, such as joining school, immunizations, voting etc.” Notably, there has never been any occasion wherein there was an all-party meeting to seek the consent of all the political parties with regard to merger of UID/Aadhaar database with “electoral roll database”. It is evident that the provision of Electoral Bonds in the Companies Act, 2013 and the merger of Voter-ID Number and Aadhaar Number through amendment in Aadhaar Act is an exercise in merger of electoral database and Aadhaar database which will lead to extinction of political and civil rights of present and future generations.

According to Dr Gopalkrishna, Justice Sikri authored order of Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench missed the opportunity to save present and future Indians from the dictatorship of faceless donors created through Finance Act 2017 and Finance Act 2018 which has compromised national security and almost all the public institutions. He has made citizens and natural persons residing in India naked and transparent in a legal system in which artificial persons, the opaqueness of body corporates has been legalized. The order committed a Himalayan blunder by ruling that right to have natural and human rights of citizens can be made conditional. This is being done by the government at the behest of the beneficial owners of ungovernable technology companies who have turned ruling political parties into puppets through their limitless and anonymous transnational donations.

This creates a compelling reason for the States to un-sign the MoUs they have signed with UIDAI and discontinue both UID/Aadhaar and NPR exercise. This is required to resist the emergence of an unlimited government, unlimited by the Constitution of India and Constitutionalism. Aadhaar database scheme is an unlimited census in disguise. It is naturalising mass surveillance and mass spying in myriad disguises and through diverse kinds of fish baits.

There is a compelling logic for setting up a High Powered Commission of Inquiry to probe the ongoing bartering of citizen’s databases and transfer of national data assets to foreign entities. In the face of assault on citizens’ rights and the emergence of a regime that is making legislatures and judiciary subservient to automatic identification, big data mining and artificial intelligence companies, the order of Justice Sikri undermined the Constitution and the sovereignty of the citizens who framed it. If the flawed order is not reversed by the 7-judge Constitution Bench, India’s social policies will be guided by biometric and genetic determinism and eugenic thinking of beneficial owners of unaccountable and admittedly undemocratic institutions.

In a country where no intelligence chief or official has been held accountable for the assassination of three of its Prime Ministers and for betraying the nation’s secrets, can it be hoped that all those who have compromised India’s data security will be made liable for their treacherous acts of transferring the sensitive data of present and future citizens including ministers, legislators, soldiers, and judges?

(The author, Dr. Gopal Krishna is a lawyer and law and philosophy researcher. He had appeared before the Parliamentary Committee that examined the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 that was withdrawn in 2016 and enacted later as Aadhaar Act 2016)

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia


Related:

Mamata Banerjee attacks Union Govt, says Aadhaar cards being rejected en masse in Bengal

New “advisory on Aadhaar as date of birth proof soon

CJP EXCLUSIVE: How the Union of India took a giant step towards both NPR & NRC in 2015 without informed consent

West Bengal Assembly next in line to pass resolution against CAA

After Kerala, Punjab Assembly passes resolution against CAA

WB becomes first state to declare it will skip NPR meet in Delhi

Kerala passes resolution for withdrawal of CAA

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UIDAI sends notices to 127 people asking to prove citizenship https://sabrangindia.in/uidai-sends-notices-127-people-asking-prove-citizenship/ Wed, 19 Feb 2020 08:37:59 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2020/02/19/uidai-sends-notices-127-people-asking-prove-citizenship/ Facing backlash, it issues a press release saying it did so on complaints of the State police who suspected the people to be illegal immigrants

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Aadhaar

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) has given time to 127 people in Hyderabad till May 2020 to appear before an inquiry officer and submit original documents to prove that they hadn’t availed the documents under “false pretenses”.

Scroll.in had initially reported that three residents from Hyderbad had been served notices by the UIDAI asking them to prove their citizenship and that they hadn’t obtained their Aadhaar numbers via fraudulent means. The letter was sent by the regional office of the UIDAI, signed by Deputy Director / Inquiry Officer Amita Bindroo.

 

 

However, the Aadhaar authority, in a press release on Twitter later said that the notices had been served to 127 people and they had been summoned “on the complaints from the State police which suspect them of being illegal immigrants”.

 

 

The UIDAI in its opening statement put forth that the Aadhaar was “not a citizenship document”. In the press release it also said, “Sometimes it becomes necessary to cancel the Aadhaar number when it is found that a resident has obtained it by submitting false biometrics or documents. It is a routine quality improvement process that the UIDAI takes up regularly.”

It emphasized that the notices had “nothing to do with citizenship and cancellation of Aadhaar number is in no way related to the nationality of any resident”.

It also cautioned that “severe errors like forged documents, etc. lead to appropriate actions including suspending / cancelling the Aadhaar.”

The clarification of the UIDAI came after it faced a severe backlash from ordinary citizens. Hyderabad MP Assaddudin Owaisi said in a tweet, “Section 9 of Aadhaar Act says that it isn’t proof of citizenship. What legal authority does UIDAI have to demand proof of citizenship? The notices don’t even mention the grounds on which they were issued. This is illegal & unacceptable.”

The notice served by the UIDAI to one of the persons, Mohd Sattar Khan, which would supposedly identical to the other 126 people clearly asks them to appear before the Enquiry officer “with all necessary documents in original to prove all your claims of citizenship and if you are not an Indian National, to prove that you have entered the territory of India legally and your stay is valid”. However, the press release by the UIDAI states that the Aadhaar isn’t a citizenship document.

Hence, if by saying that Aadhaar is not a citizenship document, on what basis has the UIDAI then asked the people to prove their claims of citizenship?

Related:

Uddhav Thackeray greenlights NPR, second U-Turn after CAA
Armed men with JCB machines target migrant workers in B’luru

 

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Aadhaar’s image makeover? Govt of India “refusing to divulge” info on amount being spent by UIDAI https://sabrangindia.in/aadhaars-image-makeover-govt-india-refusing-divulge-info-amount-being-spent-uidai/ Thu, 23 Aug 2018 05:17:01 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2018/08/23/aadhaars-image-makeover-govt-india-refusing-divulge-info-amount-being-spent-uidai/ Why is the Unique Identity Authority of India (UIDAI) refusing to divulge its advertising expenses? Two attempts were made recently to obtain information from UIDAI on advertising expenditure.   1. Right to Information (RTI) query On November 15, 2017, the following RTI request was filed with UIDAI: “According to a newspaper report in ‘Economic Times’ […]

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Why is the Unique Identity Authority of India (UIDAI) refusing to divulge its advertising expenses? Two attempts were made recently to obtain information from UIDAI on advertising expenditure.
 
1. Right to Information (RTI) query
On November 15, 2017, the following RTI request was filed with UIDAI:
“According to a newspaper report in ‘Economic Times’ on July 12, 2014, a new agency was employed for an image makeover for Aadhaar. In this article, it is stated that such agencies were employed in the past also and the tenure of agencies empanelled earlier was over. According to the attached UIDAI documents also, such agencies were employed and some budget was allocation for such branding work.
“Please provide: 1. A List of all agencies that were empanelled since the creation of UIDAI in 2009. 2. For each agency, please provide the amount spent in each financial year.”
On January 3, 2018, the Media Division of the UIDAI denied the requested information, as follows: “The information sought by you cannot be disclosed as per the provisions mentioned in Section 8 (1)(d) and 8 (1)(j) of the Right to information Act, 2005” [8(1)(d) pertains to adversely affecting third party’s competitive position and 8(1)(j) to personal information]. 
 
2. Parliamentary question in Rajya Sabha
On 27 July, 2018, the following questions were asked (emphasis added):
(a) whether UIDAI has been hiring advertising and creative agencies for publicity and undertaking an image makeover for Aadhaar programme;
(b) if so, the details of such agencies hired since 2014 and the funds spent thereon;
(c) whether UIDAI refused to reveal the details of such agencies hired and money paid to them in an RTI response recently; and
(d) if so, the basis on which this information has been denied? 

The Minister (Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad) replied (emphasis added):
(a): Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) doesn’t hire advertising and creative agencies for image makeover for Aadhaar programme. It carries out only information, education and communication (IEC) activities in order to generate awareness and convey the benefits of the Aadhaar to the residents.
(b): Does not arise in view of (a) above.
(c) and (d): No, Sir. The replies to RTI queries are provided to the applicants as per provisions of the RTI Act, 2005.
Note: In both cases, UIDAI is evading the query. In the first instance, it invokes RTI exemptions. In the second instance, it denies that money was spent on image makeover and calls it IEC. If so, then why did it need to invoke RTI exemptions in the first instance? The fact is that UIDAI has been spending a fair amount on image make-over activities, whether one calls them IEC or something else. Why is it trying to hide these expenses?

The writer is Associate Professor of Economics in the Public Systems Group at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, currently on leave from the Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi

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UIDAI stores its helpline number on smartphones without users’ consent https://sabrangindia.in/uidai-stores-its-helpline-number-smartphones-without-users-consent/ Fri, 03 Aug 2018 11:44:23 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2018/08/03/uidai-stores-its-helpline-number-smartphones-without-users-consent/ The grave breach of privacy came to light on Thursday and even people without Aadhar cards and different phone networks have found this number pre-saved in their phonebooks.   Friday morning was a tense one for Indians as they found out that the Aadhar toll-free number crept into their phones without their knowledge. Many dialled […]

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The grave breach of privacy came to light on Thursday and even people without Aadhar cards and different phone networks have found this number pre-saved in their phonebooks.

UID
 
Friday morning was a tense one for Indians as they found out that the Aadhar toll-free number crept into their phones without their knowledge. Many dialled 1947 to find a toll-free number stored in their phonebooks under the name UIDAI in their contact list.
 
On Thursday, an anonymous digital vigilante who calls themselves a French security expert, Elliot Alderson, asked UIDAI on Twitter: “Many people, with different providers, with and without an #Aadhaar card, with and without the mAadhaar app installed, noticed that your phone number is predefined in their contact list by default without their knowledge. Can you explain why?”


 
Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) changed its original helpline number 1800-300-1947 to 1947, which got into people’s phonebooks without their consent. While public service numbers are automatically saved in smartphones, with regards to city helplines for police and emergencies, many found it suspicious that this particular number had sneaked in.
 
“UIDAI has not asked or communicated to any manufacturer or service provider for providing any such facility whatsoever. It is emphasised that the said 18003001947 is not a valid UIDAI Toll-free number and some vested interest are trying to create unwarranted confusion in the public. UIDAI has reiterated that it has not asked or advised anyone including any telecom service providers or mobile manufacturers or Android to include  18003001947 or 1947 in the default list of public service numbers,” the official Twitter handle of Aadhaar stated.
 


 
 
A Reliance Jio representative said they were immediately not aware of any such number being saved on their network and Bharti Airtel, India’s largest network operators haven’t responded on the same.
 
If the UIDAI did not ask the operators to pre-add this number in their users’ phone, who is behind this grave breach of privacy? Even people who don’t have Aadhar cards found this number added to their phonebooks. Is it a new ploy before 2019 elections to show people how unsafe EVMs are or is it the sign of a surveillance state in the offing?
 

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Aadhaar Security: The Emperor Has No Clothes https://sabrangindia.in/aadhaar-security-emperor-has-no-clothes/ Fri, 19 Jan 2018 06:08:36 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2018/01/19/aadhaar-security-emperor-has-no-clothes/ Most people assume that critics of Aadhaar are concerned about citizens’ fundamental right to privacy, or the loss of statutory benefits such as rations due to a faulty Aadhaar system.   Image Courtesy: The Financial Express   Most people assume that critics of Aadhaar are concerned about citizens’ fundamental right to privacy, or the loss […]

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Most people assume that critics of Aadhaar are concerned about citizens’ fundamental right to privacy, or the loss of statutory benefits such as rations due to a faulty Aadhaar system.

 

Image Courtesy: The Financial Express
 
Most people assume that critics of Aadhaar are concerned about citizens’ fundamental right to privacy, or the loss of statutory benefits such as rations due to a faulty Aadhaar system. Two recent cases – that reported recently by Tribune and the French security researcher reporting on the novice-level security of the mobile App of Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) – bring out a completely different threat, that of identity theft and therefore, the possibility of attacks from criminals on our bank accounts. Or linking our Aadhaar to their mobile numbers or bank accounts that are involved in criminal activities.

This issue is not simply whether the state has a right to force us to link all our economic, or other activities to our Aadhaar number. But while doing so, is it protecting us from the consequence of linking our Aadhaar number to our bank accounts, mobile numbers and other such things? Or is it laying us open to various criminal threats? Threats to our money, or even to our personal security? It is as if the state is forcing us to have combination lock for entry into our houses, then deposit the combination in a specified data bank with no security, thereby making it easy for criminals to obtain the combinations.

The Tribune reporter – as reported by Tribune and not contested by UIDAI – secured access to the entire personal data of nearly a billion Aadhaar holders by paying just Rs. 500 and within 10 minutes. According to the state authorities quoted by Tribune, there are only two people in Punjab that have the necessary security clearance to access the entire Aadhaar database. That this access was being sold for only Rs. 500, and the access provided within 10 minutes, show how seriously the Aadhaar ecosystem has been compromised.

Even UIDAI conceded that only the biometric data held in a central repository is safe. Its press statements repeatedly emphasised that this part of the Aadhaar database has not been compromised. As yet. By implication, everything else is compromised.

A French security researcher, who investigated the security in the mobile app released by UIDAI for use in our smart phones – showed how weak the security of Aadhar bases systems really is. The security expert, who calls himself Eliot Alderson and uses a twitter handle @fs0c131yJan7, showed that the security in the mAadhaar app which can be downloaded from Google Play store – to be used to provide the Aadhaar details to any service provider who uses Aadhaar based verification- was minimal. It uses code snippets widely available on the net, stores the password on the mobile, the so-called random number generator produces the same number every time. Even more embarrassingly, Khosla Labs, a private players which developed this App for UIDAI, does not seem to know how to generate a proper certificate of ownership – it showed Google and not UIDAI as the owner of this app. According to Alderson, they also appear to have lost the ability of updating their app, and are now releasing new apps in the place of the compromised one.

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The android app developed by Khosla Labs for UIDAI is officially owned by Google, as per their own certificate!

Then Aadhaar security being weak will create a risk if your mobile is lost or stolen. And yes, if you lose your mobile, you are at risk of your bank account being cleaned before you block the mobile. By itself, this risk is not to the entire community of 1 billion Aadhaar holders. It brings out the security in the Aadhaar ecosystem, as exemplified by this code from Khosla Labs, is extremely poor.

Before we think that Khosla Labs is an exception, and the Aadhaar ecosystem security may be better managed – it would be instructive to know the credentials of Khosla Labs. Its three co-founders held important positions in UIDAI – and Srikanth Nadhamuni, one of its three founders, was UIDAI’s Head of Technology.

We are not discussing conflict of interests here. Nor that Khosla Labs is one of the interveners in the Supreme Court Aadhaar case, arguing on the “immense benefits” to the nation from Aadhaar. We are simply pointing out that if an organisation that includes the former head of tech in UIDAI delivers this quality of software for its mAadhaar, how safe is the rest of the Aadhaar ecosystem?

The original vision of the Aadhaar system is that the Aadhaar number is not our identity, the ID is the biometric information that we carry in our finger tips; or our eyes. It was supposed to be our fingerprints and iris data that would verify us. The problem of using biometrics for verification are numerous: from false positives, identifying wrong persons as valid users, and false negatives to failure to verify legitimate Aadhaar holders. This on top of poor connectivity and frequent lack of electricity in our towns and villages that operate computers, the internet and the biometric devices.
Faced with such problems, the authorities decided that biometric verification would be carried out only for the poor, such as ration card holders. For the vast majority of transactions, it is the Aadhaar “card” that is being used as the ID proof. The problem here is that the entire system was supposed to be built on biometric data as ID proof and not the other card. If the Aadhaar card – a duplicate of which can be printed out by anybody for anybody – is to be used for verification, then the system is in a deep crisis. As the system was never supposed to be built using the UID number as our ID proof, that could explain the poor, or non-existent security of the Aadhaar ecosystem for any data, other than the biometric data.

We haven’t even discussed here the risk that we carry when we link our Aadhaar to our bank accounts and phone numbers. How much protection do we have against misuse and hacking by insiders? As the Airtel case showed , any company that demands an Aadhaar for verification, in this case our phone number, can get our “informed consent” by popping up a 5,000 word document asking us to click “I Agree”. Airtel fraudulently used peoples’ “consent” to open 37.21 lakh Airtel Payment bank accounts, and diverted the gas subsidy payments of the customers to these accounts without their knowledge.

The state mandated Aadhaar has created a leaky eco-system that is now a security nightmare. UIDAI is clearly scrambling to restore some credibility to the Aadhaar system after the double hits of last week. It has proposed a virtual ID scheme that can be used for authentication, as well as facial recognition. The problem is that it is too late to use virtual ID schemes. Our Aadhaar number and details, including our bank account information, is already available in databases that have low, or virtually no security. It is like locking the stable door after the horse has bolted.

Facial recognition is hardly a solution. It has failed with Google software identifying images of people with dark skins as gorillas . And Apple identifying all owners of its latest i-Phones in China as the same individual: all Chinese look alike to Apple’s software !

UIDAI has promised the Indian state and its big capital that it will deliver the data of the country’s citizens for surveillance and business purposes. It will replicate the US National Security Agency equivalent by using our Aadhaar data; provide big data of its citizens to combat Google and Facebook; enable financial transactions to Indian fintech companies and banks. All of this on a very weak and shaky foundation.

For those familiar with failing software projects, there is a now sense of desperation in the UIDAI’s responses: from shooting the messenger – filing FIR against Tribune – to clutching at straws. All the measures it is proposing do not address the fundamental issue of a hugely compromised Aadhaar security system, built with public money, and at a huge cost. Can we now take a hard look at whether the Aadhaar project can actually deliver what it has promised? And scale back the Aadhaar project on which we not only continue to throw more money, after the money we have already invested, and more over create huge risks to our citizens? And perhaps to our economy itself?

Courtesy: Newsclick.in

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Aadhaar: The Lies and The Realities… https://sabrangindia.in/aadhaar-lies-and-realities/ Mon, 21 Mar 2016 05:38:50 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2016/03/21/aadhaar-lies-and-realities/   The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016 has been passed in Lok Sabha. What does this Bill mean for people and what does it entail? Aadhaar, the 12-digit individual identification number issued by the Unique Identification Authority of India on behalf of the Government of India, is […]

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The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016 has been passed in Lok Sabha. What does this Bill mean for people and what does it entail? Aadhaar, the 12-digit individual identification number issued by the Unique Identification Authority of India on behalf of the Government of India, is projected as a proof of one’s address and other important details. Aadhaar relies on the biometric information of the person, including iris recognition and fingerprints. By giving a statutory backing to Aadhaar, the government intends to provide subsidies and other benefits to individuals residing in the country. While the BJP government believes that such a move will prevent the leakage of subsidies, there are stiff opposition to this move. Finance Minister Arun Jailtey presented the Aadhaar Bill as a Money Bill in the Lok Sabha on March 3, 2016, a move that put a huge question mark over the intentions of the government.

Newsclick interviewed Prof. R.Ramakumar of the Tata Institute of Social Sciences to understand the politics and controversy behind the Bill. According to Prof. Ramakumar, the move by the government to introduce the bill as a money bill is an attempt to destroy the federal fabric of the Indian constitution.

 

Courtesy: Newsclick

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