Bernard Lewis, the influential British-American historian and Middle East scholar, played a pivotal role in shaping Western imperial attitudes toward Islam. His influence stretched far beyond academia, into the very heart of U.S. foreign policy. His counsel underpinned the American strategy of weaponising radicalised Islam for geopolitical ends, beginning with the Afghan-Soviet war.

Under this policy, the U.S. directly funded extremist literature and helped establish madrassas across Pakistan and Afghanistan to indoctrinate young Muslim men—drawn from over 35 countries—with a weaponised theology. Once trained, these fighters joined the CIA-backed jihad against the Soviets. When the war ended, they returned home, not to peace, but to disseminate their radicalised ideology further afield.

Yet even as Lewis helped construct the “radical Muslim” archetype, he also shaped its foil: the “good Muslim.” This ideal Muslim, according to Lewis, is a pacifist, apolitical, and docile figure—more cultural than religious, more mystical than legalistic. In this dual construction, Muslims were split into two essentialised camps: one to fight imperial battles, the other to legitimise imperial presence.

The Conference That Said It All

In a 2003 conference hosted by the Nixon Centre titled “Understanding Sufism and Its Potential Role in U.S. Policy,” Lewis openly championed Sufism—not for its theology or ethics, but because, in his words, it “reflects something more than tolerance” and holds that “all religions are basically the same.” In other words, it can be co-opted.

Sufi scholar Hesham Kabbani joined Lewis at the event, enthusiastically presenting Sufism as a depoliticised, non-threatening “social force.” He assured the audience—made up of Homeland Security officials and neoconservative hawks—that Sufis “never seek leadership” but serve as “social workers.” It was a performance for the empire, tailored to reassure Washington that there exists an Islam that does not resist.

But this was a gross erasure. Figures like Salahuddin Ayyubi, Umar Futi Tal, Abdul Qādir al-Jaza’iri, and Idris as-Senussi were Sufis—and they led political revolts, commanded armies, ruled states. Even within Kabbani’s own Naqshbandi lineage, the Jaysh Rijāl al-Ṭarīqa al-Naqshbandiyya was formed in Baghdad to fight the American invasion of Iraq. To erase these legacies is to rewrite history at the feet of power.

The Liberal-Orientalist Love Affair with Sufism

The romanticisation of Sufism by Western scholars is not innocent. Nineteenth and twentieth-century Orientalists and Islamicists—such as Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Fazlur Rahman, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, H.A.R. Gibb, and Annemarie Schimmel—created a scholarly framework that equated mysticism with moderation.

Schimmel herself admitted the absurdity of this selective love. “A good Sufi,” she once remarked, “should follow the shariah and all that it entails.” But the Western fascination with Rumi, Ibn Arabi, and the “whirling dervishes” consistently detaches their mysticism from their Islamic orthodoxy. This detachment implies that Sufism flourished in spite of Islam’s rigidity, rather than as an organic expression of it.

Tomoko Masuzawa warns that this portrayal is racialised: Islam becomes Arab, rigid, Semitic; Sufism becomes Aryan, gentle, European. Otto Pfleiderer, a German Orientalist, typified this racial dichotomy by treating Islam as tribal and inferior while elevating Sufism as universal and transcendent. This project—consciously or not—fed into a sanitised, de-Islamised, “Islam Lite” acceptable to the empire.

Manufacturing Consent for Genocide

In Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, Mahmood Mamdani critiques this binary construction. “Good Muslims” are cast as secular, apolitical, spiritual-but-not-religious liberals. They advocate gender equality, nonviolence, and Western-style democracy. They vote Democrat. “Bad Muslims” are political, militant, and resistant to imperialism.

This binary fuels military invasions, drone strikes, black sites, surveillance states, and genocides. It is not a cultural misunderstanding—it is a colonial strategy.

The primary architect of the “Islamic terrorism” narrative is none other than Benjamin Netanyahu, who has long sought to manufacture global consent for the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Lebanon, and Palestine bear the bloody consequences of this myth.

In this context, the imperial co-optation of Sufism is not about spirituality. It is about subjugation. It is the creation of a religious subclass willing to bless bombs and normalisation deals in exchange for visas, conferences, funding, and think-tank prestige. Today’s polished collaborators—Abdullah Bin Bayyah, Hamza Yusuf, and others backed by the UAE or U.S. State Department—have become handpicked enablers of a compliant Islam, weaponised against its more resistant, justice-oriented forms.

The Two-Faced Strategy: Wahhabis and Sufis

The imperial project thrives on contradiction. It is no surprise that both “Sufi Islam” and “Wahhabi Islam” are weaponised in tandem. These two projected as opposite poles—spiritual and severe—are manipulated to serve the same master. One is used to fight wars; the other to suppress dissent.

A legion of intellectually colonised Muslims makes this task easier by parroting imperial talking points in the name of peace, tradition, or “saving Islam.” They forget that it was the U.S., in alliance with Saudi Arabia, that funded Wahhabi madrasas to radicalise Muslim youth for its Cold War proxy battles. And yet, in the same breath, the U.S. hails Saudi Arabia—a hub of Wahhabism—as a key ally, while demonising Iran, a country with deep Sufi intellectual traditions.

Iran = evil. Saudi = friend. The absurdity is the point.

This is not a war of ideologies. It is a war of obedience. It’s not theology that divides “good” from “bad” Muslims—it’s loyalty.

Collaboration is Not Neutral

The “good Muslim” trope does not merely flatter collaborators—it provides ideological cover for genocide. Whether the branding is “Sufi Islam,” “plain vanilla Islam,” or “civilised Islam,” the core objective is control. The desire to pacify Islam, to regulate it, to make it safe for the empire, is what drives the violence, not Islam itself.

The Abraham Accords, CVE programs, Patriot Act, and Muslim Ban—across Republican and Democrat administrations—prove one thing: both sides weaponise “good Islam” to suppress resistance. Under Trump’s renewed presidency, expect more glossy initiatives promoting “peaceful Islam,” “Sufi moderation,” and “Muslim societies for progress.” These are not spiritual efforts. They are tools of colonial management.

Even the most well-meaning Sufi today must ask: have we been used? Has our spiritual tradition become a fig leaf for empire? Does our silence—or selective condemnation—manufacture consent for war?

Conclusion: The Real Struggle

Whether post-9/11 or post-October 7th, the game remains the same: pit Muslims against one another. Regulate the religion. Exalt one version. Exterminate the other.

But the consequences are not theoretical. In Gaza today, the “bad Muslims” being exterminated include poets, doctors, mothers, fathers, and children.

The tragedy is not just in bombs or policies. It is in the Muslim collaborators who, eager for Western approval, have chosen seats at imperial tables over solidarity with the oppressed. This is not just moral failure—it is complicity in genocide.

It is time to repent. To cease performing “good Islam” for the empire. To reclaim Islam—not as a set of talking points for think tanks—but as a living tradition of justice, resistance, and truth.

—–

مسلمانوں کو مسخر کرنے کے لیے تصوف اور وہابیت کو ہتھیار بنانا

مصنف: نصیر احمد

(مندرجہذیلتحریر،فرحالشریفکےمضمون: “اسلاملائٹکیتیاری: صوفیازمبطور ‘اچھااسلام’: ‘اچھےمسلمان’ بمقابلہ ‘برےمسلمان’ کیسیاستکسطرحنسلکشیکےلیےرضامندیپیداکرتیہے” کاخلاصہاورترمیمشدہورژنہے۔اصلمضمونیہاںپڑھاجاسکتاہے۔)

“اچھےاسلام” کیپیدائش

برنارڈلیوس،برطانوی-امریکیمؤرخاورمشرقوسطیٰکےاسکالر،نےمغربیسامراجیسوچمیںاسلامکےبارےمیںگہرااثرڈالا۔انکیآراءصرفعلمیمیدانتکمحدودنہرہیں،بلکہامریکیخارجہپالیسیپربھیاثراندازہوئیں۔انکیرہنمائیمیںامریکہنے “ریڈیکلاسلام” کوجیوپولیٹیکلمقاصدکےلیےایکہتھیاربنایا،جسکیشروعاتافغان-سوویتجنگسےہوئی۔

اسپالیسیکےتحتامریکہنےشدتپسنداسلامیلٹریچرکیمالیمعاونتکیاورپاکستانوافغانستانمیںمدارسقائمکیےجہاں 35 سےزائدممالکسےآئےنوجوانوںکوعسکرینظریاتسکھائےگئے۔تربیتکےبعد،یہمجاہدین CIA کےزیراثرسوویتوںکےخلافجہادمیںشاملہوگئے۔جنگختمہونےکےبعد،یہلوگامنکےساتھواپسنہیںلوٹےبلکہشدتپسندنظریاتکومزیدپھیلایا۔

برنارڈلیوسنےجہاں “شدتپسندمسلمان” کاخاکہبنایا،وہیں “اچھےمسلمان” کاتصوربھیانہینےپیشکیا۔انکےمطابق،مثالیمسلمانایکپرامن،غیرسیاسی،اورمطیعشخصیتہے—جسکیشناختمذہبسےزیادہثقافت،اورقانونسےزیادہروحانیتپرمبنیہے۔اسطرحمسلمانوںکودوخانوںمیںبانٹدیاگیا: ایکوہجوسامراجیجنگیںلڑے،دوسراوہجوسامراجیتسلطکوجائزقراردے۔

وہکانفرنسجسنےسبکچھواضحکردیا

2003 میںنِکسنسینٹرمیںمنعقدہ “صوفیازماورامریکیپالیسیمیںاسکاممکنہکردار” کےعنوانسےایککانفرنسمیں،لیوسنےصوفیازمکیحمایتکی—نہکہاسکیروحانیتیااخلاقیاتکیوجہسے،بلکہاسلیےکہاسمیں “برداشتسےزیادہ” کیعکاسیہےاوریہکہ “تماممذاہببنیادیطورپرایکجیسےہیں۔” یعنیاسےسامراجیمقاصدکےلیےاستعمالکیاجاسکتاہے۔

اسموقعپرصوفیاسکالر،شیخہشامقبانینےبھیصوفیازمکوغیرسیاسی،بےضرر “سوشلفورس” کےطورپرپیشکیا۔انہوںنےحاضرین—جنمیںہوملینڈسیکیورٹیکےاہلکاراورنیو-کنزرویٹونظریہدانشاملتھے—کویقیندلایاکہصوفی “کبھیقیادتکےطلبگارنہیںہوتے” بلکہ “سوشلورکرز” کاکرداراداکرتےہیں۔یہسامراجکےلیےایکپرفارمنستھی—ایکایسااسلامپیشکرناجومزاحمتنہکرے۔

لیکنیہتاریخکومسخکرناہے۔صلاحالدینایوبی،عمرفوتیتال،عبدالقادرالجزائری،ادریسالسنوسی—all صوفیتھے—اوروہسیاسیرہنما،سپہسالار،اورحکمرانبھیتھے۔یہاںتککہقبانیکےاپنےنقشبندیسلسلےمیںبھی،بغدادمیں “جیشرجالالطریقةالنقشبندیہ” کاقیامامریکیحملےکےخلافہواتھا۔انتاریخیحقائقکومٹاناطاقتکےسامنےجھکنےکےمترادفہے۔

لبرل-مستشرقینکاصوفیازمسےرومانیتعلق

صوفیازمکومغربیاسکالرزکیجانبسےرومانویتکالبادہپہنانامحضاتفاقنہیں۔انیسویںاوربیسویںصدیکےمستشرقیناوراسلامیاسکالرز—جیسےولفرڈکینٹویلاسمتھ،فضلالرحمٰن،سیدحسیننصر،گیب،اورانیمیریشمل—نےایکایساعلمیڈھانچہقائمکیاجسمیںتصوفکواعتدالپسندیسےجوڑاگیا۔

شملنےخوداستضادکوتسلیمکیا: “ایکاچھاصوفیوہہوتاہےجوشریعتکیمکملپیرویکرتاہے۔” لیکنمغربمیںرومی،ابنعربی،اوردرویشوںکیچکرداررقصکوانکیاسلامیسختیسےالگکرکےپیشکیاجاتاہے۔جیسےیہصوفیازماسلامکیسختیکےباوجودپنپا،حالانکہیہاسلامکےاندرہیایکروحانیاظہارہے۔

ٹوموکوماسوزاواخبردارکرتیہیںکہیہپیشکشنسلپرستانہہے: اسلامکوعربی،سخت،سامیقراردیاجاتاہے؛جبکہصوفیازمکوآریائی،نرم،یورپیسمجھاجاتاہے۔جرمنمستشرقاوٹوفلیڈررنےاسلامکوقبائلیاورکمتر،اورصوفیازمکوآفاقیواعلیٰبناکرپیشکیا۔یہمنصوبہ،شعورییاغیرشعوریطورپر،ایکایسا “اسلاملائٹ” تیارکرتاہےجوسامراجکوقابلقبولہو۔

نسلکشیکےلیےرضامندیکیتیاری

“گڈمسلم،بیڈمسلم” میںمحمودمامدانیاستقسیمپرتنقیدکرتےہیں۔ “اچھےمسلمان” کوسیکولر،غیرسیاسی،روحانیمگرغیرمذہبی،اورلبرلدکھایاجاتاہے—جوصنفیمساوات،عدمتشدد،اورمغربیجمہوریتکیحمایتکرتاہے۔ “برےمسلمان” سیاسی،مزاحمتیاورعسکریہوتےہیں۔

یہتصورہیفوجیجارحیت،ڈرونحملوں،بلیکسائٹس،نگرانی،اورنسلکشیکوجوازفراہمکرتاہے۔یہثقافتیغلطفہمینہیں—بلکہایکسامراجیحکمتعملیہے۔

“اسلامیدہشتگردی” کابیانیہبنانےوالےبڑےمعمار،بنیامیننیتنیاہوہیں،جنہوںنےفلسطینیوںکینسلیصفائیکےلیےعالمیحمایتحاصلکرنےکیکوششکی۔عراق،افغانستان،شام،یمن،سوڈان،لبنان،اورفلسطین—سباسجھوٹکیقیمتاداکررہےہیں۔

ایسےمیںصوفیازمکواپناناروحانیتنہیں،غلامیہے—ایکایساطبقہپیداکرناجوبموںاورنارملائزیشنڈیلزپربرکتدے،بدلےمیںویزے،فنڈنگ،اوراسٹیٹڈپارٹمنٹکیتعریفحاصلکرے۔آجکے “پالششدہ” معاونین—عبداللہبنبیہ،حمزہیوسفاوردیگر—سامراجکےلیےمنتخبکردہاسلامکےپرچارکبنچکےہیں،جومزاحمتیاسلامکودبانےکاذریعہہیں۔

دوہراہتھیار: وہابیاورصوفیاسلام

سامراجیمنصوبہتضاداتپرپلتاہے۔اسیلیےایکہیوقتمیں “صوفیاسلام” اور “وہابیاسلام” کوہتھیاربنایاجاتاہے۔ایکروحانی،دوسراسختگیر—لیکندونوںسامراجکیخدمتمیںہیں۔ایکجنگیںلڑتاہے،دوسرامزاحمتکودباتاہے۔

ایکپورینسل،جوذہنیطورپرغلامبنچکیہے،سامراجیبیانیےکو “امن”، “روایت” یا “اسلامکوبچانے” کےنامپردہراتیہے۔وہبھولجاتےہیںکہوہابیمدارسکوسبسےپہلےامریکہاورسعودیعربنےملکرفنڈکیاتھاتاکہسردجنگکیپراکسیجنگوںکےلیےنوجوانوںکوانتہاپسندبنایاجاسکے۔

اورپھروہیامریکہسعودیعربکودوست،اورایران—جسکاصوفیروایتمیںگہرامقامہے—کودشمنقراردیتاہے۔

ایران = بُرا۔سعودی = اچھا۔
یہتضادہیاصلکھیلہے۔

یہنظریاتکیجنگنہیں،فرمانبرداریکیجنگہے۔ “اچھے” اور “برے” مسلمانوںکیتقسیمکادارومدارعقیدےپرنہیں،وفاداریپرہے۔

“تعاون” غیرجانبدارنہیں

“اچھےمسلمان” کابیانیہصرفخوشامدنہیں،بلکہنسلکشیکونظریاتیکورمہیاکرتاہے۔چاہےنامہو “صوفیاسلام”، “سادہاسلام” یا “مہذباسلام”—اصلمقصدکنٹرولہے۔اسلامکوتابع،قابلِانتظام،اورسامراجکےلیےمحفوظبناناہیاصلہدفہے۔

ابراہیمیمعاہدے، CVE پروگرامز،پیٹریاٹایکٹ،اورمسلمبین—ریپبلکنیاڈیموکریٹ،دونوں “اچھےاسلام” کومزاحمتکچلنےکےلیےاستعمالکرتےہیں۔ٹرمپکیواپسیکےساتھ، “پرامناسلام” یا “صوفیاعتدال” جیسےمنصوبےدوبارہسامنےآئیںگے—یہروحانینہیں،نوآبادیاتیاوزارہیں۔

آجکاہرسچاصوفیخودسےپوچھے:
کیاہمیںاستعمالکیاجارہاہے؟
کیاہماریروحانیروایتسامراجکےلیےپردہبنچکیہے؟
کیاہماریخاموشی—یاچُنکرکیگئیمذمت—جنگوںکےلیےرضامندیپیداکررہیہے؟

نتیجہ: اصلجدوجہد

چاہے 9/11 کےبعدہویا 7 اکتوبرکےبعد،کھیلوہیہے: مسلمانوںکوآپسمیںلڑاؤ،مذہبکوکنٹرولکرو،ایکشکلکوعظیمبناؤ،دوسریکومٹادو۔

مگرنتائجصرفنظریاتینہیں—آجغزہمیںجو “برےمسلمان” مارےجارہےہیں،وہشاعر،ڈاکٹر،مائیں،باپ،اوربچےہیں۔

سانحہصرفبموںیاپالیسیوںمیںنہیں—بلکہانمسلمانوںمیںہےجومغربیخوشنودیکےلیےسامراجیمیزوںپربیٹھنےکوترجیحدیتےہیں۔یہصرفاخلاقیناکامینہیں—بلکہنسلکشیمیںشراکتداریہے۔

ابوقتہےتوبہکا۔
ابوقتہے “اچھااسلام” پیشکرنےکیاداکاریبندکرنےکا۔
اسلامکودوبارہاپنالو—بطورایکزندہروایت،جوعدل،مزاحمت،اورسچائیکاعلمبردارہو۔

—–

A frequent contributor to NewAgeIslam.com, Naseer Ahmed is an independent researcher and Quran-centric thinker whose work bridges faith, reason, and contemporary knowledge systems. Through a method rooted in intra-Quranic analysis and scientific coherence, the author has offered ground-breaking interpretations that challenge traditional dogma while staying firmly within the Quran’s framework.

His work represents a bold, reasoned, and deeply reverent attempt to revive the Quran’s message in a language the modern world can test and trust.

The following is a summarised and edited version of: “Manufacturing ‘Islam Lite’: Sufism as ‘Good Islam’: How the politics of ‘Good Muslim’ vs. ‘Bad Muslim’ manufactures consent for genocide” by Farah El-Sharif. Read the original here.

First Published on newageislam.com

The post Weaponising Sufism and Wahhabism to Subjugate Muslims appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Indian Muslim woman Shagufta Sayyd prays in Mumbai, India. AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool

The Trump administration has been using the phrase “radical Islam” when discussing the “war on terror.” From his inauguration address to remarks to military leaders, President Trump has been warning against “Islamic terrorists.”

Many different kinds of individuals and movements get collapsed into this category of radical Islam. A common one that is increasingly being used by politicians and journalists both in Europe and the U.S. to equate with “radical Islam” is the Salafist tradition.

For example, Michael Flynn, who recently resigned as national security advisor, was clear that what unites terrorists is their belief in the “ideology” of Salafism. Sebastian Gorka, deputy assistant to the president, also describes Salafism as a “fundamental understanding of Islam” that justifies terrorism.

France and Germany are targeting this movement, vowing to “clean up” or shut down Salafist mosques, since several arrested and suspected terrorists had spent time in these communities.

As a scholar of religion and politics, I have done research in Salafi communities, specifically in France and India, two countries where Muslims are the largest religious minorities.

Salafists constitute a minority of the Muslim population. For example, in France, estimates range from 5,000 to 20,000 – out of a Muslim population of over 4 million. Security experts estimate a worldwide number of 50 million out of 1.6 billion Muslims.

But there’s not much understanding of Salafism, its history and its diversity. In fact, Muslims themselves often have different definitions of what it means to be a Salafist.
So, who are Salafists?

Origins of Salafism

The Arabic term salaf means “ancestors.” It refers technically to the first three generations of Muslims who surrounded the Prophet Muhammad. Because they had direct experience with the original Islamic teachings and practices, they are generally respected across the Muslim world.

Self-identified Salafists tend to believe they are simply trying to emulate the path of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. This might include an array of practices from dress to culinary habits as well as ethical teachings and commitment to faith.

Salafism as a movement is believed to have originated in the 19th and 20th centuries. Some historians claim it started as a theological reform movement within Sunni Islam. The impetus was to return to the original teachings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad and the Quran – a consequence, in part, of social changes and Western colonialism.

They specifically cite the works of Egyptian, Persian and Syrian intellectuals from the 19th century as shaping Salafist movements. One recent study, however, argues that these intellectuals from the past never even used the term Salafism. In other words, there is no authoritative account of how or when exactly this movement originated.

Finally, it is also open to debate as to which Islamic groups, schools of thought and practices may be considered Salafist. This is because groups and individuals who are labeled Salafist do not always view themselves this way. And they disagree amongst each other over what defines authentic Salafist practice.

Here’s what my research shows

The vast majority of people who loosely affiliate with Salafism, however, are either simply nonpolitical or actively reject politics as morally corrupt. From 2005-2014, I spent a total of two years as an ethnographic researcher in the cities of Lyon, in southeastern France, and in Hyderabad, in south India. I clearly observed this among these two communities.

Every week I participated in mosque lessons and Islamic study circles among dozens of Salafist women. These communities maintain strict separation between men and women, but I was able to interact with and interview a few men as well.

Based on conversations and observation, I learned that they actually avoided politics. They did not attend protests or do advocacy, and in Lyon many did not vote in elections.

It is the case that there are Muslim women, including many converts, who actively embrace Salafism. They take up strict forms of veiling and work hard to practice their religion every day.

Let’s take Amal, a 22-year-old woman who grew up in a working-class neighborhood in southeastern France. I met her during my time as an ethnographic researcher on Muslim minorities in France. Amal identifies with the Salafist tradition in Islam. And if we go by the definitions being floated around, she would be considered a “radical Muslim”: She prayed five times daily, fasted all 30 days of Ramadan, and wore the “jilbab,” a loose, full-body garment that covers everything but the face. Steadfast in her religiosity, she also studied the Quran regularly and attended local mosques in the area.

She worked hard to live her life in accordance with the ethical teachings of Islam. This included spending part of her week tutoring Muslim girls in the neighborhood who homeschooled. Amal worried a great deal about their futures in France, since anti-veiling legislation had constrained their opportunities. She also quietly worried about the future of Islam, believing it is under siege both by governments and by the ungodly and destructive work of the Islamic State.

Religious does not mean radical

As anthropologists of religion have shown, Salafi women are not passive adherents. Nor are they forced into strict practices by their husbands. Still, this doesn’t mean they’re all the same.

Among the French Salafist women I knew, most were the daughters and granddaughters of immigrants from the former French North African colonies. Almost a third were converts to Islam that chose specifically the Salafist tradition as opposed to mainstream currents of Islam. They were drawn to the clear expectations, rigorous routines and teachings about trusting God.

While some of the women were raised in religious families, many broke away from their Muslim families or earned the wrath of their parents for turning to Salafism. Because the parents practiced a cultural form of Islam, or did not practice at all, they did not want their daughters to wear the jilbab. Despite this disapproval, the women focused a great deal on what it meant to have faith in God, and they emphasized that they had to continually struggle to strengthen that faith.

These struggles included various ethical behaviors including not talking too much, suppressing one’s ego and respecting people’s privacy. Along the way, some committed “sins,” like smoking or lying, and deviated from the teachings by not praying or fasting. Some even doubted their faith, which they considered normal and acceptable.

In my research, non-Muslims as well as other Muslims claimed Salafists were judgmental of those who did not believe or practice like them. In my observation, the contrary was the case: Salafis emphasized that one’s faith and piety were deeply private matters that no one but God had the right to judge.

Diverse views

However, like any movement or tradition, Salafism is profoundly diverse and encompasses a number of debates and struggles for legitimacy.

So, there are those self-identified Salafists around the world who join political organizations or participate in political debates. These include, for example, several political parties in Egypt and the Ahl-i-Hadees in India.

A small minority, estimated to be 250,000 in number by security experts, rejects nation-states and embraces political violence. They span continents but are centered in Iraq and Syria.

Different from Wahhabism

In today’s climate, however, it has become a political term. This is partly because of its connection to Saudi Arabia.

Salafism is sometimes referred to as Wahhabism, the Saudi Arabian variant of the movement that is intimately tied to the Saudi regime. They share some intellectual roots and theological emphases, but they also differ, especially in how they approach Islamic jurisprudence. While Wahhabis follow one of the main Sunni orthodox schools of law, Salafis tend to think through legal questions independently. So equating the two is a mistake.

For some Salafists, labeling them as Wahhabi is a way to dismiss their faith or even insult them. Identifying with Salafism does not mean one supports the politics of the Saudi state. In my research, in both India and France, people sometimes noted concerns about the Saudi government’s political corruption or human rights record.

Yet outwardly, practices might overlap. For example, many Salafist women wear the niqab (that covers the face). Saudi intellectual centers and sheikhs provide literature and training in numerous countries. They circulate lectures as well as money for building mosques and schools.

And of course, Mecca and Medina are the spiritual centers for Muslims more broadly. In this way there is a transfer of intellectual and spiritual resources from Saudi Arabia that supports Salafist communities around the globe.

Avoiding stereotypes, assumptions

Why is it important to recognize the complexity and diversity of the Salafist movement?

It is true that as one part of the global Islamic revival, it appears to be growing. And it likely will remain part of the social landscape in a number of cities for the foreseeable future.

But, it is important not to assume that people’s religious faith and practices are the same as terrorist violence. It fuels fear and hatred – like the kind that inspired the recent shootings at the mosque in Quebec or the arson attack that burned down a mosque in Texas.

So, from my perspective, when we hear politicians warn us of the “global Salafi threat,” or if we see a woman like Amal walking down the street in her jilbab, it’s vital to remember the dangers of simplistic (and mistaken) stereotypes of “radical Muslims.”

(Z. Fareen Parvez is Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Massachusetts Amherst).

This article was first published on The Conversation. The original article may be read here.
 

The post Who exactly are ‘radical’ Muslims? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

It is rather rich of Zakir Naik to write an Open Letter to the government about his perceived sense of persecution at the hands of Indian authorities.

As I have written in previously, every person including Zakir Naik should be probed within the due process of law. To create conditions in which he is forced to live outside India without a clinching evidence is hardly excusable. That he is followed by thousands of Muslims who have not become terrorists is proof enough that there is a complex set of causative factors behind every act of terror. A complex phenomenon such as terrorism should not be simplified as the result of the teaching and sermons of some individual.

Zakir Naik’s letter however goes further. It accuses the government of the day of selectively targeting Muslims. Zakir Naik becomes the victim within this narrative by becoming one of the 170 million of India’s Muslims.
The problem starts right here. A majority of Muslims here are poor and uneducated and mostly do not have a voice. On comparison, Zakir Naik owns a million-dollar enterprise and has a powerful lobby fighting for his defence. How then can he compare himself with the average Indian Muslim?

Moreover, Zakir Naik speaks openly against the religious practice of the majority of Indian Muslims. He has accused them of being open to polytheism and not following the correct tenets of Islam. How then does he become one of them? Clearly his ideas about Islam is much at variance with that of the majority of Indian Muslims. And that’s precisely the reason why he cannot represent the majority of Indian Muslims. For almost all major schools of Islam in India, barring Salafi-Wahhabi-Ahl-e-Hadeesi, Zakir Naik represents something other than Islam; in fact, the majority even refuse to certify him as a religious scholar.

It sounds patently hypocritical when Zakir Naik talks about ‘murder of democracy’ and violation of ‘fundamental rights’. Of course, all this is peppered by the undertone of ‘justice’ which he argues has been denied in his case. Talking in terms of democracy and rights would almost make Zakir Naik a believer in these secular ideas. However, all his own speeches and conduct have belied this.

A person who sings praises for the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, accepts their hospitality and prize is now talking about democracy and human rights. Why didn’t he remember them when the Saudis gave him millions to promote their ideology of Islamism?

A person who sings praises for the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, accepts their hospitality and prize is now talking about democracy and human rights. Why didn’t he remember them when the Saudis gave him millions to promote their ideology of Islamism? As a champion of democracy, why did he accept Saudi money when it is well documented that there are flagrant violations of all kinds of rights in that kingdom. What kind of democracy is he talking about when his mentor hangs and stones people for petty crimes in full public view?

There cannot be any doubt that Zakir Naik is talking about democracy and rights without even believing an iota in these concepts. After all, didn’t his Islamist predecessors argue that democracy was a system of men and what they wanted was to bring the system of God? Has Zakir Naik all of a sudden turned secular when confronted with man-made laws?

In the same letter, Zakir Naik argues that he is promoting peace and harmony in society through developing an understanding of Islam. Again, he probably knows that this is not the case. Through his erroneous understanding of the text, he has created newer religious schisms within the Muslim society so much so that there was a fatwa against him. If he cannot create harmony even within Muslim society, then heaven only knows how he is going to create peace and harmony within the Indian society. His sermons actually have the opposite effect: of promoting enmity between different religious groups in society.

If one is hell bent on arguing that Islam is the best religion in the world and that polytheism of the Hindus is a backward and deplorable religious worldview, then how does this promote peace and tolerance? If he continues to justify that Islam alone is the saviour of world, then how does this promote peace and mutual respect? Calling such sermons of a third rate pedant as dialogue militates against the very idea of a dialogical plural world. Zakir Naik is not interested in dialogue: he is a fascist demagogue who wants the entire world to convert to his point of view.

His hypocrisy on democracy begins to unravel the minute he takes recourse to the Quran. There are many passages within the text to cite in terms of pluralism and tolerance. But to quote the verse which tells Muslims to be patient and wait for their eventual victory over the polytheists is perhaps too much. This is not a man who is a believer in the virtues of secular laws like democracy. This is a man who wants to unfurl the Islamic flag everywhere, demean and trounce all other religious traditions. The recourse to democracy and the language of rights are only a means to an end: that of establishing the supremacy of Islam.

(Arshad Alam is a NewAgeIslam.com columnist).

This article was first published on NewAgeIslam.

The post Zakir Naik’s Open letter: Democrat or an Islamo-Fascist Demagogue? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Image: AFP

Very soon after Professor Rezaul Karim Siddque of Rajshahi Univeristy was hacked to death in the morning of April 23, 2016, I wrote my feelings, my frustrations, my concerns and my fears. From all the information we received, Professor Karim appeared to be a quiet man, a man who was of a peaceful nature, a lover of music and a committed teacher. As is the case with most Bangalis, he loved music. Cultural activities were in his bloodstream. He tried to, or did set up a cultural hub in his home, where he lived, not too far from the University where he taught.

He was not a declared atheist, nor a blogger, not even an armchair or facebook activist. Not one of the usual argumentative Bangalis, the usual picture of the intellectual. Not one of those who were in the frontlines of activism, not a talk show star, not one who wrote long opinions and editorials about the state of affairs of the country.  Why would he be killed?

We read from the reports that we get from all the different forms of media that exists, that he was what I often describe as the typical example of a citizen of this land, the kind of people I grew up with, secular in his thinking by encouraging culture, music, playing his favourite sitar, reading books, yet sensitive and responsive to the practice of religion of the people he lived amongst, his family perhaps, certainly his neighbours. We heard of his large donations to the building of the local mosque as a proof of this perception. His daughter has been very vehement in stating that he was a believer. 

I find it very telling on our current state of affairs that we have to insist that we are all believers. Why should it matter? A murder is a murder and a gruesome murder has to be taken in all seriousness no matter what one’s beliefs are or where one stands.

I find it very telling on our current state of affairs that we have to insist that we are all believers. Why should it matter? A murder is a murder and a gruesome murder has to be taken in all seriousness no matter what one’s beliefs are or where one stands. We all grew up learning to sing, dance, play an instrument, and write poetry, recite etc. Where else do we find that recitation is considered a part of cultural practice, a part of the performing arts? Was his fault that he embodied this very nature of the Bangali? Was he murdered so brutally simply to be used as an example of what not to be? Was he simply targeted because he embodied the very spirit of 1952, of 1971 in the quiet nature of his being?

The message that appears to come out is that it is perfectly alright to machete and hack to death an atheist, because she/he questions the very basis and beliefs of a believer. That a believer only implies not just one religion Islam, but also does not allow all the different schools/mazhabs, sects, trends within Islam to continue to exist.

No sooner than this murder shocked us, we heard of the brutal killing on the evening of April 25, of Xulhaz Mannan and Mahbub Rabbi Tonoy at Xulhaz’s house at Kalabagan, a crowded locality in central Dhaka. Xulhaz was very well known in the activists’ community. He co-founded the LGBT magazine, Roopban which tried to bring forth many issues and concerns along with talking about the rights of Bangladesh’s Gay community. People were in tears when I called to find out and be sure. I had not seen such a reaction before amongst a varied and large range of people from so many ages and walks of life, people who normally do not associate with each other. These were people he interacted with or touched, through his gentle nature in wanting a multicultural and diverse Bangladesh. A Bangladesh that would allow all people, of all faiths, beliefs, orientation, identities and occupations to live and flourish without fear.

He was truly fearless, he never felt threatened nor did he feel the need to leave his country, not continue to do what he believed. He had the option, which he never thought of using. He took responsibility to care for his frail and ailing mother, in front of whom he was brutally killed. How would he give others the strength, if he was not with them, if he left?  At least that is what I have been told by all who knew him well, that is what I felt in the little interactions I have had with him.

I last spoke to him on Pohela Boishakh when I heard four gay people had been held at the Shahbagh Thana. I had asked if he needed me. He was quite clear he could handle it and said that they would be released soon. That was the last I spoke to him. His friend Tonoy was a theatre activist.  Both could instill in people confidence and courage, what many people who are marginalised always experience as insecurities, but through their talk, instead they succeeded in giving them a feeling of strength and a sense of faith in themselves as they are, as they wish to be. Many spoke to me yesterday and today, how these two young men managed to dispel the idea of living in constant fear after they spoke to each person who felt threatened.  So why should they get killed?  They were not hurting anyone, they were not using any kind of coercion or violence to force their position on others?  On the contrary they tried to let everyone have the chance to express their views.   

Xulhaz’s house was a haven for people who felt the need to be comforted, to feel strong, to feel wanted.   Neither of the two very recent incidents where such gentle people were killed showed that those killed ever thought that one has to use machetes, knives, daggers, guns to spread an ideology or a belief or a life style, to express one’s rights as a citizen, to instill fear through force and venom, to take away lives to perpetuate a belief?  Surely no rational or intelligent person can ever believe that it is only through fear and force that ideology could be established and followed.  That analysis is so flawed it is beyond comprehension.  But, unfortunately in the name of ideology, in the name of religion, this is sanctioned. How contradictory can one get?  Either passively or tacitly by not acting or by deliberately pandering to this kind of action, by giving into the fear factor or by being brain washed, this kind of violence and intolerance is exactly what is being propagated.

Those feeling outraged at this barbarism are asked that one should be careful not to hurt the sentiment of the believers? Whose sentiment are we talking about? Which believers? The misogynists,  communalists who preach and breed obscurantism, a group financially strong, having the backing of the powers that be, misrepresenting and misquoting for their own vested interests.

The list of people killed during this last almost seventeen months is long. We have no idea of how long or how fast will this situation spread all over the country, before it can be stopped? Of course the question asked time and again, can we see signs that there are serious intentions to stop this?  The confusing and sometimes contradictory statements given by those in the Government certainly do not give any sense that the Government has any intention to act to suppress this.  In fact their statements are often to the contrary and seem to be given to appease the killers.  It is randomly and broadly stated that it is the bloggers who are attacked, and that all bloggers are atheists. I think it is time to stop this over simplification.  Why do people think that being an atheist is dangerous, not to be tolerated?  Just as having a religion, whatever the religion may be, either Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, Jew, Jains, etc. is very normal and acceptable, similarly not having a religion or a religious belief is not an agenda either.  It is an individual’s decision.

This is not the Bangladesh we know. We are not mentioning any general murders, rapes, sexual harassment of women in public celebrations, extra judicial killings etc.  The purpose of this piece is to mention killings in the name of ‘Religion’. What is interesting to note that in most cases the modus operandi is uncannily similar.  What is also similar is the non action in bringing to book or even finding out the perpetrators. Our government says these are isolated incidents; next day we get the report that all those who have been involved in killings have been caught. 

We know that one of the killers of Oyasequr Rahman Babu was caught but later released and we see the CCTV camera video footage of police catching and yet unable to hold on to another killer in the recent incident.  Apparently the killers were armed!  Of course they were, remember they killed two people and injured two others?  On the other hand our law enforcers are happily killing people in encounters ever so often.  The contradictions in each statement given are so weak.  They really need a better script writer.

As a woman, a feminist, as a rationalist, who believes in democracy, freedom of speech and thought, in equality in all fields specially one’s mind and thinking, freedom and security of one’s movement and the right to our basic needs including that of sharpening our intellect through knowledge and culture, I will speak out.

I would like to mention here some facts.  First, not all those killed were bloggers, and those being killed now are neither necessarily bloggers nor atheists.  Secondly, not all bloggers are atheists, nor all those active in social media are bloggers or atheists. They may or may not be, that is irrelevant. Thirdly, I had no idea, and please those who know do know, inform me under which article of the Constitution is it stated that no one can be an atheist in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh.  

The message that appears to come out is that it is perfectly alright to machete and hack to death an atheist, because she/he questions the very basis and beliefs of a believer. That one need not go through the legally accepted and established legal forum, the laws of the land or the Judiciary, nor does one need to be taken to Court. That a believer only implies not just one religion Islam, but also does not allow all the different schools/mazhabs, sects, trends within Islam to continue to exist. Islam has been practiced in what is now Bangladesh as the religion of a majority which came through the preaching of very religious and spiritual leaders, hence the influence of the Sufi Culture.  Not through the sword, definitely not through imparting fear and/or force.

The message that there is only one form, a form alien to this land, of belief and practice, that of the Wahabi/Salafis who are not part of the 4 Mazhabs of the Islamic Sunni belief is now being pushed with full force as the current agenda.  This is a global phenomenon, not just here.  It is not relevant as to whether our Government accepts that Islamic State exists in name here in Bangladesh.  They may be called Mujahideens, Talibans, Al-Qaeda, Hefazat e Islam, Harkat ul Jihad, JMB, or whatever name they wish to call themselves.  The process of force, violence, falsehoods, and murders to create fear in order to establish their State is essentially the same.  What is crucial in all this is that women will never be full citizens with equal rights.  We cannot allow ourselves to go backwards from what we have so valiantly fought for, for what we have achieved.

I write this since many people killed in this brutal manner have been believers, Pirs,  Shias, Ahmedias, followers of the Sufi tradition, priests from other religions, writers who were not necessarily atheists, or at least have never openly stated their position as being such, even expatriate residents who came to work and live in Bangladesh. People who love music, people who are young, middle aged, old, anything or anyone without any apparent basis or rationale may be killed. Believers, non believers all have been targeted in order to gain control to establish that there is only one acceptable form of Islam.

Those feeling outraged at this barbarism are asked that one should be careful not to hurt the sentiment of the believers? Whose sentiment are we talking about? Which believers? The misogynists,  communalists who preach and breed obscurantism, a group financially strong, having the backing of the powers that be, misrepresenting and misquoting for their own vested interests, building upon the lack of knowledge of the vast majority of people, in the name of religion, a completely false base? Why are these groups allowed to operate? In whose interests are they doing so? It is time to link up this obscurantist, misogynist ideologies, whether in our country or using the name of another religion in another land, and to analyse whose interests do they really serve? There does not seem to be any contradiction between great profit making interests such as the drug, arms, smuggling, trafficking and sex industry and these bigots.

Islam, and I mention Islam here since that is the religion of at present over 90% of the people of this land, existed in this country for centuries, without the current trend of extreme violence and fear (if I were in India or in Europe or North America, I would mention the majority religion, used as a political tool in those countries too) We do not need a new and alien form of Islam in this country, or any form of religious indoctrination for that matter. As a secular state we are supposed to believe in the separation of Religion and State. 

Are we, those that are either at the helm of affairs or claim to have some influence over policy and thinking, at all concerned that the numbers of people who have a different faith or viewpoint are decreasing? That non-Muslims are currently around only 9% of the population?  Whereas, in 1951 non-Muslims were 23%, which then came down to 14.6% in 1974.  Just as a country needs Democracy, a country needs Diversity in all its various forms. Killing of protestors fighting for their right to their land and home against coal fired power plants, the Tazreen, Rana Plaza and other industrial tragedies, attacks on non Muslims, Indigenous peoples, Women, are all part of the same trend; a trend towards the establishment of a controlled mono-culture, whether of production systems, market controls, or a mono-culture of the mind, through ideology and culture.

Is it not now the time to speak out? To fill in the blanks, make the links?

As a woman, a feminist, as a rationalist, who believes in democracy, freedom of speech and thought, in equality in all fields specially one’s mind and thinking, freedom and security of one’s movement and the right to our basic needs including that of sharpening our intellect through knowledge and culture, I will speak out. My mind is my own, it belongs only to me, free to move where it wishes to go and free to dream its own dreams and free to express myself. I do not hurt others ideology or beliefs, just as I do not allow others to hurt mine. I am strong in my belief, because it is mine as I have come to understand it.

My belief, my ideology, is not so feeble that just because someone does not share my ideology, my ideology becomes insecure and shaky.  1971 has taught us that killing cannot stop freedom. It did not then, it will not now.

This article was first published on Kafila.org.
 

The post Bangla Activist: “1971 has taught us that killing cannot stop freedom” appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The issues arising from the decision of India’s Sufi Muslims to provide a platform to the ‘Hindu Nationalist’ Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the World Sufi Forum in Delhi in mid-March has earlier been addressed by SabrangIndia. But that apart there is another dimension to the Sufi angst which has to do with the petro-dollar funded, aggressive promotion in India, as elsewhere in the world, of a version of Islam which is extremely rigid, highly intolerant and hostile not only to other religions but even other sects within Islam. The All India Ulema Mashaikh Board is the response of Sufi-minded Sunni Muslims at this ongoing attempt to monopolise Muslim space in India.        
 
Exporting fundamentalist Islam (Wahhabism) to Muslims across the world emerged, particularly from the 1970s onwards, has been a major preoccupation of the Saudi regime in order to gain legitimacy for the Saudi Arabian monarchy. In India this has meant the growing clout of puritanical and rigid sects like the Ahl-e Hadith and the Deobandis. This is bad news for all those concerned with bridging the growing Hindu-Muslim divide.

Reproduced below are excerpts from a paper by written by Yoginder Sikand in 2005. If anything, its contents are even more relevant today.

Its claim of representing Islamic ‘orthodoxy’ is the Saudi regime’s principal tool in seeking ideological legitimacy. Saudi Arabia prides itself on being, as it calls itself, the only ‘truly’ Islamic State in the world, although this claim is stiffly disputed by many Muslims. Official Saudi Islam, or what is commonly referred to as ‘Wahhabism’ by its opponents, is the outcome of the movement led by the 18th century puritan Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (1703-91), who, along with Muhammad ibn Saud, was the chief architect of the Saudi State.

Exporting Wahhabi Islam to Muslims elsewhere in the world emerged, particularly from the 1970s onwards, as a major preoccupation of the Saudi regime. This was seen as a vital resource in order to gain legitimacy for the Saudi Arabian monarchy. Transnational linkages are thus crucial in the project of contemporary global Wahhabism. Since Wahhabism is seen by its proponents as the single, ‘authentic’ and ‘normative’ form of Islam, it has an inherent tendency of expansionism, seeking to impose itself on or replace other ways of understanding and practising Islam.

As home to a Muslim population of over 150 million, India has been an important target of Saudi Wahhabi propaganda. Private as well as semi-official Saudi Arabian assistance has made its way to numerous Indian Muslim individuals and organisations.

Photo Courtesy: Clarion Project

The sort of Islam that the Saudis began aggressively promoting abroad, including in India, in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, had a number of characteristic features. It was extremely literalist; it was rigidly and narrowly defined, being concerned particularly with issues of ‘correct’ ritual and belief, rather than with wider social and political issues; it was viciously sectarian, branding dissenting groups, such as Shias and followers of the Sufis as ‘enemies’ of Islam; and, finally, it was explicitly and fiercely critical of ideologies and groups, Muslim as well as other, that were regarded as political threats to the Saudi regime. Accordingly, these were routinely castigated as ploys of the ‘enemies of Islam’.

Intra-Sunni rivalry and the emergence of the Ahl-e Hadith

The establishment of British rule in India had momentous consequences for notions of Muslim and Islamic identity. The widely shared perception of Islam being under threat helped promote a feeling of Muslim unity transcending sectarian and ethnic boundaries. Yet, at the same time, British rule opened up new spaces for intra-Muslim rivalry. It was in this period that serious differences emerged within the broader Sunni Muslim fold, leading to the development of neatly-defined and on numerous issues mutually opposed sect-like groups, the principal being the Deobandis, the Barelvis and the Ahl-e Hadith. Each of these groups claimed a monopoly of representing the ‘authentic’ Sunni tradition, or the Ahl al-Sunnah wal Jamaah, branding rival claimants as aberrant and, in some cases, even as apostates. This brought to the fore the deeply fractured and fiercely contested nature of Sunni ‘orthodoxy’.

The pioneers of the Ahl-e Hadith saw themselves as struggling to promote what they believed to be the ‘true’ Islam of Muhammad and his companions. Like most other Sunni ulema, they considered the Shias to be outside the pale of Islam and therefore, kafirs. In addition, they believed that the other Sunni groups too had strayed from the path of the ‘pious predecessors’ (salaf).

Overall, they saw their mission as rescuing Muslims from what they saw as the sin of shirk and guiding them to the ‘pure monotheism’ (khalis tauhid) of the Prophet and his companions. Most of them were inspired by the example of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and his companions, particularly appreciating the Wahhabis’ criticism of popular custom. Yet, they did not identify themselves as such, refusing the label of Wahhabi that their detractors used to dismiss them.

Many Hanafi ulema saw the Ahl-e Hadith as a hidden front of the Wahhabis, whom they regarded as ‘enemies’ of Islam for their fierce opposition to the adoration of the Prophet and the saints, their opposition to popular custom and to taqlid, rigid conformity to one or the other of the four generally accepted schools of Sunni jurisprudence.

Further, they also saw the Ahl-e Hadith as directly challenging their own claims of representing normative Islam. Numerous Hanafi ulema issued fatwas branding the Ahl-e Hadith as virtual heretics, contemptuously referring to them as ghair muqallids for their opposition to taqlid, which they believed to be integral to established Sunni tradition. Hanafi opposition to the Ahl-e Hadith was fierce. In many places Hanafis refused them admittance to their mosques, schools and graveyards. Marital ties with them were forbidden, and in some places followers of the Ahl-e Hadith even faced physical assault.

In recent years Ahl-e Hadith scholars have penned scores of books and tracts sternly denouncing customs that many Indian Muslims share with their Hindu neighbours, a legacy of their pre-Islamic past. These also include customs, such as those associated with popular Sufism and the cults of the saints, which enabled Islam to take root in India and to adjust to the Indian cultural context. As Ahl-e Hadith writers see it, these are all ‘wrongful innovations’, having no sanction in the Prophet’s sunnah, and hence must be rooted out.

The Saudi-Ahl-e Hadith connection: Wahhabism as an external policy tool

The 1970s witnessed a growing involvement of certain Arab states, institutions and private donors in sponsoring a number of Islamic organisations and institutions in India. This was a direct outcome of the boom in oil revenues, particularly following the hike in oil prices by OPEC members in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

Although the precise magnitude of Arab assistance to Indian Muslim organisations cannot be ascertained, it was certainly significant, although the Indian press routinely exaggerated it, leading to a scare of petrodollars flooding the country as part of an alleged grand conspiracy to convert poor, particularly ‘low’ caste, Hindus to Islam.

In actual fact, few Muslim organisations actually engaged in missionary work among Hindus received such money. Instead, most Arab, including Saudi, financial assistance went to Muslim organisations to establish mosques, madrassas and publishing houses. To a lesser extent, money was channelled to Muslim organisations to set up schools and hospitals in Muslim localities and to provide scholarships to needy Muslim students.

Saudi funds for Muslim institutions in India have come through a range of sources, including the Saudi State, various Saudi-sponsored Islamic organisations such as the Mecca-based Rabita al-Alami al-Islami (World Muslim League) and the Dar ul-Ifta wal Dawat ul-Irshad, as well as private donors, mostly rich sheikhs, some with close links to the Saudi ruling family. Several Indian Muslims working in Saudi Arabia in various capacities also send back money to fund Islamic institutions, based mainly in towns and villages where their families live.

Monetary assistance to selected Islamic institutions is only one method through which the Saudis have sought to patronise and influence key Muslim leaders and opinion makers in India. Other forms of assistance include sponsored Haj pilgrimages for Muslim leaders, including ulema, patronising of selected publishing houses, scholarships for madrassa students to study in Saudi Islamic universities and jobs for such graduates in both the private as well as public sector within Saudi Arabia.

The largest beneficiary of this largesse is believed to be the Ahl-e Hadith, although the Jamaat-i Islami and the Deobandis are also said to have benefited to some extent. The Barelvis and the Shias, both of whom regard Wahhabism as wholly heretical, have received little or no financial support at all from Saudi sources. This itself suggests that Saudi finance to Muslim institutions in India is intended to serve and promote a particular ideological vision of Islam, one that ties in with the interests of the Saudi regime and its official Wahhabi ulema.

Saudi Arabia emerged as a significant sponsor of Islamic institutions internationally, including in India, only in the 1970s. This was a period of intense ideological struggle in the Arab world. Arab socialism and pan-Arab nationalism under Nasser in Egypt and the Baathists in Syria and Iraq and various communist parties active in numerous Arab states all called for the overthrow of monarchical regimes in the region, which they saw as lackeys of the United States and as helping the Zionist occupation of Palestine. Within Saudi Arabia itself voices of dissent and protest emerged, including from those who had been influenced by socialist trends elsewhere in the region.

The literature produced by several Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses in India helps promote a version and vision of Islam that is almost identical to that of the Wahabbis of Saudi Arabia, and hence one that fits in with the interests of both the Saudi Wahhabi ulema as well as the Saudi State. The claim of the Saudi monarchy as representing the sole ‘authentic’ Islamic regime in the world is repeatedly stressed in several Ahl-e Hadith writings, and reflects the close links, ideological as well as financial, between several Indian Ahl-e Hadith leaders and the Saudi State and its official Wahhabi ulema.

Then came the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, which led to fears of an export of revolutionary, anti-monarchical Islam to the Arab world, including to Saudi Arabia. Ayatollah Khomeini vehemently denounced the Saudi kingdom, insisting that Islam had no place for monarchical rule. He also bitterly attacked the Saudis for being American stooges and for willingly acquiescing in American support for Israel.

In his will, made public in 1989, he denounced the Saudi regime as ‘anti-Islamic’, claiming that it was in league with ‘Satanic powers’. He argued that Wahhabism represented ‘anti-Koranic ideas’ and a ‘baseless, superstitious cult’, and was aimed at destroying Islam from within. Radical appeals emanating from Tehran, including anti-Wahhabi and anti-Saudi sentiments soon captured the imagination of Muslims all over the world.

The Iranian Revolution played the role of a major catalyst in moulding Saudi foreign policy, in which the export of its official Wahhabi form of Islam emerged as a key instrument. The anti-monarchical thrust of the revolution was seen by the Saudi regime as a menacing threat. If the Shah of Iran, America’s closest and strongest ally in the region, could be overthrown as a result of the passionate appeals of a charismatic Imam, the Saudi rulers, it was painfully realised, could well meet the same fate. Consequently, the Saudis, backed by the Americans, began investing heavily in promoting Wahhabi Islam abroad in order to counter the appeal of the Iranian Revolution, both within Saudi Arabia itself and abroad.

Stressing the regime’s ‘Islamic’ credentials now came to be relied upon as the principal tool to strengthen it and to stave off challenges from internal as well as external opponents, from Muslims opposed to the regime’s corrupt and dictatorial ways and its close alliance with the imperialist powers, principally the United States. Saudi export of Wahhabism was given a further boost with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when the Saudis, supported by the Americans, pumped in millions of dollars to fund Wahhabi-style schools and organisations in Pakistan in order to train guerrillas to fight the Russians. While such assistance, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, was presented as a sign of Saudi Arabia’s professed commitment to ‘true’ Islam, it also functioned as a thinly veiled guise for promoting the interests of the Saudi regime. In exporting this brand of Islam abroad, India, home to the second largest Muslim community in the world, received particular importance.

The sort of Islam that the Saudis began aggressively promoting abroad, including in India, in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, had a number of characteristic features. It was extremely literalist; it was rigidly and narrowly defined, being concerned particularly with issues of ‘correct’ ritual and belief, rather than with wider social and political issues; it was viciously sectarian, branding dissenting groups, such as Shias and followers of the Sufis as ‘enemies’ of Islam; and, finally, it was explicitly and fiercely critical of ideologies and groups, Muslim as well as other, that were regarded as political threats to the Saudi regime. Accordingly, these were routinely castigated as ploys of the ‘enemies of Islam’.

Saudi patronage and the Indian Ahl-e Hadith

A hugely disproportionate amount of Saudi aid to Indian Muslim groups in the decades after the Iranian Revolution is said to have gone to institutions run by the Ahl-e Hadith. This is hardly surprising, given the shared ideological tradition and vision of the Ahl-e Hadith and the Saudi Wahabbis. One result of the generous Saudi patronage of the Indian Ahl-e Hadith has been that there has been a growing convergence between the latter and the Saudi Wahhabi ulema, so much so that today there is hardly any difference between the two groups.

Saudi finance to Indian Ahl-e Hadith institutions has heavily influenced the contents of the vast amount of literature that they produce and distribute. In the last two decades there has been a mushroom growth in the number of Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses in India. Several of them are said to receive Saudi funds, directly or otherwise. Many of them produce low-priced books, and, now, audio tapes, video cassettes and compact discs, and some even operate their own web sites. Most of the authors whose works they publish are Indian and, to a lesser extent, Pakistani Ahl-e Hadith ulema who have received higher education in various Saudi universities.

Several of them are currently working in various official as well as private Islamic organisations in Saudi Arabia itself. Their vision and understanding of Islam is indelibly shaped by their own experiences in Saudi Arabia. They see the Saudi Wahhabi version of Islam as normative and other forms of Islam as deviant.

Much of the literature produced by Indian Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses focusses on the minutiae of ritual practices and beliefs. This is a reflection, in part, of the overwhelmingly literalist understanding of Saudi Wahhabi Islam. Scores of books penned by Ahl-e Hadith ulema are devoted to intricate discussion of what they regard as the ‘correct’ methods of praying, performing ablutions and offering supplications, as well as rules and regulations related to food, dress, marriage, divorce and so on.

A principle purpose of these publications is to attack rival Muslim, including Sunni, groups, and to sternly condemn them as ‘aberrant’ on account of differences in their methods of performing rituals and their rules governing a range of issues related to normative personal and collective behaviour.

Another interesting feature of the literature produced by Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses in India, and one that is directly linked to the close association between the Ahl-e Hadith and the Saudi Wahabbis, is a fierce hostility to local beliefs and practices. This hostility, while having been a defining feature of the early Ahl-e Hadith, has been further exacerbated with the growing Saudi-Ahl-e Hadith nexus. In recent years Ahl-e Hadith scholars have penned scores of books and tracts sternly denouncing customs that many Indian Muslims share with their Hindu neighbours, a legacy of their pre-Islamic past.

These also include customs, such as those associated with popular Sufism and the cults of the saints, which enabled Islam to take root in India and to adjust to the Indian cultural context. As Ahl-e Hadith writers see it, these are all ‘wrongful innovations’, having no sanction in the Prophet’s sunnah, and hence must be rooted out. In their place they advocate an adoption of a range of Arab cultural norms and practices which are seen as genuinely ‘Islamic’.

The publication of Urdu translations of the compendia of fatwas of leading Saudi Wahhabi ulema by Indian Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses is a reflection of this cultural alternative that they seek to provide to take the place of what they see as ‘un-Islamic’ practices widely prevalent among many Indian Muslims. This has added to the conflict with other Muslim groups, most particularly with the Barelvis, who are associated with the cults of the Sufis. The ‘Saudi Arabisation’ of Islam and Indian Muslim culture that the Ahl-e Hadith seeks to promote also inevitably further widens the cultural chasm between Muslims and Hindus.

As many Ahl-e Hadith ulema see it, and this is reflected in their writings as well, Hinduism is hardly different from the pagan religion of the Arabs of the pre-Islamic Jahiliya period. Although most of them do not advocate conflict with Hindus, some Ahl-e Hadith scholars insist on the need for Muslims to have as little to do with the Hindus as possible, for fear of the ‘deleterious’ consequences this might have for the Muslims’ own commitment to and practice of Islam.

Like other Muslim groups, Indian Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses have also paid particular attention to combating their Muslim rivals. This cannot be understood without taking into account the Saudi connection. Scores of books have been penned by Indian Ahl-e Hadith ulema, branding Sufis, Shias and Deobandis as heretical.

Tirelessly claiming in their writings to being the sole representatives of ‘normative’ Islam and, in the process, identifying themselves with the Saudi Wahhabi ulema, enables the Indian Ahl-e Hadith ulema to present themselves as faithful allies of the Saudis, which in turn helps earn them recognition as well as monetary assistance from Saudi sponsors. In addition, such publications also serve the purpose of presenting the Saudi Wahhabi version of Islam as normative, and in putting forward the claim of the Saudi regime to being the only one in the world sincerely and seriously committed to ‘genuine’ Islam.

The Iranian Revolution played the role of a major catalyst in moulding Saudi foreign policy, in which the export of its official Wahhabi form of Islam emerged as a key instrument. The anti-monarchical thrust of the revolution was seen by the Saudi regime as a menacing threat.

Access to Saudi funds has therefore led to heightened conflict between various Muslim sectarian groups in India, as Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses produce and distribute literature on a large scale bitterly attacking their rivals of being Muslim only in name.

Heightened intra-Muslim polemics within India are not unrelated to the interests of the Saudi regime. Thus, the virulently anti-Shia and anti-Sufi propaganda material churned out by various Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses in India, some of this said to be sponsored by Saudi patrons, serves the purpose of denouncing as outside the pale of Islam Muslim groups who are opposed to Wahhabism and the Saudi State, these often being branded as ‘enemies’ of Islam. In this way the literature produced by several Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses in India helps promote a version and vision of Islam that is almost identical to that of the Wahabbis of Saudi Arabia, and hence one that fits in with the interests of both the Saudi Wahhabi ulema as well as the Saudi State.

The claim of the Saudi monarchy as representing the sole ‘authentic’ Islamic regime in the world is repeatedly stressed in several Ahl-e Hadith writings, and reflects the close links, ideological as well as financial, between several Indian Ahl-e Hadith leaders and the Saudi State and its official Wahhabi ulema.

Numerous books penned by Indian Ahl-e Hadith scholars discuss in detail the ‘great’ contributions of the present rulers of Saudi Arabia to the ‘Islamic cause’, inevitably concluding with the claim that Saudi Arabia under its present masters represents the only ‘truly’ Islamic State in the world today. They also make it a point to call on God to bless the Saudi king and pray for his continued rule. The Saudi monarch is invariably presented as a pious, fully committed Muslim, whose sole concern is, so it is sought to be argued, the protection and promotion of ‘authentic’ Islam. Support for this ‘authentic’ Islam and for the Saudi rulers are presented as indivisible.

Interestingly, there is no reference at all in Ahl-e Hadith writings to the widespread dissatisfaction within Saudi Arabia itself with the ruling family. Nor is there any reference to the rampant corruption in the country, the lavish lifestyles of the princes, and to Saudi Arabia’s close links with the United States.

Nor, still, is there ever any mention of the claim, put forward by many Muslims, that monarchy is ‘un-Islamic’, particularly one like the despotic and corrupt Saudi regime. This is added evidence of the fact that Saudi-sponsored propaganda abroad is tailor-made to suit the interests of its ruling family.

Ahl-e Hadith-Deobandi polemics and the Saudi nexus

As a claimant to Sunni ‘orthodoxy’, the Ahl-e Hadith is not alone in denouncing the Shias as heretics and therefore outside the pale of Islam. In fact, many Deobandi and Barelvi ulema share the same opinion. Hence the virulent opposition to the Shias on the part of the Ahl-e Hadith is hardly surprising. Given its commitment to what it sees as ‘pure’ monotheism and its fierce opposition to ‘wrongful innovations’, its denunciation of the Barelvis, who are associated with the cults of the Sufis, is also understandable.

What seems particularly intriguing, however, is the fact that, of late, Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses in India have been devoting particular attention to denouncing the Deobandis who, while being muqallids as well as proponents of a reformed Sufism, share with the Ahl-e Hadith a commitment to strict compliance with the Shariah and the extirpation of what they describe as bidaah. In that sense, the Ahl-e Hadith are closer in doctrinal terms to the Deobandis than to any other Indian Sunni group. Despite this, it appears that in recent years Indian Ahl-e Hadith scholars have been focussing considerably more attention on combating the Deobandis than critiquing their Barelvi and Shia rivals. This seemingly puzzling development begs an explanation.

One possible reason for this is that the Deobandis in India are far more organised and influential than the Barelvis. The Deobandis manage a number of influential organisations, madrassas and publishing houses all over India. Consequently, they have probably been more effective in critiquing the Ahl-e Hadith than their other rivals, which in turn has forced the Ahl-e Hadith to pay particular attention to the challenge they face from the Deobandi front. In addition to this factor are other developments, related to struggles over money, influence and authority, which have made for a sharp intensification of rivalries between the Ahl-e Hadith and the Deobandis in recent years. The Saudi connection seems to have played a major role in abetting these conflicts.

The Deobandis, by and large, seem to have maintained the somewhat ambiguous attitude of their elders towards the Ahl-e Hadith and the Wahabbis till at least the late 1970s, when the situation began to change with new access to Saudi funding. In the course of the Afghan war against the Soviets, the Saudis recognised that the Deobandis were far more influential and had a far larger presence than the Ahl-e Hadith in both Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. Consequently, much Saudi funding began making its way to Deobandi madrassas in Pakistan in order to train guerrilla fighters armed with a passion for jehad against the Russians. A shared commitment to a Shariah-centric Islam made such assistance acceptable to both parties.

Islam is conveniently marshalled and often interpreted in diametrically opposing ways by the Saudi regime to suit its own strategic and ideological purposes abroad. Saudi Arabia is said to have been the largest financier of radical Islamist groups abroad, some of whom, as in the Philippines, Chechnya, Bosnia and Kashmir, have taken to armed struggle and terrorism against non-Muslim States. Saudi-funded literature routinely extols such groups as mujahids engaged in a legitimate Islamic jehad.

Impact of recent developments on Saudi links with Indian Muslim groups

The 1990s were characterised by fierce polemical battles between the Ahl-e Hadith and the Deobandis in India, with each group charging the other of being ‘anti-Islamic’ and as hidden fronts of the ‘enemies’ of Islam. Although the two groups continue to regard each other as fierce rivals, the sharp polemical exchanges between them now seem to have dampened somewhat. One factor for this is probably the strong need that many Muslims feel to present a united front to combat the challenge of aggressive Hindu groups in the country.

Another important factor for the apparent decline in overt strife between the Ahl-e Hadith and the Deobandis in recent years is what seems to be a significant shift in Saudi strategy. Following the events of September 2001, Saudi Arabia came under tremendous pressure from the United States to clamp down on Wahhabi militants at home and abroad. The Saudi strategy of sponsoring radical Wahhabism seemed to have boomeranged, as a new generation of Islamist radicals emerged within Saudi Arabia itself, critiquing the Saudi regime for its corruption and for its close links with the United States. Consequently, the Saudi Arabians were forced to take action against their own internal radical Islamist opponents, realising the major challenge that they posed to the Saudi monarchy.

Simultaneously, and because of these developments, Saudi aid to Wahhabi groups abroad, including India, is said to have declined somewhat. This will naturally have a major impact on relations between different Muslim groups in India, and will most notably impact on the expansion of the Ahl-e Hadith, who have been the major recipient of Saudi assistance in recent years.

Another possible indication of the shift in Saudi strategy is the fact that of late certain Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses in India have brought out books praising the Saudi State and critiquing what they describe as the ‘terrorists’ who wish to weaken it. These books argue that the ‘correct’ method of the political ‘reform’ that Islamist opponents of the regime seek is not through violence but rather through ‘guiding’ the political authorities to follow the path of God by providing them with ‘Islamic’ advice.

This shows how Islam is conveniently marshalled and often interpreted in diametrically opposing ways by the Saudi regime to suit its own strategic and ideological purposes abroad. Saudi Arabia is said to have been the largest financier of radical Islamist groups abroad, some of whom, as in the Philippines, Chechnya, Bosnia and Kashmir, have taken to armed struggle and terrorism against non-Muslim States. Saudi-funded literature routinely extols such groups as mujahids engaged in a legitimate Islamic jehad. Yet, faced now with its own internal and increasingly vocal Islamist opposition, it considers similar movements within Saudi Arabia as major sources of ‘strife’ and as clearly ‘un-Islamic’. Whether, as a result of increasing international pressure, the Saudis will be willing to extend the same logic to Islamist groups abroad whom they have been patronising for many years is a moot point.

(This article is an excerpt from the writer’s monograph, "Intra-Muslim Rivalries in India and the Saudi Connection" which can be accessed from his web site www.islaminterfaith.org. Archived from Communalism Combat, March 2005, Year 11, No. 106).  
 

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Is ISIS about Islam or about geopolitics? Or both?

Is ISIS all about Islam, or about geopolitics? This dualism has framed the debate about ISIS among Western analysts, especially American ones. They have formed two camps, one sees in ISIS and its practices an irrefutable evidence of the “true face of Islam”; another insists that ISIS has nothing to do with “real Islam” and reduces it to a telltale backlash against imperialism and Western policies in the Middle East and North Africa (hitherto MENA). This dichotomous approach is one of a few angles through which ISIS has been dissected and analyzed in the United States,[i] but it has more significance than others because it is more common and involves high profile American polemicists, activists and intellectuals who have shaped the contours of this debate. Yet both camps of the ISIS debate, we argue, evoke Orientalism as a discourse that privileges Western knowledge of the East and sidelines or patronizes voices from the MENA region. Their concerns are Eurocentric, revolving around Islamophobia, with the first camp promoting it and the second fearing and battling it, thus turning the ISIS debate into one about the West and its own battles and polemics.

This piece aims to deconstruct the polarized analysis of ISIS as either political or religious, either sacred or worldly, and suggests that, in fact, it could be both. By shedding light on some of the intensive debates raging in MENA concerning ISIS, we argue that ISIS is both a product of MENA’s politics, both local and foreign, and a symptom of a specific religious culture that reflects current developments, clashes and debates within the abode of Islam. These derive their potency from a legitimacy crisis within a fragmented Sunni authority since the collapse of the Ottoman state, rising sectarian politics, and amateur literal interpretation of religious texts, etc. All are major concerns threatening the MENA region and beyond, and with which Arab and Muslim scholars, intellectuals, politicians and activists in MENA have been deeply engaged. To invoke these modern historical crises is not meant to render the rise of ISIS inevitable or self-evident but dismissing them and the debates in MENA about them is dangerous and shortsighted, and has led to the polarized impasse in the West on how to understand the rise of ISIS. It is time we move away from religious and geopolitical essentialisms, and take seriously MENA’s contested intellectual and political ground on which ISIS has been operating.

Thus, the purpose here is not to devise the endgame of the ISIS debate, declaring whether ISIS is more about politics or about religion, especially as the debate has unfolded in the West. ISIS, we contend, does not only exist to pander to its opponents of different forms and shapes both inside and outside MENA, but is also made, unmade and constructed by Arabs and Muslims in relationship to Islamic history, Islamic theology and regional politics, altogether.

The Double-Edged Sword of Orientalism
As aforementioned, the analysis of ISIS in the United States has mostly pursued simplified schema (is ISIS political or religious?), with analysts sharply divided between two opposite camps. One, fixated on ISIS as a religious phenomenon, uses ISIS to bash Islam and Muslims, intentionally overlooking the fact that a poll after another show the unpopularity of ISIS among Arabs and Muslims.[ii] This camp reduces the complexities of MENA’s politics to pure religious and cultural factors while overlooking the wider context in which such violent movements emerge. Worst, it adopts “a holier than thou” attitude, ignoring not only the West’ s own history of violence but also the West’s current practices of violence (or complicity in such practices) around the world, not least in MENA. This camp’s knowledge of MENA societies is very remote, superficial and impressionist at best. Its crudest articulations come from right wing pundits such as Rush Limbaugh, Glenn Beck, Ann Coulter et al who are best described as Islamophobes whose rhetoric is rooted in racism, intolerance and prejudice, rather than in a desire for open discussion. Not to underestimate or disregard their influence, we seek to open a discussion which transcends these limitations. Neither does it aim to engage with the New Atheist movement, another group within this camp. Championed by the late Christopher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris and others, this movement has been particularly hostile to Islam and Muslims after 9/11. Harris’ statement that “Islam right now is the mother lode of bad ideas,” and Dawkins’ characterization of Islam as “the greatest force of evil today,” are products of Orientalist thinking in the Saidian sense. At their worst, the New Atheists, with their cultural supremacy and patronizing language, disguise an imperialist chauvinism. Asef Bayat qualifies this type of knowledge production in the West about the Muslim Middle East in particular as “neo-Orientalism,’” describing it as “more entrenched, multi-faceted, and harmful than its predecessor; it has fed into what is currently called ‘Islamophobia’.”

Not to acknowledge the presence of theology is not only an exercise in self-denial; it is also an outright dismissal of ISIS’ victims who are enslaved, maimed, tortured and executed, all in the name of the theology – as particular or extreme as it may be — that ISIS adopts
 
The other camp, alarmed by rising Islamophobia in the West and its poisonous and divisive rhetoric, sidelines Islam and the religious culture altogether from the discussion, foregrounding instead the analysis almost exclusively in MENA’s politics and economics, and in the Western powers’ foreign policies in the region. This camp is characterized by deeper knowledge of MENA’s history and societies and the complex nature of its contemporary politics. It consists of academics, journalists and online activists, both Muslims and non-Muslims. Yet this camp falls short of capturing all sides of the story informing the making of ISIS and does not cut deep enough into the various religious and intellectual milieus brewing in MENA. This can be due to ideological positions dismissing the significance and importance of religious worldviews, or to limited or partial experiences with the daily realities of MENA’s societies, or simply to lack of access to the different forms of local production of knowledge. Yet perhaps the main reason this camp is adamant about negating any connection between Islam and ISIS is the fear of pandering to Islamophobes. From that perspective, this camp risks practicing its own form of Orientalism in the way it discusses ISIS not so much as a problem in MENA but one about the West, its concerns, and internal politics. It speaks as an “authority” on the subject while overlooking voices and opinions from MENA that better represent the realities on the ground and offer a more critical analysis of ISIS that goes beyond the geopolitical dimensions. In sidelining such voices, this camp is denying the interiority that MENA’s intellectuals and scholars provide and is also painting a homogenous picture of MENA’s intellectual landscape, suppressing the variety and diversity of opinions and different levels of engagement in the region.

A good example of this camp’s narrative remains the debate that followed the March 2015 publication of the Atlantic article “What ISIS Really wants.” The article itself, with its generalizations and analytical shortcomings, suffers from crude Orientalism. For example, the author’s statement that “the religion preached by [IS]’ ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam,” is extremely flawed as it does not allow for different qualities of Islamic thought. To the contrary, ISIS’ interpretations are neither coherent nor learned, fall outside of juristic consensus and betray historical precedents. The author’s emphasis on ISIS’ “medieval religious nature” fails to see the complicity of modernity and modern institutions in the creation of phenomena like ISIS. But this article also revealed the shortsightedness of American critical commentary in general. The author, while acknowledging that nearly all Muslims reject the Islamic State, warns not to pretend “that [ISIS] isn’t actually a religious, millenarian group, with theology that must be understood to be combatted.” This characterization of ISIS as a religious group with a theology drew fierce criticism and raised the ire of many analysts, especially in the United States. Among those was the Iranian-American scholar Hamid Dabashi at Columbia University. His rebuttal best showcases this camp’s well-intended yet misleading and flawed analysis, and best captures how the IS debate in the West is not really about ISIS per se and MENA’s daily realities; it is more about the West’s internal politics and its own forms of knowledge production regarding MENA. Dabashi asked: “What utter stupidity might cause a person to ignore the world in which we live, and in which we have lived, and engage in the mind-numbing banality of searching for a ‘theology’ for the IS group?”[iii] That theology would even be considered as part of the identity and overall ideology of ISIS is an affront to him; it is dismissed out of hand. Surely, theology is not the main or only drive behind ISIS, but denying its existence denies reality. Regardless of the regional and foreign politics shaping the emergence of ISIS, ISIS defines itself in religious terms, it vies for and fiercely rivals other groups over religiously sanctioned authority, and dutifully and conscientiously anchors itself and its vision in religious texts. ISIS’ worldview, even if cultic, is a religiously-informed one par excellence while at the same time ISIS remains, first and foremost, a political organization with political goals. Not to acknowledge the presence of theology is not only an exercise in self-denial; it is also an outright dismissal of ISIS’ victims who are enslaved, maimed, tortured and executed, all in the name of the theology – as particular or extreme as it may be — that ISIS adopts. Dabashi’s refutation was purely reactionary, lacking engagement and insight. It seems he wanted to deny ISIS a theology to challenge the Islamophobes nodding approvingly,  for their own sinister goals, at the Atlantic article.

ISIS and the Debate Within
To be sure, one can find parallel narratives in MENA to those in the West, insofar as they emphasize the political or the religious. While there is no shortage of voices in MENA that argue, not unlike many analysts in the West, that ISIS does not represent Islam, a closer look at the debates about ISIS among intellectuals in MENA reveals richer discussions that do not neatly fit the analytical categories of the political and the religious, the modern and the medieval produced in the West. They offer more self-critical analyses than, say, an official –and largely discredited- institution like al-Azhar does, and do not shy away from questioning the essence of the religious worldview informing ISIS and the significance of certain religious texts and interpretations –regardless of any lack of consensus around them– in shaping groups such as ISIS.

Some of those critics belong to religious establishments but most of them do not; some of them are wedded, personally, to a religious worldview while others not necessarily so. Yet they all draw on discussions and terminology deeply engrained in Islamic history, jurisprudence and theology. They include Adonis, Sa‘d bin Tifla al-‘Ajami, al-Tahir Amin, Aziz al-Azmeh, Khalid Ghazal, Hasan Hanafi, Rosa Yasin Hasan, Ibtihal al-Khatib, ‘Amir Muhsin, Muhammad Shahrour, Sayyid al-Qumani, and others. The periodical Al-Awan alone, edited by George Tarabishi, has a whole slate of articles by Arab intellectuals dissecting the theological underpinnings of ISIS.

For these critics, theology is foundational to ISIS (as ISIS itself professes it to be) rather than decorative, thus continuing historically informed debates among Muslims regarding the tension between `aql (reason) and naql (transmission of knowledge), between a literal and an analytical interpretation of religious texts, and the influence of Wahhabism and proto-Salafi movements on contemporary Muslim societies. None of those analysts ignores or dismisses the impact of political and economic factors on the emergence of political violence in MENA, currently most strikingly embodied by ISIS, but they have no qualms identifying and criticizing the theology driving ISIS’ vision, and the religious culture that shapes and informs its acts, policies and behavior. Their analysis is built on the intertwining of politics and theology, not their dualism.

The arguments the authors make are not ad hoc or new. They are weighing in on a wider and older discussion concerning the authority of the religious text in Islam, the heavy weight of the religious heritage in the present, and the dangerous intertwining of religion and politics in Islam. While they may differ one from the other on some details, they are taking part in ongoing discussions about Islam and politics in MENA since the fall of the Ottoman order. One can trace a genealogy of this critical thought to the early history of Islam. But in more practical and pertinent terms, one can start with ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq (d. 1966) and his book al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm (Islam and the Foundations of Governance), in which he refuted the idea of religious governance in Islam. This chain of reformist thought includes many, such as ‘Abd Allah al-‘Alayli (d. 1996), Nasr Hamid Abi Zayd (d. 2010), Muhammad Arkoun (d. 2010), Jamal al-Banna (d. 2013), Muhammad ‘Abid al-Jabiri (d. 2010), Nawal al-Sa‘dawi, and many others, Islamists or seculars, who have criticized both the sacredness with which the religious heritage is held and the dangerous implications of a theology tangled with politics. An acknowledgment of the current criticism by Arab authors of the theological underpinnings of ISIS should be seen as a tribute to a long-standing reformist thought indigenous to MENA and concerned about the region’s present and future.

ISIS is both a product of MENA’s politics, both local and foreign, and a symptom of a specific religious culture that reflects current developments, clashes and debates within the abode of Islam. These derive their potency from a legitimacy crisis within a fragmented Sunni authority since the collapse of the Ottoman state, rising sectarian politics, and amateur literal interpretation of religious texts, etc.

MENA societies are too diverse for one or more groups to represent them, and their opinions too varied and too variable to be captured by one view or the other, by one writer or another. Therefore measuring the influence as well as the level of representation of those critical voices is a futile exercise. But what those debates and opinions reveal is a diverse and rich discussion of contemporary Islam and Muslim societies that defies the homogenous image of MENA portrayed by some of those who speak on behalf of the region in the West and that reflects Western concerns rather than local ones. Moreover, such a consideration betrays a critical analysis of MENA’s intellectual landscape at a time of colossal crisis in the region and preempts the desperate need for an appreciation of critical thought in MENA. In fact, ignoring or dismissing those voices not only undermines the scale of the crisis –and the reactions to it – within the abode of Islam but also perpetuates an Orientalist view of Muslim societies as static, apathetic and lethargic, as if lacking in a critical intellectual tradition that can engage contemporary problems in contemporary terms. By paying attention to what intellectuals in MENA are saying about ISIS, scholars and commentators in the West can develop a far superior framework for understanding and engaging ISIS than the two camps have managed.

[A longer version of this article will appear as a co-authored chapter by Amal Ghazal and Larbi Sadiki, in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Middle-Eastern and North African History, edited by Amal Ghazal and Jens Hanssen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).]

(This article was first published by Jadaliyya ezine)

[i] One distinctive angle, mostly revealed on the pages of The New Yorker and The Guardian, has viewed IS through the visceral and personalized lens of families in the West impacted by IS and its propaganda of a utopian/dystopian idealism. This discussion is not focused on Orientalist representations or geopolitical metrics but on the real threat posed by IS as an actual organization. See, for example, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/07/06/five-hostages; http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/01/journey-to-jihad and http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-happens-to-former-isis-fighters; http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/18/isis-islamic-state-mothers-for-life
[ii] Even the Washington Institute for Near East Policy acknowledged that fact: http://fikraforum.org/?p=5608.
 

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Recent weeks have shown an acceleration of violence against Ahmadis especially after the burning of an Ahmadi owned chipboard factory. An Ahmadi mosque in Kala Gujram, not far from the factory, has also been targeted, where attackers burned copies of the Quran. The local police and other authorities reportedly failed to control or disperse the crowd allowing destruction of the properties of the Ahmadis. Contrarily, there have been arrests of a senior member of the Ahmadi Community in Jhelum.  "I begged the mob for the life of my wife and children, and they freed them only after attempting to burn (them?) in the factory's boiler”, states Asif Shezad, an Ahmadi who survived a lynching attempt, and was quoted in a statement  by the Asian Human Rights Commission. The mob attack followed the usual pattern. An allegation of blasphemy aroused a mob to set the Jhelum chipboard factory on fire on November 20, 2015. The 2000 strong mob also burnt down the owner’s residence adjoining the factory. Instead of controlling the charged mob and the arsonists, the police arrested three Ahmadis on the local cleric’s allegation that they had burnt the holy Quran. The very next day an Ahmadi mosque adjacent to the factory was ransacked. Shezad and his family have since gone into hiding, fearing for their lives.

In another incident, the owner of a spectacles shop was arrested along with his employee on blasphemy charges for selling Ahmadi literature. The shop was situated at Chanab Nagar (former Rabwa, the centre of the Ahmadi community). Although Mr. Abdul Shakoor does not sell anything apart from eye glasses, the local administration ordered his arrest merely on the complaint of an anti-Ahmadi organisation.

Pakistan’s controversial blasphemy law does not clearly define blasphemy but says the offence is punishable by death. Anyone can thus file a blasphemy case claiming their religious feelings are injured for any reason. The accused are often lynched, and lawyers and judges defending or acquitting them have been attacked. Blasphemy laws are increasingly being used to seize money or property.

Since its inception, Pakistan has been battling a religious existential fight with itself. A country attained in the name of religion is yet to establish the definition of a Muslim. The judiciary often also appears complacent and meek in the face religious fundamentalism and orthodox clergy who are bent on enforcing and implementing the firebrand version of Wahabbism (a religious movement to restore Islam to its original form). While minorities in general are persecuted and beleaguered, the Ahmadi community suffers the brunt of the country’s religious discrimination and hatred. In the course of 2015, the Ahmadiyyas suffered severe curbs on their right to freedom of speech and to practise and propagate their religious belief, as well as the deaths of many innocent Ahmadis targeted by religious zealots.

Since its inception, Pakistan has been battling a religious existential fight with itself. A country attained in the name of religion is yet to establish the definition of a Muslim.

On 20 October 2015, 37-year-old Ikramullah was killed in broad daylight by four assailants who opened fire at him and later fled the scene. Ikramullah was in the pharmacy that he owned when four gunmen on motorbikes stormed the store and opened fire. Ikramullah was shot several times and one of the bullets went through his skull. Earlier that month, three members of the Ahmadicommunity survived a gun attack in Karachi.

Anti-Ahmadiyya literature is continuously being published and distributed, endangering the lives of community members. Several Anti-Ahmadiyya conferences were held in Lahore during 2015, where the speakers—many belonging to the ruling party—incited people against the community. In one such conference held on 11 September 2015 at Mughalpura, Lahore, the attendees declared Ahmadis to be rebels of the religion and the country, demanded their removal from important posts, and the banning of products manufactured by Ahmadi companies.

Ahmadis have been arrested in Pakistan for reading the Holy Quran, holding religious celebrations and having Quranic verses on rings or wedding cards, and even for using Islamic greetings. They suffer incessant discrimination in procuring ID cards, passports, and even educational certificates. Many Ahmadis avoid using their right to vote as they must declare themselves non Muslim Ahmadiyya, making themselves vulnerable to physical attacks and socio-economic boycott.

Years of institutionalized discrimination against the Ahmadicommunity and its persistent vilification have led to extreme apathy, where even the mass murder of Ahmadis in Lahore on May 28, 2010 failed to elicit any kind of public outrage. The blood of Ahmadis, Christians, Shias or Hindus, is not the same as Sunni blood; the bloodletting of these groups is acceptable and tolerated as a remote event that does not affect the majority.

The religious intolerance spawning in Pakistan has created a major fault line in the moral and social fabric of the society. If this inaction and apathy on the part of the state and society continues, the time is not far when the country will fall into civil strife and anarchy.

As attacks against Ahmadis and other minorities grows, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has expressed alarm and opposition over Pakistan voting last week against a United Nations General Assembly resolution that called for recognising the role of human rights defenders (HRDs) and the need for their protection. In a statement issued recently, the Commission said: “HRCP welcomes the passing of the UN General Assembly resolution, titled ‘Recognizing the role of human rights defenders and the need for their protection’, by 117 votes on November 25. It is unfortunate that the resolution had to be put to vote this year and could not be adopted by consensus as had been the norm in the past” At the same time, HRCP must express alarm and great disappointment that Pakistan chose to be one of the 14 nations that voted against the resolution. It is ominous that all 14 countries opposing the resolution are from the Afro-Asian region, as is the predominant majority of the 40 states that abstained from voting. The HRDs in the region work in such perilous circumstances that the hope was for the states to be more enthusiastic about protecting them and facilitating their work. It seems that the rights’defenders are going to have a rough time in Asia and Africa in the coming days.While regretting Pakistan’s decision to oppose the resolution, the civil society is entitled to ask what rights’ defenders have done to deserve this step-motherly treatment. It is unfortunate that the government wishes to see civil society as an adversary. The civil society cannot, and must not, surrender its role as a watchdog for people’s rights because that constitutes an entitlement, by virtue of citizens’ social contract with the state, and not a concession. “HRCP also stresses people’s right to know through an explanation in parliament the reason why the government chose to deny the need for protection for HRDs, who include, besides human rights groups, journalists, lawyers, political and social activists.”
 

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