Flagging, yet again, the crucial issue of witness protection to ensure substantive justice, the Supreme Court has exhorted governments to be pro-active on the issue of witness protection, PTI reports.

The State needs to play a definite role in coming out with witness-protection programme, at least in sensitive cases involving those having political patronage, muscle and money power so that trial does not get "tainted and derailed", the Supreme Court has said. Observing that threat and intimidation were major causes for witnesses turning hostile, it said when the witnesses are not able to depose correctly before the court, it results in low conviction rate and many times even hardened criminals escape the conviction."It shakes public confidence in the criminal justice delivery system," a bench of justices A K Sikri and Amitava Roy said.

"It is for this reason there has been a lot of discussion on witness protection and from various quarters demand is made for the state to play a definite role in coming out with witness-protection programme, at least in sensitive cases involving those in power, who have political patronage and could wield muscle and money power, to avert trial getting tainted and derailed and truth becoming a casualty," it said.

The bench noted in its verdict that it has become a common phenomenon and almost a regular feature that in criminal cases witnesses turn hostile.

The court's observation came while dismissing an appeal filed by four persons, who were convicted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court for the offences of murder and subjecting a married woman to cruelty. They were initially acquitted by a trial court but the high court had overturned the judgement and convicted them while relying on the dying declaration of the woman, who was set ablaze by the accused persons in 1999.

The husband and in-laws of the deceased woman had moved the apex court challenging the high court's judgement, saying there was no reason to rely on the dying declaration as there were certain infirmities in it. Police had registered the case against them based on the statement given by the woman, who was admitted to a hospital with 100 per cent burn injuries and had died during treatment.

Witness Protection, the Real Issue
The issue of witness protection has been high-lighted most recently in the cases related to the 2002 Gujarat genocidal killings. The famed Best Bakery Case, in which the  Supreme Court intervened and transferred the case out of Gujarat as also ordered re-trial of the case in Mumbai, the Court had flagged the issue critically.  Thereafter the Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence Bill, 2011—an aborted promise of the UPA Government made in the Common Minimum Programme(CMP) of 2004- also specifically introduced victimology and witness protection as a statutory responsibility of the state.
 
In November 2005, then chairperson of the Law Commission, Justice M Jagannadha Rao had in his keynote address at a national conference in the capital, detailed the rights, needs and benefits of witnesses required to ensure effective victim testimony.
 
In this keynote address that may be read here he had said that:

“The victim of a crime is an important player in the administration of justice both as a complainant/informant and as a witness for the prosecution/state. His or her role is vital both at the stage of investigation and at the trial stage. Without the victim’s active support, the investigation of a crime may not come to a logical end. At the same time, the victim’s testimony in court, especially if the crime is a violent one, can be said to be the best piece of evidence that can be used against the accused. But despite being an important component of the criminal justice system, much attention has not been paid to the rights of victims.

“The word ‘victim’ has not been defined either in the Indian Penal Code (IPC) or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The General Assembly of the United Nations in its 96th plenary meeting on November 29, 1985 made a Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. The declaration defines victims as "persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are violations of criminal laws operative within member states, including those laws prescribing criminal abuse of power".

“We can say that the word ‘victim’ means the person or persons who have suffered physical, financial, social or psychological harm as a result of an offence and in some cases it includes an appropriate member of the immediate family of such a person."

Judicial Precedents
There have been significant judicial pronouncements on Witness Protection by the Supreme Court and yet little has been done by successive governments to ensure an effective and sensitive Witness Protection Programme.
For example,

The Supreme Court of India in Zahira Habibulla Sheikh vs State of Gujarat, 2004 (4 SCC 158) has stated the importance of victims in the following words:
"Right from the inception of (the) judicial system it has been accepted that discovery, vindication and establishment of truth is the main accepted underlying existence of courts of justice. The operating principles for a fair trial permeate the common law in both civil and criminal contexts. Application of these principles involves a delicate judicial balancing of competing interests in a criminal trial, the interests of the accused and the public and to a great extent that of (the) victim have to be weighed not losing sight of the public interest involved in the prosecution of persons who commit offences".

The Supreme Court of India in Gaurav Jain vs Union of India (AIR 1997 SC 3021) gave various directions for the rehabilitation and other welfare of victims of such crimes. The Court said that three C’s, viz. counselling, cajoling by persuasion and coercion as the last resort are necessary for effective enforcement of rescue and rehabilitation of the victims of such trafficking. The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 deal with these aspects.

The apex court in Vishal Jeet vs Union of India (AIR 1990 SC 1412) had also issued directions on the subject.
The Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs Gurmit Singh,1996 (2 SCC 384) while dealing with a case of rape has said, "The courts should, as far as possible, avoid disclosing the name of the prosecutrix in their orders to save further embarrassment to the victim of (a) sex crime. The anonymity of the victim of the crime must be maintained, as far as possible, throughout". Though in some cases the identity of the victim is known to the accused, this is not so in all cases. Where the identity and all details of the victim are not known to the accused, maintaining anonymity would be quite helpful.[[ Anonymity of victim – Names and addresses of victims may be kept secret in criminal proceedings. Even in supplying copies of charge sheets to the accused, the identity of victims may be withheld.]]

In Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum vs Union of India, 1995 (1 SCC 14), the Supreme Court while indicating the broad parameters that can assist the victims of rape, emphasised that in all rape trials ‘anonymity’ of the victims must be maintained as far as necessary so that the name is shielded from the media and public. The court also observed that the victims invariably find the trial of an offence of rape a traumatic experience. The experience of giving evidence in court has been negative and destructive and the victims often expressed that they considered the ordeal of facing cross-examination in the criminal trial to be even worse than the rape itself.

Section 13 of TADA, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and Section 30 of POTA, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (now repealed) provides that the court may take such measures as it deems fit to keep the identity and address of witnesses secret.

Despite these consistent and repeated judicial pronouncements, across the political spectrum—despite different parties with ideological variants being in power—restoration of faith in the criminal justice system, is obviously a low priority for all. Regardless of where and on which side you claim to be on the ideological metre.

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The victim of a crime is an important player in the administration of justice both as a complainant/informant and as a witness for the prosecution/state. His or her role is vital both at the stage of investigation and at the trial stage. Without the victim’s active support, the investigation of a crime may not come to a logical end. At the same time, the victim’s testimony in court, especially if the crime is a violent one, can be said to be the best piece of evidence that can be used against the accused. But despite being an important component of the criminal justice system, much attention has not been paid to the rights of victims.

The word ‘victim’ has not been defined either in the Indian Penal Code (IPC) or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The General Assembly of the United Nations in its 96th plenary meeting on November 29, 1985 made a Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. The declaration defines victims as "persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are violations of criminal laws operative within member states, including those laws prescribing criminal abuse of power".

We can say that the word ‘victim’ means the person or persons who have suffered physical, financial, social or psychological harm as a result of an offence and in some cases it includes an appropriate member of the immediate family of such a person.
The UN General Assembly affirmed the necessity of adopting national and international norms in order to secure universal and effective recognition of and respect for the rights of victims of crimes and victims of abuse of power. It was also declared that offenders or third parties responsible for their behaviour should, where appropriate, make fair restitution to victims, their families or dependents. This declaration has been described as a "kind of Magna Carta of the rights of victims" worldwide. The declaration recognised the following rights of victims of crime:

(i) Access to justice and fair treatment – This right includes the mechanisms of justice and to prompt redress, right to be informed of victim’s rights, right to proper assistance throughout the legal process and right to protection of privacy and safety.

(ii) Restitution – This right includes return of property for the harm or loss suffered; where public officials or other agents have violated criminal laws, the victims should receive restitution from the state.

(iii) Compensation – When compensation is not fully available from the offender or other sources, the state should provide financial compensation, at least in violent crimes which result in bodily injury, for which national funds should be established.

(iv) Assistance – Victims should receive necessary material, medical, psychological and social assistance through governmental, voluntary and community-based means. Police, justice, health and social service personnel should receive training in this regard.

In Europe, the Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes incorporates the essential rights of victims as stipulated in the UN declaration. The Council of Europe has recommended the revamping of criminal justice incorporating victim’s rights in every stage of criminal proceedings. Following this recommendation, many states in Europe and elsewhere enacted laws aimed at providing increased participation and more substantive rights to victims of crime. For example, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, 1995 of the UK, the Victims of Crime Assistance Act, 1996 of Victoria, the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 1982 of the USA, the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act, 1990 of the USA, are in this category.

In an informative report on "Criminal Justice: The Way Ahead" presented to the British Parliament (February 2001) the UK home department made the following recommendation for criminal justice reform:
"We will put the needs of victims and witnesses at the heart of the criminal justice system and ensure they see justice done more often and more quickly. We will support and inform them, and empower them to give them best evidence in the most secure environment possible".

The Supreme Court of India in Zahira Habibulla Sheikh vs State of Gujarat, 2004 (4 SCC 158) has stated the importance of victims in the following words:
"Right from the inception of (the) judicial system it has been accepted that discovery, vindication and establishment of truth is the main accepted underlying existence of courts of justice. The operating principles for a fair trial permeate the common law in both civil and criminal contexts. Application of these principles involves a delicate judicial balancing of competing interests in a criminal trial, the interests of the accused and the public and to a great extent that of (the) victim have to be weighed not losing sight of the public interest involved in the prosecution of persons who commit offences".

(This) conference is mainly focused on victim/witness protection and on the care and support for victims of trafficking and other forms of violence. The term ‘trafficking’ is used to describe activities in which women and children are forced into exploitative situations. In the USA, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act came into force in October 2000, which provides the tools to combat trafficking in persons both worldwide and within the country.

The Supreme Court of India in Gaurav Jain vs Union of India (AIR 1997 SC 3021) gave various directions for the rehabilitation and other welfare of victims of such crimes. The Court said that three C’s, viz. counselling, cajoling by persuasion and coercion as the last resort are necessary for effective enforcement of rescue and rehabilitation of the victims of such trafficking. The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 deal with these aspects. The apex court in Vishal Jeet vs Union of India (AIR 1990 SC 1412) had also issued directions on the subject.

However, though these victims are more vulnerable, I would like to speak about victim protection generally.

As stated earlier, every victim is an important witness. "Witnesses," as Bentham said, "are the eyes and ears of justice." If a witness/victim himself is incapacitated from acting as the eyes and ears of justice, the trial gets putrefied and paralysed, and can no longer constitute a fair trial. The incapacitation may be due to several factors, such as the witness/victim not being in a position to speak the truth in court for reasons beyond the control of the witness/victim or due to negligence or ignorance or some corrupt collusion.

In respect of rights that are required to ensure effective victim testimony, there are two important aspects. The first is to ensure that evidence or the statement of a victim that has already been recorded at the stage of investigation is not allowed to be destroyed by the victim resiling from his or her statement while deposing on oath before a court. This phenomenon, of victims turning ‘hostile’ on account of the failure to protect the victim, is one aspect of the problem. It requires that the identity of the victim in some cases be kept secret and anonymity be given. The second aspect is the physical and mental vulnerability of the victim and taking care of his or her welfare in various respects, which call for physical protection of the victim at all stages of the criminal justice process till the conclusion of the case.

A Victims’ Identity Protection and Victims’ Protection Programme are the need of the hour. In order to provide effective Witness Identity Protection and Witness Protection Programmes, the Law Commission of India has circulated an exhaustive consultation paper on the subject including a questionnaire. I am very happy to inform you that this consultation paper has been appreciated not only in India but abroad as well. The commission has received a large number of responses from a cross section of society, viz. judges of the higher and subordinate judiciary, state governments, director generals and inspector generals of police, lawyers, various international and national organisations and individuals.

As I stated earlier, since the testimony of the victim is a very important piece of evidence in the criminal trial, it is essential that the victim should be able to give his or her testimony in court freely and without any fear or pressure. In many cases victims even turn hostile due to threats or pressure from the offender or his associates. In certain cases the victim feels uncomfortable about giving answers in the immediate presence of the offender. In order to facilitate the victim giving his or her testimony in
court freely and without any fear or pressure, it is necessary that the victim is provided certain protections and rights. These may include the following:
(i) Anonymity of victim – Names and addresses of victims may be kept secret in criminal proceedings. Even in supplying copies of charge sheets to the accused, the identity of victims may be withheld. The Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs Gurmit Singh,1996 (2 SCC 384) while dealing with a case of rape has said, "The courts should, as far as possible, avoid disclosing the name of the prosecutrix in their orders to save further embarrassment to the victim of (a) sex crime. The anonymity of the victim of the crime must be maintained, as far as possible, throughout". Though in some cases the identity of the victim is known to the accused, this is not so in all cases. Where the identity and all details of the victim are not known to the accused, maintaining anonymity would be quite helpful.

In Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum vs Union of India, 1995 (1 SCC 14), the Supreme Court while indicating the broad parameters that can assist the victims of rape, emphasised that in all rape trials ‘anonymity’ of the victims must be maintained as far as necessary so that the name is shielded from the media and public. The court also observed that the victims invariably find the trial of an offence of rape a traumatic experience. The experience of giving evidence in court has been negative and destructive and the victims often expressed that they considered the ordeal of facing cross-examination in the criminal trial to be even worse than the rape itself.

Section 13 of TADA, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and Section 30 of POTA, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (now repealed) provides that the court may take such measures as it deems fit to keep the identity and address of witnesses secret.

The New Zealand Evidence Act of 1908 contains detailed provisions regarding the maintenance of anonymity of victims and witnesses.

In the UK, the power of the court to withhold the name of the victim/witness in a criminal trial is treated as inherent in the court. Section 11 of the UK Contempt of Court Act, 1981 provides that the court may give directions to prohibit the publication of names or other matter in connection with the proceedings. In R. vs Murphy, 1989 it was held that the identity of the witness should be kept secret not only from the accused but also from the defence lawyer.

In Canada, anonymity of witnesses/victims is treated as a privilege granted under common law. The European Court of Human Rights has in Kostovski (1990), Doorson (1996), Fitt (2000) and Visser (2002) recognised the need to protect the identity of witnesses/victims.

(ii) Trial of sexual offences in camera – Section 327 of the CrPC provides that the trial of certain sexual offences shall be conducted in camera. If a trial is conducted in camera, it would help the victim to give her testimony comfortably. The presence of the public and the media produces a sense of shyness in the mind of the victim and she may not give testimony freely. The Supreme Court in the Gurmit Singh case said that if the witness or victim is protected it "would enable the victims of crimes to be a little comfortable and answer the questions with greater ease in not too familiar surroundings. Trial in camera would not only be in keeping with the self-respect of the victim of (the) crime and in tune with legislative intent but is also likely to improve the quality of evidence of a prosecutrix because she would not be so hesitant or bashful to depose frankly as she may be in open court, under the gaze of (the) public. The improved quality of her evidence would assist the courts in arriving at the truth and sifting truth from falsehood". In view of Section 327 of the CrPC and the direction of the apex court, a victim of a sexual offence has a right that trial be held in camera.

Section 13 of TADA and Section 30 of POTA provide that proceedings under these Acts shall be held in camera.

Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms speaks not only of the right to ‘open justice’ but also of the need for exceptions in the interests of morals, public order, national security and protecting the privacy of juveniles and others where publicity could otherwise prejudice the interests of justice.

Following the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in Chahal vs UK, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act, 1997 and the Northern Ireland Act, 1998 have been enacted which provide for courts to sit in camera where it was necessary on national security grounds and for appointing special counsel to represent individuals in those proceedings. Section 153 of the South African Code of Criminal Procedure permits criminal proceedings to be held in camera to protect privacy of witnesses.

(iii) Use of screen while recording of statement of victim – In many cases, especially cases relating to women and children, victims are hesitant to speak freely in the presence of offenders. Section 273 of the CrPC provides that trials should be conducted in the presence of the accused. In this regard the Law Commission in its 172nd Report (2000) has recommended the insertion of a proviso below Section 273 to the effect that where the evidence of a person below 16 years who is alleged to have been subjected to sexual assault is to be recorded, the court may take appropriate measures to ensure that such a person is not confronted by the accused. Recently the Supreme Court of India considered the abovementioned recommendation of the
Law Commission in Sakshi vs Union of India, 2004 (6 SCALE 15). The observations that the Supreme Court made in this case are worth recalling. The court observed:
"The whole inquiry before a Court being to elicit the truth, it is absolutely necessary that the victim or the witnesses are able to depose about the entire incident in a free atmosphere without any embarrassment… The mere sight of the accused may induce an element of extreme fear in the mind of the victim or the witnesses or can put them in a state of shock. In such a situation he or she may not be able to give full details of the incident which may result in miscarriage of justice. Therefore, a screen or some such arrangement can be made where the victim or witness do not have to undergo the trauma of seeing the body or face of the accused" (emphasis supplied).

The use of a screen as suggested by the Law Commission and also recommended by the Supreme Court would make it comfortable to the victim to testify in court where he or she may not confront the accused directly.

It is proper practice in criminal trials in the UK where children give evidence about sexual abuse to allow a screen to be erected between the witness and the defendant. If a defendant in person seeks to dominate, intimidate or humiliate a complainant, or should it be reasonably apprehended that he will do so, a screen can be erected. Sections 16 to 33 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999 require the court to consider special measures of various kinds for protection of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses.

(iv) Recording of statement through video conferencing – There is another method by which a victim may avoid direct confrontation with the accused while giving testimony. That is recording through video conferencing. Recording of evidence by way of video conferencing has been held to be permissible in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs Dr Praful B. Desai, 2003 (4 SCC 601). When a statement is recorded through this method, the victim would feel more comfortable and will give answers without any fear or pressure. Portuguese legislation (Act No. 93/99) of July 14, 1999 contains very exhaustive provisions regarding this aspect.

In the UK, video recorded evidence is admissible in certain cases: (a) an offence which involves an assault on or injury or threat of injury to a person (b) an offence of cruelty to persons under the age of 16 years (c) offences under the Sexual Offences Act, 1956 and 1967, Indecency with Children Act, 1960, Protection of Children Act, 1978, etc.

(v) Cross-examination through questions handed over by the defence to the judge – Victims often feel embarrassment due to the questions put by the defence counsel during cross-examination. A suggestion has been made that in some cases, instead of directly putting questions to the witness by the defence counsel, a set of questions may be handed over to the judge by the defence in advance. And the judge may ask these questions to the victim or other witnesses. The Supreme Court in the Sakshi case has stated, "often the questions put in cross-examination are purposely designed to embarrass or confuse the victim of rape and child abuse. The object is that out of the feeling of shame or embarrassment, the victim may not speak out or give details of certain acts committed by the accused. It will therefore be better if the questions to be put by accused in cross-examination are given in writing to the presiding officer of the court, who may put the same to the victim or witnesses in a language which is not embarrassing". The Law Commission in its questionnaire has posed a question as to whether it be kept in mind that the right of the accused to cross-examine a witness effectively will not be jeopardised, as this is part of a "fair trial" as guaranteed and recognised under Article 21 of the Constitution.

(vi) Change in venue of trial – In certain circumstances, the venue of the trial may be shifted if the witnesses or victims are not in a position to depose freely due to various reasons. The Supreme Court in Zahira Sheikh’s case ordered a shift in the venue of the trial from Gujarat to Maharashtra. There are other instances as well. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 contains provisions (Section 406, 407) in respect of transfer of cases. It has been done in cases in the UK and Northern Ireland also.
(vii) Providing physical and other protection to victims/witnesses – If required, victims/witnesses may be provided with physical and other protection. To provide such protection, witness/victim protection programmes may be established. Under such a programme, various protections such as police protection to victims and family members, providing new places for residence, monetary support, transport facilities and other facilities may be provided. The Law Commission in its consultation paper has discussed this aspect in detail, along with the schemes prevalent in various countries.

Article 24 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime contains provisions for witness protection.

In Australia, the Parliament of Victoria has enacted the Witness Protection Act, 1991, which contains provisions regarding a witness protection programme. For the Australian Capital Territory a separate legislation, namely, the Witness Protection Act, 1996 is in force. In Queensland, the Witness Protection Act, 2000 is in force.

In South Africa, the Witness Protection Act, 1998 is applicable for the purpose of protection of witnesses.

In Hong Kong, the witness protection programme was established under the Witness Protection Ordinance of 2000. In Canada, the Witness Protection Programme Act, 1996 has been enacted.

Portuguese legislation (Act No. 93/99) deals with the provisions governing the enforcement of measures on the protection of witnesses in criminal proceedings where their lives or physical or mental integrity, freedom or property are in danger.
In the USA, the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 contains several provisions to aid victims and witnesses of federal crimes.

(viii) Compensation to victims – In India, Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides for order to pay compensation to the victims of crimes. The Law Commission of India in its 142nd and 154th Reports has recommended the insertion of a new section in the code for a Victim Compensation Scheme. Provisions for compensation to victims are specified in many countries.

(ix) The Indian Evidence (Amendment) Act, 2002 has inserted a proviso below sub-section (3) of Section 146 of the Evidence Act, 1872 thereby giving protection to a victim of rape from unnecessary questioning about her past character. The Law Commission in its 185th Report (2003) recommended the insertion of a broader provision by way of a new sub-section (4) in Section 146.

The Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005 has inserted a new Section 164A in the CrPC for medical examination of a victim of rape by a registered medical practitioner employed in a hospital run by the government or local authority.

(Justice M. Jagannadha Rao is the chairman, Law Commission of India. This paper was presented as the keynote address at a recent National Consultation on the Protection of Victims of Trafficking and other Forms of Violence, November 19, 2005.)

Archive from Comunalism Combat, December 2005

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What happened in Gujarat was nothing but fraud — fraud on law. It was a farce of a trial. The investigation was deliberately dishonest and faulty, and perfunctory. The public prosecutor appears to have "acted more as a defence counsel" than as a genuine prosecutor. The court in turn appeared to be "a silent spectator, mute to the manipulations and preferred to be indifferent to sacrilege being committed to justice." It was an "over-hasty, stage-managed, tailored" partisan trial. The State remained indifferent, knowing as we do that the post-Godhra carnage in Gujarat was an organised crime perpetuated by the chief minister and his government.
 

Unfortunately, the high court did not understand the gravity of the situation. As the Supreme Court says: "The entire approach of the high court suffers from serious infirmities, its conclusions lopsided, and lacks proper or judicious application of mind." Even with regard to the affidavits filed for adducing additional evidence, the high court’s conclusions did "not appear to be correct and seem to suffer from judicial obstinacy and avowed determination to reject it."
 

In this background, the Supreme Court rightly observed: "The case on hand is without parallel" and no comparison can be made to any other case where re-trials might have been sought. This case stands on its own, as an exemplary one, "special of its kind, necessary to prevent its recurrence."
 

The Supreme Court had no choice but to transfer the case to another state with specified guidelines to guarantee a fair trial – fair to the accused, fair to the victim, and fair to society. Some could still question how this new trial could be fair to the accused. The Supreme Court has already answered that: "…if the acquittal is unmerited and based on tainted evidence, tailored investigation, unprincipled prosecutor and perfunctory trial and evidence of threatened/terrorised witnesses, it is no acquittal in the eye of law and no sanctity or credibility can be attached and given to the so-called findings. It seems to be nothing but a travesty of truth, fraud on legal process and the resultant decisions of courts – coram non judis and non est." – Fraud vitiates everything and there can be no right rooted in fraud.
 

The question is, what the Court should do with the other cases where there can be no hope of getting justice, particularly to the victims, if they are allowed to be tried in Gujarat? It is the same investigating agency, it is the same prosecutors, it is the same judicial administration which is willing to be "a silent spectator, mute to the manipulations" of the prosecutor, the accused and the conniving State agencies. Logically, all these cases will have to be transferred to other states, inasmuch as, even after the apex court judgement, there is no real expression of any remorse or contrition. Nor is there any move from the Central Government to initiate any action to have the state government removed.
 

It is apparent that an important wing of the administration of justice – particularly the criminal justice system has failed in Gujarat, and it can legitimately be said that the state government is not run in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
 

The larger question is what should be done if such carnages/riots take place in other states, or even in Gujarat, again, polarising the administration on the side of the majority as against the minority victims? It has happened in the past, in many states. Wherever communal riots have taken place, as between two communities, in any state, the police have shown a tendency to be on the side of the majority community. This has resulted in partisan investigation, non-registration of genuine complaints, false arrests allowing the real culprits to go scot-free, ending with tailor-made trials where no justice is done to the victims.
 

This has happened in Bangalore (1991 riots on Cauvery River verdict between Kannadigas and Tamilians), in Bombay (1992-93, after the Babri Masjid demolition) and in Delhi (1984, attacks against Sikhs). In all these places and elsewhere where such riots had taken place, there has been no conviction of any of the majority community members or of the aggressors. Gujarat is an extreme case where the whole administration, including a part of the judicial administration has been saffronised, much before the Godhra incident. Therefore, there can be no hope of getting any fair or impartial administration of justice in such situations.
 

It is precisely for such reasons that we (the Concerned Citizens’ Tribunal’s Report: Crime Against Humanity, Gujarat 2002) had suggested the need to establish a Standing National Crimes Tribunal to deal with all cases of (1) Crimes against humanity, pogroms, (2) Offences in the nature of genocide, (3) Cases of mass violence and genocide, (4) Cases of riots and incidents where there is large-scale destruction of lives and property, including caste, religious, linguistic, regional, ethnic and racial violence.
 

We suggested that this tribunal should be an independent body with persons having judicial and legal background and experience, with powers to investigate offences through its own investigating agency. The tribunal will have the right to take cognisance of crimes as mentioned above, as soon as they occur and will have the power to arrest, try, and punish the accused as well as to compensate and rehabilitate the victims and their dependants.
 

The judgement of the Supreme Court in the Best Bakery case and perhaps similar verdicts in other cases, must necessarily lead to the establishment of such an independent tribunal. That is the only way for "the restoration of the primacy of citizens’ rights against the indifference and arbitrariness of state apparatuses" (The Hindu, April 14, 2004). It is hoped that the Supreme Court will make a recommendation to the government of India to appoint statutorily such a tribunal.
 

(Justice H. Suresh is a former judge of the Mumbai high court).

Archived from Communalism Combat, April-May 2004  Year 10   No. 97, Judgement 1

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Archived from Communalism Combat, April-May 2004 Year 10   No. 97, Judgement 2

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Archived from Communalism Combat, April-May 2004 Year 10   No. 97, Judgement 3

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March 1, 2002:

Fifty-year-old Sehrunissa Sheikh, wife of the bakery owner Nafitullah Habibullah Sheikh, eldest son of bakery owner Habibullah Sheikh and 18-year-old Zahira Sheikh, her daughter, were the key witnesses. When the occupants of the building called the police for help a police van arrived about an hour and half later. But it drove past the bakery and did nothing to stop the mob. A policeman got off the van and even incited the mob. The attack intensified after the police van left. Zahira’s sister Shabira, her mama, and 12 others including four small children of the neighbours who had taken shelter there, were burnt alive by the mob. Two of her brothers were burnt alive. Two of her other brothers were tied up and torched but survived the attack. Her chacha’s entire family was killed. Two bodies could not be found. The stomachs of the three Hindu workers were slit.
 

March 2, 2002: Zahira recorded a statement at the site of the incident and thereafter continued at the hospital where the injured had been admitted. She filed an FIR before the police on March 2, 2003 naming the accused. She also made a full statement before the chairperson of the NHRC when they visited Gujarat after the riots on March 22-21, 2003.
 

May 7, 2003: Brother of Zahira, Nafitullah, and sister Saira retract their statements in court.
 

May 17, 2003: Zahira turned hostile under pressure. The same day her mother Sherunissa and younger brother Naseebullah also depose and also deny facts. She allegedly received threats from various sources including a local scrap dealer, Lal Mohammed, who was also a witness in the case and later retracted his statement. On the day of Zahira’s court appearance the local BJP MLA Madhu Shrivastava was present; he accompanied her to court. This is perceived as a tactic of intimidation.
 

June 27, 2003: Additional sessions judge HU Mahida of the Vadodara fast track court acquitted all the 21 accused in the case who were named by key witness Zahira Sheikh in her statements before the police, the NHRC and the Concerned Citizens Tribunal (Crimes Against Humanity, 2002).
 

July 7, 2003: CJP holds a press conference for Zahira in Mumbai. About a month-and-a-half after she turned hostile in court, Zahira and her family approached the Citizen’s for Justice and Peace, a citizens’ group committed to the legal battle for justice for victims of mass crimes.
 

July 11, 2003: Zahira gave a statement on oath before a full bench of the NHRC in the presence of Teesta Setalvad, secretary, CJP, about how she was forced to retract her statements in court. She named those who had threatened her and her family to pressure her to retract her statement.
 

August 1, 2003: The National Human Rights Commission filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) under Article 136 of the Constitution of India in the Supreme Court. The NHRC requested the SC to set aside the judgement of the trial court and for further investigation of the case by an independent agency. Also a re-trial of the case in a court located outside the state of Gujarat.
 

August 7, 2003: A day before the Supreme Court was to hear the NHRC’S petition, the Gujarat state government (prodded by the Supreme Court), filed an appeal before the Gujarat high court challenging the acquittal of the accused. The appeal did not ask for re-trial.
 

August 8, 2003: Zahira Sheikh and the Citizens for Justice and Peace also file an SLP accompanied by affidavits of key witnesses recording the facts that are listed along with the NHRC’s SLP.
 

October 9, 2003: During the hearing on October 9, the SC appointed senior counsel and former solicitor general of India, Harish Salve, as amicus curae to assist the court on the points that had arisen in the case.
 

October 17, 2003: Two affidavits were filed by Teesta Setalvad of Citizens for Justice and Peace before the Supreme Court. These pointed out the need for re-trial and for shifting the trial outside the state. Senior counsel Shanti Bhushan appeared on behalf of the CJP. The astounding facts about riot-stricken Gujarat contained in the affidavits made Harish Salve point these out to the Court.
 

November 21, 2003: Supreme Court stays all pending major trials including Godhra.
 

December 26, 2003: The appeal by the Gujarat government challenging the acquittal of the accused by the trial court was dismissed by the Gujarat high court.
 

January 12, 2004: The detailed reasoning of the judges was contained in a 90-page judgement justifying the acquittal. The bench comprising of Justice BJ Sethna and Justice JR Vora observed that a re-trial could not be ordered because the prosecution had failed to produce proper evidence. It pointed out that deputy commissioner of police and investigating officers had failed to discharge their duties since they did not record key witness Zahira’s FIR at the place of incident. Referring to the submission by advocate general SN Sehlat that most witnesses turned hostile under threat, the bench observed that "there may be more than one reason for the witnesses resiling from their so-called statements made before the police and that there is nothing to show that the witnesses ever made the so-called statements."
 

Moreover, the judges also passed specific remarks against Teesta Setalvad for carrying out a parallel investigation.
 

March 23-24, 2004: Arguments on Special Leave Petition in an appeal against the high court order filed by witness and Citizens for Justice and Peace.
 

April 12, 2004: Supreme Court Division bench, comprising of Justice Doraiswamy Raju & Justice Arijit Pasayat, orders re-trial of the Best Bakery case outside Gujarat, in Maharashtra. Remarks against Teesta Setalvad passed by Gujarat high court are directed to be expunged.

Archived from Communalism Combat, April-May 2004  Year 10   No. 97, Judgement 4

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In all of the most oppressive regimes of the present century, legality values, particularly in the area of ordinary and political crimes, were not simply ignored but were in fact deliberately and systematically destroyed. We may trust such regimes to identify what is essential to their own existence, and the lesson they teach is that massive assault on values of greatest importance to liberal societies will be preceded by the extinction of the legality ideal. These are the views expressed by Francis A Allen while surveying the American justice system.1  We should examine whether our Indian experience is any different.
 

Between 1968 and 1975, the institutions functioning under the Constitution comprehensively defeated the concept of equality and social change in all spheres of life. This gave rise to social and political movements with a radical thrust. Repression against these movements produced violence which could contend with State violence. This violence against the State was christened terrorism and to contain terrorism lawless laws were enacted; the latest is known by its acronym POTA.
 

Over the past two or three decades we are witnessing the struggle of the habit of legality against problems posed by political and social fragmentation of a pluralistic society. The concept of secularism and the rights of minorities are currently under attack by the forces of Hindutva. Though the Constitution recognises the plural character of our society, issues of plural societies are never confronted and resolved democratically by any of the institutions functioning under the Constitution.
 

The attack on minorities commenced with the Sikh riots in 1984. All the courts up to the apex court were not geared to deal with such large-scale genocidal violence. Nor were the innumerable commissions of inquiry set up for such purpose. When post-Babri Masjid demolition violence occurred in Bombay city in 1993, it was not a riot but was a targeted attack on the minority community. The police bureaucracy down to the constable was suffering from a Hindu perspective and the criminal justice system was no exception.
 

The government was driven to appoint the Srikrishna Commission to inquire into the riots. The findings were a scathing charge sheet against the government and its law enforcing apparatus as also the political parties. The appointment of commissions are political placebos administered by governments to tide over complaints by citizens. These are devices to manage atrocities and bad governance.
 

As riots are crimes, these need to be investigated and tried. The courts were not geared to investigate and try the offenders whose terror uprooted people in large scale from their areas and turned them into refugees in the city they had been living in for generations. These were no longer communal riots. There was a qualitative difference in the violence employed against the targeted groups.
 

"Rioting" as defined by the court may not comprehend "Genocide". The government did not take notice of the genocidal trends in the Sikh massacre of 1984 and the assault on the Muslim minority in 1993 by the majority community, and bring forth an appropriate law to prevent and control these trends. They did not show the same alacrity they displayed in bringing forth anti-terrorist legislation.
 

The communal violence that we were used to prior to 1984 was not genocide. The concerted attack on secular values and on minority communities has been on the increase post-1984. It was a challenge to the plural character of society and the assurance of equality to the constituents of this plural society. The attack against the Muslim community in Gujarat after February 28, 2002 was the most brazen violation of the Constitution by a duly constituted government. The Best Bakery case is part of that brazen attack on the Constitution and its values. By the time Godhra occurred, there had been a total erosion of all institutions of the State, more importantly the judicial system.
 

The carnage in Gujarat is part of the political campaign of the ruling party in the state and at the Centre. The major way in which Hindu religion was pushed into politics was there for all to see. What happened to the minorities from 1984 onwards and what happened in Gujarat on February 28, 2002 is genocide and not a riot as defined by Macaulay’s Code. If the Court had recognised the event as genocide the perspective of the Court would have been entirely different. All the ingredients of genocide are present in this carnage.
 

The 1948 International Covenant defines the crime of genocide. Crime of genocide means killing members of the group; causing serious bodily and mental harm; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction in whole or in part. There was present in these cases genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide and complicity in genocide.
 

The Supreme Court was shocked by the total unfairness of the trial and the partisan investigation. The apex court painfully pointed out: "In the ultimate analysis whether it is a case covered by Section 386 or Section 391 of the Code, the underlying object which the court must keep in view is the very reason for which the court exists, i.e., to find out the truth and dispense justice impartially and ensure also that the very process of courts are not employed or utilised in a manner which gives room to unfairness or lend themselves to be used as instruments of oppression and injustice." What has happened in this case is precisely what the judges said should not happen! Would such acts not amount to complicity with the culprits responsible for the carnage?
 

The judgement is remarkable in its righteous indignation and frankness and is a rare and unequivocal judgement regretting denial of justice to the minority under attack but at the same time it is sterile as it does not leave behind guidelines assuring justice to the minorities in the years to come. What was unstated in the judgement and what has driven the judges to righteous indignation was the scale of complicity of the government, the investigation, the prosecution and the courts including the high court.
 

In the political context, the reference to Mahatma Gandhi is ironical. In fact, it was the second killing of the Mahatma by the ardent followers of Godse. Godse had the courage to give his reasons for killing the Mahatma. The followers have none. The judges say criminals have no religion and that no religion teaches violence. If we examine the history of religions we may not be as willing to give such a clean chit to religions. The judges say, "the fanatics who spread violence in the name of religion are worse than terrorists and more dangerous than alien enemy." Quite true.
 

A further reading of the judgement, between the lines, tells us that the judges knew who the real culprits are. "Modern day ‘Neros’ were looking elsewhere when Best Bakery and innocent children and women were burning and were probably deliberating how the perpetrators of the crime can be saved or protected."
 

The apex court differentiated between the persons responsible for the carnage and the persons involved in the carnage, the planners and the perpetrators and the "wanton boys", the conspirators and their instruments. The unhappy part of the judgement is that notwithstanding the indignation at the failure of every institution of the State, the prosecution is directed only against the perpetrators. In our criminal justice system the principal culprit is either not prosecuted or let off if prosecuted.
 

They were reluctant to point out all the infirmities in the judgement of the high court. They describe the case as an "exemplary one, special of its kind, necessary to prevent its recurrence". The questions that immediately arise are: What guidelines have they set out for preventing recurrence? Should they not set out guidelines to ensure that religion does not enter the sphere of political government? Should they not have set down a principle of trial of these cases under the chapter on public tranquillity read with the Genocide Convention of 1948 to render complete justice?
 

All these acts leading to the carnage satisfy the principal ingredients of a terrorist act under Section (3) of POTA. The mob might not have used firearms & explosives, but surely arson could not have been managed on such a large scale without the use of inflammable and/or explosive substances. If Godhra offences could be terrorist acts, post-Godhra offences could equally be terrorist acts, and treating similar offences differently would obviously be iniquitous, unless one assumes that minorities per se are terrorists.
 

In course of time the police officers who are guilty of complicity during the carnage and thereafter in subverting the investigation, the trial judge and the high court judges will all be rewarded with promotions, elevations and even medals in recognition of excellence! PC Pandey, commissioner of police, Ahmedabad, during the period of the carnage has already been rewarded with a promotion as additional director, CBI.
 

Police officials guilty of culpable indifference and negligence deserve to be removed from service, those among them who are culpable deserve to be suspended and tried, and the high court judges for their anti-Constitutional judgement deserve to be impeached, or at any rate informed that they should, in the interests of constitutional governance, resign their judgeships. Independence of the judiciary should not become a haven for the perpetrators of unconstitutional and anti- constitutional deeds.
 

All this could have been done by the Supreme Court under Article 142 0f the Constitution. The Supreme Court was against any limited interpretation of the expression ‘cause or matter’, as that would nullify wider Constitutional powers. The Supreme Court observed on another occasion that it was advisable to leave the power undefined and un-catalogued so that it remains elastic enough to be moulded to suit the situation. It is not relevant to refer to the dicta of the courts — American and Indian — to tell us that courts will not take cognisance of matters which are best settled in the streets.
 

What happened in Gujarat in March 2002, what happened in Mumbai in January 1993, and to members of the Sikh community in 1984 are genocidal trends and courts, as enforcers of International Covenants, ought to have taken serious note of these blatant transgressions of human rights and devised jurisprudential and procedural tools to deal with this situation. A magniloquent attack on lawlessness is hardly a substitute for doing justice to the wronged. A court which innovatively protected propertied interests by devising the concepts of prospective over ruling and basic structure could have devised a concept for disqualifying a chief minister or other ministers as having been constructively responsible for the carnage by redefining a writ of quo warranto for meeting these situations. If the chief minister Modi had been disqualified on the principle of constructive responsibility, Rule of Law would not have become the fugitive that it has become now. Bal Thackaray’s Mumbai is not going to be any different. Seeing Rule of Law fleeing like a fugitive could invite private justice and the terrorist may say, "I shall repay."

___________________________________

 1 The Habits of Legality, Francis A Allen 1996 Oxford New York

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Archived from Communalism Combat, April-May 2004 Year 10   No. 97, CBI Chargesheet
 

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Archived from Communalism Combat, April-May 2004  Year 10   No. 97, Judgement, Pravind Togadia

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Donations to CJP are exempt under section 80(G) of the Income Tax Act.

The objects of CJP include:

l To check threats to Indian democracy and the Rule of Law, whether by governments or political parties or other organisations, groups or individuals.

l To combat all kinds of bigotry and intolerance which create inter-religious strife and differences among people.

l To make legal interventions in the Courts of Law through Public Interest Petitions or otherwise, to prosecute all those guilty of killing or maiming innocent citizens; and to assist others petitioning before the courts for the redressal of grievances.

l To set up or assist in setting up any lawyer/team of lawyers to effectively intervene in government appointed commissions of inquiry probing the causes of communal conflict or to identify the role of different agencies, in particular, government, police, political parties, leaders, non-party organisations, the media, and the like, in prevention or promotion of violence.

Board of Directors

The affairs of CJP are managed by a Board of Directors. The present members of the Board:

Alyque Padamsee (Communications/Advertising)

Anil Dharkar (Columnist)

Cyrus Guzder (Chairman, Airfreight)

Gulam Mohammed (Businessman, philanthropist)

Nandan Maluste (Finance, Kotak Mahindra)

IM Kadri (Senior architect)

Javed Akhtar (Poet, lyricist)

Javed Anand (Communalism Combat)

Teesta Setalvad (KHOJ, Communalism Combat)

Titoo Ahluwalia (ORG-Marg)

Vijay Tendulkar (Playwright)

Arvind Krishnaswamy (DGM, Bharat Petroleum)

Office bearers

President: Vijay Tendulkar

Vice-president: Iftikhar M Kadri

Secretary: Teesta Setalvad

Treasurer: Arvind Krishnaswamy

Report of Activities (April 2002-April 2004):

1. Relief and Rehabilitation: Compared to most NGOs engaged in Relief and Rehabilitation work after the Gujarat violence, CJP’s own contribution can be said to be quite modest: approximately Rs. 11 lakh so far . But we are happy that because we dragged the Narendra Modi Government to the Gujarat high court on this issue, the Gujarat government was compelled, as a result of the court orders, to spend at least an additional Rs. 10 crore on providing for food and other supplies to relief camps, something that the Modi government was adamant it would not do.

2. Concerned Citizens Tribunal: CJP took the initiative in setting up a citizens’ tribunal headed by Justice VR Krishna Iyer, (retd., Supreme Court) and two other retired judges – one each of the Supreme Court and high court — to conduct an independent probe into the violence in Godhra and the rest of Gujarat. Their 3-volume report, Crime Against Humanity, continues to be the most potent document till date on the Gujarat violence nationally and internationally. On its release from Ahmedabad, Delhi, Mumbai and Hyderabad, the findings and recommendations of the tribunal received extensive print and electronic media coverage.

3. Legal Action:

Best Bakery case: If the question of justice and peace in the context of the horrors of Gujarat has been brought centre-stage in the last three months, (though several legal initiatives were taken earlier), it has been due to the intervention of the Supreme Court of India in the Best Bakery case. For this, CJP can justly claim most of the credit.

It was on the CJP’s assurance of support that Zahira Sheikh and her family moved to Mumbai (CJP has since been looking after all their financial and security needs) and in early July 2003, she told a packed press conference why they were forced to lie before the court earlier and why they wanted a re-trial of the Best Bakery case outside Gujarat. The CJP secretary personally escorted Zahira Sheikh to Delhi for a full-bench hearing before the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). It was thereafter that the NHRC decided on its rare step of filing an appeal in the Supreme Court endorsing Zahira’s plea for a re-trial outside Gujarat.

Besides the NHRC, CJP and Zahira also filed a separate appeal in the SC, which has now been clubbed together with the NHRC petition. CJP’s two earlier petitions pending in the SC, on hate speech and need for transfer of investigation of the massacres to an independent agency are also to be heard now. The CJP has the moral and physical responsibility of taking care of the Sheikh family.

Godhra Families come to CJP: On Dussera Day (October 5, 2003), 14 members from four Hindu families, each of whom had lost a woman from their family in the fire that consumed coach S-6 of the Sabarmati Express in Godhra last year, addressed a press conference in Mumbai. They, too, sought the CJP’s help in their struggle for justice, as they felt totally cheated and betrayed by the very people in Gujarat who claim to be their protectors and who have raised huge amounts of money in their name. These Hindu families have also filed an impleadment application before the SC pleading that the Godhra case too must be heard outside Gujarat. Schooling and other needs of these families are also being borne by the CJP.

Gulberg Society, Chamanpura: This was one of the worst carnages where the former member of parliament, Ehsan Jaffri was brutally killed along with many others. CJP has been handling the criminal trial from the very start and it is because of CJP’s consistent support that witnesses have not been cowed down, intimidated and broken down despite numerous attempts.

The public prosecutor appointed for this trial by the Gujarat government was a man who had himself been charge-sheeted for burning alive nine Muslims in the mid-‘80s! We are pressing for a transfer of this case outside Gujarat, too.

Other Criminal Trials: Due to CJP’s sheer doggedness, tenacity and constant communication with and support to the victims in their struggle for justice, many eye-witnesses in cases that have either ruinously culminated in Best Bakery-type acquittals, or where trials have been stayed by the Supreme Court, have now approached the CJP for legal assistance. These include witnesses to the worst massacres during the Gujarat genocide: Naroda Patiya, Kidiad, Pandharwada.

Compensation claim: In response to CJP’s Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the Gujarat high court, the court has asked the Gujarat government to give a full and proper account of the Rs. 150 crore that was promised from the PM’s fund for the relief of Gujarat’s victims of violence. The chief secretary of Gujarat and three other secretaries of the Gujarat government have already held three meetings with the CJP secretary (Teesta Setalvad) following the court’s direction. Over the past month, a team of volunteers has been verifying our claims versus the district collector’s records.

Transfer Petition(s) Supreme Court: Following CJP’s initiative in the Best Bakery case and Zahira Sheikh’s appearance before the NHRC, the NHRC also filed a Transfer Petition in the SC praying for a transfer of 14 Major Carnage Trials out of Gujarat. This was in keeping with the NHRC’s findings in its path-breaking report released in 2002.

The CJP has also impleaded itself in this Transfer Petition and filed, directly in the SC, affidavits of major complainants, eye-witnesses that reveal starkly the state of subverted investigation and trials in Gujarat. The CJP has also filed along with Hindu victims of the S-6 coach burning and the relatives of illegal accused, a transfer petition in the Godhra matter.

Hate Speech and Hate Writing: The CJP has filed a petition under section 153a and 153 b of the IPC against the hate filled speeches of Gujarat CM, Mr. Narendra Modi and VHP president. Mr. Ashok Singhal. (The former had stated in August 2002, "Relief Camps are Baby Making Factories;" and Singhal said, "Gujarat was a successful experiment… I am proud that entire villages were purged of Islam."

Petition against Pandey’s appointment to CBI: Even as several matters are pending in the SC, praying for independent investigations by the CBI into the Gujarat massacres, the Central Government has appointed none other that PC Pandey, former Ahmedabad police commissioner, to the post of additional director, CBI. Pandey has been seriously indicted for dereliction of duty and failure to protect lives and property in Ahmedabad, post-Godhra.

Legal Support/Legal Aid: The CJP is also supporting a team of local lawyers in Gujarat in an effort to make sure that information is collected in time for the SC and HC cases and also to ensure that none of the local legal processes within Gujarat are subverted.

CJP Internships: Due to the respect that the CJP has earned for its work, international students of law and human rights have offered themselves for 8-week internships in Mumbai and Gujarat. A student of the New York Law School is working with the secretary, CJP on a research paper on the ‘Role of the public prosecutor in India’ and a memo on Witness Protection. All this will feed back into the litigation process that the CJP is spearheading in the SC.

Team of Lawyers: CJP is extremely grateful to the highly accomplished team of lawyers who have handled different cases for CJP pro bono (free of cost):

Gujarat high court:

Aspi Chinoi – Relief Camp case, 2002, Gujarat high court.

Mahesh Jethmalani – POTA case, Gujarat special court.

Supreme Court:

Ram Jethmalani – Advice to file SLP in Best Bakery case and for transfer

of 4 trials out of Gujarat.

Kapil Sibal – Appeal in Best Bakery acquittal case.

Shanti Bhushan – Best Bakery case.

Anil Divan – CBI Inquiry plus Godhra transfer petition.

CJP’s Achievements on the Legal Front so far:

Punish the guilty: Supreme Court order directing a reinvestigation and re-trial of the Best Bakery massacre case outside Maharashtra.

State’s duty to provide relief to victims of carnage: Gujarat high court judgements, directing the Gujarat government to provide adequate relief, medical care and sanitary facilities to the relief camps; also directing the government not to close the camps till the victims felt secure enough to leave the camps. Thanks to these judgements, the Narendra Modi government was forced to spend at least Rs. 10 crore more on the relief camps than it would have liked to do.

Archived from Communalism Combat, April-May 2004 Year 10   No. 97, Citizens for Justice and Peace

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