On January 29, 2026, the Supreme Court of India passed an interim order directing that the University Grants Commission (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026 be kept in abeyance, pending further consideration of their constitutional validity. Issuing notice to the Union of India and the University Grants Commission (UGC), returnable on March 19, 2026, the Court further invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to direct that the UGC (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2012 would continue to operate in the meantime.
As per Bar & Bench, the order was passed by a Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi, while hearing a batch of three writ petitions challenging the 2026 Regulations. Though interim in nature, the order is notable both for the breadth of constitutional concerns flagged by the Court and for the decision to suspend a regulatory framework expressly designed to address caste-based discrimination in higher education.
What follows is not merely a recounting of the proceedings, but a critical examination of why a stay was granted, whether settled principles governing interim interference were adhered to, and how the Court’s reasoning engages—sometimes uneasily—with the constitutional understanding of caste, equality, and structural disadvantage.
Background: From the 2019 PIL to the 2026 Regulations
The 2026 Regulations were framed pursuant to proceedings in a 2019 writ petition filed by Radhika Vemula and Abeda Salim Tadvi, the mothers of Rohit Vemula and Payal Tadvi, both of whom reportedly died by suicide after facing sustained caste-based discrimination within their educational institutions. According to LiveLaw, the PIL sought the creation of a robust institutional mechanism to address caste discrimination on campuses, contending that existing safeguards—particularly the 2012 UGC Regulations—had proved insufficient.
The petition may be read here.
Over the years, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasised the need for a stronger, more effective framework, even inviting stakeholder suggestions while the draft regulations were under consideration. After this consultative process, the UGC notified the 2026 Regulations in January 2026, expressly superseding the 2012 framework.
A close reading of the orders passed in that matter reveals a judicial trajectory that sits in visible tension with the later decision to place the 2026 Regulations in abeyance.
- January 3, 2025: Court acknowledges systemic failure and demands data, enforcement, and redesign
In its order dated January 3, 2025, the Court expressly recognised that adjudication could not proceed without assessing how universities had implemented the 2012 Equal Opportunity Cell Regulations, and whether those mechanisms had actually worked in practice.
The order may be read below:
Crucially, the Bench:
- directed the UGC to collate nationwide data on Equal Opportunity Cells,
- sought disclosure of complaints received and Action Taken Reports, and
- required the UGC to place its newly formulated draft regulations on record.
This was not a neutral procedural step. It reflected a judicial acknowledgment that formal regulatory existence had not translated into substantive protection for marginalised students. The Court was, at this stage, explicitly concerned with implementation failure, not over breadth or misuse.
- April 24, 2025: The Court permits notification — and treats the Regulations as additive, not suspect
By April 24, 2025, the Court went further. While disposing of an application seeking to restrain the notification of the draft regulations, the Bench refused to halt the regulatory process. Instead, it clarified that the UGC was free to notify the regulations and that they would operate in addition to the recommendations of the National Task Force constituted in Amit Kumar v. Union of India.
The order may be read below.
Two aspects of this order matter for present purposes:
First, the Court expressly noted that the steps taken by the UGC pursuant to the Payal Tadvi–Rohith Vemula petition were “in the right direction,” signalling judicial approval of a stronger, institutionalised framework to address discrimination, harassment, and mental health crises in universities.
Second, the Court treated the regulations as iterative and corrigible—open to additions, deletions, and refinement based on stakeholder input and the Task Force’s findings. There was no suggestion that the very idea of a caste-conscious equity framework was constitutionally suspect.
- September 15, 2025: Court endorses a robust, explicitly caste-conscious regulatory vision
The September 15, 2025 order is perhaps the clearest articulation of what the Court itself considered necessary to remedy caste-based discrimination in higher education.
The order may be read below.
After recording detailed submissions by senior counsel Indira Jaising, the Court flagged — without rejection — a set of far-reaching structural safeguards, including:
- a clear prohibition on all known forms of discrimination,
- an express ban on segregation based on rank or performance,
- grievance redressal bodies with mandatory representation from SC/ST/OBC communities,
- personal liability of institutional heads for negligence,
- caste-sensitive mental health counselling,
- NAAC-linked audits and social data collection, and
- withdrawal of grants for non-compliance.
What is striking is that many of these proposals go well beyond the minimal guarantees under the 2012 framework. The Court did not characterise them as excessive, divisive, or constitutionally dubious. Instead, it treated them as necessary correctives to entrenched structural discrimination.
The contradiction: Seen in this light, the later stay of the 2026 Regulations marks a sharp doctrinal and institutional turn.
In the Payal Tadvi–Rohith Vemula petitiom, the Court:
- acknowledged caste-based discrimination as systemic and institutional,
- accepted that neutrality and general anti-ragging norms were inadequate,
- encouraged regulatory expansion and refinement, and
- emphasised accountability, representation, and enforceability.
Yet, in staying the 2026 Regulations, the Court shifted focus to concerns of vagueness, misuse, and over breadth—without explaining why these concerns could not be addressed through interpretation, amendment, or guidelines, the very tools it had earlier endorsed.
This creates a deeper constitutional unease: how does one reconcile a jurisprudence that recognises caste as a structural axis of harm with an interim order that treats caste-specific regulation as inherently suspect? The stay order appears to privilege abstract equality concerns over the lived realities that animated the original petition — the deaths of students failed by institutional indifference.
The Payal Tadvi–Rohith Vemula proceedings were premised on the understanding that caste discrimination in universities is not episodic, but embedded in evaluation systems, hostel allocation, disciplinary processes, and grievance mechanisms. The Court’s own directions repeatedly moved towards differentiated, targeted protections.
Against that record, the suspension of the 2026 Regulations risks flattening constitutional analysis into a question of formal symmetry—treating all students as equally situated—precisely the approach that the Court itself had earlier found wanting.
It is against this backdrop—of Court-monitored reform aimed at addressing demonstrable institutional failures—that the interim stay assumes particular significance.
The Present Proceedings: What transpired before the Court
The challenge to the Regulations came by way of three writ petitions, filed by Mritunjay Tiwari, Advocate Vineet Jindal, and Rahul Dewan. The principal target of challenge was Regulation 3(1)(c), which defines “caste-based discrimination” as discrimination on the basis of caste against members of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes.
According to LiveLaw, the petitioners contended that:
- The definition is restrictive and exclusionary, as it does not recognise caste-based discrimination against persons belonging to non-reserved or “general” categories;
- This exclusion renders such persons remediless, even if subjected to caste-linked harassment or institutional bias;
- The provision violates Article 14 by creating an unreasonable classification lacking a rational nexus with the stated objective of promoting equity.
From the outset, the Bench subjected the Regulations to close scrutiny. Three issues dominated the hearing:
- The dual definitions of “discrimination” (Regulation 3(1)(e)) and “caste-based discrimination” (Regulation 3(1)(c));
- The omission of ragging from the 2026 Regulations, despite its inclusion in the 2012 framework; and
- The use of the term “segregation” in Regulation 7(d), particularly in relation to hostels, classrooms, and mentorship groups.
The Court repeatedly remarked that the Regulations appeared vague, capable of misuse, and potentially productive of social division rather than cohesion.
The Interim Order: What the Court did
By its interim order dated January 29, 2026, the Supreme Court:
- Issued notice to the Union of India and the UGC, returnable on March 19, 2026;
- Directed that the 2026 Regulations be kept in abeyance; and
- Exercising powers under Article 142, ordered that the UGC Regulations of 2012 would continue to operate in the meantime.
As per Bar&Bench, the Court framed four substantial questions of law, broadly concerning:
- The rationality and necessity of defining “caste-based discrimination” separately;
- The impact of the Regulations on sub-classifications within backward classes;
- Whether “segregation” envisaged under the Regulations violates constitutional equality and fraternity; and
- Whether the omission of ragging constitutes a regressive and unconstitutional legislative choice.
While these questions undoubtedly merit careful adjudication, the grant of an interim stay itself demands closer scrutiny.
Why was a stay granted — and was it justified?
Ordinarily, courts exercise considerable restraint while staying statutory or delegated legislation, especially when such legislation is aimed at addressing systemic discrimination. The established standard requires a strong prima facie case, demonstrable irreparable harm, and a balance of convenience favouring suspension.
In the present case, the Court relied primarily on:
- Ambiguity in drafting,
- Possibility of misuse, and
- The perceived exclusion of general category individuals from the definition of caste-based discrimination.
However, ambiguity and potential misuse have traditionally been treated as grounds for interpretation, not suspension, particularly in the context of welfare or protective legislation. The order does not demonstrate how the continued operation of the Regulations would cause irreversible harm sufficient to justify a blanket stay. Notably absent is any engagement with the harm caused by suspending a framework designed to respond to caste-based exclusion—an exclusion that is neither hypothetical nor speculative.
The Court’s reliance on the revival of the 2012 Regulations as a safeguard also assumes that the earlier framework was adequate, despite the fact that the 2019 PIL itself was premised on its failure to prevent institutional discrimination.
The Conceptual Problem: What is “caste-based discrimination”?
At the heart of the Court’s concern lies an unresolved conceptual question: is caste-based discrimination symmetrical?
The petitioners — and, to some extent, the Court — appear to approach caste as a neutral identity marker, capable of disadvantaging any individual depending on circumstances. This framing overlooks the constitutional understanding of caste as a structural system of hierarchy, not merely a personal attribute.
Indian constitutional jurisprudence has consistently recognised that caste-based discrimination is not simply discrimination involving caste, but discrimination arising from historical, social, and economic subordination of specific communities. To ask why upper-caste individuals are not explicitly protected under a provision addressing caste-based discrimination is to ignore this asymmetry.
Importantly, the Regulations already define “discrimination” broadly and in caste-neutral terms. Any harassment, humiliation, or unfair treatment faced by individuals from non-reserved categories is squarely covered under this definition. The absence of a separate label of “caste-based discrimination” for such individuals does not render them remediless.
The Court’s concern, therefore, risks collapsing the distinction between structural oppression and interpersonal conflict, treating unequal social realities as constitutionally equivalent.
The Slippery Comparison: “Upper castes” and de-notified or extremely backward communities
As noted by legal scholar Gautam Bhatia, one of the petitioners has argued that the impugned regulation suffers from a constitutional flaw comparable to the presumption underlying the colonial Criminal Tribes Act, 1871, which stigmatised entire communities as inherently criminal and was later repealed for violating principles of equality and constitutional morality. This submission, however, appears to rest on an analogy that implicitly places socially dominant or ‘upper’ caste groups on the same constitutional footing as communities that were historically criminalised and later de-notified.
De-notified tribes, in particular, have faced:
- Colonial-era criminalisation;
- Persistent social stigma;
- Economic exclusion; and
- Institutional invisibility even within reservation frameworks.
To suggest that excluding general category individuals from the definition of caste-based discrimination creates an equal protection problem risk flattening historical injustice into abstract formalism. Constitutional equality does not require identical treatment of groups situated in radically unequal positions. Indeed, such an approach may itself violate the principle of equality by treating unequal’s alike.
The Court’s rhetorical invocation of a “casteless society,” while normatively appealing, sits uneasily with judicial precedent cautioning that claims of castelessness often precede, rather than follow, the dismantling of caste hierarchies.
Vagueness, misuse, and the burden on protective legislation
The Court’s repeated emphasis on the “possibility of misuse” raises a familiar but contested trope in Indian constitutional adjudication. It is well settled that: The possibility of abuse of a law is no ground to strike it down.
This principle assumes even greater importance in the context of protective regulations, which have historically been diluted through misuse arguments advanced by socially dominant groups. The order does not explain why ordinary safeguards—such as inquiry mechanisms, appellate review, and judicial oversight—would be insufficient to address misuse on a case-by-case basis.
By foregrounding speculative misuse over structural exclusion, the order risks imposing a higher justificatory burden on equity-oriented regulations than on other forms of delegated legislation.
Ragging, non-regression, and judicial overcorrection
The Court’s concern regarding the omission of ragging from the 2026 Regulations is doctrinally significant, particularly in light of Justice Bagchi’s invocation of the principle of non-regression, as reported by LiveLaw. However, even assuming the omission is a serious flaw, it is not self-evident that the appropriate response was to stay the entire regulatory framework, rather than:
- Read the Regulations harmoniously with existing anti-ragging norms;
- Issue interpretative directions; or
- Direct limited corrective amendments.
The chosen course reflects a form of judicial overcorrection, where legitimate concerns about incompleteness lead to wholesale suspension.
Article 142 and the revival of the 2012 Regulations
The use of Article 142 to revive the 2012 Regulations raises further questions. While intended to prevent a regulatory vacuum, the move effectively substitutes judicial preference for executive policy, without a finding that the earlier framework better advances constitutional values.
This is particularly striking given that the 2026 Regulations were framed pursuant to Court-monitored proceedings and stakeholder consultations following the 2019 PIL. The revival thus appears less as a neutral stopgap and more as a normative rollback, albeit temporarily.
What the Supreme Court Directed in the Payal Tadvi–Rohith Vemula PIL — and why the stay order sits uneasily with it
The Supreme Court’s interim stay of the UGC (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026 must be read against the backdrop of the Court’s own continuing supervision in Abeda Salim Tadvi v. Union of India—the petition arising from the institutional failures that culminated in the deaths of Payal Tadvi and Rohith Vemula.
Conclusion: interim caution or substantive retreat?
The Supreme Court’s interim order undoubtedly reflects a desire to prevent social fragmentation and regulatory excess. Yet, in its emphasis on neutrality, symmetry, and speculative misuse, the Court risks diluting the constitutional logic of substantive equality that has long justified differentiated protections for caste-oppressed communities.
The deeper danger lies not merely in staying one set of regulations, but in the judicial reframing of caste-based discrimination as a universally symmetrical phenomenon, detached from history and structure. Whether this framing endures at the final stage will determine whether the Court’s intervention is remembered as a moment of careful constitutional recalibration—or as a cautious but consequential retreat from the promise of transformative equality.
The complete order may be read below:
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