Arms and the man

Musharraf launches ‘half–a–revolution’

It is a measure of the cynicism that pervades India’s political climate today that many commentators have responded to Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf’s major address to the nation of January 12 with the question: "But will he be able to deliver results? Can he change ground realities? Will he really be able to stop cross–border terrorism and bring Pakistan’s jehadi fanatics to heel?"

This in itself may not be an irrelevant question. But in the circumstances, it’s the wrong question to ask. More precisely, it puts the cart before the horse. The real issue is, what is the true meaning, import and significance of Musharraf’s speech? Does his address constitute a major transformatory change of intent, or a radical shift of purpose, or is it only a trivial or marginal change from the "normal" rhetoric that Pakistan’s officialdom resorts to when it is in crisis? Whether Musharraf can actually translate his intent into practical results logically comes after this question.

To honestly answer the first question, we must recognise, and frankly acknowledge, that on January 12, Pervez Musharraf did something few heads of states ever do — especially when they are beleaguered and in deep crisis. He subverted a major component, if not a pillar, of the ideological foundation which has sustained the edifice of Pakistani society and politics for two decades. He began a major surgical operation on the tumour of militant, political Islam which has long afflicted that country’s body politic. And he launched an ambitious programme of reform of society, the like of which South Asia has never seen before.

Musharraf’s January 12 address will go down as a landmark in this region’s history — even if it were to remain a catalogue of the many disorders that affect Pakistan and a list of pious intentions. But it is likely to turn out to be much more than that. It was preceded, and followed, by South Asia’s biggest–ever crackdown on communal bigots and terrorists. Already, some 2,000 "terrorist" suspects have been rounded up, five organisations including Lashkar–e–Toiba and Jaish–e–Mohammed banned, and 300 of their offices closed down, locked and sealed.

Some of our leaders have slowly, reluctantly, grudgingly, begun to acknowledge the significance of Musharraf’s reform agenda, although they see it purely in terms internal to Pakistan’s domestic politics. Thus LK Advani, fresh from a visit to the US, said (Jan. 16) the address was "path–breaking" from the internal point of view. And AB Vajpayee has finally said (Jan. 17) that Musharraf’s address has many "positive elements". Yet others, especially hawkish media commentators, have called it a successful and effective "public relations" exercise.

It will not do to minimise Musharraf’s address as a defensive or diversionary tactic aimed at appeasing Western powers on the terrorism issue. More than two–thirds of his speech was devoted to diagnosing the pathology of Pakistani society and politics and to outlining an agenda for internal reform, rather than on making concessions on "external" issues like India’s demand to take "decisive" action against its list of 20 terrorists. Of course, there was a degree of flamboyance that went with Musharraf’s much–publicised speech, but PR considerations, alone or mainly, cannot explain its thrust.

What Musharraf has unveiled is a plan to put Pakistan on the road to modernisation and secularisation by severing the links between political Islam and the state, between the military and the mullahs, and between Kashmir and terrorist violence. At the heart of the plan is trenchant criticism of Pakistan’s dangerous mix of religion and politics, and the disastrous consequences this has had on the state and civil society. Whether the general succeeds in achieving his objectives or not, and how soon, it must be conceded that his agenda represents perhaps the most ambitious reform programme undertaken in any country, barring Turkey under Kemal Ataturk, to deal with the issue of religion and politics.

It is certainly the boldest such agenda ever outlined in South Asia since Nehru’s ‘Tryst with Destiny’ speech at Independence.

Musharraf’s reform programme represents a complete reversal of the Islamisation project launched by Zia–ul–Haq to acquire a figleaf of legitimacy for his brutal military dictatorship and to transform the very character of Pakistan. The logic of Zia’s project eventually unfolded in its most developed form through the Taliban, through Pakistan’s attempt to virtually annex Afghanistan and acquire "strategic depth", and through the promotion of a variety of militant groups in West and South Asia, especially in Kashmir.

Musharraf has started cutting the umbilical cord between the Pakistani state and jehadi terrorism. One can argue that this is only the beginning of what is likely to be a prolonged process which will inevitably involve purging the army of pernicious religious–political influences, and even cleansing the ISI. It is by no means certain that Musharraf will succeed. The Pakistan situation is fraught with uncertainty, strife and danger. His agenda will antagonise some of his own military colleagues. He has hit out at the bigoted mullahs who for years have been the mainstay of fanatical groups. Successive governments, including Musharraf’s, have found it hard to rein in such men. Numerous jehadi militants, inflamed by the Taliban’s defeat in Afghanistan, are only waiting to get their claws into Musharraf.

Musharraf has thus embarked on an extraordinarily bold and risky mission. He may have done so under pressure, even compulsion. But that should not detract from the importance of his endeavour and coherence of his purpose. Far–reaching changes are sometimes brought about not because there is a "genuine" change of heart, but because "soft" options vanish, and there is a compelling need to change.

It is tempting to argue, as some Pakistani commentators have themselves done, that only a General (Musharraf) could have undone the legacy of another General (Zia). It is also easy to draw parallels between Musharraf and Algeria’s secular military junta, which a decade ago prevented radical Islamicists from taking power despite their clear victory in elections.

However, that would be trivialising the importance of the overall plan for Pakistan’s political reform, which started unfolding within a week of Musharraf’s address. This has a strong democratisation component, linked as it is with preparations to hold elections by the Supreme Court-stipulated October 2002 deadline, the abolition of communal electorates, and a 48 percent increase in the strength of the National Assembly, along with a new political initiative on Kashmir. So, while Ataturk never succeeded in democratising but only in secularising Turkey, and the Algerian junta forcefully snuffed out democracy, Musharraf’s broadly secular reform comes coupled with a momentum in favour of democratisation of Pakistan’s polity.

Therefore, it would be sheer nitpicking and pettifogging to fault Musharraf for the many omissions in his speech. True, he didn’t refer to the "Lahore process" or the "Shimla agreement". Of course, he didn’t own up the damage that Islamabad militants have caused to Kashmiri civilians, or apologise for it. But that was hardly the function of his address. Did Jaswant Singh and Vajpayee ask if he apologised for what the Taliban had done in Afghanistan when he joined the US-led "anti–terrorist" coalition which New Delhi uncritically supports? What is relevant is that Musharraf unconditionally condemned all forms of terrorism and the "Kalashnikov culture" of all religious extremism. Of equal significance was his insistence that Pakistani groups must not mess around in other countries — no matter what the cause.

It is wrong to make a rigid separation between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ components of Musharraf’s address. They are strongly, organically, inter–connected or related. Implicit in the insistence on limiting Pakistan’s external role is the view that the country has paid dearly because it pandered to pan–Islamic ideas and the vision of an ummah or Islamic brotherhood at least in this region. Musharraf wants Pakistan to be seen as a ‘normal’, moderate, non–aggressive, responsible nation in the region and the world.

Backing this up is Musharraf’s internal agenda, including the redefinition of jihad as a fight against poverty, illiteracy and backwardness, and strict regulation of madrassas and mosques through a system of registration. His radical plan can potentially transform Pakistan into a modern, forward–looking, open society which is no longer obsessed with religion, or crude, intolerant, interpretations of it. He has clearly posed the choice between this future, and a grim fate for Pakistan if it chooses to be a paranoid, closed, religion-obsessed, backward society.

And yet, despite all its far-reaching, courageous, bold and radical content, Musharraf’s agenda is flawed on two counts. One, it lacks the strong energies that can only come from a "perspective from below", one that arises from the struggles and daily activities of the working people. It is thus very much a revolutionary reform "from above". Secondly, it relies for its self–actualisation on the agency of the Pakistani state, itself a thoroughly corrupt, compromised and unreliable entity. Thus, on a demanding view, Musharraf is attempting only "half–a–revolution" although it is infinitely more ambitious than the conservatism and timidity of Vajpayee & Co.

Musharraf of course asserts that Kashmir "runs through our blood". But he has been careful to decouple Kashmir’s "freedom struggle" from terrorist militancy. And he has offered a dialogue on Kashmir. India must accept this in a spirit of openness, good faith and generosity. It just won’t do to acknowledge — as New Delhi does — that Kashmir is an issue, a dispute, a problem, albeit a bilateral one, and then refuse a bilateral dialogue on one pretext or other. There is a real danger today that failure to discuss Kashmir bilaterally, which India agreed to do at Lahore and Agra, will invite external intervention, with unpalatable consequences.

The US is in a uniquely powerful position today as a hegemonic power which is courted by both New Delhi and Islamabad. India has used the US as the central interlocutor in its post–December 13 strategy of brinkmanship. Having allowed America such a pivotal role, it cannot easily resist its friendly (or not–so–friendly) involvement in Kashmir — if bilateralism fails. Bilateralism must be made to work in its authentic spirit.

Equally important, India must immediately de–escalate its military build–up on the western border. It would be ill–advised to wait for Pakistan to "surrender" any of the 20 terrorists it has named. Musharraf cannot be easily pressurised into handing over any of the Pakistani nationals in that list to Interpol, leave alone to India. Equally unlikely is the surrender of Dawood Ibrahim or Chhota Shakeel, who in any case are gangsters rather than terrorists. India could perhaps get some former Khalistanis exiled in Pakistan handed over to some external agency. But that would be a minor consolation in relation to the substantial gain from Musharraf’s outlawing of JeM and LeT.

It would be unwise as well as unrealistic for India to cast itself in the mould of a superpower by demanding that Pakistan give up the 20 suspects, or else… For one, India has not established convincing links between them and the Parliament attack; it has just cited or raked up old cases. For another, the US was itself wrong, as this writer has earlier argued, to use military force in Afghanistan, without exhausting legal and diplomatic possibilities. It has ended up killing at least 3,700 innocent Afghans — 500 more people than were killed in New York’s Twin Towers. And for a third, India cannot bend its near–strategic equal Pakistan to its will, as the US could with its adversaries in Afghanistan. India is not a superpower which can arrogate to itself the "right" to crush terrorism outside its borders.

It is in New Delhi’s own interest to de–escalate the current eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. The present build–up is the largest ever, with half a million armed men pitted against one another. Anything can go wrong: a terrorist attack inspired by a rogue agency out to sabotage Musharraf’s plans, an overzealous local commander on either side getting hyperactive, or a plain South Asia–style goof–up. The consequences would be disastrous.

The longer India waits, the greater the chances of a mishap. Today, the Vajpayee government can draw some satisfaction from the fact that Musharraf has taken concrete action against JeM or LeT — although not entirely under India’s muscle-flexing. Colin Powell during his visit has delivered a message in favour of dialogue and de-escalation. If the government acts on its own, rather than under US goading, it might even claim a minor victory and hope that this will help BJP a little in Uttar Pradesh. But Vajpayee must draw the line here. Instead of indulging in more brinkmanship, he should try to find an imaginative solution to the Kashmir issue by widening the opening that has emerged in the Valley both as a result of the Taliban’s ignominious defeat and Musharraf’s new turn against jehadi terrorism. But first of all, Vajpayee must de–escalate.          

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8  No. 75-76, Cover Story 1

"We may in the not too distant future be able to go to our Masajid and our Imam-bargaahs without police protection"

If September 11 had happened ten–years–ago Pakistan would have be come a better coun-try by now. Thanks to Osama, we were hauled back to senses from the strategic depths of the Taliban. If September 11 were to happen in the next decade then we would have been even poorer by virtue of sending additional billions down the same Afghan hole. Thanks to Osama, again, we may in the not too distant future be able to go to our Masajid and our Imam–bargaahs without police protection.

The unprecedented crackdown on the extremist elements within our society is on. It must be awfully painful. Just ask anyone who had to put his favourite Doberman to sleep.

Are we on the verge of breaking the status quo? If PTV is any guide then we are not. PTV’s propaganda is not conducive to peace at all. It’s like one arm of the government goes out to shake Vajpayee’s hand while the other is trying to sabotage the whole effort. If the government leads the people to believe that "Kashmir will become Pakistan" and then fails to deliver there is bound to be a backlash. Ayub learnt the hard way and Tashkent finally brought him down.

My legal eagle tells me that all the people who are being arrested or who have been arrested under MPO (Maintenance of Public Order) in the on–going crackdown would have to be released. The last time he looked at the Pakistan Penal Code, keeping a beard or belonging to a madrassa was not against the law. They can be tried under the anti-terrorism law but the government of Pakistan would come short on evidence, as it always does.

To be certain, the state of Pakistan is fully capable of taking care of any non–state actor within its geographical boundaries. In a country like ours where the writ of the central government is reasonably strong, sustenance of on–state actors is actually more of a ‘host–parasite’ phenomenon.

The unprecedented crackdown on the extremist elements within our society is on. It must be awfully painful. Just ask anyone who had to put his favourite Doberman to sleep.

The host almost always gets sick (read: sectarian killings within Pakistan) but there always is an underlying state policy that governs most host–parasite interactions. In our case, the long–held policy has been to facilitate germ–cell migration through the LoC.

Welcome to Dr. Musharraf’s new chapter on parasite management and disease control (the ban on the Lashkar and the Jaish has been extended to Azad Kashmir). Identification of the parasites is easy and the right vaccine has been in store for long. Unfortunately, the state was either unwilling to administer it or our real decision makers thought that it was not in their institutional interest to do so.

Here are four questions sent in by a long–distance scribe. First, Kashmir runs in our blood–a biological analogy — but how can that be if Kashmir has never been part of our body? Second, if Pakistan is a ‘Fortress of Islam’ then why are there police squads outside each mosque? Third, in the age of information superhighways why do we want to remain a fortress (something that only has a heritage value and no military significance whatsoever)? Fourth, we advocate self– determination for seven million Kashmiri Muslims but why do we forget 140 million Pakistanis?

Moinuddin Haider claims that the vaccine has now been injected intravenously. Powell is of the opinion that the doctor should be given a chance because the vaccine needs time to work. Deep down, Jaswant suspects that the vaccine is actually a placebo.

The other issue is that of the adaptive capability of the parasites. Every parasite uses strategies to counteract and ensure survival. The only thing that the mullahs want is a war with India just so that what they now consider as their internal enemy can be humiliated. How equipped are we to fight the parasites? On a scale of 1 to 10, I would say, an 8.

In response to the January 12 "historic" address, the Indian print media exhibited a lot of political maturity. On January 14, The Hindu, in an editorial, said that the "political courage exuded by the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, in addressing India’s concerns raises the vision of a truly promising turn in the crisis–ridden bilateral relationship." The Hindustan Times wrote, "Now that India will have to wait patiently for Pervez Musharraf to turn over a new leaf to begin, hopefully, a new and more moderate phase in his career...."

The American media, however, was less forgiving. The Washington Post wrote, "There were heroic flourishes in his January 12 declaration. But Musharraf’s role in creating the disasters that led to the need for that speech cannot be simply forgotten or forgiven, or compensated."

The divide is getting clearer by the day and the future less cloudy. Within Pakistan, one is either with the status quo or against it. All that the status quo brought us was misery and illiteracy. "Kashmir runs in our blood" represents status quo. Agreeing to resolve Kashmir through blood–less means amounts to breaking the status quo.

Have the Dobermen been put to sleep or have they gone into hibernation? The answer really depends on whether the defenders of the Land of the Pure shall continue to be the defenders of the status quo or are they now sincere in breaking away from the status quo. Is the crackdown a bid to cool off pressure from all sides or does it mean a genuine change in state policy? The settled issue is that what we have achieved so far we couldn’t have without Osama. 

Courtesy: The Friday Times, Pakistan.

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8  No. 75-76, Cover Story 2

The army’s attitude towards jihadi groups was in large part a response to the fact that the proliferation of armed jihadi groups was a direct challenge to the army’s monopoly of armed force in society

To understand what has been going on, to be gin with, we should recognise and analyse the divisions and tussles within the Pakistani army itself. There are two trends in the army. During the British period, because the colonial power wanted Indian officers in the army to be unaffected by nationalist ideology, they promoted instead an ideology of army ‘professionalism’.

When Pakistan was created, that ideology continued in a slightly modified form. The top brass in the army added to the notion of ‘professionalism’ the idea of supremacy of the army over society, especially politicians whom they had learnt to despise during the colonial period itself. This ideology is by its nature ‘secular’, or I might say ‘not ideologically religious’.

When Zia came on the scene he went to great lengths to promote Islamic ideology in the army… For a time this trend was quite strong. But the Islamists, strong as they became at the time, had not yet succeeded in pushing the ‘professionals’ (as I would call them) out from positions of control in the army.

Fed up with that and impatient, the Islamists attempted a coup in 1995, led by one Major General Zahirul Islam Abbasi. They wanted to ‘Islamise the army and the country. That attempt by the Islamists gave an opportunity to the professionals to remove quite a few of the Islamists. But, by and large, many Islamists remained, some in senior positions. Some Islamists were, of course, more fanatical than others.

Musharraf clearly belongs to the category of ‘professionals’. He is a pragmatist, for whom army interests are uppermost. But he does use the vocabulary of secularism. That vocabulary is currently quite useful for them. In the name of secularism (and Jinnah) they bolster their position vis–à–vis the Islamists.

Let us not forget that Musharraf was the author of Kargil. I would say that the Kargil episode, foolish and counter–productive as it was, was anti–Indian rather than Islamist. When Musharraf seized power, you might recall his speech when he said that Kamal Ataturk was his personal hero and he also tried (unsuccessfully) to modify the Blasphemy law.

The Islamists were too powerful then… The spate of sectarian killings in the summer of 2001 (months before the US declared its ‘War Against Terrorism’) gave Musharraf the opening that he was waiting for. He read the riot act to the mullahs at a Seerat conference in June 2001 and again on August 14 (Pakistan’s Independence Day). He banned the Lashkar–e–Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Mohammad and also put Sipah–e–Sahaba on notice.

I would point out that the army’s attitude towards jihadi groups was in large part a response to the fact that the proliferation of armed jihadi groups was a direct challenge to the army’s monopoly of armed force in society. That, I believe was a major factor impelling the army on a warpath against jihadis.

America’s ‘War on Terrorism’ after Sept. 11, gave the professionals an opportunity to deal effectively with the Islamists. With American backing, they retired or transferred Islamist officers some of whom were very powerful indeed, such as Lt. Gen Mahmud Ahmad, the head of ISI, who was an extremely powerful ideological Islamist, with ambitions of becoming the top man in the army.

There is a general absence of analysis and recognition of such conflicts and contradictions within the army. It would be facile to say that the actions against Islamist and Jihadi groups by the Musharraf government, beginning from the summer of 2001 (if not Musharraf’s declarations from the outset) are due simply to American pressure. That would be a gross over-simplification. The struggle between the two groups of army officers was much older than that. As for the Jaish–e–Mohammad and Lashkar–e–Toiba, they were blamed by the Indians for the Dec. 13 attack on the Indian Parliament. Leaders and activists of both were promptly arrested by Musharraf. But he said they had been arrested not for the Delhi attack but for unspecified ‘other reasons’. Try and believe that!

(Excerpted from Hamza Alavi’s intervention in a group discussion on the Internet).

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8  No. 75-76, Cover Story 3

All Muslim states are unstable either because they have enforced the shariah and are unhappy with it, like Pakistan, or have not enforced it and are unhappy that it has not been enforced
 

On 5 January 2002, the Concerned Citizens Forum held a seminar in Lahore’s Al-Hamra hall on the topic What kind of Pakistan do we want? The main speaker was ex-foreign secretary Mr Iqbal Akhund. One thought that the subject was not open for discussion, unless you take the title of the seminar to mean improvements in the running of the various state institutions. What kind of state do we want? can be answered by: ideological; and what kind of ideology? can be answered by Islamic; and what kind of Islamic state do we want? can be answered by: that which enforces the shariah.

I thought all these answers were in the Constitution and no one demanded anything else in Pakistan. Nor could anyone want it because there is a section in the Penal Code punishing anyone who speaks against the ideology of Pakistan with a long sentence behind the bars. That’s probably why at least one Urdu newspaper condemned what was said at the seminar.

Can you improve upon ideology? Yes, but not by watering it down, but by making it more hard–line and stringent. When Gorbachev wanted to make communism ‘loose’ (glasnost) and ‘reconstructed’ (perestroika), there was a coup against him. The communist state had to collapse and make way for Yeltsin’s capitalist order. Ideology brooks no revisionism.

In Pakistan too, every time it is felt that the ideology is not delivering there are prescriptions for further strengthening of the shariah. Therefore, it is no use recommending that we want a Pakistan where the ideology is either not there or is watered down.

Needless to say, anyone recommending that the ideological state be undone is committing heresy and could be punished under law. On the other hand, there are many institutions and personalities in Pakistan who answer the question What kind Pakistan do we want? by putting forth concrete steps to harden the ideology.

Hardening as answer to demands of reform:

The clergy is constantly demanding the enforcement of the shariah in answer to the question that the seminar asked. The Council for Islamic Ideology (CII) is busy on a daily basis to put forth its proposals for the conversion of the Pakistani state into a utopia of Islamic dreams.

Can we want a Pakistan different from the one we have? The answer is no.

The Ministry for Religious Affairs has already sent to the cabinet of General Musharraf a full–fledged programme for converting Pakistan into an ideal state. (The proposal has been shelved by a scared government). We have reached this stage in a gradual fashion, where these state institutions have become directly responsible for encouraging extremism even as President Musharraf takes steps to rein in the extremists.

In 1947, just before Pakistan came into being, the founder of the state, the Quaid–e–Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, made a formal statement which answered the question What kind of Pakistan do we want? He told his countrymen that he wanted a secular state. If earlier he had made ambivalent Islamic statements to woo the Muslim community, he now wanted to put them on notice that Pakistan would not be religious state.

(As the seminar of the Concerned Citizens opened, Pakistan’s well-known nationalist historian Safdar Mahmood had finished his four–part journalistic assault on those who thought that Jinnah was secular.)

In 1948, Pakistan signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights after joining the United Nations. The Declaration contains articles ensuring freedom of religious worship. Therefore in 1949 when Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and his cabinet decided to table the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly, they were self–conscious about not infringing the rights of the non-Muslims in Pakistan.

This was Pakistan’s second answer to the question What kind of Pakistan do we want? It said that Pakistan would be an Islamic state where sovereignty will belong to God Almighty (later changed to Allah) but that all non–Muslims would be allowed to practise their religion freely.

The Hindu members of the Constituent Assembly from East Pakistan (25 percent of the delegation) objected because they did not want the kind of Pakistan envisaged in the Objectives Resolution. They were told by Muslim clerics outside the Assembly that an Islamic state treated its non–Muslims as zimmis and did not give them equal rights.

Inside the Assembly, Liaquat Ali Khan swore that non–Muslims would be treated equally, and Zafrullah Khan (sic!) told them what an excellent and progressive thing the Objectives Resolution was while Nishtar explained to them in a threatening tone the real meaning of jihad. (It is unclear why he should have spoken of jihad when trying to answer the question What kind of Pakistan do we want?)

Objectives Resolution as answer: To make sure that the ‘objective’ is not forgotten, the Objectives Resolution was appended to the Constitution as its Preamble. But then on a couple of occasions the Supreme Court had to accept the argument that a Preamble was not the actual body of the Constitution.

It was therefore taken upon himself by General Zia to insert the Preamble into the Constitution through an amendment. But, conscious of the fact that shariah ordained zimmi-hood, he removed the word freely from the text where the non–Muslims were promised freedom of worship in consonance with the Universal Declaration. The sneaky thing he did was that he did not notify the deletion of the word, freely.

That brought in the unspoken zimmi concept, in line with the fulfilment of the condition implied in What kind of Pakistan do we want? This ideal was reached by General Zia when he added separate electorates to the Constitution through his 8th Amendment. No non–Muslims could vote together with Muslims and were to be treated like a zimmi although the Constitution still did not contain the word.

General Zia asked the question very directly and answered it in great detail. His answer is now the grundnorm of our consciousness. If you deviate an iota from his shibboleths the orthodoxy of Pakistan, both political and religious, will have you by the throat. Zia asked Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari to report on what kind of state Pakistan should be in the light of the Islamic practice. The Ansari Report said an Islamic state cannot have political parties and cannot have a parliament with an opposition sitting in it. Hence the 1985 ‘partyless’ elections.

Iran got there first under the Ayatollahs by having a parliament without an opposition and no political parties. Afghanistan was even ‘purer’, it had an amirul momineen on the Medinate model, which caused many visiting Pakistani ulema, including Dr Israr Ahmad, to exclaim that he had created an ambience in Kandahar ‘just like the Prophet PBUH’.

General Zia’s answer was therefore not complete. His Federal Shariat Court was based on the ‘inclusive’ principle, meaning that anything not repugnant to Islam would be considered Islamic. While the democrats in Pakistan thought the Federal Shariat Court was incorrectly legislating instead of parliament, the ulema thought it fell far short of recreating the utopia of Madina. Major–General Abbasi, who staged his unsuccessful Islamic coup in the army in 1995, was to declare himself an amirul momineen according to the text of the speech that was found in his office.

No revisionism under ideology: Zakat and ushr were the first to be enforced to make Pakistan the kind of state we liked. Zakat, since its inception, has been regularly embezzled. Because of the malpractice in its distribution, it has not been distributed for a number of years. Its collection was always a problem because the Shia community never accepted and was allowed exemption.

The welfare state envisaged in this collection was never realised. After the Sunni community began ducking zakat by declaring themselves Shia, the Supreme Court granted the Sunnis the same exemption as to the Shias. Now as our religion minister Dr. Ghazi wants to provide loans to the unemployed out of the Zakat collection, he is supposed to have violated the law which says it can only be given as alms, and a notice to this effect has been issued by the CII.

American researcher Grace Clark, in Pakistan 2000 (Lexington Books, 2000) discloses that a federal officer had absconded to London with a billion rupees of Zakat money! On the other hand, ushr, not mentioned in the Quran, has been levied without reinterpretation: 10 percent taxation on rain–fed farms while the irrigated ones pay only 5 percent! The state we want cannot revise out–dated provisions even if the laws are not Quranic! Needless to say, the collection of ushr in Pakistan has failed.

About reinterpretation, the state we want has a clear stand. General Zia rejected Allama Iqbal when he was told in 1986 by Justice Javid Iqbal that his father did not think that hudood could be imposed in modern times and had said so in his famous Sixth Lecture. Today, we have the cutting of hands in the statute book but have not cut any hands so far.

One argument is that in ancient times hands were cut for theft because there were no prisons in Arabia. As if to answer this rationalisation, the CII has recently declared that Islam disallows prisons and therefore all prisons in Pakistan (the one we really want) should be dismantled! Another law relating to diyat (blood money) is often abused and has not been enforced with regard to a murder where the killer has not been found and the locality where the body is found has to collectively pay the blood money.

Needless to say, in the state we want, no one can reinterpret ancient jurisprudence when it doesn’t work. Banking has to be abolished because the money–lender’s riba has been equated with interest, just as rape has been equated with fornication and the raped woman is in fact punished if she cannot produce eye-witnesses who saw her being raped.

Can we want a Pakistan different from the one we have? The answer is no. The difficulty lies in the inability of the Muslims to mould their original revealed message to modern times by applying logic and rationality to the ancient case law. There was a time when this was done but the era of taqleed (imitation) has been upon us since the medieval period. Under colonial rule, many Muslims thought of introducing reason in the science of understanding the Holy Writ, but today no one in the Islamic world tolerates any deviation from taqleed even when this taqleed varies in practice from state to state.

All Muslim states are unstable either because they have enforced the shariah and are unhappy with it, like Pakistan, or have not enforced it and are unhappy that it has not been enforced. For Muslims the question What kind of state do we want? is a rhetorical one because for them it has already been answered.                     

(Courtesy: The Friday Times, Pakistan)

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8  No. 75-76, Cover Story 4

IA REHMAN
Director, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan & core member, Pak–India People’s Forum for Peace and Democracy

The factors contributing to General Musharraf’s Jan. 12 declarations need to be understood. Pakistani civil society has been for long pointing out that militant groups operating under the
garb of religion were functioning like a state within a state and, therefore, it was imperative to disband them. The army top brass realised this but could not proceed against these militias for two reasons.

First, it was believed that the militants were too powerful to be disciplined, partly because of their own accumulated power and partly because of their sympathisers within the armed forces. Secondly, since the militants were being used by a defence agency in Afghanistan and elsewhere, action against them was considered contrary to the strategy the regime had inherited from Zia–ul–Haq and which it had accepted without questioning.

The US operations against Taliban brought home to General Musharraf the futility of and dangers in employing the militants anywhere. Action against them became necessary not only in the interest of Pakistan’s integrity but also for guaranteeing the survival of the Musharraf regime itself.

A more significant factor was the Pakistani people’s rejection of the Taliban and their supporters in the country. Except for small groups of people in Peshawar and Quetta who were directly associated with the Taliban, there were no demonstrations in the latter’s support elsewhere in the country.

The message from Pakistani civil society was clear — it considered the militants a grave threat to the political, social and economic interests of the population. This gave General Musharraf the confidence, as he subsequently admitted, to deal and deal directly with the militants.

Hence the Jan. 12 address. The general has followed it up with measures to placate the non-Muslim population, women activists and a section of liberal opinion through electoral reform proposals. This has far–reaching implications as it means reducing the clerics’ role in domestic politics.

Since these measures are necessary in the interest of the survival of his regime, General Musharraf’s change of course is credible to a considerable extent. But the sincerity and adequacy of these measures over a long period remains to be tested.

Urban–educated professionals, businesspersons and women’s organisations are sections from civil society who have vocally welcomed the steps against the fanatical forces. The rural masses have no way of articulating their views.

What is significant is that the religious parties have not been able to throw a public challenge to the steps that Musharraf has announced and even taken. Two of their prominent leaders — Qazi Husain Ahmad, head of Jamaat–e–Islami, and Maulana Fazlur Rahman, head of Jamiat Ulema–e–Islam, have been detained. But their parties have failed to organise any significant demand for their release.

Eventually, the success of the regime’s new look strategy will depend on the revival of the economy, increase in employment and the administration’s ability to gain public trust in its efficiency and integrity and degree of its respect for the under–privileged.

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8  No. 75-76, Cover Story 5

BM KUTTY

Trade Unionist

I personally feel that President Musharraf ‘s comments, telecast in his TV address on January 12, on the religious extremist and jihadi groups in Pakistan were seriously meant as were the steps he announced to curb their activities.

Times have changed and, under pressure or by conviction, no matter which, Musharraf’s speech and subsequent statements, I believe, reflect the thinking of the majority of the people of Pakistan who are good Muslims but not fundamentalists.

Broadly speaking, the Pakistani people have supported the steps announced by Musharraf. The liberal, secular, politically active ones have welcomed the steps; some whole–heartedly, others on condition that Musharraf should also take firm steps to restore the democratic order.

For the first time in several years, Pakistan’s youth celebrated the New Year in a free and peaceful environment, without being subjected to violence by armed mullahs and the police. A clear sign of the sea change on the ground. So, the youth too is backing the change.

There are also some interesting and noteworthy examples of conservatives behaving moderately in the present context. For example, Allama professor Tahirul Qadri of Pakistan Awami Tehreek, is a genuine Islamic scholar running a huge madrassa with a whole complex of computers and other gadgets of modern information technology. He has come out in full public support of Musharraf’s measures.

The whole range of Muslim Leaguers — old and new — fully support Musharraf’s measures. Today, all except the Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif are supporting Musharraf’s anti–fundamentalist measures. So is Imran Khan of Pakistan Tehreek–i–Insaf, former Pakistan President Farooq Leghari of Millat Party, Malik Meraj Khalid, former Prime Minister, Mustafa Jatoi, former Prime Minister and a host of others who are good practising Muslims but totally opposed to fundamentalism and hence supportive of Musharraf’s measures.

Even maulanas like Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani of Jamiat–ul–Ulema, Pakistan (Barelvi Group), though making loud noises, are simply not willing to come into the streets to support the jihadis of the Deoband school. So, in the ultimate analysis, only the different factions of the Deoband School are on one side and the rest of the Muslims on the other.

As matters stand today, Musharraf is going ahead with his government’s New Agenda, no matter what the sceptics in India, especially the ‘experts’ of the electronic media, have to say. Their counterparts on the Pakistani side, too, have been expressing reservations but have no alternatives to offer.

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8  No. 75-76, Cover Story

ANEES HAROON

Feminist, peace activist

The present scenario has strengthened the position of liberals in Pakistani society. During the Afghan war, jihadi groups were dominant on the scene. There were large demonstrations in all the major and smaller cities of Pakistan and they were able to bring thousands of people on to the roads. They could paralyse any city; law and order could be disrupted anywhere.

The liberals too organised anti–war demos but only in few hundreds. Karachi and Islamabad had the biggest congregation of peace activists, but even these were not more than a thousand to five thousand people. But after the defeat of the Taliban the jihadis have collapsed like a house of cards. Every time we had general elections, no Islamist party was voted in. But we all agreed that they had street power. Some of us viewed them as pigmies and never ever felt threatened but for most there was the real fear of Talibanisation of Pakistan. But once protection from the establishment (one or the other agency) was withdrawn and financial channels were cut they really fizzled out.

This is the time for liberals to strike back and re-claim their space. It is possible only if there is peace. Any war with India will again snatch the initiative away from their hands. War-machinery and jihad go together.

Here no one wants war with India. It is not in the interests of the people. The fear of nuclear warfare between India and Pakistan is threatening the region. If we can somehow break the cycle of hatred and war, we may be able to build an environment of peace, enlightened and liberal politics.

We the people of India and Pakistan need to do that: Reaffirm our faith in peace and democracy and pressurise our governments to refrain from war mongering. In Pakistan, liberals have always been vocal against establishment policies. But it is a general feeling that we do not get the same response from Indian activists. They somehow defend their government and do not see the authoritarian and hegemonic trends. Well, there are exceptions but the voice has to come through loud and clear.

In Pakistan these days, there are frequent anti-extremist and anti–war demos. Indians, too, need to put more pressure on the BJP government to withdraw all anti–people actions such as the termination of means of communication between the two countries. And how about banning extremist, militant Hindu groups like the RSS, the VHP and the Bajrang Dal in India?

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8  No. 75-76, Cover Story

DR MUBARAK ALI

Pakistani historian

President Musharraf indicated his intention to introduce liberal reforms just after he took power but refrained from doing so because of threats from the right–wing opposition. In the Pakistani army, there was and still is, a strong group that wants Pakistan to become a full–fledged theocratic state. The Agra summit gave Musharraf legitimacy. He was supported in that endeavour by all religious parties. The situation changed only after September 11 when he got both support as well as severe pressure from the United States to rein in the jihadis.

Following this, he first removed ultras from important posts and he is now trying to exert control on the extremists. These steps culminated in his January 12 address to Pakistan and the world, including our neighbours.

Liberal groups in Pakistan are vocal but very weak. Many have no roots among the people. Hence this section is silently supporting Musharraf, hoping that he may complete their agenda.

Two mass-based political parties, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) have no clear agenda, apart from being opportunist rivals; hence they are silent. They are neither supporting nor opposing the present government in the radical steps that it has initiated. Both parties do in fact hope that they can strike some deal with the army and thereby come to power later this year.

Equally, despite their aggressive rhetoric, religious parties in Pakistan too have no mass support, and hence have retreated since Musharraf’s aggressive stance. Until now, the jihadis have depended on the financial support of the Arab shaikhs and active help of supporting local agencies. Bereft of financial support and patronage from these sources, they are expected to simply crumble. They do not enjoy any public sympathy as most of them have deteriorated into armed criminal gangs misusing the name of faith.

However, the rank hostility displayed by the Indian leadership combined with the extremely shrill demands being made by it may generate an unfavourable atmosphere and resentment since the Pakistani people would not like to see their government being brought under undue Indian pressure. Within Pakistan, there is a general feeling that this is the time for liberal groups in India to raise their voice against war and demand that their government re-open all routes and avenues of people–to–people access.

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8  No. 75-76, Cover Story

PROF. S HAROON AHMED

Founder member of the international group, Physicians for Nuclear Disarmament

In Pakistan, where none of the religio–political parties were able to win even a single seat in the assemblies, jihadis and fundamentalists were still very powerful. They were patronised by one or the other power base — now popularly referred to as ‘agencies’, or funded from abroad.

According to a recent estimate, we may have 80 plus religious parties in Pakistan. In 1947, there were 245 madrassas, which increased to 2,861 in 1988 and 6,761 by the year 2000. The people of Pakistan had no say, nor liked the armed presence of such parties within civil society.

Then came Sept. 11 and in it’s search for Osama bin Laden, the US attacked Afghanistan. Pakistan was inducted into the alliance and bases were provided. In the early stages of American bombing on Afghanistan there was considerable confusion. "The bombing in Afghanistan will usher civil war in Pakistan" was one very strong view. However, the collapse of the Taliban as easily as it came, blew the air out of the vociferous outpourings of religious parties.

In the atmosphere post–Sept. 11, the terrorist attack on the Parliament in New Delhi on December 13 was a rude shock. It was the very last thing that any government or citizen in Pakistan would have expected. Temperatures within India have been raised to near uncontrollable levels. Memories of Kargil are still fresh. In Pakistan there is a strange quiet and detachment — neither the government nor the public expects a war!

However, the posture that India has taken is very threatening for all of South Asia. The hot pursuit, limited war, war with conventional weapons, or all out nuclear Holocaust are stages which can quickly follow each other if skirmish is sparked off accidentally or stupidly. And then there will be no going back.

Many among the liberal intelligentsia would like to see in the present circumstances a unique opportunity to resolve the issue of ‘cross border’ interference. It is in this context that President Musharraf’s address of Jan. 12 must be seen.

Even if his stance has been forced, it is a serious development. The establishment may or may not like it but the common man in Pakistan wants Musharraf to pursue his earlier and recent pronouncements against jihadis, madrassas, ritualistic mullahs and their so-called religious–cum–political parties. He has said that the jihadi outfits have brought Islam a bad name and killed more people than reformed them. It is in the interest of the silent majority in Pakistan and in South Asia that the road map towards a democratic process within Pakistan charted by this government is not abandoned or diverted.

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8  No. 75-76, Cover Story 5