Who is to blame?

Julio Ribeiro
Former commissioner of police,Bombay and DGP, Punjab

““We must remember that fundamentalism of the majority, by sheer virtue of the numbers involved, is much more dangerous than the fundamentalism of the minority. It therefore needs to be singled out and targeted first because it is through this fundamentalism of the majority that the politics of hate gets exacerbated. What were the two major incidents of bomb blasts at Bombay and Coimbatore but a terrorist response. And what is terrorism but violent actions, in retaliation, that target innocents? Terrorism doesn’t pick and choose its targets. It’s a man-eating tiger, that’s why it is so dangerous. Terrorism is the response of those who cannot really fight . This was the message from Bombay and Coimbatore: ‘We cannot fight you so there’…..It is about time that the state sat up and took notice.

The experience of the minority during riots , which is to a great extent based on real-life, true experiences has resulted in a complete loss of faith in the law and order machinery. Unless the police shows through attitude and action that they are impartial, this faith cannot be restored.

Satish Sahney
Former commissioner of police, Bombay

“Muslims must really experience that they have a stake in this system that wants them here and is there to protect them. Or else, we will be creating more disgruntled youngsters like the young Jalees Ansari . Ansari , in his affidavit before the Justice Srikrishna Commission enquiring into the Bombay riots and the bomb blasts, has shown how a youngster, if he feels that he is denied rights of free and fair existence, drifts towards fundamentalist outfits. The biography of this youngster also reveals how from making crude explosives, his training grew into making more and more sophisticated explosives.

We are all aware that Pakistan’s ISI does have a one-point programme of causing eruptions here since it believes that this is an effective proxy war to conduct against its neighbour. But what was the spark that ignited the young Ansari into doing what he did? The feeling that as a Muslim, he and his religion are not safe and free from attack, so he had to learn to protect himself. This is a potentially very dangerous situation.

It is vital from the point of view of both justice and national security that we begin to take cognisance of this dangerous reality.”

Vibhuti N.Rai
Inspector General Border Security Force

“ “In Bombay during the post-Babri Masjid demolition riots (December 1992 and January 1993 ), it was quite evident that state failed to provide security to the minorities. Many hundred Muslims were killed, the whole community was left at the mercy of Hindu communal goondas.

In Coimbatore, also, after the assassination of a traffic constable, Selvaraj, about two dozen Muslims were killed in a manner which puts into very serious question the neutrality and professionalism of the Tamil Nadu police. The failure of the state in providing protection to the minorities will always lead disgruntled elements to become instruments in the hands of agencies such as ISI who will be only too happy to utilise them in blasts like Bombay and Coimbatore.

We should not forget that the failure of the state in the anti-Sikh riots after the assassination of Mrs Indira Gandhi provided thousands of volunteers to the separatist movement launched by Sikh militants. The sooner we learn lessons from the Coimbatore blasts the better.”

We have now been witnessing not riots but tendencies towards ‘ethnic cleansing’

Shankar Sen
Chairperson, National Human Rights Commission, former IPS officer

“The manner in which members of the minority community are branded ‘anti-national’ is wrong and incorrect. The other regrettable fact is that in very few cases are the perpetrators of crimes during communal riots ever punished. Scores of cases are withdrawn under the guise of ‘preserving communal amity’.

The broadening of the composition of the police force is a must. This need not be through reservations but in a situation where there is an abysmally low representation of minorities in the police force, through affirmative action. We must urgently strive to have a more mixed and representative police force in the country. We have now been witnessing not riots but events that are marked in their tendencies towards an “ethnic cleansing.” Such a situation reflects not only a gross failure of the state’s law and order machinery but lays the country and sections of our populace vulnerable to take recourse to unlawful acts in retaliation.”

The question of alienation (in mino-rities) must be addressed’

Padma Rosha
Former Director General of Police

“In Bombay during the post-Babri Masjid demolition riots (December 1992 and January 1993 ), it was quite evident that state failed to provide security to the minorities. Many hundred Muslims were killed, the whole community was left at the mercy of Hindu communal goondas.

In Coimbatore, also, after the assassination of a traffic constable, Selvaraj, about two dozen Muslims were killed in a manner which puts into very serious question the neutrality and professionalism of the Tamil Nadu police. The failure of the state in providing protection to the minorities will always lead disgruntled elements to become instruments in the hands of agencies such as ISI who will be only too happy to utilise them in blasts like Bombay and Coimbatore.

We should not forget that the failure of the state in the anti-Sikh riots after the assassination of Mrs Indira Gandhi provided thousands of volunteers to the separatist movement launched by Sikh militants. The sooner we learn lessons from the Coimbatore blasts the better.”

Archived from Communalism Combat, March  1998, Year 5  No. 41, Cover Story,

“It is an unfortunate fact that in successive communal riots in independent India, justice has not been done to the victims. In many cases the guilty have gone unpunished. There have also been allegations of biased handling by our police. These factors only increase alienation. Let’s not forget our peculiar circumstances – we have a neighbour whose intelligence wing is waiting to manipulate such alienation. It is potentially a very dangerous situation. The state and every section of civil society must urgently look into it

B.G.Deshmukh
Former cabinet secretary
 

“We put justice as the first principal of our Constitution, but how many of us believe in it today ? We will pay a heavy price for relegating justice to the far corner. Why cannot we see that impartial justice is meant to prevent individuals or groups from taking the law into their own hands to secure it? Why does communal rioting continue in the land ? Why did the Coimbatore bomb blast shatter and kill?

KF Rustomji
Former DGP, BSF Padma Vibhushan
 

Archived from Communalism Combat, March  1998, Year 5  No. 41, Cover Story

Dongri 1 to Police Control: Two military trucks have come carrying milk and other rations, led by Major General (retired) Syed Rehemtullah. Therefore, a crowd has gathered at IR road near Bhendi Bazar, please send some more men.

(Voice): Why the f—are you distributing milk to them laandyas (abuse for a circumcised person)? Do you want to f—their mothers? Miyan (Muslim), bastards live there.

Dongri 1, (agitated): There are lots of police here. Let them distribute milk.

Voice: Why are you distributing milk to them? Are you doing them a favour or what?

V.P.Road to Control: A mob has gathered outside Maharashtra garage, Ghas galli, Lamington road with the intention of setting it on fire. Send men.

Voice: Must be a laandya’s garage. Let it burn. S— don’t burn anything that belongs to a Maharashtrian. But burn everything belonging to a miyan, the bastards.

(Excerpts from transcripts of police wireless messages taped by Teesta Setalvad between January 10 and 18, 1993)
 

Archived from Communalism Combat, March  1998, Year 5  No. 41, Cover Story,

 
The police force in Bombay, in Maharashtra and all over India must not forget that they are Hindus first and policemen thereafter,” Bal Thackeray pronounced at the Vijayadashmi Day rally at Shivaji park, Bombay, in October 1993. The Maharashtra government and the Bombay police chose to turn a deaf ear to such blatant communal incitement of policemen.

In sharp contrast to official lethargy in prosecuting and punishing those responsible for the December - January riots was the alacrity with which the Maharashtra police handled the serial bomb blasts which killed over 300 people in the metropolis in March, 1993. It was only to be expected that the law and order machinery nab the culprits, conduct interrogations and prosecute them. But it did much more. In the name of investigations, hundreds of relatives, friends and even casual acquaintances — men and women, young and old — of the suspects, were illegally detained for days and badly tortured.

To cite just two instances: Rehmat Sayed Ali Kadri: About 70 years in age, she is the mother of Shabbir Kadri, an accused from Mhasla in coastal Maharashtra who is absconding. She was illegally detained first at the Mhasla police station and later at the Mahim police station in north central Bombay. Her daughter and daughter-in-law (with a 10-month-old son) were also kept behind bars.

Said Ms. Kadri: “For 15 days, all three of us were dragged by the hair every day, beaten and verbally abused. The 10-month baby was starved of any food. We were repeatedly humiliated. Shabbir’s father was stripped and paraded before us. ‘Where is your Allah now? Forget him. say, Jai Sri Ram,’ they used to shout.

The Haspatel family: On April 13, 1993 with much fanfare, the Maharashtra police revealed that they had unearthed 16 “projectiles” (rocket launchers) from a home in Walwat village on the coast. the “projectiles” were proved to be spindles used in a local yarn factory.

But for 10 days before that, the two male members of the family, Iqbal (65) and Mobeen (17) had been detained and tortured daily. Also illegally detained, verbally abused and humiliated for five days were two women from the family — Zubeida (55) and her daughter-in-law along with her 18-month-old baby. Senior police officials assisted by a woman constable beat the family, stripped the men and paraded them before the women every day. Mobeen, who had been cured of epileptic attacks for over ten years started getting renewed attacks after being subject to “parrot torture” for four hours every day. “You have to stop saying Allah. Or you will have to go to back to Pakistan,” is the most common refrain they heard from policemen in the lock-up.

(The victims spoke to Teesta Setalvad during a video-taped interview soon after their release)

Archived from Communalism Combat, March  1998, Year 5  No. 41, Cover Story,

 
On the day (February 16) he presented his 700-page report to the Maharashtra government on the findings of the officially appointed commission to investigate the communal riots of December 1992-January 1993 and the serial bomb blasts of March 1993, Justice B.N.Srikrishna spoke to Communalism Combat, in an exclusive interview. What his main findings were, the judge would not say except to emphasise more than once that the findings must be made public so that we all learn from the errors of the past. And, Justice Srikrishna did agree to share with us the Epilogue to Chapter VII of the commission’s report. We reproduce below excerpts from the interview with Teesta Setalvad and the epilogue:

How do you feel at the end of the whole exercise?
For all these years, sitting in this chair, being witness through real-life accounts to all that had taken place in Bombay, was an awful churning. Many times I felt angry and depressed. But now with the report submitted I have the satisfaction of knowing that it is a job well done. I feel relieved and satisfied.

Do you feel that your report will make any difference, effect any changes, be accepted by the government?
How can I say? That is the job of the wider public to ensure. So many worthwhile judicial commissions have sat in the past. Have their recommendations made any difference? All I can say is that every effort must be made to see that it is made public and that we all, the state included, learn from the grave errors of the past.

On many occasions during the commission’s work, you used harsh words against the police, even lost your temper?
Why remind me of that? It was impossible as a human being not to react. I was faced with victims who went through unspeakable horrors. That’s why the constant churning that I could not but experience. But more on that after the report is made public. As I am sure that it must be.
Just two days ago there were serial bomb blasts in Coimbatore. It has come two-and-a-half months after a terrible communal carnage. Does it not seem like a repeat of what happened in Bombay five years ago? Isn’t it awful how we refuse to learn from our mistakes? Its like the situation in any family. There is this younger brother whom I beat again and again till he is pushed to the corner. So much so that he is pushed to the wall. A point is reached when he can’t and won’t take it any more, he rebels and then he will take the help of any outsider to get back at me. That’s what happens. Anywhere.

Epilogue to Chapter VII of the Srikrishna report submitted to the Maharshtra government on February 14, 1998
The voluminous evidence produced before the Commission strikingly brings home the stark reality that the beast in man keeps straining at the leash to jump out; frictions, irritations and disputes based on colour, race and religion are but excuses.

The commission has noticed that most of the violent communal riots during December 1992 and January 1993 took place in areas called Prem Nagar, Shanti Nagar, Gandhi Nagar and so on. That vicious communal violence on such scale should occur in the land of ‘Ahimsa Paramo Dharmah’ and Mahatma Gandhi, only shows that the message of love and brotherhood preached by apostles is not internalized. Unless that is done, the spectre of communal violence would haunt the city again and again.

The Commission sincerely hopes that the calamitous events of December 1992, January 1993 and March 1993 would serve as eye openers and lead to introspection and that all concerned attain the maturity to accept constructive criticism and mend their ways. For, in the immortal words of Ramayana: “Sulabhaah purushaa rajan satatam priya vaadinah Apriyasya cha pathhyasya vakta shrota cha durlabah” ( Persons pleasing in speech are easy to find; it is difficult to find one who speaks or listens to the bitter, but wholesome truth).

Finally, before parting, the Commission would reiterate the ringing exhortation of Shankaracharya:“Tvayi Mayi chaanyatraiko Vishnuh, Vyartham kupyasi mayyasahishnuh” (The same God resides in you and me; why then be needlessly angry with me !!).
Mumbai Dated 14th February 1998 Justice B.N. Srikrishna epilogue:
 
Archived from Communalism Combat, March  1998, Year 5  No. 41, Cover Story

Like the average Hindu, the average Hindu policemen also believes that Muslims, generally, are cruel and violent by nature

It is not very difficult to identify reasons behind the discriminatory beha-vior of the police. The conduct of an average policemen is guided by those predetermined beliefs and misconceptions which influence the mind of an average Hindu. Like the average Hindu, the average Hindu policemen also believes that Muslims, generally, are cruel and violent by nature.

In the course of my study, I spoke to a large number of policemen working with different ranks. I was amazed to find that most of them seriously believed that apart from being cruel and violent, Muslims were untrustworthy, anti-national and easily influenced by a fanatical leadership and could indulge in rioting at the slightest provocation. Generally the policemen were in agreement that Muslims initiated riots. When I confronted many of them with the question as to why Muslims should start a riot as they suffered more, they replied with arguments that an average Hindu would use.

It is but natural that after being convinced of the mischievous role of the Muslims in riots most policemen do not have any doubts regarding the ways and means to check them. They sincerely believe that there is only one way to control a riot and that is to crush the mischief-mongering Muslims. Whenever an instruction is received from the state government or senior police officials to deal with the rioters firmly and ruthlessly, these instructions are interpreted in a prejudiced and biased way. Firmness and ruthlessness towards rioters is interpreted as firmness and ruthlessness towards Muslims. The various forms of firmness have distinct meanings: arrest means arrest of Muslims; search means searches of Muslim houses; and police firing means firing on Muslims.

Even in those riots where Muslims suffered from the very inception of rioting or where the killings of Muslims was totally one-sided, the policemen gave a very interesting picture of their way of thinking. It is not only during riots that they would believe that the riot was caused by the mischief of Muslims. While talking to some of the policemen posted in Bhagalpur (1989) and Bombay (1992-93), I was amazed to find that the perception of Muslims being violent and cruel was so deeply in-built in their psyche that even after admitting the disproportionate destruction of Muslim life and property, they had many “reasons” to deny the suggestion that “naturally non-violent and pious Hindus” were in any way responsible for the damage to the Muslims.

It is a common sight in the towns of northern India that the reinforcements sent  from outside during communal tensions, make their lodging arrangements in temples, dharmshalas and parks in Hindu localities or the space available in Hindu homes and shops

It is this psychology of the policemen which guides their reactions during communal strife. While combating riots, they start searching for friends among Hindus and foes among Muslims. It is a common sight in the towns of northern India that the reinforcements sent from outside during communal tensions, make their lodging arrangements in temples, dharmshalas and parks in Hindu localities or the space available in Hindu homes and shops. When the shops are closed during curfew, food, tea and snacks are supplied to them by Hindu homes. Members of the majority community, who in normal times may keep a distance from the police just like the members of the minority communities, suddenly see policemen as friends during communal tensions.

It is their natural expectation of a ‘friendly’ police that it will not use force against them. Whenever, the police uses force against Hindus, their reaction is that of an amazed and cheated group. The FIR lodged by Sri Ajit Dutta, D.I.G. during the riots of Bhagalpur (1989), very candidly underlines this mentality. It’s perusal reveals the interesting incidents of a law-breaking mob of Hindus, congregating on the road during curfew hours, expressing its dismay and anger when Mr. Dutta threatened them with police firing.

I am reminded of a similar personal experience at Allahabad (1980) when in Gadiwan Tola, I warned a Hindu mob bent upon rioting, that we would open fire if they did not disperse. I found that the crowd did not take it seriously at first and thought it was a joke. Subsequently, when they heard me ordering the head constable to open fire from his carbine, there was a clear look of disbelief and surprise in their eyes.

How far this deeply entrenched perception of Muslims being solely responsible for the riots and strict behavior towards them being the only way to quell a riot, affects the reactions of a policeman, may be illustrated with the example of Hashimpura where the savagery and horrifying non-professionalism of the police behavior is a matter of national shame.

The riots in Meerut (1987) were unprecedented in the toll of human life and for the long period of continued and unabated violence. The magnitude of the riot which started on May 17, 1987 can be gauged from the fact that to deal with it, the services of about 50 gazzetted police officers and magistrates, along with more than 70 companies of P.A.C., para-military forces and army were pressed in. The policemen deployed here harboured all the above mentioned beliefs and prejudices. When their tremendous round-the-clock vigil could not control the violence, some of them resorted to an act which could have not been imagined.

Being fully convinced that riots in a civilised society could be ended only by teaching the Muslims a lesson, one section of the P.A.C. picked up more than two dozen Muslims from a locality known as Hashimpura on the 22nd of May, where house-to-house searches were going on and killed them at two places in Ghaziabad, after transporting them there in one of their trucks.

I was Superintendent Police, Ghaziabad, at that time. After receiving the information, I got two cases registered against the P.A.C. The cases were handed over to the Uttar Pradesh C.I.D. After eight years of investigations, a charge sheet has been filed against the erring personnel of the P.A.C., only recently (1995).

Why should the P.A.C. commit such a detestable act? I had the opportunity to talk to a large number of policemen deployed in Meerut in this period during my tenure as S.P., Ghaziabad (1985-88) as also during the course of the present study. I wanted to understand the motivating factors behind such a heinous offence. The analysis of the psychology of these men will help us appreciate the relationship between the police and members of the minority communities.

Firmness and ruthlessness towards rioters is interpreted as firmness and ruthlessness towards Muslims: arrest means arrest of Muslims; search means searches of Muslim houses; and police firing means firing on Muslims.

Most of the policemen posted in Meerut in 1989 thought that the riots were the result of Muslim mischief. They were also of the opinion that Meerut had become a mini-Pakistan because of the stubbornness of the Muslims and that it was necessary to teach them a lesson in order to establish permanent peace in Meerut. They were badly affected by rumours which suggested that Hindus in Meerut were totally vulnerable to Muslim attacks. Their belief that Muslims of Meerut deserve a suitable lesson resulted in Hashimpura.

Instances like Hashimpura worsen the inimical relationship between Muslims and the police. This relationship is clearly visible during communal tension. We find that many riots start with a Muslim attack on the police. Quite often the presence of the police in a surcharged atmosphere fills Muslims with anger. Reacting to the demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, angry mobs of Muslims in other cities, venting their feelings of resentment on the street initially chose the police as their targets rather than ordinary Hindus.

There are many examples of communal rioting in which the trouble started as a clash between the police and the Muslims and then turned into a Hindu-Muslim conflict. The Idgah incident of Moradabad (1980) is an important example of this trend.

The most interesting example of the hostile relationship between Muslims and the police can be found in the behavior of a police party entering a Muslim locality during communal tension. The briefing, preparation and weaponry of this party intending to enter a Muslim locality for arrests, or searches, or even normal patrolling is as if it is going to enter enemy territory. I have seen many such groups and always found them full of apprehension and fear.

Their behavior is not without reason. Alertness on their part is necessary as they may be attacked at any time. Who is responsible for these feelings of distrust and enmity? Perhaps the seeds are to be found in the terms ‘we’ and ‘they’ used by police officials for Hindus and Muslims during their conferences, organised to devise ways and means to deal with a communal situation.

Reporting of facts, investigation into and prosecution of participants in communal riots is another area where we find a clear communal bias in police behavior. The reporting of facts is done at various levels. Intelligence reports being prepared at the level of police stations and intelligence units to be sent to government and senior police formations are normally affected by this bias.

For example, I have found one interesting thing in the lists of communal agitators being maintained at various police levels in Uttar Pradesh. For most of the officials responsible for maintaining such lists, a communal agitator means a Muslim communal agitator. Even during those days when Hindu communal forces were active in the movement of Ram Janambhoomi movement, it was very difficult to find names of Hindu inciters in the list.

What damage this bias can inflict on police professionalism can be understood from the incident of the destruction of the Babri Mosque. It is evident from the charge-sheet filed by the C.B.I. that the demolition of the mosque was the result of a well-planned conspiracy. None of the intelligence agencies could report this fact before the 6th of December, 1992.

A very heinous examples of this bias in reporting facts is available at Bhagalpur (1989). One hundred and sixteen Muslims were killed in village Logain on the 27th of October 1989. This brutal massacre was enacted by the Hindus of Logain and the neighbouring villages. Logain village is 26 kilometres from the district headquarters of Bhagalpur, with the police station only 4 kms away at Jagdisgpur. The Muslims killed were buried in the fields and cauliflower was grown over their dead bodies.

Out of the 181 Muslim inhabitants of the village, 65 survivors and their attackers went to many places, including Bhagalpur town, and reported this ghastly incident. Details were published in local and national newspapers. Inspite of this, the district and police administration of Bhagalpur kept denying any such happening till the 8th of December 1989, when a police party led by Sri Ajit Dutta, D.I.G. ,dug some of the dead bodies out of the fields.

Vibhuti N. Rai

(Excerpted from the writer’s recently published book, ‘Combating Communal Conflicts —Perception of Police Neutrality During Hindu-Muslim Riots in India’)

Archived from Communalism Combat, March  1998, Year 5  No. 41, Cover Story,

 
Thirteen bomb blasts ripped through Coimbatore in mid-February, claiming innocent lives two and a half months after an anti-Muslim pogrom
 

It was 30 minutes before BJP president, L.K. Advani was scheduled to address an election rally at Coimbatore, at 3.50 p.m. on February 14. A mere 250 metres away from the rostrum put up at T.V. Samy Road — D.B.Road Junction, the first of 13 bombs exploded killing 46 persons and injuring more than 200.
 

In the days that followed 10 more were killed. Six were killed during a pre-dawn swoop by policemen at a multi-storeyed residential premise on Thirumal Street at 2.50 a.m. on Sunday, the day after, allegedly at a hide-out. According to the official version, the bomb attempted to be hurled at the raiding policemen actually killed the seven accused. Local civil liberties groups are investigating this particular case as the police version seems to have many loop-holes. Four teenaged Muslim boys died in a stray blast three days later.
 

Advani cancelled the meeting scheduled to be held in Coimbatore. He issued a statement backed by other party colleagues claiming that he was the target of the bombs — a part of an ISI conspiracy acting in tandem with terrorist Muslim groups. The BJP accused the ruling DMK government of being soft on Islamic extremists despite persistent demand for action against them by the BJP and its affiliate, the Hindu Munnani. Incidentally, the Hindu Munnani has been indicted, by the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) along with sections of the local police for its direct participation in the anti-minority pogrom last November (see CC, February 1998). Policemen in uniform had aided Hindu communal elements in converting the government hospital at Coimbatore into a macabre war theatre, thrashing and stabbing Muslim victims brought there for treatment. Even innocent rickshawallahs who transported them were not spared. The seventh of the 13 bomb blasts that ripped Coimbatore on February 14 was placed at the same Coimbatore Medical College hospital, killing two innocent nurses. Not surprisingly, the acute communal polarisation caused by the bomb blasts led to a resounding victory for the BJP candidate in Coimbatore.
 

To tackle the emerging situation, The Federation of All Muslim Organisations in Coimbatore (formed in the aftermath of the November 1997 violence) observed an Anti-Terrorism week between March 7 to March 14. The campaign involved wall writings, wall posters and street corner meetings and culminated in a public meeting on Match 14. The Federation has also been assisting the police in apprehending known activists of some communal organisations and also detecting bombs. The Federation has also entered into a dialogue with non-communal Hindu organisations in an effort at creating lasting communal peace and unity in Coimbatore.

Hindu organisations in an effort at creating lasting communal peace and unity in Coimbatore.This action of the Federation assumes significance given the reaction of the Coimbatore public and police machinery once the bombs went off. Soon after the first explosion, Muslim commercial establishments and houses in the city in Hindu-dominated areas were attacked, looted and set on fire.On the night of the blasts, the government banned two organisations, the Al-Umma and the All-India Jihad Committee. Al-Umma leader S.A. Basha and 12 others, some from the Jihad Committee, were arrested.

The next day a highly sophisticated 80 kg car bomb was found and defused before it could go off. Arrests began immediately thereafter. Over 800 people have been arrested from the city, adjoining areas and districts as well as elsewhere in the state, besides nine others from Trissur in Kerala state.According to official reports, about 550 pipe bombs, 200 gelatin sticks, 1200 detonators and 1000 petrol bombs have been recovered.

Large-scale exodus of people, especially Muslims from many parts of Coimbatore, some of whom have left for adjacent Kerala, has been evident. Muslim families have also been forced to vacate houses rented by the landlords, many of whom were operating in abject fear and some facing threats., Some of these evacuees are staying elsewhere in the city, many with Hindu friends.

During combing operations the police have been responsible for many indiscriminate arrests without adequate proof, of innocent Muslims. A maulana, suffering from a mental illness, under treatment for the last four years (he had last been to the doctor on February 24 ) was arrested. under the same crime number.

Archived from Communalism Combat, March  1998, Year 5  No. 41, Cover Story,