The Supreme Court recently took notice of the gaps in India’s legal framework for addressing sexual harassment in the workplace with its decision in Vaneeta Patnaik v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti & Ors. The Court denied a faculty member’s complaint against the Vice Chancellor of NUJS, Kolkata based on the expiration of the six-month limitation prescribed in the PoSH Act, 2013, while at the same time, the more unusual move of ordering that the allegation be recorded permanently in the Vice Chancellor’s service record, such that it will “haunt him forever,” was ordered. This is an odd example of balancing the strict limitation of the law with that of a reputational harm, which caused upheaval within the academic community.
The ruling has already sparked protests on the NUJS campus, with students calling for the Vice Chancellor’s resignation, citing not only sexual harassment but also claims of financial misconduct. In a broader sense, the ruling has also reopened questions about whether India’s workplace harassment statute is too strict in its time limits and whether the courts should interpret those provisions flexibly in cases where survivors fear retaliation or are subject to institutional hierarchies. This judgement, combined with both a statutory formalism and symbolic sanction, captures the tensions at the heart of India’s struggle to reconcile due process, survivors’ rights, and accountability for sexual harassment.
The Judgment at a glance
On September 12, the Supreme Court in Vaneeta Patnaik v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti & Ors., dismissed a claim of sexual harassment against the Vice Chancellor of the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences (NUJS), because the claim was outside the limitation period under section 9 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. The Vice Chancellor was Dr. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti, who took office in 2019, and the complainant was Prof. Vaneeta Patnaik, a senior professor. She alleged that VC Chakrabarti subjected her to unwelcome behavior in April 2023, but filed her complaint only in December 2023. The Local Complaints Committee (LCC) dismissed the case in its entirety, citing that it was beyond the six-month time limit set by the Act.
In opposition to the LCC complaint dismissal, Patnaik appealed to the Calcutta High Court. A Single Judge accepted the appeal and directed that the continuation of a retaliatory measure against her, namely being removed as director of the MA programme, and questioning her actions, would come in due course, was a form of continuing behaviour of harassment and meant the allegations were in time. The Division Bench overturned that finding by the Single Judge by ruling that other administrative decisions of the Executive Council of the University were not like sexual harassment.
The Supreme Court confirmed the Division Bench’s ruling that statutory timelines under Section 9 are compulsory. The Court gave the Court’s judgment a startling ending: while the complaint could not be resurrected, the alleged misconduct cannot be ignored. It was ordered that the incident should be recorded in the Vice Chancellor’s official record, without the complainant being heard on the merits, and the accused subject to a reputational cloud.
Statutory framework under the PoSH Act, 2013
The PoSH Act was intended to establish a time-bound and effective mechanism for addressing a complaint concerning harassment at a workplace. These provisions are particularly relevant to the NUJS judgment, specifically:
Section 2 (n) of the act defines sexual harassment as –
“sexual harassment” includes any one or more of the following unwelcome acts or behavior (whether directly or by implication), namely:—
- physical contact and advances; or
- a demand or request for sexual favours; or
- making sexually coloured remarks; or
- showing pornography; or
- any other unwelcome physical, verbal, or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature;
Section 9
Complaint of sexual harassment — (1) Any aggrieved woman may make, in writing, a complaint of sexual harassment at workplace to the Internal Committee if so constituted, or the Local Committee, in case it is not so constituted, within a period of three months from the date of incident and in case of a series of incidents, within a period of three months from the date of last incident:
Provided that where such complaint cannot be made in writing, the Presiding Officer or any Member of the Internal Committee or the Chairperson or any Member of the Local Committee, as the case may be, shall render all reasonable assistance to the woman for making the complaint in writing:
Provided further that the Internal Committee or, as the case may be, the Local Committee may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the time limit not exceeding three months, if it is satisfied that the circumstances were such which prevented the woman from filing a complaint within the said period.
Section 9 (1) establishes a period of limitation to allow the victims to make their complaints.
The problem with limitation
The NUJS case demonstrates how unyielding time limitations deny survivors of harassment the ability to redress for their injuries. Women facing sexual harassment, especially when the perpetrator is a person of power, are often silenced due to fears of retaliation, damage to their reputation, and institutional bias. The Supreme Court has acknowledged this reality in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996), where the Court asserted that delay in reporting an incident of sexual assault should not cast doubt on one’s credibility in and of itself, particularly where there is stigma associated with reporting. Under the PoSH Act, however, if a six-month time limit has been met, a complaint cannot be entertained, no matter the context of the harassment.
This rigid scheme conflicts with the Act’s very object: to create safer workplaces and protect women from harassment. Although the drafter intended to prevent stale claims and situations that would have been better dealt with if reported earlier, the relatively inflexible nature of the six-month limit places unacceptable burdens on complainants in hierarchical institutions such as universities, with their potential for administrative reprisal and threats to career.
Indian courts have varied their approaches to limitation depending on the applicable statute. In criminal law, courts spare no time in allowing reasons for delays in FIRs relating to sexual offenses, while highlighting trauma and coercion as valid excuses.
In contrast to the Supreme Court in this judgment, the High Courts, generally speaking, have adopted a stricter stance. For example, the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Mohammad Altaf Bhat vs Principal Chief of Commissioner (2024) firmly ruled that the limitation set out through Section 9 was binding and not subject to extending the limitation period for any reason. In an institutional grievance circumstance [PoSH], courts have made clear they will not modify the length of the limitation even in the face of claims of imbalance of power.
The criminal justice paradox
This difference reveals a contradiction: while the criminal justice system has become more accepting of delays in sexual offense cases, workplace harassment law creates an absolute barrier that excludes exactly those complaints most affected by fear and power. Survivors who take time to process their traumatic experiences or wait until they feel safer to report are left without recourse. As a result, a legal framework is in place that prioritizes procedural finality over substantive justice. A broader application of the Act would involve either amending the law to include a minimum one-year limitation period for complaints, with flexibility for exceptions in special circumstances, or judicial innovation by interpreting retaliatory reprisals as a “continuing wrong” under Section 3 to extend the limitation period. Without such changes, the Act risks undermining its own protective purpose by silencing valid claims made at a later time.
Justice for both complainant and accused
In deciding that Prof. Vaneeta Patnaik’s complaint was time-barred, the Supreme Court left her with no meaningful opportunity to show that the alleged sexual harassment occurred. Survivors in hierarchical institutions may also experience retaliation, reputational damage, and institutional pressures that may prevent a timely report. The Supreme Court’s rigid application of the six-month time limit available under Section 9(1) of the PoSH Act barred an ostensibly justified legal claim while raising the question of whether the procedural aspects of statutory law should override or take precedence over justice.
For Dr. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti, the Vice Chancellor who was accused, the Court’s odd instruction to record the incident in his service record impacts his reputation, without a formal inquiry. The statute may protect him from a determination, but he will bear the reputational burdens that last much longer than the proceeding — punishment without due process.
This sort of result begs a deeper question: is the injustice an inherent part of the legal structure, the judiciary’s framework, or both? The structure has an arbitrary limitation of six months, and does not seem to take into account the fact that the nature of being targeted for harassment often delays the complaint. Power dynamics, fear of retaliation, and fears about one’s job security all impact the complainant’s decision about when to report. Meanwhile, the judicial handling of the case, in adhering strictly to the text of Section 9, compensates with symbolic punishment—a contradictory outcome that could not ultimately satisfy either party. Rather than working to align fairness with the Code-delimited response, the court demonstrated both the limitations of law and the labour of judicial improvisation.
A global perspective
By global standards, India’s limitation period under the PoSH Act is remarkably short. In the United States, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) permits victims to bring complaints about workplace harassment for up to 180 to 300 days, depending on state law. In the United Kingdom, the Employment Tribunal typically permits complaints within three months but permits extensions where “just and equitable.” In general, some European jurisdictions (France and Germany, for example) allow survivors years to bring complaints. The ILO has previously stated that restrictive timelines can be important for protection and has encouraged flexible limitation rules for gender-based violence at work.
In this context, India’s maximum of six months (very rarely) is inadequate and does not meet international standards. It is an effort to achieve administrative efficiency rather than considering substantive justice, which itself dismisses the numerous real (and documented) hurdles that survivors face in reporting harassment in the first place.
Need for reform
The NUJS decision highlights a critical need for change in the PoSH Act. At a minimum, Section 9(1) should be amended to allow for an extension of one year, with a provision for condoning delay if the complaint is received in exceptional circumstances because of retaliation, intimidation, or psychological trauma. A workable definition of sexual harassment, as per Section 2(n), should be amended to explicitly include retaliation and reprisals to ensure that administrative actions that are hostile are not deemed irrelevant in some way. Without such changes, the PoSH Act runs the risk of defeating its purpose. Potentially, governments can empower women, but they can also entrench silence when complaints violate arbitrary and excessive technical aspects of filing. The Supreme Court’s judgment, restricted by the statute, also exemplifies that contradiction. It leaves a discomforting lesson – that even if a hearing in a sexual harassment matter isn’t a complete denial, unless certain aspects of law are adapted to include the lived experiences of survivors.
The entire judgment in Vaneeta Patnaik v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti & Ors may be read here:
The judgment of Mohammad Altaf Bhat vs Principal Chief of Commissioner (2024) may be read here:
The judgement in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996) may be read here:
(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this community resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)
Related:
Sexual Harassment in the Media
Women’s protests against sexual violence continue as institutions bend to power
Mapping Gender-Based Violence in India: Trends, determinants, and institutional frameworks
Evolving legal protections for survivors of sexual assault: Anonymity, privacy, and media regulation