Upholding the Madarsa Education Act as constitutional, the SC however restricted the Board’s right to confer degrees

On November 5, 2024, a 3-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India comprising of Chief Justice (as he was then) D.Y. Chandrachud, Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, in the case of Anjum Kadari vs. Union of India, declared that the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004, is largely constitutional, except for provisions regulating higher education degrees.[1]

Context of the judgment: Balancing secularism and minority rights

The case revolved around the balance between the State’s interest in promoting secular education and the rights of religious minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The relevant provisions include:

Articles 14, 15, and 16: Guaranteeing equality before the law and prohibiting discrimination based on religion.
Articles 25 to 30: Addressing religious freedom and the rights of minorities.
- Article 28: Prohibiting religious instruction in state-funded institutions.
- Article 30: Protecting the right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions.
Article 21-A: Guaranteeing the right to free and compulsory education for children aged 6 to 14.
The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act): Implementing Article 21-A but specifically excluding Madarsas.
The Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004 (Madarsa Act): Establishing a board to regulate Madarsa education including teacher qualification, building strength etc.

The case also considered the legislative powers of the State and Parliament, specifically:

Article 246: Distributing legislative powers between the Union and States.
Entry 25 of List III (Concurrent List): Empowering both Parliament and State legislatures to make laws on education.
Entry 66 of List I (Union List): Granting Parliament exclusive power to legislate on coordinating and determining standards in higher education.
The University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (UGC Act): Enacted by Parliament under Entry 66, regulating higher education and conferring degrees.

Facts of the case

The Madarsa Act, enacted in 2004, established the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education to regulate Madarsas in the state. This included prescribing curricula, conducting examinations, and setting standards for teachers and infrastructure. The Act was challenged before the Allahabad High Court in several writ petitions. One petitioner, an advocate, argued that the Act violated the principle of secularism by regulating religious instruction. He also challenged Section 1(5) of the RTE Act, which exempts Madarsas from its purview. The essence of these challenges was that if State is funding the Madarasas, then they ought not to have religious instruction; they ought to have a diverse board governing the UP Board of Madarsa Education—which instead has religious leaders—according to the petitioners to the HC. After the High Court declared the whole act to be unconstitutional and asked the state government to accommodate the children studying in Madarsas in state government schools, an appeal was in to the Supreme Court.

Arguments presented in challenge of the Act:

Argued that the Madarsa Act, by regulating institutions that impart religious instruction, violated secularism, particularly Article 28.
Contended that the Act deprived Madarsa students of a holistic, secular education and equal opportunities.
Highlighted the overrepresentation of members focused on religious instruction on the Board.
Raised concerns about the inadequacy of teacher qualifications under the Act.
Argued that the Act encroached on Parliament’s exclusive power to regulate higher education under Entry 66 of List I, as it sought to regulate Fazil and Kamil (Higher education) degrees.

In Defence of the Act:

Argued that the Act was a regulatory measure aimed at improving the quality of education in Madarsas, which included both religious and secular subjects.
Emphasized the State’s positive obligation to ensure quality education for minorities under Articles 29 and 30.
Contended that regulating Madarsas fell within the State’s legislative competence under Entry 25 of List III.
Pointed out that the RTE Act specifically excludes Madarsas, implying no conflict with Article 21-A.

High Court’s judgement and reasoning

The Allahabad High Court declared the entire Madarsa Act unconstitutional, holding that it violated secularism and Articles 14, 21, and 21-A. The Court reasoned that the Act’s object of regulating institutions imparting “religious instruction and teachings” was inherently contrary to secularism. It also found the Act ultra vires Section 22 of the UGC Act, which restricts the power to confer degrees. The Court directed the State to accommodate Madarsa students in regular schools, effectively leading to the closure of Madarsas.

Supreme Court’s reasoning

The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s judgment, finding the Madarsa Act largely constitutional. The court noted that while the Equality code of Articles 14,15, 16 forms one facet of Secularism, Articles 29 & 30 form the other facet of Secularism. This formed the essence of the judgment. The Court’s reasoning centred on the following points:

Secularism as a positive concept: The Court emphasized that secularism in the Indian context involves not just the separation of religion and state but also the State’s positive obligation to ensure equal opportunities for all religions. Regulating Madarsa education to improve its quality was viewed as furthering substantive equality for the minority community.
Distinction between religious instruction and education: The Court differentiated between religious instruction, which focuses on specific tenets and rituals, and religious education, which provides broader knowledge about religions. It held that the Madarsa Act aimed to regulate education in Madarsas, which included both religious and secular subjects.
Article 30 and State regulation: The Court recognized the right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions under Article 30 but also acknowledged the State’s interest in maintaining educational standards in these institutions. It held that the Madarsa Act’s regulatory provisions, relating to curriculum, teacher qualifications, and infrastructure, were reasonable measures to ensure quality education without infringing on the minority’s right to administration.
Legislative competence: The Court affirmed the State legislature’s competence to enact the Madarsa Act under Entry 25 of List III. It rejected the argument that regulating institutions imparting religious instruction fell outside the scope of “education.” However, the Court found those provisions regulating Fazil and Kamil(higher education) degrees unconstitutional, as they conflicted with the UGC Act—which enables regulation of higher education degrees by the UGC— enacted by Parliament under the exclusive power of Entry 66 of List I.
Severability: The Court applied the doctrine of severability to uphold the majority of the Madarsa Act. It held that the provisions regulating Fazil and Kamil degrees could be severed from the rest of the Act, which remained valid and enforceable.

On basic structure and it being the basis of a challenge

In Anjum Kadari, the Supreme Court clarified that laws cannot be invalidated solely for violating the “basic structure” doctrine, which limits Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution. Laws can only be struck down if they breach specific constitutional provisions or exceed legislative competence.

The Court highlighted that abstract concept like secularism or democracy, while part of the basic structure, are undefined and open to interpretation. Invalidating laws based on such broad principles could undermine legislative authority. It noted that even in cases like Madras Bar Association vs Union of India [(2014) 10 SCC 1 [109], the violation had to link to concrete constitutional provisions.

For example, to challenge a law based on secularism, a petitioner must show how it violates specific provisions like Articles 14, 15, or 25-30. In this case, the Court examined the Madarsa Act under Articles 28 and 30, rejecting the High Court’s view that it inherently violated secularism.

On Right to Education under Article 21A

The Supreme Court in Anjum Kadari addressed the apparent conflict between the Madarsa Act and Article 21A, which guarantees the right to free and compulsory education for children aged 6 to 14. The key point is that the RTE Act, which implements Article 21A, specifically exempts Madarsas from its purview (Section 1(5) of the RTE Act)1. This exemption itself implies that the legislature recognized the potential tension between the universal right to education and the specific rights of minorities under Article 302.

The Supreme Court in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust vs Union of India [(2014) 8 SCC 1] had previously held that applying the RTE Act to minority institutions, including Madarsas, could undermine their minority character and violate Article 302. Therefore, the Court in Anjum Kadari did not find the Madarsa Act’s regulation of Madarsas to be in conflict with Article 21A, as the RTE Act itself carves out an exception for such institutions.

Despite the parts related to higher education degrees in Madarsas, this judgement forms a positive part of the jurisprudence relating to minority rights in the country.

(Case Note: Anjum Kadari vs. Union of India)

(The author is a legal researcher with the organisation)

[1] 2024 INSC 831

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