The Supreme Court of India recently delivered a seminal judgment in the case of Just Rights for Children Alliance & Anr. v. S. Harish & Ors. (2024 INSC 716). The decision provides a detailed interpretation of Section 15 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), which penalizes the failure to delete, destroy, or report child sexual exploitation and abuse material (CSEAM), as well as its possession and dissemination, and examines its interplay with Section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act), which addresses the electronic creation, storage, and transmission of such material. The Court’s ruling aims to address the growing challenges posed by the possession and dissemination of CSEAM in the digital age. The judgment underscores a purposive and forward-looking approach to statutory interpretation.
Factual Background
The case arose from an FIR filed against the respondent, following allegations of possessing child pornographic material. The forensic analysis of the respondent’s mobile phone revealed two video files depicting child sexual abuse and over a hundred other pornographic files. These findings led to charges under Section 15(1) of the POCSO Act and Section 67B of the IT Act. However, the High Court of Madras quashed the criminal proceedings, reasoning that the essential elements of the offenses were not met. This prompted an appeal to the Supreme Court by child rights organizations.
Legal issues framed
The Supreme Court examined several critical questions:
- The scope and interpretation of Section 15 of the POCSO Act, particularly the distinctions between sub-section(s) (1), (2) and (3) respectively of Section 15 of the POCSO?
- The application of the doctrine of constructive possession and its implications for inchoate offenses.
- The operation of the statutory presumption of culpable mental state under Section 30 of the POCSO Act.
- Whether the High Court’s quashing of the chargesheet adhered to legislative intent and judicial principles.
Court’s reasoning
Purposive interpretation: safeguarding legislative intent
The Supreme Court adopted a purposive interpretation to align the statutory provisions with their legislative objectives. Recognizing the inadequacy of a strict textual approach, the Court emphasized the broader aim of protecting children from exploitation. Key observations included:
- Section 15: Designed to comprehensively address the harm posed by possession, storage, and dissemination of CSEAM. It seeks to criminalize preparatory actions and omissions that contribute to child exploitation. [Paragraph 76]
- Section 67B: Specifically targets the electronic transmission, creation, and storage of child pornographic material, focusing on acts conducted via digital platforms. [Paragraph 151]
The Court emphasized that purposive interpretation is essential to ensure the evolving challenges posed by technology and digital platforms are addressed effectively. It warned against narrow readings that could undermine legislative intent. [Paragraph 190]
The Court highlighted the complementary roles of Section 67B and Section 15 of the IT Act. Section 67B targets digital actions like creating, transmitting, or storing CSEAM, holding online platforms accountable. In contrast, Section 15 covers broader scenarios, including physical possession, constructive possession, and failure to report such content, whether stored digitally or physically.
Detailed interpretation of Section 15 as per Supreme Court:
- Independent offenses within Section 15:
- Section 15(1): Penalizes failure to delete, destroy, or report CSEAM to authorities in order to transmit it. No actual sharing need to occur; intention is sufficient. This provision places a legal obligation on individuals to act responsibly when they come into possession of such material, even inadvertently. The Court clarified that this applies irrespective of whether the individual intends to disseminate the material. [Paragraph 87]
- Section 15(2): Criminalizes acts of facilitating, transmitting, or disseminating CSEAM for purpose of either transmitting, propagating, displaying or distributing the same in any manner. It highlights culpability in cases where individuals actively enable the spread of such material, including sharing via digital platforms. [Paragraph 88]
- Section 15(3): Targets possession of CSEAM with intent for commercial exploitation. The heightened culpability under this subsection reflects the gravity of exploiting such material for monetary or other material gains. [Paragraph 79]
The Supreme Court clarified that each subsection addresses specific dimensions of harm, ensuring that both active and passive forms of involvement are penalized.
- Constructive possession: The Court elaborated that constructive possession includes situations where an individual has control or the ability to control CSEAM without necessarily having physical possession. For instance, accessing and failing to delete such material from an online platform qualifies as constructive possession under Section 15(1). This interpretation ensures accountability in digital contexts. [Paragraph 118]
- Mens Rea and inchoate offenses: Section 15 criminalizes preparatory acts by focusing on the intention behind possession or storage. This approach aims to deter individuals from actions that could lead to further exploitation, even if the harmful act is incomplete. The Court highlighted that the provision’s preventive framework aligns with the overarching aims of the POCSO Act. [Paragraph 81]
Statutory presumption under Section 30 of the POCSO Act
Mandatory but rebuttable presumption: Section 30 shifts the burden of proof to the accused once foundational facts—such as possession or failure to act—are established. The Court emphasized that this presumption serves as a critical tool to counteract the difficulty of proving intent in cases involving CSEAM. [Paragraph 156]
Errors in the High Court’s reasoning
The Supreme Court identified errors in the High Court’s judgment:
- The High Court misinterpreted the scope of Section 15, treating it as reliant on actual dissemination.
- It overlooked the doctrine of constructive possession and the statutory presumption under Section 30.
Observations and recommendations
- Terminology Reform: The Court recommended replacing “child pornography” with “child sexual exploitation and abuse material” (CSEAM) to reflect the exploitative nature of such offenses accurately. [Paragraph 227]
- Role of Digital Intermediaries: The Court underscored the obligations of online platforms to promptly report and remove CSEAM, emphasizing strict enforcement under the IT Act and POCSO Rules. [Paragraph 254]
- Awareness Initiatives: It called for nationwide campaigns, including sex education and digital literacy programs, to prevent child exploitation and equip individuals to report such offenses. [Paragraph 248]
- Recommendation to Government
The Supreme Court urged the Union to form an Expert Committee to design programs on health, sex education, and POCSO awareness for children, ensuring robust child protection and education. It also recommended amending Section 15(1) of POCSO to enable public reporting of CSEAM through an online portal. [Paragraph 260]
Broader implications
This judgment reinforces a preventive and deterrent framework for addressing child exploitation. By adopting a purposive interpretation and emphasizing systemic reforms, the Court has paved the way for more effective enforcement of child protection laws.
Its emphasis on intent, accountability, and preventive measures ensures justice in the present case and sets a robust precedent for future interpretations of the POCSO Act and IT Act.
(The author is part of the organisations legal research team)
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