Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), along with women’s rights groups, constitutional lawyers, and minority rights organisations, has repeatedly cautioned that such laws—already operational in several BJP-ruled states—have functioned less as safeguards against coercion and more as tools for communal profiling, moral policing, and the criminalisation of adult consensual relationships. Maharashtra is now being pushed to replicate a model that is not only deeply abusive in practice but also under active constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court of India.

It is essential to note that previously, the Maharashtra Government had issued a Government resolution on December 13, 2022, following the gruesome murder of Shraddha Walkar in Delhi allegedly by her inter-faith live-in partner, forming a committee to provide a platform to ‘counsel, communicate and resolve’ issues between couples and families. According to the GR, the committee can seek information of both registered and unregistered marriages. Furthermore, the committee can intervene at the behest of any person, which the plea alleges is a breach of the couple’s privacy “especially when two consenting adults are married to each other”. A challenge against the same, filed by CJP, remains pending in the Bombay High Court. Details of the petition may be read here.

A state-wide, synchronized campaign- Event by event

The scale and coordination of the recent mobilisations are striking. On November 27, in Jalgaon, the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti organised an ‘Anti–Love Jihad’ protest where speakers openly demanded that the Maharashtra Chief Minister ensure the passage of an anti-conversion law in the upcoming winter session of the Assembly. The demand was framed as a matter of urgency and inevitability. Organisers claimed support from over 35 organisations, cited more than 300 citizen statements, and referenced a petition purportedly carrying 15,000 signatures—figures repeatedly invoked to manufacture the impression of overwhelming public consensus.

As the Assembly session approached, the campaign intensified. On December 5, in Amravati, far-right organisations led by the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti submitted a memorandum to the District Collector, addressed to the Chief Minister and Deputy Chief Minister, demanding a ‘strict’ law against the alleged conspiracy of ‘love jihad’. A signature campaign claiming the support of over 3,000 citizens accompanied the submission, making explicit that the objective was legislative pressure during the session rather than redressal of any specific grievance.

On December 7, protests were held across multiple districts. In Dapoli, Ratnagiri, far-right groups once again alleged a systematic conspiracy of ‘love jihad’ and demanded immediate legislative action. The framing was uniform: inter-faith relationships were projected as demographic warfare, and state inaction was portrayed as civilisational betrayal.

The same day, in Akola, the campaign descended into overt communal abuse. At an anti–‘love jihad’ protest, a Hindu Janajagruti Samiti member used derogatory slurs against Muslims—calling them “cowards who used to be Hindus” and “jalli-topiwallas”—and invoked the trope of ‘gaddar Hindus’. Such speech is not incidental; it reveals the communal animus that animates the demand for criminal legislation and signals how such laws are likely to be enforced on the ground.

Also on December 7, in Kothrud, Pune, at a Vishwa Hindu Parishad–Bajrang Dal ‘Shaurya Diwas’ event, speakers claimed that only organisations like the Bajrang Dal could stop ‘love jihad’, religious conversions, and cow slaughter. This assertion effectively erased the boundary between state authority and vigilante power, suggesting that the proposed law is intended to legitimise extra-legal social control.

On December 8, the campaign expanded simultaneously into administrative offices and mainstream political platforms. In Chhatrapati Sambhaji Nagar, delegations led by the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti, alongside BJP leader Kamlesh Katariya, submitted requests at District Magistrate offices across Maharashtra, uniformly urging enactment of a ‘strict’ anti–love jihad law.

The same day, at Hotel Center Point, Nagpur, during a ‘Majha Maharashtra’ event organised by Anand Bazaar Patrika, BJP MLA Nitesh Rane amplified these conspiracies from a mainstream political stage. He invoked ‘love jihad’, ‘land jihad’, and ‘halal jihad’, and further referenced ‘ghazwa-e-Hind’, explicitly linking these ideas to terrorism. Such rhetoric performs a crucial legitimising function: it converts fringe paranoia into a perceived security threat, thereby manufacturing public consent for exceptional criminal law.

Core Criticisms of Anti-Conversion Laws: Why civil liberties groups oppose them

CJP and other civil liberties organisations, women’s rights groups, and constitutional scholars have consistently raised serious objections to anti-conversion laws across states—objections that apply with equal, if not greater, force to the proposed Maharashtra legislation.

1. Criminalisation of consent and autonomy: These laws operate on the presumption that adult women—particularly Hindu women—are incapable of making informed choices about relationships and faith. By treating consent as inherently suspect, the laws directly contradict Supreme Court jurisprudence recognising decisional autonomy, bodily integrity, and the right to choose one’s partner.
2. Vague and overbroad offences: Terms such as ‘allurement’, ‘undue influence’, and ‘fraud’ are undefined or expansively defined, allowing ordinary acts—companionship, emotional support, marriage, or assistance—to be reinterpreted as criminal inducement. This violates the principle that criminal offences must be narrowly and clearly defined.
3. Burden-shifting and presumption of guilt: Many anti-conversion laws invert the foundational criminal law principle of presumption of innocence by shifting the burden onto the accused to prove that no coercion occurred. This is constitutionally suspect and procedurally unjust.
4. Third-party complaints and vigilante policing: By allowing relatives—or even unrelated persons—to file complaints, these laws institutionalise vigilante interference in intimate relationships. In practice, police action is often triggered not by the alleged convert but by ideological organisations or hostile family members.
5. Discriminatory enforcement: Empirical evidence from other states demonstrates that enforcement disproportionately targets Muslim men and inter-faith couples, entrenching communal profiling and selective policing.
6. Chilling Effect on Religious Freedom: Mandatory prior notice requirements and intrusive inquiries deter individuals from exercising their freedom of conscience, effectively converting a fundamental right into a regulated privilege.

CJP has repeatedly warned that these laws do not prevent coercion; they prevent choice.

Pending Petitions Before the Supreme Court: Laws under constitutional cloud

Importantly, CJP’s challenge to anti-conversion laws in several states—including Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Gujarat—is currently pending before the Supreme Court of India. Multiple petitions contend that these statutes violate core constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25.

Detailed report may be read here.

Petitioners have argued that the laws:

• Undermine the right to privacy and decisional autonomy recognised in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India
• Criminalise adult consensual relationships, contrary to Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. and Lata Singh v. State of UP
• Treat women as lacking agency, in violation of equality and dignity
• Enable arbitrary, discriminatory, and communalised policing
• Invert the presumption of innocence by shifting the burden of proof

The Supreme Court has been urged to examine whether the state can subject personal faith, marriage, and belief to prior scrutiny and criminal sanction in the absence of demonstrable harm. These challenges remain pending, rendering the legal framework that Maharashtra is being urged to adopt constitutionally unstable.

Manufacturing panic, normalising surveillance, reshaping criminal law

The Maharashtra campaign exemplifies a broader shift in law making: from evidence-based policy to ideology-driven criminalisation. There is no credible data demonstrating widespread forced conversions through marriage in Maharashtra. Existing criminal law already addresses coercion, cheating, kidnapping, trafficking, and sexual exploitation. The demand for a new law is therefore not remedial but symbolic—designed to signal dominance, discipline intimacy, and legitimise social surveillance.

By framing adult women as perpetual victims, these campaigns rein scribe patriarchal control. By singling out Muslims as conspirators, they normalise collective suspicion. By demanding preventive criminalisation, they erode the basic premise that criminal law punishes acts, not identities or intentions.

What is at stake for Maharashtra

If enacted, an anti-conversion law in Maharashtra will not remain a neutral legal instrument. It will embolden vigilante groups, legitimise moral policing, and place police machinery at the service of ideological enforcement. For inter-faith couples, religious minorities, and women asserting autonomy, the consequences are likely to be immediate and severe: arrests, harassment, prolonged incarceration, and social ostracisation.

As CJP has consistently argued, the real question is not whether forced conversions should be prevented—existing law already does so—but whether the state can be permitted to criminalise choice itself. Maharashtra today stands at a constitutional crossroads: between safeguarding liberty and importing a legal regime already notorious for abuse and under active constitutional scrutiny. The street pressure is loud. The constitutional warning signs are louder still.

Related:

Gujarat High Court Widened Anti-Conversion Law: ‘Victims’ can be prosecuted as offenders

K’taka HC: Ruling on state’s ‘anti-conversion’ law, lays down precedent against potential weaponisation by third-party vigilantes

Supreme Court seeks states’ replies on pleas for stay of anti-conversion laws, to decide on interim stay after six weeks

“Anti-conversion laws being weaponised”: CJP seeks interim relief against misuse of anti-conversion laws

The post Street Pressure, State Power, and the Criminalisation of Choice: How Hindutva groups are pushing Maharashtra’s anti-conversion law appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A decade-long livelihood cut short

Hussain, originally from Gagandiwan village under Laheri police station in Biharsharif, had earned his livelihood for nearly 20 years by selling clothes door-to-door in rural Nawada on a bicycle, according to Indian Express. Over the past few years, he had been living with his in-laws in Barui village, Nawada district, from where he would travel daily to surrounding villages to sell garments.

Family members described him as a quiet worker who had never faced complaints or conflict in the course of his business, as per The New Indian Express.

Night of December 5: From seeking help to being hunted

On the night of December 5, Hussain was returning from Dumri village after a day of hawking when his bicycle reportedly developed a puncture. Near Bhattapar (also referred to as Bhatta) village, which falls under Roh police station, he stopped to ask locals about a puncture repair shop, as reported by Indian Express.

According to his brother Mohammad Shakib Alam, instead of helping him, a group of villagers questioned him about his name and profession, reported Scroll. Soon after identifying him, they allegedly dragged him off his bicycle and began assaulting him.

Robbery and illegal confinement

Hussain told investigators and media, in a video recorded from his hospital bed, that the attackers robbed him of cash—variously reported as Rs 8,000 and Rs 18,000—along with his bicycle and clothes (ThePrint).

He was then tied by his hands and feet and locked inside a room, where the violence intensified over several hours. What began with a smaller group of assailants reportedly expanded as more villagers joined, eventually forming a mob of 15–20 people.

Extreme and prolonged torture

The assault, as described by Hussain and later corroborated in parts by medical findings, involved sustained and sadistic violence. He stated that he was beaten repeatedly with bricks and iron rods, resulting in fractured fingers and hands, provided Indian Express.

In one of the most chilling aspects of the case, Hussain alleged that the mob stripped him to check his private parts to confirm his religion, after which the assault escalated further, as per ThePrint. He said petrol was poured on him, and his body was branded with a heated iron rod, causing severe burns that peeled his skin.

Hussain also alleged that his ears and fingertips were cut with pliers, his nails were pulled out, and a steel rod was used to strike his head, causing serious head injuries.

At one point, according to his statement, one attacker climbed onto his chest and attempted to strangle him, leading to blood gushing from his mouth. The assault reportedly continued intermittently through the night as more assailants arrived.

Police intervention after hours of violence

An emergency Dial 112 call was eventually made, following which Roh police reached the village at around 2:30 a.m. on December 6, several hours after the assault began, as reported by Indian Express.

Furthermore, police sources told The Indian Express that Hussain was found in a grievously injured condition. He was taken first to the Roh Primary Health Centre, then referred to Nawada Sadar Hospital, and later shifted to Vardhman Institute of Medical Sciences (VIMS), Pawapuri, as his condition worsened.

Despite medical intervention, Hussain remained critical. He ultimately died nearly a week later while being transported from Pawapuri to Patna for advanced care.

Victim’s statement before death

Crucially, Hussain managed to give a video statement from his hospital bed, accessed by ThePrint. In the recording, he named the acts of torture inflicted upon him and explicitly stated that he was targeted after the assailants identified him as Muslim.

While some senior police officials later claimed that the religious aspect did not appear in the wife’s initial written complaint, the existence of Hussain’s recorded statement has become a key piece of evidence in the ongoing investigation.

FIR by wife: Allegations of false theft and mob violence

On December 6, Hussain’s wife Shabnam Parveen filed a detailed complaint naming 10 residents of Bhattapar village and 15 unidentified persons, reported Indian Express. She alleged that her husband was falsely accused of theft, tied up, robbed, and brutally tortured.

She also stated that when she and her relatives reached Bhattapar to look for Hussain, they were abused and threatened by villagers, prompting the police to add further sections relating to intimidation and criminal force.

Based on her complaint, police registered an FIR invoking multiple provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, including sections dealing with unlawful assembly, rioting, grievous hurt using dangerous weapons, abetment, common intention, and group violence motivated by discrimination. After Hussain’s death, Section 103 (murder) was added, as per The New Indian Express.

Counter-FIR against the injured victim

Within hours of the assault coming to light, a cross-complaint was filed by Sikandar Yadav, one of the men later named as an accused by Parveen. Yadav alleged that Hussain had committed theft at his house that night, claiming the loss of jewellery and utensils (ThePrint).

Based on this complaint, police initially booked the severely injured Hussain under sections of the BNS relating to theft and trespass, even as he lay hospitalised. Senior police officials later stated that both FIRs are being investigated simultaneously, a pattern that has drawn criticism from rights groups for effectively placing the victim and perpetrators on the same legal footing.

Arrests, official stance, and denial of lynching

Nawada Superintendent of Police Abhinav Dhiman confirmed that a Special Investigation Team was constituted, which arrested four suspects within 24 hours, followed by further arrests over the next few days.

As of the latest reports of Indian Express, eight to nine persons have been arrested or detained, including several named in the FIR, while police continue raids to trace the remaining accused,

Despite the nature of the allegations, some senior officials initially denied that the case amounted to a religion-based lynching, describing it instead as an assault arising out of “mistaken identity” linked to theft suspicions, according to The Print. This position stands in contrast to the victim’s recorded account and the brutality documented in medical examinations.

Family left devastated

Hussain, described by his family as the sole breadwinner, is survived by his wife and three children. His brother told The Print that the family has suffered an irreversible loss and now faces an uncertain future.

As the investigation continues, the case has become emblematic of mob violence enabled by rumours, identity checks, and delayed state intervention, raising urgent questions about accountability, police conduct, and the protection of vulnerable livelihoods in India.

Related:

Babri Masjid’ v/s Gita recital: In a cynical play of communal politics, pre-poll West Bengal sees active polarisation at both ends of the spectrum

NBDSA Raps Times Now Navbharat for communal, agenda-driven broadcast; orders removal of inflammatory segments

Silent Scars: How Muslim widows of hate crimes endure layered, unseen oppression

CJP Files complaint with NCM over escalating Hate Speeches during Hindu Sanatan Ekta Padyatra

Hindu Nationalism’s sectarian nationalism and its concept of ‘duties and rights’

The post Muslim clothes hawker dies after prolonged mob torture in Bihar’s Nawada appeared first on SabrangIndia.

NBDSA’s review of the broadcast revealed that the anchor relied on stereotypes about Bengali-speaking Muslims—particularly the Miya community—misrepresented demographic and political data, and even connected the protest song to an entirely unrelated rape case with no causal link. The Authority noted that this narrative expansion could not be justified as news reporting; rather, it demonstrated that the anchor “had a particular agenda in mind.” By weaving isolated incidents into a communal narrative and introducing ideas like a “Jihadi syndicate” or a conspiracy to undermine Hindu traditions, the programme violated the NBDSA’s Code of Ethics and Specific Guidelines for Anchors, which bar generalisation, sensationalism, and the vilification of any community.

In its direction, the Authority has ordered Times Now Navbharat to remove all “offending portions” from the programme and submit a modified version within seven days. It also instructed that the order be circulated to all member broadcasters and uploaded on the NBDA website and in the next Annual Report. For CJP, the decision marks a significant regulatory affirmation of its consistent efforts to challenge communalised media narratives. For the wider media landscape, the order serves as a critical reminder that the authority to question and critique cannot be exercised through distortion, stereotype, or the manufacturing of communal fear.

The Complaint: CJP flags communal narrative, distortion, and fear-mongering

CJP’s complaint dated September 9, 2024 focused on a Times Now Navbharat programme titled: “Desh Ka Mood Meter: सनातन संस्कृति…कट्टरपंथियों के लिए सॉफ्ट टारगेट? | CM Himanta Biswa Sarma News” that aired on 2 September 2024. The show revolved around the arrest of Altaf Hussain, a Bengali-speaking Muslim singer from Assam, who had released a protest song highlighting discrimination against the Miya community. Following his arrest, the Chief Minister og Assam made a Facebook Live appearance calling the song “an attack” and alleging an attempt to “change Bihu into Miya Bihu”.

The Times Now Navbharat broadcast then used these remarks to spin a sweeping communal narrative.

CJP pointed out that the anchor:

• Presented the incident as part of a nationwide conspiracy against Hindu culture—linking Assam, Kerala, and Kashmir in a manufactured war-like narrative.
• Used dangerous phrases such as “Jihadi syndicate”, communal conspiracy, and “invasion”.
• Equated the term ‘Miya’ with illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, misrepresenting an entire community.
• Suggested that Muslims controlled 30 Vidhan Sabha seats and posed a demographic threat.
• Linked an isolated rape case to an entire community to insinuate collective criminality.
• Wove these disparate incidents into an overarching narrative that Hindus were under “attack”.

CJP also highlighted how the broadcast manipulated imagery, language, and tone to sharply polarise viewers and turn a cultural controversy into a nationwide Hindu-Muslim conflict.

The complete report may be read here.

Broadcaster’s Defence: ‘We only reported facts’

Times Now Navbharat denied all allegations:

• It claimed the show was only reporting the arrest and the Chief Minister’s views.
• It argued that it had differentiated between “Miya” Muslims and indigenous Assamese Muslims.
• It insisted that the depiction of demographics and electoral influence was factual.
• It refuted claims of fear-mongering, stating that the anchor was merely posing uncomfortable questions in the national interest.
• It accused the complainant of “selectively quoting snippets”.

Hearing Before NBDSA: CJP demonstrates how the anchor crafted a false national conspiracy

At the hearing held on February 22, 2025, CJP meticulously demonstrated that:

• The anchor’s opening monologue itself framed the entire show as an attack on Hindu festivals “from Assam to Kerala”.
• This was not reportage but a deliberate, pre-set narrative.
• The anchor bundled unrelated issues—the singer’s arrest, a rape case, Onam interpretations, and alleged temple name changes—to craft a false story of Hindus under siege.
• The rhetoric used was not factual journalism but fear-inducing, divisive, and ethically unsound.

NBDSA’s Findings: “Anchor had an agenda in mind”

• Reporting the arrest itself was legitimate—but the anchor went far beyond facts

The Authority noted that reporting the arrest and discussing the Chief Minister’s criticism of the song was well within the channel’s rights. But the problem was everything that followed.

• “The narrative built by the anchor went much beyond that”

NBDSA found that:

• The anchor introduced communal stereotypes, generalisations, and insinuations against a specific community.
• He linked the singer’s song to an unrelated rape case, despite “no causal connection”.
• He used the incident as an opportunity to push an agenda-driven narrative.

• “The anchor had a particular agenda in mind”

This is one of the strongest observations NBDSA has made in recent orders. The Authority stated that the anchor appeared to seize the incident as a chance to craft a pre-decided, communal storyline.

“In the process, the anchor brings a stereotype in respect of a particular community which could clearly have been avoided. The anchor also connects the song with an incident of rape, though there was no causal connection and the two things arc altogether separate and distinct. It seems the anchor had a particular agenda in mind and got this opportunity to build his narrative, bearing in mind the said agenda. It is this generalisation which falls foul of the BDSA’s Code of Ethics and Broadcasting Standards as well as the Specific Guidelines for Anchors conducting Programmes including Debates.”

• This violates the Code of Ethics and the Specific Guidelines for Anchors

NBDSA held that the broadcast breached:

• requirements of impartiality,
• fairness,
• neutrality,
• and the mandates for non-sensational, non-communal reporting.

The Direction: Remove offending content, re-publish edited version

NBDSA issued a clear directive:

• Times Now Navbharat must modulate the programme by removing all offending portions.
• The broadcaster must submit the edited link to NBDSA within 7 days.
• The order will be circulated internally to all NBDA member channels, editors, and legal heads.
• It will be hosted publicly on NBDA’s website and included in the Authority’s Annual Report.

Why this order matters

For CJP: It validates months of rigorous, evidence-driven media accountability work and strengthens future interventions against hate speech and communal propaganda.

For media regulation: The order sets a clear precedent that anchors cannot camouflage communal narratives under the guise of “uncomfortable questions”.

For newsroom ethics: The order draws a sharp line between reporting and communal agenda-setting, holding anchors accountable—not just for factual accuracy but for narrative construction.

For public discourse: It recognises how dangerous and corrosive it is when mainstream news links isolated crimes to entire communities or constructs conspiracies around minorities.

The complete order may be read here.

Image Courtesy: Youtube.com

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The post NBDSA Raps Times Now Navbharat for communal, agenda-driven broadcast; orders removal of inflammatory segments appeared first on SabrangIndia.

With barely months to go for assembly elections, West Bengal’s political discourse has taken a headlong communal plunge. Again. This is not the first time but this time round, the sudden recall of the ‘Babri Masjid’ –a contentious and sore issue—through a carefully curated and widely publicised “programme” for a foundation-laying ceremony of a Mosque in Murshidabad set the proverbial stone rolling. Invitations were sent out widely by an ‘ousted’ Trinamool MLA belonging to the Muslim community (Humayun Kabir) inviting physical presence of all manner of people at this “brick laying foundation ceremony scheduled for December 6”, the 32^nd anniversary of the demolition of the historic mosque in Faizabad-Ayodya in 1992. These went out in the last week of November; however clearly for the thousands gathered at Murshidabad on Saturday, December 6, the silent planning had gone on for weeks. Making strident calls for “donations for a 300 crore Mosque!” Kabir with other controversial leaders and clerics sparked nationwide coverage and controversy by laying the foundation stone for a “new” Babri Masjid in Murshidabad. The very next day –in a carefully choreographed “rebuttal”, ‘Sanatani’ Hindus gathered in huge numbers in the heart of Kolkata for a reading of the Bhagavad Gita and calling for Hindu unity!

On December 6, 1992, a staggering number of people turned up at the site — a 25-acre plot in Beldanga, a municipality town in Murshidabad — for the brick-laying ceremony, which Kabir described as a ‘prestige battle’ for Indian Muslims. According to some reports, several people had travelled from as far as North Dinajpur and Canning in South 24-Parganas, located some 240 kilometres away. Many were seen walking toward the site balancing bricks on their heads, which they wanted to use in the structure.

Split or Grab: the rush for the ‘Muslim Vote’ in West Bengal

Monetary contributions are not only being sought but unconfirmed reports of who is actually supporting this “programme” have led to widespread speculation. Clearly what is at stake in this communal battle are the 174 Assembly seats out of the total 294 with at least a 15% Muslim electorate — as per the 2011 Census, Muslims comprise 27% of the population — the BJP has made headway in terms of vote shares but has struggled to convert its growing presence into seats. According to pollsters this Hindu majoritarian party will look to “better its 2019 Lok Sabha election record” when it led in 42 of the 174 Assembly segments that have at least 15% Muslim electorate. Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress has been accused of its fair share of “appeasement” politics and the third (insignificant) player, the Indian National Congress-CPI (M) combine also accused of encouraging a Muslim communal Indian Secular Front (ISF), founded by Pirzada Abbas Siddiqui. Now the controversial Assaduddin Owaisi has threatened to throw in his hat in the West Bengal poll ring by fielding candidates of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM). Split or grab, it’s the Muslim Vote that is in demand in West Bengal!

In 2021, after an equally high-pitched (and even communal battle by the BJP), the Trinamool Congress (TMC) managed to retain power in West Bengal. The electorate rewarded Mamata Banerjee another term with a vote share of nearly 50 percent! This signalled a significant victory since it indicated of how Banerjee was chosen by not just the minority community, but all secular-minded people from different faiths. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that ran a deeply communal campaign, openly calling Banerjee “Begum”, alluding to her alleged pro-minority bias, appears to have failed in dividing the people on the basis of religion.

Banerjee’s TMC had won not only won seats in constituencies with large population of people hailing from the minority community, like Bashirhat (Uttar and Dakshin), Deganga, Islampur, and Kasba, but also in urban centres, mixed neighbourhoods, and constituencies with a larger population from the majority community. Some of TMC’s most significant victories in such seats were, in 2021, from Dum Dum, Howrah (Uttar, Dakshin and Madhya), Jadavpur, Kharagpur, Kolkata Port among others.

“Gita” recital event

A day later, this year, on December 7, devotees in large numbers (BJP claimed 6.5 lakh) turned up at Kolkata’s iconic Brigade Parade Ground to participate in a collective recital of the Bhagavad Gita, titled ‘Panch Lakkho Konthe Gita Path’, organised by the Sanatan Sanskriti Sansad — a collective of monks and Hindutva leaders from across states and institutions. The event, attended by the likes of Dhirendra Krishna Shastri (‘Baba Bageshwar’), Sadhvi Ritambhara and Baba Ramdev, also featured BJP leaders like Samik Bhattacharya, Dilip Ghosh, Suvendu Adhikari, Dilip Ghosh, Sukanta Majumdar, Locket Chatterjee, Agnimitra Paul and others. Participants arrived in huge numbers, in crowded buses, ferries, and trucks, not only from West Bengal, but also from neighbouring states such as Bihar, Orissa, Assam, and even Bangladesh and Nepal.  Clearly underlining central government’s support for the second event, Bengal governor C V Ananda Bose, too, addressed the crowd.

Communal speeches at both events

Before the onset of the brick-laying ceremony in Beldanga on Saturday, Kabir delivered an incendiary speech, going as far as declaring that Muslims, who account for 37% of the total population in Bengal, would willingly sacrifice themselves before letting the bricks of the Babri Masjid come undone. The attendees said that he had perfectly articulated the sentiments of the Muslims in the state. Compatriots of Kabir roared from the stage, “Humayun se jo takrayega, woh choor choor ho jayega!” (Translation: Whoever clashes with Humayun will be smashed to pieces!).

This was both sudden and also planned. Local reports indicate that, Kabir had first expressed his desire to set up the mosque last year in December 2024. He had promised to make a cast of the Babri Masjid by December 6 of this year. “…With donations from everyone, we will build a new Babri Masjid in Beldanga in Murshidabad in West Bengal,” he had said. After this act on December 6, 2025, he was suspended by the Trinamool Congress, which cited communal politics as the grounds for its action. “He stays in Rejinagar and is an MLA from Bharatpur. Why then does he want to build a mosque at Beldanga? This is because Beldanga is communally sensitive, and if there are riots, it will result in polarisation and help the BJP,” Mayor Hakim was quoted as saying.

Both Kabir in Murshidabad and Shastri in Kolkata posed disquieting questions: Were they setting up their supporters for a prolonged confrontation and division?

At the Kolkata parade ground, Shastri, while calling for a Hindu Rashtra, asked: “You won’t be scared? (No) You won’t step back? (No) You won’t run away? (No).” In Beldanga, a speaker standing next to Kabir echoed a similar line of provocation: “You will not run away in fear of the police? (No) Are you ready to be beaten by the police to get what we want? (Yes).” Another compatriot of Kabir exclaimed from the podium: “Ladke lenge Babri Masjid.” (We will fight to reclaim Babri Masjid).

Divisive consequences

The unfortunate result of such verbal challenges translated into a spirit of aggressive religious posturing among the attendees. In Murshidabad, one attendee threatened to cut off the head of whoever stood in the way of the Babri Mosque and play football with it. At the Brigade Parade Ground, saffron-clad vigilantes assaulted one Sheikh Reyajul for selling chicken patties at the event. They kicked down his box of savouries, despite Reyajul pleading that it was his source of livelihood, and made him do sit-ups while holding his ears. Reports later emerged of a second incident where another Muslim vendor was allegedly assaulted for selling chicken puffs near the venue.

The Opposition, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) predictably and openly endorsed the Gita recital event and made their presence felt on the dais. However Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress is caught unawares. Forced to suspend Kabir days before the foundation laying event. Kolkata mayor Firhad Hakim referred to him as a ‘traitor’, pointedly indicating that Kabir followed in the stead of ‘Mir Jafar’, implying his history of defections, which saw him change from the Congress, to the TMC, to the BJP, and then back to TMC, before his recent suspension. Furthermore, chief minister Mamata Banerjee skipped the Gita Path events despite being invited, citing ideological differences. “How can I go to an event organised by the BJP? I am from a different party, I have a different ideology… They (the BJP) are anti-Bengali”, said Banerjee in a statement.

The BJP in West Bengal didn’t take too long to retaliate. Leader of Opposition Suvendu Adhikari said that while the party did not object to the construction of the mosque itself, they had a problem with the naming. Addressing a press conference on Monday, December 8, Adhikari alleged that Kabir had the support of the administration in celebrating “Mughal-Pathan invaders”.

Notably, one section of those who attended the Murshidabad event seemed miffed with the Bengal government. While speaking to Aaj Tak Bangla, several devotees raised allegations of corruption against the Mamata Banerjee government and underlined that nothing substantial had been done for the Muslims.

Dubious background of Humayun Kabir

This is not the first time that Kabir was expelled from the TMC. In 2015, he was expelled for 6 years over anti-party statements. After contesting and losing as an independent candidate in Murshidabad’s Rejinagar seat in 2016, he joined the BJP in 2018. After losing again in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, he rejoined TMC in 2020 and won as MLA from the Bharatpur seat.

MLA from Goshamahal, Hyderabad, T Raja Singh, notorious for his Islamophobic hate speeches and incitements to violence, released a video reacting to the ‘new’ Babri Masjid initiative. He exclaimed: “Mai aaj challenge karta hu — ke Bharat ke Ram-bhakto ko le jaakar Babar ka naam jis prakar se Ayodhya mai mita diya gaya tha, waise hi Bangal ke Ram-bhakt jayega, aur Babar ke naam ki bani huyi masjid ki ek ek eent ko samapt bhi karega.” (I’m issuing a challenge today — in the way that the Ram-bhakts of Bharat had removed Babar’s name from Ayodhya, the Ram-bhakts of Bengal will also come together to demolish each stone used in the building of a mosque in the name of Babar.)

The Wire has this piece on the controversy that may be read here

Saffron flags at Kolkata’s Brigade Parade Ground

The sentiments against the foundation of the mosque spilt onto the Gita Path event the next day. While delivering his speech at the Brigade Ground, Dhirendra Krishna Shastri made several references to Babri Masjid. “In Bharat, should anything be named after foreign invaders? Does Bharat belong to Babur or Raghubar? (Raghubar is another name for the Hindu deity Ram.) It belongs to Raghubar or not? (A resounding yes follows) Hindus need to unite, wave the Bhagwa flag and go to villages far and near to wake the Hindus…” he says during his speech.

While calling for a Hindu Rastra, Shastri also posed several provocative questions. He said, “You have to decide if you want Ghazwa-E-Hind or Bhagwa-E-Hind, if you want tanatani (tension) or sanatani, if you want to see a moon on your flag or a flag on the moon, if you want to see a crack among the Hindus or unity…”

Sdhvi Rithambhara graced the occasion as the chief guest. Rithambara she was one of the 68 people named by the Liberhan Commission in its report on the 1992 Babri Mosque demolition and the riots that followed. Besides, she had played a key role in popularising the ‘Ram Janmabhoomi’ narrative through incendiary speeches — which would be distributed through audio cassettes, and played in public. Rithambara has been awarded a Padma Bhushan by the Narendra Modi government and in August 2014 –in a unique photo-opportunity moment was seen tying a “Raakhee” to the newly elected Modi.

Read this article on Rithambara’s Padma Bhushan here.

Re-incarnated in her role at the Kolata Gita recital assembly, she asserted: “Babar ya Babri ki koi buniyaad iss desh mai nahi hai. Koi eento ki maharat khada kar sakta hai, par hriday mai Babar ko basa nahi sakta. Ye rashtra Ram ka hai, aur Ram ka hi rahega. Yaha bhagwa hi pherahega, yahi satya hai—yai Sanatan satya hai.” (Neither Babar nor Babri has roots in this country. Let them build something out of bricks, it won’t change the fact that Babar can never reside in the heart. This nation belongs to Ram, and will only belong to him. Only the saffron shall rule. This is the truth — the Sanatan truth.”

West Bengal Governor CV Ananda Bose also addressed the crowd, quoting extensively from the Bhagavad Gita and referring to the Indian epics. Reminding the audience that “something” had transpired in Murshidabad the previous day, he urged them to end “religious arrogance” in the state. Bengal is in a sad state of affairs and is ready to usher in change, he remarked. At the very beginning of his speech, he said, “I will try to speak in Hindi, since Hindi is our national language. The national language is the mother. English is a midwife, and a midwife can never be a mother.” This is an oft-repeated piece of misinformation, fact-checked by Alt News.

West Bengal: Will the Communal Narrative succeed?

While Kabir finds it difficult at the moment to make political allies, there is no doubt that the two events totally captured the political discourse in the state to an extent that almost everything else have been pushed to the distant margins. A significant marker of that is what Bengali TV news channels debated in the last few days. One can see the playlist of ABP Ananda’s primetime programme ‘Ghantakhanek Sange Suman’ here.

Republic Bangla went on an overdrive in reporting the Gita Path event on Sunday. The anchors went up on the podium, personally interviewing the guests on their observations on the mass gathering. Shows were run with the tagline “When Brigade turned into Kurukshetra.” Journalist Mayukh Ranjan Ghosh also interviewed Sadhvi Rithambhara, asking her whether she felt that Bengal was ready for such a spectacle. The latter indicated, with a wry smile, “Ye prarambh hai, aage dekhiye.” (This is the beginning. Let’s see what happens next). Ghosh was also on stage with Hiranmay Maharaj, who asserted that ‘yoddhas’ or ‘sainiks’ were being created at the venue, who had picked up the mantle of fighting injustice in Bengal, and instituting a Hindu Rashtra.

Bengali mainstream media channels such as Zee 24 Ghanta and ABP Ananda ran continuous coverage on either Humayun Kabir’s actions or the Gita Path controversy, with both stories dominating their news cycles over the weekend

Article 19India traced the dubious political history of Humayun Kabir. The Video may be watched here.

In 2021, Sabrangindia had carried a series of reports/videos on the issues impacting West Bengal Polls. These may be read/watched here and here and here.

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The post ‘Babri Masjid’ v/s Gita recital: In a cynical play of communal politics, pre-poll West Bengal sees active polarisation at both ends of the spectrum appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The freedom movement was led by leaders who had imbibed values with democratic potential and they led the movement against colonial rule. The likes of Sardar Patel, Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Subhash Chandra Bose articulated values with inherent rights for the nation. They took the lead with great cost to their personal life. One of the examples was the inspiration derived by Jyotirao Phule was from Thomas Penn’s book ‘Rights of Man’. Ambedkar was an ardent follower of John Dewey who was steeped in democratic values.

Recently Mr. Narendra Modi went on to criticise Lord Macaulay for this transition to the values of rights, when he emphasised the traditional knowledge system as a dog whistle to highlight the concept of duty over rights.

Interestingly Modi and his ilk (Hindu Mahasabha-HMS, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh-RSS) and its communal counterpart, the Muslim League both expressed the values of ‘declining classes of landlords, Nawabs and Kings’. Modi’s Hindutva has harked back to an “ancient period” where ‘Dharma’ was the core, the Dhrama which followers of Hindutva claim to be very great and the core part of Hinduism. Dharma stands for religiously ordained duties, and this includes the rigidly exclusionary system of Caste! Hindu ideologues claim that there is no equivalent of Dharma in other religions. There is Shudra Dhrama, Stree Dharma, Kshatriya dharma and what have you. At core it is caste stratification and duties which dominated the scene.

The Muslim League emerged from the nawabs/landlords and their leaders eulogised the great rule of Muslim kings, starting from Mohammad bin Kasim who ruled for some time in Sind. Their model was based on feudal values, looking down on lower levels of society. Dominant sections were blessed with the ‘divine power’ trickling down to a few feudal lords etc. Pakistan saw an initial and welcome definition of secularism by Jinnah; however, in practice, it was feudal elements that were dominant around him. After Jinnah’s death they came out openly to impose their feudal-semi feudal values on Pakistani state and society.

Even as Hindu Nationalism (read supremacism) today appears dominant in India, what is being undermined in this onward march of Hindutva politics is the concept of ‘rights’ inherent in our national movement and embodied in the Indian Constitution. This is where the non-biological Narendra Modi begins the journey to achieve the goal of undermining rights and highlighting duties.

The call for the dumping of the education system introduced by Lord Macaulay was a subtle attempt in this direction. He put it more overtly (brazenly) on Constitution Day, November 26, 2025. Modi said, “In a recent letter to Indian citizens on Constitution Day (November 26, 2025), Prime Minister Narendra Modi heavily emphasised the importance of citizens fulfilling their Fundamental Duties. He argued that performing these duties is the foundation for a strong democracy and national progress towards his “Viksit Bharat” (Developed India) vision for 2047. Modi urged citizens to place their “duties towards the nation foremost in our minds”. This aligns with his previous statements where he suggested that “rights are embedded in duties” and that “real rights are a result of the performance of duty”.

Besides, he also tweeted “On Constitution Day, I wrote a letter to my fellow citizens in which I’ve highlighted the greatness of our Constitution, the importance of Fundamental Duties in our lives…” Shravasti Dasgupta writes “While this is not the first time that Modi has laid emphasis on citizens duties, or interlinked them with rights to suggest that duties correspond to rights, the Constitution shows that such interlinking is incorrect. According to constitutional experts and political scientists, an invocation of duties, placing primacy on them above rights, is a subtle attempt to recast the Constitution, ensure compliance in a manner seen in authoritarian regimes, and signals a danger to democratic principles”

Modi went on to invoke Gandhi on this. “…and that “real rights are a result of the performance of duty,” Invoking Gandhi is totally off the mark as Prof Zoya Hasan (Prof. Emerita, JNU) says, “Gandhi often spoke of duties, but he never treated them as a substitute for rights; duties did not supersede rights. For him, duties were a moral path for individuals, while Fundamental Rights remained essential and must be protected by the state. Gandhi’s commitment to duties did not diminish rights in any way,”

Incidentally to emphasise the concept of rights, many of these were underlined during the UPA regime (2004-2014). This was through a series of enactments, long overdue. The first and major amongst these was “Right to Information Act 2005”, a mechanism to root democracy in a deeper way. This was followed by Right to Education Act 2009, Right to Food (National Food Security Act, 2013). With the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government losing power in 2014, it is the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)—dominated by the RSS-driven Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Today, in 2025 it is the third term of the NDA, today a minority government supported from the outside. With this change in power at the centre in 2014, the constitutional, rights’-based approach to public policy has gone into cold storage and duties are being made the major part of our national policies.

Even our Constitution emphasises on rights in itself. In fact, Article 21 of our Constitution, that guarantees the ‘Right to Life’ incorporates within it, the right to health, the right to education for example. The UPA Government underlined –albeit belatedly — in an appropriate way.

Today Hindu Nationalism is totally suppressing rights, like freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of expression among others. Many of these are incorporated in the wider concept of Human rights as well.

What Mr. Modi is conveying in his November 26 s letter is authenticating the suppression of the concept of ‘rights’ for all and through this relegating religious minorities to second class status, derogating questioning and dissenting citizens, academics and activists to being “Urban Naxal”. Incidentally and not surprisingly, it is the Constitutions of authoritarian states that emphasise on “duties” at the cost of rights.

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

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The post Hindu Nationalism’s sectarian nationalism and its concept of ‘duties and rights’ appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The complaint highlights how the padyatra—led by Dhirendra Krishna Shastri of Bageshwar Dham and traversing 422 village panchayats—was framed as a campaign for “Hindu unification” and the creation of a “Hindu Rashtra,” while repeatedly othering non-Hindu communities, especially Muslims, through charged rhetoric. CJP notes that these speeches did not remain confined to religious or cultural expression but crossed into fearmongering, exclusion, conspiracy theories, and open provocation, creating an environment ripe for hostility and public disorder.

Escalation of Hate Rhetoric across States

The complaint presents a chronological mapping of the speeches and categorises them into direct hate speech, exclusionary hate speech, and fearmongering, with further indicators like economic boycotts, conspiracy theories, and threats of vigilante violence.

In Ghaziabad, the yatra began with explicit demographic fearmongering—claims of Hindus supposedly “declining” and standing on the “brink of becoming minorities.” Statements insinuating that communities associated with “chadar” and “father” should decrease in number were highlighted as clear exclusionary attacks. The recurring invocation of “love jihad” further entrenched conspiracy theories weaponised against Muslims.

At the next major stop in Delhi, the rhetoric intensified. One speaker warned that in twenty years Hindus would be fighting for their very existence, and accused Muslims and Christians of adopting “foreign identities.” The praise of “bulldozer justice” and insinuations that Muslims would seize Hindu property were documented as statements bordering on direct incitement.

In Faridabad, a communal rhyme—“tel lagao Dabur ka, naam mita do Babur ka”—was used to evoke historical resentment, while the line “Jo Ram ka nahi wo kisi kaam ka nahi” blatantly ostracised minorities. A later Faridabad event referred to fears of India turning into “Bangladesh,” invoking imagery of dispossession and persecution to generate panic.

In Palwal, speeches openly demanded daily commitment to building a Hindu Rashtra and framed all conversions to Islam or Christianity as inherently “illegal,” merging conspiracy with ideological exclusion. Another speaker urged audiences to “buy from Hindus, employ only Hindus,” amounting to an explicit call for an economic boycott of Muslims.

The complaint documents how, on November 12, Dhirendra Shastri made sweeping insinuations that “only Non-Hindus are terrorists,” blamed madrassas for producing extremism, and warned of “bomb blasts in every street” if Hindus did not unite. CJP flags this as a combination of direct hate speech, fearmongering, and misinformation designed to criminalise an entire community.

In Banchari, speakers told people who disagreed with Vande Mataram or the worship of Ram to “go to Pakistan or Afghanistan,” directly equating religious identity with foreignness. References to Kashmiri Pandit displacement were used to justify the idea that Hindus could soon be driven from their homes.

At Chhatarpur, the rhetoric leaned on mockery and conditional belonging, suggesting that those who refuse to chant Vande Mataram should “book a ticket to Lahore.” Proposals for DNA testing of those who disagree with Hindu practices added an additional layer of derision and pseudo-scientific exclusion.

The speech in Mathura invoked the violent mobilisation of the Babri Masjid demolition and called for reclaiming the Shahi Idgah Mosque, evoking historical tensions and encouraging crowds toward aggressive action.

Legal Implications Outlined in the Complaint

CJP’s complaint does not merely document hate speech but sets out the legal provisions under which the incidents fall.

The organisation notes violations of:

• Article 14 (equality before law), due to calls for segregation and economic exclusion
• Article 15 (non-discrimination), owing to open appeals to religious discrimination
• Article 19(1)(a) read with 19(2), as the speeches constitute incitement and threats to public order
• Article 25, by delegitimising and attacking the religious practices of minorities

The complaint also lists specific offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023:

• Section 196 – promoting enmity between groups
• Section 197 – assertions prejudicial to national integration
• Section 299 – deliberate insult intended to outrage religious feelings
• Section 352 – intentional insult likely to provoke breach of peace
• Section 353 – statements causing public fear, alarm, or inciting communities

The organisation further references the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on hate speech, including Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan, Shreya Singhal, Amish Devgan, and the Tehseen Poonawalla lynching guidelines, to underline the constitutional and judicial standards violated during the padyatra.

A section of the complaint underscores the “extremity of speech,” the authority wielded by speakers like Dhirendra Shastri and Devkinandan Thakur, and the massive audience sizes—factors that amplify the potential for mobilisation, disorder, and violence.

CJP alerts NCM on the situation

One of the most urgent concerns raised by CJP is the scale and influence of the padyatra. With an estimated 3,00,000 participants, celebrity spiritual leaders with millions of followers, and openly majoritarian slogans gaining traction, the organisation warns that unchecked hate campaigns could lead to real-world violence, as seen in Dhutia, Madhya Pradesh, where a crowd attempted to burn Shastri’s effigy and the situation escalated into a police lathi charge.

The complaint emphasises that this is not a communal dispute, but a “systematic campaign of hate speech meant to serve political purposes” and capable of triggering targeted violence against vulnerable groups.

Prayers before the NCM

CJP has requested the NCM to:

• Take cognisance of the complaint under Section 9(1)(d) of the NCM Act
• Initiate a fact-finding mission on the padyatra
• Direct administrations to monitor rallies, record speeches, and ensure safeguards
• Protect targeted communities through nodal officers per Tehseen Poonawalla guidelines
• Ensure immediate FIRs for hate speech
• Recommend strong social media regulation to curb the circulation of hateful content

Reiterating that the complaint is not against any religion or religious exercise, CJP concludes that the issue at hand concerns the rule of law and the constitutional guarantee of equal citizenship, now under strain due to repeated, organised calls for a religious nationhood project.

The Complaint may be read here:

Image Courtesy: tv9hindi.com

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The post CJP Files complaint with NCM over escalating Hate Speeches during Hindu Sanatan Ekta Padyatra appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Yet, the film’s real significance lies not in its artistic value but in its ideological purpose. It continues a project begun decades ago by P. N. Oak, a Maharashtrian Brahmin ideologue whose writings fused conspiracy, caste supremacy, and cultural chauvinism into a potent mythos. Oak’s “Tejo Mahalay” theory, though dismissed by every serious historian and by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), continues to shape popular nationalist imagination. Yet beneath the spectacle of “historical reclamation” lies a more insidious purpose—Oak’s narratives serve to consolidate Brahminical supremacy under the garb of cultural nationalism, while simultaneously erasing Rajput agency and demonising Muslims.

The Ideological Lineage: From Savarkar to Oak 

P. N. Oak (1917–2007) came from the same ideological and cultural milieu as V. D. Savarkar, M. S. Golwalkar, and K. B. Hedgewar—all Maharashtrian Brahmins who sought to define India as a Hindu Rashtra under Brahminical hegemony. Their nostalgia for the Peshwa era of the Maratha polity reflected a longing for a Brahmin-led theocratic order—one that combined scriptural orthodoxy with militant nationalism. In their eyes, the Peshwas represented a purified Hindu past: Sanskritic, hierarchical, and morally austere, unlike the syncretic world of the Rajputs and the cosmopolitanism of the Mughals.

For Oak, as for these ideologues, the Mughal empire epitomised “foreign domination,” while Rajput kingship—though Hindu—was morally suspect because of its historical engagement with the Mughals through diplomacy and marriage. The Rajputs’ cultural openness and martial honour did not fit into the Hindutva binary of invader versus resister. Thus, Oak’s project was twofold: to vilify Muslim rulers and to discipline Rajput history—absorbing it into a Brahmin-sanctioned Hindu narrative where Rajputs were useful only as foils or symbols.

“Tejo Mahalay”: The Appropriation of the Rajput Legacy

Oak’s most famous work, republished as The Taj Mahal: The True Story (1989) — claimed that Shah Jahan merely took over a pre-existing Rajput palace or temple, allegedly dedicated to Shiva and known as “Tejo Mahalay.” He even speculated that it had been built by the Chandelas of Bundelkhand or the Kachhwahas of Amber—two illustrious Rajput lineages. This claim was entirely devoid of evidence, but it was ideologically potent. It allowed Oak and later Hindutva propagandists to erase Muslim creativity while simultaneously appropriating Rajput heritage into the Brahminical fold.

In this retelling, Rajputs cease to be historical agents; they become tokens in a morality play staged by Brahminical nationalism. Their temples, forts, and palaces are recast as manifestations of an imagined “Vedic civilisation” over which Brahmins alone hold interpretive authority. Once their history has served its purpose—negating the Muslim contribution—it is re-absorbed into the greater “Hindu” past defined by Sanskritic ideology. Thus, Tejo Mahalay functions as a symbolic colonisation of Rajput legacy: the Rajput is stripped of agency, and the Brahmin is enthroned as interpreter and custodian of history.

“Mina Bazar”: Objectifying Rajput Women to vilify Mughals

Another recurring motif in Oak’s writings—and in later Hindutva propaganda—is the Mina Bazar, a courtly fair allegedly held during Mughal times where noblewomen and men interacted. Oak and his ideological successors portrayed this event as a site of immorality and licentiousness, an emblem of Mughal decadence. But within these retellings, Rajput noblewomen— who actively participated in courtly diplomacy—became the primary objects of moral commentary. They were presented as helpless “Hindu daughters” exploited by Muslim kings, their identities erased and their agency denied.

Yet, historical, and literary records reveal an entirely different picture. Rajput and Mughal cultures carried similar notions towards honour of women — including each other’s. One such episode, recounted in both Rajasthani oral traditions and Mughal chronicles, involves Raja Aniruddh Singh Hada of Bundi and Jahanara Begum, the daughter of Shah Jahan.

When Jahanara Begum once found her camp attacked by Marathas, she called Rao Aniruddh Singh Hada close to her elephant and told him:

“Asmat-e-Chaghtaiya wa Rajput yak ast”: The honour of a Chaghtai (Mughal) woman and that of a Rajput are one and the same.

She added, “If God gives us victory with this small army that would be good; otherwise rest assured about me, I shall sit down after doing my work.” Moved by this declaration of shared honour, Raja Hada and his Rajput soldiers fought valiantly and emerged victorious.

This exchange—whether apocryphal or literal—speaks to the deep respect and chivalric regard that often-defined Rajput-Mughal interactions, far removed from the predatory caricatures peddled by Hindutva storytellers. Oak and his successors rewrite a history of mutual cultural respect into one of sexual conquest.

In short, the Mina Bazar myth is anti-Rajput woman, a patriarchal narrative disguised as historical morality.

The Brahminical Core of Hindutva Historiography

Oak’s work exposes the Brahminical DNA of Hindutva historiography. His narratives consistently elevate the Brahmin as the intellectual and moral authority over India’s past, while marginalising both the Rajput’s martial honour and the Muslim’s cultural brilliance.

By glorifying the Peshwas and appropriating Rajput heritage, Oak reaffirmed a social hierarchy in which Brahmins claim ownership of sacred knowledge and interpretation, while warriors, artisans, and others exist merely as instruments. This is why the “Tejo Mahalay” theory cannot be dismissed as mere eccentricity—it represents a Brahminical takeover of historical memory, a deliberate attempt to collapse India’s plural past into a single, Sanskritic mythos.

In doing so, Oak’s revisionism advances two parallel exclusions:

1. It excludes Muslims from the civilisational narrative by branding their contributions “foreign.”
2. It subordinates Rajputs by converting their legacy into property of the Brahmin-defined “Hindu civilisation.”

The result is an ideological order where only the Brahmin remains autonomous; everyone else, living or historical, exists within his interpretive domain.

From Fringe Pseudo-history to State-sanctioned Narrative

For decades, Oak’s theories were dismissed as fringe conspiracy. Yet today, his ideas echo through court petitions, WhatsApp forwards, and government-linked cultural projects. His books are republished, his claims amplified by television debates and political speeches. The release of The Taj Story marks the cultural mainstreaming of this pseudohistory. By presenting Oak’s fiction through the medium of film, the Hindutva ecosystem gives it emotional force and legitimacy. The courtroom format of the movie—where the Taj Mahal is “put on trial”—turns propaganda into performance, inviting audiences to see pseudohistory as suppressed truth.

This is not about rediscovering history—it is about owning it. By turning monuments into religious battlegrounds, Hindutva ideologues redirect social frustration away from real inequities—caste injustice, unemployment, agrarian distress—and towards imagined enemies. The Rajput, whose history of honour and sovereignty once stood apart, is now re-cast as the obedient foot-soldier of this Brahminical nationalism.

Rajputs in the Crossfire of Myth and Politics

The irony is profound. The same ideological movement that glorifies “Hindu warriors” has historically shown disdain for Rajput political traditions. Savarkar and Golwalkar’s writings betray a deep discomfort with Rajput alliances with Mughals, and an implicit preference for Brahmin-led militarism like that of the Peshwas.

Oak’s narratives continue this trend: Rajputs are celebrated only as mythic ancestors, never as living agents. Their plural political ethos—the synthesis of valour, diplomacy, and cultural patronage—is erased. Their women become allegories of victimhood; their men, backdrops for Brahminical triumphalism.

This trend is exemplified by a recently viral X post  by Brahmin influencer Amit Schandillia, who appropriates the pre-16th century Jauhars of Rajput women to vilify the Muslim community. He deliberately frames these pre-16th century tragedies as ‘Hindu’ events and uses them to erase the long, convivial, and harmonious history shared between Rajputs and Muslims up to 1947.

In this way, the Hindutva appropriation of Rajput history mirrors its treatment of India itself: a civilisation reimagined as a homogenous Brahminical state, scrubbed of diversity and stripped of nuance.

Conclusion

P. N. Oak’s legacy is not one of historical revision but of ideological engineering. His “Tejo Mahalay” myth and “Mina Bazar” fantasy are not just anti-Muslim—they are anti-Rajput and fundamentally Brahminical. They recast the Rajput past into a mere accessory for Brahminical nationalism, while exploiting Rajput women’s image to moralise history through patriarchal codes.

Behind the spectacle of “Hindu pride” lies a deeper agenda: the re-assertion of Brahmin control over India’s collective memory. What appears as the reclamation of the Taj Mahal is, in truth, the conquest of the past by caste. Oak’s project—and the films and movements that follow from it—transform history from a field of inquiry into a battlefield of hierarchy.

To defend the integrity of India’s past, one must see through these saffron myths and recognise their caste logic. The struggle is not just over monuments but over meaning—between those who seek to understand history in its fullness, and those who wish to reduce it to the propaganda of a Brahminical state.

(The author is a mechanical engineer and an independent commentator on history and politics, with a particular focus on Rajasthan. His work explores the syncretic exchanges of India’s borderlands as well as contemporary debates on memory, identity and historiography)

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The post The Taj Story & Resurgence of a Myth, the ideological engineering of a Brahmanical narrative of pseudo-history appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Friends in India and abroad wished to have a compilation of documentary evidence of how both the Indian State and Supreme Court succumbed to a majoritarian project of obliterating a historic mosque at Ayodhya on December 6, 1992. The following description and timeline examines the Hindutva propaganda falsehood with irrefutable facts which were conspicuously overlooked by the most crucial institutions of the Indian state.

Falsehood 1: Babri mosque built after destroying Ram birthplace temple

The supremacist Hindutva lot claimed that the new Ram temple was built on an ancient site of Hindu worship; the Ram birthplace temple which was destroyed in the early 16th century (1528-29) during the reign of the first Mughal emperor, Babar by one of his commanders, Mir Baqi. Archaeological evidence proves the mosque had no foundations of its own and was built upon a Hindu temple. They even identified the exact place of birth of Ram; under the central dome (approximately measuring 150 cm x 150 cm) of the Babri Mosque.

This falsehood has been repeated by none less than Narendra Modi several times since 2014 when he took over as Prime Minister of India, the latest pccasion being at Ayodhya on November 25, 2025, when he stated: “The wounds of centuries are healing, the pain of centuries is finding an end today, the resolution of centuries is achieving success today. Today marks the final offering of a yajna whose fire burned for 500 years.”[1]

Truth 1: This is a brazen falsehood propagated by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) with no historical or legal proof, nor any corroboration even in the ‘Hindu’ narratives of history. There is no mention of the destruction of Ram Temple even in the writings of the most prominent Ram worshiper to date, Goswami Tulsidas (1511-1623), who penned the Epic Ramcharitmanas (Lake of the Deeds of Ram) in the Avadhi language in 1575-76. It was this work which made Ram the most popular God in Northern India. According to the Hindutva version, Ram’s birthplace temple was destroyed in the period 1528-1529. It would be surprising indeed if the Ramcharitmanas, written almost 48 years after the so-called destruction of Ram’s birthplace temple, did not mention such a momentous event. Does the Hindutva lot mean to argue that the revered Saint, Goswami Tulsidas was a coward?!

For the RSS, Aurobindo Ghosh, Swami Vivekananda, and Swami Dayanand Saraswati were the saints who contributed immensely to the cause of Vedic religion and the growth of the Hindu nation. None of these Vedic saints ever referred to this destruction of Ram Temple at Ayodhya by Mughal King Babar or his agents in any of their writings.

Today, Ayodhya is referred to as one of the oldest and holiest places for Hindus. It is interesting to note that Adi Shankaracharya (788-820), who toured India preaching Vedas and refuting Buddhism and Jainism for more than a decade, who established 5 Peetams [main centres of Sanatan Hinduism] at Badrinath in the North, Puri in the East, Dwarka in the West and Sringeri and Kanchi in the South for the revival of the Vedic religion but did not consider Ayodhya as one.

It is true that traditionally, Hindus believe that Ram was born in the city of Ayodhya, but the issue is whether he was born exactly under the central dome (approximately measuring 150 cm x 150 cm) of the Babri Mosque as is claimed now by Hindutva’s flag-bearers.

Moreover, the Indian Supreme Court, in its 1,045-page Ayodhya Judgment (November 9, 2019), has, nowhere in the Judgment agreed with the claim that the Babri Mosque was constructed after destroying any temple.

Indian Supreme Court, in the said judgment made two other observations demolishing the RSS claim on the Mosque. Firstly, the SC stated: “The exclusion of the Muslims from worship and possession took place on the intervening night between 22/23 December 1949 when the mosque was desecrated by the installation of Hindu idols. The ouster of the Muslims on that occasion was not through any lawful authority but through an act which was calculated to deprive them of their place of worship.” [Supreme Court Judgment dated November 9, 2019, pp. 921-22]

Secondly, at pages 913-14, the SC stated that “On 6 December 1992, the structure of the mosque was brought down and the mosque was destroyed. The destruction of the mosque took place in breach of the order of status quo and an assurance given to this Court. The destruction of the mosque and the obliteration of the Islamic structure was an egregious violation of the rule of law.”

However, Mother India ought to be aghast to find Indian Supreme Court, despite all the above findings in its own verdict handed over a historic building which was a protected monument under Article 49 of Indian Constitution to supremacists. Arguably, what a supremacist mob could not achieve on December 6, 1992, the Supreme Court of India handed them on November 9, 2019.

It is worth mentioning here that the RSS—which initiated the bloody, violent campaign to build the Ram Temple at the end of the decade of the 1980s, never advanced this demand during the period of its founding (1925) until India attained Independence. Even after Independence, it was only in 1989 that the political appendage of the RSS, the BJP, began to focus on this issue.

The views of two RSS luminaries who initiated the Ram Temple movement reveal the preposterousness of the claim that Ram himself was born under the dome.

Rama Vilas Vedanti, a prominent Hindu clergyman of the Ram Birthplace Trust (an RSS front), stated, “We will build a temple at Ramjanam Bhoomi even if Lord Rama says he was not born there” [Outlook, Delhi, 7 July 2003). Similarly, L. K. Advani, who rode a chariot (Rath Yatra) as part of an aggressive Ram Temple campaign in 1990 said, “It did not matter whether the historical Rama was actually born at the spot in Ayodhya. What mattered was that Hindus believed that he was born there. Faith took precedence over history” [The Hindustan Times, Delhi, 20 July 2003.]

Falsehood 2: Ram Temple at the site of the Babri Mosque was essential to seek ‘restorative justice’

According to RSS the Ram Mandir has great symbolic and emotional resonance for Hindus in contemporary times and that the trauma that this destruction brought has been passed down through generations and continues to impact the psyche of Hindus and contributed historically and continues to contribute to Hindu-Muslim tensions in India to this day.

Truth 2: According to this logic, the rule by rulers with Muslim names in India was the Islamic rule of idol-breakers. This narrative of Muslim history developed only at the beginning of the 19^th century is in absolute contradiction with historical facts and even common sense. To understand the lies behind this fabricated Medieval past, one needs to examine the nature of this ‘Muslim’ rule.

Despite ‘Muslim’ rule of almost one thousand years, approximately 75% of Indians did not convert to Islam, as was made clear by the first Census held by the British in 1871-72 when even ceremonial ‘Muslim’ rule was over. Hindus and Sikhs constituted 73.5 percent of the population, and Muslims numbered 21.5 percent only. [Memorandum on the Census Of British India of 1871-72: Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty London, George Edward Eyre and William Spottiswoode, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office 1875, 16.]

In fact, this period of ‘Muslim rule’ was also the rule of the Hindu High Castes. According to contemporary ‘Hindu’ narratives, Aurangzeb never faced Shivaji in the battlefield; these were his two Rajput commanders, Jay Singh I and Jai Singh II, who fought against Shivaji on Aurangzeb’s behalf. Akbar personally never fought any battle against Rana Pratap of Mewar; Man Singh, brother-in-law of Akbar fought all battles against Rana. The Deewan Ala (prime minister) of both Shahjahan and Aurangzeb was Raghunath Bahadur, a Kayasth Hindu.[2]

It is nobody’s argument that Aurangzeb or many other ‘Muslim’ rulers were not religious bigots or tolerant. Aurangzeb did not spare his father, brothers, and many smaller ‘Muslim’ kingdoms of his times. There are also contemporary records that prove that Aurangzeb donated lands, money, and resources to many temples throughout India. Anybody who has visited Delhi’s Red Fort must have seen two temples; Jain Lal Mandir [Red Temple] and Gauri Shanker Temple, just across the Red Fort towards Chandni Chowk side. These temples were built before the rule of Aurangzeb and continued to function during his time and later.

Falsehood 3: According to RSS building of the Ram Temple was an important event for Hindus of all traditions 

Truth 3: They did not explain to the Nation why 4 Shankaracharyas of the Peetams (out of 5) established by Adi Shankaracharya boycotted the inauguration of the Ram Temple at Ayodhya. The most revered living Hindu saints of the Sanatan Dharm declared Ayodhya’s inauguration to be in contravention of Vedic scriptures, calling it Hinduism done for petty electoral gains.

It was sad to see the RSS run roughshod over the diversity of Hinduism. In its attempt to prove the homogenous character of Hindus, it turned a debate on the nature of the Ayodhya inauguration into Hindus versus others. The founder of Arya Samaj, Swami Dayanand Saraswati (1824-83), is glorified by RSS as a pillar of the Hindu nation. But Swami was an ardent opponent of the Brahmanical rituals like Pran Pratishtha, putting life into a lifeless idol (in Ayodhya case by Prime Minister Modi) and did not mince words in decrying this very ritual. He stated (in Satyarth Prakash or Light of Truth, chapter 11), “The fact of the matter is that the All-pervading Spirit [God] can neither come into an idol, nor, leave it. If your mantras are efficacious that you can summon God, why can you not infuse life into your dead son by the force of the very same mantras? Again why can you not bide the soul depart from the body of your enemy? There is not a single verse in the Vedas to sanction the invocation of the Deity and vitalization of the idol, likewise, there is nothing to indicate that it is right to invoke idols, to bathe them, install them in temples, and apply sandal paste to them.” 

Falsehood 4: According to the Hindutva narrative Ayodhya represents a five hundred years long war between Hindus and Muslims of India

Those who defend the demolition of Babri mosque argue that though sometimes presented as being a recent conflict, the fact is that this site has a long history of Hindus and Sikhs attempting to reclaim it, dating back to the early 19th century. Furthermore, the conflict has been ongoing regardless of the political party in power following India’s independence.

Truth 4: Ayodhya is presented as a place of perennial war between Hindus and Muslims, and the central dome of the Babri Mosque claimed to be the exact place where Ram was born, are modern ‘constructs’ as we will see in the following.

There cannot be a shoddier lie than this that Ayodhya was a place of perpetual war between Hindus against Muslims. During India’s War of Independence 1857, Ayodhya was the place where Maulvis and Mahants and ordinary Hindus and Muslims stood united in rebelling against the British rule and kissed the hangman’s noose together. Maulana Ameer Ali was a famous Maulvi of Ayodhya, and when Ayodhya’s well-known Hanuman Garhi’s (Hanuman Temple) priest, Baba Ramcharan Das, took the lead in organising the armed resistance to the British rule. Both of them were captured and hanged together on the same tree. In another instance of the glorious unity of Hindus and Muslims against the colonial rule at Ayodhya, Acchhan Khan and Shambhu Prasad Shukla led the army of Raja Devibaksh Singh in the area. Due to the treachery of Hindu and Muslim lackeys of the British, they were captured and killed together. The British rulers hated this unity and created narratives of perennial Hindu-Muslim conflict not only in Ayodhya but the whole of India.

Iqbal a renowned poet much maligned by the Hindutva ideologues whose poetry has been removed from textbooks wrote a peerless poem in praise of Ram in 1908 titled “Imam-e-Hind”. For Iqbal, Ram was not merely a Hindu God but “Imam-e-Hind” (spiritual leader of India). The first two lines of the poem read: Hai Raam ke wajood pe Hindustaan ko naaz/
Ahl-e-Nazar samajhte hain us ko Imam-e-Hind
(India is proud of the existence of Ram
Spiritual people consider him prelate of India).

The flag-bearers of Hindutva working overtime to undo a composite and all-inclusive India are using the Sikh factor as a bluff to legitimize its illegal project. Sikhs who do not believe in idol worship of Ram or any other Hindu God/Goddesses; we are told that on 28 November 1858, a Nihang Sikh [member of a warrior order within Sikhism] organized Pooja [worship] and havan [a Brahmanical ritual offering of grains, pure ghee and other such items to fire] in the Babri Mosque. It is unbelievable for a Sikh to perform Brahmanical rituals and would invite immediate ex-communication. Why Hindus at that time did not enter the Mosque is a mystery!

Aggrieved Muslims chose legal recourse and not community mobilisation, were they betrayed by the Judiciary?

Supremacist forces within Hindutva must understand that Ram was never the cause of perpetual conflict between Hindus and Muslims until RSS invented it as a convenient tool for religious polarization. Muslims of Ayodhya stopped going to Babri Mosque once the idol of Ram Lalla (child Ram) was smuggled into the Babri Mosque on the night of December 22/23 1949 with the connivance of local senior officials. Local Muslims did not try to break into the usurped Mosque, and there was no bloodshed engineered by Muslims of Ayodhya who were in substantial numbers in Faizabad, now rechristened as Ayodhya Dham despite the Indian Supreme Court declaring that “the mosque was desecrated by the installation of Hindu idols.”

The RSS and its affiliates instead of being ashamed of the carnage celebrate the demolition on December 6 as Shauriya Divas, day of bravery. These criminals have succeeded since 1990, RSS and its appendages had organized an aggressive campaign for demolishing the Babri Mosque, targeting Indian Muslims as Baber-zade/Haram-zade (children of Babar/illegitimate children). For more than two years, Hindus in India and abroad were asked to come to Ayodhya to tear down the mosque as kar-sevaks.

Babri mosque demolition was not a Hindu-Muslim battle but a seminal conflict between the RSS and the Secular Indian State

Did Muslims call for counter-mobilisation to save the mosque or reach the site on December 6 to confront the Hindutva mobs? Never! In fact, they trusted the RSS to honor the commitment made to the then-Indian Prime Minister, P. V. Narasimha Rao and the Indian Supreme Court that its appendages and cadres would not harm the mosque. RSS reneged on all commitments shamelessly. Indian State and judiciary remained silent spectators. How critically and fundamentally Indian Muslims were let down and even betrayed would be evident by the fact that Rao promised to rebuild Babri Mosque at its original place twice (once in Parliament and second time while addressing the nation from Red Fort on August 15, 1993), which were both promises that stand reneged on!

A detailed Video Narration of the sordid Ram Temple saga may be viewed here and here.

[1] PM’s speech during the Shri Ram Janmabhoomi Mandir Dhwajarohan Utsav, November 25, 2025, https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pms-speech-during-the-shri-ram-janmabhoomi-mandir-dhwajarohan-utsav/

[2] ‘Fallacy of the Hindutva project’ May 4, 2022, Chennai, link: https://frontline.thehindu.com/cover-story/fallacy-of-the-hindutva-project-aurangzeb-mughals-islamophobia/article38484103.ece

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

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31 years after Babri Mosque demolition perpetrators in power

The post Babri Mosque Demolition: When the Indian State succumbed to majoritarian propaganda appeared first on SabrangIndia.

“This report does not critique religion or its festivals. It examines whether public religious mobilisations are being used to spread exclusionary rhetoric and whether authorities are responding.”

Background: Sanatan Hindu Ekta Padyatra

Launched by prominent right-wing Hindutva leaders, the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra is being promoted as a socio-spiritual movement. Led by Dhirendra Krishna Shastri of Bageshwar Dham, the yatra was flagged off from Delhi with the stated objectives of establishing a Hindu nation, eradicating casteism, and fostering social unity. Scheduled from November 7 to 16, it passed through 422 village panchayats across Delhi, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh.

As part of the campaign, seven resolutions were announced, like promoting social harmony and supporting the “grand construction” of the Shri Janmabhoomi temple. The controversy primarily stems from the first and central resolution: the demand to declare India a Hindu Rashtra. This directly conflicts with the Constitution’s commitment to a secular state and violates the guarantees of freedom of religion under Article 25 as well as equality and non-discrimination under Articles 14 and 15.

However, the publicly stated resolutions tell only part of the story. Across multiple stops in Delhi, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh, several speakers, including the Padyatra’s principal organisers, delivered inflammatory speeches that went far beyond calls for spiritual unity or social harmony. These speeches invoked communal conspiracy theories (“love jihad,” “land jihad”), portrayed Muslims as demographic threats, justified vigilante violence, and openly advocated for religious segregation and economic boycotts. Many of these statements raise serious concerns under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), and established Supreme Court jurisprudence on hate speech and incitement. 

Details of the Hate Speech Delivered

Below is a consolidated analysis of the most objectionable statements made during the Sanatan Hindu Ekta Padyatra, grouped under 3 main themes and mapped against the relevant legal frameworks.
The reference links of the speeches, with timestamps mentioned, are given below-

Ghaziabad, Nov 3

Palwal, Nov 10

Palwal, Nov 12

Chhatarpur, Nov 14

Faridabad, Nov 8

Banchari, Nov 12

Mathura, Nov 15

Palwal, Haryana, Nov 10

Banchari, Nov 12

A.  Direct Hate Speech (Violence, Hostility, Social Boycott)

(Statements advocating violence, hostility, coercion, or social/economic boycott; calls for expulsion; explicit majoritarian supremacy)

Across multiple stops of the Sanatan Hindu Ekta Padyatra, speakers issued direct calls that clearly cross the constitutional threshold into incitement as interpreted in Amish Devgan and Shreya Singhal. In Ghaziabad (Nov 3), the speaker declared that India “should become a Hindu Rashtra” (0:39–0:42) and added that population decline “should happen to those who follow the ‘chadar’ and the ‘father’,” (1:17–1:20) a statement which the Supreme Court would classify as high-intensity dehumanising hate speech. Similarly, in Palwal (Nov 10), a public oath was taken to ensure that “love jihad and aaved dharmantaran will not be allowed” (0:20–0:27), effectively encouraging vigilantism against interfaith couples and converts. Under Patricia Mukhim, such statements, though framed as “protection,” amount to direct incitement toward unlawful acts.

In Delhi (Nov 7), hostility was escalated through demographic-war rhetoric: “tumhari sampatti tumhari hogi, kabza unka hoga” (2:30–2:44), and by invoking civilisational conflict through “ye desh Babar ka nahi, Raghuvar ka hai” (2:58–3:02). The Court in Amish Devgan specifically flagged the use of derogatory historical figures to mobilise hatred in the present. In Faridabad (Nov 10), a speaker warned: “jab desh lutega… tumhari beti love jihad mei pad jayegi… tumhara beta jis din shukravar ko jaane lagega,” (2:34–2:56) creating a direct incentive to treat Muslim men as targets of suspicion and implying moral justifications for coercive action.

Following the Delhi car blast, Dhirendra Shastri, addressing Palwal (Nov 12), asked: “yehi (Muslims) kyu aatangwadi hote hain?” (0:27–0:39), treating the entire community as terrorists. He further warned that unless Hindus united, bomb blasts like Delhi would occur “in every gali” (0:57–1:26), which satisfies the proximity test under Shreya Singhal. In Chhatarpur, MP (Nov 14), dissenters to Hindu symbols were told to “get their ticket to Lahore” (0:00–0:13), echoing classic expulsion rhetoric the Court has treated as unprotected. The chant recorded in Faridabad (Nov 8) — “tel lagao Dabur ka, naam mita do Babur ka; jo Ram ka nahi wo kisi kaam ka nahi” — directly targets Muslims through symbolic eradication. In Banchari, Palwal (Nov 12), speakers vowed to conduct compulsory “ghar wapsi” for those who had “left Sanatan” (0:29–0:46), amounting to a call for coercive reconversion, contrary to Shafin Jahan (Hadiya), which protects decisional autonomy in matters of faith.

Finally, in Mathura (Nov 15), spiritual leader Devkinandan Thakur invoked the Babri Masjid demolition (“4:20–4:50”) while urging the crowd to “move toward Mathura and Vrindavan,” hinting at mobilisation to claim the Shahi Idgah Mosque. The Supreme Court in the Ayodhya judgment warned that religious disputes must not be weaponised for incitement. These statements collectively amount to direct hate speech under Indian constitutional and criminal jurisprudence.

B. Discriminatory / Exclusionary “Othering”

(Normalising prejudice, othering minorities, delegitimising citizenship, religious tests for belonging)

Several speeches sought to redefine citizenship and community belonging in expressly exclusionary terms. In Ghaziabad (Nov 3), the speaker framed Hindu women as victims of Muslim men by warning that “our daughters fall into love jihad” (0:44–1:01), establishing a stereotype that casts Muslim men as predatory. He also suggested that Hindus “are not extremist,” implying that extremism is inherent to other communities (1:32–1:39). Such rhetorical othering aligns with what Patricia Mukhim describes as hate speech that delegitimises equal citizenship.

In Delhi (Nov 7), converts were described as outsiders: “Hindu issai mei converted hota hai toh ‘sister’ aur ‘sir’ kehlata hai… Hindu Musalman mei converted hota hai toh ‘bhai-jaan, amma-jaan’ kehlata hai,” followed by a suggestion that Hindus should first identify only as “Hindu” before any caste label (1:47–2:22). This constructs religious identity as the sole marker of national legitimacy. In Haryana (Nov 10), the crowd was asked if they want to see their children “wearing topi” or “going to church on Sunday” (0:04–0:25), depicting basic religious expression by minorities as inherently undesirable. The line “jab topi walo ki ekta ho sakti, toh tilak walo ki kyu nahi” (0:30–0:37) frames religious groups as competing blocs, contradicting the constitutional ideal of fraternity.

Kajal Hindusthani, in Palwal (Nov 10), urged the crowd to “be Hindus, buy from Hindus, employ only Hindus” (0:20–0:33), an explicit economic boycott. Section 196 of BNS emphasises that no citizen can be coerced into religious conformity; here, exclusion is extended to everyday economic life. In Chhatarpur (Nov 14), slogans like “jo Ram ka nahi, wo kisi kaam ka nahi” (0:24–0:33) reduce non-Hindus to second-class status. The DNA-testing analogy used to delegitimise dissenter’s mirrors what Amish Devgan classifies as dehumanising metaphors, which have no constitutional protection. In Banchari (Nov 12), Nagendra Maharaj’s line— “those who object to Vande Mataram or Ram should go to Pakistan or Afghanistan” (0:33–0:41)—constructs a religious test for belonging, contrary to the secular character upheld repeatedly by the Supreme Court.

Such statements normalise hostility and social exclusion, and the Court in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan explicitly warned that such majoritarian narratives fuel discrimination and justify vigilantism, attracting Sections 196 (Promoting enmity between different groups), Section 197 (assertions prejudicial to national integration), and Section 299 (Deliberate acts, intended to outrage religious feelings).

C. Fearmongering & Demographic Conspiracy Claims

(Alarmist misinformation about population, survival, territorial takeover; invoking existential threat narratives)

A consistent theme throughout the padyatra was the portrayal of Hindus as being on the verge of demographic extinction. In Ghaziabad (Nov 3), the speaker claimed that Hindus are “khatam ho rahe hai” despite India’s overwhelming Hindu majority, and that once “Hindus do not unite, they will not be safe” (1:55–2:06). He also asserted that Hindus are declining “day by day” (1:04–1:16), ignoring census realities. This comes under spreading demographic conspiracy narratives constitutes incitement because it fosters suspicion and hostility against minorities.

In Delhi (Nov 7), the crowd was told that “20 saal baad, Bharat ka Hindu apne astitva ki ladai lad raha hoga” (0:38–), and that minorities would seize Hindu property: “sampatti tumhari hogi, kabza unka hoga” (2:30–2:44). Such claims resemble classic “replacement” conspiracy theories. When combined with militaristic lines like “na toh pad rehna hai, na kad rehna hai” (0:55–0:58), the rhetoric urges mobilisation against an imagined security threat. In Haryana (Nov 10), Partition was invoked (“Jinnah ki leadership mein… alag Pakistan bana”), followed by an analogy that if “Sanatan Dharma ke naam par” India does not become a Hindu Rashtra, it will face a “Bangladesh-like situation” where “haq kisi aur ka hoga” (1:53–2:06). The Supreme Court in Pravasi Bhalai explicitly noted that selective historical parallels are often used to trigger fear and justify majoritarian aggression.

After the Delhi blast, Dhirendra Shastri claimed that unless Hindus unite, “aisa har gali mein hoga” (0:57–1:26), and asserted that the arrested individual— “doctor, musalman… crore-o ki jaan lene ki tayaari”—was preparing mass murder, furthering the narrative that Muslims pose a blanket existential threat. Fear of demographic loss was also invoked repeatedly: in Delhi (Nov 7), the claim that Hindus have become minorities in “9 states” is factually incorrect yet presented as imminent collapse. In Banchari (Nov 12), Nagendra Maharaj warned that Hindus could be “expelled from their homes like Srinagar,” framing political developments as religious persecution.

Such narratives fall squarely within the Supreme Court’s treatment of misinformation that has a proximate connection to public disorder (Shreya Singhal). Fearmongering of this kind shifts the public mindset from coexistence to hostility, creating conditions for violence without issuing explicit violent commands.

Legal Framework

India’s constitutional and statutory framework places clear limits on speech that promotes enmity, incites violence, or undermines the country’s secular structure. Several statements delivered during the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra appear to contravene these provisions.

Constitutional Provisions

Various provisions of the Indian Constitution safeguard against hate speech and communal othering.

1. Article 14 — Equality before law

Communal othering, demographic fear-mongering, and calls for exclusion (“be Hindus, buy only from Hindus”) violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection to all communities.

2. Article 15 — Non-discrimination on grounds of religion

Calls for a ‘Hindu Rashtra’, alongside statements urging economic segregation, employment discrimination, or “ghar wapsi” of all converts, contradict the constitutional prohibition against discrimination on religious grounds.

3. Article 19(1)(a) & 19(2) — Freedom of speech and its reasonable restrictions

Speech that threatens public order, incites violence, or promotes communal disharmony falls squarely within the restrictions permitted under Article 19(2).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that advocacy crossing into incitement is not protected speech.

4. Article 25 — Freedom of religion

Sections of the BNS

1. Section 196 of BNS: Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony

(1) Whoever—

• by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or through electronic communication or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities; or Liability of owner, occupier, etc., of land on which an unlawful assembly or riot takes place. Affray. Assaulting or obstructing a public servant when suppressing a riot, etc.
  (b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity;

2. Section 197 of BNS: Imputations, assertions prejudicial to national integration.

(1) Whoever, by words either spoken or written or by signs or by visible representations or through electronic communication or otherwise, —

(a) makes or publishes any imputation that any class of persons cannot, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established or uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India; or

(c) makes or publishes any assertion, counsel, plea or appeal concerning the obligation of any class of persons, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, and such assertion, counsel, plea or appeal causes or is likely to cause disharmony or feelings of enmity or hatred or ill-will between such members and other persons; or

3. Section 299: Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs. 

Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or through electronic means or otherwise, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

4. Section 352: Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace.

 Whoever intentionally insults in any manner, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

5. Section 353: Statements conducing to public mischief.

 (1) Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement, false information, rumour, or report, including through electronic means—

(b) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public, or to any section of the public whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or against the public tranquillity; or

(c) with intent to incite, or which is likely to incite, any class or community of persons to commit any offence against any other class or community, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

Judicial Precedents

Indian constitutional jurisprudence has consistently sought to balance freedom of expression with the imperative of preserving public order, equality, and the secular fabric of the nation. While there is no universally accepted definition of ‘hate speech’, the Supreme Court has laid down clear principles that define when speech crosses the boundary from protected expression into unlawful incitement or communal hatred.

The foundational judgment in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962) affirmed that criminal provisions affecting speech must be interpreted narrowly. The statute is constitutionally valid only to the extent it punishes speech that has the intention or tendency to create disorder or incitement to violence or disturbance of law and order.

The Padyatra speeches, alleging demographic conquest, “love jihad,” and calling for social boycotts and vigilante resistance, demonstrate a direct intention to cause disharmony between religious groups travelling through communally sensitive regions of Delhi, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh. The route’s culmination at Banke Bihari Temple, Vrindavan, a site recently embroiled in controversy, heightens the imminent potential for communal mobilisation.

A decade later, Kesavananda Bharati v. Union of India (1973) reaffirmed the inviolable constitutional commitment to secularism, equality, and fundamental rights by introducing the Basic Structure doctrine. Through this, the Court held that any attempt, legislative or otherwise, that undermines the secular character of the Republic would be unconstitutional at its core. This principle shapes the broader legal environment within which communal speech is assessed.

On debates around ‘love jihad’ and ‘illegal conversion’, the Supreme Court in the Hadiya Marriage Case (2018), held that the right to marry a person of one’s choice is integral to Article 21, and the choice of a partner lies within the exclusive domain of an individual, and is a part of the core zone of privacy, which is inviolable.

The modern understanding of hate speech was articulated in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India (2014), where the Supreme Court held that

Hate speech is an effort to marginalise individuals based on their membership in a group. Using expression that exposes the group to hatred, hate speech seeks to delegitimize group members in the eyes of the majority, reducing their social standing and acceptance within society. Hate speech, therefore, rises beyond causing distress to individual group members. It can have a societal impact.

Responding to this mandate, the Law Commission’s 267th Report proposed a structured framework for understanding hate speech. Para 5.2 laid down the criteria for identifying hate speech:

(i) The extremity of the speech

(ii) Incitement

(iii) Status of the author of the speech

(iv) Status of victims of the speech

(v) Potentiality of the speech

(vi) Context of the Speech

The Court’s earlier ruling in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) further clarified that only speech amounting to “incitement to imminent lawless action” can be legitimately restricted under Article 19(2), reinforcing the centrality of context, intent, and likely consequences.

In Patricia vs State of Meghalaya (2021), the Supreme Court quashed a FIR against a journalist, concluding that the post was a genuine plea for justice and equality rather than an attempt to promote hatred or communal discord. In Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2020), the court further stated that: the mode of exercise of free speech, the context and the extent of abuse of freedom are important in determining the contours of permissible restrictions.

Aftermath of Padyatra

The Sanatan Ekta Padyatra triggered immediate political and social pushback across several states. The Azaad Samaj Party (ASP) condemned the march on constitutional grounds, arguing that India’s identity as a secular republic cannot be undermined by a public movement openly calling for a “Hindu Rashtra.” ASP formally petitioned the President to halt the yatra, while the Dalit Pichda Samaj Sanathan (DPSS) joined ASP in filing a PIL before the Supreme Court seeking a complete stop to the march and a ban on its “inflammatory” speeches. In response, Gwalior-based politician Damodar Singh Yadav announced a counter-mobilisation titled the Samvidhan Bachao Yatra, set to begin on November 16, framing it as a defence of constitutional values.

On the ground, several areas witnessed unrest directly linked to the padyatra. Samagra Bharat reported that on 9 November in Indergarh (Datia district, MP), residents gathered at Ambedkar Park and attempted to burn an effigy of Dhirendra Shastri, alleging that his speeches promoted caste humiliation and communal hatred. Members of the Hindu Sangathan retaliated with stone-pelting, leading to a police lathi-charge when tensions escalated. Locals later filed an FIR against Shastri, but authorities have taken no concrete action. A week later, on 17 November, Patrika reported a scuffle at Vrindavan’s Banke Bihari Temple during Shastri’s visit, where a confrontation between temple priests and the police resulted in torn garments and allegations that the padyatra’s politicised presence compromised the sanctity and security of the temple premises.

Broader Pattern of Impunity towards Hate Speeches

The fallout from the padyatra reflects a broader pattern in which communal mobilisation and hate speech by far-right Hindutva leaders are met with minimal institutional response. India has witnessed repeated episodes of religiously charged violence—such as the 2019 lynching of Tabrez Ansari in Jharkhand, where the victim was forced to chant “Jai Shri Ram”—and mass events like the 2024 Ayodhya Ram Mandir consecration have increasingly become sites for majoritarian mobilisation. Despite this backdrop, police responses remain inconsistent, especially when politically influential individuals are involved. NDTV reports that although five FIRs were filed over two years against BJP legislator T. Raja Singh for comments such as “The Old City of Hyderabad is a mmini-Pakistan” two were closed, and the remaining three have seen no decisive progress.

Legal scrutiny has extended to Baba Dhirendra Shastri as well, with multiple complaints for delivering hate speeches in Udaipur, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh. In 2023, a PIL before the Gujarat High Court sought enforcement of the Supreme Court’s Tehseen Poonawalla guidelines—requiring preventive intelligence units, immediate action against hate speech, and punitive steps against officials who fail to curb mob violence—but the petition was declined. This pattern of judicial reluctance, combined with police inaction, underscores a systemic tolerance toward inflammatory communal rhetoric, even when it directly violates constitutional guarantees and statutory prohibitions under the BNS. The result is a public environment where speeches like those delivered during the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra, openly calling for a Hindu Rashtra and targeting minority communities, continue largely unchecked, emboldening majoritarian mobilisation while eroding constitutional safeguards.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this has been worked on by Shyamli Pengoriya)

Related:

Targeted as ‘Bangladeshis’: The hate speech fuelling deportations

India Hate Lab Report 2024: Unveiling the rise of hate speech and communal rhetoric

2024: CJP’s battle against communal rallies before and after they unfold

Exclusion at the Gate: Navratri becomes the new front for communal politics

Hate Has No Place in Elections: CJP moves State EC against BJP MP Ashwini Choubey’s communal speech

The post The Politics of Processions: How the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra amplified hate speech in plain sight appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Uttar Pradesh government claims to have only applied to withdraw the prosecution against Mohammad Akhlaq’s killers and that this request will be decided by a judge at the next hearing scheduled for December 12, 2025. However, when viewed through the lens of the history of this case, the timeline for this case, and the current political climate surrounding this case, it is evident that the actions taken by the Uttar Pradesh Government in withdrawing the prosecution against those responsible for lynching Mohammad Akhlaq are not only withdrawing from having any responsibility for pursuing justice but are also an example of how for the past 10 years the government has systematically neglected this case, given political support to those accused of this heinous crime and created an environment of hostility toward the family of Mohammad Akhlaq.

The circumstances surrounding the lynching of one man’s father are now much broader than that man’s father’s murder. The current circumstances have become a long-term narrative about what a state can create over time and distribute through state-sponsored actions, as well as about eliminating any ultimate responsibility associated with that state.

September 28, 2015: The Night that Violence knocked on a Family’s Door

A news announcement spread through the Bisada Temple loudspeaker about animals being slaughtered resulted in the instant transformation of an unsubstantiated rumour into a murder sentence. A mob descended on the home of 50-year-old Mohammad Akhlaq and his family within minutes of the announcement being made, and forcibly removed Akhlaq and his son from the property, beating both Mohammad and his son Danish with sticks and metal rods, not stopping until their bodies lay in a pool of their own blood on the street in front of their house. Akhlaq died as a result of the beating he received; Danish survived but required immediate neurosurgery. This particularly brutal act of violence was planned by those committing the act, as well as the community, through the use of whisper campaigns, political pressure, and the manipulation of the emotional appeal of cow-vigilantism. These events were reconstructed in detail by Sabrang in “Akhlaq’s Lynching: 7 Years On – Only 1 of 25 Witnesses Testifies; Trial Reaches Evidence Stage”.

The FIR that was filed at the Jarcha Police Station references the appropriate sections related to charges of murder, attempted murder, rioting, and unlawful assembly. The nature of the charges against those involved in this act of violence was virtually disregarded from the day it occurred, and politicians, media, and community leaders received ample time to speculate on whether there were indeed any cow products found in Akhlaq’s home before the death of Akhlaq. Public and political perceptions and narratives surrounding the event changed shortly after the announcement of Akhlaq’s death. Sabrang’s “Meet Hari Om: Part of the Mob That Killed Mohd Akhlaque” further illuminated individual roles and admissions from those involved.

The use of the murder scene is an attempt to portray or manipulate the public perception of the incident as a religious act motivated by slights to the religion of Islam.

The Investigation: Charges Filed, yet Justice Already Compromised

The police in Gautam Buddha Nagar, in its first chargesheet, named 15 main accused, including a juvenile and a local BJP leader’s son, along with 25 witnesses. Four more accused were later added, bringing the total to 19. One of them died in 2016. The prosecution has appeared to take its course through the court system; however, beneath the surface, evidence is starting to show that political pressure has compromised the investigation, as well as apathy within the institutions involved.

The Forensic Report coming out of Mathura stated that the sample of red meat taken from the house of a man who was killed had belonged to “a cow or calf,” and it changed the trajectory of this case completely. The family of the victim immediately alleged that their sample was switched. Furthermore, the timing of when the forensic report was delivered raised suspicions because the mob attacked based on a rumour and not the forensic evidence from a laboratory; however, the public debate quickly shifted away from the circumstances surrounding the killing and focused on the purported evidence.

The major shift in this case happened in 2016 when a court in Surajpur ordered that an FIR be filed against the surviving family members of Akhlaq, and thus turned the focus of the case completely upside down. At that point, the surviving family members were already grieving, emotionally traumatized, and socially isolated, and now faced with the criminal allegations of cow slaughter. This whole methodology set forth a structure by which a lynching victim is presumed guilty, while the people who committed the act are presumed to be victims.

2015–2017: Delay, Bail, and the Slow Death of Due Process

The public often forgets that the justice system did not simply fail in 2025; it faltered every year since 2015.

Bail was granted to each of the accused, with repeated adjournments of court hearings and extremely slow progress in witness testimony. Sabrang’s reporting, including “All Killers of Mohammad Akhlaq Get Bail in Dadri Lynching”, captured how each bail order was met with political celebration, further chilling the environment for witnesses. As of December 2017, the trial had barely progressed past the evidence stage. Multiple important witnesses were reluctant to testify in a public courtroom and thus did not receive adequate witness protection. The handling of police transfers caused inconsistencies in the investigation and prosecution of the case. At the same time, the family of the victim suffered from social isolation in Bisada as a result of the crimes, ultimately ending in them being forced to leave their homes. The victim’s family reported receiving threats during this period, and in the village itself, residents celebrated when defendants were released from custody on bail, where they were photographed with local BJP leaders, recognized for their “innocent status” as Hindu youth, celebrated, and received garlands as gifts.

Each public display of support for the accused was another blow to the victim’s family and a message to the justice system.

National Outrage: The Award Wapsi Moment and a Fading Democratic Landscape

In October 2015, there was a lynching and it sparked one of the largest cultural protests of the decade, known as the Award Wapsi Movement. The writers who participated in this movement, such as Nayantara Sahgal, Ashok Vajpeyi, Sara Joseph, Shashi Deshpande and others, all returned their Sahitya Akademi awards to protest against the continued violence. Their action collectively raised awareness of a growing intolerance in the country and directly referred to the lynching of Akhlaq as a moment of moral decline.

The state’s response to the writers was hostile. The government ministers called all of the protesting writers “politically motivated”. An RSS publication even went so far as to quote from the Vedas to imply that cow slaughter justified the death penalty. The Chief Ministers of several states issued statements demanding that any Muslims who consume beef should “go to Pakistan”. These were not isolated statements or the thoughts of a few fringe political groups; they illustrate the political environment that was influencing decisions regarding this case.

However, the anger and activism surrounding this event was short-lived. Today, ten years after the lynching took place and as a result, the state is withdrawing prosecution against those who committed the lynching, the anger expressed by people in 2015 has turned into a sense of quiet fear. Many of the once bold voices have become relatively quiet due to harassment, intimidation and surveillance. The transition from a period of protest to a time where most people are silent does not reflect a changing belief system; it is an indication that democracy has become less expansive.

Legal and Constitutional Problems with the Withdrawal

A major point of contention in regards to the state of Uttar Pradesh’s motion to dismiss was that there was no new exculpatory evidence in support of the defendant. Several media reports indicate that the state’s filing primarily relied on the assertion that there were “inconsistencies” in the witnesses’ testimonies and that social harmony was at risk. Such vague assertions do not meet the legal standards outlined in the jurisprudential interpretation of Section 321 of the CrPC. A defendant cannot be dismissed unless there is newly discovered evidence that would fundamentally alter the state’s case against him. In this case, the medical evidence substantiating Akhlaq and Danish’s injuries and the contemporaneous FIR, and the eyewitness accounts all consistently corroborate the state’s case against them. In similar instances, courts have continued to deny a motion for dismissal. A trial court should require that the state produce a complete and thorough review of the prosecution’s case file, as well as a detailed affidavit from the Prosecuting Attorney detailing changes to the evidence that would justify the dismissal of the case.

Further, the application seems to ignore the very explicit requirements laid out by the Supreme Court in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018). The Supreme Court held that mob lynching constitutes a separate social and constitutional emergency and requires immediate intervention. The Court ordered each state to create a “fast track mechanism” for lynching cases, appoint a nodal official, enforce preventive protocols, create strong witness protection systems, and hold police accountable for their failures

Withdrawal attempts in pending lynching trials must be considered in light of whether the state complied with the aforementioned Supreme Court’s orders. The Tehseen Poonawalla case mandates are binding on trial courts. The trial court in Gautam Buddha Nagar must consider whether the state has satisfied its obligations in this matter, and whether permitting withdrawal would defeat the entire remedial framework the Supreme Court established for addressing lynching.

In addition to the requirement to uphold statutory obligations, a factor that should also be of utmost importance for the state is whether the withdrawal has the potential to serve the ‘public interest’. Lynching is not just a crime committed against an individual; it also attacks the rule of law, social order, and equitable treatment of all individuals under the Constitution. A significant deterrent effect exists not just because offenders are punished, but because lynching demonstrates a systematic and transparent application of justice through our court systems. Discontinuation of a lynching prosecution has the potential to increase the likelihood of similar acts of vigilante violence. A decision by the court to withdraw this case must take into account how that decision will affect the larger community, particularly how it sends a message to vulnerable communities. In essence, Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution impose a duty on the Government to provide protection for life and to ensure that all persons are treated equally under the law. Accordingly, if a withdrawal occurs without adequate justification, which can only be supported through the use of clear and convincing evidence, the function of the Criminal Justice System as a protector will be diminished.

Take into account the possible influence of political factors; as noted in Sabrang’s coverage of the ceremony honouring the defendants, there were reports of assurances given to the defendants, and those reports provide essential contextual background for this case. In addition to the reports from Sabrang, what is also important to take into account are the instances of political patronage that have been shown to exist, be it via public demonstrations of support for persons who were accused or by statements made by politicians elected into office, or through institutional signals indicating support.

In other words, the very existence of political patronage creates a duty upon the court to view any motion to withdraw from prosecution through the prism of “political expediency.” A court must exercise vigilance over any motion to withdraw from a criminal prosecution, especially if it appears that political factors were involved in the decision-making process for prosecuting the case. A court must ensure that there is a clear distinction between prosecutorial discretion exercised for legitimate purposes versus prosecutorial discretion exercised under pressure from the Executive. If the court finds that an order to withdraw from a criminal prosecution merely serves the purpose of political expediency and does not promote the cause of justice, the court should deny any request made for an order to withdraw.

The Survivors: A Family Forced into Silence and Displacement

Victims and Witnesses’ Rights also require Judicial Attention. The family of Mohammad Akhlaq has experienced significant social hostility and displacement, and has been subjected to delays caused by the judicial process for nearly 10 years. Their right to be heard cannot be extinguished solely because the State wishes to withdraw from the trial. Victim Impact Hearings have been required by Courts, and/or Intervention Applications have been allowed for cases that are of large Public Interest. In a case as emotionally charged and symbolic as the Dadri Lynching, the Trial Court has an obligation to provide an opportunity for the survivors to be heard before any decision on withdrawal is made. Providing an opportunity for survivors to be heard acknowledges their constitutional rights to be heard as participants in the justice system and as complainants.

Justice Delayed, Denied, and Now Intentionally Buried

Ten years ago, the brutal murder of Akhlaq led to the emergence of a violent clash between Hindu cow vigilantes and India’s Muslim community, bringing to light the inaction (or complicity) of India’s various governmental and judicial institutions at all levels. Therefore, the prosecution attempt by the State of India to withdraw prosecution against the accused in this case today is not just a legal step but finalizing the death knell of accountability.

The failure of the Justice System was a deliberate and systemic failure at ALL levels of the Indian Judiciary, Executive, and Legislative System. The Justice System failed by creating the accused families as the “accused”; the Justice System failed by honouring the accused; the Justice System failed when judgment was delayed for 10 years; and once again, the Justice System failed if the State successfully withdraws the prosecution against the accused men.

If the Court allows the State to withdraw the prosecution, not only does it allow fifteen men to go free of blame, but it endorses and supports a decade of continuous state violence against marginalized communities so that the so-called “majority” can avenge their “honour”. It sends a message to all marginalized communities that justice will always be conditional, temporary, and rescindable by the State at will.

A government that has been elected through a democratic means should be there to ensure the safety of its citizens. In the example of Mohammad Akhlaq, however, rather than protecting him, the government protected those who killed him by their indifference, inaction, and now erasing his memory.

Akhlaq was killed quickly due to violence. The violence done to Akhlaq by the failure of the system to find justice for him was done by a systematic approach to violence. Unless the courts take immediate action, Akhlaq will no longer have the chance to see justice served against those who killed him.

The judgment in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India can be read here.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related:                                                               

The Lynching of Mohammed Akhlaq

Another mob lynching of Muslim men in Jharkhand and UP

Ramzan shadowed by targeted violence: lynching, assaults, and harassment taint the holy month in India

Two separate incidents in West Bengal result in lynching of three Muslim men in 3 days

Akhlaq’s Lynching: 7 Years on, Only 1 of 25 Witnesses Testify as Trial Reaches Evidence Stage

Meet Hari Om, part of a Mob that killed Mohd Akhlaque

Akhlaq’s Killers from Dadri Assured Job in NTPC by BJP MLA: Impunity Surpassed

All Killers of Mohammed Akhlaq Get Bail : Dadri Lynching

FIR Against Akhlaq’s Family Travesty of Justice, UP Govt Must Intervene

The post A Decade after Bisada: Why Uttar Pradesh’s attempt to drop the Akhlaq lynching case defies law and constitution appeared first on SabrangIndia.