A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice G. Narendar and Justice Subhash Upadhyay, while hearing Noor Jahan v. State of Uttarakhand, on October 29, 2025, instructed the Investigating Officer (IO) to file an action taken report by November 6, and to remove any inflammatory social media posts related to the incident.

The court’s direction came in response to a protection petition filed by Noor Jahan, the wife of Nasir, a local driver who was brutally assaulted on October 23 after rumours spread that he was transporting beef in his vehicle. The petition alleges that Madan Joshi, a local BJP leader and former president of the party’s Ramnagar City Unit, went live on Facebook, falsely claiming that cow meat was being transported — an act that allegedly incited a mob to attack Nasir.

“Lawlessness in Full Display”: Petitioner seeks CBI probe and police protection

According to the petition, reported by LiveLaw, Nasir’s vehicle was stopped by a crowd incited through Joshi’s Facebook Live. The mob allegedly dragged Nasir out, beat him with stones and kicks, and livestreamed the assault. Instead of rushing him to a hospital, the police are accused of taking the severely injured man to the police station first.

Noor Jahan described the episode as “a glaring example of complete lawlessness,” adding that it represented “cow vigilantism in utter disregard of the Supreme Court’s directions in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018).” She also claimed that since the incident, her family had been receiving threats of dire consequences from unidentified persons.

The plea sought a CBI investigation, police protection, and strict enforcement of the Supreme Court’s mob-lynching guidelines, along with compensation for her husband, who continues to receive treatment for severe injuries.

High Court’s order

The High Court’s order, though brief, is a sharp indictment of selective law enforcement and impunity in cases involving political actors. While the Deputy Advocate General informed the Bench that two of the assailants had been arrested, the Court pressed for a full update on the investigation and warned that compliance on removal of inflammatory posts must be shown at the next hearing.

The case will now be taken up on November 6, 2025, when the police are required to submit their action taken report. The Bench’s insistence on immediate removal of hate content marks an important judicial intervention in the digital dimension of communal violence — where misinformation and Facebook Live broadcasts often act as catalysts for mob action.

Selective accountability

The Ramnagar attack adds to a growing pattern of cow-vigilante violence in Uttarakhand’s Kumaon region, where rumours and Facebook Live videos frequently precede communal flare-ups. As Citizens for Justice and Peace has documented, local vigilante groups often operate under tacit political patronage, with little deterrence from police.

The petition cites the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018), which mandated states to curb mob lynching, appoint nodal officers, and ensure prompt FIRs and victim protection. Yet, as Noor Jahan’s case reveals, implementation remains largely on paper.

The High Court’s intervention also reignites a broader question — why politicians accused of hate or incitement rarely face swift prosecution, even when evidence is public. While citizens, journalists, and activists are often booked for online speech, leaders accused of fanning communal hatred enjoy impunity. As legal commentators note, this “selective policing of speech” corrodes faith in the rule of law.

The complete order may be read here.

Related:

Madhya Pradesh Muslim man lynched in Rajasthan’s Bhilwara: Family alleges religious targeting masked as cow vigilantism

Rising Cow Vigilante Violence: Muslim truck drivers targeted across states amid police inaction

2024: July and August see surge in cow vigilantism with brutal assaults, raids based on rumours and targeting of Muslims while legal consequences for perpetrators missing

November 2024 Surge in Cow Vigilantism: Rising Violence and Legal Apathy in North India

The post Uttarakhand HC pulls up police over mob attack in Ramnagar, seeks action against BJP leader for inciting communal violence appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As reported by Hindustan Times, speaking at a women’s empowerment event in Lakhipur, Cachar district, on October 25, the Chief Minister said, “The parents of the male accused in love-jihad cases will also be liable for arrest under the new law. We want to save our women from traps where they become victims of love-jihad and polygamy. We are bringing stringent laws.”

Under the proposed legislation, if a minor girl is lured into an interfaith marriage, both the man and his parents could face multi-year imprisonment. This provision — introducing familial culpability — is unprecedented in any existing anti-conversion law enacted by other states.

According to Times of India, addressing another gathering in Silchar on October 24, Sarma also announced a ban on polygamy, warning that those who “marry more than one woman” would face up to seven years’ imprisonment. “Many men cause immense harm to women by marrying multiple times,” Sarma said, adding that the move sought to “protect the dignity of women and ensure uniformity of law.”

Earlier, on October 22, speaking to reporters in Nagaon, the Chief Minister described the upcoming Assembly session as “historic”, confirming that the government will table several “important and transformative bills” — including those on “love jihad”, polygamy, preservation of Satras (Vaishnavite monasteries), and land rights for tea tribes, as reported by Indian Express. He said that the detailed provisions would be disclosed after Cabinet approval.

Cultural preservation and legislative agenda

Alongside the anti-conversion and polygamy bills, the government will also introduce the Assam Satra Preservation and Development Board Bill, 2025, which was approved by the Cabinet on October 16. The bill aims to protect Vaishnavite monasteries (Satras) — the spiritual and cultural institutions established by the 15th-century saint Srimanta Sankardeva — from alleged encroachment and ensure state-supported preservation, as per LawBeat.

Sarma’s proposed package comes ahead of the 2026 state elections and is seen as part of his government’s broader agenda to “institutionalise” an Assam-centric, almost “majoritarian” cultural and moral order. The Chief Minister has previously said that banning polygamy and “deceitful religious conversions” is part of Assam’s move towards a Uniform Civil Code (UCC)-like framework, echoing the recommendations of the Justice (Retd.) Rumi Kumari Phukan Committee, which examined the legal viability of such a measure.

In recent speeches, Sarma has also linked population control to welfare eligibility, stating, “Some people say that Allah gives them children, so they cannot stop giving birth. I say, give birth as many as you wish, but do not expect government help to raise them or to send them to government schools,” as per Hindustan Times.

The Chief Minister also reacted sharply to comments by activist Medha Patkar, who had criticised the state’s eviction drives and questioned the investigation into singer Zubeen Garg’s death, saying: “Outsiders do not understand the suffering of the indigenous people of Assam. One community is trying to grab our land and take away our sisters through tricks like love-jihad. If Medha Patkar comes here to protest against evictions, we will take strict action.”
(Hindustan Times)

The ‘Love Jihad’ narrative and legal concerns

The term “love jihad” first appeared in 2009 in publications of the Sanatan Prabhat and Hindu Janajagruti Samiti, before being amplified by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP). It gained political traction after 2014, when several BJP-ruled states — including Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, and Haryana — enacted laws criminalizing religious conversions through marriage or deception.

However, Assam’s proposal represents a radical expansion of this framework. By extending culpability to the accused’s parents, it effectively criminalizes familial relationships and transforms allegations of interfaith marriage into matters of collective criminal liability.

Citizens for Justice and Peace, who is also a lead petitioner in challenging the said state anti-conversion laws in the Supreme Court, have warned that such laws are susceptible to misuse, enabling police overreach, community vigilantism, and communal profiling. As The Wire reported, there is no official data to substantiate claims of organized “love jihad” conspiracies, and in several states, arrests under such laws have disproportionately targeted Muslim men in consensual relationships.

The November 25 Assembly session, which Sarma has called “historic,” will be the last major sitting before the 2026 elections. Observers view it as a defining moment that could reshape Assam’s social and legal order — intertwining morality, religion, and state power under the banner of “protecting women” and “preserving indigenous identity.”

If passed, Assam’s “love jihad” and polygamy bills could become among the most far-reaching personal law interventions in independent India, setting a precedent for family liability in interfaith and marital cases, and testing the boundaries between individual freedom, faith, and the expanding reach of the state.

Related:

Gujarat High Court Widened Anti-Conversion Law: ‘Victims’ can be prosecuted as offenders

Supreme Court seeks states’ replies on pleas for stay of anti-conversion laws, to decide on interim stay after six weeks

“Anti-conversion laws being weaponised”: CJP seeks interim relief against misuse of anti-conversion laws

SC issues notice to 5 states in CJP’s renewed challenge to anti-conversion laws

CJP plea against anti-conversion laws: SC seeks to know status of cases challenging ‘anti conversion’ laws in HCs

CJP, other rights groups challenge Maharashtra Govt GR setting up a Committee to “monitor inter-faith marriages”

The post Assam Government to table ‘Love Jihad’ and polygamy bills, CM Sarma says parents of male accused will also face arrest appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Context and allegations

According to the complaint filed by Eshwari Padmunja of Puttur taluk, Bhat’s address to the gathering contained statements that were inflammatory, derogatory toward women, and targeted religious minorities, especially Muslim women, in a way alleged to incite communal disharmony. The complaint says that in the speech, Bhat stated that Hindu women who had more than two children were derided for “giving birth like dogs”, whereas Muslim women having larger families apparently were not subject to the same remarks. He reportedly urged Hindu women to have at least three children, rhetorically asking: “If we don’t have children, who will go to the temples?” He also cited a supposed “survey” in which a Muslim woman aged 46-47 had borne 13 children and was pregnant again—this apparently to invoke fear of demographic threat. He additionally made reference to voter demographics and comparative fertility of communities in a manner the complainant argues was calculated to provoke communal tension.

In consequence of the complaint, the Puttur Rural Police registered a case (FIR) on 25 October under multiple provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) — namely Sections 79 (insult to the modesty of a woman), 196 (promoting enmity between groups on religious/linguistic grounds and prejudicial to harmony), 299 (deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings), 302 (deliberate wounding of religious feelings) and 3(5) (criminal act by several persons in furtherance of a common intention). The registration of the FIR followed media reports of a video of the event being circulated, in particular via the YouTube channel “Kahale News”.

Legal developments and court order

In reaction to the FIR and the consequent police notice summoning Bhat for questioning, Bhat filed a petition before the Puttur Sessions Court. He argued that the FIR is motivated by malice, politically influenced, and lacks genuine merit. He claimed the case is a tool to silence his freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and to stifle the ideological work of the RSS.

On October 28, the Court accepted his petition at the interim stage and directed no coercive action against him until the next hearing on October 29; it also issued notice to the police, asking them to respond to Bhat’s petition and the allegations in the FIR. In effect, the court has placed a stay on arrests or detentions relating to the case until further order.

Political and institutional reactions

Following the case, the Karnataka Government, through its Rural Development & Panchayat Raj Minister Priyank Kharge, publicly criticised Bhat’s remarks and questioned whether any individual is “above the law or the Constitution.” He specifically referenced the RSS’s plan to hold a “padayatra” (march) on November 2 in Chittapur, stating that permission from the court is required and that any attempt to proceed without lawful approval will invite action under law. He emphasised that people who disturb communal peace through public speeches will face FIRs under existing law.

On the other side, leaders of the BJP and RSS have accused the Congress-led state government of using state machinery to intimidate Hindu organisations and single out Hindu activists under the guise of “hate speech” policing. Some have alleged the FIR and summons against Bhat reflect “appeasement politics” and a selective targeting of Hindu voices in coastal Karnataka.

Historical Pattern and Background

This is not the first FIR registered against Kalladka Prabhakar Bhat. The present case builds on a pattern of complaints and FIRs involving Bhat and the RSS in the coastal Karnataka region, raising larger questions about law-enforcement, freedom of speech, communal harmony and political discourse.

Over the past decade, Bhat has been named in multiple police complaints and FIRs across Dakshina Kannada, often for statements made at public rallies, religious gatherings, and Sangh Parivar events. His speeches—typically invoking themes of Hindu unity against “anti-national” or “communal” forces—have repeatedly crossed into language that demonises Muslims, Christians, and women.

• 2018: Civil society groups filed complaints after Bhat’s inflammatory address during a Hindu Samajotsava in Mangaluru, where he allegedly said that Hindus must “teach a lesson” to those who “betray the nation.” The speech triggered widespread criticism and a petition before the Karnataka State Human Rights Commission. No prosecution followed.
• 2019: Another complaint was filed in Udupi after Bhat referred to Muslim traders as “enemies of dharma.” The police acknowledged receiving the complaint but cited lack of “direct incitement” to justify inaction.
• 2022: Following the Udupi hijab controversy, Bhat addressed several rallies supporting uniform restrictions, where he allegedly described the hijab as a “symbol of separatism.” A complaint under Sections 153A and 295A IPC was filed by a local activist collective, but the FIR was not registered.
• 2023: In the wake of communal tensions in Belthangady, video clips of Bhat’s speeches circulated online, showing him calling for a “strong Hindu response” to “love jihad.” Again, while fact-checking portals verified the authenticity of the clips, the local police treated the speech as “political expression,” and no FIR was lodged.
• February 2024: Following a speech in Bantwal, where Bhat allegedly said that “those opposing the Ram Mandir should not live in India,” local organisations filed complaints before the Puttur and Sullia police stations. Both complaints were acknowledged, but no arrests were made.

Across these incidents, a clear procedural pattern emerges: FIRs are delayed or not registered, magistrate cognizance is deferred, and when cases are filed, they tend to stagnate without charge-sheets. No case has yet resulted in prosecution or conviction.

Conclusion

Kalladka Prabhakar Bhat’s record illustrates how hate speech prosecutions in India often collapse at the intersection of political patronage, institutional hesitation, and legal ambiguity. The recurring cycle of complaint, delay, and deflection has allowed incendiary speech to thrive unchecked — particularly when uttered under the banner of “religious mobilisation.” As the Puttur FIR inches forward under judicial scrutiny, the question remains whether Karnataka’s justice system will finally break that cycle, or replay the familiar pattern of rhetorical accountability without consequence.

Related:

Kalladka Prabhakar Bhat booked for Babri Masjid demolition play in school

Karnataka Police’s massive crackdown on habitual hate offenders in Dakshina Kannada region

Can majoritarian societal pressure re-write the rulebook? The illegality behind forced non-veg shutdowns during festivals

CJP flags casteist, anti-Dalit videos on YouTube targeting CJI Gavai; seeks urgent takedown

From Words to Bulldozers: How a Chief Minister’s rhetoric triggered and normalised punitive policing in Bareilly

The post Court stays proceedings against RSS leader Kalladka Prabhakar Bhat over alleged derogatory remarks targeting Muslim women appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In Maihar, where the state tourism department had declared the town a “religious city,” the ban on selling meat, fish, and eggs effectively halted the livelihood of small butchers and street vendors for over a week. These directives, though framed as temporary, raise a larger concern that can constitutionally guaranteed freedoms—of choice, privacy, and livelihood—be curtailed to accommodate the societal pressure?

Courts have repeatedly questioned the legality of such bans, yet self-styled moral guardians continue to harass vendors, check identity cards, and force shop closures, turning dietary preference into a test of loyalty. Behind every shuttered meat stall lies more than a dispute over food—it is a question of equality, dignity, and economic justice.

CJP is dedicated to finding and bringing to light instances of Hate Speech, so that the bigots propagating these venomous ideas can be unmasked and brought to justice. To learn more about our campaign against hate speech, please become a member. To support our initiatives, please donate now!

If the Constitution guarantees every citizen both the right to eat what they choose and the freedom to trade under Articles 19 and 21, why are meat shops still being ordered shut, and why are non-vegetarians compelled to give up their choice in the name of a section of the majority community’s devotion?

It is no coincidence then that in all states where such unlawful and unconstitutional ‘bans’ were made operational are ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a political outfit driven by the ideology of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). In the eleven plus years that this politics has ruled India, unlawful and unconstitutional acts that specifically target the cultural, food and religious practices of minorities, Dalits and Adivasis have been normalised.

Forced shutdown in Madhya Pradesh

In Madhya Pradesh’s Maihar and Umaria districts, local administrations imposed a ban on the sale of meat, fish, and eggs during the Navratri festival. In Maihar, Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM) Divya Patel explained that the decision was taken because the town is home to the revered Maa Sharda temple, which draws lakhs of devotees during the festival. “Maihar is a religious city and Navratri begins at this time, so the administration is banning the sale of meat, fish, and eggs from September 22 to October 2,” she said.

Maihar: Religious city declared by the MP Tourism Department

Patel further noted that Maihar has been officially designated a “religious city” by the Madhya Pradesh Tourism Department. “The Maa Shardey Kwar Navratri fair will be conducted from September 22 to October 2. Lakhs of visitors filled with devotion come to Maihar from every corner of the country for Maa Sharda’s darshan,” she added.

The order, issued on September 20 under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 empowers authorities to take preventive action in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger. Violations of the order invite prosecution under Section 233 of the BNSS, carrying a penalty of six months’ imprisonment and a fine of Rupees 2,500.

Ban imposed after meeting with community representatives

A similar order was passed in Umaria by SDM Kamlesh Neeraj, who said the decision was made “after discussions with members of different religious communities.” The SDM stated that participants in the meeting voluntarily agreed to ban the sale and consumption of non-vegetarian food—such as chicken, fish, and eggs—during Navratri “in view of the festival’s sanctity.”

This, however, is not a new development. In March this year, Maihar authorities had issued a similar order during the ‘Maa Shardey Chaitra Navratri Fair,’ citing the influx of pilgrims.

Amid reports of ban in Bhopal, administration clarifies

Meanwhile, social media posts and some media outlets claimed that a similar blanket ban on non-vegetarian food had been imposed in Bhopal. The Bhopal Collector, Kaushalendra Vikram Singh, dismissed these claims through an official statement on X, clarifying that “no such order has been issued by the Bhopal District Administration.”

Prem Shankar Shukla, Public Relations Officer of the Bhopal Municipal Corporation, told The Hindu that no extended restrictions were in place. “Each year, a calendar is issued after consultation with various departments and the BMC Commissioner, with certain days marked for special instructions—but we have never had any 8–9-day period in our calendar,” he said.

A pattern beyond administrative closure: harassment, hate and restrictions

The repeated closure of meat shops and eateries during religious/festival periods is not an isolated administrative act—it often stems from pressure by self-declared moral vigilantes and local community leaders. What may appear as a routine or “symbolic” closure during festivals is, in reality, part of a growing pattern seen across several cities in India.

In recent years, incidents of harassment, forced shutdowns, and restrictions on the sale or consumption of non-vegetarian food have become common during major religious observances and yatras. These actions—whether carried out by local authorities or vigilante groups—are frequently justified in the name of respecting sentiments during festivals such as Navratri, Radhastami, and Sawan/Shravan, as well as Jain observances like Paryushan. Similar restrictions are also imposed during large pilgrimages such as the Kanwar Yatra reported TOI and the Braj Mandal Jalabhishek Yatra reported Hindustan Times.

Harassment and intimidation:

• In Sagarpur, Delhi on August 31, Hindu nationalist Vipin Rajput harassed a Muslim couple at a roadside meat stall, accusing them of cutting meat in the open during the Radhastami festival.

• In Vrindaban, Mathura, UP on August 6, Bajrang Dal leader Deepak Tiwari harassed a biryani street vendor for selling non-veg along the Kanwar Yatra route, accusing him of attempting to desecrate the kanwars.

• In Loni, Ghaziabad, UP on July 10, BJP MLA Nandkishor Gurjar shut down a meat vendor, citing the Hindu month of Sawan and the movement of Kanwar Yatris along the route.

• In Ghaziabad, UP on July 18, Hindu nationalist supporters stopped a Muslim man transporting meat during the Hindu month of Shravan.

• In Ghaziabad, UP on July 15, VHP-Bajrang Dal leader Manoj Verma stopped a Blinkit delivery person transporting chicken, questioning him for delivering meat during the month of Shravan.

• In Dehradun, Uttarakhand on July 21, Kali Sena leader Bhupesh Joshi warned Muslim meat sellers not to open their shops on Mondays during the month of Shravan, threatening violence.

• In Katra, Muzaffarpur, Bihar on September 27, Cow vigilantes from Bajrang Dal harassed a man for carrying meat and accused him of cow slaughter during Navratri.

Forced closures and administrative action:

• In Dehradun, Uttarakhand on September 15, Hindu Raksha Dal staged a protest demanding a ban on meat sales during Navratri, targeting meat shops and raising ‘Jai Shri Ram’ slogans.

• In Dehradun, Uttarakhand on September 23, Kali Sena leader Bhupesh Joshi forcibly shut down a meat shop, citing the festival of Navratri.

• In Ambheta, Saharanpur, UP on September 23, Police instructed meat, fish, and egg shops via loudspeakers to shut down, citing the celebration of Navratri.

• In Kaiser Bagh, Lucknow, UP on September 22, Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha carried out a campaign to force meat and fish shops to close for Navratri.

• In Khandwa, MP on July 6, the administration sealed a non-vegetarian eatery operated by a Muslim individual after allegations that meat had been served to Kanwariyas in a tomato-dish.

• In Indirapuram, Ghaziabad, UP on July 17, Hindu Raksha Dal forced KFC and Nazeer Foods to shut down, stating non-vegetarian food was not permitted during the month of Shravan.

Memorandums for festival bans and restrictions:

• In Satna, Madhya Pradesh on September 19, VHP/Bajrang Dal submitted a memorandum demanding action against meat, fish, and egg shops, citing Navratri.

• In Bairad, Shivpuri, MP on September 24, VHP-Bajrang Dal members demanded a ban on meat, egg, and alcohol shops during Navratri, plus restrictions on non-Hindu entry to celebrations.

• In Annapur, Madhya Pradesh on September 23, VHP-Bajrang Dal members demanded a ban on meat shops during Navratri.

• In Behat, Sahranpur, UP on September 22, VHP-Bajrang Dal demanded that meat shops remain closed on all days of Navratri.

• In Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh on September 22, VHP-Bajrang Dal demanded the immediate closure of shops selling meat, alcohol, and eggs during Navratri and barring non-Hindus from Garba events.

Forced administrative closures:

• In Dug, Jhalawar, Rajasthan on September 4, the local administration removed meat shops along main roads, citing them as “illegal,” after demands from Hindu nationalist groups (Shiv Sena)

• In Indore, MP on September 13, at a VHP National level meeting, CM Mohan Yadav highlighted government actions like restricting open meat sales and peddled anti-Muslim conspiracy theories (“love jihad,” “land jihad”).

• In Purnia, Bihar on August 25, Union Minister Giriraj Singh urged attendees to buy only from Hindu vendors, eat only jhatka meat, and avoid halal, while referring to alleged immigrants as “demons.”

• In Lucknow, UP on July 17, an Antarrashtriya Hindu Mahasangh leader urged Hindus to stop eating meat, claiming it employs non-Hindus, and called for buying goods only from Hindu traders.

Constitutional validity of meat bans in India

The wave of forced closures and targeted harassment over the sale or consumption of non-vegetarian food during festivals raises a critical constitutional question: can faith override fundamental rights? While such actions are often justified as “respecting public sentiment,” they strike at the core of India’s constitutional guarantees—equality, freedom of choice, and the right to livelihood.

Even when these restrictions come through official orders, they stand on shaky legal ground. Administrative bans or “temporary” closures imposed during festivals like Navratri or Paryushan directly conflict with Articles 14, 19(1) (g), and 21 of the Constitution. The Constitution does not permit curbs on personal liberty or trade merely on grounds of religious sentiment. In effect, these measures—whether by law or by intimidation—create a regime of unequal citizenship, where what one can eat or sell depends on their faith or location.

As such notifications or circulars have a far-reaching impact on the entire meat industry and infringe upon the fundamental right to carry on trade or business, as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

The unofficial ban on meat – because shops have been effectively closed by owners unaware of the directive’s illegality or too concerned to challenge it violates three principles of the Constitution of India as equality, freedom to trade, and the right to “self-determination” and freedom of choice.

Section 14 of the Constitution guarantees equal rights for all Indian citizens. It respects the general principles of equality before the law and prohibits unreasonable classification among people. A ban on the sale of meat certainly warrants such discrimination.

Some individuals’ livelihood depends on selling meat. Right to Livelihood is safeguarded by the fundamental rights enshrined under Indian Constitution. To know the details about Fundamental Rights under Constitution of India, enrol for the below-mentioned course

Article 14: “reasonable classification” and “understandable distinction”

The two main principles on which Article 14 is based are “reasonable classification” and “understandable distinction”. This means that the classification of people/things must be based on conceivable differences, which means where there is a law that distinguishes between two groups of people or things, any distinction must be understandable, “reasonable and wise” and must not be “artificial “.

Ban on sale of meat have failed this test. One group most affected by these bans are small-scale butchers, whose livelihoods depend on selling meat daily, which is sold for free online or in restaurants.

Section 19(1)(g) of the Constitution provides the right to practice any profession or engage in any profession, trade, or business.

Constitutional anchors of dietary freedom and trade

The Right to Food and the freedom to pursue a livelihood are enshrined in the Indian Constitution, making restrictions on non-vegetarian food a complex legal challenge. The core protections are found in the “Golden Triangle” of Articles 14, 19, and 21.

The right to self-determination and freedom of choice in one’s diet is protected under Article 21 (Right to Protection of Life and Personal Liberty). The Supreme Court, in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978, ruled that any law depriving a person of “personal liberty” must pass the test of due process. Later, the Court affirmed that what one eats is one’s personal affair, a part of the right to privacy included in Article 21, and that non-vegetarians “cannot be compelled to become vegetarian for a long period.” In Justice K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), the Supreme Court declared privacy to be a fundamental right, specifically noting that it includes an individual’s “food habits.”

Concurrently, the right to sell meat is protected under Article 19(1)(g), guaranteeing the freedom to carry on any occupation, trade, or business. This right can only be limited under Section 19(6) by law and on reasonable grounds deemed to be in the public interest.

The Supreme Court, in Mohd. Faruk vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others (1970), explicitly stated that a prohibition on trade “will not be regarded as reasonable, if it is imposed not in the interest of the general public, but merely to respect the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of the people.”

The myth of a primarily vegetarian India

The political narrative often used to justify meat bans—that India is fundamentally vegetarian—belies ground reality and recent survey data. This homogenising project, often led by right-wing supremacist groups demanding bans, is specifically a targeted assault on India’s Muslim, Christian, and Dalit minorities. The underlying narrative is that “authentic Indians” are primarily vegetarian.

Contrary to this claim, the latest National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5) for 2019-21 shows a clear rise in non-vegetarian food consumption. Over two-thirds of Indians (aged 15–49) “eat non-vegetarian food daily, weekly or occasionally.” This 2022 hate-buster by Citizens for Justice and Peace revealed non-vegetarian food consumers have increased in India, including in Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-ruled states like Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, as per data released by the recent National Family Health Survey-5 (NFHS-5). Furthermore, a 2021 Pew Research Centre report emphasises that 61% of Indians do not describe themselves as vegetarians, with only 39% of adults following a vegetarian diet.

Even among Hindus, who constitute 80% of the population, a 2018 BBC report noted that only about 20% of Indians are actually vegetarian and that Hindus are “major meat-eaters.”

Judicial test of proportionality and arbitrariness

Any government action, such as a meat ban, must withstand rigorous judicial scrutiny, requiring proof that the restriction is both reasonable and proportional, and is not an arbitrary executive decision.

For a ban to be upheld in court, the city or state must demonstrate that the restrictions are “reasonable” and respect the “doctrine of proportionality.” This doctrine requires the state action to serve a “legitimate goal of the government” and be “necessary,” meaning it must be the least intrusive means possible to achieve that goal. The twin test for reasonable classification, laid down in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) 1 SCC 1, requires a rational nexus between the classification and the object of the law. (Para 115)

The judgement can be read here:

We cannot determine who should be a vegetarian and who should be a non-vegetarian: SC

The judiciary has expressed strong reservations about arbitrary bans. In 2020, while hearing a plea filed by Akhand Bharat Morcha (Undivided India Rally) challenging Section 28 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 to ban Halal meat, the Supreme Court remarked that, “Tomorrow you will say nobody should eat meat? We cannot determine who should be a vegetarian and who should be a non-vegetarian” as Live Law reported

Similarly, in 2019, while dismissing a PIL by Health Wealthy Ethical World Guide India Trust seeking a ban on meat export, the Court orally remarked, “Do you want everybody in this country to be vegetarian? We can’t issue an order that everyone should be vegetarian.” Reported LiveLaw.

A ban is also vulnerable if it is arbitrary. For instance, in Delhi in 2022 the Hindu reported that, the South Delhi Municipal Corporation’s Mayor Mukkesh Suryaan (BJP) decided to shut down all meat shops during Navratri, arguing that “99 percent of households in Delhi don’t even use garlic and onion.” This decision, taken without a public notice or consultation, bypassed the Commissioner, who holds the official power to impose such bans under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.

The Supreme Court, in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), had stated that “Equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies,” meaning any arbitrary state action violates Article 14 (Equality before law).

Cultural pluralism and judicial defence of choice

Citing vague reasons like “foul smell” or “hurting religious feelings” conflicts with India’s diverse religious practices, prompting courts to defend the fundamental right to choice.

The Allahabad High Court in Saeed Ahmad v. State of U.P. (2017) held that the right to choice of food falls within the fundamental right to food and is a part of the “private life of an individual.”

The Court observed that such trade or profession may prima facie face complete prohibition and affect the livelihood of those involved in this trade and profession thereby impinging their Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. Not only this the same is also coupled with the issues relating to their livelihood apart from their trade and profession, that would also impinge Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

The order of Allahabad High Court dated April 3, 2017 can be read here

Similarly, on May 6, 2016, the Bombay High Court in Shaikh Zahid Mukhtar v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2016) struck down certain beef ban amendments, holding that “the State cannot make an intrusion into his home and prevent a citizen from possessing and eating food of his choice.”

The judgement of Bombay High Court dated May 6, 2016 can be read here

You don’t like non-veg food, it is your lookout: Gujrat High Court

In December 2021, the Gujarat High Court rapped the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) for prohibiting street sales of non-vegetarian food, questioning, “You don’t like non-veg food, it is your lookout. How can you decide what people should eat outside? How can you stop people from eating what they want?”,

This judicial stance shows that the constitutional mandate for tolerance and compassion must prevail over a section’s “susceptibilities and sentiments.”

The cultural reality is that while some North Indians abstain from meat during festivals like Navratri, Bengalis celebrate Durga Puja (which falls concurrently) with fish and mutton as part of their essential ritual and food system. The sale of non-veg food outside Durga Puja pandals is legal because the constitutional right to trade (Article 19) and choice (Article 21) cannot be arbitrarily curtailed based on a specific community’s fasting tradition.

Disproportionate impact and communal targeting

Despite this fairly consistent jurisprudence, the ruling political dispensation in many states, unashamedly flaunting its selective majoritarian ideology, has used its executive power to impose—even violently—food bans. Meat bans primarily harm small-scale vendors from marginalised communities, exploiting their economic vulnerability and often revealing a clear communal intent.

The ban is seen as a violation of Articles 14 and 15 (Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, etc.), as it not only discriminates between different religious groups but also discriminates between the economic capability of the vendors. The only group severely affected are small-scale meat vendors, whose livelihood depends on daily sales.

The meat, however, remains freely available in supermarkets and online stores catering to the affluent.

Such executive orders cause immediate economic disruption. The sudden closure of approximately 30 meat shops in Delhi’s INA market during the 2022 Navratri ban, without notice, severely affected daily wage earners employed in the meat and egg supply chains, as the Hindu reported

Boycott of non-veg within the non-veg: communal hatred

The political discourse surrounding the ban often targets specific communities. Calls for a boycott of ‘Halal’ meat—associated with Muslim dietary habits—by leaders like BJP General Secretary CT Ravi who termed it ‘economic jihad,’ reveal a clear communal intention rather than a neutral, public interest objective.

This tactic of harassment is also seen in incidents like BJP MLA Nand Kishor Gurjar personally forcing Muslims to shut down their meat shops in Ghaziabad.

The incidents involving the harassment of meat sellers and consumers, often by right-wing groups and cow vigilantes, can be grouped into distinct categories based on the alleged justification or context. These incidents primarily revolve around religious festivals, allegations of illegality (often related to beef/cow slaughter or operating without a license), and general intimidation campaigns against Muslim vendors.

Cow vigilantism and allegations of Beef/illegal meat sale

These incidents specifically involve right-wing groups or individuals alleging the sale or transport of beef or illegal meat, often resulting in assault, seizure, or threats.

• In Soron, Kasganj, UP on August 3, VHP-Bajrang Dal members brutally assaulted a Muslim man, alleging he was selling beef along the Kanwar Yatra route.

• In Surat, Gujarat on August 9, Cow vigilantes from the Pranin Foundation stopped a Muslim auto driver carrying meat, alleging he was illegally transporting beef.

• In Phagwara, Kapurthala, Punjab on July 2, Cow vigilantes from Gau Raksha Dal assaulted men at a dhaba, alleging the meat in cold storage was beef.

• In Belapur, Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra on June 22, Bajrang Dal cow vigilantes raided a Meat market, alleging all of it was beef, seizing meat from customers and butchers with police assistance.

• In Assam, nearly 200 were held and over 1,000 kg of suspected meat was seized in raids; the CM praised the action with an Islamophobic tone.

Anti-Muslim economic boycott campaigns

Anti-Muslim economic boycott campaigns refer to organised efforts that seek to exclude Muslim individuals or businesses from local markets and community economic activity. These incidents often involve public calls by the right-wing outfits for the closure of Muslim-owned establishments, explicit warnings discouraging people from buying from non-Hindu vendors, and political or social rhetoric promoting economic and social segregation.

CJP’s documentation on socio-economic boycotts tracks the alarming spread of hate-driven campaigns that target livelihoods and deepen communal divisions across India. The resource chronicles a decade of incidents where economic exclusion has been used as a tool of discrimination—particularly against Muslims, Dalits, and Adivasis—through calls to boycott, denial of business, and restrictions on trade.

From Bajrang Dal’s “Apna Tyohar” campaign in Madhya Pradesh urging Hindus to avoid Muslim businesses during Diwali (2024), to public oaths of economic boycott in Chhattisgarh (2023), and anti-minority rallies in Faridabad making open calls for genocide (2023), the reports expose a coordinated trend of communal mobilisation through economic segregation.

Earlier records highlight the structural inequalities faced by marginalised groups, including discrimination in housing, education, and employment, and the underrepresentation of Muslims in India.

Threats and forced closures based on location/proximity to temple:

• In Govardhan, Mathura, UP on September 2, Cow vigilantes threatened a meat shop owner, warning him to shut down permanently.

• In Maharajganj, Uttar Pradesh on September 7, AHP-Rashtriya Bajrang Dal members warned meat vendors to permanently shut their shops, citing the presence of a nearby temple.

• In Vrindavan, Mathura, UP on August 11, Cow vigilante Deepak Tiwari forced a biryani seller to shut down, declaring that meat would not be allowed in public.

• In Sagarpur, Delhi on August 16, Hindu nationalists forcibly shut down a meat shop, saying they would not allow meat stores in the vicinity of a temple.

• In Farukh Nagar, Ghaziabad, UP on May 29, BJP MLA Nandkishore Gurjar detained meat/fish vendors, demanding their arrest and citing nearby Air Force Station and temples.

Moral policing and illegal identity checks

Based on the witnessed incidents during the Kanwar Yatra, a disturbing pattern has emerged where right-wings groups engage in the illegal checking of identity cards and the religious segregation of vendors, directly contributing to subsequent harassment, vandalism, and clashes.

This self-appointed moral policing, distinct from administrative action, begins with practices like on June 30, 2025, the Hindu nationalists led by Swami Yashveer Maharaj checked the Aadhaar cards of food stall workers in Meerut, UP, to ascertain their religion.

Similarly, on July 13, 2025, the Vishwa Hindu Parishand (VHP) pasted “Say with pride, we are Hindus” stickers on Hindu-owned shops in Mandoli Chungi, Delhi, to identify them to pilgrims. This explicit religious filtering creates a hostile environment that encourages vigilante actions.

The result is immediate conflict and humiliation, as evidenced on July 7 in Muzaffarnagar, UP, where Kanwar yatris vandalised an eatery over the mere presence of onion and garlic.

Furthermore, on July 15, 2025, in Mahrajpur, Chhatarpur, MP, where a vendor was publicly humiliated and forced to perform sit-ups by the Hindu Jodo Sangathan for operating a non-vegetarian eatery named ‘Krishna Dhaba.’

Such targeted identity screening and harassment rapidly escalates into property damage and public shaming, demonstrating the dangers posed by these extra-legal moral policing actions against vendors.

A straightjacket ban on meat cannot be imposed: Bombay HC

On September 14, 2015, a division bench of the Bombay High Court, comprising Justice Anoop Mohta and Justice A.A. Sayed, remarked that a blanket or “straightjacket” ban on meat was not appropriate, especially in a metropolitan city like Mumbai. The judges stressed the need to consider the city’s diverse character, stating, “The ban is on slaughter and sale of meat. What about other sources through which meat can be availed? What about packaged meat that is already available in the market?”

The High Court also said that “We are only going by law and not by sentiment and politics.”

The order of Bombay High Court dated September 14, 2015 can be read here

When SC said meat ban cannot be forced down the throat of any one

The 2015 order the Bombay High Court subsequently challenged before the Supreme Court, the Court refused to overturn the Bombay High Court’s interim stay on the Maharashtra government’s order restricting meat sales. A bench comprising Justices T.S. Thakur and Kurian Joseph remarked that such restrictions cannot be “forced down the throat of anyone,” emphasising the need for tolerance in a pluralistic society.

The Court acknowledged that while religious sentiments must be respected, abrupt bans, especially those affecting personal dietary choices and livelihoods, raise constitutional concerns.

The Bombay High Court also questioned the legality and practicality of a sudden, extended ban, noting Mumbai’s metropolitan character and the potential impact on traders and consumers alike. The court also highlighted that bans should not be politically motivated or implemented without adequate notice.

P&H HC stays closure of private meat shops in Ambala during Paryushana, citing Bombay HC precedent

Similarly in 2022, the Punjab and Haryana High Court on August 24, 2022 stayed the Haryana government’s order mandating the closure of all private meat shops and slaughterhouses in Ambala district during the Jain festival ‘Paryushana Parv’, observed from August 24 to September 1, 2022. The Urban Local Bodies Department had issued the directive for a complete nine-day shutdown of meat-related businesses across the state.

However, the bench of Justice Sudhir Mittal passed the stay order while hearing a writ petition filed by Rajpal Poultry Farm and others, who contended that such a blanket ban infringed upon their constitutional right to carry on trade and the dietary rights of the general public.

The petitioners also relied on the Bombay High Court ruling in Bombay Mutton Dealers Association v. State of Maharashtra (2016) 2 Bom CR 171 where a similar state directive was stayed, with the court emphasising that public dietary choices should not be curtailed to appease any one religious group.

The order of P&H High Court dated august 24, 2022 can be read here

Rajasthan govt bans meat, egg sales statewide on ‘Paryushan Parv’ and ‘Anant Chaturdashi’

However, in 2025, on August 22, the Rajasthan government issued an order mandating the closure of all meat, egg, and slaughterhouse operations across the state on two upcoming religious occasions — August 28 (Paryushan Parv) and September 6 (Anant Chaturdashi). Notably, for the first time, the ban also extends to egg-selling shops and street vendors, a decision made in consideration of the religious sentiments of the Jain community.

Traditionally, only slaughterhouses and meat shops were affected, but the latest directive from the Department of Autonomous Governance explicitly includes egg vendors, impacting over a thousand small sellers in Jaipur alone.

This August 22 directive and order fails to cite any specific legal provision, rule, or circular to justify its issuance, nor does it outline any grounds of reasonable restriction or broader public interest to support such a measure.

Blanket ban orders without implementing open slaughtering and display of meat in shops

The Bombay High Court’s 2015 order had also asked if the Jain community had a problem, why a directive could not be issued against ‘open slaughtering and display of meat in shop’, as the petitioners claimed that the decision is unconstitutional as it affects the livelihood of a section of people and favours a small percentage of population.

Reasonable restriction: Rajasthan HC upholds ban on meat shops near public temples

On September 1, 2025, the Rajasthan High Court’s decision to uphold the cancellation of meat shop licences near public temples can be viewed as a reasonable restriction grounded in statutory and regulatory provisions rather than an arbitrary or faith-driven action. The Court, in its detailed judgment, clarified that the prohibition on operating meat shops within 50 meters of temples or schools is supported by law — specifically, Sections 269 and 340 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009, and Regulation 2.1.2(1)(5) of the Food Safety and Standards (Licensing and Registration of Food Businesses) Regulations, 2011).

These provisions empower local authorities to regulate food businesses to ensure hygiene, public order, and respect for community sensitivities in mixed-use localities.

The court said that even unregistered temples qualify as “public temples” if they are open to and used by the public for worship, the Court emphasised substance over technical form.

Importantly, it noted that the restriction does not amount to a blanket or discriminatory ban on meat trade; rather, it is a spatial limitation designed to balance the right to livelihood under Article 19(1) (g) with the right to religious practice and public decency under Article 25 and Article 19(6) of the Constitution.

The order, therefore, represents an attempt to maintain civic harmony and ensure regulatory compliance, while highlighting that lawful trade in meat can continue outside prohibited zones. In this context, the ruling stands as an example of how reasonable restrictions can operate within constitutional limits — regulating, but not extinguishing, the right to trade and livelihood.

The order of Rajasthan High Court September 1, 2025 can be read here

Qureshi community’s protest against harassment and vigilante attacks

The Qureshi community’s (Traditional meat sellers) state-wide strike in Maharashtra, which brought over 300 cattle markets to a standstill, exposed the growing tension between faith-driven moral policing and constitutionally guaranteed livelihood rights. Began as a protest against alleged police harassment and attacks by self-styled cow vigilantes soon evolved into a larger commentary on how religion is increasingly influencing administrative action. As cited, across cities, local authorities—often under pressure from vigilante groups—have ordered the closure of non-vegetarian shops during festivals or after religious gatherings, citing “public sentiment.”

Yet such measures, lacking legal justification, raise critical questions about constitutional validity. The community’s demand—to permit the slaughter of unfit bulls and curb vigilante interference—reflects not defiance, but an appeal for lawful protection and economic fairness.

The unstoppable harassment and violence of self-proclaimed gaurakshaks

Moreover, after meeting a delegation of the Qureshi community led by former minister Nawab Malik and MLA Sana Malik, Deputy Chief Minister Ajit Pawar convened a discussion with senior police officials in August, 2025. Following the meeting, the Maharashtra police issued a circular on August 13 clarifying that only authorised police officers can act against illegal cattle transport. “It is illegal for private individuals to stop or check vehicles carrying livestock,” the order read, Maktoob Media reported.

Constitution does not permit faith to dictate food

However, the recurring crackdowns on non-vegetarian food—whether through official diktats or vigilante coercion—serve violates the right to eat at choice and trade, the quiet surrender of governance to religious majoritarianism. A “respect for sentiment” too often ends in discrimination, exclusion, and the erosion of fundamental freedoms.

The Constitution does not permit faith to dictate food, nor sentiment to supersede rights. Yet, in city after city, devotion has been weaponised into policy, and piety into policing. Each forced closure and boycott not only robs small vendors—many from marginalised communities—of their daily income, but also fractures the secular promise that every citizen has the right to eat, sell, and live with dignity.

The judiciary has made its stance clear that tolerance, not enforcement, defines India’s pluralism. But when administrative power bends to the loudest voices of faith, it is not harmony that follows—it is hierarchy. Until the state reclaims neutrality and upholds the rule of law over religious pressure, the right to food and livelihood will remain hostage to belief, not protected by the Constitution.

[1] Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Repealed)

[2] Section 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Repealed)

Related:

Consumption non-vegetarian food growing in India: NFHS-5

Policing our Plate: What does an enforced Meat Ban mean?

Mob lynching: Three separate incidents surface, even minors and partially disabled Muslims not safe

The post Can majoritarian societal pressure re-write the rulebook? The illegality behind forced non-veg shutdowns during festivals appeared first on SabrangIndia.

While the speech originated as a local executive response to the Bareilly protest, its propagation and amplification were largely mediated through national and regional media, especially Hindi television channels like Times Now Navbharat, Zee News Hindi, and News18 Hindi, which paired the CM’s words with dramatic visuals of protests, police action, and property demolitions. Short-form clips circulated widely on social media, creating a feedback loop that magnified both the rhetoric and the state response.

This media-driven amplification transformed a local law-and-order issue into a nationally visible spectacle of punitive governance, normalising coercive enforcement and targeting of a religious community. The timing and scale of dissemination may also have significant political resonance, particularly with the upcoming Bihar elections, as the Hindi-language media networks ensured that the CM’s rhetoric reached a broad, politically significant audience.

Within days the state response in Bareilly intensified: large-scale arrests, property-sealing and demolition actions, 48-hour internet suspensions, criminal FIRs (running into hundreds or thousands in some counts), and administrative notices against aides of the cleric who called the Bareilly protest. That sequence of ‘protest → CM rhetoric → heavy-handed enforcement’ raises three connected questions the rest of this piece examines in depth:

• Did the CM’s speech cross legal lines such as incitement or unlawful discrimination?
• Did the state response follow due process and the Supreme Court’s own safeguards (including the duty to investigate hate speech suo moto)?
• What are the measurable social, legal and media consequences of that political rhetoric?

What happened — a timeline

The trigger (September 4–9, 2025): The flashpoint began on September 4 when an illuminated board/banners reading “I Love Muhammad” appeared during an Eid-e-Milad-un-Nabi procession in parts of Kanpur (Syed Nagar/Rawatpur). Local objections, framed by some Hindu groups as a “deviation from tradition”, led the police to register an FIR on September 9 against 24 persons (9 named, 15 unknown) for allegedly disturbing communal harmony. The complaint, according to the report of India Today, centred on shifting tents/banners into a location on a public road near a gate used by Ram Navami processions. That apparently small ritual alteration escalated as news and social media spread the story to other districts.

Escalation and the Bareilly protest (September 26–27, 2025): On September 26, a public gathering in Bareilly — called in sympathy with the “I Love Muhammad” campaign and associated with cleric Tauqeer Raza Khan — clashed with police after Friday prayers; police used lathi-charge and reported stone-pelting and injuries to officers. According to a report of Times of India, authorities say the protest had been called without permission; police also said the gathering showed signs of pre-planning through social media groups. Multiple FIRs and detentions followed. Local reporting states dozens detained with FIRs filed against hundreds — and some outlets report FIR counts running into the thousands across multiple stations. Shortly after the clashes, the cleric and several aides were arrested.

The Chief Minister’s response (September 28, 2025): Speaking at a public ‘Viksit UP’ event, CM Yogi Adityanath warned that those who “vandalise in the name of faith… attack the police… we won’t let you go… chedhoge to chodenge nahi aur chodenge nahi toh fir chootoge bhi nahi.” He used phrases such as “denting and painting must be done” and framed the response as necessary to protect festivals and public safety. These comments were widely reported and repeated across national news outlets the same day and the day after.

The contentious speeches delivered by CM Adityanath are:

अगर बेटी की सुरक्षा पर हाथ डालने का प्रयास किया,
व्यापारी के प्रतिष्ठान में आग लगाने का प्रयास किया,
उत्सव में अराजकता पैदा करने प्रयास किया तो,

यह रास्ता सीधे नर्क में जाने का होगा… pic.twitter.com/gUV9vkYnRX

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

‘गजवा-ए-हिंद’ हिन्दुस्तान की धरती पर नहीं होगा,

अगर किसी को जहन्नुम में जाना हो तो ‘गजवा-ए-हिंद’ के नाम पर अराजकता पैदा करने का कुत्सित प्रयास करे…

देर-सबेर ‘छांगुर’ जैसे हाल तो उनके भी होने ही हैं… pic.twitter.com/8V6MXvZbgm

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

छोटे-छोटे बच्चों को जिनके हाथों में कलम होनी चाहिए, जिनके हाथों में नोटबुक होनी चाहिए, विज्ञान और गणित की पुस्तकें होनी चाहिए, उनके हाथों में I Love Muhammad का पोस्टर…

…इनको यह भी नहीं मालूम कि उनकी जिंदगी तो बर्बाद है ही लेकिन इन बच्चों की भी जिंदगी ये लोग बर्बाद करने पर… pic.twitter.com/rhCBIxoh71

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

याद रखना!

जब भी दुस्साहस करोगे, ऐसे ही पिटोगे जैसे बरेली के अंदर पीटे गए हो… pic.twitter.com/AZWOU4m495

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

लव-जिहाद, धर्मांतरण और गो-तस्करी जैसी राष्ट्र विरोधी गतिविधियों के प्रति हमें सतर्क रहना होगा,

अगर कहीं कोई भूल से भी इस प्रकार की गतिविधियों में लिप्त है, उसकी सूचना ससमय पुलिस और प्रशासन को उपलब्ध करवाइए,

उपचार की व्यवस्था हम स्वयं कर लेंगे… pic.twitter.com/wLTyTcChgD

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

2025): After the violence and speeches, the district administration moved decisively: large-scale arrests and FIRs were filed, properties linked to accused persons were sealed or demolished by the local authority demolished including a banquet hall and other structures allegedly used by those arrested, administrative notices, for example, power-theft notices, were issued against associates of the cleric, and internet and SMS services in Bareilly district were suspended for 48 hours citing maintenance of public order, as per The Economic Times. Several human-rights and legal activists have already filed petitions and complaints alleging lack of prior notice for demolition and possible collective punishment. Political parties and civil-society delegations have begun to visit the city; opposition leaders are demanding investigations.

The problem with the speech itself

1. Targeting + personal reference. The CM specifically attacked a cleric’s actions, namely Tauqeer Raza Khan, and conduct in public, saying that the “Maulana forgot who is in power” and promising retribution that would be remembered by “future generations.” Targeting an identifiable leader and associating him and his followers with violence elevates the rhetoric beyond abstract law-and-order language.
2. Punitive metaphors taken literally. The repeated use of “denting and painting” and explicit references to the “bulldozer” rhetorical universe, and actual demolitions in other recent UP campaigns, is not merely figurative; in the current UP context it has an institutional history as a public performance of punishment — a state spectacle with material consequences. The phrase therefore reads as both a policy cue and a public warning.
3. Promise of force / deterrence directed at a community act. Even if the immediate trigger was violence, the CM’s formula — “If you trouble us, we will not spare you” — was framed to deter a specific form of expressive action, such as displaying I Love Muhammad posters, that political actors and some civil-society figures had defended as speech. The combination of delegitimisation, portraying the slogan as manipulation of children or anarchy, plus promise of collective discipline is consequential.

Those three features — naming, punitive metaphor, and generalised deterrence — are the elements that make legal and normative analysis urgent.

Media: Who amplified, and how amplification changed the story

The media ecosystem played a decisive role in transforming Yogi Adityanath’s remarks from a local political reaction into a nationally mediated performance of power. Within hours of his speech, both television and print outlets had front-paged his most aggressive lines — “chedhoge to chodenge nahi” and “denting and painting must be done” — turning threats of retribution into viral catchphrases.

National and regional broadcasters, including Times Now Navbharat, Zee News Hindi, and News18 Hindi, ran segments that paired these quotes with dramatic visuals of protests, lathicharges, and property demolitions. The YouTube thumbnails and on-screen tickers themselves became an extension of the state’s messaging — text overlays like “Maulana bhool gaya kaun sarkar mein hai” or “Bareilly mein danga, sarkar ki kathor karwai” visually encoded the CM’s warning as spectacle and slogan.

This media choreography had a dual effect. First, it nationalised the CM’s rhetoric, ensuring that what began as a local communal disturbance was recast as a state-wide law-and-order triumph. Second, the widespread replaying of his lines — often stripped of context and accompanied by enforcement footage — normalised the language of punishment and deterrence. Even platforms that did not editorially endorse the speech contributed to its amplification through repetition and aestheticisation.

Some outlets, such as The Wire and The Indian Express, offered a countervailing frame: detailed timelines, verification of police claims about “online toolkits,” and critical analysis of the administration’s disproportionate use of force. But these were exceptions within an overwhelming current of performative law-and-order coverage. The split in framing — between law-and-order narratives and civil-liberties scrutiny — reveals how editorial positioning directly shapes the moral valence of communal incidents.

Short-form videos from these channels, extracted as YouTube shorts and Twitter/X reels, circulated widely on social media. These clips — the CM’s warning juxtaposed with scenes of violence and police deployment — fed a feedback loop: the more viral the visual, the stronger the administrative justification for subsequent measures like internet suspension and mass arrests. In effect, the media ecology and the state’s coercive apparatus became mutually reinforcing.

This convergence also raises a constitutional question about mediated governance. When executive speech, journalistic amplification, and administrative coercion operate in sync, the boundary between state messaging and independent reportage collapses. The outcome is not merely the spread of information, but the construction of a “performance of control”, where the appearance of decisive governance substitutes for adherence to due process.

Attached is a collection of YouTube thumbnails from Times Now Navbharat, Zee News Hindi, and News18 Hindi demonstrates this vividly — a montage of headlines that blur the line between news coverage and narrative reinforcement, framing punitive action as political virtue.

Legal frame: what the law says and where courts have drawn the line

Three interlocking legal rules matter here:

• The statutory toolbox for “hate” / public-order speech: India’s criminal law criminalises speech that promotes enmity or hatred between groups (e.g., IPC Section 153A/Section 198 BNS), imputations prejudicial to national integration (IPC Section 153B/Section 197 BNS), deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings (IPC Section 295A/Section 298 BNS), and statements likely to create terror or public alarm (IPC Section 505/Section 356 BNS). These are the provisions courts and police typically invoke in communal-speech cases. The Supreme Court has emphasised that lawful restrictions must be precisely applied and proportionate
• The Supreme Court’s duty-to-act on hate speech: Shaheen Abdulla and follow-up orders: In Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India (2022), the Supreme Court highlighted the “growing climate of hate” and directed police chiefs to take suo motu action in hate-speech incidents — specifically instructing registration and investigation under IPC sections such as 153A, 295A and 505 without waiting for a private complaint. These directions were later extended to all States/UTs; the court took the view that proactive policing is essential to preserve the secular fabric envisaged by the Preamble. That jurisprudence puts an onus on state police: if a public utterance plausibly constitutes hate speech, police must investigate it on their own motion.
• The constitutional limit: incitement and proximity to violence: Indian courts have insisted on a context-sensitive test. The classic guide is Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962), where the Supreme Court upheld sedition law only for words that have the “tendency or intention of creating public disorder” or inciting violence; mere abusive or critical expression cannot be criminalised. Modern caselaw returns to the same principle: to punish speech the state must show an intention or proximate tendency to produce imminent lawless action — not merely dislikeable or provocative words. This high threshold matters because it keeps robust political speech protected while allowing punishment where speech is truly dangerous.

Apply the law to the facts: Did the UP CM cross the line?

This is the crucial, uncomfortable question. Courts usually apply a two-part analysis to political speech by powerful actors:

• Does the speech itself contain elements of the statutory offences?

The Chief Minister’s speech went beyond mere governance rhetoric. It singled out a specific cleric and his supporters, implicitly ascribing collective culpability to a religious community. The language of punishment and humiliation—phrases such as “denting and painting” or “beaten as in Bareilly”—was not random metaphor; it invoked a visual and historical grammar of state-sanctioned coercion. These expressions are deeply loaded in Uttar Pradesh’s recent political lexicon, symbolising demolition drives, police beatings, and targeted action that disproportionately affect Muslim localities.

Further, the assertion that “future generations” would be taught a lesson carries the unmistakable tone of collective retribution, extending the threat from present offenders to an entire community across time. Such language constructs Muslims not as citizens subject to law, but as an enduring adversarial category — a perpetual “other” against whom exemplary force is justified.

Under Sections 153A (now Section 196 of BNS) and 295A (now Section 298 of BNS)  of the Indian Penal Code, the test for criminality hinges not merely on overt incitement but also on whether the speech promotes enmity, targets a community, or is likely to disturb public tranquillity. Read against the backdrop of recent police actions in UP—demolition of Muslim-owned properties, custodial violence, and selective FIRs—the Chief Minister’s words may reasonably be understood as an endorsement and encouragement of discriminatory state practices.

Moreover, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in cases such as Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2020) clarifies that when influential figures make statements capable of mobilising real-world hostility, the likelihood of incitement must be assessed contextually, not in isolation. From that perspective, Yogi Adityanath’s remarks arguably cross the boundary from administrative assertion into speech that legitimises and incites discrimination.

In sum, while the speech may not contain an explicit call to violence, it performs a dog-whistle function: normalising state-backed hostility and signalling permissibility for coercive action against a targeted religious group. In legal terms, that makes it a fit case for prima facie examination under Sections 153A, 295A, and 505(2) IPC, especially given the speaker’s constitutional position and the demonstrable pattern of violence that followed.

• What changed after the speech? (state action and proportionality)

The true constitutional stakes emerge not merely from what was said, but from what followed. When a Chief Minister’s public rhetoric is swiftly mirrored by administrative action—bulldozers rolling in, FIRs multiplying overnight, and digital blackouts silencing affected districts—the question is no longer one of abstract speech, but of state power animated by speech.

In the immediate aftermath of Yogi Adityanath’s address, municipal and police authorities in multiple UP districts launched coordinated operations: mass detentions of Muslim youth, property demolitions framed as “encroachments,” and sweeping suspension of internet services. These were not isolated law-and-order responses but a choreographed display of retribution, executed without adequate notice, hearing, or judicial oversight.

Courts have repeatedly emphasised that executive spectacle cannot substitute due process. In its observations concerning “bulldozer justice,” the Supreme Court has held that demolitions carried out as instantaneous punishment for alleged offences are unconstitutional unless preceded by notice, opportunity to respond, and adherence to municipal laws (Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2022). The law draws a bright line: urban planning cannot be weaponised as penal theatre. Yet, in Uttar Pradesh, the chain of events—fiery speech followed by visible coercive measures—suggests a punitive motive masquerading as law enforcement.

Equally significant is the Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India (2022) principle, which imposes a positive duty on the police: they must initiate suo-moto FIRs against hate speech, irrespective of the speaker’s political stature. The judgment underscored that inaction is complicity, and selective enforcement deepens discrimination. In this case, law enforcement pursued alleged protestors with urgency but failed to act on the Chief Minister’s inflammatory remarks, despite clear statutory grounds under Sections 153A, 295A, and 505(2) IPC.

The constitutional doctrine of proportionality also comes into play. Administrative actions must bear a rational nexus to legitimate aims, employ the least restrictive means, and avoid discriminatory impact. Yet the scale and selectivity of post-speech measures—demolitions confined largely to Muslim-majority neighbourhoods, police raids on specific youth groups, and the near-complete absence of accountability for vigilante actors—suggest a pattern of collective punishment rather than targeted, proportionate law enforcement.

As many have noted, when executive speech operates as a signal and the bureaucratic apparatus responds with coercive overreach, the boundary between political rhetoric and state sanction collapses. The state ceases to act as a neutral arbiter and instead becomes a performer in its own moral spectacle, projecting deterrence through fear.

In sum, while Yogi Adityanath’s speech might be defensible as political expression if viewed in isolation, the temporal and causal sequence of events—immediate arrests, sweeping FIRs, and punitive demolitions—creates a compelling case that state power was deployed not for justice but for signalling. Such a pattern raises grave constitutional concerns under Articles 14, 19, and 21, even if establishing direct criminal culpability for the speech remains legally complex.

The ground reality: Evidence of disproportionate enforcement and social fallout

The aftermath of the Bareilly clashes reveals a pattern that extends far beyond a conventional law-and-order response. It reflects a multi-tiered exercise of coercive state power, activated in the wake of the Chief Minister’s speech and sustained through both formal and informal mechanisms of punishment.

• Mass arrests and sweeping FIRs: In the immediate aftermath, police operations intensified across Bareilly and adjoining districts. Reports cited dozens of detentions within hours, and FIRs naming hundreds—sometimes even thousands—of individuals. According to The Times of India, nearly 2,000 people were named across multiple police stations, though the exact number varied by outlet. The breadth of these FIRs—often containing generalised allegations—raises serious questions about collective culpability and the use of preventive detention as a form of intimidation rather than targeted investigation.
• Property sealing and demolitions: Municipal and development authorities undertook swift demolition and sealing drives against properties allegedly linked to the accused—among them a banquet hall and other commercial structures. Families reported that no prior notice or opportunity to be heard was provided, prompting complaints to the Uttar Pradesh Human Rights Commission. As The Times of India noted, these measures echo the state’s recent pattern of bulldozer-led punitive actions, widely criticised by rights groups as performative retribution designed to convey dominance rather than ensure compliance with planning laws. The recurrence of such demolitions immediately after communal incidents suggests a deliberate conflation of criminal liability with property ownership and community identity.
• Administrative and regulatory reprisals: Alongside police action, the administration issued a series of “ancillary punishments”—including power-theft notices, income recovery claims, and regulatory sanctions against persons associated with the cleric at the centre of the protests. These quasi-civil penalties compounded the economic and psychological burden on affected families. The simultaneity of these measures—each lawful in isolation but collectively disproportionate—points to a pattern of cumulative punishment through bureaucratic instruments.
• Communications blackouts: Authorities imposed a 48-hour suspension of mobile internet, broadband, and SMS services across Bareilly district, citing the need to curb rumours and prevent mobilisation. The Economic Times reported that this was one of several recent instances where internet shutdowns have become the default administrative reflex during communal tensions. Such measures, while framed as precautionary, raise acute proportionality and necessity concerns under the Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of Indiav (2020) standard, which requires narrowly tailored, time-bound restrictions and periodic review.
• Societal reverberations and exclusionary practices: The social aftershocks were equally significant. Civil-society observers and media, such as LiveMint documented a perceptible tightening of social boundaries in the weeks following the incident. Muslims reportedly faced pressure to abstain from participating in garba celebrations and other public festivities, and instances were noted where Hindutva groups sought to monitor or exclude Muslim presence at cultural events. Though less quantifiable, these developments illustrate how executive rhetoric and coercive enforcement combine to legitimise exclusion at the community level, embedding state-endorsed bias within everyday social interactions.

Taken together, these events depict not an isolated breakdown of order but a coordinated sequence: rhetoric, repression, and social sanction. The cycle of speech, enforcement, spectacle, and exclusion forms a distinctive template of governance—where administrative action doubles as political performance, and punishment itself becomes a form of public messaging.

The Political Economy of Hard-line Rhetoric: How speech translates into power

Whether by deliberate strategy or downstream effect, hard-line public rhetoric by state leaders like Yogi Adityanath yields three tangible advantages for majoritarian or vigilante actors operating at the political margins. It converts language into action, rhetoric into legitimacy, and coercion into spectacle.

1. Implicit legitimisation of vigilante policing: When a head of government publicly vows “uncompromising action” and uses metaphors of retribution—such as “denting and painting” or “we will not spare you”—the message travels well beyond the bureaucracy. It functions as a symbolic green light for local affiliates, vigilante groups, and ideological sympathisers. These actors interpret the rhetoric as moral endorsement for “citizen policing” or social intimidation campaigns under the guise of defending faith or nationalism. Civil-society reports document a consistent pattern: Hindutva outfits intensify surveillance of Muslim participation in cultural events—such as garba celebrations or processions—soon after high-profile communal statements. In practice, this rhetoric lowers the cost of vigilantism, creating a permissive environment where harassment appears state-sanctioned.
2. Narrative control and inversion: Strongman rhetoric also reshapes the moral sequence of events. By branding expressive or devotional acts—such as the “I Love Muhammad” posters—as “provocations,” the state repositions itself as the neutral guarantor of order, while protestors are recast as disruptors. This narrative inversion turns a community’s assertion of faith into a law-and-order problem, allowing the administration to deploy coercion with minimal public pushback.
   As The Wire and other critical outlets observed, media framing plays a decisive role: channels that foreground “riots” and “discipline” amplify the executive’s preferred storyline, while those that question due process or disproportionality are marginalised as “soft on disorder.” The result is a feedback loop where political rhetoric and editorial selection co-produce legitimacy.
3. Electoral signalling and mobilisation gains: Beyond its immediate administrative use, hard-line speech operates as a performative display of strength aimed at a political constituency. The imagery of bulldozers, swift arrests, and collective punishment serves as a spectacle of decisive governance, projecting control and dominance. Scholars of South Asian populism have noted that such performances of punishment—what The Loop terms “punitive populism”—transform the machinery of justice into an instrument of emotional reassurance for the majority. Each demolition or crackdown becomes not just an act of enforcement but a ritual reaffirmation of political identity, blurring the lines between public order and electoral theatre.

Taken together, these three dynamics show how rhetoric, media, and enforcement converge into a single ecosystem of majoritarian power. In this model, punishment is not merely administered—it is performed, televised, and voted upon.

Accountability gaps and legal remedies

The aftermath of the Bareilly episode demands more than commentary — it demands accountability. When executive speech, administrative action, and media amplification intersect to produce coercive outcomes, the constitutional order must provide correctives. The following lines of legal and institutional response arise directly from existing Supreme Court jurisprudence and human-rights practice:

1. Suo moto inquiry into the Chief Minister’s speech under the Shaheen Abdulla directions: The Supreme Court has made it unequivocally clear that police are under a continuing duty to register suo moto FIRs in cases of hate speech, regardless of the speaker’s political position. Inaction in the face of potentially inflammatory statements by high public officials amounts to contempt of the Court’s directions. A representation to the High Court or Supreme Court seeking compliance would therefore be legally tenable if no inquiry has yet been initiated.
2. Judicial review of demolitions and sealing drives for arbitrariness and disproportionality: The Supreme Court’s November 2024 observations on “bulldozer justice” caution that demolitions used as instant punishment violate due process. Every affected person is entitled to prior notice, an opportunity to be heard, and independent adjudication before property action. Where municipal or development authorities acted immediately after communal incidents, those demolitions merit judicial scrutiny as punitive theatre rather than lawful urban regulation.
3. Human-rights complaints and public-interest petitions documenting the full sequence: The timeline itself — from the Kanpur FIRs to the Bareilly clashes, the CM’s speeches, and the administrative crackdown — forms crucial evidence of state overreach and selective enforcement. Complaints to the NHRC, the State Human Rights Commission, or the jurisdictional High Court can seek independent inquiry, victim compensation, and publication of findings. Precedents show that such petitions have successfully compelled state responses and stayed coercive action.
4. Media accountability and transparency demands: Given the central role of television and digital platforms in magnifying punitive rhetoric, transparency measures are essential. Broadcasters and social media intermediaries should be required to preserve all footage, thumbnails, and metadata for future scrutiny. Outlets that used sensational promos can be asked to issue contextual clarifications or corrections through the NBDSA process. Simultaneously, police and civic authorities must disclose the legal basis for mass FIRs, demolition orders, and internet suspensions. Public disclosure often becomes the first step toward halting unchecked executive excess.

Conclusions — legal risk, democratic cost

The Bareilly “I Love Muhammad” row and its aftermath sit at a critical intersection of power and speech in contemporary India. What began as an expressive act — a slogan, a banner, a theological or identity affirmation — was transformed rapidly under political and administrative force into a narrative of provocation, then into a sequence of punitive state interventions.

Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath’s rhetoric did more than warn: it arguably furnished the legal and moral scaffolding for escalated state action — actions that, according to credible reportage, stretched procedural norms, threatened minority rights, chilled speech, and disrupted daily life for many. Legal redress is challenging but not impossible: the constitutional framework, statutory provisions, and Supreme Court precedents exist to push back against such overreach.

Bareilly is therefore not just a local incident. It’s a test case. If the judicial system, civil society, and media fail to rigorously examine speech + enforcement, the precedent is troubling: political speech that combines identity, faith, punitive promise and spectacle becomes a license to marginalise. For democracy to survive in such moments, the invisible boundary between “law-and-order” and state overreach must be policed with the same seriousness with which we monitor overt dissent.

References:

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/take-suo-motu-action-against-hate-speech-crimes-without-waiting-for-complaint-supreme-court-212282

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/what-is-i-love-muhammad-row-and-why-it-sparked-protests-across-india-barawafat-procession-kanpur-nagpur-hyderabad-owaisi-full-story-2791497-2025-09-22

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/meerut/bareilly-cleric-among-8-held-2000-booked-31-detained/articleshow/124185812.cms

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/i-love-muhammad-row-up-cm-yogi-adityanath-warns-habitual-law-breakers-after-bareilly-protest-says-denting-painting-must-be-done/articleshow/124189795.cms

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/internet-suspended-in-bareilly-for-48-hours-after-i-love-muhammad-row/articleshow/124273149.cms

https://www.livemint.com/news/india/yogi-adityanath-warns-i-love-mohammad-protesters-chedhoge-to-fir-chodhenge-nahi-11758975758381.html

https://thepolisproject.com/research/sc-verdict-demolitions-statecraft/

https://thewire.in/politics/i-love-muhammad-banner-controversy-how-routine-decoration-in-kanpur-sparked-nationwide-protests-and-crackdowns

https://www.scobserver.in/journal/bulldozer-demolitions-remind-of-a-lawless-ruthless-state-of-affairs-declares-supreme-court-as-it-issues-pan-india-guidelines

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/meerut/i-love-muhammad-row-plea-filed-in-human-rights-body-on-demolition-ofproperties-in-bareilly-affected-families-say-no-prior-notice-sent/articleshow/124345491.cms

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bareilly/i-love-muhammad-row-rs-1-crore-power-theft-notice-to-tauqeer-razas-aides/articleshow/124324197.cms

https://theloop.ecpr.eu/bulldozer-justice-punitive-populism-in-india/

https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/lucknow/i-love-muhammad-row-cleric-tauqeer-raza-detained-protest-10274731

https://theprint.in/politics/cleric-who-once-said-modi-should-learn-from-yogi-whos-tauqeer-khan-in-eye-of-i-love-muhammad-storm

https://kmsnews.org/kms/2025/09/20/muslims-protest-across-india-against-registration-of-case-for-writing-i-love-muhammad-saw.html

https://sabrangindia.in/register-prosecute-hate-speech-offences-promptly-uphold-rule-law-sci-all-states

https://sabrangindia.in/hate-crime-hate-speech-scs-scrutiny-continue

https://sabrangindia.in/free-speech-even-in-bad-taste-is-protected-if-no-incitement-to-violence-hp-hc

https://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/138-lokur-damojipurapu

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/tension-in-bareilly-drones-are-up-ahead-of-friday-prayer-internet-shut-down/articleshow/124280351.cms

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/one-can-say-i-love-modi-but-not-i-love-mohammad-owaisi-amid-bareilly-unrest-condemns-violence/articleshow/124284809.cms

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/i-love-mohammad-march-violence-after-stone-pelting-in-bareilly-cops-resort-to-lathicharge/articleshow/124157113.cms

https://cjp.org.in/bns-2023-does-nothing-to-bring-in-a-nuanced-effective-understanding-of-hate-speech-making-its-prosecution-even-more-difficult

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-files-complaints-against-the-hate-speeches-delivered-in-uttar-pradesh

https://cjp.org.in/the-sentinel-and-the-shift-free-speech-in-the-supreme-court

https://thelogicalindian.com/chedhoge-to-chodhenge-nahi-yogi-adityanaths-warning-after-i-love-mohammad-protest-turns-violent-in-up

https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/internet-cut-for-48-hours-in-ups-bareilly-amid-i-love-muhammad-posters-row-9384013

https://article-14.com/post/govt-whataboutery-inaction-why-hate-speech-persists-despite-the-supreme-court-wanting-to-stop-it-64c3372224505

The post From Words to Bulldozers: How a Chief Minister’s rhetoric triggered and normalised punitive policing in Bareilly appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Social media posts suggested there was “forced conversion” or “religious mixing” happening, resulting in vigilante groups mobilising and police quickly intervening — not against the aggressors, but against individuals accused of converting others. In several districts, including Alwar, Dungarpur, and Jaipur, the people abusing Christians worked with police and other authorities, a relationship that demonstrated their collusion. The accounts below follow this trajectory — from Alwar and Dungarpur’s early raids to the violence reported in Jaipur’s Pratap Nagar — and how an entire month was essentially practice for institutionalised religious surveillance and social exclusion.

This complaint and supporting documentation derive from validated field reports and a comprehensive timeline of events built by the Coordination Committee for Protection of Freedom of Religion and Human Rights in Rajasthan — a network of civil society organisations that has been following closely incidents of harassment and hate crimes against Christians within the state. The Coordination Committee includes People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), People’s Union for Human Rights (PUHR), All India People’s Forum (AIPF), Janwadi Mahila Samiti (JMS), Rajasthan Christian Fellowship (RCF), National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM), Adivasi Adhikar Abhiyan (AAA), and Bhil Pradesh Mukti Morcha (BPMM), among others. Their Joint Press Statement of September 25, 2025, chronicled targeted attack incidents, police harassment, and coercive raids in the wake of the Rajasthan Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Bill, 2025. CJP’s submission relies on that data to further triangulate it with independent media reports, HindutvaWatch documentation, and on-ground interviews to provide a detailed record of an organized campaign of intimidation conducted under the cover of “anti-conversion vigilance.”

Gelota, Alwar (MIA Thana, Alwar district)

Police conducted a raid on September 3 on a hostel for children that allegedly housed approximately 25 poor children run by a missionary in Galota (Udyog Nagar locality). The police action followed a complaint filed by a VHP activist alleged that a “conversion” was underway. The police reportedly confiscated literature, a FIR was filed; the police arrested two hostel staffers—listed in the log as Amrit (a teacher) and Sonu Rai (press reports also identify her as Sonu Singh/Garasia)—and detained them in judicial custody. Reports indicate that local Sangh affiliate groups (VHP/Bajrang Dal) coerced the authorities into arresting. Media reporting addresses the arrest and the police case; civil society groups who monitor the case remark that it is the first in a spate of incidents after the anti-conversion bill was introduced.

Khetolai Village (Bhabru Thana), Kotputli-Behror District

On September 9, less than an hour after the anti-conversion legislation was introduced in the Assembly, officers arrived on the property of a house in the family of brothers Vikram and Rajendra Kanav, who host their own satsang/prayer meetings. The brothers state they were told, rather explicitly, not to hold prayer sessions with outsiders, then were brought to the police station and interrogated, finally being coerced into signing a form, or written undertaking, indicating they would not hold their satsangs and would not “invite outsiders” to their home. The brothers’ account of the incident follows a trend being run in the community by local Sangh activists (identified in the log as Shri Ram Samiti), who have consistently threatened this family in various ways. Complaints were made, in writing, not only to the SP but also to other organizations such as the PUCL.

Paota (Pragpura Thana), Kotputli-Behror district

A similar incident took place in Paota on September 9. Believer Gajanand Kuldeep stated that the next morning after the Bill passed, the SHO summoned him, stating that if he hosted prayers, meals, or called people outside again, he would be arrested. He testified that he was forced to sign a document that indicated he would stop doing this activity. Like the Khetolai incident, PUCL passed his application on to the SP, and was kept on the record as an example of coercive policing as part of wider harassment following the Bill introduction.

Jhelana, Bichiwada, Dungarpur District

Local Hindu sangathans and a Sant Samaj group protested outside a minority-run school and its church ahead of the scheduled prayer service on September 10, claiming the school was a site for the conversion of Adivasi students and parents. Police arrived in significant numbers; the school maintained that it is a minority-run educational institution and denied that there had been any conversion activity. The incident intensified tensions, but no FIR was filed in relation to the protest. The account refers to this as an incident as an event of communal mobilization involving pressure from authorities on students and staff in the school community.

In a separate case in Durgapur on the same date, an Adivasi organiser with a local mazdoor sangathan said she was stopped on the road and verbally threatened by VHP/Bajrang Dal activists who accused her organisation of “converting Adivasis.” Also, the landlord of the office supposedly threatened to evict them. The organiser described it as demoralising and reported that a formal complaint was being prepared, and civil society groups mentioned that this harassment was part of the broader campaign.

St Paul’s Hostel School, Patela, Dungarpur City

On September 11, after investigation and complaints, including a health inspection in early 2023, the district authorities responded to complaints (made by the ABVP and others) by issuing an order to close the hostel/school for alleged record-keeping and sanitation infractions. The Child Welfare Committee, in collaboration with district education and administration personnel, whisked away 230 children to their families; the authorities issued show-cause notices and initiated proceedings under the JJ Act against the school authorities. The staff contends that the closure is a result of pressure from right-wing student groups and has displaced the school kids and staff; reports are that the school is seeking legal remedies to restore the school to operation.

Chak-6P hostel school (Anupgarh, Sri Ganganagar district)

On September 16, an incident log entry reported a nocturnal attack on a hostel school for orphans: students and adult supervisors were said to be frightened by an enterprising attack on the site in the middle of the night. The log entry does not provide many public details but lists the incident as one of a multitude of attacks aimed at Christian institutions in the district. Similarly, civil society narratives identify hostel attacks as part of a continuation of incidents.

Ward No. 14, Anupgarh Thana (District: Sri Ganganagar)

A local citizen complained on September 17, stating that a person who lived in the area (whom we cannot identify in the log) had been “converted” as per missionary activity; the Vishwa Hindu Parishad filed a police complaint in support of this local citizen. The officer of the law arrested two persons, associated with a missionary prayer group, by the names of Polus Barjao and Aryan, and began an investigation to ascertain the degree of conversion processes. It was reported that a third person (the landlord) was in hiding from police arrest. The two arrested were later remanded and put into judicial custody; the case file states the Indian police were undertaking active investigations into conversion processes, as per the FIR filed by the VHP.

Pratap Nagar (Sector 08/82/625), Jaipur (Rajasthan)

On September 21, approximately 40–50 Bajrang Dal activists allegedly entered a private residence where Pastor Bobas Daniel was conducting a prayer meeting of about 15–26 people. According to local sources, the Bajrang Dal group locked the doors, broke items, and physically assaulted congregants. Neighbors, including a pregnant woman and the landlady, attempted to intervene to protect the victims, but allegedly were beaten themselves. Victims state that eight were injured; the police filed the FIR only after lengthy protests and community pressure for accountability. Locals expressed concerns over delayed police responses, no prompt documentation from medical professionals, and failure to arrest persons who assaulted congregants, despite eyewitness evidence provided by victims. Media accounts confirmed both the attack and the delay of police response.

On September 23, 2025 — Hindustan Bible Institute (HBI), Pratap Nagar, Jaipur (Rajasthan)

Almost 50 Bajrang Dal activists surrounded the campus of HBI after a visit from two visiting staff members from the head office of HBI. The protesters were targeting HBI due to accusations of “forced conversions” of members of a local church. Police officers escorted the visitors from out of state to the police station after probable cause occurred from the protests. The mobile devices, Aadhaar cards, and property documents were confiscated from visitors and some local staff, and the property of the institute was detained. Guests left the facility for the night but were there after civil society intervened, although some devices and property papers were withheld. Civil society groups described the detainment as broad and the lack of property restoration as violations of their freedom of movement and association, and also demanded the immediate restoration of property and arrest of the perpetrators. National and international news services reported on the incident; civil society organized delegations to meet with senior officers and issued joint statements condemning the attacks.

Engineered Vigilantism and the Mechanics of Fear

In September 2025, an evident and purposeful pattern of inciting violence against Christians was followed. Most incidents started with rumours of “forced conversions”, often transmitted via WhatsApp groups or VHP, Bajrang Dal, or ABVP local units, targeting schools and hostels run by Christians or prayer gatherings. These allegations served as incitement to coordinated raids, mob assemblies, and police involvement, all as a rubric of vigilance. Many of the same incidents occurred across Alwar, Dungarpur, Anupgarh, and Jaipur. Pastors in Alwar and Kotputli-Behror were summoned and pressured into signing undertakings not to pray. Groups on the right stormed educational and welfare institutions for Adivasi and Dalit children in Dungarpur and Anupgarh, accusing them of “conversion through education”. The apex of these events occurred in Jaipur’s Pratap Nagar, where a mob assaulted those attending prayer, kicked several women, and destroyed public and private property while police sat by or arrived late.

Such violence was rarely spontaneous. The same three steps were followed: rumour being spread, mob assembly, and state validation of the violence through a raid or a politically motivated delay in filing an FIR. Even if the violence ended quickly, the intimidation and coercion continued – everything from pastors suspended from conducting worship, to schools sealed, to social workers leaving in fear.

While Rajasthan represented the focal point, the scenario reflected a national agenda. When combining repeat attacks by Hindutva affiliates with the targeting of marginalized groups, this wasn’t simply random aggression, but a more comprehensive policy of surveillance and social exclusion acted along with administrative acquiescence and ideological consensus.

The Rhetoric of Conversion and Cultural Purity

At the core of these campaigns rests a control ideology – an ideology that sees religious diversity as a danger, and that views women, Dalits, and Adivasis as “vulnerable bodies” who need to be protected from conversion. The rhetoric here is reminiscent of the more familiar tropes of Hindutva propaganda: the notion that Christian charity disguises “mass conversions,” that western forces undermine Indian culture, and that Hindu identity must be “defended” under the watchful gaze of vigilantism. The word “conversion” operates much like “love jihad” in anti-Muslim rhetoric – shorthand for cultural invasion and the fear of demographic change. However, the terms of conversion are also intended to implicate Christian schools and welfare Institutions in “Westernising” India’s poor through education and through care, thus recasting social uplift as social subversion. With the most recent incidents in September as one instance, foreign and local pastors were referred to as “agents.” New believers became “traitors,” and Christian education was labelled as “mental colonisation.” Such language comes out of Far-Right narratives and foretells danger while dehumanizing the minority population. Such language, too, perversely renders violence a moral obligation.

These narratives are meant to reinforce (and reproduce) caste hierarchies, wherein Dalit and Adivasi populations are painted as “vulnerable to corruption,” while maintaining caste(s) boundaries of purity-pollution under the guise of religion. The institutional forces of religion, caste, and nationalism become a single ideological and controlling matrix, which is central to Hindutva mobilisation.

In the end, it is political, not religious. As elections approach, “conversion panic” tells the story of a group working to unite the base and distract from the failures of governance. By presenting Christians as controlling the marginalized and suspicious, those invoking conversion panic can generate both moral panic and political capital, repurposing faith-based fear into electoral gold.

Silence, Complicity, and the Erosion of Protection

If there is a pattern that is as troubling as the violence itself, it is the silence—or worse, complicity—of the machinery of the state itself. All over Rajasthan, police responded to violence against Christians with bias, siding with aggressors over victims. In Alwar and Ktputli-Behror, officers pressured Christian pastoralists to sign undertakings prohibiting worship rather than offering protective services. In Dungarpur, Christian schools and hostels were invaded by police, who conducted raids without warrants, sometimes only after complaints from VHP or Bajrang Dal workers. In Pratap Nagar, Jaipur, women were assaulted and prayer halls were vandalised without the police filing any FIRs against the perpetrators. Instead, those praying were questioned as to their “conversion motives,” effectively treating them as suspects in their own community.

This pattern demonstrates not only bureaucratic indifference but collusion between law enforcement and vigilante groups. Normative lines of state duty have blurred with the mood of majoritarian sentiments in ways that create a situation of fear, putting Christians in the position of suspicion. By repeating the language of “conversion vigilance,” police and district officials not only create confusion around maintaining civic responsibility, but they also license mob violence in the name of duty.

The overall consequence is that constitutional protection is slowly torn asunder. Article 25 protects freedom of religion; Article 21 protects dignity and freedom. But the rights are now conditional – subject to majority privilege. The events of September 2025 show that when the state becomes a mechanism of ideological enforcement rather than neutrality and fairness in justice, citizenship itself becomes stratified based on faith. Unless there is accountability and equal protection can be guaranteed under the law, the glamorized promise of secular democracy will be meaningless but abiding, while hate will continue to loom under the guise of law and order.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related:

A week of escalating persecution: Far-right Hindu groups target Christian gatherings in India

The Anti-Conversion Law of Rajasthan: A threat to individual liberty and religious freedom

“Anti-conversion laws being weaponised”: CJP seeks interim relief against misuse of anti-conversion laws

Everyday Atrocity: Mapping the normalisation of violence against Dalits and Adivasis in 2025

Anti-Christians Widespread hate events on the eve of X’mas, Punjab, UP, Kerala, Rajasthan

The post September of Fear: Targeted Violence against Christians in Rajasthan exposes pattern of harassment after Anti-Conversion Bill appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The complaint, addressed to the DGP and copied to the Maharashtra Home Department and the National Human Rights Commission, argues that such conduct represents a gross violation of the oath of office, the Maharashtra Police Conduct Rules, and the constitutional principle of neutrality that underpins policing in a secular democracy.

CJP has urged immediate suspension of the concerned officers, transfer of the Suleman Pathan investigation to an independent agency, and a state-wide directive reaffirming police impartiality in communal and hate-crime cases.

The Crime: A lynching born of hate

On August 11, 2025, 20-year-old Suleman Khan Pathan, a resident of Betawad Khurd in Jalgaon’s Jamner taluka, was brutally lynched by a mob for being seen in a café with a Hindu girl. The café stands barely a minute’s walk from the local police station.

According to reports by Scroll.in, The Wire, Article 14, and NDTV, the mob dragged Suleman out, kidnapped and assaulted him for hours across multiple locations, and finally beat him to death in front of his family. His father, mother, and sister were also attacked when they tried to intervene.

The FIR, filed promptly under Sections 103(1) and 103(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (the mob-lynching provisions), named eight accused, four of whom — Aaditya Devre, Krushna Teli, Sojwal Teli, and Rishikesh Teli — were later confirmed to be active members of Shiv Pratisthan Hindustan, a Hindutva outfit led by Sambhaji Bhide, known for his anti-Muslim rhetoric and open rejection of India’s tricolour in favour of a saffron flag.

The accused were part of a local network that frequently mobilised against what they called “love jihad,” a discredited conspiracy theory used to demonise interfaith relationships.

The outfit and its ideology

Founded by Sambhaji Bhide in 1984, Shiv Pratisthan Hindustan has over the years built a reputation for hyper-nationalist, anti-constitutional, and communal rhetoric. Bhide’s speeches — including public calls to “chop down Muslim men” and to replace the tricolour with the saffron flag — have repeatedly drawn complaints under hate-speech provisions, though he has rarely faced legal consequences.

Investigations by Scroll.in and The Wire reveal that the outfit has actively expanded its base in northern Maharashtra, with hundreds of local youth being mobilised through cultural runs, martial displays, and social media campaigns steeped in communal imagery. Its members have glorified Suleman’s killers online, labelling the victim a “jihadi” and defending the lynching as “protection of Hindu women.”

The Procession: Police and accused ideologues march together

On Dussehra (October 2025), while the investigation into Suleman’s lynching was still ongoing, Jamner witnessed the Durga Mata Maha Daud — a massive public procession organised by Shiv Pratisthan Hindustan to mark the culmination of Navratri.

Thousands marched in saffron turbans, waving tridents, swords, and lathis, chanting incendiary slogans such as: “Durga ban, tu Kali ban, kabhi na burkhe wali ban” (Become Durga or Kali, but never a woman in a burkha.)

Among them were uniformed police officers, including Inspector Murlidhar Kasar, the original investigating officer in the Suleman lynching case. Videos published on social media show Kasar leading the procession, carrying the outfit’s saffron flag, and welcoming participants with tilaks and flower petals. The flag itself bore a plaque declaring it to be India’s “true national flag”, displaying a saffron map of “Akhand Bharat” that symbolically erases India’s constitutional tricolour. At that moment, the distinction between law enforcers and ideological actors collapsed entirely.

The video may be viewed here:

A betrayal of the police oath and constitutional duty

CJP’s complaint highlights that this conduct is a direct violation of the oath of office sworn by every Maharashtra Police officer — to “bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India” and to perform duties “without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.”

It also breaches the Maharashtra Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1979, particularly:

• Rule 3(1): Every government servant shall at all times maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty, and do nothing unbecoming of a government servant.
• Rule 5(1): No Government servant shall be a member of or be otherwise associated with, any political party or any organization which takes part in politics, nor shall he take part in, or subscribe in aid of, or assist in any other manner, any political movement or activity.
• Rule 24: No Government servant shall, by writing, speech or deed, or otherwise indulge in any activity which is likely to incite and create feelings of hatred or ill-will between different communities in India or religious, racial, regional, communal or other grounds.

By marching in uniform under a communal organisation’s banner, these officers have forfeited the appearance and substance of neutrality. As the complaint notes, “No investigation can be credible when the investigator marches beside those under investigation.” The police oath, the Constitution, and the spirit of secular law enforcement stand violated.

A compromised investigation

For the Pathan family, the participation of these officers has deepened their sense of betrayal.
They had earlier complained of intimidation, deliberate omissions in the FIR, and the police’s refusal to act on their statements naming key assailants. Now, with the same officers seen celebrating alongside members of the accused’s organisation, the family’s fears of bias have turned into certainty. They have indicated their intent to seek judicial monitoring of the case to ensure impartiality.

The legal and ethical context

The Supreme Court of India in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018) laid down a binding framework to combat mob lynching, directing that all investigations must be impartial, supervised, and shielded from communal influence. It further stated that any police officer found negligent or biased in such cases would face departmental and penal action.

CJP’s complaint invokes these guidelines, arguing that the conduct of the Jamner officers is in contempt of the Supreme Court’s directives and warrants immediate disciplinary inquiry.
It also references the National Police Commission’s Code of Ethics, which demands impartial behaviour and expressly forbids allowing personal or ideological beliefs to influence official actions.

CJP’s demands

In its submission to the DGP, CJP has sought the following immediate measures:

1. Suspension and departmental inquiry against all officers who participated in the Shiv Pratisthan rally, including Inspector Murlidhar Kasar;
2. Transfer of the Suleman Pathan lynching investigation to an independent agency such as the CID;
3. Public clarification from the Maharashtra Police regarding its position on the officers’ participation;
4. Statewide circular reaffirming that police personnel are prohibited from taking part in political, communal, or sectarian processions; and
5. Protection for Suleman’s family and witnesses, who have expressed fear and loss of faith in the current probe.

The Larger Issue: Policing and prejudice

Beyond the specifics of the Suleman case, the incident reflects a larger institutional drift where sections of the police appear to blur the line between law enforcement and ideological alignment. Maharashtra has, in recent years, witnessed a sharp rise in hate speech and communal offences — second only to Uttar Pradesh, according to India Hate Lab’s 2025 report.

In this environment, the neutrality of the police is not just desirable; it is existential.
A single image of an investigating officer carrying a saffron flag can undo decades of trust built between citizens and the state.

The complete complaint may be read here.

Image Courtesy: twitter.com

Related:

CJP calls for action by NCM against hate speeches at Dharam Sansad and Trishul Deekha events, files 2 complaints

CJP moves NCM against arms training camps, weapon distribution events in Assam and Rajasthan

CJP complains to NCM over Uttarakhand Muslim exodus; seeks urgent action

CJP moves NCM against Shiladitya Dev for targeting the ‘Miya Muslim’ community of Assam

The post CJP files complaint to Maharashtra DGP, SP Jalgaon over police participation in communal rally amid Suleman Pathan lynching probe appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Friday Night, October 3: The first clash

The unrest ignited around 1:30 a.m. on October 4, during the Durga idol immersion procession near Haathi Pokhari in the Dargha Bazar area, a predominantly Muslim neighbourhood known for its tight-knit interfaith community, as per Times of India. Residents objected to the loud music and provocative slogans, including repeated chants of “Jai Shri Ram,” accompanying the procession heading towards the Kathajodi river, as reported by India Today. Traditionally this slogan has no place during Durga Puja and has been perceived to be linked to an aggressive majoritarianism.

Minor verbal disagreements quickly escalated into violence. Stones and glass bottles were hurled from rooftops, injuring at least six people, including Deputy Commissioner of Police Khilari Rishikesh Dnyandeo, ANI reported. Local grocer Mohammad Asif told reporters that while the initial scuffle had been contained, “all of them were drunk. We pacified both groups, but it later escalated”, as per Hindustan Times. Rumours of Hindu fatalities circulating in the aftermath further inflamed passions, setting the stage for larger-scale clashes.

Six police personnel were injured in the initial violence, and six individuals from both communities were arrested, NDTV report states. The situation cast a pall over the city, reviving memories of past curfews, notably the last major shutdown during the Mandal Commission protests in 1991, as noted by former MLA Pravat Tripathy, according to Moneycontrol.

Sunday, October 5: VHP rally and widespread violence

Tensions further escalated on Sunday evening, October 5, when the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) organised a large motorcycle rally—allegedly numbering over 2,000 participants on more than 1,000 bikes—to protest the earlier Dargha Bazar clashes, as per India Today. Authorities had denied permission for the rally, citing concerns over law and order, but the organizers proceeded, intending to pass through the sensitive Dargha Bazar area. The permission granted for the route of the VHP rally has been questioned by right-thinking citizens.

Initially, police allowed the rallyists to assemble near the area. However, once law enforcement attempted to redirect them, the rally escalated into rampage and vandalism. Protesters stormed a local mall, vandalized shops—including mutton stalls, food joints, and general stores—and torched roadside establishments. Stone-pelting and clashes with police followed, leaving 25 people injured, including eight police officers, according to Hindustan Times.

Videos circulating on social media before the internet suspension showed plumes of smoke rising over the narrow lanes of Dargha Bazar, with police in riot gear forming barricades amid screams and sirens, as per India Today.

Government Response: Curfew, internet suspension, and law enforcement measures

In the aftermath of Sunday’s violence, the Odisha government responded with stringent measures:

• A 36-hour curfew across 13 police station jurisdictions, including Dargha Bazar, Mangalabag, Cantonment, Purighat, Lal Bagh, Bidanasi, Markat Nagar, CDA Phase 2, Malgodam, Badambadi, Jagatpur, Bayalis Mouza, and Sadar (ANI).
• Internet and social media suspension from 7 p.m. on October 5 to 7 p.m. on October 6, covering the Cuttack Municipal Corporation, Cuttack Development Authority, and 42 adjacent Mauza areas, to prevent the spread of provocative content and rumours (NDTV).
• Continuous flag marches, drone surveillance, and enhanced patrolling across the city’s sensitive areas (PTI).

Additional Police Commissioner Narasingha Bhola confirmed that eight people had been arrested, with more under detention, and investigations involving CCTV and drone footage were ongoing, reported ANI. The authorities emphasised that arrests would follow “proper examination of evidence”.

Revenue Divisional Commissioner Guha Poonam Tapas Kumar issued a warning: “All people who have tried to take the law into their own hands will be booked… Anybody who has tried to damage the social fabric will be taken to task”, reported NDTV.

Monday, October 6: VHP bandh and a fragile peace

In response to the immersion violence, the VHP declared a 12-hour bandh on Monday, October 6. Under a heavy police presence, the bandh passed off peacefully, highlighting the effectiveness of the curfew and security measures, as reported by The Indian Express. Local officials noted that while the streets remained quiet, the city was grappling with fear and uncertainty, with residents reluctant to venture outdoors.

Mayor Subhas Singh underlined Cuttack’s “unique culture of Hindus and Muslims living as brothers for generations”, and called on all citizens to protect this communal harmony, as per NDTV. Cuttack MP Bhartruhari Mahatab, BJD Chief Naveen Patnaik, Congress MLA Sophia Firdous, and Union Minister Dharmendra Pradhan issued repeated appeals for peace, stressing that rumours and inflammatory social media posts must be avoided, reported Hindustan Times.

ANI provided that several injured individuals from Friday and Sunday, including Pintu Mahar, Mukesh Mahar, Subhashree Jena, and Sankar Biswal, were treated and discharged, with the police clarifying that no fatalities had occurred.

Background: Communal sensitivities in Odisha

While Cuttack has historically been a model of interfaith coexistence, Odisha has witnessed a rise in communal tensions in recent years. Notable incidents include:

• Attacks on Christians and harassment of nuns (SabrangIndia)
• Clashes during processions in urban centres like Bhubaneswar, Sambalpur, and Cuttack (Deccan Herald).
• Property damage and arson during festivals, often exacerbated by rumours, demographic shifts, and political tensions (Hindustan Times).

The 2008 Kandhamal riots represent the most severe anti-Christian violence, but even post-2023, Hindu-Muslim tensions have increased. In 2024 alone, Odisha recorded an 84% rise in communal riots, resulting in 13 deaths, primarily among Muslims, Moneycontrol reported. The 2025 Cuttack disturbances underscore the vulnerabilities of religious processions in multi-religious urban settings. Small disputes—such as objections to music, slogans, or immersion routes—can quickly escalate if rumours or political mobilizations intervene.

Current Situation: Towards restoration of peace

As of October 7, Cuttack remains under curfew, and internet services have been extended to 7 p.m. on the same day, as per NDTV. Flag marches and intensive patrolling continue. Authorities have stressed that public cooperation is critical for restoring full normalcy.

Civil society leaders and residents expressed hope that Cuttack’s legacy of bhaichara (brotherhood) would be preserved through:

1. Strengthening law enforcement to prevent delayed or inadequate responses
2. Community engagement during festivals to foster trust and cooperation

1. Awareness campaigns to curb rumours and misinformation
2. Long-term measures addressing any fears of demographic shifts, economic inequalities, and resolving historical grievances

Related:

Institutional Murder in Odisha: A Student sets herself on fire to be heard

Bengali Migrant Workers Detained in Odisha: Calcutta High Court demands answers, seeks coordination between states

Bengali-Speaking Migrants Detained En Masse in Odisha: National security or targeted persecution?

From Protectors to Perpetrators? Police assaulted women, Children, Christian priests in Odisha: Fact-finding report

Odisha: 6 Months in Power, ‘Double-Engine’ BJP Govt Looks Button-Holed

The post Cuttack plunged into chaos during Durga Puja, dozens injured as procession clashes spiral into violence appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A courtroom disrupted

The usual morning mention round in Supreme Court’s Court No. 1 turned chaotic within minutes. At around 11:35 a.m., an advocate in full courtroom attire stood, removed a shoe (or attempted to unroll a bundle), and sought to throw it toward the bench. The act was accompanied by a sharp slogan that “Sanatan Dharam ka Apmaan Nahi Sahega Hindustan.”

Lawyers present have recalled that the object barely reached the dais — security moved swiftly. The man was escorted out, the session halted briefly, and then resumed. Chief Justice Gavai, visibly composed, turned to the next advocate and said “Don’t get distracted. We are not distracted by this.” With that, the Court proceeded as though unshaken.

The man in the robe: Rakesh Kishore

The person behind the outburst was soon identified: Advocate Rakesh Kishore, aged 71, enrolled in the Bar Council of Delhi in 2009. He held multiple bar cards — including the Supreme Court Bar Association, Shahdara Bar Association, and BCD, as reported

According to the Indian Express, Kishore resides in Mayur Vihar Phase 1, Delhi, and over the years has been associated with disputes relating to his housing society. Residents say elections in his society have not been held in recent times; complaints against him include one over an alleged assault of a senior citizen in 2021. The Delhi Police that functions under the direct control of India’s dreaded Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) –and is known for its aggressive surveillance of ordinary citizens was surprisingly charitable with the offender. Charging protesting citizens with a draconian law, the UAPA, in this instance, the same force has chosen to go soft. Citing the “reason” that the SC Registry was not pressing charges, they released Kishore within hours, maintaining he had no prior criminal record. Since then, the offender has been widely interviewed by a government-friendly media.

“More offended by rule of law than religion?” Suspended advocate reacts to CJI’s Mauritius remark

Speculation was rife on the “motive” with media quick to attribute the contemptuous aggression at CJI Gavai’s reported remark to a petitioner who had prayed for “replacing” the deity of Vishnu at Khajurao, a UNESCO world site and under the jurisdiction of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI). The CJI had later clarified his remarks in the Khajuraho case, emphasising respect for all religions and saying social media misinterpretations had amplified the controversy.

However, suspended advocate Rakesh Kishore, after being released by Delhi Police, has expressed discontent—not over any religious sentiment, but in response to a public statement made by the Chief Justice of India (CJI) during a visit abroad.

In a statement to news agency ANI, he said he was deeply hurt by what he perceived as mockery from the judiciary—especially comments by the CJI in a case involving a damaged Vishnu idol at Khajuraho. He asserted he felt “no regret” and claimed his act was a reaction to what he viewed as contempt directed at believers of Sanatan Dharma.

Referring to the CJI’s remarks in Mauritius — “The Indian legal system is governed by the rule of law, not the rule of bulldozers” — Kishore responded, stating, “…The CJI should consider that, holding such a high constitutional position, he ought to understand the significance of ‘Milord’ and maintain its dignity… You go to Mauritius and say that the country will not run with a bulldozer. I ask the CJI and those opposing me: Is the bulldozer action by Yogi ji against those who encroached on government property wrong? I am hurt and will continue to be so…”

Further, Kishore invoked “divine guidance,” saying that he could not rest after what he believed was an insult. He reiterated that he was neither drunk nor under influence, but acting from emotional distress. His reaction appears rooted more in political alignment and perceived personal affront than in any specific legal principle or religious issue.

#WATCH | Delhi: Countered on his action against the highest position holder in judiciary, suspended Advocate Rakesh Kishore, who attempted to hurl an object at CJI BR Gavai, says, “…CJI should think that when he is sitting on such a high constitutional post, he should… pic.twitter.com/6WgPZmQjO7

— ANI (@ANI) October 7, 2025

The Trigger: a temple idol, a viral remark, and Mauritius speech on ‘Bulldozer Justice’

The roots of Rakesh Kishore’s outburst appear to lie in entrenched casteist hatred and perceived ideological insult. In September 2025, the Supreme Court dismissed a public interest petition seeking the reconstruction of a damaged Lord Vishnu idol at the Javari Temple in Khajuraho. When the bench — led by CJI B.R. Gavai — rejected the plea, the Chief Justice remarked, “Go and ask the deity itself to do something.”

While intended to highlight the Court’s view that the matter fell under the jurisdiction of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), the comment sparked a firestorm online. It was widely seen — and misrepresented — as flippant and disrespectful to religious sentiments. Social media amplified the controversy, framing it as an affront to Sanatan Dharma, giving rise to a charged narrative of judicial insensitivity.

Further CJI Gavai’s recent speech in Mauritius, where he invoked his 2024 ruling on illegal demolitions, reminding the world that the highest court in the land stands against injustice. In that judgment, the Court had clearly held that the executive cannot act as judge, jury, and executioner.

SC Judgment A Clear Message That India Governed By Rule Of Law & Not Rule Of Bulldozer : CJI BR Gavai In Mauritius#SupremeCourt #CJIBRGavai https://t.co/vxQzhxm2ir

— Live Law (@LiveLawIndia) October 3, 2025

Citing this principle abroad, the CJI said, “The Indian legal system is governed by the Rule of Law, not by the rule of the bulldozer.” Though meant to reaffirm constitutional values, this statement became another flashpoint. Critics like Kishore interpreted it as an indirect attack on certain state-level actions — particularly in Uttar Pradesh. Amid these twin provocations, Kishore claimed he acted out of emotional distress and divine compulsion, viewing both statements as cumulative insults to his faith and belief system.

There is a further twist to the tale. During the Dussehra vacation of the Supreme Court Bareilly in Uttar Pradesh (a state that has been one of the prime offenders in aggressive demolitions of minority properties and places of worship) saw a series of demolitions, including the ancestral home of Olympic Gold Medallist and Padma Shri Mohd. Shahid demolished in Varanasi Road widening drive, end September.

Online Hate Build-Up against CJI Gavai

The attack on CJI Gavai and his august office as also his identity did not happen in isolation. Weeks before far right platforms were airing interviews instigating violence against India’s first Buddhist Chief Justice. Right wing “influencer”, Ajeet bharti with Kaushlesh Rai and Editor of Opindia (another instigator rightwing digital platform), Anupam Singh can be heard inciting people to violence against the CJI. During the conversation, Kaushlesh says, “I’m a Gandhian. I don’t support violence. If I did, I would have said, ‘Look, if Gavai ji gets into a fight, he lives in the courthouse, and there are Hindu lawyers there. At least one Hindu lawyer should grab Gavai ji’s head and hit him hard against the wall, so that it breaks into two pieces. But I don’t support violence at all.’ During the conversation, Ajit Bharti had also suggested surrounding Justice Gavai’s car. Kaushlesh Rai goes on to say, “Oct 2nd is coming, what Godse did is beyond your capability, but you can become Gandhi. What is the max punishment for spitting in Gavai’s face under the IPC? Not more than Six months? It’s nothing more than that. Hindus can’t even do this?”

Bar Council of India suspends lawyer

Within hours of the shocking display of hate and contempt, the Bar Council of India (BCI) issued an interim suspension of Kishore’s license to practice. The BCI’s order — under the Advocates Act, 1961 — called his conduct “prima facie inconsistent with the dignity of the Court.”

#BREAKING| BCI suspends practice of Advocate Rakesh Kishore, who attempted to attack CJI BR Gavai today

The Council has also initiated disciplinary proceedings against Kishore #SupremeCourt #cjibrgavai pic.twitter.com/Pv4lvPYTaV

— Live Law (@LiveLawIndia) October 6, 2025

According to order, he has been barred from appearing, pleading, acting or practising in any court or tribunal across India. Courts, tribunals and bar associations were to be informed. A show-cause notice was issued, requiring Kishore to explain in 15 days why the suspension should not continue.

Courts and its pesky choices

To date, the Supreme Court Registrar General opted not to initiate criminal proceedings. The Delhi Police, after questioning Kishore for a few hours, released him, citing lack of a case file from the Court, as per reports

The Court itself stayed silent in public. It neither issued a press release nor filed an FIR. Some legal observers interpreted this as a strategic restraint—refusing to magnify the act by escalating it. Yet many felt a full judicial revulsion or contempt action would have better affirmed the Apex Court’s institutional strength.

Legal fraternity condemnation

Leading bar bodies and senior advocates were quick to speak out. The Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (SCAORA) called the act “unbecoming” of a lawyer and urged suo moto contempt proceedings. They argued the gesture threatened to “scandalise the office of the CJI” and damage public faith in the court.

Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (SCAORA) passes resolution condemning the “unwarranted and intemperate gesture” of an advocate who allegedly disrespected the Chief Justice of India and companion judges, calling it an assault on judicial independence.#SupremeCourt pic.twitter.com/0PWFOq1lCl

— Bar and Bench (@barandbench) October 6, 2025

The Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) condemned the act in strong terms, stressing institutional dignity, decorum and constitutional duty.

It was senior counsel, Kapil Sibal’s tweet on X at around 5 p.m. yesterday, October 6 that pushed the moral bar high, commenting on the absence of any condemnation from either the Prime Minister, Home Minister or Law Minister.

CJI

The uncivilised behaviour of a member of the Supreme Court Bar must be publicly condemned by one and all since it is affront to the majesty of the court

The silence of the PM , the Home Minister and the Law Minister is to say the least surprising

— Kapil Sibal (@KapilSibal) October 6, 2025

Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) has unanimously condemned the “reprehensible act” by an advocate inside the courtroom of CJI Justice B.R. Gavai on Oct 6. Calling the conduct “utterly unbecoming of an officer of the court,” the SCBA said it strikes at the foundation of mutual… pic.twitter.com/VHcF3RNovh

— Bar and Bench (@barandbench) October 6, 2025

Senior advocate Indira Jaising went further, labelling the act “ideological and casteist” and calling upon the Attorney General to initiate contempt of court action. She urged the Supreme Court judges to issue a united statement rejecting ideological attacks on secular courts.

Attorney General should take action for contempt of court for an ideological castest attack on a secular court https://t.co/Fk4XrWTGOX

— Indira Jaising (@IJaising) October 6, 2025

The Solicitor General, Tushar Mehta, offered a more tempered take. He condemned the act as a product of misinformation and social media frenzy, praised the CJI’s composure, and warned that his restraint must not be mistaken for institutional weakness.

Attack on the CJI is an assault on the dignity of our judiciary and the spirit of our Constitution: Rahul Gandhi

Rahul Gandhi, Leader of the Opposition, took to X to lambast the attack, “The attack on the Chief Justice of India is an assault on the dignity of our judiciary and the spirit of our Constitution.”

The attack on the Chief Justice of India is an assault on the dignity of our judiciary and the spirit of our Constitution.

Such hatred has no place in our nation and must be condemned.

— Rahul Gandhi (@RahulGandhi) October 6, 2025

Congress directed criticism at Prime Minister Narendra Modi, noting that for hours the PM’s office remained silent. In a post, Congress taunted the PM: “Your silence is deafening — it screams complicity.”

“India’s Chief Justice B.R. Gavai was brazenly attacked in the Supreme Court today. Yet, not one word of condemnation from the Prime Minister so far. Mr. Modi, your silence is deafening and screams of complicity. You must speak up.”

India’s Chief Justice B.R. Gavai was brazenly attacked in the Supreme Court today.

Yet, not one word of condemnation from the Prime Minister so far.

Mr. Modi, your silence is deafening and screams of complicity.

You must speak up. pic.twitter.com/vodFnPjMye

— Congress (@INCIndia) October 6, 2025

Sonia Gandhi, former party president, expressed “profound distress,” calling the act an “assault not just on the CJI, but on the Constitution.”

“No words are adequate to condemn the attack on the Honourable Chief Justice of India in the Supreme Court itself. It is an assault not just on him, but on our Constitution as well. Chief Justice Gavai has been very gracious but the nation must stand in solidarity with him unitedly with a deep sense of anguish and outrage” she said

Statement of CPP Chairperson Smt. Sonia Gandhi Ji

No words are adequate to condemn the attack on the Honourable Chief Justice of India in the Supreme Court itself. It is an assault not just on him, but on our Constitution as well.

Chief Justice Gavai has been very gracious… pic.twitter.com/3FgEk2q5gV

— Congress (@INCIndia) October 6, 2025

There is no place for such reprehensible acts in our society, utterly condemnable: PM Modi

Pressure mounted. Late evening on October 6, PM Modi posted a condemnation. He wrote, “Spoke to CJI BR Gavai. The act is utterly condemnable. Such reprehensible behaviour has no place in a civilised society.” He hailed the CJI’s composure as a testament to judicial dignity.

Despite this, critics noted that the PM’s response came only after public pressure escalated. The delay was spun as political hesitation.

“I appreciated the calm displayed by Justice Gavai in the face of such a situation. It highlights his commitment to values of justice and strengthening the spirit of our Constitution” PM Modi said

Spoke to Chief Justice of India, Justice BR Gavai Ji. The attack on him earlier today in the Supreme Court premises has angered every Indian. There is no place for such reprehensible acts in our society. It is utterly condemnable.

I appreciated the calm displayed by Justice…

— Narendra Modi (@narendramodi) October 6, 2025

Underlying currents: caste, religion & polarisation

The act was not merely a shocking security breach — it looked like a violent manifestation of ideological, religious and caste bias.

CJI Gavai is a practising Buddhist from the Dalit community, and some spokespeople observed that targeting him via religious slogans—Sanatan Dharma—had distinct caste overtones. The fact that a lawyer in the name of religious pride attempted assault on a Dalit judge stirred discomfort.

In legal circles, there is now renewed urgency around access control as how did a man with a proximity card enter the courtroom and bring an item?

The attacker was in full uniform , wearing a proximity card and was carrying a bag as well along with a rolled up bundle of some papers. He apologized to J. Chandran saying that “it” was only for J. Gavai.

— Anas Tanwir (@Vakeel_Sb) October 6, 2025

The unflinching bench: how the chief justice responded

What has drawn admiration across the board is CJI Gavai’s restraint during the moment. As chaos briefly erupted, he paused, remained still, and directed his courtroom not to be distracted. That calmness — amid a surprise attack — was lauded inside and outside legal circles.

Senior Advocate Sanjay Hegde, commenting on an unusual incident, praised the CJI Gavai for maintaining a calm and composed demeanour throughout. He noted that such odd events are not unprecedented in the Indian judiciary. Recalling a similar episode from the past, he mentioned that CJI Hidayatullah, who was also from Nagpur, once had a shoe thrown at him by a disgruntled litigant.

Displaying remarkable composure and wit, Justice Hidayatullah reportedly said, “The man has lost his case, he should not lose his shoe as well.”

Full marks to the calm and composed demeanour with which the CJI continued the proceedings. Such odd events have happened before as well. CJI Hidayatullah, also from Nagpur had a shoe thrown by a disgruntled litigant. He ordered the shoe to be returned saying, “The man has lost… https://t.co/9XXfBjOwDV

— SANJAY HEGDE (@sanjayuvacha) October 6, 2025

Inside the court, no visible disruption followed the incident. The CJI continued hearing cases scheduled for the day, according to sources. His poise came to symbolise institutional durability in the face of provocation.

What comes next — contempt proceedings? Will the court act?

Legal bodies like SCAORA and senior advocates have urged the Supreme Court to take suo moto contempt notice, emphasising that any attempt to assault or scandalise the highest seat of justice cannot go unchecked.

While the CJI displayed remarkable composure, the judiciary now faces a crucial moment, whether to continue exercising restraint or to respond firmly to uphold its institutional authority.

Beyond contempt proceedings, the Court should consider imposing some penalty, and setting a clear precedent against courtroom misconduct—especially when it’s cloaked in ideological justification. Such steps would necessary for public trust, protect judicial dignity, and send a strong message that the sanctity of the courtroom is inviolable. The need for a unified condemnation of the incident by the whole of the Supreme Court is also the need of the hour.

The nation now watches: will the Supreme Court let the moment pass — or rise to define it?

Related:

“Bulldozer Justice” rebuked: Orissa High Court orders 10 lakh compensation for illegal demolition of community centre

Supreme Court rebukes “Bulldozer Justice,” plans to issue nationwide guidelines to prevent arbitrary demolitions

Supreme Court to hear urgent pleas against state-sanctioned bulldozer demolitions in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan

The post Violence & Sanatan Dharma: Now suspended lawyer defends shoe attack on CJI Gavai, claims it was a protest against ‘bulldozer’ remark” appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Busted! The Delhi High Court strongly questioned the lack of empirical evidence for these claims, pointing out that the government’s decision to bury them inside was a sensitive law-and-order call that could not be challenged over a decade later on mere “personal views.”

Background

On September 24, 2025, the Delhi High Court heard a PIL seeking the removal of the graves of two Kashmiri separatist leaders: Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) founder Mohammad Maqbool Bhatt and Parliament attack convict Mohammad Afzal Guru. Both were sentenced to death and executed in Tihar Jail – Guru in February 2013 and Bhatt in February 1984. They were both buried in the jail premises after performing the last rites according to the Islamic principles, a sensitive decision taken by the government to prevent law-and-order disturbances that may have arisen from public burials.

The petition, filed by Hindu right-wing organisation ‘Vishwa Vedic Sanatan Sangh’ argued that Bhatt and Guru, acting under the influence of “extremist Jihadi ideology,” orchestrated acts of terrorism that gravely threatened India’s sovereignty. The Sangh President, Jitendra Singh Vishen, had previously written to President Droupadi Murmu, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Union Home Minister Amit Shah and Delhi Chief Minister Rekha Gupta, urging them to shift the graves “to the depths of the Atlantic Ocean or to a secret place in the jungles of Amazon” in order to curb “Jihadi mentality” and free the “holy land of India” from the graves, dargahs, and mausoleums of terrorists.

Their plea sought directions to the authorities to remove the graves from Tihar or, as an alternative, to relocate the mortal remains to a secret location to prevent “glorification of terrorism.”

What is the Vishwa Vedic Sanatan Sangh? What purpose does its petition serve? And what larger narrative does it seek to construct? The answers begin to emerge once we look closely at the claims made in their plea.

Claim #1:

The presence of these graves, the petition stated, has turned Tihar jail into a site of “radical pilgrimage” where extremist elements gather to pay homage and venerate convicted terrorists.

Busted – a wild claim without evidence!

In the aforementioned letter, Vishen wrote that the two convicts have become “heroes of the society with a jihadi mindset” and are worshipped as religious leaders by young men who bow before their graves. “People of Jihadi society make fun of the law and order of the country by doing criminal activities day in and day out to offer prayers at the graves of the above two terrorists, and are also popularizing Central Jail Tihar as the graveyard/mausoleum/dargah of the above two terrorists,” the letter claims.

The Delhi High Court pressed the petitioner to produce data showing that people visit the graves to pay homage. Observing that no material had been produced to support the claim aside from stray social media posts, the Court asked, “Where is the empirical data? We cannot act on news clippings.”

Claim #2:

The construction and continued existence of the graves inside a state-controlled prison, counsel for the petitioner argued, was a ‘health hazard’ and a ‘nuisance’ as people are committing crimes to go to the jail and pay homage. 

Busted – legally and factually wanting! 

The Court rejected the argument that there was a ‘nuisance’ within the meaning of Section 398 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (1957). Chief Justice DK Upadhyaya said, “This provision is made for any kind of nuisance to be removed. Not for the removal of a grave if that grave has been put in with the consent of the authority which owns the land. Jail is not a public place. Jail is a place owned by the State established for a specific purpose of incarceration.”

The Court further emphasised that the government’s action to bury the bodies within the prison was based on a sensitive political and law-and-order situation. The Court could not overturn a policy decision made by the State in an area of its specific and sensitive competence, especially not 12 years later and on unsubstantiated grounds.

Claim #3:

 The graves are unlawful and violate Delhi Prisons Rules 2018, which states that the remains of executed prisoners must be disposed of in a manner that prevents glorification and maintains prison discipline, argued the petition.

Busted – no law prohibits cremation or burial inside the jail!

The Bench corrected the misinterpretation of Rules 895 to 897, remarking that, “if a body has to be transported outside the prison, it has to be done with all solemnity. It doesn’t say that each body has to be taken outside prison.”

Claim #4:

The existence of the graves not only “undermines national security and public order,” but also “sanctifies terrorism in direct contravention of the principles of secularism and rule of law under the Constitution of India,” the petition states.

Busted – no constitutional rights or fundamental rights infringed!

The Court dismissed such a broad constitutional claim. “Tell us which law has been infringed and which fundamental rights of yours have been infringed by this. Something you wish cannot become the subject matter of a PIL,” the Court said, underscoring that the judiciary’s role is to address rights and statutes, not to legislate on personal views. “I like this, you like something else. These are not matters to be taken in courts.”

The High Court further maintained that such policy decisions lay with the government, not the judiciary. “Government decided to have the burial in jail keeping these issues in mind. Can we challenge that 12 years later?” the Bench asked.

“Somebody’s last rites are to be respected.”

Pattern of Post-Mortem Erasure

The petition frames its demand for grave removal as a continuation of an “established state practice,” asking the court to treat the graves of Afzal Guru and Maqbool Bhatt the same way as those of Ajmal Kasab and Yakub Memon, “where every precaution was taken to prevent glorification.”

However, these earlier episodes do not add up to a clear, uniform practice, but a patchwork of administrative choices driven less by due process and more by political spectacle. Administrative powers, court orders and enforcement measures are deployed unevenly, creating a de facto policy that singles out sites linked to Muslim history for agitation, removal, demolition or public shaming.

The petition’s insistence the state follows an “established practice” is undercut by its own example. In September 2022, BJP MLA Ram Kadam shared photos showing marble slabs and LED lighting “adorning” the grave of 1993 Mumbai blasts convict Yakub Memon. A political row erupted: the BJP accused the erstwhile Maha Vikas Aghadi coalition and Shiv Sena leadership of having “beautified” the grave and warned it could become a ‘mazar;’ Shiv Sena leaders countered that the cemetery was privately managed and charged the BJP with trying to divert attention and inflame communal tensions ahead of civic polls. The episode illustrates how these disputes are rarely about procedure, law, or even history – rather, they are exercises in narrative-building and political opportunism.

The same year, a few months later, the spotlight shifted from Mumbai to Satara where the administration demolished structures around the 17th-century tomb of Afzal Khan, the Adil Shahi general slain by Chhatrapati Shivaji. Officially, the drive was framed as the removal of “unauthorised constructions,” with Hindu nationalist groups alleging that the Hazarat Mohammad Afzal Khan Memorial Society was expanding the tomb and glorifying an “enemy of Swaraj” in “Shivaji’s own land.” The demolition was carried out on the 363rd anniversary of Khan’s death and was seen as a major “win” for the Hindutva groups. The Supreme Court later sought reports on whether due process had been followed, but by then the demolition was over. Again, we see how the graves, memory, and history of Indian Muslims are but props in electoral theatre.

In March 2025, following the release of Bollywood film Chhava, a far-right campaign demanded the demolition of Mughal emperor Aurangzeb’s tomb in Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar with VHP-Bajrang Dal warning of a “Babri-like” repeat if the tomb was not removed. The agitation set off communal riots in Nagpur, leaving over 30 injured and 40-year-old welder Irfan Ansari dead.

Is it possible to tell history as the story of one side, while erasing the other? What happens when stories are pared down to black and white, heroes and villains, holy and savage, us and them? Do they still hold memory, or do they begin to serve a purpose beyond remembering? When history is stripped of its layers, nuance, and its many voices, when what remains is defaced textbooks and demolished tombs, are we left with memory — or with propaganda?

Conclusion

The Vishwa Vedic Sanatan Sangh has been party to over 170 cases linked to Hindu majoritarian causes across the country, including the Gyanvapi mosque dispute. Its litigation is driven by an ideology of historical revisionism – recasting India’s past as a story of continuous “foreign aggression” by Muslims and Christians, against the “native” Hindus (a claim categorically debunked by the Indo-Aryan Migration Theory). The purpose is to erase every trace of “foreign” (“enemy”) religious groups in order to establish the Hindu Rashtra.

In the end, demands for post-mortem erasure are not grounded in law, empirical evidence, or constitutional principle. They are acts of disinformation and political theatre, designed to delegitimise the cultural and historical existence of India’s largest religious minority. The campaign to target graves of Indian Muslims – rulers or convicts (or, most frequently, of ordinary citizens and local communities) – is a campaign to deny dignity even in death, and to eternally remember the deceased, and by extension their entire community, as the “perpetual other.”

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this Hate Buster has been worked on by Raaz)

Related:

Hate Buster: Muslims and the Myth of Polygamy in India

Hate Buster: Was every Muslim previously a Hindu?

Were all Muslims previously Hindus?

Why is the right-wing so scared of Shirdi Sai Baba?

Muslims and the Myth of Polgyamy

India’s Struggle for Social Harmony: Challenges Amidst Surge in Hate Speech

The post The Politics of Memory: Controversy over graves of Afzal Guru and Maqbool Bhatt appeared first on SabrangIndia.