CJP’s complaint is not an isolated intervention. It situates the latest instances within a longer history of complaints, FIRs, and prior representations against the same individual, including a detailed complaint submitted in August 2024. Despite this record, Kalicharan Maharaj has continued to occupy prominent public platforms—often at religious or media-sponsored events—where his rhetoric has grown increasingly explicit and dangerous, underscoring what CJP describes as a systemic failure of deterrence.

Previous complaints sent may be read here, here and here.

A pattern of escalation

The complaint centres on three specific public events. The most striking took place on January 8, 2025, at the “Rising Madhya Pradesh” event organised by News18 in Bhopal. From a widely publicised stage, Kalicharan Maharaj openly called for the exclusion of Muslim vendors from the Kumbh Mela, promoted fabricated conspiracies such as “spit jihad” and “urine jihad,” claimed that Muslims do not belong in India, and portrayed Muslim population growth as a form of violence against Hindus. He further accused Muslims of plotting to destroy the Ram Mandir and invoked the conspiracy of “Ghazwa-e-Hind,” casting Indian Muslims as internal enemies engaged in civilisational warfare.

CJP emphasises that this was not coded or metaphorical speech. The language was categorical and absolutist, denying Muslims any legitimate claim to equal citizenship and encouraging their removal from shared civic and economic spaces.

Earlier, on December 8, 2024, at a Shri Devi Bhagwat Katha in Nallasopara, Maharashtra, Kalicharan Maharaj advanced a series of demonstrably false claims—asserting, among other things, that 40,000 Hindu women fall victim to “love jihad” every day, that 100,000 temples were destroyed by invaders, and that 100,000 cows are slaughtered daily. According to CJP, these fabricated figures were presented as facts with the clear intent of generating fear, anger, and hostility towards Muslims.

At a Ganesh Janmotsav event in Pune on October 25, 2024, he warned that Muslims intended to turn India into a Sharia nation within 15 years, engaged in demographic alarmism, and explicitly legitimised cow vigilantism—suggesting that extra-legal action by private individuals was justified and even necessary.

Why this is hate speech in law—not opinion

CJP’s complaint draws a clear legal and constitutional distinction between protected speech and punishable hate speech. It argues that the speeches in question attribute collective guilt to an entire religious community, deny Muslims their right to belong to the nation, portray them as conspirators and existential threats, and actively advocate exclusion from public spaces and livelihoods. The repeated endorsement of conspiracies such as love jihad, demographic warfare, and Ghazwa-e-Hind, CJP contends, demonstrates ideological consistency and intent rather than isolated exaggeration or rhetorical excess.

The complaint further stresses that such speech does not need to contain an explicit call to violence to be dangerous. By legitimising vigilantism and repeatedly suggesting that State institutions are inadequate or complicit, the rhetoric creates an enabling environment where discrimination and violence become socially acceptable.

Threats to public order and constitutional fraternity

Beyond individual culpability, CJP situates the issue within a broader constitutional crisis. The complaint warns that sustained hate speech of this nature manufactures social panic, normalises discrimination, and places religious minorities at heightened risk. Calls to exclude Muslims from religious congregations or marketplaces, when made from public stages and circulated widely online, transform prejudice into an actionable social programme.

CJP also highlights the exponential amplification of harm through digital circulation. Videos of the speeches have been widely shared on social media, extending their reach far beyond the physical audience and intensifying fear and vulnerability among minority communities across regions.

Most critically, the organisation argues that such rhetoric strikes at the heart of the constitutional value of fraternity enshrined in the Preamble. By repeatedly asserting that Muslims do not belong in India, the speeches seek to convert citizenship from a constitutional guarantee into a conditional status—contingent on religious conformity.

Legal violations and state accountability

The complaint identifies multiple cognisable offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, including provisions relating to promoting enmity between religious groups, imputations prejudicial to national integration, criminal intimidation, intentional insult, and statements likely to cause public alarm. The repetition of such speeches across time and locations, CJP notes, aggravates criminal liability and establishes a continuing course of conduct.

Invoking binding Supreme Court directions, CJP underscores that police authorities are constitutionally obligated to act suo-motu against hate speech, irrespective of the speaker’s social or political standing. Inaction, the complaint argues, amounts to dereliction of constitutional duty and signals institutional acquiescence.

A call for urgent and visible action

CJP’s intervention is, at its core, a warning against the normalisation of hate speech in public life. Allowing serial hate speakers to repeatedly occupy prominent platforms without consequence, the organisation cautions, lowers the threshold of acceptable discourse and erodes public confidence in the neutrality of State institutions.

Calling for prompt, transparent, and legally grounded action, CJP stresses that this is not merely about one individual, but about safeguarding constitutional secularism, equality before law, and fraternity itself. Failure to act decisively now, it warns, will only deepen impunity and further entrench communal hatred in India’s public sphere.

The complete complaint may be read here.

Related:

NBDSA pulls up Times Now Navbharat for communal, agenda-driven broadcast on ‘Miya Bihu’; orders removal of inflammatory content

CJP files complaint with ECI against Arunachal Minister Ojing Tasing for threatening voters with denial of welfare schemes

CJP moves NCM against surge in Hate Speech at Hindu Sanatan Ekta Padyatra

CJP files complaint over Malabar Hill incident involving Aadhaar checks and targeting of Muslim vendors

The post From Media Stages to Religious Gatherings: CJP moves NCM against Kalicharan Maharaj appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Chronicle of Communal Incidents in the Coastal Districts of Karnataka 2025 exists precisely to resist that silence. Compiled by Suresh Bhat B., member of the Karnataka Communal Harmony Forum and PUCL, Mangaluru, the report is a painstaking, month-by-month documentation of communal incidents across Dakshina Kannada, Udupi, and surrounding coastal districts. Drawing exclusively from local media reports, the chronicle records 142 communal incidents in 2025 alone, while cautioning that this figure reflects only what was reported—not the full extent of what occurred.

The document does not sensationalise. It does something far more radical: it records.

Why this report matters

In a political climate where communal violence is routinely minimised, relativised, or dismissed as “law and order problems”, this chronicle performs an essential democratic function. It converts what is often portrayed as sporadic unrest into data, patterns, and continuity.

Each entry—date, location, allegation, police response—adds to a larger picture: communal polarisation in coastal Karnataka is neither accidental nor episodic. It is sustained, structured, and repeatedly enabled.

The report also makes its limits clear. It relies on publicly available media coverage. It acknowledges underreporting. It excludes highlighted or repeated articles to avoid duplication. In doing so, it asserts credibility rather than exaggeration.

142 incidents, one region, one year

The numerical breakdown alone is sobering:

• 142 total communal incidents
• 74 incidents related to social media hate and misinformation
• 36 incidents of hate speech or hate crime
• 10 incidents of cattle vigilantism
• 8 incidents of moral policing
• Multiple cases involving desecration, vandalism, intimidation, and provocation

This is not a random distribution. The largest category—social media hate—reveals how communalism in 2025 is no longer confined to physical spaces. Phones, platforms, and forwards now function as the first site of violence.

Equally telling is the report’s careful attribution. A significant majority of incidents are allegedly linked to Hindu fundamentalist or vigilante actors, while Muslim individuals and institutions appear more frequently as targets of violence, harassment, or provocation—a reality often obscured by “both sides” narratives.

Moral Policing: Discipline as communal control

One of the most chilling sections of the report documents moral policing—the public regulation of bodies, relationships, and mobility, particularly of women.

Across Mangaluru, Udupi, Uppinangady, and Puttur, young women were stopped, questioned, abused, filmed, and threatened for speaking to men of another faith. In some cases, interfaith identity was merely assumed. In others, it was used explicitly as justification for violence.

On January 23, 2025, in Mangaluru, activists of the right-wing group Sri Rama Sene vandalised a unisex salon near Bejai, alleging “immoral activities”. The attack caused extensive damage to the establishment, with glass panes shattered and furniture destroyed. The group further demanded the closure of all massage centres in the city. Following public outcry, the City Crime Branch arrested Prasad Attavar, the leader of Sri Rama Sene, underscoring how vigilante moral regulation continues to operate openly before law enforcement intervenes

Later in the year, on August 11, 2025, police arrested six men in Mangaluru for stopping and threatening a PU student for walking with a man from another faith near a bus stand. The girl reported being abused and intimidated, forcing her companion to flee the spot. A case was registered only after a formal complaint by the student

The report also records moral policing by Muslim vigilantes, including a November 6, 2025 incident in Uppinangady, where two men abused a mixed-religion group of college students and assaulted one of the boys. Police registered cases under multiple sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, demonstrating that vigilantism cuts across communities—but does not occur symmetrically in scale or frequency

The report quietly exposes a critical truth: moral policing is not about morality. It is about enforcing communal boundaries, asserting ownership over women’s bodies, and producing fear as a social discipline.

While police action followed some incidents, the chronicle notes repeat offenders, familiar group names, and recurring patterns—suggesting that deterrence remains weak.

Cattle vigilantism and the politics of suspicion

The documentation of cattle-related incidents reflects another long-running fault line in coastal Karnataka. Allegations of cattle transport or slaughter—often unverified—continue to function as instant triggers for mob violence.

What the report shows is not merely violence, but the presumption of guilt. Muslim men are intercepted, assaulted, and handed over to police by vigilante groups, reversing the logic of law enforcement. In several cases, investigations later revealed exaggeration or falsehood—yet the violence had already occurred.

The chronicle does not editorialise. But its accumulation of cases makes one conclusion unavoidable: vigilantism has become normalised, operating alongside formal policing rather than being dismantled by it.

Hate Speech: From margins to mainstream

Perhaps the most politically explosive aspect of the report is its documentation of hate speech. The chronicle documents 36 incidents of hate speech and hate crimes, with a striking number attributed to Hindu fundamentalist actors.

On June 4, 2025, in Kadaba, police registered a case against Naveen Neriya for delivering a provocative speech near a police station, allegedly inciting the public and targeting the police itself. The report notes that such speeches often occur in moments of heightened tension, acting as catalysts for escalation rather than isolated acts

In Belthangady, on April 14, 2025, a programme known as Purusha Kattuna allegedly included content insulting Islam, Prophet Mohammed, and the azaan. A video of the event circulated widely on social media, leading to the registration of a case against 20–30 persons for promoting enmity between communities

The report also records hate speech cases against Muslim individuals, including the July 2025 arrest of a student in Udupi for allegedly writing provocative communal content on a hostel washroom wall. The matter was serious enough to warrant forensic examination of handwriting samples, highlighting the criminalisation of symbolic acts when framed communally

From religious gatherings to political protests, from YouTube channels to Facebook pages, hate speech targeting Muslims, Christians, and other minorities appears repeatedly. Religious symbols are mocked. Demographic fears are stoked. Violence is justified implicitly, sometimes explicitly.

The report records arrests and cases under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita—but also notes how many accused individuals are repeat offenders, some with long criminal histories who continue to enjoy public platforms.

This repetition tells its own story: hate speech is not an aberration; it is a tolerated political instrument.

Social media: The infrastructure of communalism

If there is one through-line across the 142 incidents, it is the role of digital platforms.

False claims of attacks. Doctored images. Inflammatory captions. Videos stripped of context. The report shows how misinformation spreads faster than verification, creating panic, mobilisation, and retaliation. With 74 documented incidents, social media emerges as the largest category of communal incidents in 2025.

On June 7, 2025, a photograph falsely portraying two Muslim youths as “bikers carrying swords” circulated widely on Instagram and WhatsApp. Police later clarified that the object in question was an aquarium stone and an e-cigarette. By the time the clarification was issued, fear had already spread across Dakshina Kannada

Similarly, on August 20, 2025, false claims circulated online alleging that a Muslim man had inappropriately touched a woman from another religion in Panemangaluru. Police investigation revealed that the accused was a minor boy from the same religion as the woman. The report highlights how such misinformation routinely targets Muslim men, constructing them as default suspects.

The chronicle records repeated police action against Facebook pages, X accounts, YouTube channels, and Instagram handles—yet the recurrence of such cases suggests enforcement remains reactive rather than preventive. In several cases, police later clarified that viral claims were false. But by then, fear had travelled further than truth ever could. The chronicle captures a critical shift: communal violence no longer requires physical proximity. It can be triggered remotely, anonymously, and at scale.

Desecration and symbolic violence

The report documents incidents aimed not at individuals alone, but at religious spaces and symbols. On May 6, 2025, miscreants vandalised eight granite tombstones in a Muslim graveyard belonging to the Juma Masjid in Gangolli. The damage was discovered days later, underscoring how such acts often escape immediate detection and accountability. In another incident, a cross was found destroyed near Shirva in Udupi, where local residents alleged an attempt to vitiate communal harmony. A formal complaint was lodged, but the report does not record any arrest, reflecting a familiar pattern of unresolved symbolic violence.

State Response: Fire-fighting, not prevention

The report documents significant state action—externments, Goonda Act proceedings, arrests, and eventually the creation of a Special Action Force (SAF) for the region. Yet the very existence of the SAF is an admission of failure. As the Home Minister himself acknowledged, years of “mild” responses allowed violence to escalate to a point where extraordinary measures became necessary.

Even so, the chronicle suggests that enforcement remains incident-driven, not structural. Known troublemakers resurface. Networks remain intact. Political patronage is rarely interrogated. What is missing, the report implies through its silences, is accountability at the top.

The chronicle also captures moments when communal mobilisation openly defied state authority. Following the murder of Suhas Shetty, the VHP called for a bandh in Dakshina Kannada on May 2, 2025. Despite the imposition of Section 144, a procession carrying the body was taken out in Mangaluru, openly violating prohibitory orders. The report notes this as a critical example of how communal mobilisation often overrides legal restraint

What the report ultimately documents

By grounding itself entirely in reported incidents, the present report refuses exaggeration—and yet arrives at a devastating conclusion.

Communal violence in coastal Karnataka is:

• Frequent
• Predictable
• Digitally amplified
• Often normalised
• Rarely dismantled at its source

This report it stands as a record against forgetting—one that documents not just violence, but the slow erosion of trust, safety, and equal citizenship in the coastal belt. Until prevention replaces documentation, this chronicle will remain both necessary and unfinished. If 142 reported incidents can occur in one year—with many more unreported—then the question is no longer whether coastal Karnataka is polarised. It is how much further polarisation will be allowed to go.

The complete report may be read here.

Previous reports may be read here, here and here.

Related:

Systemic flaws or deliberate sabotage? A probe into mass voter roll manipulation stall across Maharashtra & Karnataka

Karnataka Police’s massive crackdown on habitual hate offenders in Dakshina Kannada region

Karnataka: Hindutva groups call for economic boycott of Muslim vendors at Siddheshwar Temple

2023 Karnataka assembly elections: what has BJP lost and what has it gained?

BJP govt in Karnataka drops 182 cases of hate crimes in 4 years: Report

The post Cataloguing Communalism: What does the year-long record of hate, violence, and state failure in coastal Karnataka depict appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Meanwhile, two Kashmiri vendors were allegedly harassed and threatened with dire consequences in separate incidents in Haryana over the past two days. A First Information Report (FIR) has been registered in one of the incidents. The incident of two Kashmiri vendors who faced harassment in Haryana emerged through a video depicting the same from Kaithal’s Kalayat, a local man speaking in Haryanvi dialect is heard confronting the vendor sitting on a concrete bench asking him to chant “Vande Matram”. Superintendent of Police, Kaithal, Upasana told The Hindu over phone that the police took suo motu cognisance of the matter to register a case two days ago and efforts were on to identify the accused, who was not seen in the video. In another incident, a man, in another video, is seen holding a Kashmiri vendor by his collar in Haryana’s Fatehabad asking him to chant “Bharat Mata Ki Jai”. A woman is also seen in the video trying to intervene and reason with the man to let off the vendor. Fatehabad SP, Siddhant Jain said both, the vendor and the man, were brought to the police station and the man was “counselled”. “We have asked the vendor to file a formal complaint to initiate legal action,” said Mr. Jain. He said the incident took place on December 28.

The quaint phenomenon of Kashmiri shawl sellers moving all over India with their goods is decades old in several parts of urban India. The phenomenon of their being under attack is however recent given the climate of hate incidents in the country.

The JKSA has urged that the Leader of the Opposition Rahul Gandhi, and Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh, Sukhvinder Singh Sukhu intervene immediately.  “Dozens of Kashmiri shawl sellers, who have been working in Himachal Pradesh for over 25-30 years, are now being harassed, assaulted, and threatened to leave the State in the Ghumarwin area of Bilaspur district by right-wing groups. This is the 17th such incident that occurred in Himachal Pradesh this year,” JKSA head Nasir Khuehami said. “This atmosphere of hatred and threats has the potential to destroy livelihoods built over generations,” Mr. Khuehami said.

The JKSA, which has been documenting the cases of harassment against Kashmiris, said shawl sellers were being asked to leave Himachal Pradesh. “They are not allowed to sell their shawls, their belongings have been vandalised, and even their mobile phones were smashed when they tried to record these incidents,” Mr. Khuehami said.

He said the incidents were taking place “despite having proper verification and valid documents”. “We further urge the Union Home minister to take immediate and decisive action by directing the authorities to register cases against the fringe and right-wing elements involved under the relevant provisions of law. Strict action will send a strong message that communal bigotry has no place in a progressive and inclusive society,” the JKSA said.

Jammu and Kashmir Pradesh Congress Committee (JKPCC) president Tariq Hamid Karra said he spoke to the Himachal Chief Minister and raised the issue of the harassment of Kashmiri shawl sellers. “He [the Chief Minister] assured of strict action,” Mr. Karra said.

Meanwhile, the All India Professionals’ Congress (AIPC), Jammu and Kashmir Chapter, condemned these incidents. “Targeting people because of their Kashmiri identity goes against the idea of India. Students, professionals, traders, and workers from Jammu and Kashmir have been living and working across the country for decades and have contributed to local economies and institutions,” said Sanjay Sapru, head of AIPC Jammu and Kashmir.

The AIPC chapter urged the State governments and the Union government “to take clear and strong steps to ensure the safety of Kashmiris living outside the union territory”.

Related:

Amid over 17 attacks, Kashmiri Students Abandon Studies or Live in Fear

Pahalgam attack sparks nationwide turmoil, Kashmiri students face a chilling wave of hate across India

Kashmiri students allege attacks in AMU, write to Shah for probe

The post Himachal Haryana, racial harassment and attacks on Kashmiri shawl sellers rage on appeared first on SabrangIndia.

There has been outrage at official complicity and silence, that no FIR was filed for days after the attack. Social media Zindabad. CM Pushkar Dhani (BJP) called Anjel Chakma’s father and publicised the conversation on X. There has been outrage at the prevalent concealment of the crime itself till it resulted in death. Yet, Dehradun’s Senior Superintendent of Police, Ajai Singh has been quick to state on Monday, December 22 that “there is no evidence, prima facie, of racial attack.” The clear lapses and subsequent outrage include a three-day delay in registering the First Information Report (FIR), the refusal by the Selakui police station personnel to register the complaint on multiple occasions, the failure of the police to invoke appropriate sections of the law at the initial stage, and attempts by senior police officials to dilute the crime by portraying it as a fight while ignoring elements of racial abuse.

But should not we, as Indians, ask ourselves, if we are not inherently racist, casteist and communal? Students or professionals, Delhi, Kolkatta, Degradun, Bengaluru, Chennai or Mumbai, who hail from any of the seven states in the north-east face, have faced and have always faced attacks, ostracisation and slurs. I can give examples from the 1980s from the university of Mumbai, 32 years later from 2012, when 3,000 migrant and gig workers tried to flee Chennai, Benagluru and Pune over threats and attacks. Or in between before and after. When this inherent othering was seen in brute communal attacks, first against groups, then against individuals. Muslims, Sikhs, Christians. The civilizationally sanctioned othering of our Dalits, the everyday rape and killings of Dalit women is a reality that crept on to news pages only after the 1990s somehow. Though it has existed forever. Angel Chakma’s brute killing is no worse than Mohammad Aklaq’s (Dadri, 2015) or Surekha and Priyanka Bhotmage (Khairlanji, 2006). Listing or mapping these could run like a gruesome litany, Indian calendar of hate.

Such manifest attacks after humiliation, (1980s, 2006, 2012) however elicited a seminally different response from officialdom. Or mostly. Things were attempted to be brought back on track by an overall adherence to the “rule of law” and “principles of equality and non-discrimination underlined in the Indian Constitution.” Despite gross lapses (Nellie 1983, Delhi, Kanpur 1984, Bombay 1992-1993, Gujarat 2002) in official response the veneer that society accepted or adopted was one worn by the state. A clear and conscience driven adherence to the Indian Constitution. Even if substantive justice or reparation was never quite done. We were, until 2014, a constitutional republic in the shaping and making.

Something sharply changed then, however.

No regime or administration –until 2014 –was headed by outliers who brazenly signalled to cops and officials that “those who are violent” can be identified by “their clothes” or attire. Those holding constitutional posts did not legitimise terms that slur or stigmatise particular groups or communities. Today this is par for the course. We did not have heads of state(s) that proudly espoused sectarian divide and privilege. It is this, the prevalent and dominant a politics ideologically powered on stratification and othering that has brought out the worst in us.

There are enough of us Indians who are civilizationally brutalized into othering that welcome the prevailing, politically endorsed politics of hate and violence that results in Anjel’s tragic demise. Enough in the populace to cheer the hate-leaders on. Even as those very institutions of constitutional governance, naively constructed to act as check on the executive running awry, fail us, fail India seminally.

As 2026 beckons, the rest of us Indians face a stark challenge. To meet this mob cheering hate cheerleaders, head on. To demonstrate, creatively with numbers that there are enough –and more– on our side too. Scared, scattered, maybe. Those that have forever battled stratification and divide from centuries back. Reclaim our homes, streets, schools, neighbourhoods. Do this with stories, songs, protests, meetings, marches. On beaches, parks and highways. Never mind if the panchayats, assemblies, parliament take a while. To ensure not just that we have no Anjels, no  Priyanka, no Junaids whose lives are taken before they have begun to really live. And to most of all break the shackles of all imprisonments free.

Related:

Peaceful street protest in Mumbai condemns Christmas-time attacks on Christians across India

Not Merry, Not Free: What the attacks on Christmas say about India’s shrinking pluralism

Jharkhand: Another case of mob lynching of Muslim man

Rising Menace: Mob lynchings escalate as vulnerable Muslims and minors face grave danger

The post Racist, casteist and communal, when will we as Indians reclaim that lost charade of constitutional decency? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The complaint brings together incidents from diverse regions to highlight a recurring pattern rather than isolated excesses. CJP has emphasised that these acts, frequently recorded and circulated on social media, operate as public demonstrations of intimidation that erode constitutional guarantees of equality, dignity, and religious freedom.

Vigilantism and physical violence

One major cluster of incidents documented in the complaint concerns vigilante violence carried out in the name of cow protection, moral policing, or religious assertion. These include assaults on cattle transporters, attacks on vendors selling non-vegetarian food, and instances where individuals were beaten or publicly humiliated while being forced to chant religious slogans. In several cases, the violence was carried out in public spaces and filmed by the perpetrators themselves. Despite the visibility of these acts, information regarding prompt police action against those responsible was often unavailable or unclear at the time of reporting.

Economic intimidation and livelihood disruption

The complaint also highlights repeated instances of economic harassment targeting minority livelihoods. Muslim shopkeepers, street vendors, and contractors were confronted at their places of work, accused of religious or ideological wrongdoing, and pressured to shut down businesses or comply with identity-based demands. Such actions, undertaken without any lawful authority, effectively imposed informal economic boycotts and restrictions on the right to carry on trade, raising concerns about the unequal access to public spaces and livelihoods.

Raids on prayer meetings and religious disruption

Another set of incidents detailed in the complaint involves the disruption of Christian prayer meetings held in private homes and community spaces. Organised groups entered prayer gatherings alleging unlawful religious conversions, leading to intimidation, physical violence, and the destruction of religious texts. In some cases, police action followed complaints made by these groups, resulting in questioning or detention of worshippers rather than action against those who initiated the disruption. CJP has pointed out that such incidents reflect a pattern of interference with the peaceful practice of religion, accompanied by selective enforcement of law.

Identity policing and forced compliance

The complaint further records incidents of coercive identity policing, including demands for documentation, accusations of being “illegal” or “foreign,” and the forced chanting of religious slogans. Elderly individuals, clerics, migrant workers, and vendors were stopped in public spaces and subjected to threats or humiliation when they refused to comply. CJP has noted that these acts function as mechanisms of public intimidation, reinforcing exclusion and fear among targeted communities.

Evictions, demolitions, and state-led actions

In addition to vigilante actions by private actors, the complaint draws attention to large-scale eviction and demolition drives carried out by state authorities that disproportionately affected Muslim communities. While these actions were officially justified on grounds such as encroachment or administrative necessity, the scale of displacement, the manner of execution, and the absence of adequate rehabilitation measures raise serious concerns regarding due process, proportionality, and the protection of vulnerable populations.

What the complaint underscores

In the complaint submitted to the NCM, CJP has underscored that the situation reflected in these incidents is neither episodic nor accidental. As the complaint states:

“The incidents documented herein, when viewed cumulatively, disclose a disturbing and recurring pattern in which private individuals and organised groups assume the role of self-appointed enforcers of law, identity, and morality. These actions, ranging from physical violence and public humiliation to economic coercion, religious disruption, and large-scale displacement, have frequently unfolded in the absence of timely or impartial state intervention. Such patterns risk normalising vigilantism, eroding constitutional guarantees, and fostering an environment of fear and exclusion for minority communities.”

CJP has further pointed out that in several instances, police action appeared to follow pressure or complaints from vigilante groups, while unlawful acts by private actors went unaddressed. This, the complaint argues, not only emboldens vigilante behaviour but also undermines public confidence in the impartial application of law.

What CJP has urged the NCM to do

Through its complaint, CJP has urged the National Commission for Minorities to take cognisance of the pattern emerging from these incidents and to exercise its statutory mandate to seek accountability from state authorities. The complaint calls for the Commission to seek detailed action-taken reports from concerned state governments and district administrations, particularly with regard to the registration of FIRs, investigations conducted, and steps taken to prevent further incidents.

CJP has also urged the Commission to emphasise the obligation of states to ensure impartial enforcement of criminal law, so that victims are not criminalised following vigilante complaints while perpetrators evade accountability. The complaint seeks directions to prevent economic intimidation, protect the right to peaceful religious practice, and ensure that eviction and demolition drives comply with due process and provide adequate rehabilitation.

Reiterating that the complaint is not directed against any religion or community, CJP has stated that its concern lies with the misuse of public platforms, private coercion, and state inaction that threaten constitutional values, communal harmony, and the rule of law. The organisation has urged the NCM to intervene to prevent further normalisation of such conduct and to safeguard the rights of minority communities across the country.

The complaint may be read here:

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Risha Fathima)

Related:

CJP complaints to NCM over alarming surge in hate speech against Bengali-origin Muslims

CJP calls for action by NCM against hate speeches at Dharam Sansad and Trishul Deekha events, files 2 complaints

CJP moves NCM against arms training camps, weapon distribution events in Assam and Rajasthan

CJP complains to NCM over Uttarakhand Muslim exodus; seeks urgent action

CJP moves NCM against Shiladitya Dev for targeting the ‘Miya Muslim’ community of Assam

The post CJP moves National Commission for Minorities over vigilante violence, identity policing, and targeted evictions across states appeared first on SabrangIndia.

On October 28, the Modi-led BJP government attempted, much like Lord Curzon during colonial rule, to muzzle the democratic and federal character of Panjab University by dissolving its Senate. Under the Panjab University Act of 1947, the Senate is the highest democratic body of the university, responsible for its management, property, and governance. It consists of 91 members—47 elected, 36 nominated by the Chancellor, 2 from the Punjab Vidhan Sabha, and 6 ex-officio members. Punjab has direct representation through 15 graduate seats, with graduates eligible both to vote and contest elections. The Senate functions as the “parliament” of the university, while the Syndicate, its executive body, is elected from among Senate members.

Ironically, in 1904, Lord Curzon had introduced amendments to the Punjab University Act precisely to curb anti-colonial sentiment by weakening the Senate and increasing imperial control. Today, the Modi government appears to be following a similar path—seeking to abolish the Senate to undermine Punjab’s historical claim over Panjab University, erode its autonomy, centralise control, and pave the way for privatisation. However, the historic and organic movement led by students and supported by broader democratic forces shattered the BJP–RSS dream of turning Chandigarh into a “small Nagpur”.

The dissolution of the Senate sent a clear message: Panjab University was being taken away from Punjab, its democracy murdered, and its autonomy destroyed. This sparked widespread outrage across Punjab. Even opportunist electoral parties—many of which had previously betrayed people’s struggles—were compelled to join the protest. Conscious sections of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, and other regions also recognised this as an attack on autonomy and democratic institutions and extended their support.

The Panjab University struggle has once again highlighted the urgency of addressing unresolved questions of federalism—particularly Punjab’s claim over Panjab University and Chandigarh, issues of river water sharing, other federal rights, and the systematic daylight assassination of democracy.

At its core, neoliberal policy directly undermines federalism by centralising power to facilitate large-scale privatisation. International institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and WTO actively promote this centralisation to enable the exploitation of resources and labour. Thus, the erosion of federalism and democracy is not accidental but structural to the neoliberal project.

Indian rulers have historically preferred a highly centralised state rather than a genuinely federal one. During the anti-colonial struggle, the Indian National Congress promised linguistic federalism. However, after Independence, the Nehru–Patel–Sitaramayya (JVP) Committee rejected the Dhar Commission’s recommendations, arguing that state formation on linguistic lines would threaten “national unity”. In reality, greater state autonomy was seen as an obstacle to imperialist exploitation. Hence, a “strong Centre” was prioritised over true federalism.

Although popular struggles eventually forced the government to create linguistic states, this process lacked a sincere federal spirit. Punjab faced particularly harsh discrimination. After a prolonged struggle, the Punjab Reorganisation Act of 1966 created a truncated Punjab, carving away Punjabi-speaking areas, undermining Punjab’s river-water rights, and snatching Chandigarh—constructed by demolishing more than 28 Punjabi Puadhi villages. The three-language formula was imposed, and the religious and cultural demands of Sikh minorities were ignored.

Sections 72, 78, 79, 81, 84, and 87 of the same Act placed Panjab University, Punjab Agricultural University, the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, the Bhakra Beas Management Board, and Chandigarh under central control. Despite widespread protests, betrayal continued. Although the Rajiv–Longowal Accord promised Chandigarh to Punjab in 1986, the Centre reneged. Central control over the BBMB, the increased presence of the BSF, and the appointment of a centrally controlled administrator in Chandigarh continue to erode Punjab’s federal rights.

The assault on federalism intensified with the 42nd Constitutional Amendment in 1976, which transferred key subjects like education, forests, and minerals from the State List to the Concurrent List. The neoliberal reforms of the 1990s further weakened states’ political and financial autonomy. With GST, states have been reduced to little more than municipalities, facing centralised revenue collection, decentralised expenditure responsibilities, and constant administrative interference.

Under the BJP–Sangh’s Hindi–Hindu–Hindutva project—embodied in slogans like “one nation, one language,” “one nation, one tax,” “one nation, one election,” and “one nation, one education policy”—the fascist bulldozer has moved from vote theft to Senate theft. When the Centre attempted to snatch Panjab University, the people rose up and forced Modi to retreat once again.

The struggle also firmly rejected attempts to pit Punjab against Haryana. Protesters consistently emphasised that the Centre deliberately foments inter-state conflicts to push privatisation and allow corporate plunder of natural resources across Ladakh, Himachal, Kashmir, Manipur, and central India. This is not the time for people to fight among themselves; the real struggle is against a centralised state serving imperialist interests.

The dissolution of the Senate was carried out under the NEP 2020, which explicitly eliminates elected Senates, student unions, and teacher unions, replacing them with nominated bodies. Universities are being forced to raise fees, rely on loans instead of grants, generate profits, and submit to centrally imposed curricula and regulations. This is the BJP’s idea of “federalism”.

While the Centre strangles federalism, state governments and political parties have largely failed to resist. The Bhagwant Mann-led Punjab government neither provides adequate funding to Panjab University nor actively participates in Senate meetings. Universities across Punjab face acute financial crises, student and Senate elections are avoided, and the NEP 2020 is implemented without resistance.

Ultimately, no mainstream political party appears genuinely committed to federalism. History shows that the struggle for true federalism cannot be led to its logical conclusion by opportunist electoral forces. It must be led by the people themselves—by workers and peasants—through the uprooting of parasitic neoliberal imperialist policies.

Today, as centralisation and privatisation obstruct the development of emerging nationalities from Kashmir to the North-East and push Centre–State relations to a dead end, there is an urgent need for a united national struggle of working people for true federalism. Such federalism is impossible without complete democratisation of society, including the uprooting of feudalism and imperialism. The historic struggle at Panjab University can become a powerful starting point.

Sandeep Kumar PhD, Panjab University, Chandigarh, Member, Panjab University Bachao Morcha

Courtesy: Counter Currents

The post Historic Victory at Panjab University, but Federalism Remains at Stake appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The statement says that “there are videos galore of such tactics by right wing actors and actresses and some belonging to the ruling party.” One such video is attached (in the BCS’ spokesperson Dolphy D’souza’s social media post) showcasing such shameful tactics. The organization has already brought this to the attention of Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi, “seeking his intervention to stop this madness.”

Besides, the organization that represents close to 70,000 Catholics in the Mumbai region has also, through the social media, drawn attention to the serious matter of spiralling attacks against Christians, of Rahul Gandhi, Leader of Opposition, Ms Mamta Banerjee,TMC , Akhilesh Yadav, Samajwadi Party, Sharad Pawar , NCP (Sharad Pawar), Uddhav Thackeray, Shiv Sena (UBT), M. K. Stalin, DMK and. Pinarayi Vijayan of the CPI (M) for their immediate attention and intervention. The BCS has also tagged Chief Minister (CM), Maharashtra, Devendra Fadnavis pointing out that there were incidents of attacks of Christians in Maharashtra too during 2025.

To Fadavis, BCS has urged that he ensures that Christians in Mumbai, Maharashtra have a peaceful Christmas season. Police need to be instructed to strictly ensure enforcement of rule of law equally for all. We demand that such goonda elements responsible for such tactics must be arrested and prosecuted.

Dear Hon’ble Prime Minister,
Merry Christmas
This video of attacks on Christians during the Christmas season anguishes & pains all citizens.
We seek yr immediate intervention to prevent such atrocities. https://t.co/WnEseiAQMG @narendramodi @PMOIndia @AmitShah @Dev_Fadnavis

— Dolphy Dsouza (@dolphydsouza) December 23, 2025

Dear Hon’ble Rahul Gandhi, LoP,
Merry Christmas.
Need your intervention to stop this brutal and intimidating madness! @RahulGandhi @kharge @SoniaGandhiiINC @priyankagandhi @chennithala @kcvenugopalmp @DrAMSinghvi @Jairam_Ramesh @thecaravanindia @thewire_in @scroll_in https://t.co/aee04DyO36

— Dolphy Dsouza (@dolphydsouza) December 23, 2025

Dear Hon’ble C.M. Mr. Devendra Fadnavis
Merry Christmas
There hv been incidents of Anti- Christian violence in Maharashtra during this year. We urge you this Christmas season, the police are instructed to ensure that Christians are able to celebrate peacefully. @Dev_Fadnavis https://t.co/aee04DyO36

— Dolphy Dsouza (@dolphydsouza) December 23, 2025

Citizens for Justice and Peace (cjp.org.in) has, over the past few days been highlighting these systemic attacks against Christians especially in Delhi, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. These can be read here.

Related:

MP, Odisha, Delhi, Rajasthan: Right-wing outfits barge into 2 churches ahead of Christmas, attack vendors selling X’mas goodies, tensions run high

No right to live, or die: Christians in Chhattisgarh, and India under attack

Documenting a national pattern of vigilantism & targeted action against minorities

The post ‘Brutal intimidation of Christians’ all India condemned: Bombay Catholic Sabha appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The scattered incidents observed around Dussehra are not, as they might first appear, spontaneous expressions of religious fervour. They are the visible markers of a deeply entrenched, highly coordinated “hate agenda.” This agenda involves a network of right-wing organisations, explicit political patronage, and the strategic co-option of state and secular institutions.

This investigation, based on an analysis of dozens of events across India in 2025, will argue that the modern Shastra Poojan campaign is a multi-pronged political project. It is designed to (1) subvert secular public spaces, including universities and police stations, (2) normalise the public display of weapons as a symbol of religious-political power, (3) provide a sanctioned platform for anti-Muslim hate speech and communal incitement, and (4) indoctrinate a new generation—targeting young girls and children—by framing violence and weapon-bearing as a religious and civic duty. This is not about faith; it is about fomenting fear, asserting dominance, and preparing the ground for future conflict.

The breach of the secular citadel: co-opting universities and state machinery

The most concerning aspect of this pattern is its audacious encroachment into spaces that are, by design, secular and non-partisan: government institutions and universities. This tactic serves a dual purpose as it legitimises the weapon-centric ritual by stamping it with the state’s seal of approval, and it simultaneously attacks the very foundations of secularism in public life.

The Rajasthan University RSS event: a microcosm of conflict

The incident at Rajasthan University (RU) on September 30, 2025, stands as a revealing example of how the ritual is being politically instrumentalised. The university administration, with the Vice-Chancellor’s approval, granted permission to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) to hold a Shastra Poojan ceremony within the campus premises—effectively allowing a partisan socio-political organisation to occupy an academic space. This decision marked a serious institutional lapse, blurring the line between education and ideology. Reported Times of India.

The sequence that followed was both avoidable and foreseeable. Student leaders from the NSUI staged a protest against what they viewed as the communalisation of their university. The situation spiralled when a section of NSUI members reportedly vandalised the event stage set up by the RSS, triggering clashes between the two groups. 

राजस्थान यूनिवर्सिटी में RSS के कार्यक्रम के शुरू होने से पहले NSUI कार्यकर्ताओं ने मंच पर चढ़कर पोस्टर फाड़े और पोडियम गिराया

यह ताकत है कांग्रेस की संघियों देख लिया

pic.twitter.com/u4xLPyA4Xw

— Sandeep Singh (@ActivistSandeep) September 30, 2025

The police, instead of intervening impartially, allegedly stood by during the confrontation and later detained several NSUI members, including State President Vinod Jakhar. They were held for nearly 48 hours and booked under serious, unrelated charges.

Former Chief Minister Ashok Gehlot later remarked that “no action” was taken against RSS members accused of initiating the violence. 

राजस्थान विश्वविद्यालय में RSS द्वारा शस्त्र पूजा का कार्यक्रम रखना ही आपत्तिजनक है। शिक्षा के स्थान को इस तरह की राजनीतिक गतिविधियों के लिए इस्तेमाल करना कैसे उचित माना जा सकता है? जब NSUI के कार्यकताओं ने इसका विरोध किया तो पुलिस ने बल प्रयोग किया। इसके साथ ही, RSS के… pic.twitter.com/Ew6d2doKen

— Ashok Gehlot (@ashokgehlot51) September 30, 2025

The episode, in essence, reflects a chain of administrative misjudgements—had permission for such an event not been granted in the first place, the confrontation and its aftermath might never have escalated into a larger controversy. The Rajasthan University incident thus encapsulates a troubling pattern that secular institutions are being repurposed as ideological venues, dissent is criminalised, and impunity becomes institutionalised.

State sanction from law enforcement: the Gwalior police incident

If the RU incident demonstrates the subversion of education, the events in Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh, demonstrate the co-option of law enforcement itself. On October 2, 2025, At the DRP line, a Shastra Poojan event was not just permitted; it was actively participated in by the highest-ranking police officials. The Inspector General (IG), Deputy Inspector General (DIG), and Superintendent of Police (SP) were all present, firing celebratory shots from service weapons. The event was further legitimised by the presence of top political figures, including Assembly Speaker Narendra Singh Tomar, as Dainik Bhaskar reported.

This event shatters the illusion of a neutral police force. When the state’s guardians of law—those entrusted with a monopoly on legitimate violence—publicly and ritualistically worship weapons alongside partisan politicians, the line between law enforcement and ideological militia evaporates. It sends an unambiguous message to the public and to the officers themselves: the state’s power and the party’s ideology are one and the same. On many occasions, police permissions are granted because, in many cases, the police themselves are participants.

The organisational machinery:  coordinated national campaign

The incidents might appear as “scattered incidents” actually belies the reality of a highly coordinated, nationwide campaign. The list of events from September and October 2025 reveals a clear organisational footprint, dominated by a familiar network of Hindutva groups. This is not a grassroots phenomenon but a top-down strategy.

The key players: VHP, Bajrang Dal, AHP, and Durga Vahini

The key organising force behind this nationwide campaign appears to be the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) and its youth wing, the Bajrang Dal. Their operational footprint is vast, creating a dense cluster of events across Madhya Pradesh. 

On October 2, in Indore, they conducted a Shastra Pujan displaying and worshipping swords and guns. 

This was mirrored in multiple Bhopal events on October 2, including one on Vijay Dashami where dozens of guns and swords were displayed and a speaker called weapons “essential for the protection of dharma” while peddling “love jihad” conspiracies.

On October 2, at another Bhopal event participants brandished guns and swords, chanting, “Who will protect the country, women, and cows? We will.” 

The pattern continued in Sihora, Jabalpur on October 2, where members brandished guns and swords while speakers justified keeping weapons for self-defense.

On September 29, a similar event unfolded in Bina Etawa, which also featured members brandishing guns and swords as speakers justified weapon possession for self-defense.

This template was replicated across the country. On October 2, in Agra, Uttar Pradesh guns and swords were worshipped and religious slogans were raised. 

Likewise in Jammu participants worshipped guns and swords and raised religious slogans on October 2, 2025

In Odisha, VHP-Bajrang Dal events followed the same script. The event in Godabhaga, involved brandishing and worshipping weapons. 

On October 2, the ceremony in Gudbhela also involved displaying and worshipping weapons.

On October 2, in Dhanakauda, a rally was held after the puja where participants brandished their weapons.

Operating in parallel, on October 2, the Antarrashtriya Hindu Parishad (AHP) and its arm, the Rashtriya Bajrang Dal, led by Pravin Togadia, organised their own series of weapon worship events. Togadia glorified the Babri Masjid demolition, calling it “an act of bravery,” and declared, “Until we started the Ram Mandir movement, only temples were demolished and mosques built over them. This was the first time we demolished that Babri structure and made a temple.” He warned, “To the dreamers of Ghazwa-e-Hind, remember — it is on your chest we built the Ram Mandir. That is just the start; Kashi and Mathura are waiting to be constructed on your chests.”

On September 28, in Mandla, Madhya Pradesh, their ceremony involved public processions and martial demonstrations with weapons. 

On September 28, in nearby Seoni, MP, their event also included a procession with members brandishing swords, while a speaker justified violence in the name of religion by citing religious texts. 

On September 30, in Simbhaoli Hapur, Uttar Pradesh, AHP leader Gaurav Raghav explicitly linked the ritual to protecting “dharma, daughters and sisters, and cows,” peddled the “Love Jihad” conspiracy, and urged followers to arm themselves against “Jihadis.”

Targeting women and children: the role of Durga Vahini

Crucially, the concern about “young girl students being manipulated” is substantiated by the central role of the VHP’s women’s wing, Durga Vahini, and its partner group, Matru Shakti. Their involvement is a deliberate strategy to frame weaponisation as “empowerment” and “self-protection.”

• On September 28, in Rampura, Neemuch (MP), Durga Vahini and Matru Shakti members organised Shastra Puja at multiple Garba pandals, brandishing weapons.

• On September 26, in Hatta, Damoh (MP), a VHP-Bajrang Dal event explicitly “involved children in exhibiting weapons,” with Durga Vahini members in attendance

• On October 2, in Adegaon, Seoni (MP), VHP, Bajrang Dal, Matrushakti, and Durga Vahini organised a program where “young children and girls” worshipped swords.

• On September 30, in Jamshedpur, Jharkhand, a VHP-Durga Vahini event on Durga Ashtami, attended by “large numbers of women and children,” featured speakers who peddled the “love jihad” conspiracy, explicitly linking the need for such “awareness” to the Vahini’s founding.

This organisational synergy, replicated from state to state, proves that these are not isolated events. They are the planned execution of a national agenda, sharing a common script, common targets, and a common goal.

From ritual to rhetoric: the weaponisation of hate speech

This leads to the crux of the matter: these events “evolve into platforms for hate speech and inflammatory remarks.” The Shastra Poojan is merely the stage; the main performance is the propagation of communal hatred and open calls for violence. The weapons are not just symbolic props; they are a backdrop that physically underscores the violent rhetoric being delivered.

A platform for vile, anti-Muslim incitement

The speeches delivered at these events are not subtle. They are direct, eliminationist, and consistently target the Muslim community.

• Bhopal, MP (Sadhvi Pragya): On September 28, at a VHP-Durga Vahini event, former BJP MP Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur delivered a virulently anti-Muslim speech. She urged Hindus to “assault non-Hindu sellers” near temples, referred to all Muslims as “jihadis,” and claimed they “could never consider Hindu women as sisters”

This speech was given in front of an arsenal of displayed guns, swords, and other weapons.

• Indore, MP (Tannu Sharma): On October 1, VHP-Bajrang Dal leader Tannu Sharma used his Shastra Pujan speech to promote the “love jihad” conspiracy in its most graphic form, claiming Muslim men are “trained in mosques to target Hindu girls” for trafficking and to be used as “baby-making instruments.” He then issued a direct call for beheading: “He urged Hindu women to follow Kalka Mata and ‘behead’ anyone who dares to target them”

• Kanpur, UP (Madhuram Sharan Shiva): October 3, at a Ramlila forum, the leader of the “armed-monks group” Shiva Shakti Akhada, Madhuram Sharan Shiva, declared, “To destroy sin, the sinner must be destroyed.” He explicitly called on youth to “fight and eliminate ‘jihadis,’ likening them to demons (rakshas).”

Mainstreaming conspiracy and glorifying violence

The hate speech is built upon a foundation of well-worn conspiracy theories and the glorification of past violence.

• “Love Jihad” and “Land Jihad”: This theme is ubiquitous. On September 30, in Hapur, UP, AHP leader Gaurav Raghav linked the ritual to protecting “dharma, daughters and sisters” and peddled the “Love Jihad” theory to justify arming against “Jihadis”

October 2, in Nagod, Satna (MP), a VHP-Bajrang Dal speaker, with guns displayed on stage, targeted Muslims by invoking both “love jihad” and “land jihad” conspiracies.

• Glorifying Babri Demolition: October 2, in Surat, Gujarat, AHP President Pravin Togadia used a “Trishul Deeksha” event to glorify the Babri Masjid demolition as an “act of bravery.” He then issued a direct threat for future action: “That is just the start; Kashi and Mathura are waiting to be constructed on your chests.”

• Worshipping Godse: The glorification extends even to the assassin of Mahatma Gandhi. October 2, in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, the Hindu Sena held a Shastra Pujan “chanting slogans in praise of Nathuram Godse.” 

This was repeated in Ujjain, MP on October 2, where Hindu nationalists “worshipped weapons and a portrait of Nathuram Godse.”

This evidence confirms the analysis completely. The Shastra Poojan is the legitimising framework for events whose primary purpose is to spread hate, dehumanise Muslims, and openly call for their elimination, all while normalising violence as a sacred duty. This directly leads to events like the Cuttack clashes and other riots, as the weapons and the incitement from these events spill over into the streets.

A pedagogy of violence: indoctrinating the next generation

Perhaps the most insidious component of this agenda is the focus on “young girl students” and children. This is not about self-protection; it is a systematic “pedagogy of violence.” It seeks to indoctrinate children at their most impressionable age, severing their connection to a secular society and re-forging their identity around the twin poles of weaponry and communal hatred.

The evidence for this is widespread and deeply disturbing.

• Giving weapons to children: On October 2, in Ujjain, MP, the indoctrination was explicit: “swords were given to young girls.” 

On September 26, in Hatta, Damoh (MP), “Children were involved in exhibiting weapons” at a VHP-Bajrang Dal-Durga Vahini event.

• Martial demonstrations: On September 29, in Udaipura, Raisen (MP), a VHP-Matrushakti event featured “many children performing martial demonstrations using” weapons.

This was also seen in Mandla, MP on September 28, at an AHP-Rashtriya Bajrang Dal event. This normalises the weapon as an extension of the child’s body.

• Chants of hatred: The indoctrination is both physical and verbal. On October 2, in Maharashtra, far-right influencer Sangram Bapu Bhandare, at a Shiv Pratisthan Hindusthan Shastra Pooja, “led armed children in chanting, ‘Tu Durga ban, tu Kali ban, kabhi na burke wali ban’ (You become Durga, you become Kali, never become one in a burqa. This is a direct, hateful chant that pits one religious identity against another, taught to armed children.

• Posing with weapons: On October 1, in another event in Maharashtra, “Children, including young girls, posed with trishuls” under the guidance of an AHP leader. 

On October 2, in Adegaon, Seoni (MP), “young children and girls” were documented worshipping swords.

This strategy aims to create a future generation for whom public weapon-bearing is normal, communal hatred is righteous, and violence is a celebrated tool for religious assertion. It is a long-term project to ensure the pipeline of cadres for this extremist agenda never runs dry.

The architecture of impunity: egal legality and political patronage

The legal basis for stopping these events is clear, rooted in existing statutes that are routinely ignored. The core of the issue lies in The Arms Act, 1959, which is not just about firearms.

• Section 2(1)(c) defines “arms” to include “sharp-edged and other deadly weapons… as the Central Government may… specify.”
• Section 4 strictly prohibits the acquisition or possession of any firearm without a license.
• Section 5 controls the manufacture, sale, and transfer of arms.

The argument that trishuls are merely “religious symbols” is a deliberate smokescreen, one that has been legally challenged and documented for decades. Reports from as far back as 2003 noted that items distributed at Trishul Deeksha events were often “cleverly disguised Rampuri knives, six–eight inches long and sharp enough to kill.” This led the Rajasthan state government itself, in April 2003, to issue a notification “prohibiting people from distributing, acquiring, possessing or carrying double or multi-bladed sharp pointed weapons” as per a report in The Times of India.

This ban was openly defied by organisations like the VHP, setting a long-standing precedent of conflict between these events and state law. The illegality extends far beyond just possession. The Arms Act provides clear authority for law enforcement to act:

• Section 20 allows police to arrest anyone “carrying or conveying any arms under suspicious circumstance” without a warrant.
• Section 22 empowers the District Magistrate to order a search and seizure of any arms believed to be for an “unlawful purpose.”
• Section 25 outlines punishment for the unlicensed sale or transfer of arms.

The claim that these processions are protected as an “essential religious practice” under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution has also been tested and refuted by the Supreme Court. In the landmark 1983 case Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta (1983) 4 SCC 522, the Court ruled that the Ananda Marga’s Tandava dance with items including a trishul and a knife was not an essential religious rite that could be performed in a public procession. 

The Court affirmed that such public displays are subject to regulation by the state for “public order,” a precedent that directly applies to today’s armed processions.

The copy of judgement Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta (1983) can be found here

Despite this clear legal framework, attempts to enforce it on a macro level have been thwarted, contributing to the architecture of impunity. 

Following widespread communal violence during Ram Navami processions in 2022, a PIL was filed in the Supreme Court by Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) in May 2022. This petition sought the creation of national guidelines to regulate these armed religious processions.

The plea was dismissed by the Supreme Court on December 9, 2022. The bench, led by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, declared that law and order is a “state subject” and that the court could not be “dragged into every area.” The court also remarked that one should not “portray that all religious festivals are the time for riots.” 

This dismissal effectively denied a national-level regulatory framework, placing the onus back on the same state and district-level authorities—the DMs and police—who, as seen in Gwalior and Rajasthan University, are often participants or enablers. This judicial deference, while procedurally sound, in practice grants a free pass, ensuring that the law remains on the books but is rarely, if ever, enforced on the streets.

The argument that these are merely “religious symbols” like trishuls is a deliberate smokescreen. The evidence from 2025 shows this is patently false. These events openly and proudly feature modern firearms, transforming the ritual into a menacing display of force.

• Guns and Rifles as centrepieces: The public display of firearms is a consistent theme. 

On October 2, in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, a VHP-Bajrang Dal event on Vijay Dashami saw participants displaying “dozens of guns, swords, and other weapons.” 

On September 28, at another Bhopal event featuring ex-MP Sadhvi Pragya Thakur, the proceedings “also featured guns, swords, and other weapons” as a backdrop to her inflammatory speech.

On October 2, in Indore, Madhya Pradesh, a VHP-Bajrang Dal Shastra Pujan involved the worship and display of “swords, guns and other weapons.”

This was mirrored in Jammu, where on October 2, VHP and Bajrang Dal members organised a Shastra Pujan “worshipping swords, guns, and other weapons” 

On October 2, in Agra, Uttar Pradesh, a VHP-Bajrang Dal event was characterised by the “displaying [of] guns, swords and other weapons.”

On October 2, in Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh, an AHP and Rashtriya Bajrang Dal procession “worshipped and displayed guns, swords and other weapons.” 

On September 29, in Bina Etawa, Madhya Pradesh, VHP-Bajrang Dal members “brandished guns and swords.”

On October 2, in Nagod, Satna (MP), a VHP-Bajrang Dal event featured “several guns on stage” while speakers targeted Muslims.

• Political displays of massive firepower: This display of weaponry is not limited to militant organisations; it is also a tool for political strong-arming. On October 2, in Kunda, Uttar Pradesh, the event was a staggering show of force at the residence of a sitting politician. MLA Raghuraj Pratap Singh, popularly known as Raja Bhaiya, “held a Shastra Pujan displaying hundreds of guns and rifles at his residence.”

This act, involving an arsenal far beyond any symbolic need, demonstrates a fusion of political power and a capacity for violence, sending an unambiguous message of dominance.

The mass distribution of trishuls, particularly in states like Rajasthan, also contravenes the law, as these are often sharpened and designed as weapons. But the open display of hundreds of unlicensed (or even licensed) firearms in a public, politically charged gathering is a blatant violation of The Arms Act and provisions of the CrPC related to unlawful assembly.

The enablers: political patronage and state impunity

This illegality thrives because it is protected from above. The involvement of “influential figures—MPs, MLAs, and politicians” is not a suspicion; it is a documented fact.

• Elected officials: MLA Raja Bhaiya (Kunda, UP), Assembly Speaker Narendra Singh Tomar (Gwalior, MP), and ex-MP Sadhvi Pragya Thakur (Bhopal, MP) all actively participated in and legitimised these events.
• Government Llegitimisation: A key part of this legitimisation is the government’s formal decision to lift long-standing bans on employees participating in such events, removing any professional consequence for state actors who align with this agenda. This process reversed decades of policy. The initial ban, which barred central government employees from participating in the activities of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), was first imposed on November 30, 1966, and pointedly reiterated on October 28, 1980, to ensure a secular outlook in the bureaucracy. 

This 58-year-old prohibition was officially lifted by the central government via an office memorandum from the Department of Personnel and Training on July 9, 2024. This move paved the way for state governments, such as the BJP-led government in Rajasthan, which, around August 24, 2024, issued its own circular lifting a similar 52-year-old ban, thereby granting explicit permission for state employees to participate in RSS activities. As per reports in the The Hindu.

• Systemic impunity: The “no legal action” outcome is the rule, not the exception. The Rajasthan University incident is the most damning proof that the victims are jailed, and the attackers walk free. In Cuttack, as has been noted, rioters with weapons faced no consequences. This is a deliberate tactic, one that draws parallels to the Gujarat Riots: the state machinery steps back (or actively assists) to allow “religious celebrations” to morph into organised violence, knowing that the legal system will be deployed to protect the perpetrators and punish any resistance.

This is how permissions are granted. This is how the law is ignored. The agenda is state-sanctioned, protected by powerful politicians, and enforced by a compromised or complicit law enforcement and legal system.

A year of weaponised faith: the continuum from Ram Navami to Ganpati

While the Shastra Poojan events of Dussehra 2025 present the most recent manifestation of this trend, they are merely the crescendo of a year-long symphony of hate. To view them in isolation is to miss the systemic nature of the rot. An analysis of events stretching back through 2025—encompassing Ram Navami, Ganpati Visarjan, and Durga Puja—reveals that the weaponisation of religious festivals is no longer an anomaly, it has become the standard operating procedure of the right-wing outfits. 

This sustained aggression is not accidental. It is the inevitable yield of over a decade of the current regime’s governance, a period characterised by the systematic dismantling of constitutional values and the emboldening of majoritarian forces. The frequency and ferocity of these displays are direct metrics of how deeply the “Hindu Rashtra” project has penetrated the social fabric, sanctified by political patronage and shielded by a compromised state machinery.

The Ganpati festival: from devotion to macabre propaganda

The Ganpati festival in September 2025 witnessed a disturbing shift where the celebration of the deity was side-lined for the promotion of gruesome political propaganda. 

In Madhya Pradesh, a state that has become a laboratory for right-rings’ experimentation, religious tableaux (jhankis) were utilised to broadcast graphic Islamophobic imagery. In Mahidpur, Ujjain, on September 5, a tableau explicitly promoted the “Love Jihad” conspiracy theory, depicting Muslim men slaughtering women. This was not a subtle dog whistle but a visual scream designed to provoke, leading inevitably to communal tension and stone-pelting. 

In Mahadevgarh, Khandwa, on September 5, another tableau featured a refrigerator with mutilated dolls—a crude exploitation of a high-profile murder case—to suggest that Muslim men are inherent butchers of women. 

In Kasravad, Khargone, on September 7, similar gory visuals were paraded through the streets. These were not religious processions; they were mobile hate-speech units, designed to instil fear in minorities and radicalise the majority, turning a festival of joy into a procession of trauma. 

The “Decade Plus” of impunity: the state as an extension of the mob 

This was explicitly articulated in Karnataka during the Ganpati Visarjan. In Raichur, on September 16, VHP-Bajrang Dal State Convenor Shivananda Sattigeri delivered a speech that stripped away any remaining veneer of the rule of law. He did not just threaten violence; he claimed ownership of the state apparatus, asserting that “the police and army are all Hindus” and that the Prime Minister is aligned with the RSS. He threatened to “chop off the hands” of dissenters and warned that legal challengers would be “beaten and sent to Pakistan.” 

The rhetoric is echoed by elected representatives, further blurring the lines. On September 10, in Maddur, Mandya, BJP MLC C.T. Ravi publicly threatened Muslims with “beheading” and “cutting,” reminding them of the consequences of “showing strength.” When lawmakers speak the language of lynch mobs, the weaponisation of festivals ceases to be a law-and-order issue and becomes a state-sponsored project of intimidation. 

Durga Puja: the gendered radicalisation 

The narrative of 2025 also highlights how this weaponisation is deeply gendered, using the imagery of the Goddess to militarise women and children against a fabricated “other.” During the Durga Puja festivities, the VHP and its wings, Durga Vahini and Matru Shakti, intensified their campaign to frame Muslim men as existential threats. 

In Gaya, Bihar, on September 30, women were made to brandish weapons, while in Jamshedpur, Jharkhand, on the same day, speakers used the platform of Durga Ashtami to peddle “Love Jihad” conspiracies to a captive audience of women and children. The message was clear: your faith requires you to be armed. 

This indoctrination has reached the level of hate-filled conditioning for children. 

In Maharashtra, on October 2, far-right influencer Sangram Bapu Bhandare led armed children in a chant that pitted the identity of the Goddess against the identity of the Muslim woman: “Tu Durga ban, tu Kali ban, kabhi na burke wali ban” (Become Durga, become Kali, never become the one in the burqa). By weaving hate into the rhymes and rituals of children, the regime’s ideological affiliates are ensuring that the cycle of violence continues well beyond the current political tenure. 

The calendar of hate: how a decade of impunity weaponised 2025

The festivals of 2025 have ceased to be mere celebrations of faith but they have morphed into a synchronised calendar of intimidation. This year’s timeline—stretching from the aggressive posturing of Ram Navami, through the macabre tableaux of Ganpati Visarjan, to the open weaponisation of Durga Puja—reveals a terrifying new normal. 

In Madhya Pradesh, the sanctity of Ganesh Chaturthi was desecrated by floats depicting gruesomely mutilated women, designed solely to incite anti-Muslim hysteria under the guise of “Love Jihad.” In Karnataka, the mask of democracy slipped entirely when BJP leaders publicly threatened beheadings, and VHP convenors declared the police and army to be extensions of the RSS.

This unchecked aggression is not spontaneous but it is the toxic harvest of a “Decade Plus” of the current regime. Ten years of majoritarian party rule have systematically dismantled the firewall between the state and the street. 

The normalisation of a violent public square

The 2025 Shastra Poojan campaign, as documented here, is not an expression of Hindu faith. It is the tactical expression of a political agenda that views violence, intimidation, and communal hatred as legitimate tools. It is the “weapon agenda” in its most tactical form.

The evidence is overwhelming. We are witnessing a systematic effort to subvert India’s secular institutions, transforming universities into ideological battlegrounds (Rajasthan University) and police forces into partisan participants (Gwalior). We are seeing a coordinated, nationwide campaign by the VHP, Bajrang Dal, and AHP to use these events as platforms for the vilest, eliminationist hate speech, explicitly calling for the assault (“assault non-Hindu sellers”) and murder (“behead,” “eliminate jihadis”) of Muslims.

Most chillingly, we are watching the deliberate indoctrination of children. By placing swords in the hands of young girls (Ujjain), making children chant anti-Muslim slogans (Maharashtra), and having them perform martial demonstrations (Udaipura), this agenda is attempting to create a new generation for whom violence is not just normal but sacred.

This entire enterprise is shielded by a formidable architecture of political impunity, where MLAs (Raja Bhaiya), MPs (Sadhvi Pragya), and Assembly Speakers (Narendra Singh Tomar) provide cover. The law is rendered meaningless, as police either participate in the rituals or, as seen in Rajasthan, arrest the very students protesting the illegality.

This is the terrain. The ritual of Shastra Poojan has become the chosen vehicle for normalising violence, mainstreaming hate, and asserting a militant religious supremacy over the public sphere. The parallel to pre-riot tactics in places like Gujarat is not just an academic reflection, it is a clear and present warning.

When a mob leader can openly claim the state apparatus as “theirs” without fear of arrest, it proves that impunity has been institutionalised. The most chilling aspect of this year’s agenda was the targeted radicalisation of families, women brandishing swords and children chanting hate before they can fully understand faith. 

We are witnessing the solidification of a “militant piety,” where the sword replaces the prayer, and the Constitution is quietly suspended in favour of the rule of the mob. These incidents stand as a warning that the secular citadel is not just being breached, it is being dismantled, festival by festival, under the protective gaze of the state.

Related:

Speaker at VHP weapon worship event openly targets the religious minorities of India, calls them top enemies

Arm yourself with knowledge, not tridents, swords or knives

FIR over hate speech and brandishing of swords at Udupi Durga Daud event

The post The ‘Shastra Poojan’ Project: How the ritual of weapon worship is being recast as a tool of power and hate propaganda appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This is a macabre repeat of three years ago. In November 2022, in the same region, an elderly Christian woman, Chaitibai, in Krutola village, Chhattisgarh, was denied burial space by village authorities, forcing her son to use family land.^[1]The family had initially been denied access to the village cemetery and was directed to bury the deceased on their own land. Subsequently, villagers and local political leaders attempted to exhume the body using a tractor, but the police prevented this attempt. The following day, however, the police themselves exhumed the body and reburied it in the Christian graveyard in Anantgarh pursuant to the orders of the District Collector.

A press release of the United Christian Forum has expressed alarm at the ongoing situation in Chhattisgarh. All these cases follow a documented pattern of violence and hostility against Tribal Christians.

Cases in Chhattisgarh, Odisha^[3], and Jharkhand reveal coordinated intimidation. Burials are becoming contentious and politically charged. Grieving families are forced to face violent mobs, forced exhumations and forced conversions of faith.

The United Christian Forum recorded 23 burial-related incidents (19 in Chhattisgarh, 2 in Jharkhand, and one each in Odisha and West Bengal) in 2025, whereas 2024 saw around 40 such cases (30 in Chhattisgarh, 6 in Jharkhand, and others in Bihar and Karnataka).One recent report also describes Christians being denied burial rights on ancestral land and a climate of fear among pastors and converts.^[4]

Most affected villages do not have designated Christian burial grounds, and historically shared communal graveyards have increasingly been treated as Hindu-only spaces. Families attempting to bury their dead within the village face opposition, even where they have buried relatives for generations. Where Christian only graveyards exist, they are often located far from tribal settlements.

Additionally, families frequently lack access to a mortuary, transport, or time to undertake legal procedures while a body is decomposing at home. This Practical hardship often prevents immediate complaint-making, which in turn allows authorities to record “no dispute”.

Among the recent Cases:

• In January 2025, villagers obstructed the burial of Ramesh Baghel, a Scheduled Caste Christian. With no relief from the High Court, his son approached the Supreme Court but was forced to bury him outside the village.^[5]

• In November 2025, villagers in Jewartala of Balod district in Chhattisgarh refused to allow the burial of Raman Sahu, a Christian convert, claiming that only “traditional” village rites were permissible. Just weeks earlier in Koderkurse, Kanker district, Chhattisgarh, another Christian man’s body was turned away from multiple villages for three days, with police unable to secure a burial site.^[6]

The UCF also states that “there have also been numerous instances of Ghar Wapsi and violence.^[7]The media has, over the years, documented Hindu nationalist groups in Bastar, Chhattisgarh, pressuring Adivasi Christians to “reconvert,” including a filmed ceremony led by a local BJP leader. One recent report also describes a climate of fear among pastors and converts.^[8]” 

Recent Cases

• In Nabarangpur district, a mob blocked the burial of 20-year-old Saravan Gond after his family refused to abandon Christianity. Even in the presence of officials, agitators declared Christians had “no right” to burial in the village, assaulted female relatives, and later forced the family to exhume the body themselves. After the burial site was vandalised, the family fled for safety. Saravan’s remains have since disappeared, and despite a formal complaint on 28 April 2025, the police have taken no action^.[9]

• On November 2, 13-year-old Sunita from Brehebeda in Narayanpur district, Chhattisgarh died of typhoid; when her body returned home, villagers blocked a Christian burial and insisted on traditional Adivasi rites. Her brother Manupotai said the family was told a burial on village land would be allowed only if they abandoned Christianity. Sunita was ultimately buried that evening far from Brehebeda, at a burial ground near the Narayanpur district centre, roughly 10 km away. ^[10]

Similarly in Odisha, independent fact-finding teams recorded at least 10 cases of burial denial between 2022 and 2025 across Nabarangpur, Balasore and Gajapati, along with associated exhumations,^[11]forced reconversions and assaults.^[12]Fact-finding team also reported access to community land for Christians. ^[13]

Other recent Cases:

• In Nabrangpur, Odisha, India, after a person named Keshav Santa died on 2 March 2025, villagers blocked his burial solely because his son is a Christian. Even burial on the family’s own land was denied unless they reconverted to Hinduism. The police and the local Revenue Officer arrived but took no action. Keshav’s son was ultimately forced to announce he was leaving Christianity before burial was permitted on 9 March. In the weeks that followed, the family was subjected to punitive water and electricity cuts and sustained harassment by villagers. Instead of protecting them, local authorities then issued a “breach of peace” notice against the Christian family itself, effectively charging the grieving victims while ignoring those who threatened and coerced them.^[14]

• In October 2024, in Menjar village, Nabarangpur district, Odisha, India, the family of 27-year-old Dalit Christian Madhu Harijan was prevented by non-Christian villagers from burying him in the common graveyard. Villagers demanded that his body first be “converted to Hinduism”, and a mob reportedly conducted a shuddhiritual over the corpse. When the family and the local Christian priest approached authorities, the Umerkote tehsildar suggested burial in a distant Christian-majority village instead. After a two-day stand-off during which the body began to decompose, the family, under pressure, agreed to the Hindu villagers’ conditions.^[15]

Hate Speech: Exclusion of Tribal Christians from Constitutional Protections

Calls to delist Christian tribals from the Scheduled Tribe status are creating fear and division in states like Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Odisha and Rajasthan. Organisations such as the Janjati Suraksha Manch (JSM) have held large rallies urging that tribal communities who adopt Christianity or Islam be stripped of Scheduled Tribe protections, framing conversion as abandonment of “tribal identity.” ^[16]

These campaigns insist that conversion leads to the “loss of tribal identity,” even though tribal status in the Constitution is not tied to religion. Field reports show that these campaigns have contributed to unprecedented violence, excommunication, and coercion. On the other hand, no similar objection is raised when tribals adopt Hindu practices, exposing the selective and discriminatory nature of the movement.

Many Adivasi Christians fear that being pushed to use these Christian-only burial sites will later be used to challenge their Scheduled Tribe identity and demand their “delisting,”.

UCF: Larger Context of Violence against Christians in India

• Between 2014 and 2024, incidents of violence against Christians rose from 139 to 834, reflecting an alarming increase of more than 500% over a single decade. The total number of documented incidents across this 12-year period reached 4,959 cases, affecting Christian individuals, families, and institutions nationwide.
• There are over 700 incidents in 2025 (Jan-November) affecting families, churches, schools, hospitals, and service organisations. Vulnerable communities impacted: Dalit Christians, women, and tribal Christians.
• And just two states, Uttar Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, account for 48% of all violence.
• Only 45 FIRs or criminal complaints were registered against members of the mob, despite nearly 580 incidents being recorded in 2025, resulting in 93% of incidents going unpunished due to administrative inaction and victims’ fear of retaliation.
• 230 FIRs were filed against Christians, out of which 155 were under the Anti–conversion laws, and 800+ people went behind bars.
• The two states with the highest number of wrongful arrests of Christians under anti-conversion laws are Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. In Uttar Pradesh alone, since the law came into effect in 2020 and up to October 2025, more than 350 FIRs have been registered, resulting in the arrest of over 1,000 individuals.

Finally, the organisation states that “this extreme violence and hostility at the time of bereavement in the family is a reminder that all is not well in the country.  No family should be met with intimidation, assault, or threats in their time of grief because of their faith. The recent incidents, where Christian families have been blocked from burying their loved ones, forced to bury outside their villages, or even compelled to exhume bodies under pressure, show how grief and vulnerability can be weaponised.”

The government’s first obligation is to protect life, liberty, and dignity, especially when a family is most vulnerable. If police and local authorities cannot ensure a lawful, peaceful burial and instead allow mobs to dictate who may grieve and how. The State, by failing to protect communities, is enabling impunity.

The UCF has called on the governments of Chhattisgarh and Odisha to:

• Implement a time-bound compensation and rehabilitation plan for displaced Tribal Christians, including land restitution, rebuilding of homes, and livelihood support.
• Direct the State Director General of Police to initiate departmental action against police personnel who fail to prevent or respond to violence against religious minorities.
• Direct every Gram Panchayat and urban local body to identify, notify, and maintain a “common graveyard” area that is religion-neutral and accessible to all residents, including converts and minority communities. The allotment should be backed by written land demarcation, public signage, and entry in local land records, with a clear protocol that no burial may be obstructed by private actors or mobs.
• Designate a nodal officer at the district level to ensure immediate police protection during funerals where tensions are anticipated, and any attempt to block a lawful burial or exhume remains should trigger prompt criminal action and disciplinary proceedings for official inaction.

Related:

Escalating violence sparks concerns as attacks targeting Christians surge in Chhattisgarh

Telangana: Christian cemetery attacked a week after Dalit Churchgoers were attacked

Assam: Hindutva group issues ultimatums to Christian-run schools

Christian prayer hall attacked in Karnataka

2022: A Look back at hate crimes against Dalits and Adivasis

CJP writes to Minorities Commission over attacks on churches

Kawardha communal violence: CJP petitions DGP to take certain action against perpetrators

The post No right to live, or die: Christians in Chhattisgarh, and India under attack appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to the latest available data, in 2024 alone, a comprehensive survey by India Hate Lab (IHL) documented 1,165 in-person hate-speech events targeting religious minorities across India, marking a 74.4 percent rise from the 668 incidents recorded in 2023. A significant number of these incidents occurred in states governed by the ruling coalition, underlining the geographic and political concentration of communal hate mobilisation. Many of these hate-speech events including rallies, processions, public speeches, and nationalist gatherings were accompanied by social-media amplification, transforming offline aggression into widely visible and shared public spectacle. At the same time, India is entering a high-stakes electoral cycle in 2025–2026, with state assembly elections scheduled in key states such as Delhi, Bihar, Assam, Kerala, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, and Puducherry. This convergence of rising hate speech, online amplification and election-era mobilisation has created a volatile environment in which ordinary citizens increasingly act as self-appointed enforcers of identity and morality, often targeting religious minorities under the guise of vigilante zeal. Reported NDTV.

These dynamics now play out not only through speeches or online rhetoric, but through direct interference in everyday life. Across markets, highways, neighbourhoods, schools and private homes, civilians have increasingly taken on roles that mimic policing functions. They stop individuals from demanding proof of citizenship or religious identity, supervise what businesses may sell or display, disrupt prayer gatherings inside homes or churches, compel public chanting of religious slogans, and enforce boycotts against minority traders. In several cases, these acts escalate into physical violence, public humiliation, or forced displacement. The presence of cameras and mobile phones has added another layer to the intimidation; confrontations are recorded and circulated as proof of ideological performance, converting harassment into spectacle. Police responses frequently blur the line between enforcement and endorsement, with officers either standing by during mob action, detaining victims after vigilante complaints, or acting only once public pressure mounts. Within this landscape, the distinction between civilian vigilantism and state authority weakens, leaving targets without clear avenues of protection while aggressors operate with growing confidence that their actions fall within tolerated political behaviour.

The incidents documented across states fall broadly into six categories: vigilante violence; economic harassment and boycott; raids on prayer meetings; identity policing and forced slogans; evictions and demolitions; and patterns of state response and police complicity.

Vigilante violence

Across states, groups identifying themselves as cow-protection or majoritarian outfits have moved from episodic intimidation to repeated physical enforcement on public roads, markets and transit routes. These actions take several common forms. Perpetrators intercept transporters and vendors, they detain and humiliate people on the spot, they physically assault those who resist, and they record and circulate the confrontation to amplify the act. The incidents collected here show that such attacks are not isolated. They recur in different states, follow similar scripts, and often end with victims being punished while perpetrators face little immediate consequence.

In Maharashtra on September 24, 2025, two cattle transporters – one Hindu and one Muslim – were intercepted and assaulted; a later video shows the victims forced to apologise as their cattle were taken away. In Sambhajinagar on November 10, 2025, a vigilante named Shobhraj Patil is recorded slapping and kicking a Muslim cattle transporter and verbally abusing others who were made to sit on the ground; other Bajrang Dal members restrained Patil only after the violence escalated. On November 12, 2025, In Balikuda, Jagatsinghpur, members of the Bajrang Dal and Hindu Sena entered a Muslim neighbourhood armed with sticks and, following their complaint, police confiscated meat for “investigation”; there is no contemporaneous record of action against the groups that forced entry.

Vigilante attacks also target traders. On November 2, 2025 in Ludhiana, Gau Raksha Dal members raided a biryani shop on beef allegations, detained the owner and handed him to police. In Hisar on November 4, 2025, a Bajrang Dal activist identified by local reporting assaulted a meat vendor for opening on a Tuesday and forced the vendor to chant “Jai Shri Ram,” an episode that was filmed and circulated – The Tribune reported. In Indore on November 10, 2025, Members of the Bajrang Dal assaulted a Muslim gym trainer after seeing him driving with a Hindu woman, accusing him of “luring” Hindu women. Despite the woman defending him and no formal complaint being lodged by her, the police allegedly transferred the case between police stations citing jurisdiction issues and ultimately sent the gym trainer to jail under restrictive legal sections. No reported police action against the vigilante attackers was available at the time of documentation.

The interplay between vigilante coercion and state action is evident in Damoh, Madhya Pradesh. On November 2, 2025, following pressure from far-right groups and cow vigilantes, police publicly paraded nine Muslim men accused of cow slaughter, despite statements from local butchers that the animal involved was a buffalo. In the local butcher market, vigilantes allegedly attacked with sticks while accusing traders of cow slaughter, leading to clashes. Police action was taken only against the Muslim men, who were jailed under provisions of the Animal Cruelty Act, even as officials later described the slaughtered animal as a buffalo calf. No action against the vigilante attackers was reported at the time of documentation. That sequence shows how vigilante pressure can shape law enforcement responses and how public parading becomes a tool of humiliation rather than a neutral investigatory procedure.

Legally these incidents implicate offences such as assault, criminal intimidation, trespass and unlawful assembly. These attacks also raise serious constitutional concerns about arbitrary deprivation of liberty when arrests follow vigilante complaints rather than independent police inquiry. The recorded habit of filming and broadcasting confrontations converts private violence into public spectacle, and that publicity frequently insulates perpetrators by forcing rapid public narratives that favour the aggressors. Across the documented cases, police responses range from delayed intervention to actions that appear to prioritise complaints lodged by vigilante groups rather than protecting those they have attacked. That pattern underlines why vigilante violence in the present period cannot be treated as random crime. It must be understood as a coordinated set of practices that enforce ideological norms through force, humiliation and selective use of formal law enforcement.

Harassment, Economic Intimidation and Boycott

Across multiple states, economic life has become a stage for enforcing majoritarian identity rules. Markets, roadside stalls and ordinary workplaces have turned into sites where Hindutva groups and sympathisers dictate who may trade, which foods may be sold, what symbols may be displayed and how Muslim vendors must present themselves in order to remain in business. These interventions do not involve claims of law and order. They operate through intimidation, accusations of deception and appeals to communal purity, all of which seek to restrict the economic presence of Muslims in public spaces. The incidents recorded here show that harassment often comes first, followed by pressure on police or local authorities to legitimise the exclusion.

In Ludhiana on November 2 2025, members of the Gau Raksha Dal stormed a biryani shop, accused the shopkeeper of selling beef and detained him before handing him to police. The manner of the raid reflects a broader trend in which Hindutva groups conduct their own inspections and arrests, treating Muslim-run establishments as inherently suspect while assuming the authority to punish on the spot. Police treatment of the incident focused on the allegation of beef sale rather than the unlawful detention and intimidation carried out by the vigilantes.

Economic policing is even more overt in Dehradun, where on November 14 2025, Kali Sena leaders publicly confronted a Muslim contractor who managed a dry-fruit stall. The men accused him of engaging in what they termed “mungfali jihad,” claiming that Hindu vendors and a calendar displaying a Hindu deity were being used to deceive customers. The language deployed in the confrontation draws directly from Hindutva propaganda that imagines Muslim economic activity as a covert threat. No action was taken on the leaders who staged the intimidation, although the harassment was filmed and circulated.

In Mapusa, Goa, on  October 3, 2025 far-right men harassed a Muslim shopkeeper and his staff, insisting that they present themselves as visibly Muslim by adopting green colour, changing their names and refraining from touching the picture of a Hindu deity displayed in the shop. That episode shows how Hindutva surveillance extends into everyday bodily behaviour and demands that Muslims perform identity as perceived by majoritarian norms. The threats were issued in the presence of staff and customers, yet there is no record of police intervention.

In Delhi’s Gokulpuri area on November 27, 2025, Hindu nationalist supporters forcibly shut down meat shops on the grounds that a temple was nearby. The idea that Muslim vendors should not operate in proximity to Hindu religious sites has become a recurring argument in Hindutva campaigns that seek to push Muslims out of mixed localities. The forced closures left vendors without income for the day and reinforced the message that their right to livelihood is conditional on the whims of majoritarian groups rather than equal protection under law.

These incidents illustrate a pattern in which economic activity becomes an arena for enforcing communal boundaries. They reflect a deliberate strategy within Hindutva politics to curtail Muslim economic visibility and participation. The absence of police action against harassers and the willingness of authorities to act on vigilante complaints further institutionalise these informal boycotts. Through repeated intimidation and public humiliation, these groups attempt to reshape markets into spaces that mirror and reinforce majoritarian social control.

Raids on Prayer Meetings and the Criminalisation of Christian Worship

Across several states, Christian prayer gatherings have become one of the most visible targets of Hindutva surveillance, reflecting a climate in which routine worship is increasingly cast as suspicious activity. Civil society reports show that the portrayal of Christians as agents of coercive conversion has become a central plank of Hindutva mobilisation, creating an atmosphere where even small home-based gatherings are vulnerable to intrusion and violence. This narrative has normalised vigilante entry into private spaces and produced situations where state institutions appear more responsive to the allegations of disruptors than to the rights of Christians who are attacked.

The incidents documented here show three recurring elements. Hindutva groups repeatedly enter private houses to disrupt worship, often accompanied by assault or the burning of religious books, as seen in Rohtak where, November 9, 2025 Christian participants were beaten and their Bibles burnt. These forced entries are justified through claims of “illegal conversion,” a narrative that has gained wide circulation in political speeches and local mobilisation campaigns, reinforcing the idea that Christian worship should be monitored rather than protected. The allegations themselves become tools that shift suspicion onto victims, making the act of prayer appear as evidence of wrongdoing.

A second pattern emerges through state response. In Rohtak, police allegedly questioned the victims rather than the perpetrators and later monitored their calls, reflecting a deeper institutional assumption that those who pray are the ones who require investigation rather than protection. This inversion of victim and accused also appears in Uttar Pradesh, where on November 16, 2025 members of the Bajrang Dal raided a Christian prayer meeting, alleging that illegal religious conversions were taking place. They claimed that poor Hindu women were being offered money to convert to Christianity. Following their complaint, police reached the location and arrested three individuals on charges related to unlawful religious conversion. No action against the vigilante group was reported. Similar patterns have been documented nationally wherever anti-conversion rhetoric is deployed to justify interference in Christian worship.

A third pattern concerns how the state frames these incidents. When on November 8, 2025 Hindu nationalist groups confronted a Christian gathering in Korba, Chhattisgarh, the disruption escalated into clashes after outsiders entered the residence and accused attendees of conversion. Official accounts framed the situation as a two-sided confrontation, obscuring the fact that the meeting was peaceful until disrupted. This framing aligns with rhetorical strategies that recast minority communities as sources of instability, even when they are the ones targeted.

In Agra, on November 23, 2025 members of the VHP–Bajrang Dal raided a private Christian prayer meeting and filed complaints alleging inducement to convert. Police detained a man and several women for questioning but did not act against the raiding group, entrenching the perception that majoritarian actors can intrude upon religious spaces with impunity. This is consistent with research showing that police often absorb the assumptions of vigilantes, reinforcing structural bias in how minority religious practice is policed.

Taken together, these episodes reveal a pattern in which prayer is treated as potential evidence, faith is framed as a threat and Christian worship becomes subject to the approval of hostile majoritarian actors. Hindutva groups position themselves as regulators of religious life, while police responses often validate their claims through investigation of the victims and neglect of the perpetrators. The result is a message that Christian communities can neither rely on privacy in their own homes nor on equal protection from the state.

Forced Slogans and Identity Policing

A striking feature of the current wave of communal hostility is the policing of Muslim identity in everyday spaces. These incidents do not involve allegations of crime or conversion. They revolve around humiliation, coercion and the demand that Muslims publicly affirm majoritarian slogans as proof of loyalty. National reports show that such practices have increased alongside online hate campaigns that dehumanise Muslims and frame them as permanent outsiders requiring discipline. The pattern is not incidental. It reflects a deliberate cultural project in which asserting Hindu nationalist symbols becomes a test of citizenship.

The confrontation of a Muslim fruit vendor on October 25, 2025 in Doimukh, Arunachal Pradesh, where locals accused him of being Bangladeshi and demanded NRC documentation, illustrates how identity policing collapses into racial profiling and suspicion of illegality. Research shows that “Bangladeshi” rhetoric has frequently been used to target Bengali-speaking Muslims, turning documentation status into a tool of exclusion . The vendor was forced to close his stall despite no official verification, demonstrating how communal assumptions override legal process.

Forced sloganeering further reveals the psychological dimension of this violence. In Uttarakhand, a Muslim cleric was stopped on the road and threatened when he refused to chant “Jai Shri Ram,” a moment intended to remind him of his vulnerability in public space. India Today reported that in UP, on November 25, 2025 an elderly Muslim cab driver, Mohammad Rais, was harassed near the Taj Mahal parking area by a group of young men who demanded that he chant “Jai Shri Ram.” When he initially refused, the men threatened him. The incident was filmed and later circulated on social media. Local police at Tajganj Police Station registered an FIR and said they are investigating the video evidence, though no arrests had been made at the time of the report.

Identity policing functions as a low-threshold form of violence. It does not require large groups or organised campaigns. It relies on the everyday assertion of dominance, the demand for symbolic compliance and the threat of punishment for refusal. These incidents demonstrate how Hindu nationalist mobilisation penetrates ordinary life. The pressure to chant slogans, produce documents or justify one’s presence signals a shift in which Muslim identity is treated as suspicious unless actively performed in ways that satisfy majoritarian expectations.

Evictions and Demolitions as Instruments of Displacement.

The most far-reaching form of exclusion documented in this period appears in state-led eviction and demolition drives. These actions are carried out through legal and administrative mechanisms, yet their impact falls overwhelmingly on Muslim communities, raising questions about selective enforcement and the absence of safeguards. Research on eviction patterns in Assam and Gujarat has shown that state narratives of encroachment often overlap with political rhetoric that casts certain communities as illegitimate occupants.

In Goalpara, Assam, more than 580 Bengali-origin Muslim families were displaced during a large-scale eviction operation in the Dahikata Reserve Forest on 9 November (Incident 17). Officials stated that the drive was aimed at addressing human-elephant conflict and was conducted pursuant to Gauhati High Court directions, and notices were reportedly issued fifteen days earlier. Heavy machinery entered the area under substantial police presence and demolished remaining structures. No immediate rehabilitation or resettlement measures were announced, leaving hundreds without shelter. Protests were minimal and swiftly contained, with some residents detained. Reporting from the region CNN has noted that eviction drives disproportionately affect Bengali-origin Muslim settlements and often lack clear post-eviction planning.

The Wire reported that in Gujarat’s Gir Somnath district, demolitions on 10 November focused on Muslim-owned homes, shops and a dargah (Incident 18). While several structures were removed without resistance, the attempt to demolish the dargah triggered confrontation. Residents opposed the demolition, leading to clashes with police who used crowd-control measures to disperse them. No rehabilitation measures were reported for those who lost homes or commercial property. Coverage from previous years shows a sustained pattern of demolitions in the region that disproportionately target Muslim religious structures.

A second demolition sequence that same day saw tensions escalate further when locals attempted to prevent the removal of another dargah near the Somnath Temple area. Police responded with lathi charges and tear gas and arrested thirteen people who were later paraded publicly (Incident 19). Authorities described all demolished structures as illegal constructions on government land. Details of any resettlement process were absent.

These cases demonstrate how eviction functions not only as an administrative measure but also as a tool of dispossession when applied without safeguards or rehabilitation. The selective concentration of demolition activity in Muslim neighbourhoods reinforces perceptions that state power is being deployed unevenly.

State Complicity and Biased Policing

CNN reported that across multiple states, the line between vigilante activity and state response becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish. The incidents documented here show repeated patterns in which police act on the allegations of vigilante groups while neglecting the rights of the victims. Human rights analyses have noted that policing in communal situations often reflects underlying majoritarian assumptions, leading to disproportionate scrutiny of minorities and minimal accountability for aggressors. This dynamic is visible in cases involving Christians, Muslims and those accused of violating religious norms.

In Rohtak, Haryana, on November 9, 2025 police reportedly interrogated Christian victims after an Arya Samaj group assaulted them, burnt their Bibles and injured a pastor during a prayer meeting. Rather than treating the attack as a criminal intrusion into a private residence, officers shifted attention onto the victims and monitored their phones. This reflects a broader pattern identified by rights organisations, where anti-conversion rhetoric shapes police behaviour and legitimises scrutiny of Christian gatherings.

In Uttar Pradesh, on November 23, 2025 police acted on the complaint of Bajrang Dal members who raided a Christian prayer meeting and alleged inducement to convert, arresting three attendees while declining to take action against the vigilantes. The same reversal appears in Agra, on November 20, 2025 where VHP and Bajrang Dal members entered a private home to disrupt another Christian meeting. Police detained a man and several women for questioning, again treating the accused vigilantes as complainants rather than aggressors.

In Madhya Pradesh, state complicity took a more punitive form. In Damoh, on November 2, 2025 police publicly paraded nine Muslim men after allegations of cow slaughter, even though local butchers stated that the animal was a buffalo and not a cow. No action was taken against the vigilantes who attacked the butcher market. In Indore, on November 10, 2025 a Muslim gym trainer assaulted by Bajrang Dal members was jailed despite the Hindu woman involved not filing any complaint, while no action was initiated against the attackers.

These incidents show how policing becomes aligned with vigilante narratives. When state institutions absorb the assumptions of majoritarian groups, minority communities lose access to impartial protection. The result is not simply inadequate investigation but a structural failure in which victims are recast as suspects and unlawful violence becomes socially sanctioned through official inaction.

Legal Framework: Constitutional Protections, Criminal Law and Supreme Court Guidelines

The incidents documented in this report engage multiple areas of Indian law, including constitutional guarantees, criminal prohibitions under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), procedural obligations under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) and binding Supreme Court directives on mob vigilantism. At their core, these cases reflect violations of the rights to equality, non-discrimination, personal liberty and religious freedom under Articles 14, 15, 19, 21 and 25 of the Constitution. Article 25 protects the right to freely profess and practice one’s faith, which extends to prayer meetings held in private homes or neighbourhood spaces. Evictions and demolitions without rehabilitation trigger concerns under Article 21 and the prohibition against arbitrary state action.

As per a report in the LiveLaw Under the new BNS, many of the acts witnessed here constitute clear criminal offences. Assault and causing hurt are covered under Sections 124 and 125, which penalise physical injury regardless of motive. Criminal intimidation is defined under Section 351, which applies to threats used to instil fear or force compliance. Forced entry into homes, including raids on Christian prayer meetings, falls within the definition of criminal trespass under Sections 329 and 330. The public parading of detainees undermines the constitutional guarantee of dignity and violates custodial safeguards linked to Article 21, which has been repeatedly upheld in Supreme Court jurisprudence.

Communal incitement and hate speech are addressed under Section 194 of the BNS, which criminalises acts that promote enmity between groups or deliberately provoke violence on grounds such as religion or race. This provision is directly relevant to forced slogans, threats and the circulation of humiliating videos, which mirror the trends identified in recent national analyses of hate speech escalation.

Procedurally, the BNSS continues to require prompt registration of FIRs, impartial investigation and accountability for dereliction of duty by law enforcement. These duties operate alongside the Supreme Court’s directives in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018), which remain binding. The Court mandated state responsibility to prevent mob violence, protect targeted communities, arrest perpetrators and discipline officers who fail to act. The recurring inaction or reversal of attention onto victims in the incidents documented here reflects clear non-compliance with these obligations.

Targeted demolitions and evictions further implicate constitutional protections. The Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation held that the right to life includes the right to shelter and that demolitions carried out without due process violate Article 21. The lack of rehabilitation reported in Assam and Gujarat contradicts these principles. Rights groups have noted that demolition and eviction in these regions disproportionately affect Muslim communities and often mirror political narratives of encroachment or demographic threat.

Taken together, the constitutional framework, the BNS and BNSS, and Supreme Court jurisprudence make clear that the acts described here violate established protections and statutory duties. The failure to act against vigilantes, the criminalisation of victims and the use of demolition powers without due process point not to isolated lapses but to structural disregard for the rule of law.

Conclusion

Taken together, the incidents documented across these states reveal a common pattern in which ordinary citizens, vigilante networks and state institutions participate in the policing of minority identity and belonging. What appears on the surface as scattered episodes of harassment, forced slogans, raids on prayer meetings or localised demolition drives becomes, in aggregate, a system of pressure that constrains the everyday freedoms of Muslims and Christians. National analyses of hate speech and communal mobilisation show that this pattern is not accidental but reflects a wider political environment in which minorities are cast as security risks, demographic threats or ideological adversaries. This environment encourages vigilantism by signalling that such conduct aligns with majoritarian expectations.

The unevenness of state response reinforces these pressures. Police often act on the allegations of vigilante groups while questioning, detaining or monitoring the victims. Eviction drives in Assam and demolition actions in Gujarat further illustrate how administrative power, when exercised without safeguards, produces large-scale dispossession that disproportionately affects Muslim communities. These practices undermine constitutional principles of equal protection and due process and violate the standards set by the Supreme Court in Tehseen Poonawalla, which requires proactive prevention of mob violence and accountability for official inaction.

As per a report in CNBC TV 18 a potential institutional response has emerged through Karnataka’s Hate Speech and Hate Crimes (Prevention) Bill, 2025, which for the first time proposes a clear statutory framework for defining hate speech and penalising organised intimidation. The Bill prescribes penalties of one to seven years for initial convictions, up to ten years for aggravated offences and empowers authorities to direct digital platforms to remove hate content. While some view this as a needed attempt to address escalating violence, its effectiveness will depend on impartial enforcement. Without structural reforms that ensure equal protection for minority victims, even progressive legal tools risk becoming instruments of selective repression.

The incidents in this report therefore point not only to unlawful actions by private actors but to a weakening of constitutional guarantees in everyday life. Restoring trust in the rule of law requires consistent action against vigilantism, accountability for discriminatory policing and a commitment to protecting the right of every community to live, worship and work without fear.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Risha Fathima)

Related:

Faith Under Fire: Coordinated Harassment of Christians After the Rajasthan Bill

Targeted as ‘Bangladeshis’: The Hate Speech Fuelling Deportations

The Architecture of Polarisation: A Structural Analysis of Communal Hate Speech as a Core Electoral Strategy in India (2024–2025)

Sanatan Ekta Padyatra: Unmasking the March of Majoritarianism

The post Documenting a national pattern of vigilantism & targeted action against minorities appeared first on SabrangIndia.