According to The Indian Express, the order was passed by City Magistrate Kuldeep Singh under the Uttar Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972. The dispute arose from a complaint filed by Vikas Tyagi, a former provincial coordinator of the Bajrang Dal, who alleged that a mosque had been illegally constructed within the Collectorate premises—a sensitive government complex where administrative and confidential official work is carried out. The complaint also alleged that the property was being used for commercial purposes, with portions of the premises rented to private occupants and a post office operating from the site.

Revenue inquiry and allegations

Following the complaint, the Revenue Department initiated an inquiry. In March 2025, a Lekhpal (revenue official) filed an application before the City Magistrate alleging that Abdul Hamid, described as the mosque’s manager and maulvi, was in unauthorised occupation of government land. Notices were issued to the respondents in April 2025, and their objections were filed in June 2025.

The revenue authorities contended that the land forms part of the Collectorate campus and is recorded in official revenue records as government property. According to the petition, the building originally functioned as a rest house for litigants visiting the Collectorate, but was subsequently occupied by the respondents, who allegedly converted portions of it into a mosque.

The petition further alleged that rooms on both the ground and first floors had been occupied, namaz was being offered there, several rooms had been rented out for residential purposes, and rent was being collected from tenants as well as from a post office operating from the premises.

Authorities also alleged that unauthorised construction had been carried out to convert part of the government building into a religious structure. The inquiry reportedly concluded that the occupants possessed no licence, permission or legal authority either to occupy the premises, allow third parties to reside there, or convert the building into a place of worship.

The revenue department further challenged the respondents’ reliance on a purported communication issued by the Sunni Central Waqf Board, Lucknow, alleging that the document was forged. It argued that the property has consistently been recorded in revenue records as Kachahri (Collectorate) and Kothiyat land, rather than as waqf or religious property.

The authorities also maintained that the Sunni Central Waqf Board has no legal authority to declare government land as waqf property. Although the respondents claimed to be the mosque’s mutawalli and maulvi, the petition asserted that they failed to produce documentary evidence establishing either their status or ownership rights over the property.

In addition to seeking eviction, the petitioner requested recovery of rent allegedly collected from tenants, penal rent, and all income allegedly earned through the unauthorised occupation, together with 12 per cent compound interest, to be deposited into the government treasury.

Mosque committee disputes government’s claim

The respondents denied the allegations and argued that the State had failed to establish ownership of the disputed property. They contended that the revenue records relied upon by the authorities merely reflected the physical nature or classification of the land and did not conclusively determine title.

They further alleged that the proceedings were initiated with the intention of unlawfully taking possession of the mosque and its adjoining land. According to the respondents, the petitioner had suppressed material facts, withheld relevant revenue records, and attempted to mislead the court.

Mutawalli Tanveer Ahmed maintained that the mosque is approximately 150 years old and stated that the management committee intends to challenge the order by filing a revision petition.

Court finds occupation unauthorised

After considering the material placed before it, the City Magistrate held that the respondents had failed to establish any lawful right or title over the disputed property. The court observed that Khasra No. 539 has consistently been recorded in revenue records as Collectorate/Kachahri land since Fasli Years 1324 and 1359, as well as in earlier records. On that basis, it concluded that the land belongs to the State government and that occupation without legal authority amounts to unauthorised occupation under the 1972 Act.

Taking into account the prolonged occupation of the 315-square-metre parcel, the court directed that compensation be calculated for a period of 70 years, commencing from Fasli Year 1359, in accordance with the prescribed statutory formula. The resulting amount was assessed at approximately ₹6.41 crore.

City Magistrate Kuldeep Singh told The Indian Express that the occupants have been granted 30 days to vacate the premises, failing which the administration will proceed with eviction.

Part of wider disputes over religious structures

The Saharanpur order comes amid a series of disputes involving religious structures alleged to have been constructed on public land in Uttar Pradesh. Last month, according to The Indian Express, the Varanasi Division of Northern Railways issued a notice directing the removal of a mosque located near Gate No. 1 of Kashi railway station, asserting that the structure stands on railway land. The mosque’s managing body, Anjuman Intizamia Masajid Varanasi, has challenged the notice, describing the proposed action as illegal.

The controversy also follows earlier demolition proceedings concerning the Madni Mosque in Kushinagar district. In February 2025, authorities demolished a portion of the mosque after alleging that it had been constructed on encroached land. The mosque committee disputed the allegation, asserting that the land had been lawfully purchased and had secured interim protection from the High Court until the expiry of the stay.

Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued notice to the Uttar Pradesh authorities in contempt proceedings alleging that the demolition violated the Court’s November 13, 2024 directions restraining demolition drives across the country without prior notice and an opportunity of hearing. The proceedings remain pending.

Related:

Public Purpose and Places of Worship: Allahabad HC’s Dalmandi verdict

Rebuild or Compensate: Nagpur HC confronts NMC over ‘bulldozer’ demolition in riot case

Faiz-e-Ilahi Masjid, Turkman Gate: A court-ordered demolition, midnight policing, stone-pelting, arrests, and the ongoing legal battle

“Bulldozer Justice” rebuked: Orissa High Court orders 10 lakh compensation for illegal demolition of community centre

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On June 15, Praful Vaniya, Superintendent of Police (Intelligence) in the Gujarat State Police Service (SPS), issued a notice announcing the arrival of the new Anti-Radicalisation Cell (ARC). The notice also provides a step-by-step identification, prevention, detection, intervention and re-integration checklist that the police has in mind.

The SOP for Gujarat’s newly operationalised ARC claims to lay down ways to assess and decode behavioural indicators for identifying ‘radicalised’ individuals – but the details listed seem exclusively focused on Muslim radicals, conflate Muslim religious practices with security threats, and are silent on any markers of Hindu radicalism of the kind the state witnessed in 2002 and after or the rest of India has witnessed over the past decade.

From monitoring beards and niqabs to seeing Middle East travels as suspicious, from questioning the use of Signal for messaging to watching those supporting Muslim rights on social media, the SOP appears designed to penalise common Muslims – and is silent on the violent activities of cow vigilantes and the calls by Hindutva radicals for the boycott and even killing of Muslims.

Who is a ‘radicalised person’?

“A radicalised person refers to an individual affecting law and order in the State who, driven by extremist (‘kattarpant’) ideologies, engages in anti-national activities to harm the unity and integrity of the nation, creates an atmosphere of fear among the people, and try to manipulate a sane/rational person to get them to convert their religion” – these are the exact words of the notice, seen by The Wire.

Further, the notice flags “Suddenly keeping a beard, wearing a niqab, frequent use of Arabic words, reducing contact with friends and family, expressing intense protest/resentment against events happening to the Muslim community globally, praising terrorists, or showing a change in behaviour after traveling abroad (e.g., Afghanistan, Middle East)”. Next, the notice asks officers to trace purchase activity of ‘radicalised indviduals’ – “Purchasing fertilisers containing potassium nitrate, sulphur, or ammonium nitrate; acquiring LPG cylinders; making frequent visits to forest-like areas; making frequent contact with individuals residing in the Gulf, PoK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir), or Afghanistan through encrypted apps; or withdrawing large amounts of cash”, the notice says, .

Even downloading VPN apps or using Signal or Element messengers have been listed as signs to watch out for. Other listed criteria includes ‘being members of extremist Telegram groups; following ISIS/AQ (Al-Qaeda) accounts, sharing Nasheeds, Dabiq/Rumiyah magazines; or using cryptocurrency (especially Monero) without any apparent source of income’.

Those ‘visiting extremist networks or Arabic colleges/madrasas’, performing a religious ritual like Itikaf (seclusion in a mosque) before planned activities, ‘suddenly leaving their education or employment citing Islamic duty’, or ‘visiting ‘kattarvad’ leaders after being released from prison’ are also flagged as potentially radicalised. It also orders officers to obtain complete details of maulanas teaching in madrasas, prepare a directory, and gather information/records on ‘whether they maintain contact with organisations holding extremist ideologies’.

The SOP recommends the monitoring of ‘extremist preachers, communal organisations, radicalised individuals who are or have been in prisons’, and specifically names those belonging to Salafi and Wahhabi school of Islamic thought within Sunni Islam.

Under the SOP’s ‘Intervention – Counselling and Guidance’ stage, the ARC is directed to identify and verify influential community leaders, social media influencers, NGOs, religious scholars, psychologists and educational experts who can assist in de-radicalisation efforts. It calls for counselling sessions involving family members, religious experts and psychiatrists, while requiring that the identity of individuals undergoing counselling be kept confidential. The SOP also instructs authorities to help such individuals reintegrate into education and employment and maintain regular contact with them. However, it states that if an individual commits or prepares to commit a cognisable offence after undergoing counselling, legal action should be initiated under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, with all such actions reported to the state headquarters.

While the Gujarat ARC has formally taken shape only this year, its origins date back over a decade. The idea of a dedicated deradicalisation mechanism first gained traction in 2015, at a Directors General and Inspectors General of Police conference in Gujarat’s Rann of Kutch, where the Telangana Police’s deradicalisation model was presented as a template for states grappling with online radicalisation.

In 2020, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Union home minister Amit Shah at the annual conference of DGPs and IGPs, recommended the idea of this cell.

The BJP subsequently promised to establish an ARC in its 2022 Gujarat assembly election manifesto, and began operationalising the proposal. Following the recommendations, a task force including a faculty head of the Gandhinagar-based Rashtriya Raksha University and police officials of the state Anti-Terrorism Squad, Crime Branch and Ahmedabad Central Jail was set up. But the project reportedly could not take off because of “lack of funds”.

On June 15, the SOP was circulated to district and commissionerate offices and laid out the ARC’s functioning – from identifying individuals deemed vulnerable to radicalisation and maintaining dossiers on them to counselling, rehabilitation and post-intervention monitoring. The SOP states that the ARC will function in coordination with district police units, the Special Operations Group (SOG), prison authorities and state Intelligence Bureau officers.

Communally targeted policing

Barrister Arif Ansari believes that this SOP is an open violation of the very basic fundamentals of the Constitution. “Article 14, 19, 21, 25, all are being buried under the kind of surveillance the state wants to impose on Muslims. This is state-sanctioned stereotyping and appears to be clearly motivated for electoral gains. India’s founding fathers made sure that all religions had equal respect and rights, but for Muslims, the morning begins with demolitions and evening ends with law being deployed against us,” Ansari told The Wire.

“After the 1980s, Gujarat became the laboratory of communal fascism. And the manufacturers of this policy were successful in planting this ideology in the state. Then we saw 2002, and the same politicians would be elected again and again,” Hiren Gandhi, a social activist, told The Wire.

While Gandhi recalls how post the 1980s, anti-Muslim leaders, policies and politics became the norm in Gujarat, he believes that the ARC should be placed in the broader context of how politics and sentiments have evolved in the BJP-run state.

“This kind of a mechanism is absolutely wrong but understand that it is nothing new. This is happening in ways and methods across India. During Covid-19, the same kind of radicalism rhetoric was peddled against the Tablighi Jamaat, they were dehumanised using their religion. This is a disgusting kind of politics killing democratic rights,” Gandhi said.

The SOP has also drawn political criticism. In a July 14 letter to Gujarat chief minister Bhupendra Patel, CPI(M) Rajya Sabha MP John Brittas urged the state government to keep its implementation in abeyance pending an independent review, arguing that several of its reported provisions risk conflating ordinary manifestations of Muslim religious identity with indicators of radicalisation.

“While intelligence agencies may legitimately monitor unlawful activities based on credible information, any framework that enables surveillance or profiling primarily on the basis of religion, appearance, language, dress or religious observance would raise profound constitutional concerns. Such measures, if undertaken without clearly defined legal thresholds, objective safeguards and judicial oversight, would be inconsistent with the constitutional guarantees of equality before law, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, dignity and privacy,” Brittas writes.

“Our constitutional jurisprudence has emphasised that the State cannot proceed on the basis of stereotypes or collective suspicion. Equality before law requires that every citizen be assessed on the basis of credible evidence of unlawful conduct, not on the basis of faith, cultural identity, attire, language, appearance or lawful religious practices. Any institutional framework that creates an impression of profiling a particular community would be inconsistent with the constitutional promise of equal protection of laws. Effective intelligence depends upon trust between citizens and law-enforcement agencies. Policies that appear to stigmatise an entire community undermine that trust, discourage cooperation with investigative agencies, and risk alienating precisely those citizens whose partnership is indispensable in combating extremism,” he continues.

Human rights campaigner Shabnam Hashmi asked why other kinds of radicalisation – often openly visible in today’s India – find no place in the SOP. “See, I will not dispute the fact that radicalisation is happening in different communities. But this opens up the gates to harass and pick up anyone they want to, and mainly people who have dissenting voices. That is that is what it will be used for. Secondly, if we are talking of radicalisation, what about the Hindu radicalisation? What about the threats which are being distributed openly? What about the Dharam Sansads, which are giving open calls to kill Muslims, to make India Islam-free, is that no radicalisation? This is very selective profiling of the Muslim community,” she told The Wire.

Hashmi added that while today, this Cell is targeting Muslims, “Tomorrow, it’ll target maybe Dalits, or Adivasi, or Christians.”

Former Chhattisgarh Special DGP R.K. Vij said that while radicalism is defined very widely in the SOP, the sub steps with regard to one community seem to be mentioned as an example. “This may also be understood whether Gujarat Police is mentioning the community owing to their past experience in the field,” Vij said.

The Wire reached out to Gujarat’s Deputy Inspector General of Police, Dr Sudhirkumar J. Desai, to ask about the phrasing used in the SOP and allegations of it being communally motivated. This article will be updated when a response is received.

With inputs from Sharmita Kar.

Tarushi Aswani is an independent journalist.

Courtesy: The Wire

The post For Gujarat Police, Beard, Niqab Make ‘Radicalisation’ Checklist, Cow Vigilantism Doesn’t appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In several cases across India especially over the last two years, police investigations and subsequent reporting have uncovered allegations that were not merely inaccurate but allegedly deliberately manufactured to implicate Muslims. These were not instances of mistaken identity or hurried conclusions. According to investigators, they involved conscious attempts to create communal flashpoints by exploiting existing prejudices around issues such as “love jihad”, Pakistan, cow slaughter, religious conversion and temple desecration. By the time the cycle is closed –deliberate dissemination and outrage, followed by investigation, the damage has been done.

What makes these incidents particularly significant is that each relied upon narratives that have become deeply embedded in India’s contemporary communal discourse. The allegations were believable not because they were supported by evidence, but because they echoed stereotypes that had already been normalised through decades of uncontested political rhetoric, misinformation and communal propaganda. This draws attention to the urgent need for social and political forces to immediately and systematically bust this rhetoric, one myth at a time.

Viewed individually, each incident may appear to be an isolated “conspiracy or local criminal act”. Viewed together, however, they reveal a disturbing pattern in which religion itself becomes a political weapon, with fabricated allegations serving as instruments to deepen suspicion, reinforce prejudice and fracture relations between communities.

2026: Manufacturing communal hatred through false allegations, staged incidents and misinformation

• A 12-year-old allegedly used to manufacture a communal controversy

On June 21, 2026, thousands gathered in Bareilly district for the traditional Muharram Tazia procession, one of the most significant observances in the Islamic calendar. Amid the procession, a short video suddenly began circulating across WhatsApp groups and social media platforms. The clip appeared to show a 12-year-old boy shouting “Pakistan Zindabad.” The implication was immediate and inflammatory: that pro-Pakistan slogans had been raised during a Muslim religious procession.

Given the charged political atmosphere surrounding such allegations, the video quickly acquired communal overtones. Similar allegations in the past have often been invoked to portray Indian Muslims as anti-national, resulting in criminal cases, public outrage and demands for punitive action. But the investigation reportedly uncovered an altogether different narrative.

According to police findings reported by Deccan Herald, the child had allegedly not acted on his own. Investigators found that two adult men had encouraged and instructed the boy to raise the slogan while ensuring that the incident was recorded on video. The purpose, investigators alleged, was to create precisely the kind of viral content that would portray the Muslim procession in a communal light and provoke public anger.

The incident illustrates how communal narratives can now be so easily manufactured with extraordinary simplicity. A child, a mobile phone and a few seconds of video were allegedly enough to produce material capable of triggering nationwide outrage before investigators could establish the facts.

Had the police accepted the viral clip at face value, the episode might simply have entered the long list of alleged instances used to stigmatise an entire community. Instead, the investigation reportedly suggested that the controversy itself had been orchestrated.

• A fabricated ‘Love Jihad’ case unravels in Uttar Pradesh

Barely three weeks earlier, another investigation exposed what may be one of the clearest examples of how communal narratives themselves can allegedly be weaponised. On June 2, 2026, police in Uttar Pradesh booked a Vishwa Hindu Parishad supporter, Nakul Gurjar, after an investigation into what initially appeared to be a routine “love jihad” complaint took an unexpected turn.

According to The Siasat Daily, a woman named Bhawna allegedly told investigators that Gurjar had approached her with a proposal: she would falsely implicate two Muslim men in a “love jihad” case. In return, she was allegedly promised employment and financial compensation. Investigators further alleged that the plan involved extorting ₹10 lakh from the two Muslim men after trapping them in fabricated criminal allegations. Notably, the incident took place on May 30 in Meerut’s Jagriti Vihar Extension area, and within five hours of questioning by the Meerut police, they realised that it was a trap.

The case was particularly significant because “love jihad” allegations have frequently been invoked in political speeches, criminal prosecutions and public campaigns across several states. Such allegations often generate immediate public outrage, long before investigations establish whether any criminal offence has occurred. Here, however, police alleged that the conspiracy was not the crime supposedly committed by Muslim men—but the creation of the allegation itself.

The investigation therefore exposed how one of the country’s most politically potent communal narratives could allegedly be manipulated for extortion, criminal intimidation and communal mobilisation.

• Police allege a cow slaughter case was staged to implicate a Muslim man

Few allegations inflame communal passions in India as rapidly as accusations involving cow slaughter. Against that backdrop, the investigation conducted in Bijnor, Uttar Pradesh, assumed extraordinary significance.

According to The Print, Uttar Pradesh Police alleged that a man named Jagpal had orchestrated a cow slaughter incident with the intention of falsely implicating a Muslim resident. Three people, including a village head here, were arrested for allegedly conspiring to get a calf slaughtered to falsely implicate a potential rival in the upcoming gram pradhan election. Initial allegations were being levelled against one Hasan and his associates in connection with the incident. However, acting on a tip-off, police arrested Faizan following an encounter. During questioning, he allegedly revealed that he and his associates had carried out the act at the behest of incumbent village pradhan Jagpal and his brother Kiranpal. Notably, Additional Superintendent of Police (Rural) Prakash Kumar said parts of a bovine calf were found in a field in Changipur village under Noorpur police station limits on June 18. The arrest took place on June 21.

The alleged conspiracy reversed the assumptions that typically accompany such cases. Ordinarily, public discourse begins with the presumption that a cow has been slaughtered and investigators are searching for the guilty party. In this instance, investigators instead alleged that the incident itself had been engineered to ensure suspicion immediately fell upon a Muslim individual.

The implications extend well beyond this single case. Across northern India, allegations of cow slaughter have repeatedly resulted in mob violence, social boycotts, arrests and, in several instances, lynchings. Where such allegations are themselves fabricated, the accusation becomes a weapon capable of unleashing consequences that far outlast the eventual investigation.

The Bijnor case therefore demonstrates how communal stereotypes can allegedly be converted into instruments of criminal conspiracy, relying on the expectation that public suspicion would naturally gravitate towards Muslims before evidence had even been examined.

When fabricated allegations become political capital

These incidents also reveal another important characteristic of communal misinformation. False allegations rarely remain confined to social media. Once they begin circulating, they often find their way into public speeches, neighbourhood conversations, local protests and political campaigns. Each viral post becomes another anecdote supporting larger claims that Muslims are systematically threatening Hindu society.

Even after police investigations or independent fact-checks expose the fabrication, the original allegation often continues to circulate, detached from the correction. This asymmetry gives false communal narratives extraordinary power. The accusation spreads nationally, while the correction remains local. The allegation reinforces prejudice, however the investigation receives comparatively little attention.

Old Videos, New Hatred: How misinformation was used to manufacture communal flashpoints

If the Bareilly, Bijnor and “love jihad” conspiracies demonstrated how criminal allegations could allegedly be fabricated to implicate Muslims, another set of incidents from 2026 revealed an equally dangerous strategy: the deliberate communalisation of unrelated videos and events.

In an era where a thirty-second clip can reach millions before fact-checkers or investigators intervene, misinformation has become one of the most effective tools for manufacturing communal outrage. Images stripped of context, unrelated incidents relabelled as religious conflict, and fabricated narratives built around genuine videos have repeatedly been used to reinforce the perception that Muslims are engaged in organised attacks on Hindus.

Investigations into several such incidents in 2026 exposed how communal narratives were constructed not through evidence but through strategic distortion.

• Temple brawl falsely portrayed as violence by Muslims during Eid celebrations

In early June 2026, social media users began circulating a video purportedly showing Muslims attacking Hindus during Eid celebrations. The footage, which rapidly spread across multiple platforms, was accompanied by captions alleging that Muslims had entered a temple premises and violently assaulted devotees during the festival.

The claims carried all the ingredients of a communal flashpoint. Shared without context, the video appeared to confirm a narrative frequently promoted online—that Hindu religious spaces were increasingly under attack from Muslims. However, an investigation by AFP Fact Check dismantled the viral claim. Notably, the video had been posted on May 23, while it was only on May 29 that a local assistant police inspector at the Kodoli police station, Chetan Masutage, confirmed to AFP that “no Muslims were involved” in the clash.

The fact-check found that the footage had absolutely no connection with Eid celebrations or communal violence. Instead, it depicted a local altercation at an Indian temple involving individuals from the same community, with no evidence whatsoever that Muslims had participated in the incident. The communal captions accompanying the video had been entirely fabricated after the fact. By changing only the accompanying text—not the video itself—those circulating the clip transformed an ordinary local dispute into what appeared to be evidence of organised communal aggression.

The episode highlighted one of the defining characteristics of modern misinformation campaigns: authenticity of footage is often less important than authenticity of context. A genuine video can become a powerful vehicle for falsehood once stripped of its original circumstances. For many viewers, the correction never travelled as far as the original allegation.

• A scripted entertainment video recast as evidence of ‘Love Jihad’

During December 2025, another misleading video spread rapidly across social media. This time, the clip appeared to show a Muslim man pretending to be Hindu in order to trap a Hindu woman, reinforcing familiar “love jihad” narratives that have become central to communal campaigns across several states. The video was uploaded by a user named ‘monty_deepak_sharma’ on December 3, 2025, with Factly busting the myth on December 15, 2025.

The accompanying captions claimed that the footage was genuine evidence exposing the tactics allegedly employed by Muslim men to deceive Hindu women by concealing their identities. The claims were false. An investigation by Factly established that the video was not a real incident at all. It had been created as scripted entertainment content, with actors performing fictional roles for online audiences. There was no criminal offence, no deception, and no evidence that the events portrayed had occurred.

Yet once detached from its original context, the fictional performance acquired an entirely different political meaning. The transformation was revealing. Rather than creating fabricated evidence from scratch, misinformation networks increasingly repurpose existing content—films, comedy sketches, staged performances or old recordings—and present them as documentary proof of communal conspiracies.

The objective is not merely to deceive viewers about a single incident but to reinforce broader stereotypes already circulating within public discourse. By the time the video was debunked, thousands had already viewed it as confirmation that “love jihad” was an organised and continuing phenomenon.

The mechanics of communal misinformation

The two episodes shared a striking similarity. Neither required forged documents, or sophisticated digital manipulation. Both relied upon something much simpler: removing context. A temple dispute became an alleged Muslim attack, and a scripted performance became evidence of organised religious conspiracy. The resulting narratives fit seamlessly into pre-existing communal stereotypes, making them both believable and highly shareable.

When it comes to misinformation, it has been repeatedly observed that false communal claims succeed not merely because they are dramatic but because they resonate with narratives audiences have already encountered. Once those narratives become familiar, new allegations require remarkably little evidence to appear credible. The incidents from June 2026 illustrate precisely this dynamic.

Rather than inventing entirely new stories, those spreading the misinformation borrowed ordinary events and inserted them into a communal framework that portrayed Muslims as aggressors. The factual details became secondary; the communal message remained central.

2025: Fabricated evidence, fake identities and manufactured communal narratives

If the cases from 2026 demonstrated how communal narratives could be manufactured through staged incidents and misinformation, the events that unfolded across India in 2025 revealed an even broader phenomenon. Investigations that year uncovered allegations ranging from fake terror threats and fabricated “love jihad” claims to staged temple vandalism and the deliberate assumption of Muslim identities to commit crimes.

Taken together, these incidents exposed how communal stereotypes themselves had become tools that could be exploited for political mobilisation, extortion, personal vendettas and public incitement. In each case, the initial accusation targeted Muslims; only later did investigations reveal a very different story.

• Temple walls defaced to falsely implicate Muslims

Few incidents generated as much outrage in 2025 as the discovery of provocative graffiti on the walls of several temples in Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh.

In late October, devotees arriving at the temples found messages reading “I Love Muhammad” scrawled across the walls. Photographs of the vandalised temples spread rapidly across social media, accompanied by claims that Muslims had deliberately desecrated Hindu places of worship to provoke communal unrest.

Given the emotionally charged nature of the incident, outrage followed almost immediately. The graffiti was widely projected as another instance of religious provocation by Muslims, reinforcing existing narratives that Hindu religious spaces were under deliberate attack.

The police investigation, however, fundamentally altered the narrative. According to a report of Times of India, the vandalism had not been carried out by Muslims at all. Instead, police registered an FIR against five individuals, alleging that they had deliberately written the slogans on temple walls to frame local Muslim residents and inflame communal tensions. Reports further noted that the investigation was aided by the fact that the slogan itself had been misspelled—a detail that contributed to unravelling the conspiracy and identifying the accused. Four persons were subsequently arrested in connection with the case. Police said the slogans were found scribbled on four shrines on October 25, with the police discovering the truth on October 31, 2025.

The incident was remarkable because it inverted the assumptions surrounding communal vandalism. What initially appeared to be an act of religious desecration by Muslims was instead alleged to have been an attempt to manufacture precisely that perception. Rather than responding to communal hostility, investigators suggested that the hostility itself was being consciously engineered. Had the conspiracy not been uncovered, the graffiti would likely have entered public memory as yet another example of alleged Muslim aggression against Hindu religious sites. Instead, it became evidence of how easily religious symbols can be manipulated to produce communal suspicion.

• A fake terror threat designed to implicate Muslims

Another investigation in 2025 demonstrated how even national security concerns could be exploited to create communal suspicion. In September 2025, police investigating a terror threat directed at Mumbai initially appeared to be dealing with a potentially serious security matter. Threat messages had created alarm and naturally attracted attention because of their apparent association with terrorism. The investigation eventually revealed something far less ideological but equally revealing.

According to police, as per the report of Times of India, the accused had allegedly fabricated the threat to settle a personal dispute with a former friend. The case exposed how terror allegations—particularly when associated with Muslim identities—could be weaponised to give greater credibility to personal vendettas and amplify public fear.  Although the motive was reportedly personal rather than communal, the incident reflected a broader pattern observed across several cases: exploiting prevailing public assumptions about Muslims and terrorism to make fabricated allegations appear instantly believable. Notably, the issue had come to the forefront on September 4, with police uncovering the truth on September 6.

• The Nishikant Dubey death threat case where a Hindu man allegedly posed as a Muslim

One of the most politically significant cases of the year involved BJP Member of Parliament Nishikant Dubey. In September 2025, Scroll reported, Dubey withdrew a complaint filed ragainst the death threats received by him allegedly from a Muslim individual after it was revealed that the person behind the same was a Hindu. The narrative changed dramatically after the police investigation.

According to reports, investigators found that the person responsible was not a Muslim at all but a Hindu man who had allegedly assumed a Muslim identity while issuing the threats. Following the findings, Dubey withdrew his complaint.  The case underscored the ease with which communal assumptions could shape public perception. In July 2018, the Delhi Police had filed the case based on a complaint by the Godda MP, who had alleged that a prisoner in Jharkhand’s Sahibganj jail had threatened to kill him, according to The New Indian Express. On September 3, Dubey said on social media that the investigation into the case had found that a resident of Godda district’s Kumardih village, Kundan Kumar Das, had threatened him and “conspired to frame some Muslim boys” in the case.

Simply attributing the threats to a Muslim identity was sufficient to generate widespread political attention. The subsequent revelation that the accused had allegedly fabricated that identity received comparatively limited public discussion.

From individual conspiracies to a recurring pattern

The episode illustrated how communal identities themselves can become instruments of deception, allowing fabricated allegations to acquire immediate credibility because they align with existing prejudices. The Dubey incident was not an isolated example. Throughout 2025, multiple reports documented instances where individuals deliberately assumed Muslim names or identities while committing crimes, fully aware that such identities would immediately invite suspicion or reinforce communal stereotypes. An analysis published by The Quint examined this emerging phenomenon, documenting several cases in which accused persons allegedly used fake Muslim names to commit offences ranging from fraud to harassment. Investigators in these cases found that the perpetrators were not Muslims but individuals exploiting communal biases to misdirect investigations or inflame religious tensions.  The significance of this pattern lies beyond individual criminality. A fake Muslim identity is effective only because it taps into an existing social expectation—that crimes attributed to Muslims are more readily believed, more likely to provoke outrage, and more easily woven into larger communal narratives. In this sense, prejudice itself becomes an operational tool for deception.

The events of 2025 reveal an important shift. These were no longer simply false rumours circulating on anonymous social media accounts. Investigations uncovered planned acts of vandalism, fabricated criminal complaints, assumed religious identities, and manufactured evidence, all allegedly designed to ensure that suspicion would immediately fall upon Muslims. Whether the objective was extortion, personal revenge, political mobilisation or communal provocation, the method remained strikingly consistent.

The accusation came first, public outrage followed, with the truth emerging only later. By then, the communal narrative had often already achieved its purpose.

From Manufactured Narratives to Public Mobilisation

The cases discussed thus far reveal how fabricated allegations can be used to falsely implicate Muslims in individual criminal incidents. But the consequences of these narratives do not end with police complaints or viral social media posts. Once a false claim enters public discourse, it often acquires a life of its own. Political speeches, protest gatherings, neighbourhood meetings and organised campaigns begin invoking these allegations as proof of a broader conspiracy. Individual incidents—whether verified or entirely fabricated—are woven together to portray Muslims as a collective threat.

Several incidents from 2025 illustrate precisely how unverified or demonstrably false allegations were invoked to justify communal mobilisation and discrimination.

• A double murder transformed into a speech about ‘jihadis’

On April 20, 2025, members of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Bajrang Dal organised a protest in Karol Bagh, Delhi, following the murders of Karan and Rakesh Sood. The murders themselves were reportedly being investigated as arising from a monetary dispute. Yet during the protest, speakers shifted the focus away from the facts of the case and instead sought to place the incident within a much larger communal narrative.

According to documentation by Hindutva Watch, one speaker described Muslims as people with a “jihadi mentality”, claiming that they were those who “sell drugs” and “fix punctures” before alleging that they routinely targeted Hindu society through organised conspiracies. Rather than discussing the evidence surrounding the murders, the speakers repeatedly referred to “jihadis,” portraying the crime as part of a broader communal campaign.  The speech then moved beyond the Delhi murders altogether.

One of the speakers invoked a controversy involving Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) in Nashik, claiming that 188 Hindu women had been subjected to a “collective sexual assault” by Muslim employees as part of a “love jihad” conspiracy. This allegation had already circulated widely across social media.

Despite their being no concrete evidence whatsoever supporting the extraordinary claim that 188 Hindu women had been sexually assaulted or forcibly converted by Muslim employees working at TCS. Despite the absence of evidence, the allegation was presented before a public gathering as an established fact.

Read detailed report here.

The speaker proceeded to claim that Muslims working in multinational companies deliberately identify vulnerable Hindu women during job interviews, lure them into relationships, compel them to wear hijabs and burqas, invite them to iftar gatherings, secretly record intimate encounters, and later blackmail them into religious conversion. None of these sweeping allegations was supported by evidence during the speech. Instead, a series of unverified and previously debunked claims was woven together into a single narrative portraying Muslim professionals as participants in a nationwide conspiracy against Hindu women.  The significance of the Karol Bagh speech lies not merely in its rhetoric but in its method.

Rather than introducing entirely new allegations, the speaker recycled existing misinformation, presenting previously discredited claims as factual proof before a politically charged audience. The result was the transformation of an unrelated criminal investigation into another platform for communal mobilisation.

• When misinformation becomes the basis for discrimination

The consequences of such narratives extend beyond speeches. Throughout 2025, allegations of “love jihad”—many of them unsupported or later disproved—continued to influence everyday interactions between communities. One striking example emerged from Indore, Madhya Pradesh, where reports documented how Muslim traders and workers were pushed out of a local market after rumours and allegations surrounding “love jihad” gained traction.

According to reporting by Religion Unplugged, Muslim shopkeepers and workers found themselves increasingly excluded from commercial activity as suspicion fuelled by communal narratives translated into social and economic discrimination. Businesses that had operated in the market for years suddenly faced hostility because of collective allegations directed at Muslims rather than any proven misconduct by individual traders.

The episode demonstrates how misinformation rarely remains confined to the digital sphere. False narratives eventually reshape real lives, employment opportunities disappear, businesses suffer, neighbourhood relationships deteriorate and entire communities become suspect.

The cumulative effect of repeated falsehoods

The significance of these incidents lies not only in the fact that individual allegations were eventually disproved, but also in the cumulative effect they have on public discourse. In many cases, police investigations exposed fabricated complaints, independent fact-checks debunked misleading videos, and courts rejected prosecutions that lacked credible evidence. However, by the time these findings emerged, the original allegations had often already reached a much wider audience.

False communal narratives rarely operate in isolation. Instead, each new allegation builds upon earlier ones, creating a larger body of stories that appear to reinforce one another. A fabricated “love jihad” allegation strengthens existing perceptions shaped by previous claims. A staged Pakistan slogan is viewed alongside earlier allegations of anti-national activity. Acts of vandalism falsely attributed to Muslims are cited as further proof of an already accepted narrative. As these incidents accumulate, repetition begins to substitute for evidence.

This creates an environment in which suspicion becomes normalised. Allegations against Muslims are more readily accepted because they resemble stories that have circulated before, regardless of whether those earlier claims were ever substantiated. Even after investigations disprove individual incidents, the broader narrative often survives, continuing to shape public perceptions long after the facts have been established.

When investigations expose the truth

Another striking feature of many of the incidents discussed in this investigation is that the conspiracies were not uncovered by speculation or political debate, but through official investigations.

In several cases, it was the police who concluded that a child had allegedly been coached to raise Pakistan slogans during the Muharram procession in Bareilly. Police investigations also uncovered alleged conspiracies involving fabricated “love jihad” complaints, identified those accused of defacing temples in Aligarh to falsely implicate Muslims, and reportedly found that a Hindu man had assumed a Muslim identity while issuing death threats.

These findings highlight an important aspect of the problem. The issue is not simply that misinformation circulates, but that communal allegations often gain widespread acceptance before they are properly investigated. By the time police complete their inquiries or courts assess the evidence, the original claims have frequently spread through social media platforms, messaging applications, television debates and public speeches. Although official investigations may ultimately establish the facts, they often struggle to undo the impact of allegations that have already entered the public consciousness.

The Pattern Did Not Begin in 2026: Earlier cases reveal how false allegations against Muslims can endure for years before the truth emerges

The incidents of 2025 and 2026 are not isolated aberrations. They belong to a much longer trajectory in which allegations against Muslims have often acquired legitimacy long before they are subjected to judicial scrutiny or independent investigation.

In several cases, the truth has emerged only after years of litigation, prolonged criminal proceedings or detailed fact-checking exercises. By that stage, however, those accused have frequently spent years defending themselves against allegations that eventually failed to withstand scrutiny.

The following cases illustrate the enduring costs of weaponising communal accusations:

• Six years after being branded ‘pro-Pakistan’, seventeen Muslim men were found to have been falsely prosecuted

One of the clearest examples comes from Madhya Pradesh, where 17 Muslim men were accused in 2017 of celebrating Pakistan’s victory after an India-Pakistan cricket match. The allegations carried enormous political weight.

Celebrating Pakistan’s victory in India is frequently portrayed not merely as poor judgment but as evidence of anti-national sentiment and disloyalty. The accusation quickly attracted public attention and reinforced familiar stereotypes questioning the patriotism of Indian Muslims. For the seventeen accused men, however, the allegations translated into criminal prosecution. It was only six years later, in March 2024, that courts examining the evidence concluded that the prosecution’s case could not be sustained.

As reported by Article 14, the courts found that the police case was false, effectively bringing to an end year of legal uncertainty faced by the accused. The judgment exposed serious deficiencies in the evidence relied upon to prosecute the men and underscored the dangers of criminal cases driven by communal assumptions rather than credible proof.

The case raises difficult questions about the consequences of false communal allegations. Even where courts ultimately reject such prosecutions, the process itself becomes punishment. Years spent attending court hearings, legal expenses, social stigma and the label of being “anti-national” cannot simply be erased by an acquittal or dismissal. The correction comes, but it comes years too late.

• Ramzan, Roza and the allegation of forced conversion

Another case that drew significant attention emerged from Uttar Pradesh during Ramzan 2025. A Muslim woman was arrested under the state’s anti-conversion law after allegations that she had persuaded a minor Hindu girl to observe roza (fasting) and convert to Islam. The allegations immediately acquired communal significance because they appeared to fit within broader political narratives surrounding unlawful religious conversions. Subsequent reporting, however, suggested that the factual background was far more complex.

According to The Wire, the dispute appeared to revolve less around organised religious conversion than around personal and financial disagreements between the families involved. The report questioned the evidentiary basis of invoking anti-conversion legislation and examined how routine interpersonal disputes could become transformed into allegations of religious conversion once communal narratives entered the picture. Crucial to note is that an FIR was lodged in Jhansi on March 13, 2025 after a Hindu man alleged that his daughter aged 16 was lured by two Muslim women in his neighbourhood to keep fast during Ramzan in a bid to convert her to Islam. On March 26, additional sessions judge Jhansi Vijay Kumar Verma denied bail to Shahnaz.

Whether or not criminal liability ultimately survives judicial scrutiny, the case illustrates how allegations of conversion can rapidly escalate into communal controversies before investigators establish the underlying facts.

• Karnataka: A neighbourhood scuffle falsely communalised

Another example emerged from Karnataka, where claims circulated widely alleging that Muslims had pelted stones at a Ganesh idol. The allegation spread quickly across social media and was presented yet another instance of religious hostility directed against Hindu festivals. Independent verification, however, told a different story. Notably, Kreately Media, which has shared communal misinformation on several occasions, shared the video on X on September 4 and wrote, “They hate idol worshippers”.

An investigation by Alt News, published just a day later, found that the viral claims were misleading. Rather than a communal attack by Muslims, the incident stemmed from a scuffle involving Hindu groups, with no evidence supporting the allegation that Muslims had targeted the Ganesh idol. The communal framing had been added only after the incident entered social media circulation.

Like the temple video falsely linked to Eid celebrations in 2026, the Karnataka episode demonstrated how ordinary disputes can be stripped of their original context and repackaged as evidence of communal aggression. The transformation requires little more than an altered caption. The consequences, however, can be profound.

A recurring blueprint for communal polarisation

Although the incidents documented in this investigation differ in their immediate facts, they reveal a remarkably consistent pattern in the way communal narratives are constructed and disseminated. The allegations vary—from Pakistan slogans and “love jihad” to cow slaughter, religious conversion, temple desecration and terrorism—but the underlying method remains strikingly similar.

In almost every case, the sequence follows a familiar trajectory. A sensational allegation is made, often identifying Muslims as the perpetrators at the outset. The claim is then amplified through social media platforms, messaging applications, local networks and, in some instances, political speeches or public demonstrations. The allegations generate widespread public outrage before investigators have had an opportunity to verify the facts. It is only later, through police investigations, independent journalism, fact-checking organisations or judicial proceedings, that the accuracy of the original claims comes under scrutiny.

As the cases examined here demonstrate, a significant number of these allegations either proved to be entirely fabricated or were found to be materially different from the narratives that initially captured public attention. By that stage, however, the allegations had often already entered public discourse, making the subsequent corrections far less visible than the original claims.

The incidents documented in this investigation point to a phenomenon that extends beyond the spread of misinformation. They demonstrate how existing communal prejudices can be deliberately exploited because those responsible understand that allegations involving Muslims often attract immediate public attention and are less likely to be questioned in their initial stages.

Whether it is a fabricated Pakistan slogan, a staged act of temple vandalism, a false allegation of “love jihad” or a misleading claim of religious conversion, these narratives frequently gain traction because they resonate with stereotypes that have already become embedded in sections of public discourse. The allegations are often amplified long before evidence is examined, allowing them to shape public opinion even if they are later disproved.

The consequences are significant. Individuals falsely accused may face criminal proceedings, social ostracism, threats, economic losses and lasting damage to their reputations. More broadly, such allegations reinforce collective suspicion towards an entire community, contributing to an atmosphere in which discrimination and exclusion appear increasingly justified.

In this sense, the weaponisation of religion is not confined to the dissemination of hate speech. It also involves the strategic use of fabricated or misleading allegations to lend credibility to existing prejudices and to normalise distrust of a particular community. Even when investigations eventually expose the truth, the original allegations often continue to influence public perceptions, demonstrating that the impact of such narratives frequently extends well beyond the outcome of any individual case.

Need: Sustained Hate Watch Campaigns at the Community & professional levels

This unbroken and cynical cycle of targeting misinformation and hate needs equally sustained and creative contestation, intervention. From housing societies, classrooms, playgrounds to parks, local trains and buses, discourses need to foreground the dangers of such invidious blood-letting. CJP has attempted in the past and continues to generate materials and interventions that can be used as discursive tools to combat this phenomenon. Read about these efforts here, here, here, here, here and here.

Conclusion: The Constitutional Cost of Manufactured Communal Narratives

Viewed in isolation, each of the incidents documented in this investigation may appear to be an unrelated act of misinformation, a local criminal conspiracy, or an instance of communal rumour. The motives also differ. In some cases, the objective appears to have been extortion or personal revenge; in others, political mobilisation, social media attention, or the deliberate creation of communal unrest. Yet, when these incidents are examined together, they reveal a strikingly consistent pattern in the manufacture and circulation of false allegations against Muslims.

The pattern extends far beyond the simple spread of misinformation. It demonstrates how certain allegations are repeatedly chosen because they draw upon narratives that are already deeply embedded in public discourse. Whether the incident occurred in Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Karnataka or Madhya Pradesh, the accusations almost invariably revolved around the same themes: “love jihad“, Pakistan slogans, cow slaughter, religious conversion, temple desecration, terrorism or attacks on Hindu festivals. These are not random allegations. They are accusations that have, over the years, acquired enormous political and emotional resonance. As a result, they require relatively little supporting evidence to gain traction because they reinforce stories that sections of the public have already heard repeatedly through political speeches, television debates, election campaigns and social media.

One of the clearest lessons emerging from these cases is that the accusation itself often becomes more consequential than the truth. In many of the incidents discussed in this investigation, police investigations, independent journalists, fact-checking organisations or courts ultimately dismantled the original allegations. The Bareilly incident revealed that a child had allegedly been coached to raise Pakistan slogans during a Muharram procession. Investigations uncovered alleged conspiracies to fabricate “love jihad” cases and falsely implicate Muslim youths. Police reportedly exposed a plan to frame a Muslim man in a fabricated cow slaughter case in Bijnor. The Aligarh temple graffiti investigation led to the arrest of individuals accused of writing provocative slogans to falsely implicate Muslims. Investigators also found that a Hindu man had allegedly posed as a Muslim while issuing death threats to a Member of Parliament. Earlier cases similarly exposed misleading communal claims surrounding Ganesh festival violence, false allegations of conversion, and criminal prosecutions that courts later found to be baseless.

These investigations underline an important reality. The problem is not simply that misinformation exists; it is that false communal allegations often become accepted as truth before any meaningful investigation has taken place. Investigations require time. Evidence must be collected, witnesses examined and facts verified. Social media operates according to an entirely different logic. Within hours, an allegation can spread across WhatsApp groups, Facebook pages, Telegram channels and X, before being repeated by political actors, local organisations or television debates. By the time investigators establish what actually occurred, the original narrative has often travelled much further than the correction.

The incidents examined in this investigation also reveal a remarkably consistent blueprint for communal polarisation. In case after case, the sequence follows the same trajectory. A sensational allegation is first made against Muslims. The allegation is then amplified through social media, local networks and, in some instances, political speeches or public gatherings. Public outrage follows almost immediately, while the factual basis of the allegation remains unverified. Only later do police investigations, fact-checking organisations, journalists or courts examine the evidence. In a significant number of the cases documented here, that evidence proved the original allegations to be false, misleading or materially different from the claims that had initially captured public attention.

The cumulative effect of these repeated falsehoods is perhaps even more significant than any individual incident. A single fabricated allegation may eventually be disproved, but communal narratives do not function in isolation. Each new accusation builds upon earlier ones, creating an ecosystem in which repetition gradually substitutes for evidence. A fabricated “love jihad” allegation reinforces memories of previous claims. A staged Pakistan slogan appears to confirm existing suspicions. A false allegation of temple desecration is interpreted alongside earlier rumours. Over time, these incidents collectively contribute to an environment in which allegations against Muslims appear increasingly plausible simply because similar stories have circulated before, regardless of whether those earlier stories were ever substantiated.

This process has profound implications for the administration of justice. Criminal law is built upon the principle that individuals are judged on the basis of evidence and personal culpability. The incidents documented here demonstrate how communal narratives frequently abandon that principle. Allegations against one individual are projected as evidence of the conduct of an entire community. In some of the cases discussed in this investigation, even that individual culpability proved illusory because investigators found that Muslims had been falsely implicated from the outset. Yet the allegations continued to reinforce broader stereotypes portraying Muslims as inherently suspect, disloyal or dangerous. In this way, fabricated allegations cease to be about individual criminal conduct and instead become instruments for the collective criminalisation of an entire religious community.

Equally troubling is the imbalance between the reach of the allegation and the reach of the correction. The original accusation often receives extensive media attention, dominates social media conversations and becomes the subject of political speeches and public mobilisation. By contrast, the eventual finding that the allegation was fabricated or unsupported frequently receives only limited coverage. Many people remember hearing that Pakistan slogans were raised or that temples had been desecrated. Far fewer remember learning that police later concluded the slogans had allegedly been orchestrated or that the vandalism had reportedly been staged to implicate Muslims. This asymmetry ensures that even disproved allegations continue to influence public memory long after they have collapsed under scrutiny.

The consequences extend well beyond misinformation. Individuals who are falsely accused may face criminal investigations, arrests, prolonged legal proceedings, threats, economic hardship and lasting reputational harm. Communities become increasingly vulnerable to social boycotts, discrimination and exclusion. Businesses suffer, neighbourhood relationships deteriorate and public trust between communities weakens. Even where investigations ultimately establish the truth, they cannot easily undo the social and psychological damage caused by the original allegations.

The cases documented in this investigation therefore demonstrate that the weaponisation of religion today is not confined to inflammatory speeches or overt acts of communal violence. Increasingly, it operates through the manufacture of facts themselves. A staged slogan, a fabricated criminal complaint, a misleading video, a false identity, an edited clip or a rumour repeated often enough can become the foundation upon which broader communal narratives are constructed. The objective is not always to secure convictions in a court of law. More often, it is to secure convictions in the court of public opinion, where allegations spread rapidly and corrections struggle to command equal attention.

This raises important constitutional concerns. India’s constitutional framework rests upon the promise that every individual will be treated equally before the law, irrespective of religion. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. Article 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, among other protected characteristics. Article 21, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, protects not only life and personal liberty but also the dignity and reputation of every individual. Equally fundamental to the criminal justice system is the presumption of innocence—the principle that guilt must be established through evidence, tested through due process and determined by an independent court. Manufactured communal allegations invert each of these principles. Suspicion precedes investigation, identity precedes evidence, and public outrage often precedes due process.

Ultimately, the incidents examined in this investigation are not merely stories about misinformation or isolated conspiracies. Together, they expose a recurring method by which religion can be weaponised to manufacture social divisions and legitimise discrimination. They illustrate how carefully crafted falsehoods, amplified through digital platforms and public discourse, can transform unverified allegations into accepted truths, often with serious consequences for those falsely accused and for communal harmony more broadly.

The greatest danger, therefore, is not simply that false allegations continue to be made. It is that they are repeatedly constructed around familiar communal stereotypes, allowing prejudice itself to become the foundation upon which those allegations are believed. In such an environment, the rule of law is weakened, constitutional guarantees are placed under strain, and the distinction between fact and communal fiction becomes increasingly blurred. Protecting India’s constitutional commitment to equality, secularism and due process requires not only exposing individual falsehoods but also recognising—and resisting—the broader pattern through which fabricated communal narratives are repeatedly manufactured, amplified and deployed to deepen religious polarisation.

Related:

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How big tech is profiting from Hindutva hate music

Judging the Judge: The communal backlash against a lynching verdict

Shared Muharram Heritage: Hindus lead Tazias, Sikhs serve water

Nazia Elahi Khan faces multiple FIRs over alleged hate speech

Bombay HC condemns use of externment to silence political dissent; says opposition to government cannot be treated as a crime

The post Weaponising religion, manufacturing distrust appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Two days after the child, who had stepped out on Saturday afternoon to buy a birthday gift, was allegedly abducted, sexually assaulted and murdered, Surjyapur remains suspended between grief and rage. Four arrests have been made, a Special Investigation Team (SIT) has been constituted and further raids are underway. Yet for residents, the biggest question remains unanswered: could the crime have been prevented had authorities acted faster?

Nearly two years after the rape and murder of a trainee doctor inside RG Kar Medical College Hospital triggered one of Bengal’s biggest public movements, another brutal crime against a girl has once again shaken the state. This time, however, the epicentre of anger is not Kolkata but this village in South 24 Parganas, where protests continue to erupt in different corners rather than under one organised banner.

On Tuesday, there was no single protest site. Small groups of residents could be seen outside the victim’s house, near the Surjyapur police outpost, around the block office and at local crossings. The slogans may have become quieter than Sunday’s fury, but the demand has remained unchanged: justice without delay.

Surjyapur Residents Allege Police Delay, Demand Swift Justice

“We are not scared because police are here,” says Sagir Ali, who witnessed the recovery of the child’s body from the pond. “We are scared because if this could happen to an 11-year-old in our village, it can happen to anyone.”

He recalled standing a short distance away as villagers pulled the body from the water.

“I could not go closer. She was just a little girl. I felt shattered. Around 10 to 12 of us were present, but there was no administration at the spot when the body was recovered. We want nothing less than the severest punishment for those responsible.”

Residents repeatedly alleged that they, not the police, took the lead in tracing the suspects.

Juli Seikh, one of the villagers who participated in the search, claimed locals reviewed CCTV footage from nearby shops, identified two suspects, tracked them down and caught them before handing them over to police.

“It was us who checked the CCTV footage and caught them,” he alleged. “If villagers had not acted immediately, would the arrests have happened this quickly?”

Several residents also accused the police of failing to respond promptly after an FIR was lodged at Baruipur Police Station.

There are further allegations that local BJP workers attempted to intervene after villagers handed over the suspects to police, and that pressure was exerted to secure their release on Sunday. The allegation could not be independently verified, and there has been no official response from the BJP.

The sense of insecurity has spread far beyond the victim’s family. Parents say they are no longer allowing young children, especially girls, to step out alone even for routine errands. Conversations in tea stalls, markets and village lanes repeatedly return to the same question: “If an 11-year-old is not safe here, who is?”

The child’s body, stuffed inside a sack, was recovered from a pond in the Surjyapur Haat area on Sunday morning after she had gone missing the previous afternoon. The shocking discovery transformed grief into fury.

Hundreds of residents from Surjyapur and neighbouring villages poured onto the streets, blocking the Baruipur–Joynagar Road and railway tracks for several hours. Tyres were set on fire, a police vehicle was vandalised and protesters demanded immediate arrests and exemplary punishment.

Amid the violence, one man suspected by the crowd of involvement in the crime was allegedly beaten to death by an enraged mob, underscoring the intensity of public anger.

Political Reactions Intensify as Protests Continue in Surjyapur

Facing mounting pressure, police arrested four persons in connection with the case by Monday. A Special Investigation Team has been formed and further raids are continuing.

Inspector General of Police Kankarprasad Barui assured that every person found involved in the crime would face the maximum punishment under the law. The post-mortem report is awaited to determine the exact cause of death and whether sexual assault took place.

Thousands of people again assembled in Surjyapur on Monday, demanding a fair, transparent and time-bound investigation. Although road blockades had ended by Tuesday, the protests had not. Many villagers said they would continue demonstrating until they were convinced the investigation was moving in the right direction.

The incident has also snowballed into a political flashpoint.

CPI(M) leader Md. Lahek Ali visited the victim’s family and joined protests on both Sunday and Monday. Indian Secular Front (ISF) MLA Nawsad Siddique was prevented by security personnel from meeting the bereaved family.

Meanwhile, heavy deployment of police and Central Armed Police Forces outside former Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s Kalighat residence on Sunday night triggered a separate political controversy. The Trinamool Congress alleged the security arrangement amounted to “house arrest” and was intended to prevent her from travelling to Surjyapur. On Monday evening, unable to visit the village, she led a candlelight march in Kolkata condemning the killing and demanding justice for the child.

Back in Surjyapur, however, politics appears secondary to the pain etched on every face.

The pond where the body was found has become a grim reminder of a tragedy the village cannot forget. Outside the victim’s home, neighbours continue to arrive quietly, offering condolences to a family struggling to comprehend its loss.

For the people here, the story is no longer only about a child who left home to buy a birthday gift and never returned. It is about whether a village’s cries for justice will continue to be heard after television cameras leave, political leaders move on and public outrage fades.

That question still hangs heavily over Surjyapur.

Antara is a freelance independent journalist based in Kolkata, West Bengal. She reports on climate change, environmental issues, human rights, and crime, with a focus on stories that highlight marginalised voices and public interest. She holds a Bachelor’s (Honours) degree in Philosophy from the University of Calcutta.

Courtesy: The Enewsroom

The post Just 11, Her Last Birthday Gift: Inside Surjyapur’s Fight for Justice appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Hence, in a pro-active move, on July 2, 2026, a delegation representing ‘Mumbai for Peace’ and 24 other civil society organizations visited the Office of the Police Commissioner to submit a detailed memorandum regarding the proposed event on Sunday. The delegation also highlighted that individuals, specifically identifying Ankit Yadav—a resident of Golibar, Santacruz—and his associates, have been regularly engaging in questionable (read criminal) and hate-filled activities that pose a severe threat to the city’s law and order.

The memorandum details how these groups have been breaking in at prayer venues and using social media to disseminate false propaganda against peaceful Christian religious assemblies. These actions have included making unfounded allegations of “black magic” against members of the Christian community, which the delegation argues have led to unnecessary police pressure and the filing of cases against the very pastors and religious heads whose services were targeted. In criminal law, such actions amount, among other things to criminal trespass. The memorandum dated July 2, 2026 may be read below:

The imminent threat in Vakola

The primary concern necessitating the July 2, 2026 meeting was an inflammatory call to action circulating on social media under the banner of “Sakal Hindu Samaj”. The poster alleges that illegal religious conversions are taking place in Vakola (Gamdevi) and demands strict legal action against four unnamed pastors by July 4, 2026. It is such unfounded and misguided provocations that have been consistently indulged in by this and other outfits, often unchecked by the police and administration.

Link: https://www.instagram.com/reel/DaNcKWoIjHl/?utm_source=ig_web_button_share_sheet

The content of the poster explicitly states that if these demands are not met by the police, the group intends to assemble on Sunday, July 5, 2026, in Santacruz East to sit directly in front of a Christian prayer assembly and perform a recitation of the Hanuman Chalisa. The message characterises the potential disturbance of law and order as the responsibility of the Vakola Police Station, a framing that the delegation has explicitly labelled as criminal intimidation intended to provoke communal tension.

Background

According to the memorandum submitted by the organisations, every Sunday, groups of anti-social elements allegedly target peaceful assemblies of followers of Jesus Christ. They are accused of criminally trespassing into places of worship, assaulting and threatening those present, and creating disturbances outside police stations. The representation states that these individuals, allegedly associated with the Bajrang Dal form groups arrive in large numbers, creating law-and-order situations, and that Ankit Yadav and his associates (Manojkumar Sarva, Abhishek Omprakash Tiwari, Dhananjay Dubey, Mehul Khokardiya, Harsh Pathak, Pradeep Mishra, Aditya Upadhyay and others) allegedly raise communal slogans outside police stations as part of a planned campaign. It further alleges that they circulate videos on social media containing false and baseless allegations against Christians, with the aim of spreading hatred and communal tensions. The memorandum also claims that these groups routinely approach police stations alleging, without basis, that their religious sentiments have been hurt and that Christian pastors are practising black magic. As a result of the pressure created by these incidents and the resulting law-and-order concerns, the representation alleges that the police have, in several instances, registered cases against pastors under the provisions of the Black Magic Act and for offences relating to hurting religious sentiments.

Link: https://www.instagram.com/p/DaL2INlM-Yg/

Recent incidents highlighting a pattern of disruption and intimidation

The detailed memorandum submitted to the authorities yesterday also highlighted recent incidents that reveal a clear and alarming pattern of organised disruption and intimidation directed at the Christian community. These recurring events demonstrate how anti-social elements systematically target peaceful gatherings to create communal instability. Some of these recent incidents include the following:

• Attack on a peaceful Christian assembly in Vasai (June 12, 2026): On June 12, 2026, Ankit Yadav and members of his group allegedly travelled from Santacruz to Vasai and attacked a peaceful Christian assembly being held at Dheeraj Complex, Second Floor, Evershine, Vasai East, within the jurisdiction of Achole Police Station. They allegedly forcefully entered the hall, assaulted those present, and created a law and order situation. In connection with the incident, Achole Police Station registered FIR No. 202 of 2026 against “unknown members of Bajrang Dal” under Sections 118(1), 189(2), 190, 191(2), 351(2), and 352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. However, despite CCTV footage reportedly showing Ankit Yadav and his associates physically attacking those assembled, no arrests have been made. Subsequently, Ankit Yadav and his associates allegedly made false allegations that the pastor had hurt their religious sentiments and was practising black magic. According to the representation, these allegations are baseless, as the gathering consisted solely of Bible readings and prayers, which had been conducted peacefully for years. Based on these allegations, Achole Police Station registered cross FIR Nos. 204 and 205 of 2026 against one Ravi Gupta. The representation further states that CCTV footage of the entire incident was provided to the police for investigation, but no action has yet been taken against Ankit Yadav and his accomplices.

• Attempted disruption of a Christian gathering in Kandivali (June 14, 2026): On Sunday, June 14, 2026, Ankit Yadav and members of his group allegedly attempted to forcefully enter a Christian assembly being held at White House Banquet Hall, behind Golden Leaf Hotel, Kandivali East, Mumbai. After being prevented from entering the premises, they reportedly went to Charkop Police Station, created a law and order situation, and alleged that Pratik Sitaram Naik was posting content about miracles of Jesus Christ on social media and spreading false claims about miracles. Following the incident, Charkop Police Station registered FIR No. 476 of 2026 against Pratik Sitaram Naik under Section 66(D) of the Information Technology Act and Sections 3(2) and 3(3) of the Maharashtra Black Magic Act. The representation states that despite clarifications being provided to the police, no action has yet been initiated against Ankit Yadav and others.

• Similar incidents reported at multiple locations: The representation further alleges that the same group has been involved in similar incidents targeting Christian gatherings at Ghatkopar on June 7, Andheri on June 20, and several other locations, following what it describes as a recurring pattern of disrupting peaceful religious assemblies, making allegations of forced conversion or black magic, and creating law and order situations. It contends that despite repeated complaints, effective action against the alleged perpetrators has remained absent.

Engagement with police leadership

The delegation held a formal meeting with the Joint Commissioner of Police (Law & Order), Dr. Manoj Kumar Sharma, to appraise him of these developments. The delegation included diverse voices such as Sameer Wagle, Smriti Nevatia, Pastor David Tribhuvan, Fr. Frazer Mascerenhas, Neena Shah More, Elvina Gonsalves, Pastor Jomon Mathew, Dolphy Dsouza, Shakir Shaikh, Ashfaque Mohammed Yaqub, Sandhya Panaskar, Shaista Sayyed Aejaz, Lalita Deonalli, and Lara Jesani.

During the meeting, the Joint CP stated that the police force was cognisant of the incidents involving these individuals. He provided an assurance to the delegation that the police would take all necessary steps to address these concerns and uphold the rule of law within the city. The collective of organisations emphasised that their goal is to ensure the constitutional rights of all citizens—specifically Article 14 (equality), Article 15 (non-discrimination), Article 21 (life and liberty), and Article 25 (freedom of religion)—are protected against such targeted harassment.

Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP): preventive frontier

Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) has consistently adopted a systematic, evidence-based approach to countering hate speech and communal mobilisation. Central to its strategy is the proactive filing of preventive legal complaints with district and state authorities. When events organised by groups such as the Sakal Hindu Samaj, Hindu Janajagruti Samiti and by the habitual hate offenders are announced, CJP monitors these platforms to identify potential threats to public order.

The organisation’s complaints are rooted in documented history, highlighting the recurrence of provocative rhetoric and violence at past events. By providing authorities with concrete evidence—such as social media posters, planned agendas, and the track records of scheduled speakers—CJP urges the police to invoke Supreme Court guidelines on hate speech and deny permissions for events likely to incite enmity. These filings emphasise that preventive measures are not merely discretionary but are mandated by judicial precedents to maintain peace. Furthermore, CJP’s interventions extend to scrutinising campaigns related to exclusionary narratives, such as “love jihad” or calls for economic boycotts.

By consistently engaging with administrative and police machinery, CJP advocates for the enforcement of constitutional rights, aiming to hold hate offenders accountable while compelling local administrations to fulfill their duty in preventing communal harm.

A joint demand backed by 25 civil society organisations

The representation was jointly endorsed by 25 civil society organisations, demonstrating widespread support from civil society. The signatories include the Bombay Catholic Sabha, People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Citizens for Justice and Peace, All India Students’ Federation (Mumbai), Centre for Study of Society and Secularism (CSSS), Pani Haq Samiti, Christian Development Association, Parcham Collective, Citizens for the Constitution, Hasrat-e-Zindagi, Mamuli, Free Speech Collective, Stree Mukti League, Platform for Social Justice, Disha Students’ Organisation, Association for Protection of Civil Rights (APCR), Bhagat Singh Jan Adhikar Yatra, Students Islamic Organisation (Mumbai), Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (Mumbai), among others.

By copying the Deputy Commissioner of Police (West Division Zone 1) and the Senior Inspector of Police at the Vakola Police Station, the delegation demands the urgency of local-level preventive measures.

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Thereafter, in a detailed statement, MSCE said that the objective of the restrictions is not to interfere with religious practices but to ensure transparency and prevent malpractices during the examination, which will be conducted under live CCTV surveillance.

“The council has not imposed restrictions on what candidates can wear. However, during the examination, the face must be clearly visible on CCTV cameras. No cloth or covering should conceal the ears, head, mouth or any part of the face above the neck,” MSCE commissioner Nandakumar Bedse said.

Outlining the initial rationale behind the decision, the council said that examination authorities across the country are increasingly dealing with sophisticated methods of cheating, including concealed mobile phones, miniature Bluetooth devices and other electronic gadgets.

Officials pointed out that in recent D El Ed and computer shorthand examinations conducted by the council, some candidates were found to have hidden mobile phones inside dupattas and burqas and used them during the examination.

“The Teacher Eligibility Test is a highly sensitive examination. With the emergence of AI-enabled tools, miniature Bluetooth devices and other electronic equipment, preventing malpractices has become increasingly challenging. Ensuring that every candidate’s face is clearly visible on live CCTV is essential to maintaining fairness and credibility,” the council said.

This clarification put out by the council is now expected to put to rest the controversy surrounding the dress-code instructions ahead of the examination scheduled for June 28. Figures reveal that  more than 6 lakh candidates have registered for this year’s TET examination, making effective monitoring a key challenge. Officials said clear visibility of candidates is necessary for identity verification, biometric authentication and CCTV-based surveillance throughout the examination period.

The council also relied on practices followed in several national and state-level competitive examinations, including UPSC, SSC, IBPS, SBI, RRB, GATE and public service commission examinations, where face-covering items are restricted to facilitate identification and monitoring.

The MSCE also referred to a 2024 Bombay high court (HC) judgment in a petition challenging a college dress code that prohibited hijab, burqa and other religious identifiers on campus. The court upheld the college’s dress code instructions, observing that the petitioners had failed to establish that wearing a hijab constituted an essential religious practice.

A translation of the clarifying instructions may be read below:

 Maharashtra State Examination Council, Pune

Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Office Building,

(Second and Fourth Floor) Survey No. 832 A, Shivajinagar, Pune – 411004

Telephone No.: 020-29709396    Website: www.mscepune.in   E-mail: mscepune@gmail.com

Outward No.:
MSCE/Svee.Sanha/217/2026                                                           Date: 22/06/2026

Subject: Regarding clarification on the use of dupatta, burqa, and hijab by female candidates in the Teacher Eligibility Test

Clear instructions have been issued that since live CCTV will be used in all classrooms at the examination centers during the Teacher Eligibility Test to be conducted by the Maharashtra State Examination Council on June 28, 2026, nothing including a dupatta, burqa, mask, or cap can be worn so that the entire face is clearly visible. However, emails have been received requesting that female candidates be permitted to use the burqa, hijab, and dupatta. A clarification on the said matter is being made as follows:—

In the Writ Petition WPL No. 17737 / 24, Zainab Abdul Qayyum Choudhary Vs Chembur Trombay Edu. Societys, Chembur Trombay Education Society’s, N.G. Acharya and D.K. Marathe College of Art, Science and Commerce, Chembur, Mumbai, order dated June 26, 2 024, filed in the Hon’ble High Court, Mumbai, 9 female students challenged the college’s dress code instructions, wherein hijab, burqa, niqab, and other attire revealing religious identity were banned on campus. In the said judicial decision, the Hon’ble High Court recorded observations as follows:—

In the writ petition, it has been pleaded that the petitioners have been donning a Hijab and/or Nakab for last few years. The pleadings in the writ petition to support the plea that donning of a Hijab or Nakab is an essential religious practice however are insufficient. Except for stating that the same constitutes an essential religious practice on the basis of the English translation of Kanz-ul-Iman and Suman Abu Dawud, there is no material placed to uphold the petitioners’ contention that donning of Hijab and Nakab is an essential religious practice. The contention in that regard therefore fails.

For the aforesaid reasons, we are satisfied that the Instructions issued by the College under which a dress code has been prescribed for its students does not suffer from any infirmity so as to violate provisions of Article 19(1)(a) and Article 25 of the Constitution of India.

In almost all major competitive examinations in India—national-level examinations such as UPSC, SSC, IBPS, SBI, RRB, GATE, CLAT, CA, CS, CMA, etc., and State Public Service Commission examinations like MPSC, GPSC, BPSC, UPPSC—face-covering clothes such as dupatta, burqa, scarf, cap, and goggles are prohibited. This is because it is necessary for the face to be clearly visible during identity verification, biometric checks, and the CCTV verification process throughout the examination period. The main objective behind banning the hijab, burqa, or dupatta on the face during examinations is to prevent malpractices by closely monitoring all candidates through Live CCTV during the entire examination period, to ease identity verification, and consequently to maintain transparency and credibility in the examination.

Various types of malpractices are being used in examinations nowadays, such as carrying a mobile phone, sending the question paper outside via mobile WhatsApp/Telegram, receiving answers via mobile, and keeping extremely small-sized Wi-Fi Bluetooth devices in the ears, among many other tricks. Therefore, the complete face and the entire portion above the neck—meaning the mouth and ears of all candidates at the examination centre—must be clearly visible so that there is no room for suspicion regarding malpractice. If the face is kept covered, it will not even be known who is talking to whom. Furthermore, if a female candidate is asked to show her face based on suspicion for verification at the examination centre, it might lead to a completely different issue altogether.

Recently, in the D.El.Ed. and Computer Shorthand examinations conducted by the Maharashtra State Examination Council, it has come to light that candidates hid mobile phones in their dupatta/burqa, brought them into the examination centre, and used them.

The Teacher Eligibility Test is a highly sensitive examination, and considering factors like AI, Bluetooth devices, and electronic devices as small as shirt buttons, it has become highly challenging to prevent any kind of malpractice. For the examination to be transparent and to curb all kinds of manipulations, it is necessary that the faces of all 6 lakh candidates are clearly visible in the Live CCTV.

Overall, considering all the above points, female candidates will have the freedom to wear any clothes, dupatta, odhni, or burqa for the Teacher Eligibility Test; however, during the examination period inside the classroom at the examination centre, the face must be fully and clearly visible in the CCTV camera. For this purpose, above the neck—meaning on the ears, head, or mouth/face there should be no cloth/covering of any kind; this is being clarified here.”

The June 22, 2026 circular has been signed by Dr. Nandkumar Bedse (I.P.S.), Chairman, Maharashtra State Examination Council, Pune.

The original circular in Marathi may be read below Embed Original

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The post Face must be visible, then hijab, burqa, dupatta or attire of choice permitted to TET candidates: MCSE appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As reported by The Wire, on April 26, 2026, residents of Manoharpura in Mathura discovered that graves inside the Ahl-e-Muslimeen Kabristan had allegedly been damaged during a demolition exercise carried out with JCB machines working under the supervision of local authorities. Burial shrouds were exposed, graves were uprooted and skeletal remains reportedly became visible. Families arrived to find the resting places of parents, grandparents and relatives disturbed, turning what should have been a protected space of mourning and remembrance into a site of anguish and outrage.

The cemetery is not an informal burial ground. According to documents cited by The Wire, the Ahl-e-Muslimeen Kabristan is a gazetted waqf property dating back to 1909 and recognised by the Uttar Pradesh Sunni Central Waqf Board. For generations, it has served as the burial ground for local Muslim families. Residents allege that nine graves were damaged, while six trees, boundary structures, fencing pillars and other parts of the cemetery were also destroyed during the operation.

Yet what transformed the incident from a local controversy into a matter of wider constitutional concern was not only the damage itself, but the state’s response to it.

Documents reviewed by The Wire reportedly show that the Mathura-Vrindavan Municipal Corporation formally acknowledged that approximately nine graves had been damaged. In a communication issued following complaints lodged through Uttar Pradesh’s Integrated Grievance Redressal System (IGRS), authorities reportedly directed compensation at the rate of Rs 100 per grave, valuing the destruction of nine graves at Rs 900. Separate assessments were conducted for damaged trees and fencing structures, resulting in compensation calculations for those losses as well.

For many residents, the issue was not merely that the amount was small. Rather, it was the very act of assigning a bureaucratic value to disturbed graves that appeared shocking. The controversy has therefore become less about the amount of compensation and more about what the calculation itself represents.

The question repeatedly raised by affected families is a simple one: what is the value of a grave?

The significance of that question becomes clearer when one considers the unique nature of burial grounds. A cemetery is not merely land. Nor is it simply a collection of physical structures. Burial grounds occupy a distinctive place within every society because they exist at the intersection of memory, religion, family history and human dignity. They are spaces where communities maintain continuity with previous generations and where the living continue to honour those who have passed away.

Every grave represents a life lived and relationships that continue beyond death. A parent, a sibling, a spouse, a grandparent or a child may be buried there. The disturbance of a grave therefore affects far more than physical property. It disrupts a family’s connection to the deceased and a community’s relationship with its own history.

This is why societies across cultures and faith traditions have historically treated the disturbance of burial grounds as a particularly serious wrong. Respect for the dead has long been regarded as one of the most basic markers of civilisation itself. Even international humanitarian law, which governs armed conflict, contains provisions concerning the respectful treatment of human remains and burial sites. The protection of the dead is recognised as a moral obligation that survives political conflict, territorial disputes and social divisions.

The outrage in Mathura stems from precisely this understanding. Residents are not merely complaining about damage to land. They are expressing anguish over what they regard as the desecration of a sacred space and a violation of the dignity of their dead.

The controversy also raises important questions about how law understands compensation.

Compensation in law is often misunderstood as a mechanism for calculating the market value of a loss. In reality, courts routinely award compensation for injuries that are impossible to measure in economic terms. Constitutional courts have awarded compensation for custodial violence, illegal detention, police excesses, violations of fundamental rights, wrongful deaths, emotional suffering and infringements of human dignity.

In such cases, compensation does not place a literal price on liberty, dignity or human suffering. Rather, it serves a broader purpose. It acknowledges wrongdoing, recognises injury, affirms the dignity of the victim and signals the state’s acceptance of responsibility.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognised this principle. Beginning with landmark cases such as Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa and subsequent constitutional tort jurisprudence, Indian courts have held that monetary compensation may be awarded when fundamental rights are violated. Such compensation is not intended to erase the injury suffered. Instead, it functions as public recognition that a serious constitutional wrong has occurred.

Viewed through this lens, the Mathura episode appears particularly troubling.

The official response reportedly treated damaged graves within the same administrative framework used to calculate losses relating to fencing structures, landscaping and trees. Yet a grave is not municipal infrastructure. It is not an asset whose value can be determined through replacement cost. It is the resting place of a human being and occupies a unique position within constitutional, religious and social life.

The controversy therefore exposes the limitations of administrative approaches to certain forms of harm. Some injuries cannot be fully understood through accounting exercises because the injury itself lies not in the physical object damaged but in what that object represents.

The constitutional implications of the incident extend beyond compensation. Article 21 of the Constitution protects the right to life and personal liberty and has been interpreted by courts to include human dignity as one of its central components. Importantly, Indian courts have repeatedly recognised that dignity does not disappear at the moment of death.

Judicial decisions have acknowledged the importance of dignified burial, dignified cremation and respectful treatment of human remains. During the COVID-19 pandemic, courts across the country intervened repeatedly to ensure that even those who had died from infectious diseases were accorded respectful last rites. The underlying principle was clear: human dignity survives death. The treatment of the dead reflects the constitutional values of the living.

Seen from this perspective, the alleged disturbance of graves at the Ahl-e-Muslimeen Kabristan engages concerns that extend beyond municipal negligence. It raises questions about whether public authorities adequately recognised the nature of the harm involved. If the disturbance of graves implicates dignity, memory and religious identity, then reducing the injury to a compensation calculation risk obscuring the true nature of the wrong.

The controversy also engages questions of religious freedom. Burial practices are integral components of religious life. Cemeteries and graveyards are not ordinary public spaces but sacred sites through which communities discharge religious obligations, preserve ancestral connections and maintain collective memory. Their protection is therefore closely connected to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom under Article 25.

This concern becomes particularly significant where the cemetery in question is a recognised waqf property. Waqf institutions occupy a protected legal status and are intended to preserve religious and charitable assets for the benefit of the community. The fact that the Ahl-e-Muslimeen Kabristan is a notified waqf property raises additional questions regarding the safeguards that existed to protect the site and the procedures followed before demolition work was undertaken.

The incident acquires further significance when viewed against the broader political and social context of Mathura. As The Wire notes, the district has witnessed continuing disputes concerning Muslim religious sites, waqf properties, demolition drives affecting Muslim localities, campaigns targeting Muslim-owned businesses and politically charged litigation surrounding the Shahi Idgah mosque. Local residents have also raised concerns regarding encroachments around the cemetery, the establishment of a garbage collection point near its entrance and previous attempts to alter the character of the land.

Whether these concerns are accepted or contested, they form the backdrop against which the graveyard controversy is being interpreted by the affected community.

This context matters because institutions do not operate in a vacuum. Administrative actions acquire social meaning through historical experience. For many local Muslims, the disturbance of graves does not appear as an isolated bureaucratic mistake. Rather, it is seen as part of a broader pattern in which Muslim spaces—homes, businesses, places of worship and now burial grounds—have increasingly become sites of contestation and intervention.

This is what transforms the story from an administrative controversy into a constitutional one. The issue is not merely whether a contractor made an error or whether compensation was eventually paid. The deeper concern is how institutions respond when sacred spaces belonging to a minority community are damaged. Do they treat the incident as a technical mistake requiring reimbursement, or as a serious violation demanding accountability, restoration and recognition of the injury inflicted?

The documents cited by The Wire establish a paper trail showing that authorities acknowledged the damage and directed compensation. But acknowledgment is not accountability. Compensation is not justice.

A cheque may close an administrative file, but it does not answer the central questions raised by the episode. Why was a legally recognised cemetery disturbed? Who authorised the operation? What safeguards existed to protect burial sites? Was the legal status of the cemetery verified beforehand? Were any officials held responsible? Will restoration measures be undertaken? And what remedies are available when the dignity of the dead is violated?

Until those questions are answered, the controversy surrounding the Ahl-e-Muslimeen Kabristan will continue to resonate far beyond the boundaries of a single graveyard. Ultimately, the most disturbing aspect of the Mathura incident may be the message that many residents believe it conveys. The issue is not simply that graves were damaged. It is that the destruction of a sacred burial ground appears to have been processed through the machinery of administration as though it were no different from a damaged fence or uprooted tree. In doing so, the state risks transforming a question of dignity into a question of accounting.

And that is why the controversy has become about far more than nine damaged graves. It forces a larger reckoning with how law, administration and public institutions understand harm itself. Some injuries can be compensated. Others can only be acknowledged. The disturbance of the dead belongs firmly in the latter category.

Related:

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Christians not being allowed burials, forced to cremate in Mumbai?

In a Heartwarming Gesture, Hindu Family Donates Land for Muslim Burial Ground in Assam

The post When the State Valued a Desecrated Grave at Rs 100: The Mathura cemetery controversy appeared first on SabrangIndia.

For generations, this has been the lifeline of Pani Sol.

Today, fear travels those roads alongside them.

On 9 June, one of the village’s hawkers, 50-year-old Akbar Ali Mondal, was allegedly beaten to death in Purulia district while earning a living. Yet the arrest of the accused has done little to calm nerves in Pani Sol, where thousands of families depend on hawking for survival.

A week after the killing, the village remains engulfed in anxiety. Men leave for work with apprehension. Families wait anxiously for phone calls. Conversations in tea stalls, village shops and courtyards inevitably return to the same unsettling question: could the next victim be one of us?

Pani Sol, located under Onda Police Station in Bankura district, is one of the largest villages in the region. Home to nearly 80,000 to 90,000 residents, around 90 per cent of whom are Muslims, the settlement is known across neighbouring districts as a village of hawkers, with generations of families relying on itinerant trade for their livelihood.

According to local residents, nearly seventy to eighty per cent of the village’s young men earn their livelihood through itinerant trading. Every day, they travel long distances carrying household goods, relying on personal relationships, trust and repeat customers to earn a living. Few families have agricultural land. Even fewer have access to stable salaried employment.

Akbar Ali Mondal was one of these workers.

How Akbar Ali’s Final Journey Shook a Village of Hawkers

Akbar worked in areas near the Purulia-Jharkhand border alongside his 24-year-old son, Zulfikar Ali. Although father and son operated in different localities, they followed the same routine. They would leave early in the morning and return home after a day of selling goods door to door.

On 9 June, they set out as usual.

By midday, Zulfikar received a phone call informing him that his father had fallen ill and had been taken to hospital. Rushing there, he found not an injured man awaiting treatment but the lifeless body of his father.

Showing photographs of the deceased, Zulfikar struggled to control his emotions.

“I still cannot understand why such brutality was inflicted upon him,” he said.

Akbar Ali Mondal’s killing has left behind more than grief. Akbar’s widow and young daughter depended heavily on his earnings. The family’s modest mud house stands as a reminder of how fragile their economic existence had always been. Now the responsibility of supporting the household rests entirely on Zulfikar.

Fear Spreads Through Bengal’s Village of Muslim Hawkers

While Akbar’s family mourns a personal loss, many residents of Pani Sol fear the killing signals something larger.

Many villagers believe Akbar Ali Mondal’s killing has transformed a livelihood concern into a question of survival. Residents allege that harassment of Muslim hawkers has increased in recent years in some areas where they work. Several claim that traders are sometimes subjected to intimidation and communal abuse.

Zulfikar alleged that Muslim hawkers were occasionally forced to chant religious slogans and threatened with exclusion from local markets and neighbourhoods.

“We have been working under fear for a long time,” he said. “Now that fear has become even greater.”

Whether or not all such allegations are established through official investigations, the perception of insecurity is now widespread across the village. In many homes, parents worry every time their sons leave for work.

The impact on the village economy is already visible. Several hawkers working in distant areas have reportedly returned home after Akbar Ali Mondal’s killing. Others say they are reconsidering where they travel and whether they can continue in the profession at all.

The dilemma is stark: stay home and face hunger, or continue working while fearing for one’s safety.

Why Pani Sol’s Economy Depends on Thousands of Hawkers

Beyond the killing, the deeper tragedy lies in the economic reality of Pani Sol.

A drive through the village reveals a settlement bustling with human activity but struggling with limited opportunities. Bicycles loaded with merchandise are as common here as tractors are in farming villages.

The village economy revolves around hawking because alternative employment opportunities scarcely exist.

Despite its large population, the village has only two high schools and fewer than ten primary schools. Residents complain of teacher shortages and poor educational infrastructure. Extreme poverty forces many children to abandon their studies before completing secondary education.

According to villagers, only a handful of residents have secured government jobs. The number of graduates in a population approaching one lakh is astonishingly small.

The consequence is visible everywhere. Each generation enters the same occupation as the previous one. Sons become hawkers because their fathers were hawkers.

Hawking is not merely a source of income in Pani Sol; it is the backbone of the village economy.

That is why Akbar Ali Mondal’s death has generated fear far beyond his immediate family.

Growing Fear After Attacks on Travelling Muslim Traders

Residents also recalled earlier incidents involving hawkers from the village. One local resident cited an alleged stabbing attack on another trader from Pani Sol a few months ago near Bankura town.

Whether isolated or part of a broader pattern, such incidents have reinforced feelings of vulnerability among villagers.

“Hawking once meant hardship,” said an elderly resident. “Now it also means fear.”

Rights Groups Step In as Family Seeks Justice and Support

Akbar Ali Mondal’s killing has attracted the attention of rights organisations and community groups.

A team from the Association for Protection of Civil Rights (APCR), led by social activist Omar Owais, visited the family and assured them of legal assistance. Representatives of Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind also met villagers and expressed concern over both the killing and the broader economic insecurity facing the community.

According to Owais, the family is living under tremendous psychological pressure and requires legal support to pursue the case, particularly because the crime occurred around 90 kilometres away in Purulia district.

For a family already struggling financially, travelling repeatedly to another district to follow legal proceedings presents a major burden.

“How Are We Supposed to Live?”

The question echoing across Pani Sol today is not only who killed Akbar Ali Mondal, but what comes next.

Akbar’s elder brother, Noor Mohammad Mondal, who survives by selling poultry, summed up the village’s predicament.

“Many hawkers are returning home because they are frightened,” he said. “But there is no other work here. Tell me, how are we supposed to survive?”

His question captures the anxiety of an entire village.

For decades, the roads of Bengal, Jharkhand and Bihar provided a livelihood for Pani Sol’s residents. Today, those same roads have become a source of uncertainty.

As the investigation into Akbar Ali Mondal’s killing continues, thousands of hawkers from this village will once again leave home in search of customers. They will carry their goods as they always have.

But many will now carry something else as well: the fear that, for Muslim hawkers from Pani Sol, earning a living may itself have become dangerous.

Courtesy: https://enewsroom.in

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The protesters foot march happened days after the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), which protects the mosque, wrote to the district administration to not allow any “large gathering” on June 10, even as the campaign was building up. However, under the banner of temple Shri Chakradhar Swami National Heritage Conservation Committee and several Jain organisations, a march was organised from Hostel ground to the district collectorate, covering nearly a kilometre.

Apart from Gujaratis, several followers of Chakradhar Swami from Amravati and other districts in Maharashtra participated along with local residents, holding placards and banners. Among the participants was Bhavesh Patel, who was released on bail after his conviction in the Ajmer Dargah blast case of 2007 investigated by the National Investigation Agency. Patel had by then become a self-styled godman, assuming the name of “Swami Muktanand” reported Indian Express.

Protesters handed a memorandum to Bharuch Collector Navnath Gavhane and demanded preservation of the monument to its original structure. The memorandum states that a drive was carried out to create public awareness in Gujarat and Maharashtra by the followers of Chakradhar Swami from May 18-23. Signatures of over 35,000 were taken, along with their mobile phone numbers.

Muktanand Swami alias Bhavesh Patel of Bharuch said, “The Jama Masjid has its origin in the birthplace of an ancient Jain temple, and the birthplace of Swami Chakradhar of Maharashtra. The Islamic rulers had converted the monument into a mosque. The Masjid is presently under the possession of the ASI. We have come to know that the rules and regulations of the ASI are not followed, as some people are involved in making changes in the existing structure. Actions should be taken against those who are involved in alterations or changes made to the historically protected monument.”

Quick to set the record straight, however Bharuch district collector Dr. Navnath Gavhane said, “There is no law-and-order situation. District Superintendent of Police, District magistrate office and ASI (Archaeological Survey of India) officials are maintaining it. We have appealed to people to refrain from making any generalised comments about the monument or believing in rumours and misunderstandings. The ASI is a competent authority to decide about the monument.”

Over the past decades, far right groups have been consistently mobilising to “re-claim” Mosques and Dargahs in campaigns that threaten the cultural and religious rights of the religious minority.

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The post Despite ASI’s warning protesters in Bharuch march to collector to ‘preserve original identity’ of Bharuch mosque appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Signed by the superintending archaeologist, ASI Vadodara Circle, the letter dated June 10 (Wednesday), accessed by the newspaper, is addressed to the Bharuch collector and district magistrate, and requests that “necessary steps” be taken to safeguard the Jami Masjid, a centrally protected monument, ahead of a large “gathering” planned by a right-wing organisation named Rashtriya Dharohar Sanrakshan Samiti (RDSS). The RDSS has been coordinating signature drives and public events in Bharuch since May 18, as part of a “campaign to reclaim” the centuries-old Sunni mosque as a Jain religious site.

ASI letter

The letter, describes Bharuch Jami Masjid as a living Monument of National Importance, listed under the Gazette Notification dated May 26, 1909. The ASI letter refers to information it has received from Maulana Qureshi Gulam Mustafa, President of the Jami Masjid, and notes that videos and messages circulating on social media platforms were calling on people to assemble in large numbers at the protected monument, and flagged the possibility of an untoward incident given the sensitive nature of the site.

The letter states, “…there is a possibility of a large gathering at the protected monument on June 15 and videos are getting viral in the social media platforms… As the monument is sensitive in nature, there is a likelihood of an untoward incident. Such gatherings may also pose a risk to the communal harmony and physical damage to the monument.”

Citing Article 49 of the Constitution of India, which places a direct obligation on the State to protect every monument or place of artistic or historic interest declared by Parliament to be of national importance, the letter also states Section 16 of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains (AMASR) Act, 1958, which requires the Collector to make due provision for the protection of such a monument from pollution or desecration.

Pirana Durgah, Gujarat

This is not the only site under attack and challenge by the majoritarian right-wing. Gujarat’s 600 year old Pirana Dargah has seen a similar aggressive attack and the matter is contested. Detailed reports may be read here and here.

Jami Masjid trustees

On Thursday, multiple representations were filed by the trustees of Jami Masjid with the Bharuch district administration and the police, citing serious apprehension about public order ahead of the June 15 gathering. In the representation, the trustees have pointed out that the Jami Masjid has functioned as an active Muslim place of worship for several generations and is also a registered Waqf. The trustees have submitted that “a campaign disputing the religious character of the monument has been gaining traction on social media over the past several months,” and flagged specific incidents, such as the March 3, 2026, incident of an alleged attempt to perform non-Muslim religious rituals within the monument premises.

The ASI had already requested adequate security arrangements and preventive measures from district authorities following that incident. The ASI has now also asked the district collector to unlock the exit gate of the monument on Fridays, to permit the continuance of religious observances by the Muslim community, referring to a September 2025 letter in this regard.

Bharuch District Collector N K Gavhane told this newspaper that the district administration is coordinating with all relevant agencies and that the situation remains under control. He said, “The monument is managed and protected by the Archaeological Survey of India. There is no law-and-order situation. Bharuch Superintendent of Police (SP) office, Sub-Divisional Magistrate office, and the ASI are maintaining it. We have appealed to people to refrain from making any generalised comments about the monument or believing in rumours and misunderstandings. ASI is a competent authority to decide about the monument.”

On Thursday, June 11, the trustees requested that the administration immediately prohibit all rallies, assemblies, and processions near the monument, enforce existing notifications under the Gujarat Police Act, deploy adequate police personnel, and initiate criminal proceedings against those spreading inflammatory content on social media. “If timely action is not taken and any untoward incident occurs the full responsibility will rest with the administrative and police machinery concerned,” the representation stated.

Related:

Sambhal, UP: ASI has no records to prove that Shahi Jama Masjid was built after demolishing earlier structure

Faiz-e-Ilahi Masjid, Turkman Gate: A court-ordered demolition, midnight policing, stone-pelting, arrests, and the ongoing legal battle

The post ASI, Gujarat: Will Bharuch’s 700 year old Jama Masjid be the next target of right-wing saffron grab and terror? appeared first on SabrangIndia.