The Bharat Chodo Slogan was coined by none less than Yusuf Meherali, the historic venue for the launch of the Quit India Movement was the Gowalia Tank Maidan, thereafter named the August Kranti Maidan in Mumbai.
112 years ago, and 37 years before the Quit India Movement, the words and melody of the Rakhee Sangeet by Rabindranath Tagore filled the streets of Bengal and Hindus and Muslims poured out on the streets to say ‘No’ to the Partition of Bengal. The Partition was revoked and east and west Bengal were re-united on December 12, 1911 by the British. A new partition which divided the province on linguistic, rather than religious grounds followed, with the Hindi, Oriya and Assamese areas separated to form separate administrative units: Bihar and Orissa Province was created to the west, and Assam Province to the east. The administrative capital of British India was moved from Calcutta to New Delhi as well.

Rakhee Sangeet
During the swadeshi and anti-partition agitation people in both the Benglas took out processions in the streets of towns and villages and sang swadeshi and patiotric songs. An English version of one such song, originally composed in Bengali by Rabindranath Tagore, is reproduced below.

Let the earth and water of Bengal,
Let the air and fruits of Bengal, be sacred, be sacred, be sacred, my god.
Let the homes and marts of Bengal,
Let the forests and fields of Bengal, be full,  be full, be full, my god.
Let the promises and hopes of Bengalis,
Let the deeds and language of Bengalis, be true, be true, be true, my god.
Let the lives and hearts of Bengalis,
Let all the brothers and sisters in Bengali homes, be united, be united, be united, my god.

Excerpts from Gokhale’s Presidential Address
Bengal was at its peak of the united nationalist movement at the dawn of 19th century, which eventually emerged as a formidable threat to the British Raj. Divide and Rule has always been the policy of the rulers be it the British or those who rule from Delhi today.

To curb this nationalist movement, the Britishers decided to divide Bengal, a move vehemently opposed by various leaders of the time, including Rabindranath Tagore.

The decision was taken at a meeting between Lord Curzon and a Muslim delegation in Assam in June 1905, where the Muslims were convinced of the idea of a separate state to keep their identity. The plan was to divide the Hindu majority regions of West Bengal, Bihar and Odisha from Muslim-dominated areas of Assam and Sylhet. The British government passed the orders of partition in August 1905, which came into effect on October 16 of the same year. However, the date fell in the month of Shravan, when the festival of Raksha Bandhan was celebrated by the Hindu community.

Tagore masterfully used the concept of brotherhood, togetherness and ‘the thread of protection’ as a medium to protest against British’s partition policy by showing a picture of unity among the two communities.

Gopal krishna Gokhale’s Presidential Address at the Banares  Congress Convention (1905), where the made a detailed analysis of the question  of the partition of Bengal and the Swadeshi movement are worth a recall:
“Gentlemen, the question that is uppermost in the minds of all at this moment is the partition of Bengal. A cruel wrong has been inflicted on our Bengalee brethren, and the whole country has been stirred to its deepest depths in sorrow and resentment, as had never been the case before. The scheme of Partition concocted in the dark and carried out in the face of the fiercest opposition that any Government measure has encountered during the last half-a-century, will always stand as a complete illustration the worst features of the present system of bureaucratic rule-its utter contempt for public opinion, its arrogant pretensions to superior wisdom… Lord Curzon and his advisers… could never allege that they had no means of judging of the depth of public feeling in the matter. All that could possibly have been done by way of a respectful representation of the views of the people had been done. As soon as it was known that a partition of some sort was contemplated, meeting after meeting of protest was held…. The Secretary of State for India was implored to withhold his sanction to the proposed measure. The intervention of the British House of Commons was sought, first by a monster petition, signed by sixty thousand people, and later by means, of a debate on the subject raised in the House by our over-watchful mend, Mr. Herbert Roberts. All proved unavailing…. To add insult to injury, Lord C m n described the opposition to his measures as “manufactured”-an opposition in which all classes of Indians, high and low, uneducated and educated, Hindus and Mahomedans had joined, an opposition than which nothing more intense, nothing more wide-spread, nothing more spontaneous had been seen in this country in the whole course of our political agitation.. . .

The tremendous upheaval of popular feeling, which has taken place in Bengal in consequence of the partition, will constitute a landmark in the history of our national progress. For the first time since British rule began, all sections of the Indian community, without distinction of caste or creed, have been moved by a common impulse and without the stimulus of extend pressure to act together in offering resistance to a common wrong. A wave of true national consciousness has swept over the province…. Bengal’s heroic stand against the oppression of a harsh and uncontrolled bureaucracy has astonished and gratified all India, and her sufferings have not been endured in vain, when they have helped to draw closer all pasts of the country in sympathy and in aspiration….”

On July 19, 1905, British governor-general Curzon announced the partition of Bengal into two provinces-Eastern Bengal and Assam, and the rest of Bengal which included Bihar and parts of Orrisa.

The main political aim of the partition decision was a divide the Bengal population and to weaken the nationalist movement of which Bengal was the most important entre.

The British move was also to disrupt Hindu-Muslim unity by convincing upper class Muslims that the newly created province with its Muslim majority was in their interest. However, it only served to arouse and bring in all sections of the people in Bengal into an unprecedented mass movement which soon spread too many other parts of the country.

The anti-partition agitation assumed a militant from on August 7, 1905 when thousands of people at a meeting in Calcutta resolved to boycott British goods until the partition proposal was withdrawn.

The Partition of Bengal came into force on October 16, 1905 which day was observed as a day of national mourning throughout Bengal. It was during this movement that Swadeshi or use of Indian goods and boycott of British Goods became an integral part of the freedom struggle. At thousands of meeting people took the pledge of Swadeshi and boycott. Resolutions supporting Swadeshi and boycott were also passed at the Benares session of the Congress under the presidentship of Gokhle in December 1905, although the Moderates then and later tried to restrict their scope. The message of Swadeshi spread to the entire country and helped in promoting Indian Industries. A large number of educational institutions were also opened by nationalists and a National Council of Education was set up. The movement which had begun in Bengal over the question of partition was transformed into a wider movement for freedom of the country. The British rulers, in order to crush the rising tide of nationalism, unleashed naked repression.

Congress Resolutions on Partition, Swadeshi and Boycott Movement

At the annual session of the Congress held in 1906 in Calcutta, the resolutions passed at the preceding session (1905) against the Partition, were re-asserted and further resolutions were passed, supporting the Boycott and Swadeshi.

Some excerpts from the resolutions VI, VII and VIII read”

VI.       The Partition of Bengal-This Congress again records its emphatic protest against the Partition of Bengal and regrets that the present Government, while admitting that there were errors in the original plan and that it went wholly and decisively against the wishes of the majority of the people of Bengal, is disposed to look upon it as a settled fact….

This Congress, composed of representatives from all the Provinces of this country, desires earnestly to impress upon the British Parliament and the present Liberal Government that it will be not only just, but expedient to reverse or modify the partition in such a manner as to keep the entire Bengali speaking community under one undivided administration and thus restore contentment to so important a province as Bengal

VII.     Boycott Movement-Having regard to the fact that the people of this country have little or no voice in its administration, and that their representations to the Government do not receive due consideration, this Congress is of opinion that the Boycott Movement, inaugurated in Bengal by way of protest against the partition of that province was, and is legitimate.

VIII.    Swadeshi-This Congress accords its most cordial support to the Swadeshi Movement and calls upon the people .of the country to labour for its success by making earnest and sustained efforts to promote the growth of indigenous industries and to stimulate the production of indigenous articles by giving them preference, wherever practicable, over imported commodities, even at a sacrifice.

Widespread Protests at Meeting in Agra and Surat

Protest meetings against the Partition of Bengal were organised in all parts of the country on and after October 16, 1905.

From the Archives of the Amrita Basar Patrika.
AGRA CITY, Oct 22
At the Swadeshi Mass Meeting held in the Mankameshwar temple, over ten thousand people, both Hindus and Mahomedans, were present. Native Christians sent a sympathetic message explaining their absence that it was a Sunday. Lala Kedarnath Vakil was elected Chairman. The meeting commenced and terminated with singing national songs. A resolution was passed for the adoption of country-made goods….

Surat, Oct. 23…Public meeting of over 5000 people was held here-Parsis, Hindus, Mahomedans…. Israel and Native Christians attended. Lawyers, merchants, landlords, pensioners, artisans-in short, men of all classes and creeds assembled in the ball which was crowded to overflowing. Rai Bahadur Krishamukhram Mahata, retired Small Causes Court Judge, presided, supported by Divan Bahadur Ambalal Des     ai (Ahmedabad). Ali Mohamed Bhimji (Bombay) and Maulvi Abdul Halim Monghyr spoke in favour of the Swadeshi movement. Great enthusiasm prevailed. The proceedings lasted for three hours…. Handicrafts were exhibited A committee was formed to carry out the objects of the meetings.

Background of theBengal Partition and the Swadeshi Movement

What were Curzon’s  Aims  in Partitioning Bengal ?
The following  excepts from Curzon’s letter of February 2, 1905 to St. John Broderick, Secretary of state for India, give an idea of his aims in partitioning  Bengal.
“Calculation is the centre from which the congress party is manipulated throughout the whole of Bengal and indeed the whole of India. Its best wirepullers and its most frothy orators all reside here. The perfection of their machinery, and the tyranny which its enables them to exercise are truly remarkable. They dominate public opinion in Calcutta; they affect the high court; they frighten the local government and they are sometimes not without serious influence on the government of India.

The whole of their activity is directed to creating an agency so powerful that they may one day be able to force a weak government to give them what they desire. Any measure in consequence that would divide the Bengali-speaking population; that would permit independent centres of activity and influence to grow up; that would dethrone Calcutta from its place as the centre of successful intrigue, or that would weaken the influence of the lawyer class, who have the entire organization in their hands, is intensely and hotly resented by them. The outcry will be loud and very fierce, but as a native gentleman said to me-‘my countrymen always howl until a thing is settled; then they accept it’.

Partition Proclamation   
The text of the Partition of Bengal Proclamation issued from Simla on  September 1, 1905 is reproduced below:
The following Proclamation to which the sanction of His Majesty the King-Emperor of India has been signified by the secretary of state for India in council is published:
The governor general is pleased to constitute the territories at present under the administration of the chief commissioner of Assam to be for the purposes of the Indian councils Act 1861…a province to which the provisions of that Act touching the making of laws and regulations for the peace and good order of the presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay shall be applicable and to direct that the said province shall be called and known as the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam…

2. The Governor General in council is pleased to specify the sixteenth day of October,1905 as the period at which the said provisions shall take effect and 15^th  as the number of councilors whom the Lieutenant Governor may nominate for his assistance in making laws and regulations.
3. The Governor General in council is further pleased and appoint that upon the constitution of the said province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, the districts of Decca, Mymensingh, Faridpur, Backergunge, Tippera, Noakhali, Chittagong, the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Rajshahi, Dinajpur, Jalpaiguri, Rangpur, Bogra, Pabna, and Malda which now form part of the Bengal Division of the Presidency of fort William Shall cases to be subject to or included within the limits of that Division, and shall thenceforth be subject to and included within the limits of the Lieutenant –Governorship of the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam.

Calcutta in Morning
The first part of a news item, which appeared in the Amrita Bazaar Patrika of October 17, 1905 entitled “Calcutta  in Morning-A Unique Sight”, describing the situation in Calcutta on October 16, 1905, the day Bengal was partitioned, is given below.
Yesterday was one of the most memorable days in the history of the British administration of India. It being the day on which the Bengal partition scheme took effect, the day on which our unsympathetic government forced a measure by a proclamation in the official gazette against the wishes of the whole population, the day on which our rules tried to separate the Bengali speaking people of the East Bengal from those of the West Bengal, the people of Calcutta, irrespective of nationality, social position, creed and sex, observed it as a day of mourning. The leaders of the Bengali community-Hindus and Mahomedans-did not however silently mourn and weep. They did something more. They as a legacy to posterity and as a landmark to British administration laid the foundation of the Federation Hall. They also took a practical step towards the furtherance of the Swadeshi movement by opening the National Fund.

The Scene on the Bank of the Hooghly
From the small hours in the morning till noon, the bank of the Ganges from Bag bazaar to Howrah presented a unique spectacle. It looked, as if it were, a surging sea of human faces. From all streets, lanes and bye-lanes, leading to the bank a quick succession of streams of people all bare-footed-found their way to the bank to have a plunge in the sacred river.

As the day advanced, the gathering thickened more and more and by 10, about a lakh of the male population of the metropolis-all in mourning-thronged the bank and the Ghats of tender sex.

They cry of “Bande Mataram” now and then, broke the silence of the still air and reverberated through it imparting a chastening influence on the minds of those who gathered together there…innumerable processions consisting of scores and hundreds of men, after arriving at the bank of the sacred river and wearing Rakhi (yellow thread) proceeded in procession singing ‘Bande Matram’ all the way.

Several thousands of such processions passed all over the city especially the northern quarter of it from 8 am. To 2 pm. They accosted on the way everyone they met with “Bande Mataram” in embracing each other and putting on “Rakhi”. It was a sight for the gods to see….

Roads and Streets
The scene in the roads and streets of whole Calcutta was quite novel and was perhaps never before witnessed in any Indian city….No purchasers were there and thus no sellers had to exhibit their articles…All the mills were closed and the mill hands paraded the city in procession…The only cry that was heard was of “Bande Mataram” . Bands of Mahomedans and Marwari’s joined the processionists and greatly enhanced the enthusiasm.

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The incidents varied significantly in their immediate triggers. In some cases, police and media reports described clashes between groups following arguments and slogan-shouting; elsewhere, disputes centred on religious imagery, procession routes, sound systems or alleged acts of provocation. Yet a common feature ran through many of the reports: once videos began circulating on social media, competing narratives about who had provoked whom spread rapidly, often well ahead of verified police findings.

• Mumbai: Parel-Chinchpokli turns tense after Eid procession

The most prominent incident in Maharashtra was reported from Mumbai’s Parel-Chinchpokli area on the night of August 26. According to The Indian Express, tension erupted near Laxmi Cottage after two groups clashed following an Eid procession. Police said they suspected that both groups had raised slogans, leading to a verbal altercation. Reports of stone-pelting and the use of mild police force subsequently emerged. The Free Press Journal similarly reported that a scuffle and stone-pelting occurred near Laxmi Cottage during the Eid Milad-un-Nabi procession. It reported allegations that banners were torn and slogans were raised, while videos circulating online showed crowds blocking roads and police attempting to disperse those involved.

The police response was immediate. Mumbai Police Joint Commissioner (Law and Order) Dr Manoj Sharma said senior officers were present and appealed to people not to believe rumours, stating that the situation had returned to normal. Additional police personnel were deployed in Parel, Chinchpokli and surrounding areas, while roads leading towards the area were blocked as a precaution. The Byculla-Lalbaug-Parel Bridge was also shut to vehicular traffic temporarily.

The incident has since generated sharply divergent accounts on social media. One set of claims alleges that Muslim youths were assaulted by Hindutva activists after a dispute over the alleged desecration or disrespect of a flag associated with the procession. Videos circulated online appear to show a physical altercation involving several people. However, subsequent reporting indicates that police were still investigating the precise trigger.

The Times of India reported on August 27 that three people had been booked following the Parel clash, while additional police personnel were deployed to prevent further disturbances. A later report by ABP Majha provided another version of the sequence, reporting that the confrontation occurred during police nakabandi and involved bikers allegedly violating traffic rules. It said the altercation began late on August 26 and continued into the early hours of August 27, with some police personnel also injured and three people booked.

• Bengaluru: Hindutva activists named in FIRs as police investigate competing complaints

A more detailed picture emerged from Bengaluru, where a clash took place in Basavanagudi during an Eid Milad procession. According to The Hindu‘s reporting, tensions flared near Garadi Apartments on KR Road when members of a Hindutva group, including activist Puneeth Kerehalli, allegedly raised slogans as the procession passed. Police intervened, but a youth identified as Murali was subsequently allegedly assaulted with a weapon.

Police later registered multiple FIRs arising from the confrontation. One case, based on a complaint by Abdul Razak Khan, invoked provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita relating to promoting enmity between groups, unlawful assembly, assault and criminal intimidation. Kerehalli, Gopi Gowda and Vinod Nayak were among those arrested in connection with that case.

At the same time, a second FIR was registered on the basis of a complaint by Kerehalli. That case included allegations of attempt to murder and provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. Three people, namely Kamal Pasha, Abubakar Siddiq and Syed Anas, were arrested in that case, while two juveniles were produced before the Juvenile Justice Board.

A third case was registered by traffic police concerning obstruction of a public road. Police were examining CCTV footage and recording statements as the investigation continued. The Times of India reported that complaints had been filed by both sides following the Basavanagudi confrontation, with police maintaining additional security in the area.

• Rajasthan: Religious imagery triggers dispute in Chittorgarh

In Rajasthan, a separate confrontation was reported during an Eid Milad procession in Bassi town of Chittorgarh district. The Times of India reported that controversy arose over religious images on plastic sheets allegedly thrown into the air from a tempo-mounted setup accompanying the procession. The incident led to protests, and around 200 people from the Hindu community reportedly gathered near the old bus stand, shut shops and recited the Hanuman Chalisa. Police intervened and stopped the throwing of the plastic sheets. Additional forces were deployed and officials negotiated with representatives of the two communities. The procession was subsequently allowed to continue to its destination.

A complaint was later filed and Bassi police registered a case against unidentified persons under Sections 125, 299 and 302 of the BNS, according to The Times of India. Another report by Aaj Tak described the dispute as involving fariya, sheets or objects thrown during the procession, which allegedly contained images of Hindu deities. Hindu organisations objected and sought action from the administration.

• Gwalior: Confrontation over DJ music

Gwalior also witnessed a dispute during Eid Milad celebrations over the playing of DJ music. Reports from Madhya Pradesh said an argument broke out after police attempted to stop the DJ. A report by IBC24 News provided that the confrontation reportedly involved heated exchanges between police personnel and people participating in the procession.

The social-media battle begins almost immediately

The events of August 26 also demonstrate another increasingly familiar feature of communal tension in India: the speed with which isolated incidents become competing communal narratives. Within hours of the Mumbai incident, videos circulated claiming to show Muslims attacking Hindus; other accounts alleged that Hindutva activists had attacked Muslim participants. Neither narrative can safely be adopted merely because a video appears dramatic.

In fact, The Indian Express explicitly cautioned that reports of stone pelting and police use of force had not been independently verified. Meanwhile, as reported by Free Press Journal, Mumbai police publicly appealed to citizens not to believe rumours and said senior officers were monitoring the situation.  This is particularly important in communal incidents because the first version of events can acquire a life of its own. Once a video is captioned as an “attack by Muslims” or an “attack by Hindutva activists”, subsequent users often circulate it without checking its date, location, sequence or context. The result is not merely misinformation. It can itself become an accelerant of violence.

One cannot ignore the pattern of violence as well and hold that the August 26 incidents did not occur in a vacuum. Mumbai had already witnessed tension earlier in the week after eggs were allegedly thrown at a Ganesh idol procession in Mazgaon. Hindustan Times had reported that organisers alleged eggs were hurled at the Ganesh procession, following which tensions escalated and police deployed additional security. The Parel incident occurred only days later, and local accounts cited by Free Press Journal linked the atmosphere to the earlier Mazgaon episode. This is precisely where the responsibility of political actors, religious organisations, police authorities and media platforms becomes critical.

The August 26 incidents also expose a broader challenge for Indian cities entering the peak festival season: equal enforcement of public-order rules. If authorities prohibit provocative slogans, the prohibition must apply regardless of who raises them. If loudspeakers and DJs are regulated, the same standards must apply to every religious procession. If roads are blocked, organisers of every community’s procession must comply with traffic restrictions. If religious symbols are damaged, the police must investigate regardless of whose symbol was targeted. Selective enforcement does more than create resentment. It undermines public confidence in the neutrality of the State and provides fertile ground for competing narratives of victimhood.

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The report’s first part, titled “Communal Polarisation in Mira Road,” was authored by Irfan Engineer and Neha Dabhade. Its second part, titled “Communal Tensions Surrounding Bakri Eid at Poonam Estate Cluster 1, Mira Road, Maharashtra, May 2026,” is based on fact-finding undertaken between May 30 and July 12, 2026. The second exercise was conducted by a team comprising Irfan Engineer, Director of CSSS; Sameer Wagle, member of the civil society initiative Mumbai for Peace; Rukmini Iyer, peacebuilder; and Sudhakar Suradkar, a retired IPS officer.

Taken together, the two parts offer a picture of a city suburb where disputes that may initially concern housing, public space, animals, religious practices or municipal regulation can rapidly acquire a communal character when political mobilisation, misinformation and outside intervention enter the picture.

From a growing suburb to a communally marked locality

The report begins by challenging simplistic understandings of Mira Road’s demographic composition. Mira Road emerged as a major residential destination as property prices in Mumbai increased and middle-class families, workers and young couples sought more affordable housing. Improved railway connectivity and the expansion of the real-estate sector accelerated this transformation.

But the report argues that the locality’s demographic evolution cannot be separated from the history of communal violence in Mumbai. Following the 1992–93 Bombay riots, substantial numbers of Muslim families from South Central and Central Mumbai moved towards Naya Nagar in Mira Road. At the same time, Hindu residents who acquired economic opportunities elsewhere gradually moved out. This produced the concentrated Muslim population that is now frequently described as a “ghetto”.

The 2011 Census figures cited in the report put Hindus at 68.96% of the population of Mira-Bhayander city and Muslims at approximately 16.28%. Christians constituted 6.01%, Jains 5.67%, Buddhists 1.86% and Sikhs 0.53%. Yet the report warns against treating Naya Nagar’s present demographic character as evidence of an inherently segregated or sectarian community.

Its founding story, in fact, was explicitly pluralist. Naya Nagar was established by Syed Nazar Hussain in 1979, who invited Shiv Sena founder Bal Thackeray and Indian Union Muslim League leader G.M. Banatwala to jointly inaugurate the colony. This occurred before the undivided Shiv Sena formally adopted Hindutva as its party ideology in 1985. Long-time residents interviewed for the report described decades of ordinary Hindu-Muslim coexistence.

The report does, however, document patterns of informal residential exclusion. Muslim residents reportedly face difficulties obtaining rental housing in the neighbouring Hindu-majority Shanti Nagar. It argues that the language of “ghettoisation” is itself unevenly applied: Muslim-majority neighbourhoods are frequently described as ghettos and subjected to heightened scrutiny, while exclusionary practices in Hindu-majority localities do not receive comparable treatment.

Communal politics and the electoral competition in Mira Road

The first part of the report places considerable emphasis on the role of political competition. It examines the trajectory of local legislator Geeta Jain, who contested the 2019 Assembly election as an independent candidate on a platform centred on development, women’s rights and employment. The report notes that she had earlier attempted to organise an Iftaar event using municipal funds.

Her political positioning subsequently changed significantly. By March 2023, Jain was participating in the flagging-off of a Hindu Jan Akrosh Morcha organised by Hindutva-affiliated groups. In January 2024, following the violence, she publicly stated that Hindus required only “five minutes” to demonstrate their numerical and physical superiority over Muslims.

The report places this transformation within the context of competition for the BJP ticket ahead of the 2024 elections. It points to other political actors employing increasingly prominent religious symbolism, including BJP district president Ravi Vyas, who inaugurated a replica of the Ayodhya temple in the constituency, and former legislator Narendra Mehta, who proposed a competing religious procession along a route substantially overlapping with an earlier Hindu Akrosh rally. The Shinde faction of the Shiv Sena also organised a motorcycle rally invoking the idea of Ram Rajya.

The report’s broader argument is that communal mobilisation increasingly became an electoral resource in an area where political competition was intense. The political consequences were followed by legal proceedings. A writ petition was filed before the Bombay High Court in March 2024 seeking action against Jain, BJP legislator Nitesh Rane and Telangana legislator T. Raja over alleged inflammatory speeches connected with the January violence.

The report records that the Bombay High Court subsequently directed police to examine recordings and transcripts of relevant speeches. Criminal cases were registered against Rane and Jain under provisions including Sections 153A, 153B, 143, 504 and 506 of the IPC, along with provisions of the Maharashtra Police Act.

Hate speech before the January 2024 violence

The report is particularly significant in its insistence that the January 2024 violence did not emerge from nowhere. It traces an escalating pattern of communal rhetoric to at least March 2023. At a March 12, 2023 rally organised by the Sakal Hindu Samaj, social media commentator Kajal Shingala, also known as “Kajal Hindustani,” called for an economic boycott of Muslims and made derogatory communal assertions. The report says she also made unsupported claims portraying Naya Nagar as a narcotics hub and made unsubstantiated claims concerning fertility-related harms allegedly caused by Muslim vendors. The speech was delivered in the presence of police officials and was followed by a citizen complaint. A case under Sections 153A and 505(2) was eventually registered.

Around a week later, a mass gathering addressed by spiritual figure Dhirendra Shastri saw assertions that Maharashtra would play a central role in the establishment of a “Hindu rashtra”. The report also records accounts from students and minors of recurring religiously motivated harassment during 2023, including pressure to recite religious slogans, intimidation in educational spaces and communal messages circulating in peer groups.

The significance of these episodes lies in the report’s larger thesis: communal violence is rarely an isolated eruption. It can follow a period in which language that marks one community as threatening, alien or economically undesirable becomes normalised.

CJP’s involvement: 2024

Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) has previously intervened in matters concerning communal tensions and the potential for provocative mobilisation in Mira-Bhayandar. In February 2024, CJP wrote to the Commissioner of Police, Mira-Bhayandar, expressing concern over the proposed visit and rally of BJP MLA T. Raja Singh in Mira Road. The intervention came against the backdrop of communal violence reported in the area in January 2024. Singh had announced a rally organised under the banner of the ‘Hindu Jan Aakrosh Morcha’ to mark the birth anniversary of Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj. After an earlier rally planned for February 19 was cancelled for want of police permission, a fresh announcement was made for February 25. CJP urged the police to carefully assess the proposed mobilisation and take steps to prevent any further deterioration of the law-and-order situation.

CJP’s detailed complaint may be read here

CJP again became involved in June 2026, when it assisted Sadique Basha, a senior CPI (M) leader from the Mira-Bhayandar region who has worked extensively on issues of communal harmony, in drafting a complaint to the police concerning events at Poonam Estate Cluster-1 in Mira Road in the period preceding Eid-ul-Adha. The complaint sought the registration of an FIR and a comprehensive investigation into allegations of communal provocation, intimidation, hate speech and other unlawful acts associated with the incident. In fact Sadique Basha is an activist who has campaigned at the time of the Covid-2019 crisis for access to public health and vaccines and also consistently for right to access to public education.

The complaint called upon the police to preserve and examine all available evidence, including CCTV recordings, mobile-phone videos, media footage and social-media material. It also sought the recording of statements of residents, eyewitnesses and others who had publicly spoken about the incident. Further, it urged the police to investigate the role of individuals and organisations allegedly involved in mobilising crowds, making inflammatory statements or otherwise contributing to communal provocation.

Importantly, the complaint emphasised that any investigation and subsequent legal action must be impartial and must not be influenced by political affiliation, organisational position or public standing. CJP called for appropriate action against anyone found to have violated the law.

The intervention reflected CJP’s broader position that maintaining communal peace cannot be limited to managing tensions after they have erupted. It also requires timely scrutiny of alleged acts of provocation, preservation of evidence and accountability for those responsible. A prompt, fair and impartial investigation, the complaint argued, is essential to reinforce the principle that attempts to generate communal hostility will be treated as matters of law and not merely as issues of public order.

Reconstructing the January 2024 violence

The report reconstructs the events of January 21–23, 2024 in considerable detail. On the night of January 21, at approximately 10.30 pm, a procession consisting of around four cars and ten two-wheelers, carrying saffron flags and equipped with a microphone, travelled through Naya Nagar.

According to police accounts cited in the report, the procession passed two mosques on Lodha Road while religious slogans were allegedly shouted. The vehicles then entered a dead-end lane containing another mosque. Residents, fearing an attempt to enter the mosque, confronted the procession. A confrontation followed, involving stones and physical altercation. Police intervention brought the immediate situation under control and five arrests were made. The following day coincided with the consecration of the Ram temple in Ayodhya, dramatically increasing the political significance of the incident.

BJP legislator Nitesh Rane posted a warning that there would be “strong reactions” to what had happened in Mira Road. At the same time, a media outlet described the previous night’s mob action as “jihadi” in a social-media post that reportedly received more than 800,000 views. Violence then spread beyond Naya Nagar.

In Shanti Nagar, shops identified as Muslim-owned were vandalised. According to residents interviewed for the report, some shops were targeted because of Muslim proprietor names or because they lacked saffron symbols. In Bhayander West, Jabir Siraj Ansari, an Ola-affiliated cab driver, was reportedly stopped, removed from his vehicle after his Muslim identity was established and beaten, sustaining multiple facial fractures. Another motorcyclist was identified as Muslim through a religious decal and was allegedly forced, under threat of violence, to recite a Hindu religious slogan. A Muslim-owned commercial tempo was also stopped by an armed group. The driver and another employee were injured, with the latter requiring stitches for a head wound. A mosque in Bhayander West was also reportedly subjected to stone throwing.

Detailed report on the incident may be read here, here and here.

Detailed reports on BJP MLA Raja Singh and his speech may be read  here, here, here and here.

Detailed reports on BJP MLAs Geeta Jain and Nitesh Rane may be read here and here.

The bulldozer action: when demolition followed communal violence

Perhaps the most contentious finding in the first part concerns the municipal demolition drive. On January 23, 2024, the Mira-Bhayander Municipal Corporation’s anti-encroachment division demolished structures in Naya Nagar. One proprietor who had operated an automobile repair business there for 22 years said he was physically removed from his premises immediately before demolition. He estimated his loss at between ₹5 lakh and ₹6 lakh and said authorities disregarded tenancy-related documentary evidence. A municipal official confirmed that the demolished structures were Muslim-owned but described the action as part of an enforcement drive against unauthorised construction.

Contemporary estimates cited in the report placed the number of demolished structures between 12 and 17. What generated particular concern was the timing. The demolition took place shortly after Deputy Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis demanded strict action against those responsible for the violence. Yet, according to the report, the structures demolished were exclusively identified as Muslim-owned, while no comparable immediate enforcement action was documented against Hindu participants in the violence.

Residents also questioned why structures that had allegedly existed for more than two decades were suddenly targeted immediately after the communal clashes. The report cites Amnesty International India, which criticised the demolitions as reflecting a discriminatory de facto policy of punitive demolition and called for due process and prosecution rather than collective punishment.

A troubling asymmetry in policing

The report’s analysis of police and criminal proceedings is among its strongest findings. It examined eight FIRs connected with the violence and found that in four cases where the complainant was Muslim, no arrests had been made at the time of review. More significantly, despite at least 22 Muslim-owned commercial establishments reportedly being vandalised during the three-day period, the report found that police had not registered a single FIR concerning those incidents at the time of its review.

The alleged assault on Jabir Ansari and the attack on the Muslim-owned transport vehicle also had not resulted in arrests in the weeks following the violence, despite victims reportedly assisting in the identification of assailants from circulating video footage. The disparity was also visible in the charges.

Muslim residents accused in connection with the January 21 confrontation were charged under Section 307 IPC — attempt to murder, carrying a maximum punishment of life imprisonment. The FIR reportedly attributed collective responsibility to a crowd of approximately 50–60 people without individualised allegations. By contrast, Hindu individuals implicated in attacks on the tempo driver and others were charged under provisions including Sections 141, 143, 147, 149, 324, 341 and 427, with a maximum punishment of three years.

The report does not claim that every accused person was innocent or guilty. Rather, it highlights the apparent difference in the treatment of comparable violence and asks whether the criminal justice response itself became communalised.

Two years later, another communal flashpoint

The second part of the report moves from the 2024 violence to Poonam Estate Cluster 1, where communal tensions erupted in May 2026 in the run-up to Bakri Eid. The immediate issue was the temporary keeping of goats within the residential complex. CSSS began its fact-finding on May 30 and continued the exercise through July 12. The team visited Poonam Cluster and interviewed residents, managing committee representatives, political and community representatives and a person who reported being assaulted.

The team also spoke to Nagnath Kamble, associated with the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Bajrang Dal, met senior municipal and police officials and observed police-convened meetings with Muslim residents on July 5 and Hindu residents on July 12.

Importantly, CSSS expressly acknowledges the limitations of its investigation. The team did not have access to several relevant documents, including FIRs, CCTV footage, some permissions and correspondence, and municipal orders or circulars. The report therefore distinguishes between corroborated information, official statements, allegations and contested interpretations, and expressly states that determining individual criminal responsibility falls outside its scope.

A detailed may be viewed here.

The goat enclosure dispute

According to Muslim residents interviewed by CSSS, goats had been temporarily kept in the society ahead of Bakri Eid for approximately eight to ten years. They consistently stated that ritual slaughter, or qurbani, had never taken place within the residential complex and was not intended there in 2026. At the same time, the report does not dismiss the concerns of Hindu residents.

Hemendra Joshi, who identified himself as a complainant, said he had objected to the practice since 2019, citing smell and use of common space. The report therefore characterises the dispute as one involving both a longstanding practice and longstanding objections. A police application or intimation was reportedly made around May 13–15. Senior Police Inspector Rajendra Kamble subsequently confirmed that police permission had been granted in time. Preparation of the temporary enclosure reportedly began around May 16. However, the administrative process remained unclear. Residents said they had approached MBMC and received acknowledgement of their application but neither a clear approval nor rejection.

Around May 24, municipal officials removed the asbestos roof of the temporary enclosure, reportedly citing fire-safety concerns. Bamboo supports were subsequently removed, and authorities ultimately ordered the goats to be taken away. Approximately 48 goats were moved on May 26 to a ground near NH School in Naya Nagar. The police later raised questions about documentation, including medical certificates, ear tags and photographs, as well as animal transportation requirements. But residents maintained that they had followed substantially the same practice for years and were willing to comply with applicable rules. The report notes that Senior PI Kamble himself recommended, after the incident, that MBMC formulate clearer regulations governing the transportation and management of animals.

When an administrative dispute became a communal confrontation

The report’s central finding on the Poonam Cluster episode is that there were real practical grievances, but these were subsequently transformed into a communal confrontation. Residents had longstanding disagreements concerning smell, hygiene, visitors and common space. The tensions also reflected earlier disputes over Taraweeh prayers, namaz, loudspeakers, religious lighting and banners, festival committees and the use of common areas.

The decisive change came when people and organisations from outside the society became involved. Residents reported the arrival of persons associated with the VHP and Bajrang Dal. Nagnath Kamble told the fact-finding team that Poonam Cluster residents had approached the VHP for assistance and estimated that the crowd eventually reached 400–500 people. Violence followed. A person interviewed by CSSS, identified as Rahim, said he was assaulted by a group after stopping near the society to enquire about the gathering. Police personnel reportedly extracted him from the crowd.

Three FIRs had been registered, according to Senior PI Kamble, although the fact-finding team did not have sufficient documentary material to establish individual criminal responsibility. A particularly provocative moment involved the appearance of a pig during the confrontation. Videos circulated widely, but CSSS could not conclusively establish who was responsible or what the person’s intention was. That uncertainty is important.

The report does not convert an unverified viral narrative into a factual conclusion. Instead, it observes that social-media circulation and political intervention increasingly reframed the dispute as one about animal sacrifice. This was materially different from the consistent account given to CSSS by Muslim residents: that the goats were being temporarily housed and that qurbani was neither being conducted nor proposed within Poonam Cluster.

What does the law actually regulate?

One of the report’s most important contributions is its attempt to separate legal questions that were repeatedly collapsed into one another. There are different legal issues concerning transportation of goats; temporary keeping of goats, animal welfare, slaughter, municipal regulation, fire safety, sanitation, and use of common residential spaces.

The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, particularly Sections 3 and 11, establishes duties concerning animal welfare and prevention of unnecessary suffering. The Transport of Animals Rules, 1978, as amended, regulate transportation of sheep and goats, including veterinary certification, fitness for transport, overcrowding and transport conditions. But, crucially, the report says these provisions do not by themselves establish a blanket prohibition on temporarily keeping goats inside residential society premises.

The report also examines the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949, and the Maharashtra Animal Preservation Act, 1976. It notes that goats are not among the cattle categories whose slaughter is prohibited under the Maharashtra Animal Preservation Act, although slaughter remains subject to other applicable requirements. The report also considers the Bombay High Court’s 2019 interim order in Jiv Maitri Trust v. Union of India, but points out that the case concerned temporary permissions for slaughter during Bakri Eid and did not, on its face, establish a general prohibition on temporarily keeping goats in residential societies. The critical administrative problem, therefore, was not that no regulation could apply It was that the applicable regulation was never made sufficiently clear.

CSSS says it was unable to establish which specific MBMC provision, bye-law or administrative order was being used to prohibit or regulate the temporary keeping of goats at Poonam Cluster. If requirements had changed, or if existing requirements were being enforced differently in 2026, residents should have been informed beforehand and the rules applied transparently and consistently.

The report is particularly critical of the involvement of outside organisations. Its finding is not that religious organisations cannot raise concerns. Rather, it argues that whatever the merits of residents’ grievances, outside organisations cannot be permitted to exercise an extra-legal veto over the religious practices of residents or substitute themselves for lawful authorities and internal dispute-resolution mechanisms. This is a larger constitutional and civic question.

The report’s recommendations

CSSS calls for a considerably more transparent administrative system. It recommends that MBMC and police publish clear, multilingual guidelines well before major festivals, distinguishing between animal transportation, temporary housing, slaughter, sound, common spaces, sanitation, fire safety and crowd management. It proposes a single-window permission mechanism or nodal officer coordinating municipal, police, fire, veterinary and transport authorities. It calls for impartial and proportionate enforcement, written reasons for approvals and refusals, and an end to selective enforcement.

The report also recommends representative internal mechanisms within Poonam Cluster involving different faith communities, owners and tenants, women and senior citizens. It also calls for trained mediators and Mohalla or Shanti Committees to intervene before ordinary disputes become communal flashpoints.

Most significantly, the report calls on police to act preventively against unauthorised gatherings, intimidation, threats, blockades and attempts by outside groups to impose decisions upon residential communities.

On hate speech, it refers to Sections 196 and 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and the Supreme Court’s directions in Shaheen Abdullah v. Union of India concerning suo motu action by police where hate speech meets the legal threshold. The report also calls for more responsible communication by political actors, community organisations and the media, specifically warning against conflating temporary goat-keeping with slaughter.

The report ultimately does not call for the State to ignore genuine grievances. Its position is more demanding: the State must address genuine grievances without allowing communal identity to determine whose grievance is heard, whose violence is prosecuted and whose rights are protected. CSSS concludes that the Poonam Cluster episode was neither simply a dispute about goats nor an inexplicable outbreak of communal hostility. It resulted from the interaction of religious practice, local grievances, unclear regulation, weak internal dispute-resolution mechanisms, municipal intervention, outside mobilisation, political intervention, violence and social-media amplification.

The complete report may be read here:

Related:

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Mira Road: Mosque clerics welcome people from across religion and caste to Jama Masjid Al Shams this Ramzan

Mira Road to see Hindutva rally tomorrow after HC grants permission, citizens approach police to ensure peace

Bombay HC grants conditional permission to BJP MLA Raja Singh for Feb 25 Mira Road-Bhayander meet, orders videotaping and ‘No Hate Speech’

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Mira-Road Bhayander Police rejects permission to BJP MLA T Raja Singh for rally on February 25, cites hate speeches

Police disrupt anti hate-speech campaign in Mira-Bhayandar 

The post From the violence of 2024 to the Bakri Eid tensions of 2026, a fact-finding report examines Mira Road’s deepening communal fault lines appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to her husband, Jumman Fakir, the family soon received a call from the Mumbai Police’s Chembur Crime Branch. Sahida had been detained on suspicion of being an “illegal immigrant”. Within days, the family was told that she had been sent to Bangladesh. Her husband says he had repeatedly approached the authorities with documents establishing her identity and roots in West Bengal, but they were allegedly disregarded. Sahida eventually called her family from Satkhira, Bangladesh.

The story, first reported in detail by Scroll on August 11, is disturbing not merely because of what allegedly happened to one woman, but because of the larger question it raises: what happens when the State begins treating Bengali identity as evidence of foreignness?

The Indian Express separately reported that Sahida was detained on July 18 and that sources said she was taken to Assam before being pushed across the border along with others. The report also provided that her family was preparing to approach the Calcutta High Court and that a migrant workers’ forum had written to the Ministry of External Affairs seeking intervention.

The facts, as reported, demand something more than administrative clarification. They demand scrutiny of the entire architecture through which a person can apparently move from being a resident of India to being labelled an “infiltrator”, detained and ultimately expelled from the country without a meaningful opportunity to contest that determination.

A woman disappears, and the State’s explanation is suspicion

Sahida’s case is particularly troubling because her family says it did not merely possess one disputed identity document. They produced a birth certificate recording her birth in Swarupdaha village in West Bengal in 1988. They produced a school certificate, a voter identity card issued in 2008, documents relating to land in Gobindapur, and records concerning her family. Her parents’ names, according to Scroll, also appeared in the 2002 electoral rolls.

None of these documents, individually, should be treated as an automatic and conclusive certificate of citizenship. That distinction matters. A voter ID, Aadhaar or land document cannot, by itself, settle every question concerning citizenship. But that is precisely why the State’s obligation becomes more important, not less.  If citizenship is disputed, the answer cannot simply be deportation. The dispute must first be investigated.

Sahida’s husband told Scroll that police asked for the birth certificates of her parents even after he had produced her own birth certificate and other documents. He said the family could not provide such certificates because they were from a generation in which birth registration was not common. That raises an obvious question: how much documentation must a poor citizen produce before the State believes that she belongs to the country in which she was born and has lived?

For months, instances of forced deportations and illegal pushbacks have surfaced from Assam, West Bengal, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Maharashtra and Delhi of individuals “suspected” of being Bangladeshi nationals. In many of these cases, the family of those deported have approached the courts alleging that the removals were carried out without any disclosed nationality verification, without travel documents, and without Bangladesh formally acknowledging or accepting the individuals concerned.

Detailed reports may be read here, here, here, here and here.

The most dangerous word in this story is “suspected”

There is a profound legal difference between suspecting that someone may be a foreign national and establishing that they are one. The first is an investigative starting point. The second is a legal conclusion. Sahida’s case, as reported, appears to collapse the two. Scroll reported that the family was not given documents relating to her arrest or detention and that the Mumbai and Navi Mumbai police did not respond to questions seeking clarification about the grounds for her detention.

When the State takes away a person’s liberty, the burden of public accountability does not disappear merely because the allegation involves “illegal immigration”. If anything, the stakes are higher because the consequence may ultimately be removal from the country itself. The Constitution does not create a zone of executive immunity around immigration enforcement.

Article 21 protects life and personal liberty. Article 14 demands non-arbitrariness and equality before the law. Article 22 contains safeguards concerning arrest and detention. These constitutional protections cannot become conditional upon whether the person is socially respectable, economically secure or perceived to “look Indian”. And the constitutional question becomes particularly serious when a person is allegedly identified not through a properly adjudicated finding but through a combination of suspicion and social profiling.

The border cannot become a substitute for a hearing

Sahida’s husband told Scroll that she was detained because she was Bengali. In Maharashtra, the crackdown has become increasingly expansive. Hindustan Times reported in March that the state government told the Legislative Council that more than 2,000 alleged illegal Bangladeshi nationals had been deported in 2025, compared with 202 in 2024, and that the state planned intensive “combing operations” in slums, construction sites and other areas. There is nothing inherently unlawful about a State identifying and removing foreign nationals who are illegally present. Immigration control is a legitimate governmental function. The danger begins when the hunt for foreigners becomes a hunt for people who appear foreign.

The physical act of pushing someone across an international border has consequences that are fundamentally different from ordinary detention. Once a person is in Bangladesh, an Indian court’s ability to protect her becomes substantially more complicated. Access to lawyers, family members and documents becomes difficult. The very act of deportation can therefore create a second legal problem out of the first. This is exactly what makes Sahida’s account so alarming. According to the Indian Express, she said she was taken to the Assam border and pushed into Bangladesh at around 1 a.m. She reportedly walked for hours through muddy fields before local residents helped her and a family in Satkhira provided her shelter.

A precedent already exists for bringing people back

The danger of mistaken deportation is no longer theoretical. In 2025, several Bengali-speaking residents working outside West Bengal were detained and sent across the Bangladesh border amid claims that they were Bangladeshi nationals. One of the most consequential cases involved Sunali Khatun, her husband and their son. The Calcutta High Court’s September 2025 judgment in Bhodu Sekh v. Union of India is particularly relevant. The court examined the deportation of Sunali Khatun, Danish and their son Sabir. The authorities had argued that the family had failed to establish Indian citizenship. But the court also considered the procedure prescribed by the Union’s May 2, 2025 memorandum for persons suspected of being Bangladeshi or Myanmar nationals who claimed Indian citizenship in another State.

The memorandum contemplated verification by the State or district from which the person claimed to originate. Where a person claimed Indian citizenship and residence in another State, the concerned authorities were required to seek verification from that State and district administration. The judgment records that such verification was to be undertaken within a specified period, during which the person could be kept in a holding centre.

The Calcutta High Court ultimately held that the procedure had not been followed and described the authorities’ action as being undertaken in “hot haste”. It set aside the detention and deportation orders concerning Sunali, Danish and Sabir and directed the authorities to take steps to bring them back to India. In May 2026, the Union told the Supreme Court that it would bring back people deported to Bangladesh and verify their citizenship claims. All those six deported in this case are now back in India.

Detailed reports may be read here and here.

Notably, a separate affidavit was filed by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) on July 31, 2026 in Rajubala Das v. Union of India pursuant to the Supreme Court’s order dated March 21, 2025. The affidavit sought to explain the legal and administrative framework governing deportation where the nationality of a declared foreigner remains unknown or unverified. In doing so, the Union makes one of its clearest judicial admissions to date: deportation cannot even be initiated unless the individual’s nationality has first been verified by the receiving State, appropriate travel documents have been obtained, and the receiving country has agreed to accept the individual.

The affidavit fundamentally distinguishes between being declared a foreigner and being legally deportable. While a declaration by a Foreigners Tribunal may settle a person’s legal status within India, it does not, the Union now accepts, authorise the State to physically remove that individual from Indian territory. Deportation remains contingent upon a separate process involving diplomatic engagement, nationality verification, issuance of travel documents and, most importantly, the consent of another sovereign State. In other words, the executive cannot unilaterally deport a person merely because Indian authorities believe them to be a foreign national.

Detailed report may be read here.

The SIR connection makes the situation even more sensitive

Sahida’s case also comes amid intense scrutiny of electoral citizenship verification in West Bengal. According to Scroll, Sahida’s parents appeared on the 2002 electoral roll, while Sahida herself was marked “under adjudication” in the recent Special Intensive Revision process, with an appeal pending before the relevant tribunal. The fact that an electoral-roll dispute exists cannot itself establish whether Sahida is or is not an Indian citizen. But it does reinforce why administrative processes must remain separate and carefully bounded. Being excluded from an electoral roll is not the same thing as being declared a foreign national.

Indeed, in August 2025, the Supreme Court sought clarity from the Centre on the standard operating procedure governing deportation drives and specifically raised concerns about allegations that Bengali-speaking minorities were being singled out. The Court observed that while persons attempting to illegally cross into India could be dealt with at the border, once a person was already inside the country, the law prescribed a procedure.

Over the past few months, multiple petitions before the Supreme Court and High Courts have alleged that persons suspected of being Bangladeshi nationals were taken across the international border without any publicly disclosed deportation process. In several cases, families have alleged that individuals were picked up without prior notice, denied access to lawyers or relatives, and removed without any disclosed deportation order or travel documents.

Detailed report may be read here, here, here and here.

Related:

‘Deportation Cannot Begin without Nationality Verification’: Union’s Rajubala affidavit clarifies legal limits on executive power

Aadhaar, Voter ID and PAN Cannot Prove Citizenship: Calcutta High Court’s Foreigners Order and the burden of belonging

They Belong Here: An elderly couple’s victory for citizenship

Another CJP Victory: Barpeta Tribunal declares Alam Khan ‘not a foreigner’

When a narrow reading of documents decide citizenship: GHC in Aminul Hoque

‘Fairness & reason ‘: SC rules that due process is a must for citizenship determination

Gauhati High Court upholds foreigner declaration, rejects mental illness plea

The post When Suspicion Becomes Deportation: The case of Sahida Fakir and the dangerous criminalisation of Bengali identity appeared first on SabrangIndia.

That distinction has become increasingly difficult to ignore. The 2026 Kanwar season was marked not simply by the ordinary logistical difficulties of accommodating millions of pilgrims, but by repeated reports of assaults, vandalism, intimidation, attacks on vehicles, confrontations with police, targeting of Muslims, pressure on Muslim-owned establishments, and an increasingly aggressive campaign around what citizens may eat or sell during Shravan. The question, therefore, is not whether the Kanwar Yatra should be allowed. It should.

The question is what happens when the State begins accommodating a religious procession to such an extent that the rights of everyone outside the procession begin to appear negotiable? That is where the 2026 Yatra becomes constitutionally significant.

A pilgrimage of millions — and a State willing to rearrange public life around it

The sheer scale of the Kanwar Yatra makes substantial administrative arrangements inevitable. Uttar Pradesh deployed approximately 35,000 police personnel, 151 companies of the Provincial Armed Constabulary and 11 companies of paramilitary forces for the 2026 pilgrimage. According to The Times of India, the State also installed nearly 29,500 CCTV cameras and deployed 395 drones, alongside 1,222 police helpdesks and 829 medical camps. The Uttar Pradesh government had announced an elaborate security and logistical plan even before the Yatra began. The Indian Express reported that round-the-clock control rooms, CCTV surveillance, additional buses and other arrangements were being put in place, with Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath stating that nobody could stop the annual pilgrimage.

The administration’s preparations were explicitly framed around ensuring the safety, convenience and dignity of the Kanwariyas. Uttar Pradesh DGP Rajeev Krishna announced a “zero incident, zero accident” target, while senior officials discussed interstate coordination, medical preparedness, traffic management and surveillance. Again, there is nothing objectionable about this in itself. A democratic State should facilitate the peaceful exercise of religion. But the scale of accommodation raises another question: where is the corresponding obligation to protect those who are not participating in the pilgrimage?

During the Yatra, roads are closed or heavily restricted, schools and institutions in some areas are shut or their schedules altered, businesses are asked to modify operations, and entire stretches of public space are effectively reorganised around the movement of pilgrims. In western Uttar Pradesh, Hindustan Times reported extensive traffic restrictions, including the planned closure of the Delhi-Haridwar National Highway and Ganga Canal Road in Muzaffarnagar for the movement of Kanwariyas. Non-vegetarian eateries and liquor shops were cleared from parts of the route. The Delhi-Meerut Expressway was also closed to regular traffic at the peak of the Yatra, causing severe congestion on alternative routes, according to The Times of India.  Such measures can be justified when they are proportionate, temporary and genuinely necessary for public safety. But accommodation cannot become capitulation. And that distinction becomes particularly important when the very group being accommodated is also involved, in individual cases, in disrupting public order.

When a minor collision becomes collective punishment

One of the most disturbing patterns emerging from the 2026 Yatra is the repeated escalation of relatively minor road incidents into collective violence. On July 16, in Purkazi, Muzaffarnagar, a pickup vehicle reportedly brushed against Kanwariyas, reported by The Hindu. What should have been an ordinary traffic dispute escalated into an attack on the vehicle. Videos showed men climbing onto the pickup, smashing its windshield and striking it with sticks. Police intervened, registered a case against unidentified persons and began examining video footage to identify those involved.

The incident is revealing because the vehicle was not accused of deliberately attacking a religious procession. The reported trigger was an accidental collision. Yet the response was collective retaliation. The same pattern appeared in Manglaur town, Haridwar district, Uttarakhand on August 1, when an Alto collided with a Kanwariya and broke his Kanwar. As reported by ETV Bharat, a crowd reportedly pulled the driver from the vehicle, assaulted him and then vandalised the car. Significantly, the driver was himself reportedly a Kanwariya returning with Gangajal. Police eventually intervened and registered an FIR.

These incidents demonstrate that the problem cannot simply be explained as hostility between Hindus and Muslims or as attacks by outsiders upon a religious procession. The underlying problem is the normalisation of mob justice. A collision becomes “desecration”; desecration becomes an excuse for anger; anger becomes collective violence and the crowd becomes the adjudicator. That is precisely the opposite of the rule of law.

The school van attack: When even children are not outside the zone of religious aggression

Perhaps the most disturbing example occurred in Lucknow. On August 3, six Kanwariyas allegedly attacked a school van after a motorcycle associated with the group collided with the vehicle at Charak Chowk. The men allegedly smashed the rear windshield and side mirrors and threatened the driver. The van was carrying schoolchildren. The incident was reported by Hindustan Times, which provided that police subsequently arrested one person in connection with the attack.

The children were not physically injured, but the psychological dimension cannot be dismissed. A school vehicle is not an ideological adversary; a child sitting in a school van is not an obstruction to religious freedom; and a driver involved in a traffic dispute cannot lawfully be subjected to collective punishment because the other side happens to be carrying a Kanwar.

The newspaper records allegations by parents that the police initially refused to register the complaint and instead threatened action against the van for alleged documentation violations. Parents also alleged that the assault occurred in the presence of policemen who failed to intervene. Those allegations require independent investigation and should not be treated as established fact without verification. But they raise an important institutional question: what message is communicated when citizens perceive that the police are more comfortable questioning the victim than confronting the mob?

When the police themselves become targets

The violence has also extended to law-enforcement personnel. In Meerut, as reported by Deccan Herald, a dispute between groups of Kanwariyas following a motorcycle collision reportedly escalated into a fight. A head constable who attempted to intervene was allegedly pushed and beaten before police eventually brought the situation under control. The significance of such incidents goes beyond the injury to an individual officer.

The State cannot maintain public order if the police are expected to negotiate with a mob whose religious identity is treated as a reason for exceptional restraint. A police officer cannot be expected to enforce the law only when the crowd permits him to. Once a group begins attacking police personnel, damaging vehicles and obstructing roads, the religious nature of the gathering cannot operate as a shield. The constitutional obligation is precisely the opposite: the more sensitive the religious context, the more carefully and impartially the State must enforce the law.

The communal turn: When the Kanwar route becomes a map of exclusion

If the violence were limited to road accidents and crowd-management failures, it would be a serious law-and-order problem. But the 2026 Yatra has also revealed a distinctly communal dimension.

The material compiled for this piece records a series of incidents in which Muslim-owned businesses, Muslim participation and Muslim presence along Kanwar routes were specifically targeted.

On July 28 in Dehradun, members of the Hindu Raksha Dal reportedly submitted a memorandum demanding that Muslim shopkeepers remove their shops from the Kanwar route and refrain from offering food or water to pilgrims. The organisation reportedly threatened to shut Muslim-owned shops itself if they did not comply. This is an extraordinary demand. A Muslim offering water to a Hindu pilgrim is not a constitutional violation. A Muslim-owned shop selling lawful food is not a threat to religious freedom. A citizen does not lose the right to conduct a business because a religious procession happens to pass through the locality. And no private organisation has the legal authority to decide that another citizen’s shop must close because of that citizen’s religion.

Location: Dehradun, Uttarakhand

Date: July 28

Members of the Hindu Raksha Dal, led by Uttarakhand State President Lalit Sharma, submitted a memorandum at the SDM Office and declared that the Hindu Raksha Dal would not allow its religion to be “destroyed” during the Kanwar Yatra. Sharma demanded that Muslims remove their shops from the yatra route, avoid obstructing the procession, and refrain from offering food or water to pilgrims, stating that such offerings were not needed. He warned that Muslims should comply with these demands “for their own good,” threatening that the organisation would otherwise enforce them through violence. He further threatened that if Muslim-owned shops continued to operate along the Kanwar Yatra route after July 30, members of the organisation would shut them down themselves.

The danger lies in the gradual normalisation of precisely this idea. The controversy surrounding shopkeeper identity is particularly revealing. In 2024, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand authorities had directed eateries along the Kanwar route to display the names of their owners and employees. The Supreme Court intervened and stayed the directions. It permitted authorities to require disclosure of the nature of food being served but rejected the requirement that owners and employees be identified by name. The constitutional concern was obvious. A food item can be vegetarian or non-vegetarian; a restaurant can be licensed or unlicensed; a kitchen can meet or violate health standards. But the religion of the person selling the food is not a food-safety category.

The Supreme Court’s intervention therefore went directly to the danger of converting a dietary preference into a system of religious identification. The 2026 incidents suggest that the politics behind that controversy has not disappeared. The document records an alleged incident in which a Muslim shopkeeper was pressured to display his name prominently so that Kanwariyas could determine whether the establishment was Muslim-owned. This is the politics of the nameplate in another form. The underlying message is: Know who owns the shop. Know whether he is Muslim. Decide whether you will enter.

That is not neutral consumer information, rather it is communal sorting. And communal sorting becomes particularly dangerous when it occurs in an environment where vigilante groups have already threatened violence. The politics of the Kanwar Yatra in 2026 cannot be understood without examining the increasingly aggressive campaign against meat and non-vegetarian food.

This is where an individual’s religious observance begins to collide with another citizen’s personal autonomy and livelihood. Kanwariyas may choose to abstain from meat. They may insist that the food they themselves consume during their pilgrimage is vegetarian. They may choose not to enter a restaurant serving meat. None of this is controversial. The constitutional problem begins when their dietary discipline is converted into a rule for everyone else.

In Meerut, the district administration issued directions concerning food served along the Kanwar route, including restrictions concerning onion and garlic, while meat and liquor shops were to be closed or covered, according to Hindustan Times.

In Hapur, authorities ordered meat, fish, egg and other non-vegetarian outlets shut from July 26 until further orders, explicitly citing the need to ensure the peaceful passage of the Kanwar Yatra. India Today reported that the closure extended to all such outlets in the relevant area. In Delhi, the MCD ordered action against unauthorised and unlicensed meat shops along Kanwar routes and near 308 Kanwar camps. Hindustan Times reported that the order followed a meeting chaired by Delhi minister Kapil Mishra.

Again, there is an important legal distinction. If a meat shop is illegal, it can be shut. If a business violates municipal rules, it can be proceeded against. If an establishment lacks a licence, the law can be enforced. But if the underlying principle becomes “meat must disappear because Kanwariyas are passing through”, then the State is no longer merely regulating illegal businesses. It is imposing the religious preferences of one group upon the everyday life of everyone else. And this becomes even more troubling because meat businesses in many parts of north India are disproportionately dependent on Muslim workers and proprietors. Thus, what is presented as a religious restriction on food can have a distinctly communal economic impact.

From administrative restriction to vigilante enforcement

The State’s actions are only one part of the story. More alarming is the extent to which private Hindu nationalist organisations have attempted to enforce these restrictions themselves. On July 30, an incident in Ghaziabad took place where a Hindu Raksha Dal member allegedly assaulted a man transporting meat, objecting to the transportation during Shravan.

Location: Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh

Date: July 30

Bajrang Dal members, led by leader Pankaj Arya, assaulted a Muslim man and accused him of deliberately damaging a Kanwar carried by a Hindu pilgrim near Guldhar. They claimed the man struck Kanwar with a stick while the pilgrim was carrying Ganga water from Haridwar to Bharatpur, Rajasthan and later handed the man over to the police.

In Mainpuri, members of Hindu organisations reportedly entered non-vegetarian establishments and egg carts, allegedly abusing shopkeepers and ordering them to close. In Deoband, members of VHP-Bajrang Dal reportedly objected to the sale of chicken and called the police, after which employees were detained and meat was seized. This is where the distinction between religious practice and religious policing becomes essential.

Location: Mainpuri, Uttar Pradesh

Date: August 9

Members of Vishva Hindu Mahasangh and Gau Raksha Dal, led by Golu Rathore, raided several non-veg outlets and egg carts, wielding sticks, hurling abuses at shopkeepers, and forcibly ordering them to shut their businesses, citing the Hindu month of Shravan and the ongoing Kanwar Yatra.

The most striking example of this convergence of religion, meat and administrative power came from Baheri in Uttar Pradesh, where a chicken-biryani shop near the Kanwar route was demolished after Bajrang Dal workers complained about the sale of non-vegetarian food. As reported by Maktoob Media, the owner, Mohd Salman, was detained. Police described the action as preventive and said the establishment was disturbing public peace, while municipal authorities said the structure was an illegal construction over a drain. If the structure was genuinely illegal, the administration must be permitted to enforce municipal law.

But the central question remains one of procedure and proportionality: Was the law enforced because there was an established municipal violation, or did the religious complaint trigger the enforcement action?

The Constitution does not prohibit the State from removing an illegal structure. It does prohibit the State from using public power as a disguised instrument of communal punishment. A shopkeeper cannot be punished for being Muslim. A business cannot be demolished because a vigilante group dislikes what it sells. And “public peace” cannot become a vague administrative formula through which the State converts the demands of a mob into enforceable orders.

The Kanwar Yatra and the politics of Muslim belonging

The communalisation of the Yatra has also extended beyond shops and food. Many inciteful statements from Hindu religious figures and organisations were reported where they were seen demanding that Muslims participating in the Kanwar Yatra conform to Hindu visual markers, including saffron clothing. As reported by Deccan Herald, Right-wing leader Swami Yashveer of Yog Sadhna Ashram questioned the participation of Muslims wearing skull caps or burqas in the Kanwar Yatra, stating that such attire is inappropriate for the pilgrimage and suggesting that those who participate genuinely should formally return to Hinduism. This is an extraordinary conception of religious participation.

If a Muslim chooses to participate in a Hindu pilgrimage peacefully, that should be understood as an expression of individual conscience.

Instead, the political framing asks: Why is a Muslim here?

And then: If he is here, why does he still look Muslim?

The implication is that participation in the religious life of another community is acceptable only after the Muslim has symbolically surrendered his Muslim identity. The rhetoric surrounding the Yatra has also spilled into explicitly territorial and historical claims. Slogans invoking Mathura, Kashi and Deoband, including the formulation that “Mathura and Kashi are just a glimpse; Deoband is yet to come.” Such slogans cannot be dismissed as harmless rhetoric.

Location: Saharanpur, Uttar Pradesh

Date: July 14

Members of the Hindu Raksha Dal from Uttarakhand staged a protest against Darul Uloom Deoband, claiming that the site was originally a Shiv Mandir and asserting that they would reclaim it. Lalit Sharma, Uttarakhand State President of the Hindu Raksha Dal, demanded an administrative investigation, accusing the authorities of delaying the process. He asserted that if no action was taken, they would return with trishuls and perform jalabhishek at Darul Uloom. He further threatened that Kanwar pilgrims would march to Deoband, after which “everything would belong to us.” He derogatorily referred to Muslims as “topiwale,” alleged that Muslims had occupied the site for the past 100 years, claimed that digging 14 feet beneath the site would reveal “their father Shiv,” and declared that there was no need for mosques anywhere. Participants also raised the slogan, “Mathura and Kashi are just a glimpse; Deoband is yet to come.”

The same political impulse surfaced in Agra, where members of the Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha reportedly attempted to enter the Taj Mahal with Kanwar water, asserting the claim that the monument was actually “Tejo Mahalaya”. The Kanwar is consequently being made to carry political baggage far beyond the act of carrying Gangajal. It becomes a symbol of territorial assertion. And, increasingly, a means of demonstrating who can occupy public space and on what terms.

Location: Agra, Uttar Pradesh

Date: August 3

Members of Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha attempted to enter the Taj Mahal to offer Hindu ritual prayers with Kanwar water, claiming that the monument is a Hindu Shiva temple called “Tejo Mahalaya.”

 The political nature of the Yatra was especially visible in Maharashtra. During a Kanwar procession in Muslim-majority Mumbra, BJP legislator Nitesh Rane reportedly made remarks asserting that Mumbra “was and will remain” Hindu, according to NDTV‘s reporting. The significance of such rhetoric is difficult to miss. A religious procession in a particular neighbourhood becomes an opportunity to make a claim about the religious ownership of that neighbourhood.

The question is no longer simply: Can Hindus carry out a religious procession in Mumbra?

Of course they can, subject to ordinary law-and-order requirements. The political question being manufactured is: Who does Mumbra belong to?

That is an entirely different proposition. A constitutional democracy does not assign neighbourhoods to religions. Mumbai’s Muslims do not cease to be equal citizens because a Hindu procession passes through their locality. Nor does a Hindu procession become a declaration of territorial ownership. Yet political rhetoric increasingly attempts to make precisely that transformation.

The state, selective enforcement and the constitutional line

There is an uncomfortable contradiction running through the entire Kanwar season. On the one hand, the State has undertaken extensive measures to regulate and facilitate the pilgrimage, deploying thousands of police personnel, installing CCTV cameras and drones, closing roads, diverting traffic, inspecting businesses, shutting meat shops and, in some areas, even altering school schedules. Entire districts have effectively been reorganised around the movement of Kanwariyas. On the other hand, when members of the same pilgrimage are accused of vandalising vehicles, assaulting drivers, confronting police personnel or intimidating businesses, enforcement has at times appeared hesitant, delayed or reactive. The document records several instances in which police intervention allegedly came only after violence had escalated, alongside allegations that FIRs were initially resisted or that accused persons were subsequently released on bonds. These allegations must, of course, be examined individually and should not be used to suggest that every police officer or administration acted in favour of violent Kanwariyas. Yet the recurrence of such allegations raises a larger constitutional concern: selective enforcement is itself a rule-of-law problem. A State that is willing to deploy extraordinary resources to facilitate a religious pilgrimage must be equally willing to enforce the law when individuals participating in that pilgrimage are accused of violating the rights of others.

This brings the discussion to the constitutional limits of religious freedom. The answer to the violence surrounding the Kanwar Yatra is not to restrict the right to practise religion, but to understand that right within the constitutional framework in which it operates. Article 25 guarantees freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion, but that freedom is expressly subject to public order, morality and health, as well as the other fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. Religious practice is therefore protected, but violence is not; pilgrimage is protected, but vandalism is not; devotion is protected, but intimidation is not. Similarly, while a Kanwariya is free to observe vegetarianism as part of religious practice, that preference does not automatically confer a right to determine what another citizen may eat or sell. A religious assembly is protected, but it cannot become a licence to assault a person who happens to cross its path. The State’s obligations under Articles 14 and 21 are equally important: equality before the law, equal protection, life and personal liberty cannot be subordinated to the preferences or sensitivities of a religious crowd. The Supreme Court’s intervention in the 2024 Kanwar nameplate controversy is instructive in this regard. The Court permitted authorities to regulate the nature of food being served but stayed directions requiring establishments to disclose the names and identities of their owners and employees. The distinction is fundamental: the State may regulate conduct where the law permits it; it cannot turn religious identity itself into a regulatory category merely to accommodate the preferences of one group.

When the state outsources public order to majoritarian sentiment

The otherisation being normalised through meat deserves closer scrutiny because it is often reduced to a question of religious sensitivity, when its consequences extend far beyond individual dietary preferences. Food is closely connected to identity, livelihood, caste, class and community, and for a large number of Indians, eating meat is an ordinary part of everyday life. At the same time, for thousands of workers employed in slaughterhouses, meat markets, restaurants, transportation and allied businesses, the sale and distribution of meat is a source of livelihood. The consequences become even more significant when meat-related businesses are disproportionately associated with particular communities, including Muslims. When the consumption or sale of meat is therefore politically constructed as something that must disappear from public spaces during a Hindu pilgrimage, the impact is not confined to Kanwariyas who voluntarily choose to abstain from it. It can result in restaurants being forced to shut, meat sellers losing their income, workers being sent home, shopkeepers being pressured to alter their businesses and Muslim-owned establishments becoming more visible and vulnerable to targeting. It also sends a wider social message that the everyday dietary choices and livelihoods of one section of citizens can be restricted to accommodate the religious sensitivities of another. The politics of meat, therefore, is not merely a disagreement over food; it is a question of economic freedom, equal citizenship and the extent to which one community’s religious preferences can determine the conditions under which others live and work.

This has a direct constitutional dimension. Article 19 (1) (g) protects every citizen’s right to practise a profession or carry on an occupation, trade or business, subject to restrictions imposed by law. Such restrictions must have a legitimate legal basis and satisfy the requirements of reasonableness; they cannot become constitutionally valid merely because a section of society considers a particular occupation offensive or incompatible with its religious beliefs. A lawful meat business cannot be treated as inherently illegitimate simply because a religious procession is passing through the area. If an establishment is unlicensed, violates municipal regulations or breaches food-safety requirements, the State has both the authority and the responsibility to act against it. But the basis of that action must remain the law and not the demands of a religious crowd.

This leads to the deeper institutional concern surrounding the Kanwar Yatra: the danger of the State allowing majoritarian sentiment to determine the boundaries of public order. A democratic State possesses the legitimate authority to regulate public spaces and enforce the law; a vigilante organisation does not. If the administration considers that meat shops should be temporarily closed along a particular route for a legally defensible public-order or regulatory reason, that decision must emerge from a lawful order, a clearly identifiable statutory basis and a proportionate exercise of administrative power. What cannot happen is for a private organisation to first threaten or demand the closure of businesses and for the administration to subsequently give effect to that demand, whether directly or indirectly. Such a process effectively reverses the constitutional chain of authority: the mob demands, the administration accommodates, and the police enforce.

That inversion is particularly dangerous because it allows majoritarian power to acquire the appearance of State authority. A vigilante group does not become legitimate simply because its demands are subsequently reflected in administrative action, just as a religious sentiment does not become a legal standard merely because it is politically popular. The State’s responsibility is not to determine which community is numerically or politically stronger and then organise public life around its preferences. Its responsibility is to ensure that the strength of one community cannot be converted into the power to determine the rights, livelihoods or freedoms of another. Public order cannot mean the preservation of peace by asking the more vulnerable to surrender their rights; it must mean the equal protection of all citizens, including those whose presence, food, occupation or identity may be politically unpopular.

And yet, there are alternative examples

It is important not to reduce the entire Kanwar Yatra to a narrative of violence or communal hostility. Such a portrayal would be both inaccurate and unfair to the millions of devotees who undertake the pilgrimage peacefully and to the many instances in which Kanwariyas and local communities have demonstrated restraint, accommodation and mutual respect. These examples are important precisely because they establish that confrontation between the Yatra and other communities is neither inevitable nor intrinsic to the religious practice itself.

A recent example from Bijnor illustrates this possibility. Navbharat Times reported that Kanwariyas halted their procession and switched off the DJ music to allow a Muslim funeral procession to pass. Rather than treating the funeral as an obstruction to their religious journey, the pilgrims reportedly made way for the procession and maintained silence as the funeral passed. The incident is a small but significant illustration of what religious coexistence can look like in practice: the exercise of one’s own faith does not require denying another community the space to mourn, pray or move through the same public space.

Such instances matter because they expose the artificiality of the claim that religious processions must necessarily generate confrontation with other communities. There is nothing inherent in the Kanwar Yatra that requires hostility towards Muslims; there is nothing inherent in Hindu devotion that requires meat shops to be vandalised; there is nothing inherent in religious faith that requires a school van carrying children to be attacked; and there is certainly nothing inherent in pilgrimage that requires a neighbourhood to be treated as the exclusive property of one religious community. Where devotees choose restraint, the same public space can accommodate different religious practices without one being perceived as a threat to the other.

Indeed, these instances provide a useful counterpoint to the more disturbing episodes documented during the 2026 Yatra. They demonstrate that the conflict is not an unavoidable consequence of the scale of the pilgrimage or of competing religious practices. It is shaped by choices — by the conduct of individuals, by the rhetoric of political and religious actors, and crucially, by the manner in which the State responds to both cooperation and provocation. The choice to transform religious devotion into confrontation, exclusion or majoritarian assertion is not dictated by faith; it is political.

The 2026 yatra must be understood against the history of 2024 and 2025

The events of 2026 cannot be viewed as a series of isolated disturbances detached from the history of the Kanwar Yatra. The document records at least 20 incidents of violence during the 2024 pilgrimage, while Hindustan Times reported that more than 170 Kanwariyas were booked within just five days of the 2025 Yatra in Uttarakhand for alleged offences including hooliganism, rioting, obstruction of highways and wrongful restraint. The recurrence of similar incidents in 2026 therefore demands something more than the familiar administrative response of treating each episode as an unfortunate, isolated altercation.

When vandalism, assaults, road blockages, confrontations with police and intimidation of civilians repeatedly emerge around the same pilgrimage year after year, the question is no longer simply what happened in a particular incident, but whether there is a systemic failure in the way the State anticipates, manages and responds to violence associated with the Yatra. That necessarily raises questions about how processions are regulated, what protocols are followed when a Kanwar is damaged, how quickly arrests are made, whether FIRs are registered without regard to the religious identity of the parties involved, and whether the police are exercising a different degree of restraint when the accused are members of a religious procession. It also requires scrutiny of whether Muslim-owned establishments are disproportionately exposed to intimidation, whether restrictions on businesses are genuinely grounded in neutral statutory criteria, and whether threats issued by vigilante organisations receive the same seriousness from law-enforcement agencies as threats allegedly directed at pilgrims. These are not questions directed at Hinduism or at the legitimacy of the pilgrimage. They are questions about whether the State is capable of administering a mass religious event without allowing religious identity to influence the application of ordinary law.

The Azeem Case: When a Traffic Dispute Ends in Death

The death of 27-year-old Mohd Azeem in Hapur brings these questions into their most serious and tragic form. According to The Hindu, Azeem, a mini-truck driver from Moradabad, was involved in a road collision near Garhmukhteshwar on July 31 and was allegedly assaulted following the incident before being shifted to a Delhi hospital, where he died on August 4. Hapur Police subsequently arrested Lokesh and Shivam and booked them for murder and rioting, with police stating that two of the four named accused had been arrested and efforts were underway to apprehend the remaining accused. The case, however, involves competing accounts that must be carefully distinguished.

Azeem’s family alleged that he was assaulted after the collision, while the father of the auto-rickshaw driver involved in the incident filed a separate complaint alleging that Azeem had deliberately rammed his vehicle into the auto-rickshaw. Police indicated that the competing allegations were being investigated. Those competing versions must ultimately be tested through evidence, investigation and trial rather than public speculation. Yet irrespective of how the underlying collision is eventually established, the death illustrates the grave consequences of allowing a road dispute to become a matter for collective retaliation. A traffic accident is supposed to activate the ordinary machinery of the criminal justice system — police intervention, investigation, collection of evidence, identification of individual responsibility, prosecution and trial. It must never become a progression from collision to anger, from anger to mob mobilisation, and from mob mobilisation to assault and death. Where the alleged perpetrators are members of or associated with a religious procession, the State’s responsibility becomes even greater: religious identity must neither shield an accused person from accountability nor prejudice the investigation against the victim. The ultimate test is whether the law can operate with the same force and impartiality when the accused belong to a politically influential or numerically dominant religious group as it would when the circumstances were reversed.

A pilgrimage should not become a test of submission

The 2026 Kanwar Yatra therefore raises a question that extends far beyond individual incidents of vandalism, assault or the closure of particular shops. It forces us to ask whether religious freedom is increasingly being interpreted not simply as the freedom to practise one’s faith, but as the freedom of one religious group to determine the conditions under which everyone else must live. That is not the guarantee contained in Article 25. The Constitution protects the believer, but it also protects the person who does not share that belief; it protects the vegetarian, but it also protects the meat-eater; it protects the Hindu pilgrim, but it equally protects the Muslim shopkeeper whose business happens to lie along the pilgrimage route. It protects the right to assemble and practise religion, but it also protects the right of other citizens to move through public spaces and carry on their livelihoods.

These rights do not exist in separate constitutional compartments; they operate within a common framework of equality, liberty and the rule of law. The State must therefore resist the tendency to treat criticism of violence or vigilantism associated with the Kanwar Yatra as criticism of Hinduism itself. The two are fundamentally different. It is entirely possible to respect the faith of millions of peaceful Kanwariyas while demanding accountability from those who vandalise vehicles or assault civilians; to respect Hindu religious practice while opposing intimidation of Muslim-owned businesses; to recognise the religious significance of Shravan while insisting that meat sellers and other lawful businesses retain their rights; and to facilitate a religious procession while requiring those participating in it to remain subject to the same law as everyone else. Indeed, that is what genuine secularism requires: not hostility towards religion, but equal constitutional protection irrespective of religion.

Faith deserves protection; impunity does not

The 2026 Kanwar Yatra should therefore not be remembered merely as another annual pilgrimage marked by massive crowds, saffron flags, elaborate security arrangements and traffic diversions. It should instead prompt a more serious examination of the relationship between religious practice, political mobilisation and State power. The recurring incidents — from the vandalism of vehicles in Muzaffarnagar, the attack on a school van in Lucknow and confrontations involving police, to the reported targeting of Muslims and meat sellers, threats against Muslim-owned businesses, communal rhetoric surrounding Mumbra and Deoband, attempts to turn the Taj Mahal into another site of religious contestation, and ultimately the death of Mohd Azeem — cannot simply be dismissed as a collection of unrelated disturbances. Taken together, they point towards the gradual normalisation of religious exceptionalism: the assumption that a religious procession is entitled to extraordinary accommodation, that religious sentiment can justify extraordinary restrictions, that meat can be removed from public spaces because pilgrims prefer vegetarianism, that Muslim businesses can be identified or pressured, that a crowd can punish what it perceives as an insult, and that political actors can use religious gatherings to make claims about the ownership of neighbourhoods and public spaces.

The danger lies precisely in allowing these assumptions to become normal. The answer, however, is not to diminish or delegitimise the Kanwar Yatra. It is to restore its constitutional boundaries. Faith must be protected, pilgrims must be protected and religious processions must be protected, but no person can be placed above the law merely because they claim to be acting in the name of religion. The real test of the State’s commitment to secularism is therefore not how warmly it welcomes a majority religious procession, but whether, while facilitating it, it can extend the same protection to the Muslim shopkeeper, the meat seller, the commuter, the schoolchild and every other citizen affected by it. It must be able to say to the shopkeeper that his lawful business cannot be destroyed because someone finds it religiously offensive; to the meat seller that his livelihood cannot be extinguished by a mob; to the vigilante that religious identity gives no authority over another citizen; to the politician that a neighbourhood cannot be claimed as the property of one religion; and to the Kanwariya that faith may be sacred, but it does not place anyone beyond the Constitution. The Kanwar Yatra can and should remain a journey of devotion. What it cannot become is a vehicle through which majoritarian power determines who may eat, who may trade, who may move, who may pray, who may belong — and who must simply get out of the way.

Related:

How deviant acts mar the sacred Kanwar Yatra

Faith v/s Environment: 17,600 trees felled in U.P. to pave way for proposed Kanwar Yatra route, fact-finding panel tells NGT 

Hindu-Muslim Unity: The other side of Kanwar Yatra

Kanwar Yatra episode: Pasmanda Muslims, ‘wooed’ by BJP, perhaps biggest losers

Supreme Court stays directive of state forcing food sellers along Kanwar Yatra to display names, states authorities cannot usurp power without legal foundation

Pay heed to Article 21 and its order in the Kanwar Yatra case: SC to Kerala Gov’t

Aligarh: Woman allegedly raped while undertaking ‘Kanwar Yatra’

The post When Faith Becomes a Licence for Control: The 2026 Kanwar yatra, violence, vigilantism and the politics of meat appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Indian Express, in a social media post said, “A man was beaten to death in Jharkhand’s Chatra district on Tuesday (Aug 4) morning after villagers accused him of confining a minor girl and sexually assaulting her. A top officer in the administration said the allegations of confinement and sexual assault are yet to be confirmed. The father of the man beaten to death has filed a police complaint, and an FIR has been registered under several sections, including one related to mob lynching.

The team visited the village eight days after the incident on August 12, met the family members of Imroj, the survivor victim girl, neighbours and the in-charge of Tandwa Police Station. The team comprised representatives of Jharkhand Janadhikar Mahasabha, Karwan e Mohabbat, Sajha Kadam and United Milli Forum.

The team learnt that a mob of Bargaon’s Hindu villagers led by local BJP leader and husband of Panchayat Mukhiya Vijay Choubey stormed Imroj’s house on the morning of August 4. They tied his father, Md Sultan, to a pole outside their home and beat him. They accused Imroj of kidnapping an underage girl from a neighbouring house, keeping her hostage for two days in the house and raping her. The mob finally found Imroj and brutally lynched him. The police had reached within half an hour of the mob (after Muslims called them). But, according to the version of the family to the factfinding team, the police personnel remained mute spectators and allowed the lynching in front of them.

The girl’s house is right opposite Imroj’s house, across the street, states the findings in the report. Her grandparents stayed in the outer room of Sultan’s house for three days until August 3 as their kuchcha house had collapsed. Furthermore, the rooms in Sultan’s under-construction house do not have doors. The door at the entrance of the house also remained open most of the time as he spent a lot of time on the verandah. All the houses (all Hindu except four Muslim houses) in the lane are close to each other. Hence, the fact-finding team thinks that it is improbable that a girl from across the street could be kidnapped and kept in this house. Imroj was accused of attempting to rape/abetting the attempt to rape of an underage girl in an earlier case. People complained that he used to smoke Ganja and his behaviour was not good. Hence, the allegation needs to be thoroughly and fairly investigated, states the team’s report.

While this lynching itself is a case of communal violence, there have been visible attempts by the BJP and RSS organisations to use this incident to deepen religious polarisation. BJP Scheduled Caste Morcha President and ex-MLA Kisun Das addressed a mass meeting of Hindu families in the village on 7 August. In his speech, he can be heard saying, “Naam tumhara jab alpsankhyak hai, to kayde-kanun mein rahoge to fayede mein rahoge. Aur agar utpat machaoge, to abhi to ek gaya hai, aur bhi kayio ko jana padega”. The crowd chanted, “Jai Shri Ram” in the background. BJP leader Babulal Marandi, accompanied by the Chatra MP, local MLA and several BJP leaders, addressed a mass meeting in the village on August 9 and addressed a mass meeting. Rather than trying to bridge the communal gap, he also can be heard inciting the Hindu masses. The Hindu vegetable vendors and shopkeepers have stopped selling anything to the Muslims of the village, reports the team.

There are many serious questions regarding the police’s handling of the matter. The SHO told the factfinding team that he was informed about the missing girl on August 3 by one Vijay Choubey. The question is why he did not visit the village and undertake an inquiry. Both the police and the administration allowed BJP leaders to address meetings in the village, despite BNS section 163 prohibitions in place, and did not take any action against their hate speeches. The police officers were unaware of the Supreme Court guidelines on lynching and hate speeches.

The Dalit family lives in dire poverty. Imroj worked as a labourer, and his brothers are migrant workers. It is clear that there is an attempt by the BJP to use this whole incident and also these families to build a communal narrative against Muslims. The incident also exposed Hemant Soren government’s failure in addressing communal violence. While there were many cases of communal-violence inspired lynching under the Raghubar Das government, it has continued under this dispensation too.

Demands from the local administration and state government placed by the fact-finding team include:

• The Tandwa SHO should be removed from the investigation, and a senior officer should be made the investigating officer. The state government should ensure a free and impartial investigation in both the FIRs. The people who mobilised the mob on 4^th August should be identified and arrested, along with the perpetrators of violence.
• Strict action should be taken against the BJP leaders for their hate speeches given after the incident in the village. FIRs should be registered, as per the Supreme Court judgement in the Ashwini Upadhyay case. Action should be taken in accordance with the law against everyone who incited collective hatred, ostracism, or a sense of vengeance against any community.
• The families of the both the girl and Imroj should be provided with police and legal support for the duration of the investigation.
• The administration and police should implement the Supreme Court guidelines in the Tehseen Poonawala case, such as constitution and regular meetings of peace committee.
• The state government should ensure accountability of police and administration in cases of communal violence and lynching. The government should also undertake campaigns to promote communal harmony across the state.

The factfinding team included Praveer Peter, Priyasheela Besra, Afzal anees. Mohammed Shadab Ansari, Raja Bhuiyan and Siraj Dutta.

Details of this report rely on the press note of the organisation Jharkand Janadhikar Mahasabha, dated August 17, 2026

Related:

Judging the Judge: The communal backlash against a lynching verdict

As lynchings “normalise” in ‘New India, a Bihar imam is ‘thrashed, pushed’ from train to die in Bareilly

Dadri lynching: UP Court rejects state govt plea to withdraw charges against Akhlaq murder accused

The post Jharkand government accused of continued communal lynchings by fact-finding team appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Uttar Pradesh & Uttarakhand, June 28 – July 5, 2026

Chronology of Incidents

June 28- Ilaichipur, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh

BJP MLA for Loni, Nandkishore Gurjar at the inauguration of local development projects is seen addressing a large crowd stating that 99 percent of Indian Muslims were originally Hindus. He added that those who were “weak” converted while those who were “strong” fought “demons” rather than convert.

This was not an isolated incident during the reporting period. Gurjar was also implicated in another hate speech delivered on July 3, which will be listed down in the chronology. (See incident number 6)

CJP is dedicated to finding and bringing to light instances of Hate Speech, so that the bigots propagating these venomous ideas can be unmasked and brought to justice. To learn more about our campaign against hate speech, please become a member. To support our initiatives, please donate now!

Incidentally, two hate speeches in 2025 according to IHL’s report traces directly to Gurjar. On March 17,  2025 in Loni, Uttar Pradesh, Gurjar referred to Muslims as “demons” and “beasts” while glorifying the demolition of Babri mosque. On April 26, he administered an oath to protest attendees, urging them to identify and expel all those who “support Pakistan,” referring to them as “topiwallas,” “jihadis,” and “Rohingya Bangladeshis.”

In addition to this documented history of communal speeches, Association for Democratic Reforms records show that Gurjar has multiple criminal cases in which charges have been framed, including:

• IPC Section 295: Injuring or defiling a place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class.
• IPC Section 436: Mischief by fire or explosive substance with intent to destroy a house or other property.
• IPC Section 332: Voluntarily causing hurt to deter a public servant from the discharge of duty.
• IPC Section 506: Criminal intimidation.
• Three charges under IPC Section 147: Rioting.
• Two charges under IPC Section 148: Rioting while armed with a deadly weapon.
• Two charges under IPC Section 353: Assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from the discharge of duty.
• IPC Section 427: Mischief causing damage.
• IPC Section 504: Intentional insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace.

All of this taken together indicates a recurring pattern of inflammatory public statements—often a precursor to targeted violence- alongside a long-standing record of criminal proceedings.

June 29– Champawat, Uttarakhand

Chief Minister of Uttarakhand, Pushkar Singh Dhami, at a Mukhya Sevak Samvad outreach event, Dhami credited his government with implementing the state’s amended anti-conversion law, running Operation Kalnemi, and “freeing” over 12,000 acres of government land from what he called “land jihad.” He also invoked “love jihad,” “thook jihad” (spit jihad) and “mazar jihad” (shrine jihad), calling them anti-social and anti-national. He further accused the political opposition of appeasement politics for opposing action against “illegal” encroachments and mazars (Muslim shrines).

https://www.facebook.com/hindutvawatchIn/videos/location-champawat-uttarakhanddate-june-29at-the-mukhya-sevak-samvad-program-chi/1751173735881458/

This rhetoric is a verbatim repetition of Dhami’s script which he has used in at least half a dozen recorded speeches since 2024 in Haridwar, Dehradun, Chamoli and Sagar. Reported by The Quint and Deccan Herald.

According to IHL, Dhami has “emerged as the most prolific hates speech actor in 2025, with 71 speeches.”

“CM Dhami and his colleagues frequently invoked the anti-Muslim conspiracies of “love jihad,” “land jihad,” and “spit jihad” alongside fear-mongering about demographic change,” the report states.

June 30– Dehradun, Uttarakhand

A Vishwa Hindu Parshad-Bajrang Dal leader Vikas Verma, at a weekly Hanuman Chalisa gathering cited an unverified case of Hindu students allegedly forced to remove their tilak, kalava and janeu at school. He accused Christianity and Islam of long targeting Sanatan Dharma and welcomed Uttarakhand’s dissolution of the Madrasa Board as he alleged madrasas teach students that non-Muslims are “kafirs” who should be beheaded. He also claimed that those who choose to educate from madrasas will not hesitate to practise terrorism.

Verma has delivered near-identical claims about mosques, madrasas and “anarchists” at the same weekly event before. Im May this year, he also led a right-wing group to a prominent footwear showroom in Dehradhun and a clip was circulated where they were purportedly seen selectively confronting Muslim staff and even snatching their name tags and writing “jihadi” on it.

An investigation published by The Wire found Dehradun Bajrang Dal members running dedicated social-media pages built around similar content.

June 30– Loni, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh

Hindu Raksha Dal leader Sunny Bajrangi, at a Hanuman Chalisa event called “love jihad” a “termite” eating away at Hindu society. He alleged “jihadis” hide their identity to trap Hindu women, and warned that demographic change would become unstoppable within 20 years unless Hindus unite.

July 1- Domariaganj, Siddharthnagar, Uttar Pradesh

Former BJP MLA Raghvendra Pratap Singh at an event marking Shyama Prasad Mukherjee’s birth anniversary said “love jihad” was rising rapidly and cited an unverified ‘kidnapping’ allegation of a Hindu woman against a “Mulla.” Singh urged BJP workers to watch for “vidharmi” (heretic/anti-faith) and “kukarmi” (evildoer) elements. He also called for scrutiny of Christian missionary activity.

https://www.instagram.com/reel/DaavObxMIgW/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igsh=NTc4MTIwNjQ2YQ==

In February 2022, a report by Citizens for Justice and Peace documented two FIRs for hate speech against Singh. CJP quoted far more extreme past remarks, including threats to “get their blood tested” against Hindus who did not vote for him. Read the report here.

July 3- Loni, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh

The incident again implicates Nandkishore Gurjar, the BJP MLA for Loni who was also the perpetrator in the current reported incident 1. At the inauguration of a road-widening project, Gurjar called Muslims “pigs” and a “disease.” He praised a village for barring any “jihadi” from settling there, and said hospitals now stood where   these “pigs” once roamed. He warned residents against renting warehouses to “Bangladeshis” and vowed to drive them out.

https://www.instagram.com/reel/Dad_ttrsEyL/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igsh=NTc4MTIwNjQ2YQ==

Ten months earlier, in September 2025, Gurjar was filmed at a yoga event in Baghpat saying, “Swines and Bangladeshi Rohingyas are being settled here, and they will ruin the country.”

July 4- Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh

Vimlesh Sharma of the Shri Ram Sanatan Seva Samiti and the Gau Raksha Dal along with a group of 15-20 men confronted a Muslim man over alleged remarks about a cow. In the video, they are seen repeatedly slapping and hurling abuses at him as he tries to offer an explanation. The group dragged him to a shed, and forced him to kneel and touch a calf’s legs and later chants “Jai Shri Ram.” Sources also document that he was forced to drink cow urine.

Location:Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh, India ,
According to reports, Vimlesh Sharma, State President of the Shri Ram Sanatan Seva Samiti, along with members of the Gau Raksha Dal, allegedly assaulted a Muslim man after accusing him of making objectionable remarks about a cow.

The… pic.twitter.com/BFPrrT5Ik1

— Rising Falcon (@TheRFTeam) July 5, 2026

The Siasat Daily also reports that the Hindutva group’s own Instagram post accused the man of threatening a violent, blood-soaked Holi.

In a video posted on X, Vimlesh Sharma justified the assault by alleging that the victim had abused their mothers and sisters and mocked their dietary practices, stating that these actions prompted the group to respond as they did.

Location: Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh

Vimalesh Sharma, the state president of Shri Ram Sanatan Seva Samiti, released a video in which he said that he beat a Muslim man accused of making offensive remarks about cows and forcibly made him drink cow urine. https://t.co/K8zCAB2L17 pic.twitter.com/eYt8ux4M8Q

— The Muslim (@TheMuslim786) July 7, 2026

According to media reports, the Public Relations Officer (PRO) of the Barabanki Superintendent of Police stated that the police were unaware of the incident.

Congress MP Syed Naseer Hussain has condemned such acts of forced religious worship and described it as “deeply disturbing.”

The assault and humiliation of a Muslim man in Barabanki, including forcing him to perform religious acts against his will, is deeply disturbing. Such acts are not expressions of faith but crimes that violate human dignity and the Constitution.

When vigilante groups believe they… pic.twitter.com/jq7Hlgb0Ki

— Dr Syed Naseer Hussain, M P (@NasirHussainINC) July 4, 2026

July 5- Kaintholi, Tehri Garhwal, Uttarakhand

One, Amit Thapliyal along with a few associates stopped a Christian Sunday prayer meeting, asserting that Hinduism is the village’s only permitted religion. Thapiyal accused attendees of attending for payment, and told them to surrender their Scheduled Caste (SC) reservation benefits if they wished to practice Christianity.

Assessment

No reports of any FIR or case registered has emerged against any of these incidents. Most, in fact, were not found reported in mainstream media at the time of writing. This unfortunately is evidence if such were needed of the cavalier and casual manner in which legacy and mainstream media treats such hate speech; avoidance of which allows for a continued prevalence of a culture of impunity. However, the videos show a pattern of anti-minority mobilisation that is consistent with established scholarship on communal politics, majoritarian nationalism, and hate speech in India. They demonstrate how political rhetoric, vigilante action, and symbolic performances of dominance reinforce one another to construct religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Christians, as threats to the nation, culture, and social order.

The incidents are examples of moral panic and conspiracy framing in which minority communities are portrayed as engaging in coordinated efforts to undermine the demographic, territorial, or cultural integrity of the Hindu majority. This assessment is not to paint any one community as total saints and another as perpetrators. However, such rhizomatic organisation and hate speech by creating an atmosphere of perceived threat only legitimises exceptional state action and public hostility.  They create an imagined internal enemy whose existence justifies exclusionary politics.

The repeated and exhausting invocation of various forms of ‘jihad,’ portrayal of Muslims as ‘Bangladeshis,’ or ‘swines,’ disruption of Christian prayer meetings, and performative humiliation by asking someone to forcefully chant a religious slogan suggest diffusion of a shared ideological repertoire of how political authority and vigilante mobilisation reinforce one another.

Importantly, 3 out of 8 incidents have been attributed to a sitting Chief Minister and an MLA. This convergence of official political speech and vigilante action is a significant feature of democratic backsliding and ethno nationalism. Uttarakhand held municipal elections on June 9, 2026, and Uttar Pradesh has delayed its three-tier panchayat elections, with voter-list work underway through the summer of 2026 across nearly 58,000 gram panchayats

But a similar language appearing across chief ministerial speeches, local political leaders, and organisations such as the Bajrang Dal, Hindu Raksha Dal, and cow-protection groups suggests the diffusion of a shared ideological repertoire. One that is unconstitutional. However, such language has frequently been used, even at a national level, including from the head of government.

The trajectory of hate speech leading up to the 2024 General Elections has been documented by India Hate Speech Monitor. It can be accessed here.

Several of these incidents cannot be separated from a broader, well-documented campaign. Since May 2025, Indian authorities have detained and, in many cases, summarily expelled thousands of people to Bangladesh, a substantial number of them Bengali-speaking Indian Muslims with valid citizenship documents. UP has seen its own share of wrongful detentions of West Bengal migrant workers holding valid Aadhaar and voter identification.

In Uttrakhand, disruption of prayer meetings is documented. In July 2024, an 11-person FIR followed a mob attack on a Dehradun prayer meeting that vandalised a crucifix.

Uttarakhand: Hindutva mob attacks Christian prayer meet in Dehradun. A group of Hindutva ‘activists’ barged into the house and assaulted people including women present inside, Forcefully entered inside the house and vandalised a Christian cross, prayer room and bedroom, made… pic.twitter.com/BLD7vbXp2Y

— Mohammed Zubair (@zoo_bear) July 16, 2024

Similarly, in May 2022 in Purola,Uttarakhand a prayer meeting was stormed by an armed group. The coercive demand to renounce SC reservation status is a recognisable feature of this genre nationally. However, the groups are also apprehensive of forced-conversion practices.

Sections 196 and 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 penalises promoting disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will. This is the only remedy for hate speech between religious, racial, linguistic or regional groups. The maximum sentence is three years, rising to five if the act occurs at a place of worship or religious ceremony.

However, the structural problem, independent of any single case, is enforcement and conviction rates. In May this year, the Supreme Court said that separate guidelines for heat speech were unnecessary. This climb-down by the apex court to its own earlier interventionist directions and orders around such mobilisations is also a sign of institutional disregard to a culture of growing anti-minority public rhetoric. A detailed analysis on the Supreme Court’s final judgement on the issue may be read here and here.

According to IHL, documented 1,318 hate speech events nationally in 2025, roughly four events a day, with 98 percent targeting Muslims either alone or alongside Christians.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

Related:

Targeted as ‘Bangladeshis’: The hate speech fuelling deportations

A Targeted Campaign: The orchestrated crackdown on Bengali Migrants and the rising pushback from courts, Bengal government, and civil society

India Hate Lab Report 2025: How Hate Speech has been normalised in the public sphere

The post A week of anti-minority hate that grips UP-Uttarakhand appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Pannalal was reportedly arrested from his residence in Raipur late on Friday night, August 7, and was subsequently sent to judicial custody. According to a statement issued by a group of activists and human-rights campaigners, members of the Bajrang Dal had gathered outside his residence during the arrest, while a substantial police presence was deployed in the area.

The activists have described the arrest as an attempt to “silence a voice for minority rights” and have called for Pannalal’s immediate release on bail, a transparent judicial process and an end to what they describe as the misuse of criminal law in matters involving religious speech.

FIR over Alleged Facebook Comment

According to the statement, the case against Pannalal was initiated following a complaint by BJP spokesperson Amit Chimnani concerning an allegedly objectionable comment Pannalal made on Facebook in connection with a post about Lord Shiva.

The activists say Pannalal has been booked under provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) relating to promoting enmity between groups, deliberately insulting religious beliefs with the intention of outraging religious feelings, and intentional insult intended to provoke a breach of peace.

Section 196 of the BNS covers conduct that promotes or attempts to promote disharmony, hatred or ill-will between religious or other groups. Section 299 addresses deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage the religious feelings of a class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs, while Section 352 deals with intentional insult where the accused intends, or knows it is likely, that the provocation will lead to a breach of public peace.

The precise contents of the alleged Facebook comment, the FIR and the police’s evidence against Pannalal could not be independently established from the material available for this report. The allegations remain subject to investigation and judicial determination.

Activists Question Circumstances Surrounding Arrest

The signatories to the statement have questioned the timing and circumstances of the arrest, particularly the reported presence of Bajrang Dal activists outside Pannalal’s residence.

They argue that the combination of a politically affiliated complainant, the late-night arrest and the mobilisation of Hindu-right groups raises questions about whether adequate safeguards were followed in handling a case involving potentially sensitive religious speech.

Those assertions, however, are the position of the activists who issued the statement and should not be treated as established findings unless supported by police records, court proceedings or independent evidence.

The authorities have not, in the material reviewed for this report, publicly established that the gathering outside Pannalal’s residence was coordinated with the police or that the arrest itself was politically motivated.

Pannalal’s Longstanding Role in Chhattisgarh’s Minority-rights Debate

Pannalal is a longstanding public figure in Chhattisgarh’s Christian community and has frequently spoken about alleged attacks on Christians, religious freedom and the rights of tribal Christians.

The Chhattisgarh Christian Forum, which he heads, has previously highlighted alleged attacks on Christian communities and places of worship. In 2020, Pannalal publicly raised concerns following violence involving Christian families in Kondagaon district. At the time, police described the underlying dispute as involving tensions within local communities and said they would take legal action as appropriate.

His advocacy has also brought him into conflict with authorities and Hindu organisations in previous years. In 2025, an FIR was registered against him at Raipur’s Azad Chowk police station following controversy surrounding social-media material related to the Pahalgam terrorist attack. Reports at the time said the case invoked BNS Sections 196 and 299, while Hindu organisations including the Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad had demanded action against him.

Earlier reporting has likewise documented Pannalal’s involvement in disputes concerning alleged attacks on Christians and restrictions affecting Christian religious activity in the state.

Arrest Comes Shortly After Tougher Anti-conversion Law Takes Effect

The latest controversy comes against the backdrop of a major change in Chhattisgarh’s religious-conversion law.

The Chhattisgarh Religious Freedom Act, 2026 has now come into force. The legislation replaces the older law inherited from undivided Madhya Pradesh and introduces substantially tougher provisions concerning religious conversion. Reports say the law took effect from July 10, 2026, following notification by the state government.

The new legislation provides stringent penalties for conversion through force, fraud, coercion or inducement, with provisions that can result in lengthy imprisonment and, in certain circumstances, life imprisonment and substantial fines. It also establishes additional procedural requirements surrounding religious conversion.

The law has become a major point of contention between the BJP government and opposition and civil-society groups. The government has defended the legislation as necessary to prevent exploitation and protect religious freedom, while critics have expressed concern about the potential for broad provisions to be used against legitimate religious activity.

The timing of Pannalal’s arrest is therefore likely to intensify an already contentious debate over the relationship between religious-conversion laws, minority rights and freedom of conscience in Chhattisgarh.

Constitutional Questions

The activists opposing Pannalal’s arrest have invoked Articles 19 and 25 of the Constitution.

Article 19 guarantees citizens specified freedoms of speech and expression, subject to constitutionally permitted restrictions. Article 25 guarantees freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality, health and other constitutional limitations.

The constitutional question in Pannalal’s case will ultimately turn on the precise content and context of the alleged Facebook comment, the applicability of the criminal provisions invoked, and whether the prosecution can establish the necessary legal ingredients of the offences.

Freedom of expression in India is not absolute, particularly where speech is alleged to threaten public order or deliberately insult religious beliefs. At the same time, criminal prosecution for speech requires the statutory elements of the offence to be established, and the accused remains entitled to due process and the presumption of innocence.

Allegation of Executive Prejudgment

The statement issued by the activists also criticises Chief Minister Vishnu Deo Sai, alleging that he publicly described Pannalal’s remarks as objectionable to Sanatan Dharma before the case had been adjudicated.

If accurately attributed and contextualised, such comments could become an important part of the wider debate over executive commentary on pending criminal proceedings. The activists argue that a government should not prejudge an accused person’s guilt before the courts have examined the evidence.

However, whether the Chief Minister’s reported remarks amount to improper interference with the judicial process is ultimately a matter that would depend on their precise wording, context and the applicable legal standards.

Wider Backdrop of Christian-minority Concerns

Pannalal’s arrest follows a period of heightened national attention on religious-conversion allegations and the treatment of Christians in Chhattisgarh.

In July 2025, the arrests of two Catholic nuns and another person at Durg railway station over allegations involving forced conversion and human trafficking generated protests and political controversy. The arrests were made under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the then-existing Chhattisgarh Religious Freedom Act. Christian organisations argued that the allegations were politically motivated, while authorities maintained that the cases required investigation.

The episode illustrated the highly polarised environment surrounding allegations of religious conversion in the state, where accusations can rapidly become intertwined with political mobilisation, communal tensions and questions about minority protection.

Pannalal himself has been a prominent critic of what he and other Christian organisations describe as growing pressure on Christian communities. His organisation has previously alleged attacks, intimidation and restrictions on Christian religious activity, claims that have at various times been disputed or differently characterised by authorities.

Demand for Release and Due Process

The August 9 statement has been signed by a group of activists, writers, academics, diplomats and civil-society figures, including former National Integration Council member Dr John Dayal, Jesuit priest and human-rights activist Fr Cedric Prakash, activist Minakshi Singh, Caleb Institute president Dr Richard Howell, Raipur-based activist Dr Goldy George, writer Jay Jayaram, academic Fr Frazier Masceranhas, retired diplomat Ashok Sharma, Dr Fatima Poonawala and writer-activist Blessy Prasad Mathews, among others.

They have demanded:

– Pannalal’s immediate and unconditional release on bail;

– a fair and transparent judicial process;

– an end to executive commentary that could prejudice criminal proceedings;

– protection of freedom of expression and freedom of conscience; and

– an end to what they characterise as the use of criminal law for political silencing.

The controversy now moves into the legal arena, where the contents of the alleged social-media post, the FIR, the prosecution’s evidence and the circumstances surrounding Pannalal’s arrest will be subject to scrutiny.

What Happens Next

The immediate legal issue is Pannalal’s custody and his prospects for bail. The investigation will also determine whether the prosecution can establish the statutory requirements of the BNS provisions invoked against him.

Beyond the individual case, however, the arrest is likely to become a test of how Chhattisgarh balances competing constitutional interests: protection of religious sentiment and public order on one side, and freedom of expression, freedom of conscience and minority rights on the other.

For supporters of Pannalal, the case represents another instance of a minority-rights advocate being criminally prosecuted after speaking publicly about religious issues. For those supporting the complaint, the case concerns accountability for speech alleged to offend religious beliefs and potentially disturb communal harmony.

The courts, rather than political actors or street mobilisation, will ultimately have to determine whether the alleged Facebook comment crossed the legal threshold for criminal liability.

The allegations against Arun Pannalal are not proof of guilt. Likewise, allegations of political or communal targeting made by his supporters remain claims unless established through independent evidence or judicial findings.

Courtesy: CounterView

The post Arrest of Christian leader in Raipur sparks concerns over minority rights and free speech appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The first FIR was registered on August 5, just four days after the law came into force. According to The Indian Express, the 22-year-old, originally from Uttar Pradesh, was allegedly in a relationship with a minor from his village. The two subsequently moved to Karnataka and then Pune. Police allege that he asked the girl to convert from her religion. He has been booked under Sections 3 and 9(2) of the new Act, along with provisions of the POCSO Act, and is currently in judicial custody.

Section 3 prohibits conversion or attempts to convert through coercion, fraud, allurement, misrepresentation, force, threat or undue influence. Where a minor is involved, Section 9(2) permits punishment of up to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to ₹5 lakh.

The allegation, however, still has to be established. The FIR itself does not establish that an offence under Section 3 occurred, particularly since the prosecution will have to demonstrate the specific means allegedly used to induce the conversion. The distinction matters in a law where ordinary interpersonal conduct could potentially come under scrutiny if the statutory ingredients are interpreted expansively.

Second FIR widens the scope of concern

The second case concerns a British national and OCI cardholder. Pune Police allege that he participated in prayer meetings and religious gatherings and attempted to persuade people to embrace Christianity. Police have also alleged that he spoke about following Jesus and made statements concerning Hindu temples and deities that were intended to mislead people and induce conversion, The Indian Express reported.

The police have reportedly invoked both the Maharashtra Freedom of Religion Act and provisions of the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, arguing that the OCI cardholder was not authorised to preach or deliver religious discourses without permission. This case raises a more fundamental question about the boundary between religious propagation and unlawful inducement. Participation in a religious gathering or expressing one’s religious beliefs, by itself, does not establish coercion, fraud, force or undue influence. Whether the alleged conduct crosses that statutory threshold will ultimately have to be determined through evidence and judicial scrutiny.

A law with wide-reaching provisions

The Maharashtra Act does more than criminalise forced or fraudulent conversion. It introduces a prior-notice regime for persons intending to convert, permits complaints by specified relatives, regulates conversions connected with marriage or promises of marriage, and places the burden of establishing that a conversion was voluntary on the person conducting it. It also provides enhanced punishment where the alleged conversion involves minors, women, members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, or persons of unsound mind.

The breadth of terms such as “allurement”, “undue influence” and “misrepresentation” is likely to be central to the misuse of the law. A law intended to prevent coercive conversion cannot, constitutionally, become a mechanism for policing voluntary religious belief, expression or association.

The concern is particularly relevant because the legislation operates in an area closely connected with individual autonomy, freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise and propagate religion under Article 25 of the Constitution. This is one of the key substantive points argued by the CJP in its constitutional challenge to the Himachal Pradesh law. Report may be read here.

The speed with which the legislation moved through the state legislature had itself become a point of criticism. Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), in its dissent note, highlighted that the Bill was introduced and passed within days, with limited scope for public consultation or legislative scrutiny, despite the fact that similar anti-conversion laws enacted by other states are already under examination before the Supreme Court. CJP is the lead petitioner in the constitutional challenge to the first batch of such laws passed by five states between the years, 2020-2023. This challenge has been pending in the Supreme Court, despite pleas for interim stays on the most egregious provisions for over five years now. [1]

Details on the interim applications urging stay on the most egregious provisions, filed by CJP on April 16, 2025 may be read here.

In early 2026, while the batch of petitions challenging the constitutional validity of these state laws were listed before the court of the Chief Justice of India (CJI), they were once again deferred. Reports may be read here. Thereafter, first on May 13, 2026 the matters were listed to be heard after which the next date that appears on the Supreme Court calendar is August 12, 2026.

Related:

Allahabad HC flags misuse of UP Anti-Conversion Law, quashes FIR and rebukes ‘mimeographed’ complaints

35 civil society groups oppose Maharashtra’s proposed anti-conversion law, warn of threat to women’s autonomy and constitutional freedoms

‘Faith Is Not a Crime’: Mumbai’s Christians rise against Maharashtra’s proposed anti-conversion bill

Maharashtra’s Proposed Anti-Conversion Law: Manufacturing moral panic to criminalise personal choice

Supreme Court defers hearing in batch of petitions, led by CJP, challenging state Anti-Conversion laws; interim relief applications pending since April 2025v

Maharashtra’s Anti-Conversion Push: How organised street pressure, Hindutva mobilisation and a pending law threaten constitutional freedoms

The post Two FIRs, Four Days In: Pune sees first use of Maharashtra’s controversial anti-conversion law appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Maharashtra Freedom of Religion Bill, 2026, was introduced during the Budget Session of the Maharashtra Legislature in March 2026. The Bill was tabled in the Legislative Assembly on March 13, 2026, and was passed by the Assembly on March 16, followed by approval from the Legislative Council on March 17. After being cleared by both Houses, the legislation was sent to Maharashtra Governor C.P. Radhakrishnan, who subsequently reserved it for the consideration of the President of India. The Bill received presidential assent from President Droupadi Murmu on July 31, 2026, after which the Governor forwarded it to the state government for notification. The Act will come into force only after the Maharashtra government issues a notification specifying the date of commencement. Maharashtra becomes the 13^th state in the country to pass such/similar laws. All these states are governed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that has its ideological base in the far right, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).

The speed with which the legislation moved through the state legislature had itself become a point of criticism. Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), in its dissent note, highlighted that the Bill was introduced and passed within days, with limited scope for public consultation or legislative scrutiny, despite the fact that similar anti-conversion laws enacted by other states are already under examination before the Supreme Court. CJP is the lead petitioner in the constitutional challenge to the first batch of such laws passed by five states between the years, 2020-2023. This challenge has been pending in the Supreme Court, despite pleas for interim stays on the most egregious provisions for over five years now. [1]

Details on the interim applications urging stay on the most egregious provisions, filed by CJP on April 16, 2025 may be read here.

In early 2026, while the batch of petitions challenging the constitutional validity of these state laws were listed before the court of the Chief Justice of India (CJI), they were once again deferred. Reports may be read here. Thereafter, first on May 13, 2026 the matters were listed to be heard after which the next date that appears on the Supreme Court calendar is August 12, 2026!!

The presidential assent does little to resolve the fundamental constitutional questions surrounding the legislation. Instead, Maharashtra has now joined a growing list of states that have enacted “freedom of religion” laws whose provisions are being challenged for creating a framework where the exercise of an individual’s conscience and religious choice is placed under state surveillance.

CJP, which is also the lead petitioner challenging multiple anti-conversion laws before the Supreme Court, has consistently argued that these statutes do not merely target coercive conversions. Rather, their architecture treats voluntary conversion, particularly in the context of interfaith relationships, as inherently suspect and places private decisions under criminal scrutiny.

A “Freedom of Religion” law that restricts the freedom to choose

The Maharashtra Act claims to prevent conversions caused by force, fraud, coercion, misrepresentation, allurement or undue influence. On paper, preventing coercion may appear consistent with constitutional guarantees. However, the difficulty lies in the breadth of the law and the mechanisms it creates.

The Act treats offering money, gifts, employment, education, promises of marriage, assurances of better living conditions or claims of divine healing as unlawful inducements if linked with conversion. The problem is that the law does not adequately distinguish between genuine coercion and ordinary circumstances in which individuals make religious choices influenced by personal relationships, social support, material circumstances or lived experiences. By creating a wide category of prohibited influence, the law risks converting legitimate exercises of conscience into potential criminal offences. A person’s decision to embrace another faith is protected not because the State approves of the choice, but because the Constitution protects the individual’s autonomy to make that choice.

Mandatory state oversight over matters of faith

One of the most intrusive features of the legislation is the requirement of prior notice before conversion. The Act mandates a 60-day prior notice to the district magistrate before conversion. This effectively transforms a deeply personal decision into an administrative process.

Instead of recognising conversion as an exercise of individual conscience, the law creates a system where government authorities are informed in advance and can scrutinise the circumstances surrounding a person’s decision.

CJP has argued that such provisions undermine the constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience by making religious choice dependent on executive oversight. The Constitution does not make the right to believe, reject, adopt or change religion conditional upon government approval.

The law creates a climate of suspicion around interfaith relationships

While the Act is presented as a measure against forced conversion, its most contentious impact is likely to be felt in cases involving interfaith relationships. The legislation permits complaints by relatives of the person who has converted, including parents and siblings. This creates a mechanism where consenting adults may find their personal relationships subjected to police investigation merely because family members object to their choices.

CJP’s dissent note has warned that such provisions disproportionately affect interfaith couples by allowing private disagreements and social opposition to be converted into criminal proceedings.

The concern is not hypothetical. Similar anti-conversion laws across states have repeatedly been invoked in cases involving marriages between persons of different faiths. A law meant to protect individual choice cannot operate by empowering third parties to challenge that choice.

Reversal of burden of proof

Perhaps the most constitutionally troubling feature of the Maharashtra Act is the reversal of the burden of proof. Under ordinary criminal jurisprudence, the prosecution must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, under this legislation, the accused person must prove that the conversion was lawful and voluntary. The State is therefore not required to first establish wrongdoing in the traditional sense; instead, the person accused of facilitating conversion must defend the legitimacy of the act.

CJP has identified this reversal as one of the central constitutional defects in anti-conversion laws, arguing that it undermines basic criminal law protections and creates a chilling effect on legitimate religious choices.

Regulating women’s choices under the guise of preventing coercion

Although the Maharashtra Freedom of Religion Act is presented as a law against forced or fraudulent religious conversions, its operation is likely to fall most heavily on women exercising autonomy in matters of faith and marriage. Across states with similar anti-conversion laws, a significant number of prosecutions have arisen not from allegations of organised or coerced conversions, but from consensual interfaith relationships where families have opposed a woman’s decision to marry or convert. By permitting complaints from parents, siblings and other blood relatives, mandating prior notice before conversion, and empowering the police to investigate private decisions, the Act effectively shifts control over an adult woman’s choices from the individual to her family and the State. Instead of presuming that adult women possess the capacity to make informed decisions about their faith and relationships—a principle repeatedly affirmed by constitutional courts—the law creates a legal framework that invites suspicion of their agency. As CJP has argued in its dissent note, the legislation risks reinforcing patriarchal assumptions that women are vulnerable to manipulation and therefore require State and familial supervision, undermining the constitutional guarantees of dignity, privacy, equality and decisional autonomy under Articles 14, 19, 21 and 25 of the Constitution.

Passed without meaningful debate

CJP has also criticised the legislative process through which the Maharashtra law was enacted. In its dissent note, the organisation argued that the Bill was introduced and passed with extraordinary haste, leaving little opportunity for meaningful public consultation or democratic scrutiny.

The Bill was introduced in the Maharashtra Assembly on March 13, 2026, passed by the Legislative Assembly on March 16, and cleared by the Legislative Council on March 17. CJP argued that the hurried passage of the law was particularly concerning because the Supreme Court is already examining the constitutional validity of similar legislation enacted by multiple states. Introducing another law of the same nature while constitutional challenges remain pending raises questions about legislative accountability and respect for judicial review.

The Maharashtra law comes amid a broader challenge before the Supreme Court against anti-conversion statutes across India. The proceedings, led by CJP, initially challenged laws enacted in Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. The challenge was subsequently expanded to include laws enacted in Gujarat, Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Jharkhand and Karnataka.

The petitions argue that these laws violate:

• Article 25’s protection of freedom of conscience;
• Article 21’s guarantee of personal liberty and privacy;
• Article 14’s guarantee of equality.

The petitioners contend that the State may prohibit forced conversion, but cannot regulate voluntary conversion or require individuals to justify their faith choices before public authorities.

Courts have already warned against excessive state intervention

The constitutional concerns surrounding such laws are not new. In Evangelical Fellowship of India v. State of Himachal Pradesh, the Himachal Pradesh High Court struck down provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 2006 requiring prior declaration before conversion. The Court held that the right to change one’s belief could not be restricted merely on the assumption that public order might be affected. Despite this clear course correction by a constitutional court, the same state re-enacted a similar law with the same provisions in august 2022. This is one of the key substantive points argued by the CJP in its constitutional challenge to the Himachal Pradesh law. Report may be read here. While the Indian National Congress (INC), the lead opposition party has come back to power in the state (December 2022), this law has not yet been repealed, close to four years later. Similar is the situation in the state of Karnataka, a state ruled by the INC since May 2023.

Despite this judicial warning, similar provisions have repeatedly resurfaced in newer anti-conversion laws. The Gujarat High Court and Madhya Pradesh High Court have also intervened against certain provisions of their respective state laws, particularly those involving interfaith marriages and mandatory declarations.

The Maharashtra government has defended the law as necessary to prevent exploitation and fraudulent conversions. However, the constitutional challenge is not about whether coercive conversion should be prohibited. It is about whether the State can create a system where every conversion is treated as requiring explanation, scrutiny and approval. A democratic Constitution protects the freedom to choose one’s faith precisely because such choices are deeply personal and cannot be determined by the State.

The complete dissent note may be read below:

[1] CJP had first, in December 2020-February 2021, filed petitions in the Supreme Court challenging the Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh laws passed earlier and thereafter, in 2023, amended their plea to include similar laws passed in Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, and Karnataka. CJP is the lead petitioner in this matter.

Related:

Allahabad HC flags misuse of UP Anti-Conversion Law, quashes FIR and rebukes ‘mimeographed’ complaints

35 civil society groups oppose Maharashtra’s proposed anti-conversion law, warn of threat to women’s autonomy and constitutional freedoms

‘Faith Is Not a Crime’: Mumbai’s Christians rise against Maharashtra’s proposed anti-conversion bill

Maharashtra’s Proposed Anti-Conversion Law: Manufacturing moral panic to criminalise personal choice

Supreme Court defers hearing in batch of petitions, led by CJP, challenging state Anti-Conversion laws; interim relief applications pending since April 2025v

Maharashtra’s Anti-Conversion Push: How organised street pressure, Hindutva mobilisation and a pending law threaten constitutional freedoms

The post Policing Autonomy & Faith: Maharashtra’s Anti-Conversion law gets President’s assent appeared first on SabrangIndia.