Signed by the superintending archaeologist, ASI Vadodara Circle, the letter dated June 10 (Wednesday), accessed by the newspaper, is addressed to the Bharuch collector and district magistrate, and requests that “necessary steps” be taken to safeguard the Jami Masjid, a centrally protected monument, ahead of a large “gathering” planned by a right-wing organisation named Rashtriya Dharohar Sanrakshan Samiti (RDSS). The RDSS has been coordinating signature drives and public events in Bharuch since May 18, as part of a “campaign to reclaim” the centuries-old Sunni mosque as a Jain religious site.

ASI letter

The letter, describes Bharuch Jami Masjid as a living Monument of National Importance, listed under the Gazette Notification dated May 26, 1909. The ASI letter refers to information it has received from Maulana Qureshi Gulam Mustafa, President of the Jami Masjid, and notes that videos and messages circulating on social media platforms were calling on people to assemble in large numbers at the protected monument, and flagged the possibility of an untoward incident given the sensitive nature of the site.

The letter states, “…there is a possibility of a large gathering at the protected monument on June 15 and videos are getting viral in the social media platforms… As the monument is sensitive in nature, there is a likelihood of an untoward incident. Such gatherings may also pose a risk to the communal harmony and physical damage to the monument.”

Citing Article 49 of the Constitution of India, which places a direct obligation on the State to protect every monument or place of artistic or historic interest declared by Parliament to be of national importance, the letter also states Section 16 of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains (AMASR) Act, 1958, which requires the Collector to make due provision for the protection of such a monument from pollution or desecration.

Pirana Durgah, Gujarat

This is not the only site under attack and challenge by the majoritarian right-wing. Gujarat’s 600 year old Pirana Dargah has seen a similar aggressive attack and the matter is contested. Detailed reports may be read here and here.

Jami Masjid trustees

On Thursday, multiple representations were filed by the trustees of Jami Masjid with the Bharuch district administration and the police, citing serious apprehension about public order ahead of the June 15 gathering. In the representation, the trustees have pointed out that the Jami Masjid has functioned as an active Muslim place of worship for several generations and is also a registered Waqf. The trustees have submitted that “a campaign disputing the religious character of the monument has been gaining traction on social media over the past several months,” and flagged specific incidents, such as the March 3, 2026, incident of an alleged attempt to perform non-Muslim religious rituals within the monument premises.

The ASI had already requested adequate security arrangements and preventive measures from district authorities following that incident. The ASI has now also asked the district collector to unlock the exit gate of the monument on Fridays, to permit the continuance of religious observances by the Muslim community, referring to a September 2025 letter in this regard.

Bharuch District Collector N K Gavhane told this newspaper that the district administration is coordinating with all relevant agencies and that the situation remains under control. He said, “The monument is managed and protected by the Archaeological Survey of India. There is no law-and-order situation. Bharuch Superintendent of Police (SP) office, Sub-Divisional Magistrate office, and the ASI are maintaining it. We have appealed to people to refrain from making any generalised comments about the monument or believing in rumours and misunderstandings. ASI is a competent authority to decide about the monument.”

On Thursday, June 11, the trustees requested that the administration immediately prohibit all rallies, assemblies, and processions near the monument, enforce existing notifications under the Gujarat Police Act, deploy adequate police personnel, and initiate criminal proceedings against those spreading inflammatory content on social media. “If timely action is not taken and any untoward incident occurs the full responsibility will rest with the administrative and police machinery concerned,” the representation stated.

Related:

Sambhal, UP: ASI has no records to prove that Shahi Jama Masjid was built after demolishing earlier structure

Faiz-e-Ilahi Masjid, Turkman Gate: A court-ordered demolition, midnight policing, stone-pelting, arrests, and the ongoing legal battle

The post ASI, Gujarat: Will Bharuch’s 700 year old Jama Masjid be the next target of right-wing saffron grab and terror? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The idea of a UCC in India has been debated for decades including within the Constituent Assembly itself, but its recent passage in BJP-governed states has reignited the question of whether this reform is genuinely about protecting women’s rights across communities, or is it primarily a political tool aimed at communalising what is, at its core, a secular problem of gender justice. Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has openly linked the passage of the UCC to the BJP-RSS ideological project, stating that, “Had I not been a BJP CM and a swayamsevak of RSS, probably I would not have been able to bring the UCC to the assembly.” Interestingly Sarma currently serving as the 15th Chief Minister of Assam was a former member of the Indian National Congress (INC) who joined the BJP only on August 23, 2015!

‘Uniform Civil Code or Gender Justice?’ was the question raised around thirty-two years ago by the 1994 cover story of Communalism Combat. Teesta Seetalvad wrote:

“Through its constant argument that enacting a uniform civil code will bring about national integration, the Sangh Parivar has succeeded in making many Hindus believe that, one, only “separatist-minded” Muslims are opposed to a uniform law, and, two, the uniform civil code will only affect Muslims.”

Remarkably, that observation remains just as germane today. What this narrative however ignores is one, the call to do away with several practices, including polygamy, have come from Muslim women themselves (all while the BJP has adopted this issue as one of its own), and, two, all personal laws irrespective of religion have an-anti woman bias. Reported the Hindustan Times. Practices such as restitution of conjugal rights and the absence of no-fault divorce have existed in many religious communities. The broad powers granted to testators to will away property have long enabled the disinheritance of vulnerable family members across many faiths. The 2018 Law Commission report suggested that the legislature first consider guaranteeing equality within communities‘ between men and women, rather than equality between communities while suggesting that personal law reform over a UCC is recommended.

“Various aspects of prevailing personal laws disprivilege women. This Commission is of the view that it is discrimination and not difference which lies at the root of inequality,” the report read.

What the Bill changes 

The Bill aims to unify all personal family laws, including issues related to marriage, divorce, intestate and testamentary succession, and live-in relationships within the State of Assam. It applies to all residents of the state; including those living outside its territories, but it specifically excludes members of any Scheduled Tribes.

It sets uniform conditions for a valid marriage, including a minimum age of 21 for men and 18 for women, replacing the varying thresholds that existed under some personal laws. The religious ceremony through which a marriage is solemnised (whether a Saptapadi, Nikah, Holy Union, Anand Karaj, or any other recognised rite) remains valid and untouched.

The Bill explicitly prohibits polygamy; however, this is not a novel change as only last year, Assam had passed a law banning polygamy across the state. The UCC also standardises the list of prohibited relationships. This has an impact on Muslim personal law, which permitted marriage between first cousins.

Compulsory registration of all marriages within sixty days of the ceremony is introduced for the first time as a uniform requirement though several states, notably Maharashtra had introduced a separate law for this in 1999 while retaining personal laws (Maharashtra Regulation of Marriage Bureaus and Registration of Marriages Act, 1998). Failure to register attracts penalties, though importantly the UCC clarifies that non-registration does not by itself render a marriage invalid. The Bill also establishes procedures for judicial separation and the restitution of conjugal rights. The framework provides standardised grounds for divorce (such as cruelty, desertion, or mutual consent) and extrajudicial methods of dissolving a marriage or unilateral divorce are no longer legally recognised for any community. Maintenance during the pendency of proceedings and permanent alimony after a decree are available to either spouse, again, without any community-specific distinction.

The UCC’s most far-reaching provisions concern succession, where it departs most sharply from the existing personal laws of several communities. It defines a clear ‘Order of Preference’ for how property is distributed when a person dies without a Will. Class-1 heirs (including the spouse, children, and parents) generally succeed simultaneously and take equal shares. For a detailed understanding of this, read a previous analysis by Citizens for Justice and Peace here

Lack of stakeholder consultation 

Hasina Khan and Mridul Kaintura writing for Sabrang India in 2024 noted that conservative and orthodox religious leaders had failed their community as they sought to control their bodies under the guise of protecting the religion. However, they also wrote, “Despite spearheading the movement to bring reforms within our own communities, including the formulation of Nikah-Nama, protesting against fatwas and advocating reforms in discriminatory personal laws, the state has never taken any steps to hear our concerns and protect our rights effectively,” they added.

The UCC Bill was cleared without con­sult­ing any minor­ity organ­isa­tions who had demanded further consultations before the Bill was passed. Beyond the absence of consultations, even the text of the Bill was not placed in the public domain, despite the 2014 circular mandating that draft legislation be made publicly available for at least thirty days to invite comments and feedback. The Bill was vetted by the Assam Cabinet only May 12 before it was introduced on May 25 in the State Assembly and passed on May 27 after about five hours of discussion and debate. As per reports in both The Hindu and The Shillong Times.

The manner in which the Assam government pushed through the UCC Bill is not an isolated instance but reflective of a growing pattern across India where major legislative changes are introduced with little transparency and minimal consultation with those most affected. Similar criticisms accompanied the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Act, 2026, and the Delimitation Bill.

CM Sarma in fact went on record to say that Congress’s opposition does not matter because except one Congress MLA, rest of the 18 MLAs represent a particular religion.  He was referring to eighteen of the 19 MLAs of Congress, the largest opposition party, who are Muslims. This brazen vocal exclusion and segregation of elected representatives of the religious minorities bodes ill for any representative and participative democracy. Reported in The Times of India.

Dr Noorjehan Safia Niaz, co-founder of the Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan, had said last December that her organisation had twenty-five points specifically relating to Muslims that must be included in any UCC, among them the preservation of mehr (the compulsory payment by the husband to the wife upon marriage, which provides a measure of financial security). The Bill does not incorporate any of the positive and progressive aspects of Muslim personal law. The mehr, nikahnama (which allows spouses to negotiate mutually agreed and legally enforceable conditions in the marriage contract) have completely omitted or left out, as has the one-third limit rule on willing away property for the first spouse and children, which served as a protection against complete disinheritance. The practice of khula, through which a Muslim woman may initiate divorce on grounds such as irreconcilable differences, neglect, or lack of financial support, has not been codified and extended to all women representing a missed opportunity to give every woman a meaningful right to exit a marriage independently. Such legislative exclusion is reflective of a majoritarian bias through exclusion that fails to introduce or include cultural-religious norms from varied communities that are or maybe progressive. As per a report in reddif.com.

The restitution of conjugal rights, which legally compels an unwilling spouse to return to cohabitation, and in the case of a wife could expose her to the risk of rape and forcible pregnancy, has also been retained at a time when its constitutional validity is actively challenged before the Supreme Court and the 21st Law Commission Report recommended its removal. The Bill is entirely silent on custody, and guardianship which are the areas in which Hindu law and Mohammedan law (after seven years of age) gender-based discrimination has been extensively commented upon as the guardianship of a minor boy or unmarried girl vests in the father before the mother.

Had the government followed stakeholder consultations and the Law Commission’s recommendations, would a Bill ostensibly rooted in gender justice have overlooked such regressive practices?

“Instead of maintaining a silence on all these anti-women and pro-men or pro-Hindu provisions of family laws, should not the debate on reforms in family laws be re-framed by secularists incorporating all these arguments with a correct perspective?” had asked Setalvad in 1994.

Exclusion of Scheduled Tribes

In a report in The Times of India, the most glaring contradiction in a supposedly uniform code is the blanket exemption granted to Scheduled Tribes. As per the last census (which was over 15 years ago!), 12.4 per cent of Assam’s population constitute of scheduled tribes meaning their exclusion removes a significant section of the state’s residents from the scope of legislation. When asked to justify this, CM Sarma reportedly stated that,

“Medicine will be given where there is illness… UCC will give radiotherapy, chemotherapy where there is cancer. Where there is no cancer, there is no necessity of giving radiotherapy.”

“Whether we bring UCC or not, our tribal people never accept polygamy … Our tribal people give equal rights to girls, they do not accept live-in relations. Self regulation is the best regulation. If Hindu and Muslim societies also had customary rights like tribals and our society would have been tied together with equal rights like them, maybe a UCC would not have been required for anyone,” he added.

In his speech in the House, he also stated that the society rarely sees distressed or neglected women within tribal societies, like that of the Shah Bano case because through their customary rights and customary courts, these communities had already been regulating their social systems.

This stance is perhaps ignorant of first, the socio-economic status of tribal women and how that could affect their access to courts and second, the available data and judicial record! Were consultations with tribal women held for the State to arrive at this conclusion?

According to the International Institute for Population Sciences, compared to the national average of 1.4 per cent (NFHS-5), the rate of polygamy was 2.4 among STs. Tribal communities have also historically opposed women’s inheritance rights on the grounds that recognising such rights would result in land being alienated to non-tribals through inter-community marriage. As per reports in The Print and the Hindustan Times.

There are also cases where tribal women have knocked on the doors of courts! In Gopal Singh Bhumij v. Giribala Bhumij (1990), a ST woman who sought the partition of her father’s property, was denied the same by the Patna High Court as she was bound by tribal custom, which excluded daughters from inheritance. In Smt. Butaki Bai v. Sukhbati (2005), a daughter of the Halba tribe similarly failed to obtain inheritance rights because she could not provide sufficient evidence of Hinduisation. In Ram Dev Ram v. Dhani Ram (2016), a daughter of the Uraon tribe was denied inheritance rights because she did not follow the tribal custom. All of this demonstrates that customary tribal law is neither beyond scrutiny nor inherently gender-just.

“What does uniform mean?… The content of this large Bill does not align with its title. Because to be uniform, it has to be the same for everyone staying in this state. I have no objection with someone being left out from it, I respect all tribes and communities, but the name should be changed… The CM and the other MLAs have been talking about ‘rights’ being secured by the Bill, but in that case, aren’t the women of those who are being left out being deprived of their rights?” said MLA Jakir Sikdar. As per a report in the Indian Express.

Mandatory registration of live-in relationships

One of the most controversial features of the recent UCC framework is its mandatory registration framework for live-in relationships which is a significant expansion of state and community oversight into intimate relationships. This applies even if the partners are residents of Assam living outside the state territories. Partners in such a relationship are obligated to submit a statement to the Sub-Registrar; who then conducts a summary inquiry, and must either register the relationship and issue a certificate or refuse to register with written reasons within thirty days. If either partner is below twenty-one years of age, the Sub-Registrar is legally obligated to inform their parents or guardians. In all cases, a copy of the statement is forwarded to the officer-in-charge of the local police station. Third parties are also permitted to provide information or file complaints regarding unregistered live-in relationships.

This means that a woman may marry at eighteen without parental consent, but must wait until twenty-one to enter a live-in relationship without triggering mandatory parental notification. This inconsistency is difficult to justify on any coherent principle of personal autonomy, nor has the State done its bit to explain the reason behind it.

“These are also matters concerning Muslim women, who may once again find themselves subjected to suffering at the hands of the institution of family, the state, and third parties. Here, the third party could be the involvement of any institution, from community Khaps, Jamaats to even Fatwa-judgements. The punitive measures after being unable to register the live-in relationships are in no way a protective measure but to further surveil the relationships that challenge the institution of marriage,” wrote Khan and Kaintura for Sabrang.

The Uttarakhand UCC Rules also require individuals seeking registration of a live-in relationship to furnish certification from a religious leader or community representative. In January 2025, CJP raised concerns that such rules “make it practically impossible for interfaith or inter–caste individuals to be in a live-in relationship. The requirement of religious sanction for two consenting adults to enter a live-in relationship defeats the principle of secularism provided in the Preamble of the Constitution of India.”

The UCC Rules for Assam are expected to be formulated within six months of Presidential assent. One will have to wait and see whether such draconian provisions are a part of the Assam UCC Rules too. On his X, Biswa has already linked the UCC as a panacea from ‘Love Jihad’ signaling the intent to regulate and restrict inter-faith relationships.

This is consistent with a rising trend across India where anti-conversion laws along with the mandatory public notice provisions of the Special Marriage Act, and now the UCC, create records that right-wing and Hindutva vigilante groups use to track and harass interfaith couples. Reports of young couples being attacked, or forcibly separated have become disturbingly common. Read weaponisation of laws to prevent interfaith marriages in Uttrakhand here. Stated a report in The Polis Project.

This was precisely what CJP tried to address when it challenged the constitutional validity of various State enactments regulating religious conversion. Read detailed reports here and here. By forwarding relationship data directly to police stations and permitting third-party complaints, has arguably created a fresh infrastructure for exactly this kind of extra-legal intimidation.

The Bill also maintains a complete silence on the rights of queer and transgender persons within the family, their rights to marry, and their inheritance and succession rights. In a country where the legal recognition of same-sex relationships remains contested and transgender persons continue to face pervasive discrimination, the UCC’s failure to even acknowledge their existence within the family law framework is a profound omission that no claim to progressiveness can easily paper over.

Conclusion

Women across every community have demanded reforms in personal law for decades. That is not the contention here. The concern, however, is that the UCC in name of reform is plausibly being deployed as a selective intervention that leaves comparable inequalities untouched and exempts a portion of the population on grounds it refuses to apply consistently. By introducing registration of live-in relationships, surveillance mechanisms are introduced that go against the right to privacy and dignity guaranteed by the Constitution and judgments by the Supreme Court.

Reports indicate that Madhya Pradesh is next in line and consultations have already begun. A law that is serious about gender justice would incorporate the best practices from every community and also address the silences around queer persons, HUFs, guardianship, and resist the temptation to use intimate relationships as a theatre for communal politics. By these measures, the Assam, Gujarat and Uttrakhand UCCs as passed have already fallen significantly short. Reported The Hindu.

The full draft of The Uniform Civil Code, Assam, 2026 can be accessed here

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

Related:

The Uniform Civil Code (UCC) of Uttarakhand: Advancement in gender justice or violating individual liberties?

Calls for Uniform Civil Code, Population Control Bill by Right-Wing groups amplified with divisive rhetoric

Destroying the basic standards of legislation- the Uttarakhand Model of UCC

The post Assam Becomes Third State to Adopt UCC: Reform for Gender Justice or Communal Politics? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Neither the government nor the Commission has answered this question.

Without conducting any proper study on illegal migration, how and why are they undertaking a potentially harmful exercise such as the SIR? Even the Supreme Court, while examining the constitutional validity of the SIR, unfortunately did not ask this fundamental question.

Thus, three-fourths of the SIR process was ‘completed’ without any respect for due process or empirical foundation whatsoever. After as many as 75 million Indians had already been pushed out of the electoral rolls, the Modi government, on May 26—just a day before the Supreme Court was due to deliver its verdict in the SIR matter —constituted a “High-Level Committee on Demographic Change” under the chairmanship of retired Justice Prakash Prabhakar Naik.

A close look at the committee’s composition, its members, and its terms of reference makes it abundantly clear that this is, yet another, carefully plotted political-bureaucratic plot designed to perpetuate the harassment of Indian Muslims. First, as Justice Prakash himself has reportedly admitted, he possesses no expertise whatsoever in this subject. He was also not informed in advance about the assignment.

Second, the other members of the committee include a retired bureaucrat, Durga Shankar Mishra; a retired police officer, Balaji Srivastava; and Shamika Ravi, an economic adviser to the Prime Minister. This is the same scholar who recently dismissed concerns about the rupee falling to 100 against the dollar by saying that it is “just a number.” Shamika also has the unique distinction of being the daughter of none less than former Tamil Nadu governor, R.N.Ravi, notorious for his attacks on federalism in that state. So critical has Ravi been to the services of the New Delhi regime that, in March 2026, he was transferred as the governor of West Bengal where he oversaw not just the notorious SIR but also the recently concluded ‘elections’ to the State Assembly!

Most strikingly, in a committee specifically constituted to study demographic change, there is not a single expert on the subject, demography. Every member appears to have been selected for political allegiance and loyalty rather than for any recognised expertise in population studies.

The terms of reference assigned to the committee raise even more serious concerns. Notably, the committee has not even been asked to investigate whether there is, in fact, any large-scale and systematic illegal migration into India from neighbouring countries.

Terms of Reference Designed to Officialise Propaganda

Instead of first establishing whether such large-scale, organised, and malicious illegal migration is actually taking place, the committee has already proceeded on the assumption that it is. The questions it has been asked to study include:

i) To comprehensively deliberate upon the challenges arising from demographic changes, including illegal immigration.

ii) To study the possible causes of such demographic changes, such as cross-border activities (including illegal immigration), economic opportunities, and other socio-environmental factors.

iii) To identify the underlying factors behind these changes, which include illegal immigration, abnormal settlement patterns, and orchestrated migration

iv) To analyse structural population changes at the level of religious or social communities, particularly where they deviate from broader trends.

v) To recommend a streamlined and permanent operational mechanism for the legal, fair, and time-bound identification, detention, and deportation of illegal immigrants already residing in the country.

vi) To recommend an appropriate institutional mechanism to strengthen border management, population stabilization, and identification systems for the continuous monitoring of such trends.

The committee has been instructed to study these issues and submit its report and recommendations within one year.

Thus, it is clear that the Modi government’s agenda effectively treats as established facts several partisan and communal claims that the RSS and the BJP have long propagated regarding demographic change in India. These include:

• That the Muslim population in India is growing disproportionately, not only because Muslims allegedly do not practise population control, but also because of illegal migration from Bangladesh and other neighbouring countries.
• That this demographic growth is part of a deliberate project to reduce the proportion of Hindus and eventually transform India into a Muslim-majority nation.
• That this constitutes an international conspiracy in which Indian Muslims are complicit, making the entire Muslim community suspect. The only way to defeat this conspiracy, according to this narrative, is to transform India into a Hindu Rashtra.

A careful reading of the committee’s terms of reference makes it clear that it has been constituted primarily to validate these long-standing falsehoods and lend official legitimacy to a campaign of communal polarisation.

This propaganda has already succeeded in fostering a deeply anti-Muslim and fascistic social mind-set across large sections of the country. That is why, even when large numbers of Hindus lacking proper documentation are themselves being excluded through exercises such as the SIR, a narrative is being constructed that Modi is protecting Hindus from Muslims. As a result, poor Hindus are being persuaded to support policies that ultimately harm their own interests.

Economic Refugees or Illegal Conspirators?

Viewed in perspective, although both the Congress and the BJP have governed this country over the past seventy-seven years, it is unlikely that illegal migration into India has ever occurred on the scale of millions. At most, it may have involved thousands or perhaps lakhs of people entering the country in search of livelihoods.

Moreover, since around 2005, Bangladesh has recorded rapid economic progress, particularly in sectors such as ready-made garment exports. In fact, its per capita income has, at times, marginally surpassed that of India. As a result, illegal migration from Bangladesh into India has declined significantly.

This is precisely why neither the Election Commission nor the Modi government is willing to answer a simple question: in the states where the SIR exercise has already been completed, including Bihar and West Bengal, how many illegal migrants were actually identified through the process? Was it hundreds, thousands, or lakhs? No answer has been forthcoming. The Supreme Court, too, has not pressed the Commission on this question.

Meanwhile, reports over the past two weeks indicate that the BJP governments in West Bengal and Gujarat have identified around three to four thousand impoverished Bangladeshi nationals who were either overstaying their visas or residing in India without proper documentation. This is not fundamentally different from the thousands of Indians who attempt to enter the United States illegally every year in search of economic opportunities and are subsequently detained.

When Indian Hindus migrate illegally to the United States in significant numbers, they are not doing so as part of a demographic invasion aimed at altering America’s racial composition or taking over the country. By the same logic, the few thousand undocumented workers who may have migrated from Bangladesh to India are economic refugees in search of survival, not conspirators engaged in a grand political project.

Yet the purpose of the “Committee on Demographic Change” appears to be precisely to brand Muslims as perpetual illegals, keep them under a constant cloud of suspicion, and reduce them to a condition of permanent insecurity and uncertainty.

In reality, neither illegal migration by foreign Muslims nor the growth of India’s Muslim population poses the demographic challenge facing the country.

India’s population challenge lies elsewhere entirely. By deploying fascistic political strategies and manufactured fears, the Modi government is obscuring the real issues confronting the nation.

The Myth of Muslim Population Growth

If the BJP were to think about the interests of the country, even once, rather than viewing every issue through the prism of partisan advantage, a few realities would become immediately apparent:

• India is not facing a population explosion.
• Population growth is not the primary cause of poverty in India. On the contrary, India’s large youth population presents a historic opportunity for rapid economic growth.
• The rate of growth of the Muslim population has been declining sharply over the past two decades, and in fact has been falling faster than the growth rate of the Hindu population.

These facts are clearly borne out by the third, fourth, and fifth rounds of the National Family Health Survey (NFHS), conducted under the aegis of the Government of India’s Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, as well as by the population census reports of 1991, 2001, and 2011.

India’s Population Growth Rate Is Declining

One of the biggest myths surrounding India’s demographic situation is that because India has one of the largest populations in the world, its population growth rate is spiralling out of control and therefore requires urgent and stringent intervention.

The reality is precisely the opposite. India’s population growth rate is steadily and healthily declining, not increasing.

The most widely used measure for assessing population growth is the Total Fertility Rate (TFR). TFR refers to the average number of children a woman is expected to give birth to during her reproductive years, generally between the ages of 15 and 49.

At the time of Independence, India’s TFR stood at approximately 5.9. In other words, an average Indian woman gave birth to nearly six children during her lifetime. Had that trend continued unchecked, India’s population today could have reached 2.5 to 3 billion people.

However, from the very beginning, India placed considerable emphasis on family welfare programmes, awareness campaigns, access to contraception, and reproductive health services. Wherever awareness increased, healthcare became accessible, and women gained greater educational and economic empowerment, fertility rates began to decline rapidly.

According to the 2015–16 National Family Health Survey, India’s average TFR had fallen to 2.3. Compared to 1951, this represents a decline of well over fifty per cent in the rate of population growth.

Women’s Empowerment, Not Coercive Laws, Drives Fertility Decline

Apart from the excesses associated with forced sterilisation during the Emergency, India’s family planning programme has largely relied on persuasion, access to healthcare services, and women’s empowerment rather than coercive legal measures.

This is not unique to India. Across the world, every successful population stabilisation programme has followed the same path. At the International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo in 1994, India reaffirmed its commitment to this rights-based approach.

The variation in fertility rates across Indian states further reinforces this conclusion.

According to the 2015–16 NFHS, while India’s average TFR stood at 2.3, relatively developed states such as Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Maharashtra, and Gujarat recorded fertility rates of only 1.7 to 1.8—well below the national average.

In stark contrast, Bihar recorded a TFR of 3.4 and Uttar Pradesh 2.7, both substantially above the national average. The difference is not difficult to understand. States with lower fertility rates generally exhibit higher levels of female literacy, educational attainment, women’s participation in public life, and overall socio-economic development.

Indeed, the fertility rate among Hindus in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar is higher than the fertility rate among Muslims in many southern states. In other words, Muslim women in the southern states are, on average, having fewer children than Hindu women in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.

That is precisely why the phrase “Development is the Best Contraceptive” has become a widely accepted principle across the world. Development reduces fertility rates far more effectively than punitive laws ever can.

Equally important is the finding of the 2020–21 National Family Health Survey that 54 per cent of Indian women have only two children, while 76 per cent of women married during the past decade have expressed no desire to have a second child.

The implication is clear. When women are empowered to make decisions about their own bodies and reproductive lives, and when families become more democratic and egalitarian, population growth declines naturally without the need for coercion or state-imposed restrictions.

Muslim Population Growth Is Declining Faster Than Hindu Population Growth

Another important fact revealed by the National Family Health Surveys is that, over the past three decades, the fertility rate among Muslims has been declining faster than that among Hindus.

According to the third round of the NFHS conducted in 2005–06, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) among Hindus stood at 2.59, while the corresponding figure for Muslims was 3.4.

A decade later, according to the fourth round of the NFHS, the Hindu TFR had fallen from 2.59 to 2.13—a decline of 0.46 points.

During the same period, the Muslim TFR fell from 3.4 to 2.61—a decline of 0.79 points.

In other words, although the Muslim fertility rate remains higher than the Hindu fertility rate, it has been declining much more rapidly over the past decade. Consequently, the rate of Muslim population growth has also been falling significantly faster than the corresponding rate among Hindus.

In 2005, the gap between Muslim and Hindu fertility rates stood at 0.81. By 2015, that gap had narrowed to just 0.4. If this trend continues, the difference between Hindu and Muslim fertility rates is likely to become negligible within the next decade.

Equally significant is the fact that fertility rates among Muslims have been falling most rapidly in states with substantial Muslim populations, including Kerala, Assam, West Bengal, and Jammu & Kashmir.

The government’s own demographic data therefore establishes three important conclusions:

• India’s population growth rate is declining in a healthy and sustainable manner.
• The rate of Muslim population growth is declining far more rapidly than is commonly portrayed in public discourse.
• Wherever socio-economic development has advanced, fertility rates have declined across all communities, irrespective of whether they are Hindu or Muslim.

The logical conclusion is straightforward. If the government is genuinely concerned about population stabilisation, its focus should be on education, employment, healthcare, family welfare programmes, access to reproductive health services, and above all, women’s empowerment.

The Real Challenge Is Not Population Growth—It Is Population Decline

In fact, both the NFHS findings and demographic research from around the world point to a very different concern. The challenge confronting many societies today is not unchecked population growth, but declining population growth.

According to a study published in The Lancet, one of the world’s most respected scientific journals, India’s population, currently around 1.4 billion, may continue to grow and reach approximately 1.6 billion by 2048. However, because fertility rates are steadily declining, India’s population is projected to begin shrinking after that point.

By the end of the century, India’s population is expected to decline substantially.

Even more significant than the overall decline in numbers is the changing age structure of the population. The proportion of elderly citizens is expected to rise sharply, while the share of the working-age population will steadily decrease.

This will have profound economic consequences. A smaller workforce will be required to support a much larger elderly population. Governments will face growing pressure to provide pensions, healthcare, and social security, while economies may increasingly depend on migration and labour inflows from younger populations elsewhere.

These are the demographic challenges that demand serious attention.

The issue before India is not an imaginary population explosion. The real question is how to create productive employment opportunities for the country’s vast youth population and harness this demographic advantage while it still exists.

At the same time, policymakers must begin preparing for the economic, political, and social consequences of an ageing society that will emerge over the coming decades.

Instead of confronting these real challenges, communal fearmongering and demographic myths are being used to divert public attention from the issues that genuinely matter.

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The post High-Level Committee on Demographic Change (HLC-DC): Another Offensive on Indian Muslims! appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Significantly, this action by the BMC authorities, as reported by India Today, followed two months after BJP leader and former MP Kirit Somaiya visited the place and urged the authorities to demolish the structure that was allegedly constructed on the land of the Maharashtra government’s dairy development project. Somaiya is a key leader who stokes strong communal passions in Mumbai. Soon after the demolition, the veteran BJP leader wrote on X, “Land JIHAD… illegal DARGAH of Aarey Colony Mumbai Demolished today. I had visited & filed a complaint on April 9, 2026.”

AAREY Land JIHAD

70,000 square feet Forest Land was grabbed in the name of Dargah.

After consistent efforts of 12 months 6 visits & 12 meetings with Minister, Officials & 1 FIR yesterday DEMOLITION.

Now this land is to be handed over to Forest Dept, Sanjay Gandhi National… pic.twitter.com/RA8NddmIxe

— Kirit Somaiya (@KiritSomaiya) June 3, 2026

Land Jihad
Land Grabbing in the name of DARGAH

Aarey Colony Reserved Forest Land by

Mahmud Yasin
Anwar Pinjari
Imran Mansuri
Vasim Mansuri & others

I had visited the site half a dozen times in last 12 months. Exposed the Land JIHAD & Filed complaints with Aarey Colony,… pic.twitter.com/CRxgq2UCvx

— Kirit Somaiya (@KiritSomaiya) June 2, 2026

Early on Tuesday morning, an army of bulldozers and cranes arrived on the land to start the demolition drive. The area was cordoned off by a heavy deployment of police forces to prevent any unpleasant situation from arising. Keeping the stone-pelting incident of Bandra Garib Nagar in mind, where the people allegedly threw stones at the officials when a demolition driver headed to raze down a religious structure, the people started throwing stones. Personnel from both Mumbai Police and riot-control forces were present at the spot.

Last week, the BMC also demolished a temple that was illegally constructed in Mumbai’s Dindoshi area.

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The post Under heavy police protection, decades-old Mumbai dargah razed appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Statesman reported that the Ajgaib Shaheed Mosque, located near Rajghat and falling within the alignment of the railway expansion project, was brought down shortly after midnight amid extensive security arrangements. Officials claimed that the structure stood on railway land earmarked for the station’s modernisation and expansion.

A report in the Deccan Herald said that a Hanuman Temple, which was also built on the railway land, was removed.

This sudden and arbitrary demolition is linked to a major infrastructure project under which Kashi railway station is being transformed into an integrated transport hub with airport-like facilities. Estimated to cost between Rs 330 crore and Rs 400 crore, the project aims to connect rail, road, metro and water transport networks at a single location to improve passenger movement in the city.

According to officials, senior police and administrative officers reached the site late Tuesday night and supervised the operation, which was completed within a short span. Bulldozers and earth-moving equipment were deployed to bring down the structure and clear the debris.

Massive security cover for overnight operation

The administration had put in place elaborate security measures to prevent any law-and-order issues during the exercise.

Joint Commissioner of Police Shiv Hari Meena led the security arrangements, with several IPS officers, police personnel and paramilitary forces stationed in and around the area. Access to the site was tightly restricted during the operation.

Officials said five JCB machines and two Poclain excavators were used in the demolition process.

Senior officers monitored operation

Before the demolition began, senior officials carried out a review of the area and security deployment. Among those present were DCP Kashi Gaurav Banswal, ADCP Vaibhav Bangar, ACP Vijay Pratap and officers from multiple police stations. The heavy deployment continued until debris from the site was removed.

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The post Why was a 200-year-old mosque in Varanasi demolished in the middle of the night? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In many places, the festival passed peacefully. Families gathered after morning namaz, meat was distributed among relatives and poorer households, and local communities quietly adjusted practices to avoid confrontation. But in several cities and towns, Bakri Eid also became the centre of communal disputes over goats, housing societies, slaughter spaces, public prayer, and even the visibility of Muslim religious life itself.

The result was a festival that revealed two India’s simultaneously: one still capable of accommodation and coexistence, and another where Muslim festivals are increasingly subjected to suspicion, policing, and political contestation. Authorities across the country remained on high alert in the days leading up to Eid-ul-Adha. Police deployments were increased, livestock transportation was monitored, housing societies issued restrictions, and state governments reiterated cattle slaughter regulations. The atmosphere reflected the growing politicisation of Bakri Eid itself.

The festival under regulation

One of the clearest patterns this year was the extent to which Eid celebrations became governed through administrative control and legal regulation. As Moneycontrol reported in a detailed nationwide survey of cattle slaughter laws ahead of Bakri Eid, state governments issued extensive advisories and intensified enforcement drives around livestock transport, slaughterhouses, and sacrificial practices.

The report highlighted how India’s fragmented legal landscape around cattle slaughter shaped Eid observances differently across states. Maharashtra strictly enforced provisions under the Maharashtra Animal Preservation Act, which bans slaughter of cows, bulls, and bullocks. Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat continued to enforce some of the country’s harshest anti-cow slaughter laws, with penalties extending to life imprisonment in certain circumstances. Assam intensified enforcement under the Assam Cattle Preservation Act, while Karnataka reiterated provisions under its stringent 2020 anti-cattle slaughter legislation.

In Delhi, minister Kapil Mishra publicly warned that sacrifice of prohibited bovine species would invite criminal prosecution. Rapid response teams were formed across districts to monitor transport and slaughter activities.

Municipal corporations and local administrations across cities also insisted that qurbani be conducted only at officially designated spaces. In Mumbai, the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation reportedly designated 109 authorised slaughter locations and discouraged sacrifice in residential societies and chawls.

Increasingly, the question was no longer merely what Muslims could sacrifice during Eid, but where, how visibly, and under whose permission.

Pandharpur and the other possibility

Yet even amid this tense atmosphere, there were moments that reflected a very different social reality. Perhaps the most striking example came from Pandharpur in Maharashtra. As reported by Hindustan Times, the town’s Muslim community voluntarily decided to defer goat sacrifice because Bakri Eid coincided with Adhik Maas Ekadashi, an occasion of deep significance for devotees of Lord Vitthal.

Members of the Muslim community told reporters that they wanted to honour the sentiments of Hindu pilgrims visiting the temple town. Some residents reportedly said that Muslims in Pandharpur had long-standing emotional and spiritual connections with the town’s religious culture and had similarly deferred sacrifice in previous years when such overlaps occurred. The symbolism mattered. At a time when Muslim religious practices were being intensely scrutinised elsewhere, Pandharpur offered a reminder that coexistence in India has historically depended less on legal coercion and more on negotiated accommodation and everyday mutual recognition. The story received wide attention precisely because it contrasted so sharply with the hostility unfolding elsewhere.

Mira Road: From housing dispute to communal flashpoint

The most widely discussed communal tensions around Bakri Eid this year emerged from Mira Road near Mumbai. What began as a disagreement by a few inside a housing society over goats being kept ahead of Eid soon escalated into a much larger communal controversy involving right-wing groups, police intervention, counter-protests, and allegations of deliberate provocation.

Detailed report by SabrangIndia may be read here.

Tensions erupted at Poonam Cluster Society after some residents objected to goats being housed within the premises. Muslim residents maintained that they had obtained municipal permission and pointed out that the practice had existed for years within the society. The dispute quickly moved beyond internal society negotiations.

As provided in our report, fringe elements associated with organisations such as the Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad entered the scene. What followed was an escalation marked by religious sloganeering, clashes, and eventually one of the most disturbing incidents reported during this year’s Eid period: attempts to bring pigs into the housing society as a counter-protest to the legally valid presence of goats.

The symbolism was unmistakable. And yet, what happened afterward was equally important.

Three days later, the same society celebrated Eid peacefully under police protection. In a follow-up report, Hindustan Times quoted residents insisting that “outsiders” had aggravated what was initially a manageable internal disagreement.

Residents described years of communal coexistence inside the society. Muslim families explained that the temporary goat sheds had existed for years with proper drainage and regular cleaning arrangements. Hindu and Muslim neighbours reportedly exchanged Eid greetings despite the violence of previous days.

The Mira Road episode therefore became more than a local dispute. It illustrated how quickly ordinary disagreements over shared residential space can now be communalised through organised intervention and political mobilisation. At the same time, it also revealed the persistence of local social relationships that continue to resist complete polarisation.

Kalyan and the politics of religious space

Another major point of friction emerged in Kalyan, Maharashtra. As reported by The Hindu, police-imposed restrictions on animal sacrifice inside several housing societies and heavily barricaded the area around the historic Durgadi Fort complex during Eid prayers.

The site is politically and communally sensitive because a temple and mosque exist in close proximity within the fort complex. According to the report, temporary restrictions on temple access during Eid prayers led to protests by members of both Shiv Sena factions and Hindu organisations. Groups gathered nearby to recite the Hanuman Chalisa after prayers concluded, while demonstrations were organised around allegations that Hindu devotees were being prevented from entering the temple.

The issue carried deep historical resonance. The Hindu noted that the Durgadi Fort dispute has remained politically charged since the 1980s and is closely linked to the legacy of Shiv Sena strongman Anand Dighe. Bakri Eid here became not just a religious event but a symbolic battleground over ownership of public and sacred space.

Political language and “new Hindutva”

The tensions surrounding Bakri Eid also triggered overt political commentary. Shiv Sena (UBT) MP Sanjay Raut accused certain groups of attempting to communalise the festival through what he described as “new Hindutva.” According to reports published by News The Truth, Raut argued that Maharashtra historically represented a culture of coexistence and criticised what he viewed as selective outrage around Muslim animal sacrifice while remaining silent on sacrifices associated with other traditions.

His remarks reflected a broader political argument emerging this year: that opposition to Bakri Eid practices was no longer being framed merely through animal welfare or civic regulation, but increasingly through majoritarian identity politics. At the same time, Hindu nationalist groups repeatedly framed their protests around language of “public hygiene,” “society rules,” “religious sensitivity,” and “illegal sacrifice.”

The conflict was therefore rarely articulated openly as anti-Muslim hostility. Instead, it often appeared through the bureaucratic and civic vocabulary of regulation, sanitation, legality, and public order.

Varanasi and the economics of Eid

The tensions surrounding Bakri Eid were not only communal or political. They were also economic. In Varanasi, authorities sealed the city’s decades-old Benia Bagh goat market just days before Eid, triggering panic among traders. According to reports carried by Indian Express, the market — one of eastern Uttar Pradesh’s largest seasonal livestock bazaars — had functioned for nearly four decades before authorities abruptly shut it down citing sanitation complaints and overcrowding.

Traders alleged that they were given little warning and faced devastating losses after travelling from multiple districts with goats purchased on credit.

Several traders reportedly said they had mortgaged valuables and borrowed money at high interest rates to participate in Eid livestock trade and now feared financial ruin if they could not sell their animals.

The closure highlighted another dimension of Eid increasingly overlooked in public discourse: the festival sustains a vast informal economy involving livestock farmers, transport workers, traders, butchers, leather workers, and local markets. Administrative crackdowns therefore carry not only symbolic implications, but material consequences for livelihoods as well.

Prayer, surveillance, and preventive policing

Even public prayer itself became contested in some areas. Reports circulated from Agra that Hindu nationalist leaders planned protests over temporary free entry arrangements at the Taj Mahal for Eid namaz. Police responded by placing several individuals under house arrest to prevent escalation. Elsewhere, social media videos documented protests around Eid prayers and public recitations of the Hanuman Chalisa near Muslim gatherings.

The visible police presence across cities became one of the defining features of Bakri Eid this year. In Mira Road alone, dozens of police personnel were reportedly stationed around sensitive housing societies to prevent further escalation.

The scale of preventive policing reflected both administrative caution and the extent to which Muslim festivals are increasingly treated as potential law-and-order situations.

The festival that revealed the country

Bakri Eid in India this year cannot be reduced either to a story of communal harmony or one of inevitable communal conflict. Both realities existed simultaneously.

There were stories of accommodation: Muslims in Pandharpur postponing sacrifice to respect Ekadashi; local communities negotiating solutions quietly; residents insisting that coexistence mattered more than provocation; neighbours exchanging Eid greetings despite recent tensions.

But there were also unmistakable signs of a changing political climate: housing societies policing Muslim practices; right-wing mobilisation around goats and sacrifice; counter-protests involving pigs; increasing restrictions on where Muslims may pray or perform qurbani; administrative language increasingly framing Eid through surveillance and control.

The deeper significance of Bakri Eid this year lay not merely in the incidents themselves, but in what they revealed about the condition of public life in India.

Questions that once belonged largely to the private domain of religious observance — where goats may be kept, where sacrifice may occur, whether namaz may be offered in a particular place — are now increasingly contested in public and political arenas. And yet, despite everything, the festival still passed. Families prayed. Communities negotiated fragile peace. And in many places, ordinary people continued to protect coexistence even when political actors attempted to fracture it. Bakri Eid in 2026 therefore became a portrait of contemporary India itself: anxious, polarised, heavily policed — but still, in countless everyday ways, struggling to hold together.

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The post Between Celebration and Suspicion: How Bakri Eid passed across india in 2026 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

SabrangIndia spoke in detail with Sadique Basha, CPI(M) leader from Mira-Bhayandar who has long worked on questions of communal harmony in the region and remained closely involved on the ground throughout the developments at Poonam Estate Cluster-1.

According to Basha, much of the public narrative around the incident has obscured a crucial fact: the temporary housing of goats ahead of qurbani had been a long-standing practice within the society and had continued for nearly a decade without generating communal tensions among residents.

He stressed that the issue escalated only after “outside fringe mobilisation” entered the society premises and transformed what had previously been an internally managed matter into a communal spectacle.

#WATCH | Mira Bhayandar, Maharashtra: Residents engage in protest at Poonam Estate Cluster-1 on Mira Road ahead of Eid al-Adha. Commotion erupted after goats were brought inside the society, with residents citing High Court orders banning sacrifices in residential areas without… pic.twitter.com/fuE4xPcvda

— ANI (@ANI) May 26, 2026

A long-standing practice within the society

Poonam Estate Cluster-1, located in Mira Road East, is a mixed residential society with a Hindu-majority population and several Muslim families residing there for years.

According to Basha, residents belonging to different communities had coexisted peacefully despite political attempts over the years to polarise the wider Mira-Bhayandar region. He stated that temporary covered shelters for goats brought ahead of Eid-ul-Adha had routinely been arranged within the society premises for years without objection from residents.

Basha shared with SabrangIndia that AGM records and internal society discussions reflected that the practice had existed for nearly ten years and had continued through consensus and coexistence. SabrangIndia is in possession of the society’s AGM resolution that in deed allows such temporary shelter spaces within its premises.

“This was never treated as a communal issue earlier. People knew each other. Families had been living together peacefully for years. Even though the society is Hindu-majority, there was no atmosphere of intolerance,” Basha said.

He added that contrary to claims circulated publicly by Hindutva groups, the arrangement primarily involved temporarily keeping goats in covered enclosures until qurbani and did not involve open slaughter within the residential premises.

This account also aligns with statements quoted in several media reports. Congress Corporator Zuber Inamdar reportedly told The Indian Express that while goats had indeed been brought into the society in previous years, slaughter had never taken place openly within the premises.

How the issue escalated

According to reports published by Mid-Day, objections initially emerged over the construction of a temporary shed for goats inside the society compound. The situation escalated sharply after right-wing elements associated with organisations such as Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) entered the locality following complaints raised by a section of residents.

Multiple reports noted that Bajrang Dal extremists gathered outside the society complex late Monday night, after which arguments between groups intensified. According to police accounts carried in media reports, confrontations later escalated into physical scuffles.

Basha told SabrangIndia that this marked a turning point in the situation, “A local disagreement was converted into a communal confrontation once outsiders entered the area. Many of the people mobilising outside the gate were not even residents of the society,” he said.

Residents familiar with developments similarly indicated that the dispute intensified only after outside political and Hindutva groups began assembling near the complex and framing the issue in openly communal terms.

Police intervention prevented further escalation

Despite the growing tensions, local residents and activists repeatedly emphasised to SabrangIndia that police intervention played a decisive role in preventing violence from escalating further. According to Basha, Mira-Bhayandar police responded actively and quickly once outside groups began mobilising. Moreover, while a couple of newly arrived residents had raised ‘objections’ to the previously existing practice, a vast majority of those who live there were not in agreement with what was being said (removal of the shelter spaces).

Finally, when fringe elements allegedly attempted to bring a pig into the society premises, police immediately intervened and removed the animal from the area. Officers also dispersed crowds, increased barricading around the housing complex and prevented direct confrontation between groups gathered outside the gates.

“The police acted quickly when the pig was brought. They stopped the provocation immediately and ensured the situation did not spiral,” Basha said.

Reports carried by The Indian Express noted that heavy police deployment followed the clashes, with more than 200 personnel stationed in and around the complex. Media reports further documented that police used crowd-control measures, including mild lathi-charge and barricading, to disperse aggressive gatherings and maintain order.

The administration also facilitated negotiations between residents and eventually arranged for the goats to be shifted to an alternative municipal ground nearby. Deputy Commissioner of Police Rahul Chavan told The Indian Express that meetings were conducted with both sides and that the municipal corporation identified an alternative location where the goats were later relocated.

By Tuesday evening, reports indicated that all goats had been removed from the society premises in municipal vehicles.

#WATCH | Maharashtra: Clashes erupt in Mumbai’s Mira Road as residents of Poonam Cluster Society protest against having goats inside the premises for sacrifice during the festival of Eid Al-Adha.

Heavy police deployment to maintain peace. pic.twitter.com/aV25rJAvPe

— ANI (@ANI) May 26, 2026

#WATCH | Maharashtra: Goats are being taken out of the Poonam Cluster Society in Mumbai’s Mira Road after clashes erupted over having goats inside the premises for sacrifice during the festival of Eid Al-Adha. https://t.co/XSvPq4RxAY pic.twitter.com/b6M2krUdAZ

— ANI (@ANI) May 26, 2026

Tegang Menjelang Aidiladha, Protes Bawa Babi Cetus Kekecohan Di Mumbai

OLEH MYNEWSHUB

MUMBAI – Ketegangan dilaporkan tercetus di kawasan Mira Road, Mumbai, India menjelang sambutan Aidiladha selepas sekumpulan aktivis Hindu didakwa cuba membawa babi memasuki sebuah kawasan… pic.twitter.com/qN1E81BhXA

— MYNEWSHUB (@mynewshub) May 26, 2026

Local residents resist polarisation

A central aspect repeatedly stressed by Basha was that many local residents themselves resisted efforts to communalise the atmosphere. According to him, despite the tensions and outside mobilisation, residents across communities largely wanted peace restored rather than confrontation prolonged.

“People living in the society know each other. They did not want violence or communal hatred. The atmosphere was disturbed by people coming from outside and turning it into a political issue,” he said.

Basha also noted that many residents remained disturbed by how rapidly the issue was amplified through provocative slogans, media attention and outsider intervention.

Even after the immediate clashes were brought under control, he said groups unaffiliated with the society continued gathering outside the gates and reciting the Hanuman Chalisa in an apparent attempt to sustain communal tension.

“Even today, people from outside the society came near the gates and continued slogan shouting and recitations. Residents remain anxious because they fear the issue is still being politically exploited,” he said.

In Mumbai’s Mira Road area, tensions surfaced after goats brought for Eid al-Adha were reportedly kept inside a residential society. Following objections from some residents, members of a Hindutva organization gathered outside the society and recited the Hanuman Chalisa as a form… pic.twitter.com/e1AkRIsPZV

— FOEJ Media (@FoejMedia) May 27, 2026

FIRs, detentions and unanswered questions

According to police statements, one FIR was registered in connection with an alleged blade attack on Bajrang Dal member Harsh Singh during the late-night confrontation. Police reportedly detained one person in connection with that incident, while several others were detained following scuffles outside the society.

#WATCH | Maharashtra: Harsh Singh, Vishwa Hindu Parishad Coordinator, who claims to be injured in the clashes, says, “Yesterday, around 8:00 PM, in the Poonam Cluster Society, a group of individuals had brought over 40 to 50 goats onto the premises; this caused significant… https://t.co/XSvPq4RxAY pic.twitter.com/t6kK1ESVuT

— ANI (@ANI) May 26, 2026

However, Basha pointed out that no broader FIRs had yet been filed regarding the communal mobilisation itself — including the attempted pig provocation, public intimidation outside the society and the role played by organised fringe groups in escalating tensions.

He stated that residents and activists planned to pursue demands for legal action after Eid-ul-Adha.

“As of now, the immediate focus has been on maintaining peace and ensuring no further escalation during Eid. But there are serious concerns regarding the communal provocation that took place,” he said. “Thereafter, we will definitely also want to pursue registration of more FIRs,” he added.

Attempts to give the issue an Islamophobic and communal turn

According to Hindustan Times, tensions escalated significantly after fringe groups attempted to communalise the issue through provocative acts and rhetoric. One of the most inflammatory moments came when Hindutva extremist allegedly attempted to bring a pig near or inside the society premises in response to Muslim families keeping goats for Eid-ul-Adha.

Several reports documented that the far-right elements justified this as a so-called “Varaha Puja.” However, reports also pointed out that Varaha Jayanti falls much later in the year and that the act appeared designed primarily as a retaliatory communal provocation.

Basha described the move as a deliberate attempt to intimidate Muslim residents and transform the atmosphere inside the society.

“When fringe elements brought a pig near the society and tried to communalise the issue openly, the atmosphere became tense very quickly,” he told SabrangIndia.

The communal rhetoric surrounding the issue was further intensified through inflammatory public statements made by certain political leaders and Hindutva functionaries.

Statements reported in The Indian Express included allegations that Muslims were attempting to “occupy Hindu localities,” assertions that goats created fear among vegetarian and Jain residents, and threats that “goats would be answered with pigs.”

BJP leader Kirit Somaiya publicly framed the issue as one involving “fear” among Hindu and Jain families and demanded restrictions on qurbani in housing societies. BJP MLA Sanjay Upadhyay reportedly stated, “If the minority community does not follow the Constitution and follows Sharia, then we will answer goats with pigs.”

Mumbai, Maharashtra: BJP MLA Sanjay Upadhyay says, “Not only in Mira Road, but also in Borivali, in Sumer Nagar society, a single family lives there, yet they have brought six goats into the society premises. The entire society is opposing this. The Maharashtra government has… pic.twitter.com/fh2QPS0waU

— IANS (@ians_india) May 26, 2026

For many local residents, these statements deepened fears that an ordinary residential issue was being transformed into a wider communal mobilisation.

A wider political campaign around Qurbani

The Mira Road controversy has unfolded amid a broader political campaign by sections of BJP leaders and Hindutva organisations seeking restrictions on qurbani practices within residential areas across Mumbai and surrounding urban regions.

In recent days, BJP leaders including Kirit Somaiya and Mumbai Mayor Ritu Tawde reportedly urged civic authorities to prohibit animal sacrifice in housing societies, chawls and residential complexes.

Simultaneously, Maharashtra authorities have also announced stringent action against alleged illegal slaughterhouses ahead of Eid-ul-Adha, including possible invocation of MCOCA provisions in certain cases.

Within this larger climate, residents and local activists fear that routine religious practices are increasingly being reframed as communal flashpoints through organised political mobilisation.

For many in Mira Road, the incident has therefore come to symbolise not merely a dispute over goats or temporary sheds, but the vulnerability of mixed neighbourhoods to rapid communal polarisation once external political groups intervenes.

Opposition parties condemn communal mobilisation, call for peace

Opposition leaders and minority representatives also reacted sharply to the developments at Mira Road, condemning attempts to inflame communal tensions ahead of Eid-ul-Adha and urging the administration to ensure peace and lawful accommodation of religious practices.

Waris Pathan criticised the escalation and described the incident as an attempt to damage communal harmony between Hindus and Muslims.

Speaking on the controversy, Pathan said the developments at Mira Road were “shameful” and alleged that deliberate efforts had been made to create communal division in the area.

“The incident that happened is shameful. An incident to tear apart the Hindu-Muslim brotherhood has taken place,” he said, while demanding “strict legal action against those who tried to spread communal hatred.”

His remarks came amid growing concerns among residents and civil society groups that the issue had been amplified far beyond an internal housing society disagreement through organised political mobilisation and provocative rhetoric by fringe groups.

VIDEO | Mumbai: On Mira Road Bakri Eid Row, AIMIM leader Waris Pathan says, “The incident that happened is shameful. An incident to tear apart the Hindu-Muslim brotherhood has taken place… I have demanded that strict legal action to be taken against those who tried to spread… pic.twitter.com/2XzR5EFKci

— Press Trust of India (@PTI_News) May 26, 2026

Meanwhile, Abu Azmi appealed for restraint and urged the government to ensure that Eid-ul-Adha could be observed peacefully and in accordance with legal regulations.

Referring to qurbani as an essential religious obligation for Muslims who have the means to perform it, Azmi said authorities should proactively create designated arrangements to prevent conflict and anxiety during the festival period.

“The government should pay attention and allow this festival to be celebrated properly. There should be no tension among people,” he said.

Azmi further stated that while religious practices should remain within the framework of law and public regulations, the administration should provide separate designated spaces to facilitate sacrifice arrangements in densely populated residential localities.

#WATCH | Mumbai: On the issue of the shed built for sacrifice in Mira Road before Eid ul-Adha, Maharashtra Samajwadi Party President Abu Azmi says, “The government should pay attention and allow this festival (Eid ul-Adha) to be celebrated properly. There should be no tension… pic.twitter.com/xjocsrAJdD

— ANI (@ANI) May 26, 2026

The reactions from opposition leaders came even as local residents at Mira Road continued to emphasise that coexistence inside the society had remained peaceful for years before outside mobilisation escalated the situation into a communal confrontation.

Situation currently calm, but residents remain concerned

At present, the immediate situation in Mira Road remains under control. Police deployment continues in sensitive pockets around the housing complex, while local residents across communities have sought restoration of normalcy.

Basha told SabrangIndia that despite the fear and tension generated over the past two days, ordinary residents still wished to preserve the coexistence that had characterised the locality for years.

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The post Attempts to communalise Mira Road Eid preparations defused by residents and police appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The 242-page judgment delivered by the Division Bench of Justice Vijay Kumar Shukla and Justice Alok Awasthi goes far beyond a conventional determination of competing religious claims. The Court purportedly undertook an exhaustive examination of archaeological surveys, inscriptions, architectural remains, historical literature, colonial gazetteers, legislative history, constitutional principles, Hindu endowment law, Islamic waqf doctrine, and the jurisprudential framework evolved by the Supreme Court in the Ayodhya judgment.

At the heart of the ruling lies the Court’s conclusion that the present structure standing at Bhojshala was constructed after the destruction and alteration of an earlier temple complex and that the continuity of Hindu worship at the site “has never been extinguished”.

The Bench ultimately quashed the 2003 arrangement framed by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) to the extent that it permitted Friday namaz while restricting Hindu worship inside the complex. At the same time, the Court attempted –not very convincingly–to balance competing religious claims by observing that the Muslim community may apply to the State for allotment of an alternative site in Dhar district for construction of a mosque.

The ruling is likely to have profound legal and political implications, not merely because of its conclusions regarding Bhojshala, but because of the constitutional and evidentiary methodology adopted by the Court — one that unmistakably draws from and expands the contentious principles articulated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Ayodhya Verdict.

Dismantling the 1991 Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act

What is crucial for the citizen and legal mind to understand and assimilate is what the Courts are themselves doing to an existing law, the 1991 Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act. Passed in the wake of the Babri Masjid demolition on December 6, 1992, this law that received resounding support of the legislature after it was tabled by the Narasimha Rao government (that incidentally also was in power when the illegal act of the demolition took place) is currently under constitutional challenge in the Supreme Court of India.

Ironically, the last time that the “challenge to this law” was heard by the apex court was in December 2024 when the matter was supposed to be heard after four weeks. While this has not happened, verdicts such as the Bhojshala verdict, again, seek to undermine this law. The Supreme Court’s December 12, 2024 order –albeit directed at trial courts—asked them to refrain from registering new suits and passing any effective orders (including survey orders), in cases challenging the religious character of places of worship pending the challenge to the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act of 1991.

This order was passed by a bench, led by Chief Justice of India Sanjiv Khanna and comprising Justices PV Sanjay Kumar and KV Viswanathan and the Judges had then emphasised emphasised that such proceedings violate the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act of 1991. This law prohibits altering the religious character of places of worship as they stood on August 15, 1947.

The Court’s intervention in December 2024, after years of pendency and delay (notice was issued on these petitions in 2021) came amidst a rising tide of petitions and suits challenging the status of religious sites, many of which are medieval mosques and shrines. At the time, a November 2024 survey order by a trial court regarding the 16th-century Sambhal Jama Masjid in Uttar Pradesh escalated communal tensions, culminating in violent clashes that claimed four lives in November. While the court had then stated that it would begin hearing the challenges to this law, the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, this has not yet happened. Read on those developments here.

Context and broader implications of the PWA 1991

The 1991 Act was introduced to prevent the conversion of the religious character of places of worship, with an exception only for the Babri Masjid site, which was the subject of the Ayodhya dispute. The Act, which has been subject to increasing challenges, seeks to ensure that no new legal disputes are initiated over the status of religious places, especially those with historical significance, as of August 15, 1947.

Read this crucial reference on ‘When and How Ram Vilas Paswan made a strong pitch for the Places of Worship Act, 1991 here: A powerful leader from Bihar, unkindly known as the shrewd weatherman of Indian politics, Ram Vilas Paswan, then a member of the National Front, spoke powerfully from the Opposition benches, in support of the proposed law and scathingly of the BJP’s destructive politics of demolishing places of worship (Babri masjid, December 6, 1991) while not sparing the Congress either.

Read about the Babri Masjid demolition and also extensive analyses of the flaws in the Babri Masjid judgement here, here and here.

Even as we understand and analyse the flaws behind the ‘Bhojshala’ verdict –and there are several—it is crucial to also understand what the courts are themselves doing to this law. Across several states and sites, courts are reaching the same destination through different presumptions and conclusions. As a result, now the ‘Bhojshala Order’ just like several others that are being conclusively passed while the constitutional challenge to a vital law hangs in judicial limbo, effectively is doing to the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, what neither parliament nor the Supreme Court has been willing to do. The Act is not being amended. It is not being struck down. It is being made rendered ineffective and inapplicable to those it was written to protect, one site at a time, through a different doctrinal route each time.

Incidently, the Bhojshala verdict delivered on Friday (May 15) by the Indore Bench of the Madhya Pradesh high court is the latest expression of this pattern. It is also the most ambitious. The Bench comprised Justices Vijay Kumar Shukla and Alok Awasthi. It has held the 1991 Act inapplicable to Bhojshala. The ground is that the site is a centrally protected monument under a different statute. The route that this bench has introduced was not, until now, judicially available. This verdict now sets another precedent for those litigating sime verdict adds a sixth procedural pathway to a map that already had five.

As the Hindustan Times has reported, litigation similar to Bhojshala is now alive in courts from Uttar Pradesh through Karnataka. The geographic spread is itself the analytical fact. What follows is the spread, read against the Act it is dismantling.

Section 4 of the 1991 Places of Worship Act law says that the religious character of a holy site “shall continue to be the same as it existed” as it was on August 15, 1947, the day of independence. The only exception, under Section 5, said: “…nothing contained in this act shall apply to the place or place of worship commonly known as Ram Janma Bhoomi-Babri Masjid situated in Ayodhya.”

However be it Gyan Vapi Mosque (Varanasi) or the or the suits related to the 13.37-acre land of Katra Keshav Dev Temple, seeking the removal of the 17th-century Shahi Idgah mosque, there are cases pending across courts that violate this law passed by Parliament. At least 18 suits for possession of land after removal of Shahi Idgah Masjid as well as for restoration of the temple and for permanent injunction are pending before the high court. The case was first heard on October 18, 2023 and the next hearing date is not available.

Apart from the Sambhal Shahi Masjid site in western UP, the site of the Idgah maidan dispute in Hubali, the Baba Boudhangiri syncretic shrine in Chikmagalur, Karnataka and the Malali Mosque in Malali village Mangaluru are already under similar litigation by far right Hindu organisations.

A dispute rooted in competing historical claims

The Bhojshala dispute –on which the MP HC pronounced its verdict on May 15–concerns an ASI-protected medieval structure in Dhar, Madhya Pradesh, long claimed by multiple religious communities. While Hindu groups have since the early 1990s claiming that the structure has historically been regarded as Bhojshala — a temple of Goddess Saraswati and a renowned centre of Sanskrit learning established by Raja Bhoj, the celebrated Paramara ruler associated with scholarship, literature and temple patronage, the site has Mosque located there too..

The Muslim community, however, has been worshipping here at the Kamal Maula Mosque, claiming that the site functioned as a mosque for centuries and relying upon historical references from the Khilji period as well as a 1935 Ailan issued by the erstwhile Dhar State recognising it as a mosque.

A separate set of claims was raised by Jain petitioners, who argued that certain recovered idols and iconographic features suggested that the site was originally a Jain temple associated with Goddess Ambika or Jain Vidyadevi traditions.

The dispute had for years been governed by a 2003 administrative arrangement framed by the ASI under which Hindus performed puja on Tuesdays while Muslims offered namaz on Fridays.

The litigation intensified after petitions were filed seeking recognition of the site as a Hindu temple and restraining namaz within the complex. During the proceedings, the High Court ordered a scientific survey of the site by the ASI — an order that briefly reached the Supreme Court before the survey process was ultimately permitted to continue under judicial supervision. The resulting ASI report became the backbone of the High Court’s eventual conclusions.

The Court’s Central Finding: Bhojshala was a Saraswati Temple and centre of Sanskrit learning

The High Court concluded that the cumulative historical and archaeological material overwhelmingly established Bhojshala as a temple dedicated to Goddess Saraswati and a Sanskrit educational institution associated with Raja Bhoj.

The Bench recorded:

“We have noted the continuity of hindu worship at the site through regulated over time has never been extinguished. We record finding that historical literature placed established that the character of the disputed area was Bhojshala as a Centre of Sanskrit learning associated with Raja Bhoj of Parmar dynasty and the literature and architectural reference including those connected with the period of Raja Bhoj indicate the existence of temple dedicated to the goddess Saraswati at Dhar.” (Para 210)

Crucially, the Court clarified that it was not adjudicating a civil title dispute in the conventional sense. Unlike the Ayodhya litigation, which arose from suits concerning ownership and title over land, the Bhojshala matter, according to the Bench, primarily concerned determination of the “religious character” of the disputed structure through archaeological, historical and documentary evidence.

This distinction allowed the Court to focus extensively on patterns of worship, inscriptions, architectural continuity, historical references and archaeological findings rather than conventional proprietary claims.

The ASI Survey: The foundation of the judgment

The most decisive aspect of the ruling was the Court’s reliance on the scientific survey conducted by the Archaeological Survey of India.

The Muslim parties had strongly challenged the fairness and methodology of the survey, raising objections regarding excavation practices, debris contamination, recovery of artefacts and interpretation of findings. The Court, however, categorically rejected allegations of bias or procedural impropriety.

The Bench noted that the survey had been carried out by a core technical team of senior archaeologists under the supervision of an Additional Director General of the ASI. It also recorded that officers belonging to the Muslim community participated in the process and that representatives of all contesting parties were present during videography and photography throughout the survey proceedings.

The Court held:

“We find that the survey was conducted by adopting scientific method in a fair and impartial manner. The presence of representatives of the petitioners and the respondent can be very well seen in the videography. The method which has been adopted by the experts was as per their expertise. The carbon dating method is used to determine the age of material itself and not for the age of construction period.” (Para 195)

Rejecting allegations regarding plastic waste and modern debris allegedly found at the site, the Court accepted the ASI’s explanation that such material was located only in upper heterogeneous debris layers containing modern dumped material, wrappers and conservation waste, and did not compromise the archaeological integrity of deeper strata.

The Bench further accepted the ASI’s clarification that carbon dating was not necessary because the purpose of the survey was not to determine the age of isolated organic material but to identify the architectural period and historical evolution of the structure itself.

Some facts about the History & structure

For 700 years, the Kamal Maula Mosque had been a place of worship for Dhar’s Muslims. Following the demolition of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992, and the political ascendance of Hindutva majoritarianism, the efforts to twist and misrepresent archaeology and history both at Faizabad-Ayodya and elsewhere had begun. In fact, in May 2003, a year after the Gujarat pogrom, Communalism Combat, had published a detailed list –sourced from the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)—of dozens of such “site on Hindutva’s hit list.” These may be read here.

Coming back to the Kamal Maula Mosque. History tells us that, in 1903, a British-era education officer named K.K. Lele while viewing a structure that locals called “Raja Bhoja ka Madrassa” decided to call it Bhojshala. Every British officer before him had called it a mosque. John Malcolm visited Dhar in 1822 and removed an inscribed panel from the structure. Of the building, he said only that it was a “ruined mosque.” William Kincaid, writing in 1888 about his years in Malwa, documented local legends about Raja Bhoja extensively and never once mentioned a Bhojshala. Then, in 2003, after the matter was contested in the courts, that is one hundred and twenty-three years later, the ASI submitted a 2,000-page report to the Madhya Pradesh High Court where this nuance around nomenclature was erased and only “Bhojshala Temple” appeared throughout. For locals, the structure that had stood in Dhar since 1304 CE is the Kamal Maula Mosque. Yet this history stands erased by this verdict of the MP High Court.

“Evidence of a pre-existing Temple structure”

The High Court repeatedly returned to one central conclusion drawn from the voluminous but flawed ASI report: that the existing structure was built upon and through the remains of an earlier temple complex dating to the Paramara period.

The Court observed that the remains of the earlier structure still survive beneath the present complex and that numerous inscriptions, sculptures and architectural fragments embedded within the existing structure clearly belonged to an earlier Hindu religious monument.

The judgment notes that hundreds of large and small inscription fragments were found in and around the structure, demonstrating that the site once possessed a substantially different architectural and religious identity.

The Court noted from the brief findings of the survey:

“Fragments of inscriptions, sculptures and architectural members suggest that superstructure of this stone structure was later modified and converted into mosque.” (Para 173)

The ASI findings also became central to the Court’s conclusion that the pillars and pilasters used in the present structure originally belonged to temples. There was no attempt by the Court to test the independence or autonomy of the ASI itself or seek expert autonomous opinion on the structure.

The Bench referred extensively to sculptural remains depicting:

• Ganesh,
• Brahma with consorts,
• Narasimha,
• Bhairava,
• divine and semi-divine figures,
• animal and human carvings,
• and temple motifs such as kirtimukhas.

According to the Court, many of these figures had been intentionally defaced, mutilated or chiselled out before reuse in the later structure.

The Court specifically noted that anthropomorphic depictions are generally inconsistent with mosque architecture and treated the mutilation itself as evidence that temple material had been repurposed during construction of the mosque structure.

The Bench also relied on the ASI’s observation that the present structure lacked architectural symmetry and appeared to have been assembled hurriedly from reused material of varying periods and styles.

The Paramara Dynasty, Raja Bhoj and the dating of the site

A substantial part of the judgment is devoted to dating the earlier structure to the 10th–11th centuries CE during the rule of the Paramara dynasty.

The Court relied upon:

• Paramara-era pottery,
• Indo-Sassanian coins,
• Sanskrit and Prakrit inscriptions,
• temple architectural remains,
• iron objects,
• mutilated Vishnu sculptures,
• and historical references associated with Raja Bhoj.

The Bench referred to the ASI’s finding that the earliest coins recovered from the site belonged to the Indo-Sassanian period, corresponding to the time when the Paramara kings ruled Malwa from Dhar.

One of the most important inscriptions discussed in the judgment contained two Prakrit poems consisting of 109 stanzas each associated with Raja Bhoj.

The Court noted that the inscriptions reportedly opened with invocations such as:

“Om Sarasvityanamah”

“Om Namah Shivay”

The Bench regarded this as significant evidence that the site possessed a deeply rooted Sanskritic and Hindu religious identity prior to later Islamic inscriptions. Importantly, the Court also observed that the Sanskrit and Prakrit inscriptions predated all Arabic and Persian inscriptions found at the site.

Bhojshala as a great centre of Sanskrit learning

The High Court accepted the argument that Bhojshala was not merely a temple, but a renowned educational institution associated with Sanskrit learning under Raja Bhoj.

The Court relied on several historical texts and administrative publications, including:

• the Imperial Gazetteer of India (1908),
• publications of the Royal Asiatic Society,
• G. Yazdani’s Mandu: The City of Joy,
• archaeological reviews from 1972–73,
• and educational records from the Dhar State.

The Bench repeatedly referred to the famous “serpentine grammatical inscriptions” found at the site — Sanskrit grammatical formulae carved in serpent-shaped arrangements on floor slabs and architectural members.

These inscriptions became central to identifying the structure as “Bhojshala” or “Hall of Bhoja”. Historical literature cited before the Court described the structure as: “Raja Bhoja ka Madrassa” or Raja Bhoja’s School.

The Court treated these records as corroborative evidence establishing the site’s longstanding association with scholarship, Sanskrit education and Goddess Saraswati.

The Court’s Conclusion: The existing structure was built from Temple remains

The judgment repeatedly emphasises that the current structure reflects unmistakable evidence of reuse of temple material after demolition or dismantling of an earlier Hindu religious structure.

The ASI report, extensively reproduced in the judgment, stated that the structure appeared to have been assembled rapidly using material from an earlier building without regard for symmetry or consistency.

The Court pointed to:

• reused basalt pillars,
• temple-style columns,
• mutilated deity carvings,
• reused sculptural blocks,
• and fragmented inscriptional material embedded within the mosque structure.

According to the Court, the cumulative architectural evidence clearly established that temple components had been dismantled and incorporated into the later Islamic structure.

Why the Court rejected the Mosque claim

One of the most consequential portions of the judgment concerns the Court’s rejection of the claim that the disputed structure was originally and validly a mosque. The Muslim parties had relied on historical references from the Khilji period and the 1935 Ailan recognising the structure as a mosque.

The Court, however, concluded that none of the historical material produced by the Muslim side established that the structure existed as a mosque prior to the already established 1034 AD Hindu religious structure. More significantly, the Bench held that there was no evidence establishing the site as valid waqf property.

The Court undertook a detailed discussion of Islamic waqf doctrine, referring to Sir Dinshaw Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan Law. It observed that a valid waqf requires:

• ownership by the waqif,
• dedication of the property to Almighty God,
• and extinction of the waqif’s ownership.

The Bench held that no evidence showed that the disputed land had ever been dedicated as waqf property.

It observed:

“No material suggests that the part of the land No.604 (Old No.313) is a Waqf property and the same was dedicated or could be dedicated to Waqf. It is imperative under Muhammadan Law that property must belong to waqif and the owner must belong to waqif and the owner must dedicate the property to the Almighty. Historical material placed before us could not show that waqf has been created and therefore, there can be no presumption regarding existence of a mosque in the disputed area which is prima facie established to be constructed as Bhojshala and temple of goddess Vagdevi (Saraswati) a place of learning Sanskrit language in 1034 AD.” (Para 192)

The Court further reasoned that land already vested in a Hindu deity could not validly become waqf property.

The 1935 Ailan declared constitutionally unsustainable

The Court also rejected reliance on the 1935 Ailan issued by the ruler of Dhar State recognising the site as a mosque. The Bench held that the order could not automatically survive after the Constitution came into force.

Invoking Articles 13 and 372 of the Constitution, the Court observed that pre-Constitution executive orders remain operative only if they conform to constitutional principles. According to the Court, the Ailan was inconsistent with the overwhelming archaeological and historical evidence establishing the site’s Hindu religious and educational character.

The Court further held that because the site had already been notified as a protected monument under the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act, 1904, the Dhar ruler lacked authority to alter its essential legal status in 1935.

The Jain claims and the British museum idol

The judgment devotes considerable attention to claims raised by Jain petitioners who argued that certain idols and iconographic features established the site as a Jain temple. Particular emphasis was placed on an idol presently located in the British Museum and identified by some petitioners as Ambika, a Jain goddess. The Court, however, rejected the argument that the disputed structure was a Jain temple.

The Bench held that no historical literature, ASI findings or architectural material supported the conclusion that the site functioned as an exclusively Jain religious structure.

It observed:

“Whether the idol is of Saraswati or of Ambika would not render much assistance to his submission that the disputed area was a Jain temple as we held that no material has been placed before us either by way of historical literature, architectural features or in ASI survey suggesting that the disputed area was a Jain temple.” (Para 209)

The Court noted that Saraswati is worshipped in both Hindu and Jain traditions as a deity associated with learning and wisdom.

The Bench also referred to iconographic features such as books held by the deity, accompanying figures and seated ascetic forms.

In one of the most controversial observations in the judgment, the Court stated that Jainism and Hinduism evolved alongside each other and referred to statutory provisions under the Hindu Marriage Act and Hindu Succession Act to note that Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs are treated within broader Hindu legal frameworks for certain civil purposes.

The Court therefore concluded that the presence of Jain-associated iconography did not alter the essential Hindu character of the site.

The Saraswati Idol and the possibility of repatriation

The High Court also considered requests seeking the return of the Saraswati idol presently believed to be housed in the British Museum.

The Bench noted that representations had already been submitted to the Union Government seeking repatriation of the idol and observed that the Government of India may consider taking steps to bring the idol back and reinstall it within the Bhojshala complex.

The Court referred to inscriptions associated with the idol mentioning Vararuci, an official in the Paramara kingdom, who had commissioned images of Vagdevi and Ambika.

How the High Court imported the Ayodhya framework into Bhojshala

Perhaps the most legally significant feature of the judgment is its explicit adoption of principles articulated by the Supreme Court in the Ayodhya verdict. The High Court treated the Ayodhya decision not merely as persuasive precedent, but as a foundational jurisprudential framework for resolving historical-religious disputes.

The Court identified several governing principles:

• disputes over ancient religious sites must be decided on the civil standard of “preponderance of probabilities” rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt;
• courts must focus on continuity of worship, patterns of religious use and historical belief;
• destruction or removal of idols does not extinguish the underlying religious endowment;
• ASI reports deserve substantial evidentiary weight because they are prepared by technical experts;
• and archaeological remains, inscriptions and religious motifs possess strong probative value in determining the historical religious character of a site.

The Court also emphasised that faith cannot always be tested through rigid secular logic or documentary proof and that longstanding continuity of belief deserves legal recognition where corroborated by historical circumstances.

Final directions of the court

The High Court ultimately:

• declared the religious character of the disputed site to be Bhojshala, a temple dedicated to Goddess Saraswati;
• recognised the site as a Sanskrit learning centre associated with Raja Bhoj;
• quashed the 2003 ASI arrangement permitting namaz at the site;
• directed the Union Government and the ASI to formulate arrangements for administration and management of the temple and Sanskrit learning centre;
• clarified that the ASI would continue exercising overall statutory control over the protected monument;
• and observed that the Muslim community may apply for allotment of alternative land for construction of a mosque in Dhar district.

The Bench further stated:

“Every Government has the constitutional obligation to ensure preservation and protection of not only the ancient monuments and structures including temples of archaeological and historical importance, but also of sanctum sanctorum as well as the deity of spiritual importance. There is a constitutional duty even to sanction funds for providing basic amenities to pilgrims, proper arrangements for shelter places, maintenance of law and order and the preservation of purity and pristine character of the deity. We have noted the continuity of hindu worship at the site through regulated over time has never been extinguished. We record finding that historical literature placed established that the character of the disputed area was Bhojshala as a Centre of Sanskrit learning associated with Raja Bhoj of Parmar dynasty and the literature and architectural reference including those connected with the period of Raja Bhoj indicate the existence of temple dedicated to the goddess Saraswati at Dhar.” (Para 210)

Why the judgment will matter far beyond Bhojshala

The Bhojshala judgment is likely to become one of the most consequential religious-site rulings in India after the Supreme Court’s Ayodhya verdict, not merely, because of what it decided, but because of the legal framework, it normalises and expands. The judgment represents a significant moment in the evolution of Indian constitutional jurisprudence on contested religious spaces, where courts are increasingly being called upon to adjudicate centuries-old historical, theological and civilisational disputes through the language of archaeology, faith, continuity of worship and constitutional law.

At the heart of the ruling lies a judicial methodology that goes far beyond the facts of Bhojshala itself. The High Court explicitly imported and applied core principles from the Ayodhya judgment — particularly the reliance on “preponderance of probabilities”, continuity of worship, archaeological interpretation, and the survival of religious endowments despite destruction of structures or idols. In doing so, the Court has effectively reinforced and expanded a legal template through which competing historical claims over religious sites may increasingly be litigated and judicially resolved.

The judgment is particularly significant because it elevates archaeological evidence to a position of extraordinary constitutional and evidentiary importance. The Court repeatedly treated the ASI report as a highly persuasive and technically authoritative document capable of determining not merely architectural history, but the religious character and historical evolution of the site itself. Although the Court formally acknowledged that expert reports are not conclusive, the structure of the judgment demonstrates that the ASI findings became the backbone of almost every major conclusion ultimately reached by the Bench.

This growing judicial centrality of archaeology is likely to have implications far beyond Bhojshala. The ruling strengthens the idea that excavation reports, inscriptions, iconography, architectural fragments and material remain can decisively shape constitutional adjudication concerning religious identity and historical memory. In practice, it signals a judiciary increasingly willing to reconstruct medieval histories through archaeological interpretation and then attach contemporary legal consequences to those reconstructions.

Equally significant is the Court’s treatment of continuity of worship. The Bench repeatedly emphasised that Hindu worship at the site had “never been extinguished”, even if regulated or interrupted over time. This formulation mirrors a crucial aspect of the Ayodhya framework: that religious continuity may survive political conquest, structural alteration or physical destruction. The judgment therefore deepens the doctrinal move away from viewing religious disputes purely as questions of title and possession, and toward a broader inquiry into historical faith, devotional memory and civilisational continuity.

The ruling may consequently influence future litigation concerning other disputed religious sites where arguments are framed around claims of interrupted worship, historical destruction or continuity of sacred identity despite architectural transformation.

At the same time, the judgment raises serious constitutional, factual and secularism-related concerns. The Court repeatedly entered deeply partisan and contested theological and historical terrain, particularly while discussing the relationship between Hinduism and Jainism. Its observation that Jainism is “a branch of Hinduism”, supported through references to personal law statutes such as the Hindu Marriage Act and Hindu Succession Act, is likely to invite substantial criticism from constitutional scholars, historians and members of the Jain community. Critics are likely to argue that civil statutory classification for limited legislative purposes cannot automatically determine independent religious identity or theological distinctiveness.

The judgment also raises larger concerns regarding the role of courts in resolving historical controversies that are often shaped by fragmentary evidence, competing interpretations and politically charged narratives. By relying heavily on bodies like the ASI that are neither independent nor autonomous, the kind of “literature, inscriptions and archaeological reconstruction” that the ASI has indulged in without the expertise of subject experts –that too, to determine the “religious character” of a centuries-old structure—is seriously questionable. The Court has moved the judiciary further into the terrain of subjective adjudication — an area where legal institutions may struggle with methodological and (absence of expertise) limitations.

Another critical aspect of the ruling is its treatment of waqf doctrine and mosque status. The Court concluded that no valid waqf existed because there was insufficient evidence showing dedication of the property by a lawful waqif. It further suggested that a mosque constructed upon a pre-existing Hindu religious structure could not acquire legitimacy in the absence of valid waqf dedication. This reasoning and subsequent conclusion is inherently problematic. Besides, it could have repercussions on future litigation involving mosque structures standing over sites claimed to have earlier religious histories.

Importantly, the judgment also reflects the continuing constitutional afterlife of the Ayodhya verdict. Ayodhya was initially presented by many as a singular and exceptional resolution to an unusually complex dispute. However, judgments such as Bhojshala indicate that the legal principles evolved in Ayodhya are now becoming part of a broader and expanding jurisprudential framework governing religious-site litigation across India.

The Bhojshala ruling therefore marks more than a adjudication of a long-running dispute in Dhar. It signals the consolidation of a new judicial approach in which courts are increasingly prepared to engage with questions of untested sacred geography and ‘historical grievance’ through constitutional adjudication. This kind of approach is unlikely to be healthy for a modern constitutional approach that is required to lean not on majoritarian contestation of historical fact –like in Faizabad-Ayodhya but on a sober evaluation of all aspects of such engendered conflicts.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Related:

Ayodhya, January 22: Growing influence of religion in state & society matter of disquiet say 65 former civil servants

Babri-Ayodhya verdict: Will appeal for peace apply to Hindutva hardliners in future?

Reading SC order on Ayodhya: Condemn the Sin but Concede to Sinners

Political dimensions of Ayodhya verdict

Ayodhya Verdict: Has Faith Prevailed Over Justice?

The post Bhojshala Judgment: MP High Court declares Dhar site a Saraswati Temple, ends Namaz rights at complex appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The event started with a formal speech by Suhail Ahmed Maroor who also read out the Preamble of the Constitution aloud for the audience present to repeat it. Followed by Yaseen Malpe who asserted that the Karnataka’s Muslims (about 13% of the state’s population as per Census 2011) played a significant role in the 2023 mandate by ensuring voter participation from within the community, and thereby ousting the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) from power. Now, he said, the convention representing the Muslims community seeks clarity on the promises made, not just assurances.

The convention’s report, formally submitted to the Chief Minister, Deputy Chief Minister, Ministers and MLAs/MLCs, promised to reach Leader of the Opposition (LOP), Rahul Gandhi as well. The convention positions itself as an exercise in constitutional responsibility and democratic accountability, not confrontation.

The convention held aimed to:

• Review key promises made to Muslims and minorities by the Congress during and after the 2023 Assembly election (Manifesto promises)
• Acknowledge steps taken, but highlight gaps in delivery and pending implementation.
• Seek a time‑bound, credible roadmap on unresolved commitments.
• Assert/remind the Congress party about the promises made through 10 demands.

The 10 key promises / issue areas

1. Action against communal hate organisations

• Manifesto promise: Firm action against individuals and organisations spreading communal hatred.
• Concerns raised: Despite that promise, RSS and affiliates are said to hold large numbers of public programmes, processions and rallies, including in sensitive areas near mosques, with limited preventive action. At the same time, civil society and student groups reportedly face more difficulty getting permissions for peaceful gatherings, leading to a perception of selective administration.
• Demand: Consistent, visible enforcement against habitual hate offenders, fake‑news networks, moral policing, cattle vigilantism, economic boycotts and organised intimidation, beyond just FIRs. 

2. Hijab Government Order – assurance vs formal withdrawal

• Background: The Hijab Government Order of February 5, 2022 is described as one of the most painful symbols of exclusion for Muslim girls in Karnataka. In December 2023, the CM publicly said his government would withdraw the order and that women should be free to wear what they want.
• Impact cited: Rights’ groups report is quoted, documenting rights impacts (education, dignity, privacy, expression, non‑discrimination) and noting that 1,010 Muslim girls aged 16–18 dropped out of college, partly due to the hijab policy.
• Finally, in May 2026 the order was withdrawn allowing religious symbols including the hijab be worn in schools and colleges.
• Question: Though the Convention and the Muslim community welcomed this step with open arms, the question arose as to why it took the ruling party about 3 years to withdraw the order. 

3. Cattle slaughter law – promise of repeal vs “no proposal”

• Law: Karnataka Prevention of Slaughter and Preservation of Cattle Act, 2020.
• The report notes the Act’s impact on farmers, traders, butchers, transporters, leather and hide workers, small eateries and Muslim meat traders.
• Congress had politically opposed this law and promised to repeal “unjust and anti‑people” BJP‑era laws within one year.
• However, in July 2023, the Animal Husbandry Minister stated in a written reply there was no proposal to repeal the Act, which media flagged as inconsistent with the party’s earlier stance.
• Demand: A legislative correction that aligns practice with the manifesto promise- review and repeal/replace the 2020 Act. 

4. Restoration of 4% Muslim/Category 2B reservation

• Issue: The previous BJP Government scrapped the 4% OBC quota for Muslims (Category 2B) and redistributed it to Vokkaliga and Lingayat categories.
• In 2023, senior Congress leaders, including the DCM, publicly promised that a Congress government would restore the 4% in the very first Cabinet meeting.
• Media and roundtables repeated this as a categorical assurance.
• Concern: It was flagged that this key reservation promise remains unresolved, despite being one of the clearest pre‑poll commitments.
• Demand: Full restoration of the 4% Category 2B reservation, backed by an explicit Cabinet and legislative decision. 

5. Repeal of the anti‑conversion law

• Law: Karnataka Protection of Right to Freedom of Religion Act, 2022 (“anti‑conversion law”).
• On June 15, 2023, the Cabinet decided to repeal this law and stated a repeal Bill would be introduced in the July 2023 session. According to media reports cited, the government later did not table that Bill in the Budget Session, leaving the law in force.
• The report calls this “announcement without completion”: a Cabinet decision that never became legislation.
• Demand: Introduce and pass the repeal Bill so the law is actually taken off the statute book. 

6. ₹10,000 crore annual minority welfare commitment

• Manifesto promise: Raise annual allocations for minorities (Muslims, Christians, Jains, Buddhists, others) to ₹10,000 crore.
• Current status: PRS budget analysis cited in the report shows ₹4,762 crore allocated for minority welfare in 2026–27- less than half the promised figure and under 1% of the total budget.
• The report released notes positive steps, such as upgrading 117 Maulana Azad Model and Urdu schools to Karnataka Public Schools with ₹600 crore, plus 100 more schools with ₹400 crore.
• Concern: Welcome but not at the scale implied by the ₹10,000 crore promise; welfare expansion remains significantly below commitment.
• Demand: Move towards the full ₹10,000 crore annual allocation, with clear focus on education, livelihoods, infrastructure, scholarships and institutions. 

7. Waqf protection and administration

• Context: Waqf properties – mosques, madrasas, health centres, orphanages- are described as major religious and charitable assets of the community.
• The report refers to “systemic failure” in Waqf administration, citing encroachment, illegal sale/transfer, undervalued leases, misuse, weak legal action, and staff shortages.
• It acknowledges initiatives like UMEED digitisation and repair grants as positive but limited steps.
• Demand:

• Stronger measures against encroachment and illegal alienation.
• Better litigation capacity, tribunal strength, administrative staffing.
• Strategic development of under‑utilised Waqf assets, not only minor repairs. 

8. Reservation ceiling, caste survey and social justice architecture

• The report links Muslim issues to broader social justice architecture in Karnataka:

• The need to table and implement caste survey data.
• Addressing the 50% reservation ceiling through mechanisms like Ninth Schedule and OBC internal reservation.

• The argument: Without a clear framework on data, ceilings and internal categories, promises on Muslim reservation (2B) and OBC justice cannot be sustainably implemented.
• Demand:

• Make caste survey data public and act on it.
• Explore constitutional routes to adjust reservation ceilings and internal reservations in line with social realities. 

9. Education – progress but not a full pipeline

• There are some visible positive steps: Maulana Azad Model Schools, Urdu school upgrades, hostels, scholarships, women’s colleges, coaching and loans.
• Core point: Minority education still functions as disconnected schemes, not a “school‑to‑employment pipeline”.
• Gaps identified: Staffing, utilisation, course coverage, scholarship adequacy, hostel capacity, professional pathways and competitive exam success.
• Demand:

• Treat minority education as an integrated education and human capital strategy, from school to jobs, not fragmented welfare. 

10. Special Intensive Revision (SIR) and voting rights

• The report treats Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls as a crucial democratic issue: Ensuring Muslim voters are not wrongly deleted or left out before damage is done.
• Concern: Without close monitoring and corrective mechanisms, SIR could result in disenfranchisement in Muslim‑concentrated areas.
• Demand: Proactive steps to protect voting rights, including transparency, grievance redressal and timely corrections before elections.

The convention and the report frames its demands as a call for:

• Clear timelines (Monsoon Session 2026, Budget 2027, before May 2028).
• Legislative and budgetary follow‑through, not just statements.
• A “constructive partnership” between government and the Muslim community, grounded in measurable outcomes and institutional accountability.

The convention’s tone today was not confrontational. It was constitutional – a community reminding a government that votes create accountability, not just mandate.

The harder question now is not whether Congress will respond. It’s whether the Muslim community will, by 2028, still be waiting for the same ten answers – with a fresh set of promises attached. Because if the pattern holds, the next round of “acceptable” leaders is already being prepared to deliver those promises.

And the round after that is already being quietly planned. 

(The author is Editor in chief, NewsHamster (NH), a portal that majorly covers Bengaluru and Karnataka related stories.)

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Karnataka: Hindutva groups call for economic boycott of Muslim vendors at Siddheshwar Temple

In line with the approaching Karnataka polls, BJP MLA KS Eshwarappa gives anti-Muslim speech

Supreme Court takes action amid outrage following Karnataka Judge’s anti-Muslim and gender-insensitive comments in court

The post A Reminder Congress Didn’t Ask For: Karnataka Muslim convention demands accountability from the Congress appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As reported by Live Law, the new order immediately nullifies the earlier 2022 government directive and expressly allows students to wear symbols and articles associated with religious or customary practice, including the hijab or headscarf, turban (Pete), sacred thread or Janeu (Janivara), Shivadhara, Rudraksha and other similar faith-based items. The government clarified that such symbols would be permissible so long as they do not interfere with institutional discipline, safety, identification of students, classroom functioning or public order.

The state government has framed the move as an attempt to balance constitutional values of equality, secularism and inclusion with the need to maintain institutional discipline. According to reports published by The Times of India, the order emphasises that educational institutions are constitutional spaces meant to cultivate scientific temper, rational thinking, fraternity, dignity, equality and mutual respect among students. The preamble to the order states that “secularism, in constitutional sense, does not mean opposition to personal beliefs,” but instead requires equal respect for all faiths, institutional neutrality and non-discriminatory conduct by the State and educational authorities.

The government further observed that institutional discipline and uniformity can be preserved “without mandatorily prohibiting limited traditional and practice-based symbols that students commonly wear.” Referring to provisions under the Karnataka Education Act, 1983 and Rule 11 of the Karnataka Education Institutions (Classification, Regulation and Prescription of Curricula etc.) Rules, 1995, the order states that limited faith-based practices may be accommodated so long as they do not disrupt teaching, safety or order within educational institutions.

Importantly, the circular also provides explicit protections against exclusion and humiliation of students. It states that no student wearing permitted symbols can be denied admission, attendance, participation in classroom activities, examinations, competitions or academic progress solely on that basis. The order further directs that no student shall be compelled to remove such symbols and that no institution or authority may forcibly remove them. School Development and Monitoring Committees (SDMCs), College Development Committees (CDCs), governing bodies and institutional heads have additionally been instructed not to humiliate, demean or subject students to insulting behaviour because of their attire or faith-based practices.

The order does, however, carve out a narrow exception for examinations, clarifying that dress code regulations prescribed for national or state-level examinations may continue to apply wherever required by examination authorities. At the same time, the government stressed that implementation of the new policy must remain free from communal or religious discrimination and be uniformly applied across institutions.

The circular also invokes the inclusive social philosophy of 12th century reformer Basavanna, quoting the phrase “Iva Nammave” (“They are ours”) and directing educational institutions to adopt this principle while dealing with students from different communities and backgrounds.

The reversal comes against the backdrop of the highly contentious hijab controversy that erupted in Karnataka in early 2022 after several Muslim students were denied entry into classrooms for wearing hijabs. The previous BJP government had issued the February 5, 2022 order mandating strict adherence to prescribed uniforms in educational institutions, effectively banning the hijab inside classrooms. The move triggered state-wide protests, counter-mobilisations by saffron scarf-wearing groups, intense political polarisation and legal challenges before the Karnataka High Court and later the Supreme Court.

In March 2022, the Karnataka High Court upheld the government order, holding that wearing the hijab was not an “essential religious practice” protected under Article 25 of the Constitution. Subsequently, a split verdict by a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India in October 2022 resulted in the matter being referred to a larger bench, where the constitutional challenge to the hijab restrictions continues to remain pending.

The government’s latest move also appears to have been influenced by more recent controversies surrounding religious attire and symbols in educational spaces. According to The Times of India, the decision followed public outrage over an April 24 incident in which a student’s sacred thread was allegedly cut during an examination. Separately, the Karnataka High Court had recently issued notice to the state government in a public interest litigation challenging the action of Karnataka Examination Authority officials who allegedly prevented students wearing sacred threads from appearing in the Common Entrance Test (CET) 2025.

Defending the policy shift, Karnataka School Education Minister Madhu Bangarappa stated that the government order formally recognised long-standing religious and customary practices followed by different communities. He reportedly said that practices such as wearing the sacred thread, Shivadhara, turban, traditional attire, Jain customary clothing and hijab had now been properly specified and protected under the new order. He added that students from Class 1 to Class 12 should not face any obstacles for wearing such permitted symbols in educational institutions under the Education Department.

Karnataka Health Minister Dinesh Gundu Rao also defended the decision, stating that “limited customary practices are being allowed and nobody should be hurt because of this.”

The opposition BJP, however, sharply criticised the withdrawal of the hijab ban and accused the Congress government of engaging in appeasement politics. Leader of Opposition R. Ashoka alleged that the Congress government was reviving the hijab issue for electoral considerations and described the move as “anti-Hindu.” According to report carried by The Quint, BJP IT Cell head Amit Malviya also criticised the decision, claiming that it institutionalised religious identity inside classrooms and undermined the idea of schools as spaces of equality and shared citizenship.

Despite the political backlash, the Karnataka government has maintained that the order seeks to protect constitutional freedoms while preserving institutional discipline and social harmony. The revised guidelines now apply across government, aided and private schools and pre-university colleges in Karnataka, marking a significant departure from one of the most contentious educational and religious policy decisions in recent years.

Detailed reports may be read here and here.

Related:

“How does dictating attire empower women?” Supreme Court partially stays Mumbai College’s Hijab Ban

Karnataka: Muslim girl asked to not wear hijab to school, after students protested wearing saffron shawls

Extremists assaulted Muslim woman; hijab stripped of in broad daylight in Bengaluru and Muzaffarnagar

Ex-Muslims observe ‘No Hijab Day’

The post Karnataka revises school uniform policy, permits religious symbols alongside uniforms appeared first on SabrangIndia.